THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1942-7
It is most cordial of you to allow some of the last pages which have been written in a most complimentary spirit. It is not to be long before a visit to you shall be made in a most cordial spirit. It is not too late for a visit, for there is not a single word that can be said in your favor. From you, you can.
CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA

THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1942-7

Volume I The Cripps Mission
January–April 1942

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Sir S. Cripps and Mr Jinnah. (Imperial War Museum)

Mr Amery and Sir S. Cripps. (Syndication International)

MAP
At end of volume
India 1942
Foreword

On 9 March 1966 the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Commons that the closed period for official records was to be reduced from fifty to thirty years. He stated that the Government also proposed that the range of Official Histories, which had hitherto been confined to the two great wars, should be extended to include selected periods or episodes of peacetime history and considered that there was scope for extending to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents relating to external relations. The Prime Minister hoped that both of these subsidiary proposals, supplementing the reduction in the closed period to thirty years, would be acceptable in principle to the Opposition parties, who would be associated with their implementation.¹

On 10 August 1966 the Prime Minister announced that a standing inter-party group of Privy Counsellors was to be appointed to consider all such proposals² and on 8 June 1967 that its members were, for the Government and to act as Chairman, the Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister without Portfolio; for the Official Opposition, the Right Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home; and for the Liberal Party, Lord Ogmore.³

A project to publish documents from the India Office Records had been under discussion for some years and on 30 June 1967 the Prime Minister, in replying to a written question in the House of Commons, announced that the first of the new series of selected documents to be published was to relate to the Transfer of Power in India. His statement was as follows:

As I informed the House on the 9th of March, 1966, the Government have decided to extend to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents concerned with our external relations, subject to inter-party agreement through the Group of Privy Counsellors whose composition I announced on the 8th of June. I am happy to inform the House that the Group have agreed that in view of the great interest now being shown in historical circles in the last days of British rule in India the first selection of documents to be published under the new arrangements should be documents from the India Office records on the Transfer of Power and the events leading up to it.

The scheme will follow closely the lines of the Foreign Office series of Documents on British Foreign Policy from 1919 to 1939, and, as in that series, the editors will be independent historians who will be given unrestricted access to the records and freedom to select and edit documents for publication. Professor P. N. S. Mansergh, Smuts Professor of the History of the British Commonwealth at Cambridge, has expressed willingness to accept

² Ibid. vol. 733, cols. 1706–7. ³ Ibid. vol. 747, col. 1291.
appointment as Editor-in-Chief, and the scheme will be in full operation by the end of the year.  

Mr E. W. R. Lumby was appointed Assistant Editor and took up his duties on 1 January 1968. The Editors were assisted by Mr R. W. Mason, C.M.G., Director of Research, Librarian and Keeper of the Papers at the Foreign Office 1960-5, who by that date had already made a preliminary survey of the India Office papers relating to the theme, and by Mr C. G. Costley-White, C.M.G., and Mr D. M. Blake, both of whom joined the Historical Section at the India Office Records in March 1968.

The first point to be determined was the period to be covered. The phrase ‘the Transfer of Power and the events leading up to it’ required construction in respect of an opening, though not of a terminal date since the latter, 15 August 1947, was fixed by the actual transfer of power on that day. In the making of a decision in respect of a starting point certain considerations were kept in mind. There was the possibility, given evidence of sufficient public interest, that the plan for the publication of documents might be extended so as to cover at least the last ten to twelve years of British rule in India and eventually the period from the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 to the Transfer of Power in 1947. The present series had, accordingly, to be considered not in isolation but as a possible part of a larger whole. It had also, however, to be regarded in the context of the Prime Minister’s statement of 30 June 1967, in the course of which he noted that the first selection of documents to be published under the new arrangements were to be on the Transfer of Power and the events leading up to it because ‘of the great interest now being shown in historical circles in the last days of British rule in India’. The problem, therefore, was to find an opening date that would not be inconsistent with possible longer-term plans, would satisfy shorter-term interests and possess its own historical justification.

The dates most carefully considered were 1937; September 1939; August 1940; and December 1941–January 1942. The first, marking the extension of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 to the Provinces of British India, had much to recommend it historically, but was hardly likely to meet predominant contemporary interest since its adoption would mean that many years must necessarily elapse before the documentary evidence on the final phase of the Transfer of Power could be published; the second suffered from the historical disadvantage of tying the transfer of power to the outbreak of war; the third, deserving of consideration because of the so-called ‘August Offer’, appeared barely of sufficient significance as a point of departure; leaving the last alone, associating the outbreak of the war in the East with fresh Indian demands for constitutional reform, and followed by a significant British

4 Ibid. vol. 749, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 147-8. 5 See Appendix I.
initiative in the Cripps Mission, as meeting, in so far as it seemed possible to do so, all of the principal desiderata. Accordingly the conclusion was reached that the series on the Transfer of Power should begin on 1 January 1942.

The publication of documents on almost any topic, or phase, in contemporary history can be the outcome only of selection. This is an inevitable consequence of the range of modern official records. No student would wish to be confronted in print with the details of the transaction of business as carried on from day to day, irrespective of their continuing interest or immediate relevance to the purpose of the publication. Yet, after recognizing this, there still remains an area where decision is required of a kind that cannot be reached without careful consideration. On the one hand to restrict the publication of documents in the case of this particular series to those which have an obvious and direct bearing upon the Transfer of Power would be unhistorical in the sense that matters excluded by so rigid a principle of selection (for example evidence of the impact of the Japanese victories in South East Asia early in 1942 on British and Indian opinion) may have had a considerable bearing upon the nature and timing of the transfer, while on the other hand to enlarge the selection so as to include documentation upon all important aspects of British government in India, economic, financial, military and social, and of Indian reactions to it in all its manifestations throughout the years under review, would incur the serious risk of losing the theme in a mounting volume of print. In these circumstances the editors have thought it best to pursue a middle course, and while aiming at the rigorous exclusion of what lies outside the theme of the series, even when important in itself, they have included, over and above the documentary evidence directly and obviously relevant to the transfer of power, other evidence of external or domestic Indian developments which, while possessing no such immediate relevance, none the less will clearly require to be taken into consideration when historical judgements come to be pronounced.

The application of such principles of selection has had certain consequences. In the first place it has meant that the considerable correspondence which passed between the India Office and the Government of India on economic and financial matters, on the civil and military services and on India’s external relations, is not itself reproduced in the series, though the subject matter of it may from time to time be indicated in other documents. In the second place, and arising in large measure from the nature of certain important categories of documents in the India Office Records and Library, it has meant the reprinting only in part of certain documents. Two such categories should be mentioned here. The private and secret weekly letters exchanged between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy, and the fortnightly reports or letters from the Governors of the Provinces of British India to the Viceroy, dealt ordinarily with a variety of topics and were intended to be comprehensive, mopping-up communications on all matters not otherwise or more immediately disposed
of. Owing to their range and character the reproduction in full of these
documents would be inconsistent with the principles of selection already
enunciated, and it has, therefore, usually seemed desirable either to omit certain
paragraphs or to reprint only extracts (as has happened very frequently in the
case of the Governors’ Reports) because of the irrelevance of what has been
excluded to the theme of this particular series. In the former case, that is to
say where a paragraph, or paragraphs, are omitted, their contents are briefly
indicated in an editorial insertion so that the reader may judge for himself the
reason for it; in the latter case, that is to say where the major portion of a
document is omitted, a line of asterisks has been inserted to indicate where
the excisions occur.

This series on the Transfer of Power in India is modelled upon the earlier
and still continuing series on British Foreign Policy. But there was one
important difference between the responsibilities of the India Office and the
Foreign Office which is reflected in their records and, by necessary consequence,
in any documentary publication based upon them. The Foreign Office was
concerned with the conduct of relations with foreign states, but the India
Office was the channel through which British governmental responsibility for
the Government of India, until 15 August 1947 vested ultimately in the King
in Parliament, was exercised. A documentary series on the Transfer of Power
does not record, therefore, the course of official relations between two sovereign
states, since the Government of India, with the Viceroy and Governor-General
at its apex, derived its authority from a British source, and remained down to
August 1947, despite the considerable autonomy which in certain respects it
enjoyed, in the last resort an outpost and instrument of British Government.
It shows rather how British responsibility for government was discharged in
war as in peace, and more particularly the reasons for which, and the means and
the stages by which, it was decided to transfer it to Indian hands. These twin
preoccupations, the one administrative, the other belonging to the realm of
haute politique, were themselves distinguishable in principle, even though in
practice that distinction was often blurred, since administration could rarely be
carried on without some regard to political decisions or attitudes, and political
decisions could hardly be reached without some regard to administrative con-
sequences. But more important in this context was what was common to
both. They derived alike from Empire and neither belonged to the traditional
sphere of foreign relations.

The great majority of the hitherto unpublished documents included in these
volumes are drawn either from the official archives of the India Office in the
custody of the India Office Records or from the private collections of the
Viceregal papers in the India Office Library. The principal categories of such
documents are the Governors’ Reports and correspondence with the Viceroy;
the telegraphic correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy
and the weekly letters (already alluded to) exchanged between them—both the telegrams and the letters, though dealing with public affairs, being for the most part essentially personal correspondence, and carrying the customary 'Private and Personal' prefix; the minutes of officials and of the Secretary of State on the India Office files; and finally, and of the highest significance in respect of the formulation of policy, the Minutes of the Meetings of the War Cabinet Committee on India which met for the first time on 26 February 1942 and was still in existence as the India and Burma Committee of the Cabinet in August 1947, the papers or memoranda submitted to that Committee or circulated to the War Cabinet, the relevant War Cabinet Conclusions together with certain papers of the Prime Minister’s Office which record *inter alia* exchanges of view on Indian policy with the heads of Government in the United States and the Dominions. In no instance is the record of Cabinet discussion included, but indications of the balance of opinion in the Cabinet on Indian policy are given from time to time in the Secretary of State’s correspondence with the Viceroy.

The arrangement of the documents was considered in the light of earlier precedents, both British and foreign, and also on the merits of the particular case. Broadly speaking the choice was twofold: arrangement by topic or arrangement in strict chronological order. The former has been uniformly adopted in the successive series of *Documents on British Foreign Policy* and the case for it was argued by Dr G. P. Gooch and Professor Harold Temperley, the Editors of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, in the Foreword (a trifle oddly) to Volume VII of their series. They noted that the topical method was used in the German documents, *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914*, with the material grouped into chapters and sections and that the alternative chronological method was adopted in the French series, *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, covering the same period
6 and they did not presume to decide between them in respect of countries where the governmental procedures and practice might differ from the British. But they believed that the topical method was essential for showing the workings of British policy, their reason for this conclusion being the fact that when a crisis arose in England, or when a particular decision came up for discussion before the Cabinet, the previous papers relating to the topic were printed and circulated to the Cabinet in special sections. Consequently, the Editors felt that, in adopting the topical method, they were presenting the problems and decisions to their readers in much the same way as they had appeared to the Cabinet and the Foreign Secretary at the time.

6 The French translators of *Die Grosse Politik* did not confine themselves to translation; they also rearranged the documents in chronological order! For their reasons see *La Politique Extérieure de L'Allemagne 1870–1914* (Paris 1927–39) 32 vols. down to January 1908, vol. 1, pp. viii–xii.

and Professor Temperley, Professor Sir Llewellyn Woodward and Mr Rohan Butler, endorsed this conclusion, remarking that 'the disadvantages of a chronological method without any 'sorting out' into subjects are too obvious to need mention'.

While the Editors of this series of Documents were initially also predisposed towards a topical arrangement and indeed made a provisional sorting of the documents on this principle, they came subsequently to a different conclusion. This derived mainly from the general character of the India Office records. In the first place the Editors were impressed, despite the disadvantages inherent in a chronological arrangement, by some of the general arguments deployed by the Commission responsible for the editing of the French documents in its favour, notably that of conveying a sense of the interrelation and the complexity of events or negotiations as they presented themselves to those responsible for the conduct of affairs at any particular moment in time. In the second place, and more particularly, it was noted that those major questions of Indian policy, in the period with which the series is principally concerned, were themselves in substance so closely interrelated as to have been considered at the time by the Cabinet ordinarily not as several and separate problems but as parts of one common, underlying problem, namely the future government of India. Inasmuch as there existed and there developed progressively this sense of the subordination of all political questions to one overriding question, namely the conditions, circumstances and timing of a transfer of power, the documentary record in essence related to a single theme— and therefore in this case the adoption of a strictly chronological arrangement, which was at least superficially at variance with the topical arrangement used in the Foreign Office series, may be thought at a deeper level actually to be in accord with it. It was, indeed, finally adopted by the Editors in the belief that thereby they were enabled to gain the principal advantages of both systems.

In the determination of the chronological order of documents in this series the date and, where important and known, the actual time of despatch have been taken as the basis of classification, irrespective of the place of origin of the particular communication. The date and time of receipt are also usually indicated on telegrams received by the India Office but not on those received by the Viceroy. Where the sender's and recipient's copies of telegrams are both available, the sender's copy has been reproduced; but where details of address and times of despatch and receipt are shown on the recipient's, but not on the sender's, copy these have been included. Variations in the texts of the two versions are indicated in the footnotes when they appeared to be of any significance.

9 Documents Diplomatiques Français 1871-1914, 1re Série, tome premier (Paris, 1929), p. xii.
To assist readers who desire to follow the documentary record through on an important subject, the Summary of Documents in each volume will be divided into chapters, each with a title indicating its principal contents not on a chronological but on a topical classification.

Each volume will be prefaced by a list of the holders of the principal offices of government in Britain and in India, by a brief chronology and by a list of abbreviations used in that particular volume, and will conclude with a glossary of Indian terms, an index of persons named with biographical notes as well as a subject index. Documents already reprinted in Command Papers or elsewhere are reproduced in the text or in an appendix only when their inclusion is thought essential for following the development of policy or the sequence of events. But in every case in which they are mentioned an appropriate reference is given. Where it has not been possible to trace a document this has been indicated; where it has been decided not to include a document referred to in the text on grounds of insufficient relevance a footnote refers to the fact in the words 'not printed'—which is not necessarily to be taken to mean that the document in question (e.g. one of obvious irrelevance in the files of another department) has been traced. Three full points have been inserted where small excisions have been made in documents. Unless otherwise specified, such excisions have been made out of regard for personal susceptibilities. Nothing has been omitted in this way which was considered necessary to an understanding of the history of the Transfer of Power in India.

Footnotes are ordinarily grouped at the end of each document except where the document continues over a right hand page; in these cases footnotes relating to that page and the facing page are printed for convenience at the foot of the right hand page. Throughout, footnotes are designed only to aid the user of the collection of documents and neither seek nor are intended to offer any comment upon the text. The one purpose of the series is to make available to scholars the British historical records relating to the Transfer of Power in India.

N. MANSERGH

Historical Section
India Office Records
June 1969
Introduction to Volume 1

This first volume in the series of British Documents on the Transfer of Power in India covers the period 1 January–30 April 1942. Some brief indication of the principal preoccupations of these months and of the more significant initiatives or developments that took place during them may serve as a helpful introduction to its contents.

The volume opens with a report from the Governor of Bombay dated 1 January containing his impressions of the impact of the war in the East and the Japanese advances in South East Asia upon Indian public opinion, and his assessment of the attitudes of Indian political leaders, and it continues with the text of a cable sent by a distinguished group of Indian liberals, under the leadership of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, to the Prime Minister, Mr Winston Churchill, appealing in the face of so grave an international situation for some bold stroke of far-sighted statesmanship in order to enlist India's whole-hearted active cooperation in the war effort. The two themes, the Japanese threat to India and the British reaction to heightened Indian demands or appeals for a new departure epitomized in Sapru's cable to Churchill, dominated the period. But while the themes were constant the situation, both militarily and politically, was in process of rapid change. Both are reflected in the Documents.

From Washington on 7 January Churchill, referring to a suggestion made in the War Cabinet on 19 December, expressed the hope that 'my colleagues will realize the danger of raising constitutional issue, still more of making constitutional changes, in India at a moment when enemy is upon the frontier' [No. 6]. But discussions proceeded between members of the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy, nominally on the particular issue of the reply to be given to Sapru but in fact upon the desirability and nature of a fresh British initiative. On 21 January the Viceroy, the Marquess of Linlithgow, telegraphed an appreciation of the political situation in India [No. 23] together with a message for the Prime Minister [No. 26] which concluded: 'I shall not have an easy hand to play here if we stand firm, but I think I can hold the position well enough. Vital thing is that people should stand firm at home.' The Secretary of State, Mr L. S. Amery, agreed with the Viceroy 'that there is nothing to be done at this moment with Sapru's proposals or with any suggestions of a fresh constitutional advance' [No. 27]. On 24 January the Lord Privy Seal, Mr C. R. Attlee, in a manuscript letter to Amery (part of which is reproduced as the Frontispiece to this volume) expressed misgivings about the Viceroy's judgment. Attlee wrote: 'It is worth considering whether someone should not be charged with a mission to try to bring the political leaders together.' He also stated that there was 'a lot of opinion here' which 'exists in your Party as well as mine' which was not satisfied 'that there is nothing to be done, but to sit tight on the declaration of
August 1940'

[No. 35]. On 28 January, however, the Secretary of State, in a detailed analysis of the Indian situation circulated to the War Cabinet [No. 43], attributed the political deadlock in India, ostensibly concerned with the transfer of power from British to Indian hands, in reality to "the far more difficult issue of what Indian hands, what Indian Government or Governments, are capable of taking over without bringing about general anarchy or even civil war", and concluded with the Viceroy that "there is no immediate further interim constitutional advance that we can make". On 1 February the Secretary of State submitted a further memorandum [No. 57] to the Cabinet on the specific questions of the reply to be sent to Sapru, Indian representation at meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet\(^2\) and new appointments to the Viceroy's Executive Council. On 2 February Attlee restated and amplified [No. 60] his earlier views favouring the entrusting of "some person of high standing either already in India or sent out from here with wide powers to negotiate a settlement in India", and concluded: "There is precedent for such action. Lord Durham saved Canada to the British Empire. We need a man to do in India what Durham did in Canada."

The interrelation of the war and the constitutional question was underlined by the visit of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek to India in February (see Chapter II in the Summary of Documents) contemporaneously with continuing discussion of the major issues of Indian policy still in the formal context of the reply to be given to Sapru and his fellow memorialists [No. 89] but with a broadening perspective in respect of India's membership of an Imperial War Cabinet and a Pacific Council [Nos. 89 and 100] and indications of greater British sensitivity to American opinion. On 5 February the War Cabinet invited the Secretary of State to prepare a statement indicating the new initiatives that might be taken in India [No. 66]; the most notable result was Cabinet agreement upon a proposal by the Prime Minister that he should broadcast to India announcing the establishment of an enlarged Defence of India Council. An outline of this plan was given to the Viceroy in the Secretary of State's telegram of 11 February [No. 101]; the Viceroy in reply showed his displeasure at not having been consulted earlier [No. 103]. On 25 February the Viceroy transmitted his alternative suggestions for the Prime Minister's broadcast [No. 183] and on 26 February the War Cabinet Committee on India, specially constituted [No. 196] and meeting for the first time [No. 185], reviewed the situation in the light of these exchanges. It met again on 27 and 28 February [Nos. 190-1, 193-4] and reached certain conclusions about the proposed draft Declaration to India which were the subject of much debate,

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1 See Appendix I.

2 Though the phrase was used in this correspondence, no Imperial War Cabinet was in fact constituted during the Second World War but representatives of the Dominions and of India were invited to attend meetings of the War Cabinet as opportunity offered and circumstances required.
discussion and consideration of its many implications on succeeding days. On 4 March the terms of the Declaration were communicated to the Dominion Prime Ministers [No. 233]; on 6 March, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the India Office, Sir David Montecatth, in a Minute that was circulated to the War Cabinet Committee by the Secretary of State, noted that while the 'insistent demand in India (and in this country) is for complete Indian control or a fuller Indian share in control of India's war effort now', the draft Declaration concentrated 'on the future constitution and does not deal at all with the present, except in the last paragraph and then without precision and only in very general terms' [No. 252]; on 9 March [No. 282] the Cabinet accepted the offer of Sir Stafford Cripps, who had replaced Attlee as Lord Privy Seal, to negotiate on the basis of the draft Declaration in India, while the Viceroy, on the same day, announced and explained his decision to resign should the Declaration be made in the form then before the Cabinet Committee [No. 290]. On 10 March Churchill explained the considerations which had prompted the Cripps Mission [No. 294] and urged the Viceroy not to resign. On 22 March Cripps left for India and a new chapter opened.

The Cripps Mission coincided in time with the crisis of the War in South-East Asia. Singapore had fallen on 15 February, Rangoon on 8 March, the north-eastern Provinces of British India were threatened with actual invasion and the whole country was overshadowed by the possibility of it. These dangers were reflected in the reports of Governors to the Viceroy [e.g. Nos. 322 and 651] and were a constant preoccupation of the Government of India and the War Cabinet in London. Nor did they provide only the background to the Cripps Mission; they played at one remove a central part in his discussions with Indian leaders on responsibility for defence.

The documentary evidence on the Cripps Mission is extensive and as a result the negotiations, as they pursued their fluctuating course in an atmosphere of growing tension, can be followed not only from day to day but frequently also from hour to hour. Cripps himself kept notes of his interviews with Indian leaders, and these are reproduced in this volume. The main source of information is, however, provided by the many telegrams which passed between Sir Stafford Cripps and the Viceroy in India on the one part and the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister in London on the other. A résumé of these telegrams, covering the period of the Cripps Mission and its immediate antecedents, was later prepared in the India Office. It provides a valuable summary of and guide to the principal contents of these telegrams and is reproduced as Appendix v in this volume.

There are also other important documents on the Mission, chief among them being the records of the War Cabinet Committee on India, which met on 26 March [No. 393] to consider matters relating to the Mission and then with some frequency in early April to deal with particular issues that had arisen,
and the Minutes from the Conclusions of the War Cabinet itself, which decided on 2 April [No. 500] that any proposals to compromise on the principle that control of the defence of India must rest with H.M.G. were to be submitted to it. On 9 April, when proposals of this kind, worked out by Cripps with the help of Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt’s personal representative, and referred to as the ‘Cripps-Johnson’ formula, were laid before it, the War Cabinet emphasised the necessity of reverting to the scheme of the original draft Declaration and decided to request clarification [Nos. 565, 566, 567 and 568] from Cripps of the precise implications of the formula on Defence he had outlined [No. 559]. On 10 April the President of the Indian National Congress, Maulana Azad, conveyed the decision of the Congress to reject the draft Declaration and explained the reasons for it [No. 587]. Cripps sent a summary of Azad’s letter to Churchill and concluded that there was no hope of agreement [No. 588]. On 12 April President Roosevelt telegraphed a message for Churchill urging him to postpone Cripps’ departure from India so that he might make a final effort to reach a settlement [No. 611]; but Churchill’s reply explained that this would be impracticable [No. 617].

On 14 April the Secretary of State began to discuss with the Viceroy a projected White Paper on the Cripps Mission [No. 622], the form of which was finally determined after consultation with Cripps on his return on 21 April [Nos. 661 and 664]. The White Paper was presented to Parliament on 22 April, and on the same day Cripps held a Press Conference on his Mission [No. 665]. During the latter part of April the Viceroy indicated to the Secretary of State [Nos. 634, 647, 666, 688 and 699] the line he hoped the Government would take in the Commons Debate on the Cripps Mission, which was held on 28 April. The question whether the draft Declaration should be regarded as having lapsed owing to the failure of the Mission was also considered [Nos. 625, 647, 674–6, 678, 681 and 698].

By far the greater part of the hitherto unpublished documents included in this volume are drawn either from the official archives of the India Office in the custody of the India Office Records or from the Linlithgow Collection in the India Office Library.

The documents reproduced from the India Office Records are from the following series:

- L/F/7 Financial Department Collections
- L/I/1 Information Department Files
- L/PO Private Office Papers
- L/P&J/7 Political Department Files
- L/P&J/8 Political Department Collections

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3 Sir S. Cripps’ Report on his Mission was not submitted to the War Cabinet till July 1942 and will accordingly be reprinted in Volume II.
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I

L/P&J/10 Political Department Transfer of Power Papers
L/P&S/12 External Department Collections
L/WS/I War Staff Files.

Every document in these series is referred to in the text by the appropriate series notation followed by the number assigned to the particular file, collection, or volume in which the document is filed or bound. Thus the notation L/P&J/10/2 refers to the second file in the series called Political Department Transfer of Power Papers. A document in a file, collection, or volume is identified by folio references.

The Linlithgow Collection consists of the papers of the second Marquess of Linlithgow as Viceroy and Governor-General of India which the present Marquess deposited on permanent loan in the India Office Library in 1964. The documents from this Collection which are published here are almost all drawn from the series of volumes of the Viceroy’s correspondence. Each of these volumes is divided into two sections, the first containing correspondence (letters and telegrams), addressed to the Viceroy, the second, correspondence from him. Within each section, correspondence is, with some exceptions, in chronological sequence. Documents from the Linlithgow Collection are referred to in the present volume by the catalogue-number of the Collection (MSS. EUR. F. 125), followed by the number of the relevant volume.

The Editors wish to thank the present Marquess of Linlithgow for permission to use the Linlithgow papers.

A few documents which are not in either of these archives have been obtained from elsewhere, notably the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister’s Office.4

The most important categories of telegraphic communications between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy were classified in the following ways. One category of Private and Personal telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State carried the letter ‘S’, or ‘S.C.’ if the Viceroy was in Camp, i.e. at Dehra Dun or on tour. Another category consisted of ‘U’ telegrams, which were reserved for the most secret and personal matters, the letter ‘U’ indicating the nature of the telegram, irrespective of whether it did, or did not, carry a ‘Secret’ or ‘Private and Personal’ prefix. ‘U’ telegrams could be enciphered or deciphered only in the Private Offices of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy. Telegrams in the Superintendent series indicated to Superintendents of Telegraph branches that especial care should be taken to safeguard their security.

One set of documents reproduced has a feature that calls for special comment and two require some particular mention or explanation. It was the practice of the Viceroy to comment in the margin of incoming letters from the Secretary of State or reports from the Governors of the Provinces of British India for the guidance of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy (P.S.V.) or occasionally,

4 A file (R/30/1/1) containing copies of these documents can be consulted in the India Office Records.
it would seem, for his personal satisfaction. These marginal comments are reproduced in italics so as to distinguish them from the main text. The more important set of documents requiring particular mention consists of the records made by Sir Stafford Cripps of his interviews with Indian leaders or spokesmen. These were written by Cripps and were deposited in the India Office by Mr F. F. Turnbull, Cripps' secretary during the Mission, with a covering note to the Secretary of State on 10 August 1942. The other set of documents requiring some explanation as being outside the ordinary run of official or demi-official records consists of extracts from a Diary kept during the Cripps Mission first by Mr L. G. Pinnell, acting Private Secretary to the Viceroy while Sir Gilbert Laithwaite was ill, and completed by Laithwaite. Such extracts have been included where they throw light on the views and actions of the Viceroy or Sir Stafford Cripps, but not usually where they concern members of their staffs. The Viceroy read and initialled most of the Diary entries relating to discussions or meetings at which he had been present. The Diary is deposited with the Linlithgow Papers in the India Office Library (MSS. EUR. F. 125/141).

The Editors would like to thank the literary executors of the Right Hon. William Lyon Mackenzie King for permission to use certain papers.

In conclusion the Editors desire to acknowledge the friendly assistance and advice they have received from the officials at the India Office Library and Records, among whom they would like to mention the Librarian and Keeper of the Records, Mr S. C. Sutton, C.B.E., and the Deputy Librarian and Deputy Keeper, Miss Joan C. Lancaster, F.S.A.; from the Editors of the Documents on British Foreign Policy; and from the Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Rohan Butler, C.M.G.

N. MANSERGH
E. W. R. LUMBY

5 In reply to an enquiry of 12 December 1968 Sir Frank Turnbull recalled: 'Sir S. Cripps held all his interviews in 1942 alone, except possibly one with representatives of the Chamber of Princes. Neither I nor anyone else was present. He wrote the notes in his own hand. Whether he wrote them during the interviews or not I cannot remember. But as these interviews were man to man it is very improbable that he wrote them during the interview. No one else took any part in drafting them except for minor corrections.'
Abbreviations

A.B.D.A.  American, British, Dutch, Australian Command
A.D.C.  Aide-de-Camp
A.H.Q.  Air Headquarters
A.I.C.C.  All-India Congress Committee
A.I.S.A.  All-India Spinners Association
A.O.C.  Air Officer Commanding
A.P.S.V.  Assistant Private Secretary to the Viceroy
A.R.P.  Air Raid Precautions
B.B.C.  British Broadcasting Corporation
B.S.T.  British Summer Time
C.-in-C.  Commander-in-Chief
C.I.D.  Committee of Imperial Defence or Criminal Investigation Department
C.I.E.  Companion, Order of the Indian Empire
C.I.O.  Central Intelligence Officer
C.O.S.  Chiefs of Staff
C.P.  Central Provinces
C.S.I.  Companion, Order of the Star of India
D.I.B.  Director of the Intelligence Bureau (Home Department)
D.M.I.  Director of Military Intelligence
D.P.S.V.  Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy
G.C.B.  Knight Grand Cross of the Bath
G.H.Q.  General Headquarters
H.E.  His Excellency
H.M.  His Majesty or Honourable Member
H.M.G.  His Majesty's Government
I.A.  Indian Army
I.C.S.  Indian Civil Service
I.P.  Indian Police
I.S.T.  Indian Standard Time
K.B.E.  Knight Commander of the British Empire
K.G.R.I.M.  King George's Royal Indian Military (Schools)
M.L.A.  Member of Legislative Assembly
M.O.I.  Ministry of Information
M.P.  Member of Parliament
M.S.V.  Military Secretary to the Viceroy
N.D.C.  National Defence Council
N.H.Q.  Naval Headquarters
No. 10  Number Ten, Downing Street
N.W.F.P.  North-West Frontier Province
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.S.V.</td>
<td>Private Secretary to the Viceroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A.F.</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rt. Hon.</td>
<td>Right Honourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/S</td>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>United Provinces</td>
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</table>
List of Principal Holders of Office

UNITED KINGDOM

WAR CABINET (UNTIL 19 FEBRUARY 1942)

Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, Minister of Defence  Mr Winston S. Churchill
Lord Privy Seal  Mr Clement Attlee
Lord President of the Council  Sir John Anderson
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  Mr Anthony Eden
Minister without Portfolio  Mr Arthur Greenwood
Minister of Supply (Minister of War Production from 4 February)  Lord Beaverbrook
Chancellor of the Exchequer  Sir Kingsley Wood
Minister of Labour and National Service  Mr Ernest Bevin

WAR CABINET (FROM 19 FEBRUARY 1942)

Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, Minister of Defence  Mr Winston S. Churchill
Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs  Mr Clement Attlee
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons  Sir Stafford Cripps
Lord President of the Council  Sir John Anderson
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  Mr Anthony Eden
Minister of Production  Mr Oliver Lyttelton
Minister of Labour and National Service  Mr Ernest Bevin

OTHER MINISTERS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME

Secretary of State for Air  Sir Archibald Sinclair
Secretary of State for the Colonies  Viscount Cranborne (Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs until 19 February)
President of the Board of Education  Mr R. A. Butler
Secretary of State for India and for Burma  Mr L. S. Amery
Minister of Information                     Mr Brendan Bracken
Lord Chancellor                           Viscount Simon
Secretary of State for War                 Sir James Grigg

**INDIA OFFICE**

Secretary of State                                 Mr L. S. Amery
Permanent Under-Secretary                        Sir David Monteaeth
Parliamentary Under-Secretary                     Duke of Devonshire
Deputy Under-Secretary                           Mr W. D. Croft
Assistant Under-Secretaries                      Sir Leonard Wakely

Private Secretary to Secretary of State          Mr P. J. Patrick
                                                  Mr F. F. Turnbull
                                                  *During his absence with Sir S.
                                                  Cripps (from 12 March) Mr M. J.
                                                  Clauson

**INDIA**

Viceroy, Governor-General and Crown Representative Sir Gilbert Laithwaite
Private Secretary to the Viceroy                  *During his illness (circa 20 Jan.–
                                                  11 April) Mr J. C. Donaldson
                                                  I.C.S. and later Mr L. G. Pin-
                                                  nell I.C.S.
                                                  H. V. Hodson

**EXECUTIVE COUNCIL**

Commander-in-Chief                                General Sir Archibald Wavell (to
                                                  16 Jan. and from 7 March)
                                                  General Sir Alan Hartley
                                                  (17 Jan.–6 March)
                                                  Sir Reginald Maxwell I.C.S.
                                                  Sir Jeremy Raisman I.C.S.
                                                  Sir Andrew Clow I.C.S.
                                                  *During his absence on leave
                                                  (23 March–21 April) Mr S. N.
                                                  Roy I.C.S.
LIST OF PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICE

Education, Health and Lands
Mr Nalini Sarker

Commerce
Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar

Labour
Sir Firoz Khan Noon

Law
Sir Sultan Ahmed

Indians Overseas
Dr Madhao Shrihari Aney

Information and Broadcasting
Sir Akbar Hydari
(Died 8 Jan.; his portfolio remained vacant during the rest of this period)

Supply
Sir Homi Mody

Civil Defence
Mr E. Raghavendra Rao

GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES

Madras
Capt. The Hon. Sir Arthur Hope

Bombay
Sir Roger Lumley

Bengal
Lt.-Col. Sir John Herbert

United Provinces
Sir Maurice Hallett I.C.S.

Punjab
Sir Bertrand Glancy I.C.S.

Central Provinces and Berar
Sir Henry Twynam I.C.S.

Assam
Sir Robert Reid I.C.S.

Bihar
Sir Thomas Stewart I.C.S.

North-West Frontier Province
Sir George Cunningham I.C.S.

Orissa
Sir (William) Hawthorne Lewis I.C.S.

Sind
Sir Hugh Dow I.C.S.

PRIME MINISTERS OF PROVINCES

Bengal
Mr A. K. Fazlul Huq

Punjab
Sir Sikander Hyat Khan

Orissa
Maharaja of Parlakimedi

Sind
Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh

The remaining Provinces were administered by their Governors under Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935.
### Chronological Table of Principal Events

#### December

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Japanese attack Pearl Harbour</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Churchill arrives for Washington Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-7</td>
<td>Muslim League Working Committee meets at Nagpur</td>
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<td>23-31</td>
<td>Congress Working Committee meets at Bardoli</td>
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#### January

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Declaration of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sapru cables Churchill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wavell appointed to A.B.D.A. Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-16</td>
<td>All-India Congress Committee meets at Wardha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Churchill returns to England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Japanese invade Burma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Cripps returns from Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-9</td>
<td>House of Commons debate on vote of confidence</td>
</tr>
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#### February

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-22</td>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to India</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>First meeting of Pacific War Council, London</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Fall of Singapore</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Reconstruction of War Cabinet</td>
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<td>21-2</td>
<td>Muslim League Working Committee meets at Delhi</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-2</td>
<td>Non-Party Conference meets at Delhi</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Dissolution of A.B.D.A. Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>First meeting of War Cabinet Committee on India</td>
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#### March

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Fall of Rangoon</td>
</tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>War Cabinet decide on Cripps Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Churchill’s statement to Commons on Cripps Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Cripps arrives in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Japanese occupy Andaman Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Publication of draft declaration for discussion with Indian leaders. Cripps’ first broadcast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>First meeting of Pacific War Council, Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Japanese naval raid on Colombo, Ceylon</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Japanese air raid on Vizagapatam and Cocanada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Japanese naval raid on Trincomalee naval base, Ceylon. Surrender of American forces in Bataan peninsula</td>
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11 Publication of resolutions by Working Committees of Congress and Muslim League rejecting draft declaration. Cripps' second broadcast
12 Cripps leaves India
28 House of Commons debate on Cripps Mission
29 Allies evacuate Mandalay
Summary of Documents

CHAPTER I

The War Situation, Indian requests for a new departure in British Policy and British consideration of them. 1 January–28 January 1942

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<th>Name and Number</th>
<th>Date (January)</th>
<th>Main subject or subjects</th>
<th>Page</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Lumley to Linlithgow Report 98 (extract)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Repercussions of war; Bardoli Resolution of Congress</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Sapru to Laithwaite Letter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Encloses text of cable from himself and others to Churchill on need for some bold stroke of statesmanship in view of gravity of international situation</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 53–S.C.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Asks for account of Amery’s talks with Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Hope to Linlithgow Report 8 of 1941 (extract)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Alarm and distrust owing to war reverses; importance of truthful news</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Amery to Linlithgow Letter (extract)</td>
<td>5–7</td>
<td>Imperial Preference; political situation; recruitment to Indian Civil Service and Indian Police; National Defence Council</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>6 Churchill to Attlee Tel. Grey 255 via naval cipher</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>On danger of raising constitutional issue</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>7 Linlithgow to Amery Letter (extract)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Reconstruction of Executive Council; war situation in South-East Asia; Muslim views on Pakistan; French settlements in India</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 1 (extract)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Effect of war news; local Congress reactions to Bardoli Resolution</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Refers to no. 3 and gives account of talks with Press</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Asks for suggestions for reply to Sapru</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>11 Amery to Linlithgow Letter</td>
<td>13–4</td>
<td>On reply to Sapru; political situation in India; inter-allied and inter-imperial co-ordination in the war; Indian representation on Committee of Defence</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Turnbull to Martin Tel. Taut 516 via naval cipher</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Transmits text of suggested interim reply to Sapru</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>13 Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 269/H.E.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Discussion with Jinnah</td>
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<td>14 Amery to Simon Letter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Covering note to convey no. 15 and its enclosure</td>
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<td>15 Amery to Attlee Letter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>On reply to Sapru with enclosure of draft reaffirming August offer and rejecting suggestions for solving constitutional deadlock</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 11 D/42</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Summary of proceedings of All-India Congress Committee on 15 January</td>
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1 The principle on which documents are arranged in Chapters is explained in the Foreword, p. x, first para.
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<td>17 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 12D/42</td>
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<td>18 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 89-S</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Preparation of political appreciation, with comments on Sapru’s message</td>
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<td>19 Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 86</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Refers to no. 18 and requests political appreciation urgently</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P. 119 (extract)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Congress politics</td>
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<td>21 Turnbull to Rowan Letter</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>British Press comment on India</td>
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<td>22 Amery to Linlithgow Letter</td>
<td>20-1</td>
<td>Criticism in Commons of Churchill’s conduct of war and Amery’s failure to draw greater resources from India; importance of airborne troops; governorship of Bombay</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 104-S</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Appreciation for submission to H.M.G. of political situation in India with recommendations as to general line of policy</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Lumley to Linlithgow Report 99 (extract)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Congress attitudes to co-operation in war effort</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 105-S</td>
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<td>Criticism of Sapru proposals</td>
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<td>26 Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 106-S via India Office</td>
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<td>Wisdom of standing firm and harm done by Press speculation about possible concessions</td>
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<td>27 Amery to Churchill Minute</td>
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<td>Policy to be adopted in reply to Sapru</td>
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<td>28 Amery to Attlee Letter</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Encloses Linlithgow’s political appreciation and requests comments on draft reply to Sapru</td>
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<td>29 Twynnam to Linlithgow Report R.72-G.C.P. (extract)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>All-India Congress Committee meeting at Wardha; opinion that satyagraha is over for the time being</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Linlithgow to Amery Letter (extract)</td>
<td>23-7</td>
<td>Discussions with Coupland; detention of U Saw; future of small and medium-sized States; Congress policy; India and Atlantic Charter; attitude of The Times; draft reply to Sapru; Chiang Kai-shek’s visit to India</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Note on the tour of five Provinces by the Reforms Commissioner from 8 November to 7 December 1941</td>
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<td>31 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 132-S</td>
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<td>32 Anderson to Amery Letter</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Refers to no. 28 and agrees in substance with Amery’s draft reply to Sapru</td>
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<td>33 Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 110</td>
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<td>Refers to no. 25 and asks for comments on draft reply to Sapru</td>
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<td>35 Attlee to Amery Letter</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Criticises Linlithgow’s appreciation (no. 23)</td>
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<td>37 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 159-S</td>
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<td>Agrees with draft reply to Sapru subject to two amendments</td>
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<td>38 Amery to Attlee Letter</td>
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<td>Replies to criticism of Linlithgow’s attitude</td>
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<td>42 Attlee to Amery Letter</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Refers to no. 38 and insists that position is most unsatisfactory</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Memorandum by Amery reviewing the Indian political situation and agreeing with Linlithgow’s conclusion that no further interim constitutional advance should be made</td>
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### Chapter 2

The visit of Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek to India, further consideration of British policy, and India’s representation at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific Council. 24 January–27 February 1942.

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<td>On proposal by Chiang Kai-shek to visit India and Burma</td>
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<td>39 Linlithgow to Clark Kerr Tel. 161-S</td>
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<td>Refers to no. 36 and welcomes proposal</td>
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<td>40 Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1595</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Refers to no. 39; Cabinet had approved reply (no. 41) to no. 36</td>
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<td>41 Eden to Clark Kerr Tel. 144</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Refers to no. 36 and cordially welcomes proposal, subject to views of Government of India</td>
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<td>44 Amery to Churchill Minute</td>
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<td>Submits draft reply to Sapru</td>
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<td>45 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 177-S</td>
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<td>Proposed reconstruction of Executive Council</td>
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<td>46 War Cabinet W.M. (42) 13th Conclusions, Minute 1: confidential annex</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Amery to send telegram (no. 54) to Linlithgow</td>
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<td>48 Amery to Linlithgow Letter</td>
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<td>Commons debate on war situation; criticism of India’s war effort</td>
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### CHAPTER 4

Sir Stafford Cripps in India. Discussions with Indian parties and leaders and the reaction of the Viceroy and Cabinet to them. 23 March—11 April 1942

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**CHAPTER 5**

Reactions to the failure of the Cripps Mission and reappraisals of British policy. 12–30 April

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APPENDICES:

1. Statement issued with the authority of His Majesty's Government by the Governor-General on 8 August 1940 (the 'August Offer').
2. Resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay, 16 September 1940.
3. Resolutions issued by the Congress Working Committee at Bardoli, 30 December 1941.
4. Resolution passed by the Muslim League Working Committee at Nagpur, 27 December 1941.
5. Note prepared in the India Office: résumé of telegrams dealing with the Cripps Mission.
Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT NO. 98

This report covers the last half of December.

1. *The War and Politics.*—The past fortnight has been marked both by anxiety about the war and anticipation of internal political developments. The former has sharpened speculation about the latter. The Japanese advance in Malaya, the reported exodus from Calcutta, and, in particular, the bombing of Rangoon, have been followed with anxious attention, and although it is realised that Bombay is not in immediate danger unless enemy warships penetrate to the Arabian Sea, there is nervousness about the future. Banks report a noticeable tendency to buy gold and silver. On the Stock Exchange, the fixing of minimum prices, mentioned in my last report and now in operation, has eased the position there, and other markets have been fairly steady. Rises in prices have been an important feature, and I will refer to that subject later, in another paragraph. There is no noticeable exodus from the city at present, but there is an under-current of nervousness which might lead to one if the danger were thought to be nearer. I hope that, before that can arise, it may be possible to raise a sufficient *esprit de corps* among those whom we want to remain, but this needs care, or else Labour will take alarm prematurely.

Into this atmosphere in Bombay came most of the Congress leaders on their way to Bardoli. We had a spate of oratory and press interviews. You will have seen them, and they are now past history. Nehru and Azad had several very large meetings. The obvious confusion in their own minds as to what should be done cannot have given great illumination to their audiences: but that did not detract from the success of the meetings, since the one common feature of all discourses was the laying of all the blame for the deadlock on the British Government, and that must have gone down well, besides serving to distract attention from the shortcomings of Congress leadership.

The Working Committee's resolutions have just come out from Bardoli. I will give you my first reactions. The idea that Gandhi has, during the fourteen months of his dictatorship of the Congress, misunderstood the resolution under

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1 Not printed.  
2 See Appendix III.
which he was acting provides a light touch in an otherwise unattractive document. Certain passages impose a considerable strain on one’s temper and patience. They can, no doubt, be attributed to Nehru, and we must, I suppose, ignore them and endeavour to make out what is the meaning of this move. It is being described already in the Congress press here as “opening the door”, “again holding out the olive branch to Britain”, “a desire to co-operate”, and so on. It is difficult to find the olive branches on the face of the resolution. It appears to be the same policy which has been pursued since the outbreak of war, namely, to force concessions out of us as the price of co-operation in the war. Indeed, this last resolution could be held to go even further along that road than any previous one, for the hint that no assurances about the future will be acceptable suggests that co-operation can only be secured by surrendering everything to the Congress now.

We may soon have some further light on what is intended by the resolution, for Nehru and Azad are said to be going to speak in Bombay in the next few days. I doubt, however, whether the resolution is intended to represent a rigid attitude. The present temper of the rank and file of Congress hardly suggests that. I am inclined to think that the real meaning behind the move is that they want to move out of the negative position into which Gandhi has led them, and want to make the best bargain they can, and are therefore taking up their first bargaining position. The vagueness of the resolution, and the absence of any specific terms, rather supports this conclusion. The eagerness with which the Congress-minded press has hailed the resolution as a magnanimous gesture reveals, I think, the wish of many Congressmen, and the intention of the Right Wing, to find some basis of compromise.

Whether they will come down to terms which can be at all acceptable is much more doubtful, and will depend, it seems to me, on whether Rajagopalacharia’s group can get the better of Nehru. Rajagopalacharia, I would judge, looks on the Bardoli resolution as opening the way to negotiations. Nehru, I suspect, hopes that we will turn it down, and that the Congress position will be much strengthened if we do. I think he may be right there. The dropping of non-violence (and, in spite of the kind references to it in the resolutions, he seems to look upon it as dropped) is a sound move from the Congress point of view. It will gain them some adherents. Already Mr. N. C. Kelkar, an old and, at one time, a powerful political figure in Poona, has announced that, with the dropping of non-violence he now feels able to go all the way with Congress. The public mind, too, is being made to think, by the nationalist press, that Congress has made a very generous gesture. The week’s deliberations at Bardoli have in fact, produced a clever setting of the stage. Congress appears as realistic and generous. It has even gone so far as to drop the Mahatma, the greatest sacrifice it could make, in an attempt to compromise at a critical stage in the war. If the British Government fails to respond, “arrogant Imperialism”
will once again have banged the door. That, I believe, is what Nehru hopes to stage, while Rajagopalacharia hopes that we will bargain.

Those are my first reactions to the Bardoli resolutions. I cannot say that the position looks to have been made easier by them. I did not expect, and I have not found any one who did, that Congress would rise to the occasion and help itself, and India by a really fine gesture at a vital moment: but it is rather despairing that nothing but interminable manoeuvring for position and hard bargaining can be expected. I will not attempt, at this moment, to offer any views for your consideration as to the line we might adopt to meet this development. We shall, perhaps, obtain some further clarification in the next few days, and if there seems reason to believe that the Right Wing are out for terms, it might be as well to find out how far they would go. That, I am afraid, would open up another series of negotiations before you, which can hardly be an alluring prospect in the present state of affairs. Comments from Home, I notice, hope for some dramatic stroke of leadership. I wish I could believe that something of that kind had a chance of meeting with a real response, but Jinnah's unusually temperate reiteration\(^3\) of the Muslim League position comes as a reminder that there are others to be considered besides Congress, and we are dealing with leaders who are usually able to ensure that any gesture is not allowed to go down well unless they want it to succeed.

\(^3\) This may refer to Mr Jinnah's presidential address to the All-India Muslim Students' Federation on 26 December 1941; or to the principal resolution of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League passed at Nagpur on 27 December (Appendix iv).

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2

*Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite*

*MSS. EUR. F. 123/124*

**19 Albert Road, Allahabad, 2 January 1942**

Dear Sir Gilbert,

I enclose herewith a copy of a cable which the signatories to it have sent through me today to the Right Hon'ble Winston Churchill, Prime Minister, at Washington.\(^1\) I have also cabled a copy of it to the Secretary of State for India.

I have by telegrams or letters obtained the permission of my co-signatories to append their names.

I should be grateful if you would kindly lay it before His Excellency the Viceroy.

Yours sincerely,

TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.\(^2\)
Enclosure to No. 2

Gravity international situation compels some of us who have spent long years in public life India make this appeal you, Prime Minister, realise urgent necessity for transforming entire spirit and outlook administration India. Detailed discussions of question permanent constitution may well wait more propitious times, until after victory achieved in this titanic struggle against forces threatening civilisation.

But some bold stroke far-sighted statesmanship called for without delay in India, at this hour of growing danger to her safety, to enlist her wholehearted active co-operation intensifying war effort. Millions men women required for adoption effective measures designed protect civilian population. Heart of India must be touched to rouse her on nation-wide scale to call for service undistracted by internal and domestic differences.

Is it not possible for you declare this juncture that India no longer be treated as dependency to be ruled from Whitehall, and henceforth her constitutional position and powers identical with those other units British Commonwealth? Such declaration should we suggest be accompanied concrete measures calculated impress people that in co-operating war effort they are safeguarding their own freedom. These measures are—

1) Conversion and expansion Central Executive Council into truly National Government, consisting entirely non-officials of all recognised parties and communities, and in charge all portfolios subject only responsibility to Crown.

1 Mr Churchill was in Washington from 22 December 1941 to 14 January 1942.
2 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru had presided at the Non-Party Leaders Conferences held in March and July 1941, which had passed resolutions making demands similar to those urged in this telegram. Opening the March Conference Sir Tej had said that it 'was a conference of men who were approaching the Indian question as it had tended to become not from the point of view of any particular party but from the point of view of the whole country. There were some at the Conference who were identified with strong party organisation; there were others who were not identified with any party organisation.' The Conferences were attended by leaders of the Indian Liberals, the Hindu Mahasabha and other parties and interests, but not the Congress or the Muslim League. Of the signatories of the telegram other than Sir Tej, those who are known to have been present at one or both of the Conferences were Mr M. R. Jayakar, Sir Jagdish Prasad, Sir Maharaj Singh, Mr T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Mr Chunimal Mehta.

Sir T. B. Sapru, Sir P. S. Sivaswami Aiyar and Sir Moropant Joshi were past Presidents of the All-India Liberal Federation, and the last two, with Sir V. S. Srinivasa Sastri and Mr Venkatarama Sastri, were currently Vice-Presidents of the Federation.

The signatories were distinguished in public life. For example, Sir T. B. Sapru, Sir Srinivasa Sastri and Mr Jayakar were Privy Councillors; Sir T. B. Sapru and Sir Jagdish Prasad had been members of the Viceroy's Executive Council; Sir T. B. Sapru and Sir Srinivasa Sastri had represented India at Imperial Conferences, and Sir Srinivasa Sastri and Sir Sivaswami Aiyar at the General Assembly of the League of Nations. Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at Oxford University and Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University. Mr Mohammed Yunus had been Premier of Bihar in the interim Ministry which had held office in 1937. Lord Sinha was the son of the First Baron Sinha of Raipur. Mr Chunimal Mehta and Sir Rahimtoola Chinoy were prominent businessmen.
(2) Restoration, in provinces now ruled autocratically by Governors Section 93 Government of India Act, of popular Governments broad based on confidence different classes and communities; failing this, establishment non official Executive Councils responsible to Crown, as proposed for Centre.

(3) Recognition India's right to direct representation through men chosen by National Government in Imperial War Cabinet (should such body be set up) and in all allied war councils, wherever established, and at peace conference.

(4) Consultation with National Government, precisely same footing and same extent as His Majesty's Government consult Dominion Governments in all matters affecting Commonwealth as whole and India in particular.

These are war measures whose adoption need no way prejudice claims or demands different parties regard to India's permanent constitution. But knowing intimately feelings aspirations our countrymen as we do, we must express our conviction that nothing less than inauguration this policy can resolve crisis in India. Urgency immediate action cannot be overemphasised. We appeal you in all sincerity but with greatest emphasis to act while there is still time for such action, so that India may line up with other anti-Axis Powers on footing absolute equality with them in common struggle for freedom humanity.

Since this is matter vital interest to public India and Britain we propose giving statement publicity in Press both countries.

Signatories are Tej Bahadur Sapru ... ... Allahabad.
Sriniwasa Sastri ... ... Madras.
Jayakar ... ... Bombay.
Jagdish Prasad ... ... Moradabad.
Sivaswami Aiyar ... ... Madras.
Sinha ... ... Patna.
Raja Maharaj Singh ... ... Lucknow.
Moropant Joshi ... ... Amraoti.
Mohammed Yunus ... ... Patna.
Venkatarama Sastri ... ... Madras.
Radhakrishnan ... ... Benares.
Chunilal Mehta ... ... Bombay.
Rahimtoola Chinoy ... ... Bombay.4

3 Sec. 93 of the Act of 1935 enabled the Governor of a Province, if 'satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act', to issue, with the concurrence of the Governor-General, a Proclamation assuming all the powers of the Provincial Government. At the beginning of 1942 the following Provinces were administered under Section 93: Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Central Provinces and Berar, Madras, North-West Frontier Province and United Provinces.

4 Sir Tej's letter also enclosed a 'full text' of the cable which is not printed as it differs in no material respect from his first enclosure.
3

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

4 January 1942

No. 53—S.C. Could you let me know how your talks with the Press last week went off? Times under new editor\(^1\) seems rather more wobbly than one could wish, and as you know every word that can be regarded as encouragement to Congress is boosted to the skies here and every word in the least degree critical entirely suppressed. Can you give me any further background?

\(^1\) Mr R. M. Barrington-Ward, Editor since 1 October 1941.

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Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

SECRET

REPORT NO. 8 OF 1941

GUINDY, 4 January 1942

Almost the only subject talked about here is the war situation in the East, and there is undoubtedly a great deal of nervousness and alarm. There is also a good deal of genuine annoyance that we had repeated \textit{ad nauseam} that we were ready and prepared for all eventualities and that Malaya was so strongly fortified that no attack could succeed. The results have had a bad effect on public opinion and there is great criticism of our propaganda and lack of belief in our official statements. The great majority of Indians in Malaya and Burma are Madrasis and the lack of news and the delay in issuing statements is having a deplorable effect. I do most fervently hope that the truth can be told and told quickly because the rumours being spread both by enemy sources and the usual rumour-mongers are doing a great deal of harm. What about?

To take an instance, owing to the delay in announcing the casualty figures in Rangoon, rumour has mentioned fantastic figures. Why should we announce that there were 600 casualties in the first raid when we know that there were at least 1,700? I do not agree at all with Dorman-Smith that it is not better to tell the truth. Refugees are arriving from Rangoon, who are telling their

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friends what did happen and there is a very general feeling of disbelief in the official statements and figures. Furthermore people cannot get cabled replies to enquiries in Burma or Malaya and this gives ground to yet further alarm and rumours. I do feel so strongly that we should get the news of events, subject to military considerations, to the public as soon as possible and above all to tell the truth.

I am really alarmed at the disbelief in official communiqués among all classes and it is having a very bad effect. There has been a partial exodus from the City on fear of bombing, although the danger here is slight except from a possible raider.

Prices which had risen considerably, now show a tendency to fall and with the advent of the new harvest and a so far voluntary arrangement with the merchants, I hope to keep them down.

However, there is a panicky atmosphere about, fear of looting, bombing, anxiety about relatives in Malaya and Burma, lack of news and general “wind up”. I met a deputation from the Corporation and I think reassured them, and also spoke at the People’s Park Fair to a very large crowd. I repeat, that if the truth was told to the public, they would be much more reassured than with the delays and half truths to which they are now subjected, and in consequence lose confidence in the official word.

Naturally we are doing all we can to calm the public, but less reticence would help a great deal. The fact that Europeans were evacuated from Penang whilst Indians were not, has done a great deal of harm, although no doubt the far larger number of Indians in Penang presented obvious transport difficulties. None the less, there is pretty bitter feeling about it.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

6. Now for a wider imperial issue which is being forced on us by America and which is at any rate not without its importance for India. Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, is a very good friend of ours and a fine old man. But his views about economic matters date back to somewhere round 1860 and he has conceived the idea that he can use the Lease-Lend business as a lever for compelling us to adopt the same ideas and more particularly to pledge ourselves to abandoning Imperial Preference. In this latter design he would no doubt get the support of American big export interests as well as
of all that element in America which, consciously or unconsciously, dislikes the idea of a united Empire and looks forward to seeing at any rate Canada and the Pacific Dominions eventually affiliated to the United States.

7. We, in our anxiety to secure Lease-Lend and bring America in, have never had the courage to say straight out that Imperial Preference is not merely a matter of economic policy but a natural political right of the British Commonwealth if it is to be regarded in any sense by the outside world as a political entity. We have embarked on a new form of political organisation, most hopeful for the world as a whole, namely, a group of nations united, not by a rigid federal constitution, with a precise division of powers, but by free mutual co-operation. This, however, extends not only to foreign policy and defence but equally to economic policy, and we are entitled to say that our internal economic relations are our own concern and nobody else’s. Apart from that, Imperial Preference means so much to our own export trade and to many parts of the Empire and we may well find ourselves, all of us, after the war, even more dependent upon inter-Empire trade than at present.

8. Quite apart from our own interest in the matter, I am convinced that the whole world has long ago moved away from the 19th century conception of economic activities as something entirely individual and international and that in future economic relations will be far more controlled in the national interest and influenced by the political relations of nations to each other. From that point of view the chance of returning to the old system, with its unconditional Most Favoured Nation Clause and the rest of it, is very remote, and by far the best prospect of moderating the tendencies which make for extreme autarky in economic matters lies in the formation of nation groups bound together whether by a customs union or by mutual preference. To my mind that is the only hope for Europe and Europe realises that. We should make a great mistake if we underrated the appeal of Hitler’s “New Order” to the European business world. They would certainly prefer a new order based on free co-operation to one based on German domination and exploitation. But even the latter would be preferred to a return to the old anarchy which is what the re-establishment of the Most Favoured Nation Clause would mean. We are in grave danger, therefore, if we submit to the American pressure, of not only imperilling our own future but of antagonising Europe and making a peace settlement more difficult. I won’t pursue this disquisition further but in order to get my views on the matter you might care to read a couple of memoranda which I enclose, one written more than a year ago on the general question of reconstruction, and the other a few days ago in face of this American pressure which is demanding an answer from us at the pistol’s point plus a further draft of a paper to the Cabinet. We have indeed held off a reply till Winston comes back, because one or two of us, e.g., Kingsley Wood and myself,
quite flatly feel unable to accept the American ultimatum, while Cranborne doubts if he could do so without much fuller consultation with the Dominions than seems possible at present. I also enclose an old paper\(^2\) on the Most Favoured Nation Clause which might be of interest to Mudaliar.

9. If this thing is rushed through and the country discovers that we are committed to getting rid of Imperial Preference there may be no end of a row either immediately or later on, and the same may take place in other parts of the Empire. My own position too might become very difficult. As you know, I came into politics over Imperial Preference and have always regarded it as the key to the whole economic development and political unity of the Empire. In ordinary times I certainly could not stay in any Government that proposed to go back on Ottawa\(^3\) and pledge itself to abandoning Imperial Preference. In the present situation I suppose I should have to carry on and await some opportunity when I could afford to state frankly my disapproval and my determination to see the whole thing reversed. This, of course, in my personal capacity. As Secretary of State I fully realise that Indian politicians—mainly in order to emphasise their separatism—have in the past been critical of any inter-Imperial arrangement. But I do believe that there is more than enough of complementary economic interest between India, ourselves, and the Dominions to make the development of Imperial Preference a matter of great importance to India. What you initiated at the Delhi Conference\(^4\) is after all only a part of a much wider programme in times of peace for the mutual benefit of all concerned.

10. I won't attempt in my letter today, to go into the political situation. So far as I can see, nothing has happened as the result of the breach between Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee to justify the kind of nonsense that has been telegraphed home about the Congress having opened the door to co-operation, the need for our meeting them half-way by some initiative, and all the rest of it. I was indeed sorry to see a very sensible long telegram of Inglis' accompanied by another weak leader in The Times. Certainly Jinnah's attitude lends no colour to the idea that we are any nearer solving the deadlock between him and Congress. But I get some quiet amusement from the fact that our Declaration of August 1940\(^5\) is becoming more and more looked upon as the charter of Muslim and minority rights. Don't be startled if one of these days you find me referring to it as the Linlithgow Charter!

11. In that connection I wonder whether my Manchester speech,\(^6\) pointing out how contemptuously and indignantly India would have rejected the

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\(^1\) Not printed. \(^2\) Not printed. 
\(^3\) The agreements concluded at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932 established the system of Imperial Preference.
\(^4\) The Eastern Group Conference held in Delhi, October 1940.
\(^5\) See Appendix I. \(^6\) At the Manchester Luncheon Club, 2 November 1941.
Atlantic Charter if it had come from us as our declaration of Indian policy, had any effect in clearing up the general misconception? I might indeed have gone further and asked whether the peoples whose right to choose their own form of government we propose to respect were the Muslims of India, or the States, or the Provinces, or India as a whole! Meanwhile, Bajpai has signed on behalf of India to yet another resounding declaration which bases itself upon the Atlantic Charter, so it can hardly be said now that India is excluded from its purview.  

14. I have given very careful consideration to the questions regarding continuance during the war of European recruitment for the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police which you raised in your private and personal telegram No. 786-S.C., dated 26th October 1941. There are two general observations that I feel that I must make at the outset. Firstly, if and in so far as we based ourselves on the supposition that questions in connection with European recruitment will proceed on the same lines as after the last War, and that any problems on the racial side that may arise now with reference to selection posts will present themselves in anything like the same form to our successors in 15 or 20 years’ time, we shall of course be making large assumptions—and indeed I should say rather shutting our eyes to the realities of the situation. Secondly, any deficiencies in European recruitment during the War could of course, in theory, be made good after the War, and a block avoided by antedates suitably distributed. But I quite recognise that what is theoretically possible may not be politically very practicable. If it were possible, having regard to the man-power position here, to continue to recruit young men of the right type (and, in the case of the I.C.S. with the academic qualifications necessary to avoid the criticisms referred to in the Government of India’s telegram No. 2704, dated 6th June 1941), I should be all in favour of doing so, notwithstanding the probability that by the time candidates recruited now would become ripe for consideration for appointment to selection posts the constitutional and administrative position of India will have undergone great changes. Unfortunately, however, I am afraid that any attempt to induce the War Office to agree to the release from the army of young men of the type we require who have undergone more than six months’ military training would be bound to fail (and that is what would be necessary, at any rate in the case of the I.C.S., because there will be in future no field of candidates academically qualified apart from those who are now in the Forces). It is true that the numbers required for India are very small, but if any concession were made to us, the Colonial Office, whose needs so far as numbers are concerned are much greater, could hardly be denied similar treatment, and I feel sure that in present circumstances neither the War Office nor the Cabinet would be ready to agree to the release of a substantial number of young officers from the Forces for civil
employment in India and the Colonies. As you are no doubt aware the Home
Civil Service is being called upon to surrender to the Forces a considerable
number of trained staff of all grades and it might well be argued that the Indian
and Colonial services are fortunate in being able to retain all the officers they
already have.

15. I fear that the only suggestion that I can offer you is along the lines that
Cornwallis has in mind for Iraq (Baghdad telegram of 5th December, No. 1331,10
which was repeated back to your External Department), or that, mutatis
mutandis, you are contemplating for your Political Department; that is to say
that enquiries should be made as to the possibility of finding among young
Officers now undergoing military training or serving in India a few suitable
men, with the requisite academic qualifications, who would be ready to accept
appointment to the I.C.S. at once, or to be seconded to it for the time being
with an option, on both sides, as to firm appointment at the end of the war;
but before making any such enquiries you will no doubt consider whether
recent developments have not rendered it undesirable to take steps in the direc-
tion of weakening the defences of India even to the extent of a handful of
young military officers. The possibility that the transfer of young European
officers from the Indian Army to the I.C.S. would be regarded by Indian
opinion as inconsistent with the steps taken to encourage young Indians to take
commissions in the I.A. instead of competing for vacancies in the I.C.S. would
also need consideration.

16. With regard to the Indian Police, I hope that it may be possible to obtain
some recruits from among the young men selected to undergo a year's training
at a University by the Joint Recruitment Boards.

7 January 1942

17. Your letter of December 5th has just come in, with a postscript showing
that the Japanese had just gone off the deep end when it was posted. A very
deep end too; ultimately for them, but immediately for us, and we may still
be in it well after Germany collapses at this end of the world.

7 On 1 January 1942, at Washington, Sir G. S. Bajpai, the Agent to the Governor-General in the
United States, had signed on behalf of India the Joint Declaration of the United Nations referring
to the Atlantic Charter as 'a common programme of purposes and principles' and pledging them-
selves to employ their full resources in the prosecution of the war and to co-operate with one
another.

8 Discussing the difficulties involved in recruiting Europeans for the two Services in wartime and
concluding that 'we should make every effort to discover suitable candidates and offer all reasonable
inducements to attract them'.

9 Anticipating that public opinion in India would be strongly critical if men without university
degrees were appointed to the Indian Civil Service.

10 Requesting sanction for the secondment of eight officers from the Army in Iraq as deputy assistant
political advisers, with a view to their joining Iraqi Service at the end of the war.
18. What you say in your letter about the National Defence Council is most encouraging, but adds to my regret that you should be losing Wavell. I don’t suppose Hartley, even if he did know the world strategical position, could impress them similarly with what he has to say. That raises in my mind the question whether you might not conceivably manage to combine the date of some future meeting with a visit to Delhi from either Wavell or Auchinleck and get them, as it were, to talk to them straight from their respective fronts.

19. What you say about the personal influence of the Princes at these meetings is most interesting and I am quite prepared to admit that you were right in attaching so much more importance to their personal attendance than I was at first inclined to do. I have always thought that in any kind of Federal India the Princes would acquire a very great say, partly by sheer instinctive authority, partly by financial inducements to members.

20. As to the political situation, it seems almost impossible here to make people understand that there has been no kind of offer of co-operation from Congress. The Times, with a new leader-writer, Professor Carr, has been stupidly wobbly, though Carr was one of the people present with Frank Brown at the talk I gave to the Editors the other day. The real thing is that there are so many people who do not want to be convinced of the facts, because those facts prevent the simple solution which appeals to them. It was the same with the Liberals in the old days of the Home Rule controversy: they just would not believe that Ulster existed, or that it was more than a small fraction of the Northern Protestants. Whether this sudden revival of interest in India in all sorts of ill-informed quarters is likely to be permanent or seriously to affect the House of Commons, I don’t know. So far, the Recess has only produced the usual batch of questions from Sorensen, which I shall be dealing with tomorrow.

21. I think there is great force in what you say about making Indian politicians face the consequences of their mistakes instead of trying to save them all the time. Thus, I really see no reason why the political leaders should not be told that they have missed the bus so far as the Executive is concerned, that you have had to fill up with other men whom you have no intention of turning out simply because the parties have reconsidered their attitude. It is interesting in this connection to see how the friends of Congress in this country are already jumping at Jinnah’s professed willingness to join in on a “fair” basis of representation, when they ought to know quite well that what Jinnah calls fair is something very different from what the Congress could accept. My inclination, at present certainly, and pending much clearer evidence of a real desire to co-
operate wholeheartedly, would be to stick to your present Council, make the most of it in private and in public, and fill up gaps with men who are prepared to come forward individually.

22. The success of this type of Council at the Centre does, however, raise the question whether a similar type of Council, and all Indian at that, might not be the right solution in the Congress Provinces. It would be a case not merely of some non-official advisers, but of a complete Council of Ministers, though not Parliamentary ones. This would incidentally go some way towards meeting one of Jinnah’s grievances. I shall be interested to hear what you think of this in the light of the situation when this reaches you or when it becomes quite definite that Congress really has no constructive or positive policy, but has only been hoping, by breaking away from Gandhi, that the public at home would force us to do something that would save their face.

23. What you tell me about Gwyer’s inability to suggest any positive constructive solution is rather depressing. That is one of the weaknesses of eminent lawyers, namely, that their analytical and critical faculties are generally so much stronger than their constructive. Let us hope Coupland¹⁴ may eventually have something more positive to suggest.

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P.S.—Just seen the news of Akbar Hydari’s death. He will be a loss and his going raises the question of the minimum of ex-officials.¹⁵ I could always legislate for that if necessary.

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¹¹ The National Defence Council consisted of about thirty persons, nominated by the Viceroy to represent both British India and the States. Its meetings, at which the Commander-in-Chief and other military experts were present, were held at intervals of about two months.

¹² General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, India, since 11 July 1941, was appointed Supreme Commander, A.B.D.A. (American, British, Dutch, Australian) Command in the Far East on 4 January 1942.

¹³ Professor E. H. Carr, Director of Foreign Publicity at the Ministry of Information from October 1939 to April 1940, became Assistant Editor of The Times in 1941.

¹⁴ Professor R. Coupland was visiting India in connection with a study of the Indian constitutional problem which he was making under the auspices of Nuffield College.

¹⁵ Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 36 (g).
Mr Churchill to Mr Attlee (via Naval Cypher)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106a: f 88

HUSH—MOST SECRET

GREY 255. Prime Minister for Privy Seal.

With reference to Cabinet Conclusion No. 41 of December 19th, I hope my colleagues will realize the danger of raising constitutional issue, still more of making constitutional changes, in India at a moment when enemy is upon the frontier. The idea that we should “get more out of India” by putting the Congress in charge at this juncture seems ill-founded. Yet that is what it would come to if any electoral or parliamentary foundation is chosen. Bringing hostile political element into the defence machine will paralyse action. Merely picking and choosing friendly Indians will do no serious harm, but will not in any way meet the political demands. The Indian liberals, though plausible, have never been able to deliver the goods. The Indian troops are fighting splendidly, but it must be remembered that their allegiance is to the King Emperor, and that the rule of the Congress and Hindoo Priesthood machine would never be tolerated by a fighting race.

2. I do not think you will have any trouble with American opinion. All press comments on India I have seen have been singularly restrained, especially since they entered the war. Thought here is concentrated on winning the war as soon as possible. The first duty of Congress nominees who have secured control of provincial government is to resume their responsible duties as ministers, and show that they can make success of the enormous jobs confided to them in this time of emergency. Pray communicate these views to the Cabinet. I trust we shall not depart from the position we have deliberately taken up.

1 WAR CABINET W.M. (41) 131ST CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 4, DATED 19 DECEMBER 1941

INDIA

The Minister of Labour and National Service [Mr Ernest Bevin] said that he thought there was some anxiety in this country about the position in India, both from the point of view of defence and of the Constitutional issue. For example, was our policy calculated to get the fullest war effort from India? Ought we to be doing more to increase war production in India? He thought that the position might give rise to a demand for a discussion in Parliament at short notice, and that it might therefore be desirable that the War Cabinet should have a general discussion on the position at the first convenient opportunity.

The War Cabinet took note of this suggestion.

2 Against this sentence Sir D. Monteth added: “Would the selection of a non-Congress Indian to be a civilian “Defence Member” (as Sir Maung Gye is Counsellor in Burma for certain Defence matters) be held to “do no serious harm”? It might go a good way to meet some political demands.”
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Viceroy's Camp, Karachi, 8 January 1942

This must again be a short and rather hurried letter. My hands have been very full with this my first visit to Sind on top of one's other preoccupations. I reached Karachi yesterday morning and since then have had a heavy programme of interviews and discussions with the Governor¹ and his Ministers, and with a variety of other people.

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7. I fear that old Sir Akbar Hydari can hardly hope to last long. He came down to see me at Calcutta at Christmas, and then seemed to be in perfectly normal health, very much on the alert, sketching out elaborate tours for himself, and very sound and sensible as usual. But on return to Delhi he had a severe stroke, and the latest news as I write is that his condition is very grave. It was obvious to me from the beginning that he could hardly hope, even if he recovered from this stroke, again to carry the burden of an Executive Councillorship; and that that was obvious to a number of vultures, as was clear from the approaches I at once began to receive as to the succession to him. We will have to face up to this issue now, but I should like to postpone any recommendations to you for the reconstitution of my Council until after the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, which I gather is about the middle of the month. It goes without saying that the nature and character of any reshuffle of portfolios or any fresh appointments will be most carefully scrutinized to see what political pointers can be drawn from it, and I have no doubt, too, that there will be a considerable howl of disappointment, first when these posts are filled, and filled by people of the same type as my present Executive Councillors; secondly when, by appointing Benthall,² if Benthall was willing to serve, we maintain the principle that a non-official Executive Councillor need not necessarily be an Indian. But I will hope to have let you have recommendations by telegram before this letter reaches you. I am by no means certain about Nalini Sarker's prospects of staying the course, and it is of course very unsatisfactory that for nearly three months, though he has not been on leave, I should have had for practical purposes no work out of him, beyond an occasional case dealt with in his house. But I should be very reluctant to press him, and, as I know that he took office in face of a good deal of opposition and that to that extent we have a certain obligation to him, I wish to show him

¹ Sir H. Dow.
² See No. 57, para. 3.
every possible consideration. But my team has not been too lucky. Rao is now becoming a little more robust and will, I am sure, be very good. Sarker has been out of commission most of the time; I have now lost Hydari; and Clow has been suffering from Pneumonia. However, we seem to carry on pretty well and without too much difficulty.

* * *

10. I need not say how completely I agree with what you say, in an allied connection, in paragraph 5 of your letter of the 18th December; and as you will have seen from the notes which will by now have reached you of a conference in Calcutta at Christmas time over which I was requested to preside and at which Wavell and Pownall were present, I took very much the same line myself. The collapse of the French in French Indo-China made Singapore useless as a base or as a repair station for heavy ships. Our inveterate habit of propaganda (in these rough days of power politics) seems to have led us to push the _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ forward to Singapore instead of keeping one at Ceylon and the other at Port Darwin, where they would have weighed on the Jap conscience far more heavily than does the _Tirpitz_ on that of the Admiralty. The result is that we have lost them both, and left ourselves pretty well exposed in addition. The area of the whole Malay Archipelago (which I know well) is no place for capital ships in these days of torpedo bombers (for either side) and I do not doubt that we shall lose any battleships we commit to those regions while the Japanese have command of the air.

11. You proved a very good prophet in paragraph 5 of your letter of the 11th December, and as you say we are faced again with an offer to co-operate, more reasonable perhaps than the Poona one (but only to the extent that the absurdity of non-violence is temporarily removed), but still unacceptable. I hope and am sure that you will do what you can at your end to work up a prophylactic power against this subtle form of attack.

12. As regards paragraph 6 of your letter I quite agree that our formula of last year which you mention is good enough. But it has to be pretty strictly interpreted now that all—the services included—are strung up by the Japanese advance. I had no hesitation, as you will have seen, in making it clear to Reid over his problems in Assam that we must have a perfectly clear understanding that any Ministry coming into power there must be prepared to co-operate to the full over the war and must not be dependent for its majority on elements which, when the war issue came up, could not be relied on to play.

13. I shall be interested in Turnbull's comment which you mention in paragraph 8 of your letter about Pakistan. I have not the least doubt that as you say the Muslims will in the long run press Pakistan either as a bargaining asset or as a genuine objective. But I am in no hurry to face up to this matter
and I would propose to leave them alone and not to get into it too closely for some considerable time to come. Wint, I know, had in mind a further visit to India to explore Pakistan: but he is of course engaged on other work. I am not a bit fussed about the post-war period save where I judge that to be short-sighted or unwise, and am prepared to leave it to the post-war men! I doubt, too, if there is any value at this stage in asking Governors for an appreciation of local Muslim reactions to Pakistan. Jinnah has been at great pains not to define exactly what he means by that blessed word, and all we should get would be something pretty woolly and general. Equally I doubt the case for taking up Muslim complaints against Congress governments. As you know I never took those complaints too seriously, and I should be surprised if they did not prove to be either psychological in character or the type of quite minor oppression, insolence, injustice, which in a country so immense as this, so densely populated, and so entirely staffed by Indians of every class and kind, is bound to happen once the impression gets abroad in a major province that there is a Hindu Raj or a Muslim Raj as the case may be in the government of that province. However I have no objection to letting the matter be looked at departmentally and will be interested to see what you are sending out.

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15. It is so tiresome of Beaverbrook. I cannot think why he takes the line that he does. We could do such an immense amount out here to help (I am told that certain of the people who have come out recently in connection with Ministry of Supply schemes have been astonished by the potentialities of India and of Indian workmen so long as a sufficiency of supervisory staff can be obtained), and we are of course only too anxious to give all the help we can.

3 Expressing uneasiness about the danger to Malaya and Singapore.
4 On 27-8 July 1940 the All-India Congress Committee, meeting at Poona, confirmed a resolution of the Congress Working Committee passed at New Delhi on 7 July. The Working Committee's resolution had demanded an unequivocal declaration of the complete independence of India and, as an immediate step in giving effect to it, the establishment at the Centre of a provisional National Government, such as to command the confidence of all the elected elements in the Central Legislature and secure the closest co-operation of the responsible Provincial Governments. The resolution had concluded by declaring that 'if these measures are adopted, it will enable the Congress to throw its full weight in the efforts for the effective organisation of the defence of the country'.
5 That a Governor would have no further justification in maintaining Sec. 93 of the Government of India Act 1935 if a party leader commanding the confidence of the majority in the Legislature expressed his willingness to undertake 'the responsibilities attaching to office in present circumstances'.
6 Mr Turnbull's note (I/Pk/8/699: ff 272–87), prepared in November 1941 while he was in the Political Department of the India Office, consisted mainly of a summary of schemes put forward by individual Muslim exponents of the idea of Pakistan.
7 In para. 15 of his letter of 11 December 1941, Mr Amery had criticised Lord Beaverbrook, as Minister of Aircraft Production (May 1940 to May 1941), for not allowing India to start aircraft production 'on a tolerable scale'; and, as Minister of Supply (from June 1941), for his reluctance to allow supervisory staff to go out to India in pursuance of the recommendations of the Ministry of Supply Mission to India 1940–1, whose chairman was Sir Alexander Roger.
The pressure on us is going to be far greater with the Japs in, and with India (now that Australia is to a much greater extent in the front line) as the essential supply base for both east and west. I entirely agree with your comment.

16. About your paragraph 16, I am very sympathetic about a K.B.E. for Bonvin, and if you would like me to take it further here I will do so. But before I mention it to my Departmental Advisers I suggest that you might ask the Foreign Office what their general policy is or is likely to be as regards recognition for Free French Governors. I suspect that this is a business that will have to be settled on general principles, and I do not want to run any risk of trouble for Bonvin or to reduce the prospect of his getting a decoration which I am sure he richly deserves by a premature move. The Foreign Office, I have no doubt, could give you a line without any formal sounding of de Gaulle and without compromising anybody.

17. You will find any amount on record in the India Office about the idea of a swap designed to mop up all these little enclaves of French territory in India, and we went into it in very considerable detail, I think, shortly before you took office. The French tradition has of course consistently been to refuse to surrender an inch of French territory in any circumstances. But France may come out of the war in a position which will make her somewhat more reasonable on a good many topics.

18. Auchinleck seems to have done extremely well. The only crab in that campaign has really been the excessive optimism which was displayed officially at the start (led by our most sanguine Prime Minister!), and the consequent exaggerated expectations of a runaway victory which was aroused in the public mind. Given the relative strength and positions of each side I have never been able to understand why we should have expected a quick win there. But we may be well content with the way things have gone.

19. I am very grateful to you for sending me this copy of Alexander’s letter. His sincerity of purpose I fully accept. But the one sentence that matters, I think, in the accounts of these discussions is Gandhi’s statement that “he could not however talk to Mr. Jinnah as a Hindu leader since he was not one”. That you may take it from me, cancels out every other word said by him!

8 M. Louis Bonvin, as Governor of the French Establishments in India, had rallied to General de Gaulle’s French National Committee in September 1940. In a letter of 28 February Mr Amery was to refer to para. 16 above, adding that the Foreign Office view, with which he agreed, was that the question of a K.B.E. for M. Bonvin should continue to stand over until it could be dealt with as part of a considered scheme. MSS. EUR. F. 125/11.

9 With his letter of 11 December 1941 Mr Amery had sent Lord Linlithgow copy of a letter from Mr Horace Alexander, of the Friends Service Council of London and Dublin, congratulating him on the release of Congress prisoners and forwarding information on the efforts made by the All-India Conference of Indian Christians to bring about reconciliation between the leaders of the various parties.
Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR’S REPORT NO. 1, DATED THE 9TH JANUARY 1942

Owing to the Japanese successes, more interest is taken in war news today than at any time during the last 18 months. The general reaction of the people has been satisfactory. Muslim opinion is solidly anti-Japanese. Hindus apparently have a sort of brotherly feeling for them. This might be dangerous if the Japanese were ever strong enough to get a real footing in India, but for the present our Hindus here would probably discount such a possibility. Propaganda that we have put about in tribal territory regarding the entry of the Japanese into the war has met with a very satisfactory response.

2. Local supporters of Congress seem to have welcomed the resolution adopted by the All-India Congress Working Committee at Bardoli and the alleged relinquishment of the leadership of the party by Gandhi, as they think this will at least keep the door open for a settlement between Government and Congress and the resumption of office by Congress Ministries. I think that most people, however, suspect that Gandhi’s withdrawal is merely a deliberate move in his own complicated game, and do not believe that Congress will go seriously against his wishes. In this Province, at any rate, his lead is pretty sure to be followed. Dr. Khan Sahib, who has just returned from Bardoli, has said privately that Congress are really anxious to assume office once more, but that they want some excuse to be provided by His Majesty’s Government; he said they expected an announcement of some sort from Whitehall in a few days. He also says that Jawaharlal Nehru, Abul Kalam Azad and other Congress leaders mean to visit Peshawar in the Spring.
9

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/1/1/996: ff 86-7

IMPORTANT PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 10 January 1942, 12.30 am

43. Your telegram No. 53-S.C., January 4th. So far as I can judge my confidential meeting with editors went very well and since it took place lighter press such as Pictorial, Sketch and Standard which had all produced comment on general lines that Japanese war makes an initiative by us to end Indian constitutional deadlock necessary, have abandoned subject. Chronicle, Daily Herald and Manchester Guardian have continued to pursue it but except for latter provincial press generally has been more restrained.

2. Main points which I emphasised at meeting here (1) scope and importance of India's military and industrial war effort, (2) fact that this effort is dependent on support of States, the Muslims and other elements not within Congress for example Nepal, (3) that to a large extent India's fighting war effort is dependent on Muslim support; that there is no lack of recruits and that limitations are in sphere of equipment, (4) that any step in constitutional sphere which would alienate Muslim opinion might have most serious repercussions on India's war effort whereas active assistance of Congress would not make much difference to India's fighting strength though it would be of value internally in such matters as Civil Defence, (5) that a tendency in press here to come out in favour of giving way to Congress would make Congress less likely to compromise and was therefore harmful.

3. I fully agree as regards unsatisfactory attitude of Times. About a month ago I saw Barrington-Ward and found him, as I thought, understanding and appreciative of our position. Comment in yesterday's Times is however most unfortunate and I am taking steps to make contact with Barrington-Ward. I will inform you later of developments.

4. We have noticed here that Times has several times failed to give reasonable prominence to Muslim point of view in particular to Jinnah's statements given to Reuters. Inglis never seems to send any comment from Muslim sources. Times Calcutta correspondent's long telegram in Times, January 8th, was particularly mischievous. I don't know whether you can do anything at your end to improve this, but it is certainly very unfortunate.²

¹ No. 3. ² The final sentence was received corrupt.
I

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/509 : f 137

IMPORTANT
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 13 January 1942, 11.15 pm
Received: 14 January

63. In view of necessity of preparing for Prime Minister a suitable answer to Sapru and Co. and generally of Press agitation here and in India, I should be glad to have as soon as possible any suggestions you may have as regards former and your appreciation of the situation generally. Is there in your opinion anything beyond the forms of recognition which we at present accord that can be usefully said or done to emphasise India’s inter-Imperial or international status? Supposing for purposes of argument that the statutory obstacles were removed and that we were prepared to announce that you would set up a wholly non-official Indian Executive on Sapru lines, what prospect is there of League and Congress or even League and non-Congress Parties agreeing as to proportion of portfolios, &c., or remaining in agreement once they were in office? Is there behind the very negative Congress resolution any such real readiness to cooperate as Press suggests or is it all manœuvre to get us away from August 1940 insistence on agreement?

II

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 13 January 1942

I have just sent you a telegram\(^1\) asking if you have any suggestions to make for the kind of answer which the Prime Minister should send to Sapru and his 12 co-signatories, as well as wondering whether you have any comments on the situation in general. The memorial is of course treated here as having far greater importance than it may have in the eyes of those who know what are the actual forces behind politics in India. But I am sure the Prime Minister will be well advised to reply in as conciliatory a spirit as he can and incidentally, perhaps, to take the opportunity both of making the most of our 1940 Declaration and of associating himself with it personally. There has been so much criticism to the effect that anything in that Declaration or that has been said in speeches is only you and me and does not reflect the real purpose of the

\(^1\) No. 10.
Prime Minister, who means to concede nothing and therefore has deliberately avoided speaking about India. It won’t be too easy to get him to say the right sort of thing, but at any rate I must try, and hope that by the time this reaches you he may have given the kind of answer that will help to improve the atmosphere, even if it doesn’t change the actual political situation.

2. As I see that situation the main object of Congress is somehow or other to get us to go back upon the Declaration of 1940, with its insistence upon agreement, if not in so many words, then at any rate by some interim action that will prejudice the situation against the Muslims. In that manœuvre the Moderates, who are practically all Hindus and also old-fashioned believers in a Parliamentary Executive, consciously or unconsciously play their game. What our answer is to be, beyond keeping on reaffirming the extent and generosity of our 1940 policy, is not easy to see. Personally, I shouldn’t hesitate to go a long way in improving the inter-Imperial and international status of India, or the cutting down of control from here, if I felt it would really help the situation at this moment. But I don’t see myself the parties that matter being prepared either to agree beforehand themselves on the allocation of places in the Executive, or to accept an allocation by you, with any intention of playing the game either with you or with each other. Nor am I very anxious to cut short the life of your present Executive, which I feel is a real and live thing, capable both of helping the war and of advancing the Indian situation nearer to some solution.

3. The natural and obvious answer to Congress is that if they really mean co-operation they should come back in the Provinces and take their share in the National Defence Council. But I imagine that that is the last thing they wish to do and I shouldn’t be surprised if, once the so-called co-operators discover that they cannot get all that they want, the Congress meeting at Wardha should swing back to Gandhi and non-violence.

4. What I still feel difficult to answer is the criticism that we have promised to promote, as well as to welcome, the different elements coming together, and are not doing anything about it. It may be a perfectly sound answer that we are not doing anything because in your judgment it is useless to approach people at a moment when you know perfectly well from experience that they will not come together. There you alone can judge whether there is, or shortly will be, anything in the nature of an opportunity for bringing the parties together to discuss ways and means of dealing either with the constitutional future or with the more immediate present.

5. I know you don’t feel that the situation is ripe for setting up anything in the nature of a commission to study the constitutional problem. Have you
thought any further—for I haven’t had any answer from you yet—about the minor suggestion, arising out of Rao’s paper, that a small branch should be set up in your office, at any rate to collect and classify material of all sorts bearing on the problem? An idea which Attlee suggested to me the other day was that Gwyer might be relieved of his present post and invited to serve as a Royal Commission of one on the whole problem. I told him that you had recently commented on the absence of positive suggestions of a constructive character on his part but he still thought that, left to himself with a definite task of that kind, he would eventually come to definite conclusions. I confess I rather wonder. Coupland, to my mind, is much more likely to plan something constructive and I am not unhopeful that he may in the end produce something which will at any rate set India thinking.

14 January

6. The whole question of inter-Allied and inter-Imperial co-ordination in the conduct of the war is very much to the front just now. I enclose a copy of a paper which I drafted for the Cabinet and which Hankey has also endorsed. He and I are the only people in the Government circle who were actually concerned with the problem of co-ordination in the last war, but whether our views will count for much I am not sure. Meanwhile, Winston at Washington has been starting his, or rather the President’s, scheme of co-ordination for the South-West Pacific, and working backwards from that to an “Agency” in Washington, consisting of the American Chiefs of Staff, plus representatives of our Chiefs of Staff—primarily Dill—who, under the directions of the President and the Prime Minister, will decide upon Wavell’s suggestions. The idea is that this Agency should be purely Anglo-American, but that there should be set up a Far Eastern Council at this end, consisting of the existing Defence Committee (which I and Lockhart normally attend anyhow), plus representatives of the Dominion Governments concerned and of the Dutch. I suppose the Chinese ought to come into the picture, too, but they haven’t been mentioned so far. As you will see from my memorandum, the conclusion which Hankey and I come to is that a technical planning staff is not necessary for the war as a whole, the broad allocation between effort in the Far East and effort against Germany being only possible on the highest plane between Governments and Chiefs of Staff, and that we think that the actual planning organisation might be divided into one for the Japanese war and the other for the European and Middle Eastern war. The essential thing to my mind—and it will not be easy to get the Cabinet to understand the point—is that the actual

2 Joint Memorandum on Constitutional Reform in India, dated 17 April 1941, by E. Raghavendra Rao, Sir Hassan Suhrawardy and Diwan Bahadur S. E. Runiganadhan, Advisers to the Secretary of State; see L/P&J/8/509: ff 441–8.

3 Not printed.
planning organisation should, in order to be able to plan from the point of view of the Alliance as a whole, contain officers or sections of the different Allied nationalities; but they should be there in their individual capacity and in no sense as representatives of their Governments. On the other hand, when it comes to a deciding body like the Defence Committee (for in effect its conclusions are accepted by the Cabinet) that ought to have on it representatives of the Governments concerned.

7. Personally, I regret the rather negative attitude which Winston has throughout assumed on the question of Imperial representation. The mere fact that Mackenzie King and Smuts cannot conveniently attend is no reason why other parts of the Empire should not be fully and permanently represented. However, as you will see from my paper, I am simply suggesting at this stage that this should be representation on the Committee of Defence level. Once that is conceded I have no doubt that the Empire representatives on the Committee of Defence will also normally attend Cabinets at which their affairs come into discussion. I think you should begin considering whether there is any member of your Executive whom you would wish to send over here, not merely for a visit as we originally planned, but possibly more permanently. In that case you would, I think, have to make him a Member without portfolio, so as to enable his portfolio to be filled by someone else while he is here, or alternatively appoint an entirely new man without portfolio specially for that purpose.

8. That raises at once the further question whether, if you sent one representing British India, you should not follow the precedent of Imperial Conferences and Imperial Cabinets in the past and send someone representing the Princes. There is strong feeling against overloading the Defence Committee or its expansions with too many people, and I can foresee difficulties if we were to ask for two, while the Dominions and Dutch only had one apiece.

9. I notice that you are taking a certain number of candidates for commissions in the Indian Army from the Australians. When we originally approached the Canadian Army here on the subject they were rather sticky. I have since corresponded with McNaughton who is more forthcoming and hopes to spare a few. Meanwhile, I have learnt that in Canada they believe quite a number of young officers and men in training there would be willing to join the Indian Army. That might be a very useful additional feeder and produce a good type of young officer, as well, incidentally, as helping for the
future to bring about increasing Dominion understanding of Indian affairs. The problem of how to select these young men at the Canadian end is being gone into, as it would be impossible to bring them over here merely to be looked at and possibly rejected. It would be a curious sequel if the impossible attitude of the War Office about officers from here were met by India recruiting her officers entirely from the Dominions!

[Para. 10, on the political situation in Burma, omitted.]

I2

Mr Turnbull to Mr Martin (via Naval Cypher)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/509: f 142

TAUT No. 516. Following for Martin from Turnbull.
Telegraph from Sapru and others addressed to Prime Minister in Washington has been repeated to my Secretary of State who feels that in view of importance of signatories it would be desirable for Prime Minister to send interim reply in following sense. Begins: “I thank you for telegram for [from?] yourself and your distinguished co-signatories regarding Indian situation. You will I am sure appreciate that I cannot consider it as fully as it merits until I return to London when I shall send you further reply.” Ends.

I3

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

D.-o. No. 269/H.E.

GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, 15 January 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

In your private and personal telegram No. 146–S.C., dated January the 13th, you suggested that I might find a suitable opportunity to ask Jinnah to a meal. It so happened that a most useful opportunity, and one which relieved me of all embarrassment in asking him, was at hand, as Professor Coupland arrived here on the day I received your telegram. Accordingly, I asked Jinnah to lunch and he came today. Clow was also there. Jinnah was most friendly throughout,

1 Not printed.
and, if there is any effect from this social contact with him, I think it would be favourable. After lunch I had a talk with him, which I had intended would be a short one, so that he could then tackle Coupland: but at the first opening he proceeded to give me an exposition of the Muslim League position which lasted for three quarters of an hour. It was all most friendly, very logical, and well argued from the Muslim League point of view; but there seemed to me to be no indication at all of any change in his position. He appeared quite satisfied with our attitude, although, as will be seen, he expressed some fears that the British Press and public opinion would be taken in by Congress and other Hindu propaganda. I do not think any fresh point arose, but I will give you an account of the conversation.

2. I began by remarking that the Congress attitude did not seem to me to have undergone any real change: how did he see the present situation? This gave him his cue and he embarked on his exposition, of which the following is a summary. He agreed that the Congress resolutions had not materially altered their position and he thought that Amery, in his reply to a question in the House of Commons, had given the only possible answer. In effect, we still stood by the Declaration of August 1940, which of course satisfied him; but the Congress had [and?] other bodies, including the Liberals, (and it did not matter much what they called themselves, as they were all Hindus), were all hard at it trying to persuade us to depart from that Declaration. Congress was, perhaps, being more blatant than the others, but he thought that the attitude of “another brother” who represented himself before the British public as more reasonable than the “Congress brother”, was more subtle and more dangerous. This other “brother” wanted us to make a further declaration of Dominion Status with a time limit. Muslims were “mortal afraid” that we would fall into the trap and he noticed that newspapers in England seemed ready to fall. There was still another “brother” who appeared even more reasonable, who wanted only a National Government at the present time, responsible to the Crown. But all these “brethren” were out for the same thing. They wanted, first, to get us to make a declaration which would prejudice the issue of Pakistan and would rule it out, and, having obtained that from us, they would use it as a weapon with which to intimidate the Muslims. He assured me that the Muslims would never submit and would rather die. Even if the Hindus and the British were united together, the Muslims would still resist with all their strength. He was convinced that that would be so. He was in the closest touch with Muslim opinion amongst the masses all over India, and he was constantly receiving letters from Muslims which showed the intense interest which the community was taking, now, in every move on the political scene. It was true that the Congress had so many years of organisation behind them and that they were a very powerful body, and that the organisation of the Muslims had been dead
until a few years ago, but they were very much alive now. They realised that their existence was at stake, and, unless he was very much mistaken, they were in a determined mood. Moreover, all these discussions in the political field by the Congress and others, the obvious pressure which they were putting upon us, the recognition of our anxiety to reach a settlement because of the war situation, and the comments of British newspapers and of some politicians, made them extremely anxious and increased the ferment in their minds.

3. I put in, here, the question as to whether he considered that this awakening of the Muslims applied equally to the Muslim minority and majority Provinces, and he at once took me on a tour of every Province and explained his view of the Muslim position in each of them, which seemed to me of much interest as it revealed something of the inner working of the Muslim League mind. It was true, he said, that, in the Muslim minority Provinces, which had suffered under Congress Ministries, the determination to resist Hindu domination appeared to be greater than in the majority Provinces. The most determined were, perhaps, in the C.P. and in Bihar. There, the Muslims were both small in numbers and poor in status, and they had been “thrashed” by the Congress there more than in any other Province. In the U.P. although they were not large in numbers, the Muslims had greater status and more power, and they had been able to hold their own with greater success. In Madras, although they were very small in numbers, there was the non-Brahmin party, which was bitterly opposed to the Congress, and that had brought the Muslims a measure of support. In Bombay, the more enlightened and cosmopolitan atmosphere of the city had made it dangerous for the Congress to go to great lengths against the Muslims, and they had not dared to do so. Nevertheless, in all the minority Provinces the Muslims had sampled Congress Rule and were determined not to submit to any constitution which would install Congress domination over the whole country. He admitted that in the Muslim majority Provinces, if one looked only at the working of the Assemblies and Ministries it might appear that the same feeling did not exist, but that was a superficial view. Take the Punjab. There, the Muslims, although they formed the strongest party, could not have a majority over all others. In order to carry on a Government at all, they had to work in with Hindus and others, and if the Government there was to be maintained with a large Muslim element, there had to be a compromising attitude. That was the difficulty of Sikander Hyat Khan’s position. He had often come to the Working Committee of the Muslim League and pointed out his difficulties, and he (Jinnah) had always recognised the difficulty of his position. That would always be the case so long as the Muslims only had a small majority over other communities, and that was why, in framing his Pakistan scheme, he excluded from that Muslim zone the predominant Hindu area centering on

Ambala. The Muslims, according to his plan, would have 75 per cent. of the population, and they would be able to form a strong Muslim Government.

4. In the North-West Frontier Province, he would openly admit that he had failed, before the 1937 elections, to get them to form a Muslim League Parliamentary Board. Congress had got in ahead of him, and local conditions there had defeated him at that time; but since then, the Muslim League had won every bye-election, and he was quite confident that, if general elections were held in that Province, the Muslim League would win.

5. In Sind, he had similarly failed in 1937, and since then the composition of the Legislature and the extraordinary corruption had prevented any party which did not support the Government from making great headway. He did not express the same confidence about future elections in Sind, but undoubtedly the Muslims were becoming roused there, and it was noticeable that Allah Bakhsh, the Premier, did not dare to face a public Muslim audience. If the Muslim League did manage to get into power, the corruption advantage, regrettable as it was, would operate in its favour.

6. What was the position in Bengal? There, he had had more success in 1937, and, fortunately for the Muslims, Congress there had refused to enter a coalition and it had been possible to form a predominantly Muslim Ministry. But there, again, they could not have a clear majority in the Assembly, and forces were continually at work which undermined the solidarity of the Ministry. He had reason to believe that Sarat Bose and Mukerjee had obtained documentary evidence about some shady transactions of Fazlul Huq’s, and they had blackmailed him to such an extent that the poor man had been forced to do many things, recently, against his convictions and his better judgment.

7. It was local conditions like those he had mentioned to me which had given rise to the present Parliamentary situations in the Muslim majority Provinces, but it would be a mistake to deduce from that that the Muslims in those Provinces were not awake to their danger and were not behind the Muslim League. He was confident that they were. To him, the lesson of these Parliamentary situations was that it was necessary for the Muslims to have an overwhelming majority in their zones, instead of the precarious majorities which they had in the present artificial Provinces.

8. In the course of his exposition, Jinnah was at pains to counter the accusation, made against him by Congress and others, that he was acting in a manner which imposed a veto on constitutional advance. That was nonsense. What had he vetoed? No proposition had been put up to him by the other side which he had vetoed. It was most unfair to brand him before the world as the obstacle, and to assume that he was bound to be unreasonable. He was concerned with
maintaining the very existence of the Muslims, and, in his efforts to do so by Pakistan, he was being more reasonable than the Hindus. They wanted to dominate the whole country. He, by his Pakistan scheme, was giving them three-quarters of the country, and only wanted one-quarter for the Muslims. He was being neither unreasonable nor was he exercising a veto. It was the other side which, by its intransigent attitude, prevented a settlement.

9. I found, later, that Low had had a three hours' interview with Jinnah a few days ago, and [he?] had taken almost exactly the same line. Low told me, however, that on the question of maintaining his demand for 50 per cent. of the seats in any immediate National Government, he was adamant. He preferred, incidentally to talk of a co-national or a coalition government, rather than a national government.

10. Jinnah revealed, during his talk with me, that very recently he had had a talk with a leading Congressman, but, as always, Congress wanted him to put the cart before the horse, and I inferred that Jinnah had given whoever it was no comfort.

11. I repeat that Jinnah was most friendly. He abused no one, not even Fazlul Huq: he accepted without question that we genuinely wanted to arrive at a settlement which must mean a transfer of power: but he was afraid that we might succumb to pressure, although he seemed well satisfied with the present attitude of the British Government. He made no special mention of the Times article, but he did, on two occasions, refer to the symptoms in the British Press which looked to him as if they were falling into the Hindu trap. I was considerably impressed by the ability and logic of his arguments—and so, I find, was Low. But, at the end of it all, the deadlock seems to remain so far as he is concerned, without any prospect of a solution.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY.

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3 Apparently an allusion to Lord Linlithgow's telegram mentioned in para. 1.
I4

Mr Amery to Viscount Simon

L/PO/6/106a: f 83

INDIA OFFICE, 16 January 1942

My dear John,
I enclose a copy of a letter I have written to Attlee, together with a first tentative draft of the kind of answer I think Winston ought to give to the memorial by the Indian Moderate leaders.
I enclose a copy of the memorial for convenience.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

1 A similar letter was sent to Sir J. Anderson.
2 No. 15.

I5

Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/6/106a: f 84

INDIA OFFICE, 16 January 1942

My dear Clem,
It is, as we agreed the other day, very important that the appeal of the thirteen Indian Moderate leaders should be fully answered by the Prime Minister. I am waiting for suggestions on the point from the Viceroy, but have meanwhile tried my hand at a tentative draft which I should like you to look at and consider. The answer has obviously to be a reasoned proof of the impracticability of the greater part of their proposals. On the other hand, it is of the first importance that it should be forthcoming with regard to anything that is at all feasible, e.g. in regard to day-by-day relations between Whitehall and the Government of India. Above all, it is important that the general tone should by sympathetic and that the Prime Minister should personally identify himself with the full import of the Declaration of 1940. One of the troubles of the present situation is that both in India and here it is continually said that "mere statements by Amery and Linlithgow mean nothing; we want the Prime Minister to state the thing himself if we are to believe in the sincerity of the British Government." I have therefore brought in a good deal that is essentially explanatory of the policy of 1940.

I have at the same time attempted to make it the kind of letter which Winston himself might possibly write, at any rate in its general attitude and line of
argument. Whether I have at all succeeded in achieving the Winstonian style is another matter. However, I daresay he will be able to put in some of his own inimitable touches if only he can be persuaded to accept the document, or something like it, in its main line of argument.

I enclose a copy of the Memorial\(^1\) for convenience.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

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1 Namely enclosure to No. 2.

Enclosure to No. 15

L/PO/6/106a: ff 64-71

TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR A REPLY TO THE MEMORIAL

You will I am sure understand that it was not possible for me before returning from Washington to reply to your cable of January 1st. Nothing less than a full and carefully considered answer could do justice to an appeal coming from yourself and your co-signatories, patriotic men who have given such eminent service to India and to the British Commonwealth, and whose earnest desire to see India wholeheartedly united in the struggle against the forces threatening civilization we all gratefully recognize.

You ask whether it is not possible for me to declare at this juncture that India is no longer to be treated as a dependency to be ruled from Whitehall and that henceforth her constitutional position and powers are to be identical with those of the other units of the British Commonwealth. It is our sincere desire that India should rule herself in the same position of freedom and equality of status as is enjoyed by the United Kingdom and the other units of our Commonwealth. To that aim the Government, which I have the privilege to lead, solemnly pledged itself in the Viceroy’s declaration of August 1940 and to that pledge I readily once more give my personal endorsement.

The Viceroy’s declaration moreover made it clear that we were anxious to implement that pledge with the least possible delay after the principal elements in India’s national life have come to an agreement on the constitutional framework on which India’s self-rule is to rest. The definite conclusion to this problem must, as you have pointed out, necessarily wait until after victory has been achieved, though I see no reason why the discussion of its many facets should not proceed even now between Indian political leaders and thinkers.

What I find it more difficult to understand is the procedure by which you suggest that the goal upon which we are all agreed can in fact be achieved outright in isolation from any solution of the problem of India’s future constitutional structure, or how the powers which we both wish to see transferred to an Indian system of government can be so transferred otherwise than to
some established form of government resting on some definite basis of responsibility and enjoying general acceptance.

Your first suggestion in this connexion is that the existing Central Executive Council should be converted into a "truly National Government consisting entirely of non-officials of all recognised parties and communities and in charge of all portfolios subject only to its responsibility to the Crown." The Governor General's Executive Council has recently been expanded and now comprises a substantial majority of Indian and non-official members. If these do not include representatives of the two most important party organisations that is certainly not the fault of His Majesty's Government or of the Viceroy who used his best endeavours last year to secure their inclusion. In that Council both the new members and the older members with their special experience have worked most effectively together. Under their general guidance India is putting forth a remarkable effort in the raising and equipping of her forces, and those forces, voluntarily recruited, have shown by their spontaneous valour and devotion their belief in the cause for which they are fighting. I should gravely hesitate before accepting the conclusion that the displacement lock, stock and barrel of the present Executive by new members, even if more representative of the party organisations, would in fact increase the efficiency of government, give added confidence to the troops or enlarge the volume and activity of the support given to the war effort by the general public. In any case it is difficult for me to consider that aspect of the question without some more precise indication that the main parties are, in fact, now prepared—as they have not been hitherto—to agree, both as a matter of principle and in respect to their respective representation in participating in the work of such an expanded Council.

I come now to the other feature of this first suggestion, namely that the proposed National Government should only be responsible to the Crown. At present the ultimate responsibility of the Central Government of India is to the Crown in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. We are agreed in wishing to see it transferred to the Crown in the Legislative and Executive scheme of an Indian government. But to whom is it proposed that the suggested immediate transfer should be made? Is the Governor-General to become a personal autocrat amenable to no form of constitutional control? Or is the final and indisputable authority over all Indian affairs to rest in a majority vote of the new Executive? I cannot persuade myself that either of these alternatives would be constitutionally satisfactory or really acceptable to Indian public opinion.

On the other hand, leaving on one side this question of ultimate responsibility, I hope I may be able to set your mind at rest with regard to the points raised in your third and fourth suggested measures. His Majesty's Government is only too anxious that India's position should be recognised internationally and inter-Imperially. She was represented in the Imperial War Cabinets of 1917 and 1918 in the last war, at the Peace Conference, and since then at the League of Nations
and at Imperial Conferences. The Government of India has in these last few weeks subscribed to the declaration of aims by the 26 “United Nations” through its own representative at Washington. I can readily give the assurance that in connexion with any inter-Imperial or inter-Allied organisation that may be set up during the war, as well as with the eventual Peace Conference His Majesty’s Government here has no desire to dictate to the Government of India either the selection of its representatives or the instructions which that Government may decide to give them.

Nor has His Majesty’s Government here any desire to interfere gratuitously with the Government of India in the ordinary course of its administration. It cannot, as I have pointed out, ask Parliament to divest itself of its ultimate responsibility for India except to a properly constituted and generally acceptable Indian Government. But short of that it is its intention, and, indeed, its practice, to regulate its relations with the Government of India so far as possible on the same footing of free mutual consultation as governs its consultation with the Governments of the Dominions.

So far, indeed, as the Provinces are concerned His Majesty’s Government have only assumed the responsibility for their direct control owing to the refusal of the existing Ministries to fulfil their constitutional obligations to the people whose suffrages they had secured. The restoration of popular government, “broad-based on confidence between different classes and communities,” as asked for in your second suggested measure, is a matter essentially in the hands of the representatives of the people in each Province. As the recent example of Orissa has shown, Governors are only too willing to welcome the return to office of any Party or Coalition of Parties that is prepared to undertake the responsibilities of office under present conditions. His Majesty’s Government would regard such resumption of office as the most obvious and practical method of cooperation in the common effort, more particularly in view of the importance of the tasks in connexion with civil defence which fall within the purview of the Provincial Governments.

As for the suggested establishment, failing the restoration of ministerial government, of non-official Executive Councils “responsible to the Crown,” that proposal seems to me to invite the same questions as in the case of the similar proposal for the Centre: to whom, in the last resort, are the proposed Executive Councils, in fact, to be responsible? Is it to the Governors, i.e. ultimately to the Crown in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to a majority of their own number?

I have put these difficulties to you, not as a mere excuse for inaction, but because the transcendent importance and complexity of the task before us makes it essential that we should set about it both on the right lines and in the

1 See No. 5, note 7.
2 In Orissa a Ministry took office on 23 November 1941, with the Maharaja of Parlakimedi as Premier.
right spirit. The problem is a double one: on the one hand, how to transfer the ultimate control of the Government of India from a British to an Indian authority; on the other, how to create an Indian authority which can take over that control without risk of grave internal discord or disruption.

Each of these two complementary aspects presents its difficulties. There are many intricate matters arising from the long interlocking of British administration with Indian life which can only be resolved by careful planning and by mutual good will—good will which, on our part, will certainly be forthcoming. But even these difficulties are small compared with the task of devising a framework of government within which nearly four hundred millions of the human race can live in permanent peace with each other and cooperate effectively alike for their defence and for their economic welfare and social progress, and yet do so without fettering or overriding the individual freedom and way of life of the various profoundly different elements which make up the great sum total.

That task, the greatest that human statesmanship has yet essayed, is essentially one for Indians to settle among themselves. No scheme that could be devised by Parliament here could either respond so closely to Indian needs, or secure the good will so essential to its successful operation, as one contrived by Indian brains in accordance with Indian conceptions and Indian sentiments and by fair compromise and free agreement between the main elements of India’s national life. It is to that high task that we have invited Indian statesmanship to devote itself, assured at every stage of our willing cooperation.

Meanwhile we are engaged in a struggle to the death against forces whose victory would mean the end of all Indian aspirations for the future. You have been proud, and rightly proud, of the achievement of India’s soldiers on so many a hard fought field. By standing together with each other and with their comrades from every part of the British Empire they have not only won imperishable renown for themselves but strengthened the whole foundation of India’s future self-reliance. Shall we not do well, in the interest of that future, to follow their example and to concentrate all our efforts at this time upon the common task of saving ourselves and saving civilization? In doing so I believe we may all—British and Indian, Hindu and Moslem, British Indian statesmen and Indian Princes—come close together, and so do more to promote the constitutional solution, upon whose general character we are all agreed, than by any attempt to recast the foundations of Indian Government, in advance of any agreement as to the nature of the future constitutional solution, and under conditions which inevitably preclude due consideration either in India or in Parliament.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/509: f 232

NEW DELHI, 17 January 1942, 1.50 pm
Received: 17 January, 9.15 pm

11D/42. Following is summary of press account of opening day of all-India Congress Committee Session at Wardha on 15th January. Of 384 members about 40 are said to be in prison; of the remainder about 190 are attending.

Maulana Azad in presidential speech said Congress stood exactly where they stood 16 months ago. Nothing had happened to make Congress change their attitude though they wanted a change and wanted to obtain control of country’s Government irrespective of war or peace. He was sure in considering Bardoli resolution all would agree with Working Committee that there was no necessity yet to make any change in Congress attitude to the war—Congress position was in (? 19)40 and remained today one of non-participation and non-co-operation in war effort. Government had not done anything to invite Congress to reconsider their decision. Explaining difference in outlook himself and Gandhi, Azad said he was prepared to accept country’s independence whenever available whether during war or peace; his sole object was attainment of real independence of Hindustan.

Gandhi in course of an hour’s speech urged complete support for Bardoli resolution. He said non-violence was political weapon in hands of Congress that could be relied on and wielded at times and discarded at times; he himself would not have Swaraj at cost of non-violence. He urged all-India Congress Committee to pass unanimously Bardoli Resolution. He still regarded Poona Resolution1 as mistake, but in Bardoli Resolution there was no room for any misunderstanding. He had first thought of letting House divide on this issue but later felt it would be against non-violence; he had asked “whole hoggers of non-violence” to remain neutral on Resolution but if he found attempts being made to divide House he would advise them to support Resolution. He wanted Resolution accepted because though a step backward in his opinion it reflects exactly all shades of Congress opinion. Gandhi emphatically denied he wanted to turn Congress into religious body, and that there had been split or quarrel in Working Committee. Known difference between him and Nehru could not separate them; Nehru was Gandhi’s “heir” and after Gandhi’s death would take up all his work. There was no question of Congress losing him

1 See No. 7, note 4. The resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee at Poona, 28 July 1940, reasserted the principle of non-violence in the struggle for independence but expressed inability in existing circumstances to decide that this principle should be extended to the national defence of a free India.
(Gandhi); when he went out of Congress, it was only to serve Congress better. No man however great was indispensable for Congress; to bring another Resolution to retain his leadership would be foolish. All agreed whatever Congress had hitherto achieved had been due to non-violence. He saw no reason why there should be split on issue on non-violence now. Resolution was only explanatory and needed no operative clause. Answering question by Prakasam (Ex-Minister Madras) about future of Satyagraha Gandhi said Congress had given him free hand; they could not handle Civil Disobedience as effectively as he, the expert, could. “At present I do not know what to do. When and if I find that I should have Civil Disobedience (I will do) it”. He maintained suspension of Civil Disobedience had nothing to do with Bardoli Resolution but was connected only with present conditions of country. Nehru, moving Resolution, said at this late stage talk of coming to terms with British Government was out of the question. Relations between India and Britain had been very unhappy and there could be no hope of any settlement. Britain seemed blind to real situation. So long as India was not free one could not dream of settlement with Britain. Maybe free India might throw her weight on side of those countries with whom Britain may be in agreement but that did not mean settlement with Britain. She had lost opportunity for settlement with India two and a half years ago. If India experienced actual war it would help her to understand world much better. He ridiculed idea of returning to Parliamentary activities in face of uncertain conditions of next six months. Real work of Congress lay in organising every province, town, village and ward for every eventuality, raising volunteers to preserve order and protect people. Rajagopalachari seconded Resolution reserving his comments to end of debate, which continues today (16th).

**17**

*The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery*

*Telegram, L/P&EJ/8/509: ff 230-1*

*NEW DELHI, 18 January 1942, 7.15 pm  
Received: 18 January, 11.45 pm*

12D/42. Continuing my telegram dated January 16th number 11D/42:1 Following is summary of press account of 2nd day’s proceedings of All India Congress Committee at Wardha. Begins. Amongst amendments moved to Bardoli Resolution were 4 on behalf of Communist Party which stated inter alia that Congress recognised changed character of war and realised supreme issue before all mankind was complete victory against Hitler and his Allies; that present
reactionary policy of British Government should not prevent Indian people from forging rightful places in sacred and historical war against Fascism; and that Congress should record whole hearted support to Allied Cause. Mover said that they should not take Working Committee’s position (corrupt group). Congress Socialist Party moved amendment suggesting convening of Constituent Assembly as National Authority to watch interest of the people. Prakasam opposed resolution maintaining Gandhi’s interpretation of Bombay resolution\(^2\) was correct, that Bardoli resolution is worse than Poona offer as it keeps door open for settlement with Britain without making any demands, and that Congress could ill afford to repudiate Gandhi’s leadership a second time.

Rajagopalachari said India is alive to the dangers of aggression but not in a position to render assistance to victims thereof; nevertheless 400,000,000 are not powerless. If British Government suddenly either by stroke of wisdom or by stroke of misfortune realised Congress position and made it possible for Congress “to do necessary things” Congress could not shirk that responsibility. They asked for freedom and said they were entitled to it, so they must be ready even at the last moment to take up responsibility implied by freedom. Replying to critics who, in case Britain may be defeated, are unwilling to antagonise other powers, Rajagopalachari said “Are you going to tell victorious powers that Indian armies and Indian products were forcibly (?) taken out of India and that Congressmen in Wardha passed resolution against India’s participation in war?”. No amount of declarations or promises by Britain would do; severe proof and positive action are wanted. Resolution did not say what Congress wanted as Government knew already. Congress has not helped Government because Government has been unhelpful. Congress co-operation or non-co-operation remain exactly as when Congress declared attitude at beginning of war, but readiness for settlement is fundamental principle of non-violence struggle. Talk of Parliamentary programme is not merely seeking of power but matter of expediency. If Central Government is placed in my hands I would take it, but I would not touch Madras Government today without control of Centre. In present conditions there is no sense in coming to power in Province. Parliamentary programme without power is out of the question. Dealing with unjust charge that he is being too clever, Rajagopalachari said, “If I am a hunter, credit me with being big game hunter. I will not be content with less”.

Rajendra Prasad, explaining the position of pacifist group, said Bardoli resolution made opening however small, for armed help in war provided British Government accepted India’s demands. Arms had not and would not settle any dispute in world. This is not merely theoretical proposition but political necessity. It is politically wrong to involve country in war at this

\(^1\) No. 16. \(^2\) See Appendix ii.
time. Indians should not in this war or in East relax its hold on principle of non-violence. By merely passing resolution they were not called upon to take up arms today; that would happen only in unlikely contingency of British Government declaring in favour of India’s independence and transferring responsibility of administration to people. They did not accordingly think it necessary to resign from Working Committee. They would make their choice when Government opened way for armed assistance by Congress.

Nehru replying to debate criticised Prasad’s group who said that they did not consider independence of countries like England and America worth acceptance. He would accept that imperfect type of freedom and try to remedy its defects and build up new structure of society which would be free from periodical wars and use of violence. Bardoli resolution passed 204 votes to 15 with the additional words “from any quarter” after the words “subject to aggression” in paragraph 4 my telegram dated December 31st. Ending.

3 Transmitting text of the resolution reproduced in Appendix III.

18

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

18 January 1942

89.–S. I am preparing brief appreciation of political position here in the light of Bardoli etc. and also comments on Sapru’s message etc. for which you asked me. I could let you have both by 21st but would prefer longer if there is no likelihood of early debate or pressure for early discussion in Cabinet. Could you let me know programme as regards both Cabinet and Parliament?

2. Appreciation will be my own and I shall not have time to consult Governors. (Nor do I think it essential or even desirable to hold up appreciation while I do so). I anticipate however that His Majesty’s Government will want a brief supplementary telegram once I have been able to ascertain Governors’ views. I do not want to burden Cabinet or Prime Minister with anything lengthy and think the first thing to get Winston’s mind on to is the broad essentials of position from the all-India angle.
19

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106a: f 81

INDIA OFFICE, 19 January 1942, 3.20 pm

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

86. Your private and personal telegram 89–S1 dated 18th January. I should be glad to have your appreciation and comments on Sapru’s message by the 21st if you can manage this without inconvenience, as Parliament resumes tomorrow. But if this means rushing you it would suffice if you could let me have them by Friday evening. Please keep them as short as possible as they are for Prime Minister.

1 No. 18.

20

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET

19 January 1942


I never anticipated that Congress would become more reasonable either because of the war situation or because of the release of political prisoners and this view seems to be confirmed by the most recent reports from Bardoli which I have seen in the newspapers. One very significant point is that Gandhi appears to have definitely nominated Jawaharlal Nehru as his successor; in other words he has rather discarded the more reasonable persons in Congress, such as Rajagopalachari, but of course this does not mean that there will be a split in Congress which will obviously never occur so long as the Mahatma is alive. Some leader writers in the British newspapers talked about “dropping the pilot” and made other similar comments on the Congress situation. Indeed at that time before Bardoli, there were indications in Rajagopalachari’s speeches that he might part company with the Mahatma, but once again history has repeated itself and Gandhi with his usual cunning has welded Congress together with a formula which is capable of numerous interpretations. But it is very significant that Nehru’s speech at the A.I.C.C.1 goes to show that Congress are not in the least prepared to make any settlement with the British Government whatever concessions might be given to them, and for that reason the Hindustan Times in its issue of the 17th January has its main headline—“No

1 See No. 16.
hope of settlement with Britain”. The National Herald of the same date in a
side paragraph on the front page quotes as the nation’s demand the com-pre-
hensive and full-throated slogan—“Not a pie—not a man”. Whether this is
actually a quotation from the Mahatma’s speech is not quite clear, but all this
goes to show that we can expect no co-operation of any kind from the Congress.
It also goes to show how correct H. G. Wells was in his reply to Nehru, which
appeared in the press, in which he described him as a “shiftv politician”. Later
reports of the A.I.C.C. meeting show a lot of confused speaking and thinking.
As Nehru said in a recent telegram to Gandhi, quoted by the D.I.B., “it is too
sad that at this critical juncture there should be anything leading to confusion
in the public mind”. As D.I.B. pertinently comments—“the confusion exists
primarily in his own mind”.

11. In view of this attitude of Congress, the recent replies made by the
Secretary of State in the House of Commons were clearly very desirable, though
as usual they excited much criticism; if a more definite declaration that Govern-
ment will have no further dealings with Congress were made, that would
undoubtedly be well accepted by the Muslims and also by the less vocal but
none the less loyal elements in the country who disagree entirely with the
Congress policy. But there are times when silence is golden and on the whole
I think we should avoid any more statements on the political situation.

12. I am always somewhat diffident of attempting any forecast of future
developments, but from the most recent reports which I have from my district
officers, there are some signs that Congress workers in the districts are engaging
in undesirable activities, in particular in regard to agrarian matters e.g., the
District Magistrate of Gorakhpnr who it may be remembered was the officer
who sentenced Nehru and whose views may be possibly somewhat extreme,
says that the release of prisoners has resulted in a serious increase in agrarian
agitation particularly among the sugar-cane growers, that the agitators were
telling the growers to ask for a very high price for cane and at the same time
were carrying on their subversive pro-
paganda on the lines that the British
should be turned out of India “naked
and hungry” or that there is no dif-
ference between German and British rule. Somewhat similar reports come from
other districts and now that the Congress Committee have finished their
lengthy discussions, we may expect a good deal of trouble from these agrarian
agitators, but I think we shall be able to deal with them satisfactorily.

I suppose if these Satyagrahis
would have been out about now
on expiry of sentence. L.

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Mr Turnbull to Mr Rowan

L/PO/6/106a: f 72

INDIA OFFICE, 20 January 1942

Dear Rowan,
My Secretary of State has telegraphed\(^1\) to the Viceroy for his suggestions as to the reply to be given to Sapru’s telegram\(^2\) to the Prime Minister. He expects an answer by the end of the week and thereafter will put up proposals for the Prime Minister’s consideration.

2. Mr. Amery thinks the Prime Minister ought to know that since the outbreak of war with Japan there has been a general tendency in the Press to argue that the danger in the Far East makes a settlement of the Indian question necessary and that the Government should take the initiative with this object. Popular Conservative papers, such as the *Sunday Pictorial*, *Standard* and *Sketch* have taken this line, and *The Times* has supported measures on the line of Sapru’s proposals. This general tendency was checked by a Press Conference which my Secretary of State gave on 23rd December, but has not ceased. My Secretary of State also thinks the Prime Minister’s attention should be drawn to the enclosed cutting from *John Bull*\(^3\).

I also enclose some extracts\(^4\) from recent Press comment about India, which it may be useful for you to have when the reply to Sapru is receiving the Prime Minister’s consideration.

Yours sincerely,

F. F. TURNBULL

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\(^1\) No. 19.  \(^2\) Enclosure to No. 2.  \(^3\) Not printed.  \(^4\) Not printed.

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 20 January 1942

Winston has come back having, I think, done a really great work in America, psychologically in bringing the two countries closer together and winning the President as a real friend, as well as making far-reaching arrangements, which on the whole should I think work well, for co-operation in shipping, materials, munitions and strategy. He is very full of the greatness of this achievement
and in a mood of confidence looking to the ultimate result. But he comes back to a pretty serious situation both at Singapore and in Burma, and to a House of Commons which is in a very critical and angry mood. Much of the criticism is wholly unfair, especially where it deals with strategy, and generally ignores the fact that the same machines and men could not have been sent to Malaya and Burma as well as used in Libya or sent to Russia, or when it overlooks the fact that Pearl Harbour and the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse have so completely altered the naval situation that the defence of Malaya has been almost impossible except to the extent of rearguard fighting. More pertinent is the criticism that we have not even now got the machines and men required for our many tasks, and that admitting that the main blame goes back for many years, possibly our productive organisation might have been better during these last two years. The underlying criticism indeed is of the structure of the Cabinet as an instrument for getting the most out of the nation.  

2. Much will depend on how Winston handles the matter next week. I hope he will be in his best expository vein, and not unconciliatory to the House, in which case he may well get away with it with flying colours. But he is apt to be combative and over-resentful of criticism, and if he takes that line we may have a decidedly unpleasant debate. I sincerely hope not, for there is no one to replace him and I don’t somehow see him, once he has had his fight and won, reconstructing his Cabinet in order to please what he will consider unreasonable and personally hostile critics. So I can only hope that the debate goes off smoothly and that the course of events may turn out more favourable and mitigate the mood of the House—and indeed of the country.

3. So far as the House is concerned, I dare say I may also find myself the target of criticism, not only on the constitutional issue, which I dare say I can weather all right in spite of the Press-fed clamour, but also for not having done far more to find both troops and munitions in India. Well, you know well enough what you have done with the resources at your disposal, and that you could only have done more if at this end more machine tools, more skilled staff, &c., had been immediately forthcoming. The most absurd type of criticism, of course, is that which suggests that if only we gave Congress, or even Sapru and Co. what they ask for, there would be millions of new recruits, rifles, tanks and aeroplanes springing up from nowhere all over India.

4. I said just now that an improvement in the situation may steady the critics. But we may well go through much worse days than we have seen yet. The Japanese are near, have far many more troops available than we have, and
lose not a minute in taking chances pushing on with them. I trust Singapore will hold, but it will only be as a beleaguered garrison, not playing any general part in the war or able to prevent the Japs turning round and attacking Burma in strength. They got Tavoy yesterday, which means fighter support for their bombing attacks on Moulmein and Rangoon, and it is quite possible that both of these places may be made unusable or even fall to the enemy, in which case not only are our troops in Burma largely cut off from any reinforcement, but China gets cut off likewise.

[Para. 5, on Mr Amery’s talk with an American parachute expert about the construction of parachutes in India, omitted.]

6. I still feel that we are not doing nearly enough in the matter of air-borne troops. If we could have landed even a couple of battalions the other side of Rommel we might have him in the bag at this moment. Later on India may well be faced with the problem of war simultaneously in the Middle East and in Burma. Supposing the Bay of Bengal is so infested with Japanese raiders that ordinary convoys cannot pass, or supposing even that Rangoon itself were taken, or at any rate unusable, it would make all the difference in the world if troops could be flown to Upper Burma from Assam or indeed all the way from the Middle East. The same applies to the problem of flying troops from one part or another of the island group which we are now defending and may have to reconquer.

Put up the equipment and I and mine will guarantee to do the rest and quick.

7. I have had a talk with Schomberg, who was very interesting on the subject both of Pondicherry and of Goa. It would be a great thing if we could somehow get rid of all the overlap of small territories and even fields between British India and French and Portuguese India; better still if we could concentrate both of them into an expanded Pondicherry and expanded Goa; best of all if they could both be bought out altogether. I was Secretary in the last war of two committees concerned with the problem of exchanges and we came to all sorts of definite conclusions; but the Foreign Office never attempted really to push the matter after the war, so here we are again. I believe, in fact, so far as the French are concerned, we nearly came to some tidying up arrangement 70 or 80 years ago. Schomberg is anxious to go out to India again and be re-employed in any sort of capacity. He looks fit enough and I imagine that he is pretty shrewd, as well as the possessor of a good pen, but I expect it may not be easy to find anything for him to do.

[Para. 8, on the possibility of finding Lieut. Col. Bremner, H.M. Consul at Goa, a more congenial appointment, omitted.]
9. Dill, as you may have heard, was originally left behind by Winston in order to be his representative as Defence Minister: this over and above the representatives of the Chiefs of Staff to sit in a combined body with the American Chiefs of Staff. It has now been decided, I gather, that Dill is to become head of our Chiefs of Staff Representatives and not the Prime Minister’s personal representative. Apparently he gets on extremely well with the President and everybody there and has made a very good impression. All this now looks to me much more like a permanent job, rather than the two or three months that I first thought it would be, and consequently raises the whole issue of what is to happen about Bombay. It would be a great pity if Dill’s appointment to Bombay were cancelled and someone else found. On the other hand, I don’t know for how long Lumley would be prepared to continue if it were put to him on the grounds of public convenience. I have no doubt he might be persuaded to put in an extra six months or even a year. But it would hardly be fair to ask him to continue indefinitely, if the war should be prolonged. On the other hand, if the war is prolonged indefinitely, I don’t see why Dill should stay there indefinitely. By the time he has been there for a year or so, the joint Chiefs of Staff machinery should be in good working order and I should have thought he could be replaced. Anyhow I must try and find out from Winston as soon as I can what his intentions are with regard to Dill and let you know if necessary by cable.

Last news about Malaya very disquieting. Defence Committee meets tonight to consider whether we should not be concentrated on Burma.

1 Field-Marshal Sir John Dill had been appointed Governor-designate of Bombay. He had accompanied Mr Churchill to Washington in December 1941 in place of General Sir Alan Brooke, who had relieved him as Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 1 December.

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23

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

21 January 1942, 6.15 pm
Received: 21 January, 4.20 pm

No. 104-S. His Majesty’s Government will wish for an appreciation of political position here in light of recent developments, particularly Bardoli resolution, and for my suggestions as to policy which we should wisely adopt in present circumstances. Text of Jinnah’s resolution at Nagpur and of Bardoli resolution, and gist of discussions on latter in All-India Congress Committee will be available to you and need not be repeated here.
2. Cabinet will have noted in Bardoli resolution insistent demand for "full freedom"; reference to our system as "arrogant imperialism which is indistinguishable from fascist authoritarianism"; and deliberate misrepresentation of our attitude. Discussion of resolution in A.I.C.C. on 15th January was important as bringing out real reluctance of substantial elements to co-operate wholeheartedly whatever happens; fact that resolution was got through entirely on assumption that it committed nobody to anything unless His Majesty's Government conceded Congress demand, when the position could be reconsidered; and extent to which elements in Congress were afraid to antagonise possible victors by helping or coming to terms with us. Rajagopalachariar added that the Bardoli resolution "does not say what we want. The British Government know what we want. Therefore we need not reiterate it", and, as usual with Congress pronouncements, there has been a number of competing public statements by prominent Congressmen as to what exactly it means.

3. In effect Bardoli resolution taken with discussion in A.I.C.C. represents reiteration of Congress demand for surrender by His Majesty's Government to Congress claims, ignoring other parties and interests and their own obligations in the hope they will get Congress support in fighting the war. Its main importance is that it places us at some tactical disadvantage because of the ease with which it can be misrepresented to our disadvantage here and elsewhere, while it has helped the Congress machine by responding to the strong feeling in the country that non-violence is an impossible proposition in present conditions with the Japanese next door. It is important not to let ourselves be hypnotised by Rajagopalachariar and his appearance of reasonableness and plausibility. He is endeavouring to concentrate spotlight on himself and to obscure the very significant dissident strains that have emerged in the discussions at the A.I.C.C.; while Congress publicity will continue to oversimplify resolution and endeavour to present it to the public at home as generous offer to co-operate on reasonable terms.

4. The Muslim League attitude, so far as I am aware, remains unchanged, with Jinnah apprehensive that His Majesty's Government will allow themselves to be stampeded by the Hindus and Congress. Jinnah has just informed Lumley that he stands firm on Pakistan, and thinks that Hindus are out to get us to make a declaration which would prejudice and rule out Pakistan, and, having obtained that, use it as weapon with which to intimidate Muslims. In all the minority provinces the Muslims had sampled Congress rule, and were determined not to submit to any constitution which would install Congress domination over the whole country. He does not think that Congress resolutions have materially altered their position, and thinks that Secretary of State in reply to a recent

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1 Resolution passed by Muslim League Working Committee at Nagpur, 27 December 1941 (Appendix IV).
question in Parliament has made only possible answer. He accepts without question that we genuinely want to arrive at a settlement which must mean a transfer of power, but is afraid that we may succumb to pressure, though he seemed, to Lumley, well satisfied with present attitude of His Majesty’s Government.\textsuperscript{2}

5. Minor minorities such as Scheduled Castes, and large body of opinion which is anxious to assist but knows that it can in no circumstances hope to exercise real control itself over the political future, is watching the line we shall take with uneasiness and uncertainty.

6. Issue is clearly of great importance and we must consider it dispassionately. I am quite ready to accept that it may be necessary for us to alter the general line of our policy towards India after and as a consequence of the war. But I am clear that in any event that policy as it stands (ultimate Dominion Status and transfer of real power to Indians at the Centre, \&c., and ultimate implementing of arrangements covered by Declaration of August 1940) is one which can only be successfully implemented from a strong position. Our present position I would not regard as a strong one, and our prestige is undergoing some deterioration. I have to bear in mind, further, fact that we are under warning that we may lose Singapore and that, as I have frequently informed Secretary of State, I am advised that India is at present wholly insufficiently protected against attack, and that direct attack on any considerable scale might produce an exceedingly difficult situation to hold in terms of security in this country. I would not judge that there could wisely be any question of allowing ourselves to be stampeded into implementing either wholly or partially our long-term policy in such circumstances, and at the present time. And if I am right in thinking that these are not circumstances in which implementation of our long-term policy is practicable, I am of opinion equally that there is very little if anything further that we can do within our tether.

7. I develop this position further below. In doing so I concentrate on the issue as affecting the Centre. The provincial aspects though important are less so, and not decisive in the present argument.

8. Main propositions put forward for our consideration are either (a) in effect, implementation of our long-term policy either completely or to a degree which would make it impossible for us after the war to regain any ground given now, and which we thought it desirable to retrace, \textit{e.g.}, the Congress demand for acceptance of complete independence for India, to be accompanied by positive immediate steps in evidence, and their demand (Bardoli resolution) for a “free independent India which only can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis and be of help to the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the storm of war”. Or (b) the Sapru
type of proposal—elimination of parliamentary control, Viceroy to have autocratic powers with wholly non-official executive responsible to him, &c.

9. To take second category first, Cabinet will be fully alive to objections to severance of parliamentary control and will appreciate that acceptance of Sapru's propositions would compromise post-war position beyond any question, while I do not myself believe that it would secure us support of major political parties. They represent a leap in the dark from the solid platform of the Act of 1935 and with no guarantee of any reward. "Home rule for Viceroy", which I have been disturbed to see that the Times has tended to support recently, ignores impossibility of any Governor-General reconciling his diverse obligations, or disposing on an autocratic basis of all the resources of this immense country, without parliamentary sanction and control. We have already made arrangements to meet the contingency of a break-down of all communications between London and Delhi. Indeed, in any emergency it may well be unavoidable that the Governor-General should take immediate responsibility for much about which he would prefer to have secured the prior consent of His Majesty's Government. But all this is very different from a proposal to release the Governor-General and the Government of India from all statutory control by His Majesty's Government and Parliament.

10. Nor do I believe that any entirely non-official Council that I could put together unless it had the full support of the majority parties (who have refrained from supporting Sapru), would be better than I have got at the moment. Sapru and his friends carry no real weight here. The inclusion of all or any of them would add nothing to the effectiveness of our prosecution of war; and I think it quite likely that we should be under strong pressure from them for concessions in this direction or that designed to show Indian public opinion that they really counted for something. In a wholly Indianised Council I should be much concerned, too, lest, the moment the war drew nearer to India, we found ourselves under pressure to recall Indian formations overseas for India's local defence, and to close down despatch of warlike supplies outside India in interests of conserving them for India herself. I would take that risk very seriously if I had strong Congress element in Central Government, but it cannot be ignored even with a Central Government of the Moderates of the Sapru type.

11. So much for what I might call a policy of nibbling, and of endeavouring to buy off opposition by concessions of greater or lesser importance, which would not however take us all the way to our final objective. I now turn to the wider suggestion that we should in effect go the whole way at once, accept demand for full independence and give tangible proof of the reality of our doing so. It seems to me to be out of the question to consider anything of the

2 See No. 13.
sort. And I imagine that that will be the feeling of the Cabinet also. On that assumption we may take it that there is no possibility of giving satisfaction to Congress or securing their real and wholehearted support. In my experience they are entirely ruthless politicians; will take all they can get; will do their utmost to manœuvre us into a position in which we make sacrifices that are substantial and that will increase the prestige and the power of Congress in this country. But short of acceptance of their full demand no sacrifices however great can be relied on to keep them quiet.

12. I need not develop the unfortunate effect on those who genuinely sympathise with us in this country, or on those to whom we have given undertakings, such as the Muslim League, or on the Princes, of allowing ourselves to be stampeded into negotiations with Congress or acceptance of Congress demand. Nor (while possibility of underground negotiations can never be wholly ruled out) do I see anything to suggest that Congress and Muslim League are at this stage likely to unite and get together in an expanded Council. (Jinnah has made clear to Editor of Times of India that he would regard as essential first 50:50 in any such Council; secondly that the representation of minorities should be secured through him and be under his control, since otherwise minority representatives would be absorbed by the Hindu element. I need not elaborate difficulties which any such arrangement would produce.)

13. My general conclusion, viewing this difficult matter with greatest detachment that I can, and with full sense of its importance, is in these circumstances that we should stand firm and make no further move. I do not believe that any further move at this stage will be likely to improve India’s contribution to the war. As mentioned above I think it quite possible that further transfer of power might mean pressure on us for withdrawal of Indian troops and Indian supply. I do not believe that we could rely on a united India (even a united British India, for the Princes tend to be ignored to a dangerous degree in discussion in the Press, &c.) solid behind us in fighting the war. India is hopelessly, and I suspect irremediably split by racial and religious divisions which we cannot bridge, and which become more acute as any real transfer of power by us draws nearer.

14. I take very seriously too in reaching my conclusions possibility that further transfer would give marked encouragement to quisling activities. Recent report from military authorities in eastern India is to effect that there is a large and dangerous potential 5th column in Bengal, Assam, Bihar, and Orissa, and that indeed potential of pro-enemy sympathy and activity in eastern India is enormous. Sarat Bose has been a lesson. The activities of U Saw and Tin Tut (a senior civil servant occupying a very responsible position) are another and a grave one. I know that we are frequently urged to do something to “touch the heart of India” and our sympathies naturally lean in that direction. But
Cabinet will I think agree with me that India and Burma have no natural association with the Empire, from which they are alien by race, history and religion, and for which as such neither of them have any natural affection, and both are in the Empire because they are conquered countries which had been brought there by force, kept there by our controls, and which hitherto it has suited to remain under our protection. I suspect that the moment they think that we may lose the war or take a bad knock, their leaders would be much more concerned to make terms with the victor at our expense than to fight for the ideals to which so much lip-service is given, and I have been impressed by the prominence given by Rajagopalachariar to the doubts felt in the A.I.C.C. as to the wisdom of antagonising possible victors.

15. What we have to decide however is whether in such circumstances, whatever the feeling of India, we intend to stay in this country for our own reasons, and whether India’s place in imperial communications is not so important, at any rate in war-time, that we must hold on and must not relinquish power beyond a certain point. If we accept that India is too important at this stage for us to take any chances, then I would rather face such trouble as we may have to face here as a result of making no concessions now in the political field than make concessions which are ill-advised and dangerous and on which we might have to go back for reasons of imperial security at a later stage in the war.

16. I recognise to the full that Cabinet have to deal with much Left Wing pressure and pressure from academic theorists or sentimentalists, reflected even in papers so important as the Times. This battle if it is lost, will, however, be lost at home and not in India, and if my suggestion that we make no move is accepted by yourself and by the Cabinet it will be necessary to consider the best line to take to try to damp down activities of this order. You alone can judge how much significance is to be attached to criticism in the home Press and from Left Wing and liberal elements in Parliament. I would have judged it myself to be largely a reflection of uneasiness at the turn things have taken.

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3 Sarat Chandra Bose had, with his brother Subhas Chandra Bose, been a leader of the Forward Bloc, a group formed by members of Congress in Bengal who disagreed with the orthodox policy of the party. Though expelled from Congress in October 1940, Sarat Bose continued to lead the Congress Parliamentary Party in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. On 11 December 1941 he was arrested and detained under the Defence of India Rules. The Government of India announced that they were satisfied that there had been contacts of such nature between him and the Japanese as to render his immediate apprehension necessary.

4 U Saw, Prime Minister of Burma, and his Adviser U Tin Tut were arrested on their return journey from a visit to Britain and America. The following announcement was issued from 10 Downing Street on 18 January: "From reports received about the movements of U Saw after his goodwill mission to this country it has come to the knowledge of His Majesty’s Government that he has been in contact with Japanese authorities since the outbreak of war with Japan. This fact has been confirmed by his own admission. His Majesty’s Government have accordingly been compelled to detain him, and it will not be possible to permit him to return to Burma."
in the Far East, and to be based on assumption, which I do not regard as correct, that by a generous gesture now we can unite India behind us and get her solid moral support for the prosecution of war.

17. His Majesty's Government will naturally wish to appear as constructive as possible in any debate. I suggest however that the general line of any debate could properly be that we have responsibilities to discharge and pledges to honour; to harp again on the depth and reality of Indian differences; to insist that in no circumstances shall we go back on our pledges to the Muslims; to bring out the incompatibility of the Muslim League demands with those of Congress; to show the public how little the Bardoli resolution really means; to lay particular emphasis on the discussion in the A.I.C.C.; to repeat (it does not matter if it bores people here) the merits of the August Offer and the reluctance of Congress to face up to it; to repeat that it was Indians themselves alone that made impossible in October 1940 something approximating pretty closely to what the Congress are now asking for; to stress that we have got in practice as national a Government and as good a national Government as we can get in present circumstances, in the expanded executive; and, as a possible constructive alternative, to refer to the possibility of the federal scheme (which from our point of view secures defence, secures a degree of financial control, brings in the conservative princely element to which our undertakings are so important, and would be practicable consistently with maintenance of war effort). On these lines I should hope that we could regain any ground which Congress have taken from us by the appearance of readiness to co-operate on reasonable terms which attaches to Bardoli resolution.

18. Above represents my own considered view. I have not yet consulted Governors, though I would expect general support from them for policy of standing firm. If there is any further information which you or Cabinet require to enable you to reach decision you will I am sure let me know.

24

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, 21 January 1942

REPORT NO. 99.

This report covers the first half of January.

1. Political Situation—The expectations which were aroused in the public mind on the first release of the Bardoli resolutions appear to have died down
considerably. It is clear, I think, that the newspapers, which hailed them as a great advance and an olive branch, were too optimistic, and I notice that several Congress leaders have taken them to task for misinterpreting the resolutions, and have been at pains to minimise the desire for co-operation. The statement issued by six members of the Working Committee, including Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad, which declared that they adhered to non-violence and would not support co-operation in the war, revealed the cleavage which still exists in the Congress, and, to my mind, exposes the hollowness of the claim that, if we will only respond to the Congress gesture, we shall have a united India in support of the war. It would appear more true to say that, if we appeased the Congress, we should run the risk of calling back to power an organisation which is by no means convinced of the necessity of carrying out a war policy, quite apart from the reactions of the Muslim League. This statement by the six members of the Working Committee came as a considerable shock to the Congress optimists here, and they did not disguise in the press their disappointment. This possibly accounts for a certain slackening of interest over the Congress deliberations. The adoption by the A.I.C.C. of the Bardoli resolutions does not seem to amount to more than a willingness to preserve a façade of unity over the divergent views held within the Congress.

There is a more satisfactory development in the Congress attitude towards A.R.P. in Bombay. Yesterday, the Municipality reversed its previous decision not to co-operate in A.R.P. measures, and has agreed to undertake various duties which we have requested them to perform. This is satisfactory as far as it goes, and I hope they will not resort to arguments and further delay over details. If they do, we shall have to make use of the recent Ordinances, but I hope that will not be necessary.

The Congress resolve to organise the countryside in the interests of law and order and the maintenance of morale will want watching. Its object is, I have little doubt, to re-establish Congress hold and prestige, and to take advantage of any weakening of authority which may result from war developments. Judging from past experience, this resolve will not prove so effective as Congress desires, but it may prove obstructive to the war effort in recruiting and other matters. Few Congressmen will be found to resist the temptation to advocate non-co-operation in all forms of war effort and I notice that Kher, for one, has been making some stupidly
hostile and petulant speeches. I should also mention that the Congress party in the Provincial Legislature has recently met, and appears to have resolved that a return to Parliamentary activities is out of the question until independence has been obtained.

25

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 105–S. Your private and personal telegram of January 13th. I am telegraphing separately appreciation for Cabinet. I am also sending message to the Prime Minister.

2. Sapru's letter has of course had a good Indian press, but it has not secured formal support of the major parties; and none of the signatories is by himself of any real political importance; and only two of them are Moslems, and those unsubstantial. Nor could any or all of them for a moment hold a political situation; while I would regard my present non-officials in my Council as better men from the political point of view than any of signatories including Sapru himself. I see no cause for moving our ground merely because of Sapru, but I agree that conciliatory but firm reply will be called for.

3. Whole manifesto completely ignores practical difficulties of Indian situation made abundantly clear by recent manifestos such as Jinnah's at Nagpur. Existing Government is as near a national government as we are likely to get in present conditions. Its complete non-officialisation would not in my judgment, unless you had willing support of both major political parties in our war effort, in any way improve matters. We should add two or three Indians of same type as I have already in place of two or three Europeans. That would be the end of it. I should have thought it quite likely, too, that for reasons developed in my appreciation for Cabinet, such a government would be less effective and less dependable from the point of view of war effort.

4. I need not comment on the suggestion of "Home Rule for the Viceroy" objections to which are fully present to you, both practical and political. Burden on Governor-General himself would be one which could not be borne.

5. So far as Provinces are concerned extension of Section 93 is not by any wish of ours and normal constitution is working perfectly well in at least two
major Provinces. Moderate politicians of the type of Sapru may well feel frustrated in Provinces under Section 93 but I should myself anticipate that Executive Councils “responsible to the Crown” as he suggests and without backing of majority in Legislature would go no way to ease political tension or after a short interval to remove feeling of frustration save on the part of those who had become Executive Councillors.

6. As for international position of India we can I have no doubt give reassuring reply. I have no particular suggestion to make but feel that it would be well to make it clear that India would of course be represented in any peace negotiations or other major discussions that may take place to the utmost extent that geographical and physical conditions make practicable. Zafrulla has already been over, and I have had it in mind with your full support to send one of my Executive Councillors home, once my Council settles down, to make contact with His Majesty’s Government and with war effort at home. We can amplify on those sort of lines.

7. As regards consultation with India in same manner as Dominions, here again it ought not to be difficult to find some soothing phrase. I am of course aware of constitutional difficulties that make consultation on precisely same basis as with Dominions impracticable, but see no difficulty in taking the line that Government of India are kept in close and full contact with what is going on etc., and that that will continue to be objective of His Majesty’s Government pending achievement by India of Dominion Status which is their objective for her.

8. As you will see I have not tried to be specific in my suggestions, but would welcome opportunity of seeing draft of any reply proposed to be sent to Sapru, when I may be able to give you more assistance.

\[\text{No. 10.}\]  \[\text{No. 23.}\]  \[\text{No. 26.}\]

26

*The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)*

*Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22*

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

21 January 1942

106-S. Following for Prime Minister. I hope you will look at my telegram\(^1\) of to-day to Amery about Indian Constitutional position. It is longer than I could wish but I have thought it right that in this very important issue you

\[\text{No. 23.}\]
should be seized of all essential factors. I have no doubt myself as to wisdom of standing firm and facing the music, and I am sure you will agree. If there is anything that can possibly be done to damp down ill-conceived speculation in the "Times" and by Schuster\textsuperscript{2} etc. it would be invaluable. Immense harm has been done here by campaign that has been run at home for the last three or four months, which has been construed here as meaning that Cabinet are ready to give way and that we are so alarmed at possible turn of the war that we will make any sacrifice. I shall not have an easy hand to play here if we stand firm, but I think I can hold the position well enough. Vital thing is that people should stand firm at home.

\textsuperscript{2} Lord Linlithgow may be referring to a letter in \textit{The Times} of 18 December 1941 from Sir George Schuster M.P., who had served as Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council from 1928 to 1934, and Dr Edward Thompson, the historian. This urged ‘a fresh start in India’ and, more particularly, first, that the Viceroy should be surrounded by a fully representative Cabinet, commanding the widest popular support and pledged to concentrate all on the war effort; and, secondly, that the Provincial Governments should resume office on a frankly coalition basis with enlarged cabinets in which opposed groups could work together.

27

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

\textit{L\slash PO\slash 6\slash 106a: ff 53–4}

INDIA OFFICE, 22 January 1942

Prime Minister

Herewith a short telegram\textsuperscript{1} from Linlithgow for you and a long one\textsuperscript{2} to myself. At this moment I think it will be sufficient if you read paragraphs 12, 13 and 17, which contain the gist of his conclusions.

I entirely agree with him that there is nothing to be done at this moment with Sapru’s proposals or with any suggestions of a fresh constitutional advance. Congress is not concerned in the least with co-operation, but only with getting us to do something which will prejudice the future in a sense contrary to our declaration of August 1940, with its explicit pledges to the Muslims, Princes and other minorities. I am sure our main line should be to stand firm on the present position, i.e. both on our 1940 policy, which is essentially generous and yet workable, and on the present expanded Executive. So far as I am concerned I can hold the fort perfectly well in the House on the general lines of Linlithgow’s paragraph 17.

I have drafted for your consideration an answer\textsuperscript{3} to Sapru and Co. which I

\textsuperscript{1} No. 26.  \textsuperscript{2} No. 23.  \textsuperscript{3} Enclosure to No. 15.
have sent to Attlee, Anderson and Simon for their comments. It is a polite but firm negation of their proposal in the setting of a reaffirmation of our 1940 policy.

28

Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/6/106a: f 52

INDIA OFFICE, 22 January 1942

My dear Clem,
I sent you with my letter of the 16th January a tentative draft reply to Sapru’s telegram to Winston. I have now got the Viceroy’s appreciation which I was expecting, and I enclose a copy of it. Would you let me know whether you agree generally with the line taken in my proposed reply or whether you have any comments or suggestions.

Yours ever,
L. S. A.

1 Similar letters were sent to Sir J. Anderson and Viscount Simon.
2 No. 15.
3 No. 23.

29

Sir H. Twynham (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

CAMP, 22 January 1942

No. R.-72-G.C.P.
2. The principal event of the first half of January was of course the meeting of the A.-I.C.C. at Wardha. The outcome of that meeting which endorsed the Bardoli resolution of the Working Committee is now public property. Some controversy has arisen as to the deductions to be drawn from the fact that while only 15 delegates voted against the adoption of the Bardoli resolution a large number of delegates apparently did not vote at all. On the one hand, it is asserted that the delegates who did not vote were actuated by a desire to express their neutrality; on the other hand, Nehru has described this interpre-

The Working Committee of Congress is a collection of ancient valetudinarians who (with the sole
tation as nonsensical on the ground that it was so certain that the resolution would be carried, in view of the small numbers which voted for amendments, that many of its supporters did not trouble to raise their hands. The chief motive for remaining neutral was apparently fear of offending Gandhi, who is still of course the “king-maker”. Of our ex-Ministers who attended the Meeting only D. K. Mehta voted for the Bardoli resolution: Shukla and Misra did not vote but the former is believed to have privately assured Rajagopalachariar of his support.

In view of Gandhi’s opposition to legislative activities in the present situation it seems doubtful whether any response to Sapru’s telegram to the Prime Minister will have any effect on Congress.

The expectation which I expressed in my letter, dated the 24th December, that the amnesty had given the Satyagraha movement its quietus for the time being has now been fulfilled. In his statement to the Press, dated the 7th January, Gandhi has stated that “Civil disobedience in the sense in which it was launched is not likely to be revived on behalf of the Congress till the war has ended” while individual Civil disobedience has now been officially withdrawn by the A.-I.C.C. and it is pointed out that Congress activities will be wholly directed to carrying out the constructive programme. This is a big advance on Gandhi’s first reaction to the amnesty proposal (13th November 1941) in which he declared that “So far as I know, there will be on the part of the Congress neither appreciation nor response”, or his later statement (4th December) that “it cannot evoke a single responsive or appreciative chord in me”. I expected the formal extinction of the Satyagraha movement because all the evidence in this Province pointed to the conclusion that Congressmen of Provincial and district importance were nearly all dissatisfied with the negative policy of going to jail again and again in symbolic vindication of freedom of speech. It was all very well for Gandhi himself—whose freedom from arrest has now been clearly established as a wise move—but the average Congressman was subjected to considerable discomfort and inconvenience with little prospect of any tangible result by his going to jail. The general dislike for this form of civil disobedience must have, I think, been brought home pretty forcibly to the Mahatma. The attitude of Gandhi and the A.-I.C.C. has no doubt been affected by the Japanese advance in Malaya and the bombing of Rangoon and Singapore but these events would not have produced the same reaction by themselves and it was fortunate that we got in the amnesty first.

If experience of previous non-co-operation and civil disobedience movements exception of Nehru) command nothing to matter in votes, and are purely parasitic on Gandhi. No wonder they don’t drop him. L.
may be trusted, I should be surprised if Satyagraha is revived earlier than the end of the war, as promised by Gandhi, because enthusiasm for this kind of self-sacrifice is seldom long lived and some preparation is required before a movement of this kind can be launched. Of course, a false step may again lead to active opposition; on the other hand, an enemy air raid on India will, I have little doubt, produce reactions which will not be unfavourable to Government.

Gandhi's attitude generally to the course of events from the first mooting of the amnesty proposals to the conclusion of the Wardha meeting of the A.-I.C.C. has been inconsistent and the C.I.O.'s report suggests that he has been guilty of duplicity of set purpose. It is suggested that Gandhi's sudden swing over to support for the Bardoli resolution was occasioned by the obvious unwillingness of the delegates to abandon his leadership in favour of the Bardoli resolution, although it seems clear that they were little in favour of a continuance of Satyagraha. The expedient which has been tried before was therefore again adopted of Congress speaking officially with one voice and Gandhi with another, on the old principle of combining threats and cajolery or, as Gandhi put it, making a small hole in the wall through which to shake hands with Britain. The main idea of the Congress now is said to be to establish an organisation parallel to the Government machinery for whatever use future developments, internal or external, may indicate.

30

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 23-7 January 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

12. I have had an interesting note\(^1\) (copy of which was sent by last week's bag) from Hodson of the impressions formed by him on his recent tour, which covers a good deal of ground. I have no doubt whatever as to the educative value from his point of view of contacts of this nature; there is always the risk of one who, without previous experience of the country, merely sits in the Central Government forming views which may be off the mark. I note with interest his conclusion that the initiative in constitutional progress offered to India has patently not yet been accepted and remains in British hands.

* * *

15. Of our other travellers, Coupland has been in Bengal and the Central Provinces, and he came to lunch on Saturday, before setting off again for the

\(^1\) Printed as an Annex to No. 30.
United Provinces. He seems to have enjoyed his tour round the country, and to be in good heart. He reminded me that when I first saw him, he had undertaken to keep off the short-range problem of our immediate political difficulties but said that inevitably he had been drawn into the vortex, and wished to give me his views. I said that I should, of course, be delighted to hear these which I was certain would be most helpful. He then proceeded to develop at length the points which he subsequently sent me in the memorandum of which I send you a copy by this bag. I did not fail to point out the practical difficulties attaching to certain of his suggestions. Thus, I reminded him that Dominion Status for British India alone would leave the Governor-General entirely beholden to an Indian Ministry, with no safeguards and no limitations as to the field in which Ministerial advice would have to prevail with the Governor-General; and that the Governor-General would therefore be quite disabled from acting as Crown Representative, in which position he would have to champion the rights and interests of the Princes whenever these came into collision with the interests of British India. I reminded Coupland also of the important fields in which these interests might collide, such as excise, customs, taxation, industrial and labour policy, and the like. I also tried to put to Coupland the very real difficulties which must arise in the field of defence if in that field the Governor-General was to be in the position of having to take the advice of his Ministers, and the impossibility of maintaining British troops in India if these were to be at the disposal of Indian Ministers responsible only to an Indian Legislature. But I found Coupland had got his "solution" in his mind, his ticket for home in his pocket, and his subjects, I suspect, neatly arranged in his twelve chapters, and that he was not disposed to welcome criticism which was in any degree destructive of those plans! Thus, in the matter of defence, he told me that he contemplated, as a consequence of the present war, the setting up of an international defence force, a generous allocation from which would be maintained in India, and said that the presence of this force would meet the military difficulties involved in adjusting a scheme for Dominion Status for British India, or, for that matter, for solving the defence problems of a full-blown federation for all India. I had to tell Coupland that I really could not contemplate, as a means of solving the present deadlock, the acceptance of constitutional plans which rested on any speculative hypothesis of the kind he had described. I got a letter from him later which showed that my argument had gone home, and that he was inclined to feel that Dominion Status for British India alone was rather more difficult of achievement than he had contemplated. He will be leaving India at about the end of March, and is, I think, reconciled to the prospect of travelling part of the way by sea via Lagos.

16. This business about U Saw must have given a nasty jolt to a lot of people. Comment for the first few days after the news was known tended to follow
the lines of Rajagopalachari's rather woolly statement of protest on the subject, and we have since been following Burma's lead in damping down Press speculation on the cause of detention. If more evidence could have been published or if there could have been a trial, I have no doubt that it would have been a healthy lesson for many more people out here, but, of course, I fully appreciate the reason why that has not been possible.

* * *

18. . . . I consider it necessary to examine the general question whether the Provinces can be allowed to exercise complete discretion to refuse to absorb a small State, for in any future scheme of Federation the main difficulty would be the smaller States and the probability is that three courses will be open to such States:

(a) A voluntary combination among themselves into some form of administrative unit;

(b) absorption into a larger State;

(c) absorption into a Province of British India.

In view of the difficulties presented by (a) and (b), it would seem probable that (c) would in a considerable number of cases be the most practicable course to take. In that case it will have to be decided whether the British Indian Province concerned is to be allowed complete discretion to pick and choose or whether it can be compelled to absorb any small State for which no other course but absorption is practicable. This question raises important constitutional issues, and I have asked Craik to have them examined in consultation with the Reforms Commissioner. 4 I will let you know the result.

* * *

22. Your two letters, dated 24th December and 5th January 5 have just come in, the latter by a fast mail for these times. A good many of the subjects which you touch upon have already been disposed of telegraphically or by the course of events, but I will make hurried comment on one or two of the matters about which you write.

23. In the first place let me thank you very warmly for your good wishes for 1942, which I most warmly reciprocate. I haven't the least doubt but that it will be a testing and anxious year, but I have hopes that by the end of it we may find ourselves with a good many difficulties which now seem almost insuperable well on the way to solution and with our general military position greatly improved.

2 Not printed. 3 Government of India Act 1935, Secs. 2 (1) and 3.
4 Mr H. V. Hodson. 5 No. 5.
24. I am interested in all that you tell me about the state of opinion in the House and outside in regard to Winston and the Government. It is not easy for any one at a distance accurately to gauge the currents of opinion. But I cannot but feel that a good deal of the uneasiness can be traced to the extent to which Winston has taken the machine into his own hands, and thereby weakened the position of the other members of his Government and the prestige of the Cabinet as a whole. That is a very difficult condition to correct and, in any event, Winston, if I judge him right, is not the man to wish to make over anything which he has gathered into his own hands. But anything and everything will be forgiven if Winston can present the country with an obviously improving military position. I must admit that I do not myself see any immediate prospect of improvement in the Far East: indeed, I have little doubt that we shall have to face worse things before the tide turns. But I suppose that the situation in Russia, which is not yet by any means out of hand from the German point of view, may develop into a major German defeat, in which case (with the corollary of relief from any threat to the Middle East this year) things would come in a short while to look very much better.

25. I am interested in what you say about the prospects of Winston making a big speech on India. I confess that it had not entered my head that it might be for me to take the initiative in pressing him to do this. But I will ponder your words and if I think fit will return to the charge later.

26. The doings of the Congress Working Committee and the A.-I.C.C., and also Jinnah’s organisation at their several meetings, are by now stale news; but I notice that you were correct in your prognostications about the probable outcome of these. The Congress Working Committee, with the possible exception of Nehru, who is in a very special position, appears more and more clearly as a collection of declining valetudinarians who have no grip on the country, but, who, politically, are purely parasitic on Gandhi the spell-binder. Why, therefore, should anyone expect his colleagues to dismiss the Mahatma! By their manoeuvres, executed under Gandhi’s skilful promptings, both he and the Working Committee have now attained the enviable position of enjoying the best of both worlds. They have put themselves right with public opinion which recognised that non-violence chimed ill with the emergent menace of Japan, while they have made it possible both for Mr. Gandhi to resume his effective leadership and for those members of the Working Committee, who do sincerely adhere to non-violence as a principle, to remain within the fold.

28. You ask whether your Manchester Speech, in which you dealt with India and the Atlantic Charter, has had any effect in clearing up the general misconception. I wish I might report that so clear and convincing a presenta-
tion had met in this country with its due reward. But the fact is that in their present mood, the politically-minded in India are not prepared to be persuaded or comforted by any speech however able or however tactfully phrased. Each successive pronouncement is hailed as a further insult to India’s self-respect, as salt in the wound, and all the rest of it, and the speaker is accused of lecturing India with his tongue in his cheek. Indeed, I verily believe that the fewer speeches that you and I, or any one else even remotely responsible for Government in this country, make at this stage the better. No one could have tried harder or more effectively to help them than you yourself have done during these past months. It is with a feeling of real sadness, therefore, that I write as I have. As regards Bajpai’s signing on behalf of India, I did my utmost through our publicity organisation to promote a favourable political reaction to what was quite evidently an event of real significance in the story of India’s elevation to higher international status, but more than half the national Press twisted the material with which we provided them to serve their purpose of proving that Bajpai, as the hired minion of the British Government, had signed under your malevolent instructions a document which added outrageous insult to the cruel injury of Winston’s interpretation of the Charter.

* * *

30. I am much obliged for your views about the continuance during the war of European recruitment for the I.C.S. and the I.P., which I raised in my private and personal telegram No. 786-S.C. of 25th October 1941. I must take a little time to consider and consult others about these, and will let you have my comments a little later on.

31. I have read with great interest what you tell me about the rather stupid leading article in the Times... I am afraid my rather rude comment to Inglis, their principal correspondent in India was that weakness of the sort displayed in the leader would very soon correct itself, for no one would for long be found willing to pay three pence for what quite obviously wasn’t worth a half penny. That indeed is the position, for there is nothing of real substance in this line picked up so ill-advisedly by the Times from quarters moved much more by prejudice and sentiment than by any real understanding of the problem. The first consequence of this blunder will emerge on the publication of Winston’s answer to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, for the Times will then be discovered to have backed a policy which is incapable of being defended in serious argument, and which is rejected by His Majesty’s Government—a position quite unworthy of that great journal.

32. I am very sorry indeed to have lost Akbar Hydari, for whom I had affection and real respect. He was of course far past his best, though still able

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6 Personal comments omitted.
7 Sir Akbar Hydari died on 8 January 1942.
to make a very useful contribution. Above all, he was something which is unfortunately rare in this country—a man of broad citizenship, sincerely and selflessly devoted to the good of India.

27 January 1942

33. I liked your draft answer\(^8\) to Sapru, which strikes me as a very adequate presentation of our case. I hope the discussion in Cabinet will go satisfactorily and that Winston will follow your advice. I see no reason why he should not because that advice is entirely in line with what I conceive to be his own inclinations and prepossessions. "Home Rule for the Viceroy" is the sort of specious slogan that goes down well with unthinking people and with all who have a prejudice against authority and what they are pleased to call red tape. I was sorry to see that Victor Sassoon lent his support to this campaign in a speech which he made the other day in Bombay. Fortunately he sent me a copy, so I was able to write a sharp note to him, telling him that, in my opinion, the plan to which he had lent his name was as mischievous as it was misconceived. I do not doubt he will put it about that I have come out strongly against Arthur Moore's leading idea, but that I think will be all to the good.

34. As I write, I have just received your telegram\(^9\) telling me that you are forwarding a copy of the telegram\(^10\) sent by the Foreign Office to Chungking about Chiang Kai Shek's proposed visit to India and Burma. The Foreign Office telegram has not yet been received. You may be sure that I appreciate to the full the great importance of making the visit of the Generalissimo and his Lady a great success, and I shall spare no effort to that end. Evidently his desire to talk to Gandhi and Nehru raises certain difficulties, given the fact that these two gentlemen are at the present moment not on speaking terms with me, but these difficulties we must circumvent as best we may. I knew you would at once take the point of his seeing Jinnah as well as the other two, and I shall have to coax him to receive the head of the Muslim League whether he feels inclined to or not.

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\(^8\) See enclosure to No. 15, and No. 34 below.  
\(^9\) No. 40.  
\(^10\) No. 41.
Annex to No. 30.\(^1\)

Note on the the tour of the Reforms Commissioner from 8 November to 7 December 1941, to Madras, Orissa, Assam, Bengal and Bihar

\[\text{L/P&J/8/509: ff 8–15}\]

The tour was of very great value in establishing contacts and in elucidating aspects of the constitutional problem which are apt to be obscure or ignored in a Delhi-centred view. Among those with whom I had conversations were Their Excellencies the Governors of the five provinces, Ministers of the two provinces\(^2\) where provincial autonomy was working and prospective Ministers in Orissa, representatives of the Congress, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Justice Party in Madras and the Forward Bloc\(^3\) in Bengal, of the Europeans, the Depressed Classes, the trade unions, the land-owning interests, the Assam hill tribes and other minorities in that province, the principal civil servants including Governors’ Advisers and Inspectors General of Police, editors of the leading provincial newspapers, Judges and Advocates General, Chairmen of Public Service Commissions, and a large number of others, many of them detached Indian observers of the political scene. All conversations were informal and confidential, and no statements were issued to the press nor press interviews granted.

2. One impression left by the tour, bearing out earlier experience, was the persistence of old habits of thought, deriving from a reliance upon British authority and an assumption of its permanence, which have become deeply ingrained even upon the strongly nationalist mind. One of their less mischievous manifestations is the tacit assumption, so often made by those with whom one talked, that under Dominion Status there will still be some supreme non-Indian authority, available not indeed to intervene in administration but to take those critical decisions of a semi-constitutional kind where communal bias might be fatal. This assumption is traceable in many conversations with those who affected to stand for national independence as well as with others who openly asked for some such form of British authority to remain. Among the latter, of course, are the orthodox supporters of Pakistan, whose custom it is, from Mr. Jinnah downwards, to answer awkward questions put to them about such problems as all-India defence by saying that during a “transitional period” these must remain in the hands of the British. On the Hindu side, an interesting version of the view that some outside, impartial authority is needed came from a high Indian I.C.S. officer of strong nationalist sympathies, who, when I ex-

\(^1\) This note was sent separately by bag: see No. 30, para. 12.

\(^2\) Assam (until 25 December 1941, when the Governor took over the administration under Sec. 93 of the Government of India Act 1935) and Bengal.

\(^3\) See No. 23, note 3.
pressed surprise that in his constitutional scheme for the future the Governor would appear to have an independent responsibility, at least as regards backward elements in the population, replied that there ought to be somebody who could ask the Prime Minister of a self-governing province "questions of conscience".

3. Almost as widespread appeared to be the belief, or at least the assumption, that the responsibility for framing a new self-governing constitution for India must fall upon the British. This is likewise based, it seems, as much upon the ingrained habit of reliance upon authority to settle disputed questions as upon any deliberate and overt arguments. There are, of course, many who profess—no doubt with sincerity—a disbelief in British good faith in offering to leave it to a representative Indian body to devise the framework of the new constitution. The arguments on such lines are very familiar. On the other hand, a number of politicians whom I interviewed expressed their frank scepticism of the ability of the different Indian communities and parties to come together and frame an agreed constitution, even on a generous interpretation of the word "agreed". People who argued thus did not intend to imply that if a constitution devised by the British Government in consultation with different elements of Indian opinion were applied, it would not meet with sufficient agreement to make it work, but only that the initiative must rest on the British side and could not be left to Indian opinion. It certainly seems that the policy of His Majesty’s Government of postponing until after the war any major overhaul of the Indian constitution (a policy with which I found little quarrel outside the extremer Congress camp) has rendered any agreement between the various communities and groups in India on the lines on which the constitution should be framed unlikely until that time is reached. Conversations reflected the fact that meanwhile each faction must continue to state its case in the stiffest possible terms and to retain every bargaining counter that it can, lest by making concessions now it prejudice its position in the "real showdown". Although at the time of the tour the cloud in the Far-East was obviously about to burst, there was nothing to suggest that the approach of war to India had overborne these disruptive tendencies with an imperative sense of the need for unity. On the contrary, one could not help being impressed by the very small interest taken in the international scene as the background of present political problems or the ultimate constitutional solution. If this appreciation is just, no changing of the bait can serve to justify angling for a fish which is not yet in the stream.

4. The policy of postponing constitutional decisions, as far as the British Government is concerned, until after the war, sets the stage for the posturing of those who see in a magnification of the claims of their own particular community or group a larger opportunity of advancement (not necessarily for
themselves but for their people) than in service of a larger citizenship. One outstanding feature of almost all the conversations that I had with provincial politicians was the concentration of interest upon their own local problems. For most of those in this category the long-term constitutional problem appeared to resolve itself into the status of their own community or party in their own province. This may well account for the very small part which the problem of the Indian States seems to play in the politician’s approach to the constitutional issue. They are usually left out of the picture altogether, and it is commonly assumed that, whatever solution may be found for them, their presence will not have much effect, if it has any, upon the pace and character of constitutional progress in British India.

5. One could not but be impressed, not only with the provincialism of the average politician’s outlook, but also with the multiplicity of communal divisions upon which emphasis was laid in regard to such matters as separate electorates. The Brahmin–Non-Brahmin conflict in Madras, and the inter-valley conflict in Assam, came up in conversation as prominently as the Hindu-Muslim problem; and the Ahoms, the tribalists, the scheduled castes and others all raised their voices loudly in their own communal cause. I naturally heard a good deal about the formation of new provinces,—in the South by the creation of Andhra⁴ and Tamilnad⁵ and other provinces, in the North-East by the repartition of Bengal⁶ or the re-absorption of Assam.⁷ It was interesting to find in Orissa an almost unanimous agreement among official and unofficial leaders that the construction of the new province⁸ had given the Oriyas a fairer deal and a larger hope than they had had in their previous subordinate position. It seems likely that for the reason suggested above the various movements for new provinces or readjustments of the boundaries of existing provinces will gather force as time goes on, in anticipation of a fresh constitutional settlement. Though they are less important and less sincere, they obviously have much in common with the Pakistan movement, which is already finding sympathisers among the separatists of the south.

6. The Pakistan theory itself was supported with strict orthodoxy by every Muslim League politician with whom I spoke (except Mr. Fazlul Huq, who

⁴ The proposal to constitute a new Province of Andhra out of Telugu-speaking areas.
⁵ The proposal to constitute a new Province of Tamilnad out of Tamil-speaking areas.
⁶ In 1905, Bengal was partitioned. Western Bengal with the areas of Bihar and Orissa (then still parts of Bengal) formed one Province, while Eastern Bengal was joined to Assam to form the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. A further reorganisation took place in 1912. Bihar and Orissa were constituted a separate Province, while Eastern Bengal was separated from Assam and rejoined to Western Bengal to form a reunited, but much smaller Province of Bengal.
⁷ Namely into Bengal, out of the eastern parts of which the Province of Assam had originally been created in 1874.
⁸ Orissa was constituted a separate Province on 1 April 1936. Previously, the Oriya-speaking peoples had belonged to three separate provinces: Bihar and Orissa, Madras, and the Central Provinces.
was then still nominally a leading member of the League) and by no one else, though one Congress leader, Mr. Nityananda Kanungo, was prepared to say, after offering to open the whole Muslim position in a future constitution to settlement by the Muslims themselves, that if by popular vote they chose Pakistan, he would be ready to accept it. The most interesting point was that every Muslim Leaguer, with but one exception, interpreted Pakistan as consistent with a confederation of India for common purposes like defence, provided the Hindu and Muslim elements therein stood on equal terms. Discussion of the position of the Muslims in Hindu-majority provinces indicated, as was to be expected, that in these provinces there was no acceptance whatever of the proposition urged upon me by Mr. Jinnah that the accomplishment of Pakistan would so relieve communal tension as to render special safeguards for minorities much less necessary than at present. Muslims, unbriefed on this by the Quaid-e-Azam, usually took refuge in the principle of reciprocity over safeguards as between Hindus in Pakistan-provinces and Muslims in Hindu-provinces, but when pressed they frankly demanded not only the full rigour of existing safeguards, like separate electorates and weightage, but more besides.

7. My impression was that among the Muslim Leaguers in the provinces visited there was no genuine enthusiasm for Pakistan. At the same time, none of them will repudiate it, not only for fear of incurring the wrath of Mr. Jinnah or impairing the Muslim solidarity which they feel to be vitally necessary at the present time, but also, I thought, because the policy itself, extreme and unpalatable as it may seem to them, expresses however crudely some inarticulate but vital theme in the Muslim mind. Even Muslim critics of the League, like Sir Mahomed Usman, told me that outside Bengal it would be hopeless for anyone to try to capture a Muslim constituency on anything but the League ticket. H.E. the Governor of Madras went so far as to say that whenever there was any effective organisation among the Opposition (including the Non-Brahmins, who are not prevented by their communal proportion from actually commanding a majority) it was now always engineered by the Muslim League.

8. I was therefore led to ask myself, what is this element in Muslim thought which finds expression in Pakistan? It derives, it seemed to me, from a revolt against the allied concepts of “minority” and “safeguards”. Experience under Congress governments may have been the immediate stimulus, but the real motive goes deeper. Nor does it lie only in the recognition that “safeguards” depend for their efficacy upon the presence of a third power to enforce them, a power which will disappear from the Indian scene with the coming of Dominion Status. It lies more profoundly, though perhaps less consciously, in the knowledge that “safeguards” are designed to improve, but cannot radically alter, the position of a “minority”, which remains a minority, a Cinderella
with trade-union rights and a radio in the kitchen but still below-stairs. It is against this whole combination of ideas that the Muslim mind rebels. The two-nation theory, which transmutes the ideology of "minorities", is thus more fundamental to their present thought than the Pakistan theory, which transmutes the ideology of "safeguards". From this new outlook of the Muslims there will obviously be no retreat. My conversations have therefore indicated that it is misleading to approach the general Muslim problem in terms of the same phraseology as we use about the interests of minorities like the Europeans, Depressed Classes, and so on. Some new terminology is needed to keep our consideration of this problem on the right lines—a terminology which recognises that the problem is one of sharing power rather\(^\text{11}\) qualifying the terms on which power is exercised by a majority.

9. In effect, the British Government and Parliament committed themselves to this approach when they first introduced separate communal electorates.\(^\text{12}\) I found no sign that any substantial section of Muslim opinion would sacrifice separate electorates at any price in the currency of other constitutional concessions. This ineluctable fact is the background against which one is obliged to consider the various proposals, put to me by political leaders and constitutional students, for systems of functional representation or indirect election as a means of avoiding communalism in the electoral process. I heard a little of the former device, a good deal of the latter, in the form of the use and development of village panchayats as electoral units, or of some similar enlistment into electoral service of the alleged ability of the villager to choose a leader among his own number to speak and act for him. If, as I believe, no such arrangement, however adapted, would be acceptable for a moment to majority Muslim opinion unless it included a provision for separate communal electorates or their equivalent then neither functional representation nor indirect election can seek justification as a solution for the communal problem, but each scheme must stand on its merits by comparison with territorial elections, both alike being combined with separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims, and the new proposals under the handicap of being even more complicated and cumbersome than the present electoral system.

10. The demand for separate electorates from smaller minorities appears to be growing along with their political consciousness. The idea that was pressed on me by representatives of the Justice Party in Madras that Non-Brahmins

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\(^9\) [By Mr Hodson]. They included Sir Nazimuddin, Mr H. S. Suhrawardy, Sir Mahomed Saadullah, Mr Sobhan Khan, Mr Abdul Hameed Khan, Mr Abdul Matin Choudhry, and Khan Bahadur Saiyid Muhammad Ismail.

\(^10\) The 'Supreme Leader', namely Mr Jinnah.

\(^11\) The words 'than of' appear to have been omitted.

\(^12\) In 1909, under the Indian Councils Act.
should have separate electorates to save them from domination by the Brahmins is ridiculous in theory, and the answer in practice is obviously that the Justice Party should improve its organisation and leadership. Majority Hindu opinion is, of course, strongly against separate electorates, and it is more often than not that any Hindu with whom one talks will begin his observations on the constitutional problem by blaming everything on separate electorates. Nevertheless, there is a widespread recognition, encouraged by the official policy of the Congress, that if the Muslims insist on having separate electorates they must have them.

11. In a discussion with Mr. Sarat Bose and members of his party, one of the latter said heatedly, "Either the constitution is communal from top to bottom or it is non-communal from top to bottom". He was using this as a weapon against separate electorates, but the logic of it would equally sustain an argument for special communal arrangements in legislature and executive, if the communalism of the electorate must continue to be recognized. My conversations showed that there is growing support for the idea of compulsory composite Cabinets. This notion was supported not only by all authentic Muslim League opinion but also by several representatives of Depressed Classes or Labour interests, by the provincial Presidents of the Hindu Mahasabha in Madras and Bengal, and by a number of independent Hindu and Muslim spokesmen (both prominent and obscure). I even found tentative support for it in the Congress camp. The notion goes beyond that of a coalition, implying as it does that, as in the Swiss system, the composition of the Cabinet to reflect minorities as well as the majority should override the principle of cabinet solidarity if these should clash. Many people shy from the idea because of the difficulty of envisaging what happens when there is a cabinet split, but contemporary events in Bengal furnished a useful exemplar of the fact that the British system of party majority government with collective responsibility was no proof against equal difficulties.

12. The fact that the idea received support from the representatives of Depressed Classes and of Labour is interesting. It would seem that British public opinion, approaching the constitutional problem, has not paid sufficient attention to the position of these classes. It is not suggested that the problem of establishing their place in the constitution is one-half as difficult as that of the Hindu-Muslim conflict, nor that politically they count for very much at present; but as "have-nots", in a period of economic and social development when the "haves" are finding their privileges curtailed and their possessions redistributed, these are elements whose position it may be very important to take care of if future India is to stand up well to the social problems with which it will be faced. The case put to me on behalf of organized labour in Bengal was that they preferred a wide franchise with no special representation for any economic
interest, but that if capital was to be represented in seats for landowners, commerce, etc. then labour must claim at least equal representation.

13. This obviously bears on the question of European representation in the legislatures. Incidentally, it was acknowledged by the labour spokesmen with whom I talked that British capital was a much better employer than Indian capital, and that they did not demand the abolition of European representation but would rather welcome it if they were sufficiently represented themselves. In conversation with unofficial Europeans I tried to ascertain whether, in future constitutional deliberations, they would take their stand on their business position or on their community position. In Madras opinion was divided. In Bengal the argument was that in their case these two things were practically identical, but I think that the choice will have to be made as a matter of tactics and that a good deal will turn upon it. Nevertheless, it will surely not be on theoretical grounds that the Europeans will make or lose their case for a special position in a future Indian constitution but on their record under the existing constitution. On this opinions vary. A particular problem of much indirect importance is that of the allocation of European seats to special interests like Chambers of Commerce, tea associations, etc. I heard this arrangement both criticised and defended by Europeans; my own impression is that it is a handicap to them in future constitutional dealings because it endorses the allegation, which the European community is at much pains to repudiate, that its representatives in the legislature are there merely to protect their own business interests. If, as its defenders maintain, this is not its result nor does it bring different people to the legislature from those who would come if the whole European bloc were open to election by the community in general, there remains little to be said for it.

14. The question of safeguards for the services is of a different order altogether. It divides into two parts. First there is the need for protecting the status, pay and pensions of existing members of the Secretary of State’s services. This is a more-or-less technical problem which does not excite political controversy at the present time. Secondly and more difficult, there is the need for defending the services generally against undue political interference which would impair their efficiency and morale. One special aspect, which was brought vigorously to my notice by several of those with whom I talked, was the relation between provincial and imperial services. It appears to be a genuine source of grievance among provincial politicians that their Ministries are served for many important purposes by officers over whose appointment, conditions of service and discipline they have practically no control. No doubt the sting would be taken from this grievance if under a constitution of the Dominion Status type such officers had no appeal to a non-Indian authority and were not duty-bound, when

13 Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 244.
occupying the highest posts in the provinces, to report to Governors on any matters which might fall within the latter's special responsibility, a point which significantly caused peculiar irritation to Mr. Rohini Kumar Choudhury, who complained that it encouraged I.C.S. officers to adopt a patronising attitude towards Ministers. (Similarly I was told that the sting had very largely disappeared from the old Congress grievance over combination of executive and judicial functions in the lower magistracy as soon as the executive functions came under their own political control). At the same time, the absence of any court of reference beyond politics will clearly render much more difficult the problem of protecting both provincial and Imperial services against undue political pressure. Incidentally, I was told by several of the numerous representatives of the services, with whom I was at pains to discuss the problem, that the political interference to which the services had been subjected under provincial autonomy was much more of a personal and local than of a communal kind; that is to say, it was not that a Muslim Minister of a province would insist on a certain post being held by a Muslim, but that he would insist on its being given to a particular Muslim to whom he directly or indirectly via some political supporter owed an obligation.

15. Incidentally, I was strongly impressed by the arguments of the President of the Legislative Council\(^14\) and the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly\(^15\) in Bengal in favour of the establishment of their own staff of servants, who should not look elsewhere for promotion nor be liable to transfer to other departments just when experience had made them most useful, and indeed of the complete detachment of their staff and expenditure from departmental control.

16. On the assumption of Dominion Status, discussions about service conditions usually centred on the possibility of giving more powers to provincial public service commissions, though it was recognized that in the last resort there must be Ministerial responsibility for the conduct of the public services, and even for the appointment of the public service commissions and the framing of their rules; in other words, that in the last analysis the commissions' functions could only be advisory. Even so, there was seen to be a great deal of merit in making improper interference by Ministers more difficult by means of the complication and partial insulation of the machinery for appointments, promotions and discipline. Two of the Chairmen of Public Service Commissions with whom I talked made a point of the great value that would attach to the right to publish an unexpurgated annual report. Various other proposals directed to the same general end were put forward.

17. A large number of conversations on this subject, however, many of them following the lines of a comparison between civil service conditions here and
in the United Kingdom, brought out the fact that neither the defects of the machinery of public service commissions, nor even these combined with the absence of the traditions and conventions that prevent a British Minister from interfering with personal issues in the public services, altogether account for the exposure of the services in India to improper political manipulation. One reason for the better conditions in Britain is undoubtedly the solidarity of the services themselves, the existence in the lower ranks of powerful trade union organisations and in the upper ranks of an esprit de corps which makes the members of the civil service stand firmly together if they believe that an injustice has been done to any of their number. This solidarity takes a hierarchical as well as a horizontal form, subordinates and superiors looking to each other reciprocally for protection and loyalty; nor would anyone in authority tolerate attempts by a subordinate to use outside leverage for his own advancement. In India, apart from communal and racial divisions in the services, the traditions are largely alien to all this. Different services, I was told, are jealous of each other, and the superior services would certainly not be inclined to welcome trade union organization among the inferior branches. There is also a tradition, deeply embedded in Indian society, of the right of the humblest to appeal to the throne, which takes a perverse form in the claim of lower officers to seek the ear of Ministers on their own behalf. The protection of the services undoubtedly lies to a large extent with the services themselves. One proof of this argument appears to lie in the fact that in all the five provinces which I visited I found that there was far less complaint of successful interference by Ministers with the police than with other services on matters of personnel, a fact which is surely due in a large measure to the character of the police as a disciplined force with a strong esprit de corps of its own.

18. Comparison with British conditions also brought out the great importance of the party political structure in affecting the relations between politicians and services. A British Minister can rebuff a private Member who attempts to intervene on behalf, or to the detriment, of an officer of his department, because he has behind him the discipline of the government and the party over the individual Member of Parliament. This discipline rests on a number of factors such as the distribution of honours and preferment and the right to seek a dissolution of Parliament if defeated through the defection of their supporters, which an Indian provincial Ministry does not command under the present constitution, but more particularly to the power of the centralised party machine, with its funds, its propaganda and its intangible goodwill, to make or break any member who has not both the means and the popular standing to carve a way in politics for himself. The Congress alone, among the parties contesting for power in the provincial legislatures, has hitherto possessed any-

14 Mr Satyendra Chandra Mitra. 15 Khan Bahadur Sir M. Azizul Haque.
thing comparable to this, and it may be significant that the complaints which
I heard of political interference with postings, service discipline and so on, were
much more numerous and vehement from the non-Congress provinces that I
visited than from those which formerly had Congress governments.

19. This contrast may also be due in a large measure to the fact that the Congress
governments were not only in possession of a strong party machine but were
also backed by substantial and solid parliamentary majorities. It was no doubt
the belief of many people at the time of the last constitutional reforms that a
position of unstable equilibrium, such as was indicated by the balance of power
under the Communal Award in several provinces, would lead to sound and
moderate government because extreme measures or communal bias or personal
manipulation could be defeated by conservative elements like the Europeans,
who could tip the political scales. My conversations about the working of
provincial autonomy suggest that this was a profound mistake based upon a
false analogy between Indian and British conditions.

20. The weakness of successive governments in Assam and its effect on service
matters lent extra point to the conversations which I had there with His
Excellency the Governor and a number of others about the position of the
hill peoples under any future constitution. I also had an opportunity of dis-
cussing the problem of backward peoples with the Governors of Orissa and
Bihar, though not at equal length. This is manifestly a problem of great difficulty,
involving as it does one of the responsibilities which history has laid upon
Great Britain, and I would like to advert to it separately.

21. On the whole, the impression left by the tour is not discouraging. Beneath
the crust of communal and party rigidity, and of querulous shirking of re-
sponsibility for the pursuit of agreement, there seem to be trends of thought
which may eventually lead to compromises and construction. These trends will
need time to grow to tidal strength, and in other respects, such as the rise of
fissiparous forces, time is not on the side of constitutional sanity. Meanwhile
the initiative in constitutional progress, offered to India, has patently not yet
been accepted, and remains in British hands.

16 In a statement dated 4 August 1932, His Majesty's Government announced that, in the absence
of any agreement between the Indian communities, it had itself decided how seats in the Provincial
Legislatures were to be allocated among the communities under the proposed new Indian Constitu-
tion then under discussion by the Round Table Conference (Cmd. 4147). This allocation, known
as the Communal Award, was, with some modification, to form the basis of the distribution of
seats in Provincial Legislatures eventually laid down by the Government of India Act 1935.
31

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

No. 132-S. Some of my Indian colleagues have shown signs of wishing to communicate formally to His Majesty’s Government their agreement with the Government of Australia that the Pacific affair is no child’s play and should be regarded as of equal importance with all other areas of war. I raised the question in Council and undertook to convey through you to the Prime Minister their deep sense of the seriousness of the position. Naturally I assured them that both His Majesty’s Government and the Government of the United States of America were doing their utmost to meet the situation. Their misgivings which are widely shared in India are founded in various loose statements in the Press about the Allies regarding the Far Eastern theatre as of secondary importance and to be cleared up after Germany is beaten. I do not doubt that Winston’s next statement will contain the appropriate corrective.

23 January 1942

32

Sir J. Anderson to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106a: f 51

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, GT. GEORGE STREET, S.W. 1, 23 January 1942

My dear Leo,

Thank you for your letter of yesterday¹ enclosing the Viceroy’s appreciation of the position in the light of recent developments. I gather that he would fully support the line taken in the draft² which you sent to Attlee and me on the 16th. I read that draft carefully at the time of its receipt and I have now read it again. I entirely agree with you that a reasoned reply is called for and I also agree, in substance, with the line you have taken.

Yours ever,

JOHN ANDERSON

¹ See No. 28. ² Enclosure to No. 15.
33

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106a: f 33

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

110. Your private and personal telegram, 105-S.¹ My immediately succeeding telegram contains first draft of suggested reply to Sapru for your comment, which I should like to have as soon as possible before submitting to Prime Minister. Attlee and Anderson have seen and approve generally. You will note that it follows generally line suggested in your 105-S. and in paragraph 17 of your 104-S.² I think it sufficiently rubs in our determination to stick to August, 1940, to satisfy Jinnah and Princes. I have not thought it necessary to argue against Indian constituted provincial executives as case is really covered by argument against similar executive at Centre and as I am anxious to keep reply on broad lines.

As regards your 104-S. generally I have no doubt Cabinet will endorse your conclusion that we should reaffirm our 1940 long range policy and stick to our new Executive and I can see that through in Parliament.

¹ No. 25. ² No. 23.

34

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106a: ff 34–41

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

111. My immediately preceding telegram. [There follows the Enclosure to No. 15, except for (a) a few drafting amendments and (b) the omission of the tenth paragraph beginning ‘As for the suggested establishment...’]
JANUARY 1942

35

Mr Attlee to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106a: f 50

II DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W. 1, 24 January 1942

My dear Leo,

I am away for a few days staying with Lord Portal—otherwise I would have got you to have a talk on the Viceroy’s Despatch¹ and your draft reply to the Indian Liberals.

I find the Viceroy’s despatch distinctly disturbing. He seems to assume a greater degree of solidarity in intransigence among the members of Congress than I had previously understood. I have had the impression that a good many of them were looking for a way out of the impasse of their own creation.

The corrupt group in the second line of paragraph 4 prevents one getting the sense of the passage.² Is it the Moslem mass? whom Jinnah thinks may be stampeded by Hindus? If so the whole position seems to be altered as it would appear that Jinnah’s attitude may not be that of his followers.

I am disturbed by his paragraph 14 which says for the first time that there is a large Fifth Column element in the North Eastern provinces. This cannot have sprung up in a day. Yet we have had no hint of it hitherto.

I must confess that the general effect of the despatch does not increase my confidence in the Viceroy’s judgment. I should like to know what other men such as the Chief Justice think of the position. Linlithgow seems to me to be defeatist.

I think your draft reply is on the right lines, but I feel that it will have to be followed by some action.

It is worth considering whether someone should not be charged with a mission to try to bring the political leaders together.

There is a lot of opinion here which we cannot ignore which is not satisfied that there is nothing to be done, but to sit tight on the declaration of August 1940. This opinion exists in your Party as well as mine.

Yours ever,

CLEM.

¹ Namely, telegram 104-S (No. 23).
² See No. 38.
36

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 369

IMMEDIATE

CHUNGKING, 24 January 1942, 11.30 pm
Received: 25 January, 3 am

No. 107. Chiang Kai-shek asks whether there would be any objection to his paying a brief unofficial visit to Burma and India. His purpose as regards Burma would be to examine with the Governor of Burma and General Officer Commanding, the military situation about which he feels considerable anxiety; and as regards India, to get into personal touch with Viceroy and to see Gandhi and Nehru, the latter of whom is his friend, and to impress on them essential wisdom of co-operating fully in the common cause. He is persuaded that here he can make a valuable contribution. He would like to start at the earliest possible moment while the Japanese are licking wounds they got at Changsha, and Chinese are preparing to hit them again. This time may be short. He would like the visit to be kept strictly secret until he is safely back in China, when such publicity as may be useful would be given to it. He would be accompanied by Madame Chiang Kai-shek.

2. I strongly urge an immediate and cordial assent be given to this proposal on which Chiang Kai-shek has set his heart, and which is made in best spirit with intention of marking in a striking way his whole-hearted desire to co-operate.

3. Please reply most immediate. India and Burma please also do so. Repeated to India No. 41 and Burma No. 46.

37

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

159–S. Your telegrams No. 110¹ and 111,² private and personal. I consider draft reply for Sapru excellent presentation of the case. My only suggestion of substance is the insertion in seventh³ paragraph between the words “coalition of parties that is prepared” and “to undertake” words “with the support
of a majority in the Provincial Legislature”. On a small point earlier in the same paragraph, suggest insertion of words “their then” before “existing ministries”.

1 No. 33.  2 No. 34.  3 This should read ‘ninth’.

38

Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/6/106a: f 49

INDIA OFFICE, 26 January 1942

My dear Clem,
The word “mass” in the second line of paragraph 4 of the Viceroy’s long telegram should read “H.M.G.”. That sentence indeed goes to the root of the whole question at this moment. Congress have never forgiven us the pledge of 1940 and all their efforts are aimed at some concession now which would prejudice the issue in the Congress sense and in effect make us go back upon our pledge that the future should be settled by agreement.

On that issue Congress are, I fear, solid in their intransigence. I have read all the various telegrams and reports of the meetings with care and I confess I see no sign of any willingness to cooperate on any terms that do not involve surrender of the general position to Congress. Rajagopalachariar might personally be willing to go rather further than others, but he is obviously afraid of in any way detaching himself from the main body. Briefly, the Congress attitude might be summed up as saying that they refuse to cooperate, but might conceivably reconsider the position if H.M.G. now came forward and offered to accept their terms.

Their position is a hopelessly negative one and I don’t see that we can do anything to meet it. On the other hand, I don’t think they mean positive mischief and their general ideas of working to keep order and maintain the ordinary course of life in case of invasion are not too bad. In fact, while refusing to cooperate in principle on the higher plane, they realise the danger to India sufficiently to be willing to cooperate in the villages with the police etc. There is always the danger in this sort of volunteer movement that it might become aggressive, but I think most Congressmen are really sufficiently non-violent not to wish to develop things in that direction.

As to quislings, I confess that I was a little surprised at Linlithgow’s paragraph

1 No. 23.
on that subject. But anything is possible if a victorious army began invading India and no doubt we have to be prepared.

Like you, I find one or two things in the tone of Linlithgow's telegram not altogether to my liking. But I confess that I do not see how we can differ at this moment from his general conclusion, or that there is the slightest prospect of any constitutional step at this moment which would improve the war effort or bring the parties together. I doubt if any sort of mission would have much effect. The only person who could undertake it with any authority would be myself, and I don't see either Linlithgow or Winston welcoming that at this juncture. If things became much more serious the suggestion might be worth making, but at least as much on grounds of emergency defence measures as on those of political mediation.

I fully realise the strength of opinion here, but I don't see what we can do beyond making clear the extent of what is involved in our August Declaration and the dangers involved in anything that meant going back on the pledges then given to the Moslems, the Princes, and other minorities. I think I can quite well hold the House on the general lines of Linlithgow's paragraph 17. Anyhow, I expect I shall have to try it.

Yours ever,
L. S. A.

39

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Clark Kerr

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 371

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 26 January 1942

161-S. Addressed Kerr Chungking repeated to Secretary of State and Governor of Burma.

Your immediate telegram January 24th.¹ Visit from Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai Shek at New Delhi would be most welcome, and members of my Government would also welcome opportunity meeting them there. Value of visit to war effort would be greatly increased if condition of secrecy could possibly be lifted to extent of publication of message by Generalissimo issued on Indian soil urging fullest co-operation India and China against common enemy. Meetings with Gandhi and Nehru are likely in any case to make maintenance of real degree of secrecy very difficult, even if they came to Delhi for the purpose, as seems best method. I think that they would do so if Generalissimo would send each a message asking him to meet him in Delhi. I will facilitate desired meetings as far as possible but regard it as important
that I should see him first before they take place. I also consider it important in order not to create any impression that he thinks Congress Party are only people on whom India’s co-operation depends, which is far from correct, that Generalissimo should similarly invite Jinnah as head of the Moslem League to meet him in Delhi. I have no views on the question raised by Governor of Burma as to time of meeting with Wavell.

1 No. 36.

40

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 368

MOST IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 26 January 1942, 10.50 pm

Received: 27 January

No. 1595. Your telegram 26 January 161-S1 to Chungking. In view of importance of avoiding slightest delay in responding to Chiang Kai-shek’s offer to visit Burma and India Cabinet approved despatch this evening by Foreign Office of reply to Clark-Kerr’s 1072 (which is being repeated to you) before your 161-S arrived. I am glad to see that Foreign Office telegram on which I was consulted and which was designed to safeguard your position in regard to suggested meeting with Gandhi and Nehru is fully in line with yours. I had taken point that this meeting would involve one with Jinnah too, which of course adds to difficulty of secrecy. I had it in mind that arrangement of any such meetings would best be deferred if time permits till Generalissimo has received from you and your Council general picture of internal political situation but this of course is for your judgement.

1 No. 39.  2 No. 36.

41

Mr Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 373

FOREIGN OFFICE, 27 January 1942, 1.15 am

144. Your telegram No. 107.1

Subject to the views of the Government of India which have not yet been received, His Majesty’s Government cordially welcome the proposal that

1 No. 36.
Chiang Kai-shek should visit Burma and India. The Governor of Burma has already expressed his warm concurrence.

2. His Majesty's Government feel assured that the Generalissimo's contacts with the civil and military authorities in those countries will be of great value to the co-ordination of the allied war effort in the Far East.

3. As regards suggestion of meeting with Gandhi and Nehru, we feel that this should be left till after his arrival in India for discussion with Viceroy who we are sure will give it his most careful and sympathetic consideration. You may however explain in confidence that issues of great delicacy clearly attach to suggestion that Chiang Kai-shek (who is generally regarded as the Head of the Chinese State) should intervene between established government of India and private individuals who have till now deliberately refused to co-operate with that government.

4. No doubt Viceroy and Governor of Burma would do all that is possible to keep visit secret, but difficulty of doing so would be vastly increased by suggested meeting with Nehru and Gandhi.

Repeated to India No. 1598 and Burma No. 235.2

2 In his telegram 122 of 28 January to the Foreign Office, Sir A. Clark Kerr reported that the Chinese were ‘down in the dumps. More so indeed than I have ever known them. This is cumulative effect of many things, true and untrue, for instance (1) our continued withdrawals in Malaya where they expected us to be reinforced and to hold (2) persistent rumours that we scorn their offer of military help in Burma although our line is very thinly held and situation precarious (3) belief that we are unwilling to take them into our confidence and generally to treat them as equals in the alliance (4) alleged reluctance on the part of Malaya and Burma to accept offers of Chinese co-operation in civil defence. Here (group indecipherable ?their) old and not entirely unfounded grievances as to a like attitude in Hong Kong are being recalled with bitterness and they are finding it difficult to forgive us for failing, it seems, to warn their consulates when we withdrew so hastily from Penang. They grumble too about supposed inadequacy of our scorcht earth action in Malaya (5) First Lord of Admiralty’s recent suggestion that our policy must be Hitler first which in company with Colonel Knox’s somewhat similar statement caused great despondency and suspicion (6) finally, disturbing echoes of Axis propaganda contrasting [with] President of United States’ declaration that he would use all his resources to achieve deliverance and independence of Philippines with absence of any kindred declaration by ourselves that might give Indians something to hope for and to fight for.’

In his telegram 126 of the same date Sir A. Clark Kerr said that ‘Chinese criticism about (6) is harsh and persistent. They accuse us of insincerity. No material that I have as yet received from Government of India has been of the nature to enable me to counter it.’

Both these telegrams were repeated to the Government of India.

In their reply (No. 187 of 3 February) to these two telegrams the Foreign Office referred Sir A. Clark Kerr to the Prime Minister’s speech in the House of Commons on 9 September 1941 (Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 374, cols. 68–9), to the reaffirmation of this statement by the Secretary of State in answer to a Parliamentary Question on 9 October (ibid., col. 1104) and to passages in the Secretary of State’s speeches which were relevant to the charge that India had been given nothing to fight for.

For these three telegrams see L/P&S/12/2315: ff 364, 363 and 335.
42

Mr Attlee to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106a: f 31

II DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W., 27 January 1942

My dear Leo,
Thanks for your letter of the 26th January. I still think the position most unsatisfactory and I very much doubt whether it can be held.

Yours ever,

CLEM.

1 No. 38.

43

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 42

R/30/1/1: ff 27-9

THE INDIAN POLITICAL SITUATION
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, 28 January 1942

I. THE REAL ISSUE
The political deadlock in India to-day is concerned, ostensibly, with the transfer of power from British to Indian hands. In reality it is mainly concerned with the far more difficult issue of what Indian hands, what Indian Government or Governments, are capable of taking over without bringing about general anarchy or even civil war.

The former issue has been settled in principle by pledge after pledge given in the name of His Majesty’s Government, culminating in the Viceroy’s definition in January 1940 of the objective as “full Dominion Status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster,” and in the promise of full and equal partnership contained in the Viceroy’s declaration of August 1940. That declaration further made it clear that this status of practical independence was to be attained as soon as possible after the war under a constitution of Indian devising. It anticipated in the fullest and most generous sense the general principle enunciated in Article III of the Atlantic Charter. That its fulfilment must

1 In a speech at the Orient Club, Bombay, on 10 January 1940 Lord Linlithgow said: ‘His Majesty’s Government have made it clear, both through statements issued by myself, and in Parliament, that their objective for India is full Dominion Status, Dominion Status, too, of the Statute of Westminster variety.’ The Marquess of Linlithgow: Speeches and Statements. (New Delhi, Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, 1945), p. 228.
necessitate some provision for the carrying out of existing obligations is a limitation which would naturally apply no less to any other case in which effect were given to the principle of the Atlantic Charter.

What would be equally necessary in the application of that principle in India or elsewhere is some measure of agreement as to who constitute the people or peoples whose freedom of choice as to their form of government is to be respected. That insistence on agreement is, indeed, an essential feature of the August Declaration. But it is precisely that feature which has brought to the forefront the true nature of the Indian problem, namely, the existence in India, over and above all other local differences, of two great communities, at least as separate, and indeed antagonistic, in culture and outlook as any of the contending nations in Europe. To talk of those two communities as majority and minority is a dangerous misuse of terms, because it tends to imply that the right of the numerically smaller community to have its individuality respected is less than that of the larger. It is, after all, in defence of that right that we are at war to-day.

Yet this fundamental issue has been throughout ignored by the Congress Party—which, in spite of efforts to keep a Moslem element in its façade, is essentially a Hindu Party—in its ingrained conviction that it is the natural heir to the British Government in India, and entitled to take over control both of legislative and executive power, unfeathered by any limitations save such “safeguards” for the “minorities” as it has professed to be willing to grant.

The issue was, indeed, also largely ignored by Parliament when it based the present India Act on the assumption of the possibility for All-India of a central Government constituted on British lines, and thought that the position of the Moslem community could be sufficiently safeguarded by separate electorates. Congress was thus afforded an opportunity, which is never likely to recur, of securing effective control of the machinery of Indian Government. But in its “all or nothing” mood it rejected the Act at the Centre for its essentially temporary limitations upon full independence and for the “undemocratic” weightage given to the Indian States.

Meanwhile, the experience of Congress Government in the Provinces and of the centralised dictatorship of the Congress “High Command” finally decided the Moslems, now increasingly coming together in the Moslem League, to reject entirely any system of government for India as a whole based on a Parliamentary majority Executive. The demand for Pakistan, i.e., for the complete separation of the Moslem majority Provinces from the rest of India, embodies this rejection in its extreme form. It is to be hoped that practical considerations will, in fact, induce the Moslem Provincial leaders in the end to accept some form of All-India Government over a carefully limited field and under some mutually agreed constitution. But Parliamentary Responsible Government for India as envisaged by the Declaration of 1917 and worked out
with such infinite care in the Act of 1935 is, to my mind, no longer in the picture. The solution can, and must be found; but it will have to be found on different lines.

That was the real meaning of the Declaration of 1940 with its insistence upon agreement between the main elements in India’s national life. That is why it was welcomed, and is to-day regarded as a solemn pledge, by the Moslems and other “minority” elements, as well as by the Princes. That is why, in spite of its acceptance of the principle of an Indian-made constitution, the declaration was regarded by Congress as a direct challenge to its whole position, a direct denial of its claim to speak for India. Congress policy since then has concentrated on one main object: to put pressure upon the British Government to go back upon the Declaration of 1940. It is in the light of that purpose that we must judge its past and present political manoeuvres, as well as the efforts of those eminent and respectable Hindu Moderates who, while deprecating the extremist attitude of Congress, have continued to turn the same blind eye to the existence of Moslem India, and to pin their faith to British Parliamentary Government as the only solution of the Indian problem.

2. PARTY MANŒUVRES 1940–41

The opening gambit in the Congress game was the campaign of selective civil disobedience, beginning with the leaders of the Party and intended, by their example, to spread ever wider and wider, impressing both India and the outside world with India’s self-imposed martyrdom in the cause of freedom. Starting in October 1940 the campaign gathered some strength in the opening months of 1941, chiefly in the United Provinces, and by May there were some 14,000 satyagrahis in prison. But by then it had already lost momentum. New entrants rapidly declined and were soon exceeded by the release of time-expired prisoners, who, in their turn, showed no inclination to obey Mr. Gandhi’s injunctions to seek re-imprisonment.

Meanwhile, in March 1941 a Conference of Moderate leaders met in Bombay under the presidency of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to look for some way of breaking the deadlock. The real nature of that deadlock was recognised by an initial approach to Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah urging them to come together. But coming up against a stone wall in that quarter the Moderate leaders—nearly all Hindus—at once turned back into the easier and more congenial path of putting His Majesty’s Government on the defensive by demanding greater powers to be given to “India”, both immediately and prospectively, without facing the issue how these powers were to be shared between the contending elements.

The demand for an immediate declaration that Dominion Status would be granted within a specified time after the war in effect pushed back upon His Majesty’s Government the responsibility for finding and imposing their own
solution by the prescribed date, and gave both the main parties every excuse for refusing to come to terms with each other and for disagreeing with whatever constitution might be imposed. The demand for the immediate transfer of full power to an entirely Indian Executive Council responsible to the Crown alone, but treated as a Dominion Government, simply ignored the manœuvring for power and position which had previously frustrated the Viceroy’s efforts to bring the party leaders together in an expanded Executive, and would no doubt have equally frustrated the offer of seats on a Council with greatly enlarged powers.

Congress, while not indisposed to encourage the Bombay proposals behind the scenes, took good care not to associate itself with them. The Moslem League treated them with contempt, and proceeded in April formally to reaffirm its faith in Pakistan. The practical difficulties in the way of the Bombay scheme, as well as the absence of support from either of the main parties, were set out by myself in the debate on the continuance of Section 93 government in the Provinces in the same month.2

3. THE NEW INTERIM CONSTITUTION
At the same time it was generally felt intolerable that the intransigence or exigencies of party leaders should impose a veto on all effective association of Indians with the government of their country in the present crisis. The Viceroy accordingly decided to appeal to individual Indian public men of standing and experience to join his Executive Council, the enlargement of which was in any case desirable on practical grounds, and to join a National Defence Council which, in an advisory capacity, was intended to serve as a link between the war effort at the Centre and in the Provinces and States. The Indian members are in a majority of eight to four on the new Executive, while only one European and one Anglo-Indian figure among the 29 members of the National Defence Council.

The two bodies between them are as fully representative as possible of the leading personalities of every community and of every shade of political opinion in India, given the fact that actual members of the present Congress organisation and of the Moslem League are not included. The exclusion of the latter was, however, the result, not of any objection on principle, but of pique on Mr. Jinnah’s part at not having been consulted. By a somewhat unscrupulous use of his almost dictatorial powers in the League, and playing upon the fear of disruption of that body, he forced the Premiers of Bengal, of the Punjab and of Assam to resign from the National Defence Council. The Moslem Premier of Sindh, who had already broken with Mr. Jinnah on other grounds, remained, while Mr. Fazlul Huq, the Bengal Premier, has since rejoined, after reconstituting his Government and leaving the League.

The expansion of the Governor-General’s Executive Council has marked a noteworthy change in the spirit, if not in the legal structure, of the Government
of India. The whole government of British India, in all its aspects, and not merely the powers transferred to an Indian Cabinet under the dyarchical scheme of the 1935 Act, is now within the purview of a Cabinet with a substantial Indian and non-official majority. The Viceroy and his Executive are, no doubt, subject to the overriding authority of the British Cabinet and Parliament. But that authority has never been lightly or arbitrarily exercised against the considered view of the Government of India, and is even less likely to be so exercised under the new conditions.

The enlarged Executive has, in fact, shown itself a practical and responsible body in which the new members have worked on the best of terms with the Viceroy, with the older members and with each other. They have been responsive to Indian public opinion, but as representative public men and not as party delegates. They have also effectively remedied one of the gravest weaknesses of the Government of India in the past, the absence of Indian speakers both prepared and able to defend the policy of the Government. It is difficult to believe that this practical advance in the government of India by Indians has been without its effect upon public opinion, both in regard to the relations between India and this country and in regard to the relations between the two main communities.

No less successful, within its narrower limits, has been the National Defence Council. The opportunity of hearing the heads of every department, from General Wavell downwards, frankly and fully expounding and discussing every aspect of the conduct of the war has made a great impression on all its members, and Provincial Governors have testified to the enthusiasm with which members have come back to their part in the local war effort. Princes and Provincial representatives have worked most happily together on this, the first All-India political body. Here, too, it would seem that the beginning has been made, without overt constitutional change, of something that may develop and exercise a real influence on the Indian political atmosphere.

4. CONGRESS IN CONFUSION—THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES

As against these positive steps on the part of the Government the futility of the Congress policy became increasingly obvious to many of the Congress leaders, as well as to the general public. One sign of this was a demand for the resumption of ministerial government in the Provinces, which acquired sufficient force in one Province, Orissa, to enable the Governor to assent to the formation towards the end of November of a Coalition Government, including several dissident Congress members. On the other hand, the Coalition Government of Assam disintegrated a month later and the Governor, failing to find an alternative Ministry prepared to support the war effort, was forced to assume control under Section 93.

Once it had become evident that Mr. Gandhi’s campaign of symbolic civil disobedience no longer constituted in any sense a real challenge to the authority of the Government, it was an open question whether it was worth while keeping the dwindling balance of satyagrahis in prison for the full term of their sentences. When the matter was raised in November by a motion in the Assembly the Viceroy’s Executive were in favour of release, not in the expectation of any response from Congress itself, but with a view to liquidating a position which had become absurd. With the exception of the Governors of the United Provinces and Madras, who feared public disturbance and possible serious reaction on the Moslem League, the Provincial Governments welcomed the proposal, which was eventually sanctioned by His Majesty’s Government. In the event the releases seem to have left the Indian public tranquilly uninterested. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Kalam Azad, the Congress President, were released at the same time, though strictly speaking they were outside the category of purely symbolic “protestants.”

The effect on Congress was to tear away the veil of pretence which had enveloped its proceedings. So long as there were still some thousands of “martyrs” in prison it was always possible to make out that something was happening or might happen. Once these were released, and no one could be found willing to take their places, it was difficult for anyone but Mr. Gandhi himself to discover that Congress still had any policy. On top of this came the war with Japan with its more immediate threat to the actual security of Indian lives and property. The demand for a more realist policy on the part of many Congress leaders came to a head at the meeting of the Working Committee at the end of the year at Bardoli, and led to Mr. Gandhi’s resignation of the leadership.

It is typical of Congress methods that the breach of the majority of the Working Committee with Mr. Gandhi was ostensibly on the question of unconditional non-violence based on theoretical pacifism versus a non-violence based on opposition to the Government but capable of modification in the event of a direct threat to India. On this latter basis the Working Committee resolved, not indeed to offer to co-operate with the Government, but to declare that “only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis,” that “the whole background in India is one of hostility and distrust of the British Government, and not even the most far-reaching promises can alter this background, nor can subject India offer voluntary help to arrogant Imperialism,” and to announce that it was back to the position which it had adopted a year before in Bombay, when it had rescinded the so-called Poona offer, i.e., back to the demand for an immediate and unqualified recognition of Indian independence under a constitution to be settled by an All-India Constituent Assembly based on universal suffrage, in other words, by Congress. The Bardoli resolution has since been
unanimously endorsed by the All-India Committee meeting at Wardha on the 16th January.

On the face of it there is no change of policy from the extreme intransigence of last year. In fact, however, there is no doubt that some of the more moderate leaders, like Mr. Rajagopalachariar, would be willing to make some partial temporary concession if they could get their way on what is for them essential, *i.e.*, on some immediate measure of constitutional advance which would ensure future Congress control of the situation. They have accordingly done all in their Power, through the Press, to create the impression that they are, in fact, ready to co-operate, and are only waiting for the Government to take some initiative to which they can respond. How little even the moderates are ready to commit themselves to any practical suggestion is shown by Mr. Rajagopalachariar’s answer to a question on this point at the Wardha meeting: “The British Government know what we want. Therefore, we need not reiterate it.”

The Moslem League, whose Working Committee met at Nagpur immediately after the Bardoli meeting, was equally careful to avoid any precise declaration of its intentions. It began by “warning the British public and Government that a departure from the solemn declaration and pledges of the 8th August, 1940, would constitute a gross breach of faith...and would be resisted by Moslems with all force at their command, thus resulting in serious impediment to the war effort.” On the other hand, it went on to declare “its readiness as before to shoulder the burden of defence singly or in co-operation with other parties on the basis that a real share and responsibility is given in Government at the Centre and in the Provinces within the present constitution, but without prejudice to the major issues involved in the framing of the future constitution.” This is, no doubt, on the face of it, a more reasonable attitude. But everything turns on the League’s interpretation of what it means by a “fair share” of power for itself. There is nothing in Mr. Jinnah’s previous or recent utterances, public or private, to indicate that his idea of a fair share and that of Congress (or, indeed, of the Viceroy) can be reconciled.

5. The Sapru Memorial
On the 2nd January Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Srinivasa Sastri, Mr. Jayakar and ten other Moderate leaders cabled to the Prime Minister their suggestions for an immediate ending of the political deadlock. Admitting that “detailed discussions of the question of the permanent constitution may well wait until after victory is achieved,” they appeal for some immediate “bold stroke of far-sighted statesmanship...to enlist India’s wholehearted active co-operation in intensifying the war effort.” This, they urge, should be in the nature

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3 On 3 December the Government of India announced its decision (to which effect was to be given as soon as possible) to release ‘those civil disobedience prisoners whose offences have been formal or symbolic in character’.

4 See Appendix II.
of a declaration that "India is no longer to be treated as a dependency to be ruled from Whitehall", and that henceforth her constitutional position and powers should be identical with those of other units of the British Commonwealth.

The "concrete measures" by which it is suggested that this declaration is to be implemented are:

1. Conversion and expansion of the Central Executive Council into a truly National Government consisting entirely of non-officials of all the recognised parties and communities and in charge all portfolios subject only to responsibility to Crown.

2. Restoration in Provinces now ruled autocratically by Governors, with Section 93, of popular Governments broad based on the confidence of different classes and communities: failing this establishment of non-official Executive Councils responsible to the Crown as proposed for Centre.

3. Recognition of India's right to direct representation through men chosen by the National Government in the Imperial War Cabinet should such body be set up, and in all Allied War Councils wherever established and at the Peace Conference.

4. Consultation with the National Government on precisely the same footing and to the same extent as His Majesty's Government consult Dominion Governments in all matters affecting the Commonwealth as a whole and India in particular.

These are described as "war measures whose adoption need in no way prejudice the claims or demands of different parties with regard to India's future constitution," but also as the very minimum which could resolve the crisis. Coming from men of such high standing and undoubted patriotism, this appeal has received wide-spread publicity.

The essence of the proposal is in the first item. What precisely is meant by responsibility to the Crown alone is not quite clear. But whether it means that the final decision on all issues is to rest on the Viceroy personally or on the majority in this new National Government, it would, in fact, mean transfer of the ultimate responsibility for the Government of India, not to a duly constituted and generally acceptable system of Indian Government, but to an irresponsible individual or to a handful of men nominated by the party leaders.

It may be said that this part of the proposal is in the nature of a rhetorical flourish and that all that is intended is that Whitehall should declare its intention of interfering as little as possible with an all-Indian all-party Executive. But here we come to the real crux of the problem. What prospect is there of any agreement between the two main parties either upon the principle of such an Executive or upon its application in respect of the allocation of places? The signatories to the appeal—of whom, incidentally, only two are Moslems—are
in no sense capable of delivering the goods. Nothing, so far, in the attitude of Congress as a whole would suggest that it would accept even the principle, especially if it were clearly understood that the future constitution is definitely outside the purview of the new Government and that the pledge of 1940 holds good. The Moslem League might accept on that understanding, though probably demanding a further pledge to the effect that Pakistan is not ruled out as the ultimate solution. But it would almost certainly insist on more places than the Hindu parties would consider for a moment. That the two main parties would of themselves come together to put forward an agreed demand on the Sapru lines seems practically excluded.

Should the British Government then take the initiative and announce its intention of framing such an all-Indian party leader Government, either with or without participation by Congress? Success is, to say the least of it, doubtful. However doubtful, it would be well worth attempting if it were really likely to bring about general agreement and increase the intensity of India’s war effort. With every desire to see some broad, generous gesture "touching the heart" of India, and bringing its contending elements into unison with each other and with the British Government, I cannot see this resulting. Such a new Executive, if it could be got together, would certainly not be as efficient as the existing Executive from the purely administrative point of view. Depending, as its members would, on parties which are more concerned with the struggle against each other for future power than with anything else, it would be far less likely to coalesce into a harmonious working team. It might easily become so unmanageable as to break up or have to be dismissed. Or, again, its members might be tempted to outbid each other in demands calculated in a moment of crisis to appeal to the least steady elements of the public, e.g., for the recall of all Indian troops to within the frontiers of India. It would be different if there were any evidence of the leaders of the two main communities being genuinely willing to sink their differences in a common desire to save India. As it is there is no justification for scrapping or discrediting a predominantly Indian Executive, which is working well, in order to embark on the almost certainly fruitless attempt to secure one which, if secured, would, at best, be inferior, and, at worst, a real danger.

The other recommendations of the Sapru memorial are in a different category. Items 3 and 4 are really matters of degree. While the ultimate responsibility must remain here until it can be duly transferred, there is no reason why, to an increasingly wider extent, the views of the Government of India should not be accepted without question in respect of the representation of British India on inter-Imperial or international occasions, or the consultations between the two Governments not be on the footing of free and equal discussion. As for the restoration of ministerial government in the provinces, that clearly rests with Congress itself. If it really has the slightest intention of co-operating there
is the field in which its co-operation can be immediately exercised, both directly in the administration of civil defence and more generally through membership of the National Defence Council.

6. CONCLUSION
I agree, therefore, with the Viceroy’s conclusion in his telegram No. 104–S. (W.P. (42) 43)5 that there is no immediate further interim constitutional advance that we can make. We have in the 1940 Declaration a long-term policy which is not only generous and far-reaching, but the only long-term policy which can achieve a settlement. We cannot go back on the pledges which it embodies: our business is to stand by it and expound it confidently and with conviction and not apologetically. We have in the present Central Executive and National Defence Council as representative and as efficient an instrument for associating India with her war effort as we are likely to get, at this juncture, without aggravating her internal discords. We can and should make the most of it by the consideration and respect we give to it, not only in matters of inter-Imperial and international status, but in the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards it. On that ground we can, I believe, weather the immediate storm which is sweeping down upon India.

L. S. A.

5 No. 23 was circulated to the War Cabinet under this reference.

44

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106a: ff 29–30

INDIA OFFICE, 29 January 1942

Prime Minister
Now that the debate is over I hope you may consider the attached suggestion for a reply to Sapru & Co. I took the precaution, in order to save time, of telegraphing my draft to Linlithgow and you will see from his reply1 attached that he approved and had only two trifling additions to suggest. These I have included. I have since myself suggested a somewhat more guarded assurance with reference to representation, but I have no doubt Linlithgow would agree to that (see slip ‘A’ attached on page 5).2 As I told you before, I also sent copies to Attlee, Anderson and Simon. The two former have let me know that they approve in general terms and have not suggested any alterations: Simon has not replied.

In drafting it I have followed the general line advocated by Linlithgow at
the end of his long telegram,\(^3\) namely that of setting our refusal of the Sapru proposals against the background of our very far-reaching and generous Declaration of August 1940 and of the pledges there given to the Moslems and Princes. Similarly, the draft emphasises the importance of the interim advance already made, the value of the present Executive and the objections to displacing it.

The general assurance given as to India’s status in inter-Imperial and international affairs really only conforms to what has been the established practice since the last war, at any rate in outward form, though of course the matter has naturally been and would continue to be subject to informal consultation with the Viceroy. In this connection the decision with regard to Australian and New Zealand representation at the War Cabinet naturally implies that the Viceroy should be consulted, in view of India’s at least equal interest in the Far Eastern situation, as to whether he wants to send any representative of his Government over here or is content to be represented by myself. I know his idea has been to send a member of his Council over here for a short visit, and I daresay he would think that sufficient. But the question of a representative of the Princes also coming over (as at previous Imperial Conferences and War Cabinets) may possibly arise later.

L. S. A.

\(^1\) No. 37.

\(^2\) Mr Amery suggested that the following should be substituted for the final sentence of the seventh paragraph of the draft (Enclosure to No. 13): ‘I can readily give you the assurance that the Indian Government will be afforded full opportunity for the presentation of their views when matters affecting the defence of India are under discussion in the War Cabinet, or in any other inter-Imperial or inter-allied body which may be set up during the war; and that His Majesty’s Government here have no desire to dictate to the Government of India the selection of any representatives that they may wish to send for this purpose. I need hardly add that at the eventual Peace Conference India will have her own representatives and that in this connection too His Majesty’s Government have no desire to dictate the selection of them, nor the instructions on which they will act.’

\(^3\) No. 23.

45

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE 29 January 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

177-S. Now Working Committee and A.I.C.C. meetings have been held and H.M.G.’s policy in constitutional field will be for the present governed by Prime Minister’s reply to Sapru, we can go ahead with Executive Council vacancies and readjustments. My proposals are to appoint Sir Muhammad
Usman in place of Akbar Hydari, to appoint Benthall in place of Clow, and to add one more member making 13, and for this vacancy to appoint Ambedkar. See your private and personal telegram No. 1175\(^1\) of October 8th 1941 and connected correspondence. We can now as agreed before count the C.-in-C. as one of the Service members. As to Benthall I can carry the appointment of a non-official European here (though there may be some grumbling amongst my Indian colleagues as well as from press and public) but can you face up to it in the Commons? For portfolios in order to make member in charge of Communications free to devote himself whole time to very urgent problems of transportation, I propose to take away from his charge Posts and Telegraphs, Aviation (which goes closely with the former) and Meteorology and to rename the Communications portfolio Transport. I propose that Benthall should follow Clow as Member in charge of Transport, while Posts & Telegraphs etc. would be made over either to Aney who could I think do these in addition to Indians Overseas and Leadership of Assembly, or to Ambedkar. I will let you hear further on this point. I propose to move Firoz Khan Noon to Information and to put Usman in charge of Labour. Transfer of Posts & Telegraphs with patronage involved will I feel sure be popular with Indian opinion and help us over the stile of Benthall’s appointment. I am afraid the Sikhs will have to wait for a bit. They may be expected to make a dreadful fuss but that cannot be helped. If you agree to support these appointments we should get on as quickly as possible. Usman will be here next week for the Defence Council and perhaps you could sound Benthall. Clow ought to have some leave before going to Assam but we can hardly afford to have any hiatus in charge of Transport which is vital subject at present. Benthall should be flown out at earliest moment. Announcement of Clow’s appointment and of all these others should be simultaneous. The sooner we can get them settled the better.

\(^1\) Suggesting that the occasion of the vacancy created by Sir A. Clow’s appointment as Governor of Assam should be taken to appoint both Dr Ambedkar and Sir E. Benthall to the Executive Council.

\[46\]

*War Cabinet W.M. (42) 13th Conclusions Minute 1, Confidential Annex*

L/P&S/12/2315: f 348

29 January 1942

**China**

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs referred to General Chiang Kai-Shek’s forthcoming visit to India. Attention was called to telegrams from Sir A. Clark Kerr (No. 107)\(^1\) and from the Viceroy (No. 161-S)\(^2\) in which reference
was made to the fact that General Chiang Kai-Shek had expressed his desire to see Gandhi and Nehru.

The view was expressed that it would be most unfortunate if the impression was given that the Generalissimo had come to India to visit the Viceroy, Gandhi and Nehru. The right course was that he should come to India to visit the Viceroy and members of his Council; the Viceroy should then ask him what other persons he wished to see, and should take steps to make sure that he saw persons representative of a wide selection of communities and sections of opinion, in order that he might realise the diversity of India.

The War Cabinet:
Invited the Secretary of State for India to despatch a telegram to the Viceroy on these lines.

1 No. 36.  2 No. 39.

47

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

188-S. In continuation of my private and personal telegram 177-S\(^1\) of 29th, I have been discussing with Raisman and Maxwell the tentative changes in Council described in that telegram. Although a fourteenth member would be difficult to accommodate in terms of portfolios, they have both urged that there would be many advantages in increasing number to include a Sikh representative. Commander-in-Chief and Defence Department have always been very strongly in favour of such inclusion on grounds of recruiting. I am consulting Glancy about possible names in case we should decide to include a Sikh. What do you think about one Member of my Council being permanently stationed in London ostensibly for consultation with yourself and War Cabinet? Publicity about Dominion representation on Cabinet is already producing customary grumbles and I feel sure that any arrangement that puts India in this picture will be widely welcomed here. I realise that Dominions are sensitive about matter of India’s status in contrast with their own. But the times are not ordinary and Indian goodwill is immensely important to the war effort. I should welcome an early expression of your views on these points.

1 No. 45.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 30 January 1942

The great three days’ debate1 ended in the most satisfactory fashion. Everybody except Maxton voted for the Government, while Winston has at any rate met the volume of criticism from every quarter in the House by deciding to appoint a Minister in control of the whole of production. This I imagine must be Max, for he is not capable of working under any one else and should be at his best where he has complete control and no colleagues to refuse to co-operate with! Whether Winston will take the further step of setting up a proper War Cabinet, I doubt. These problems of structure and organisation don’t interest him, and I am not sure sometimes whether he even understands what the critics are driving at. Anyhow, he is the obvious national leader. His great qualities transcend his weaknesses, and we must just hope that defects in organisation will gradually be remedied.

2. The military situation everywhere is at the moment anxious. Rangoon has held out splendidly and I am more than grateful to you for the promptitude with which you have been pushing in reinforcements from India. Singapore doesn’t look too good, though I don’t see why the place should not be held for a long time to come. Rommel has given us a nasty knock in Cyrenaica, though I should not exclude the possibility of Auchinleck turning the tables on him any day.

3. There has been a lot of stupid clamour in the House about the inadequacy of India’s war effort. One speaker even suggested that India ought, like Russia, to have put tens of millions of trained troops into the field. I don’t know whether he would have been in favour of both military and industrial conscription in India over the last quarter-century, or whom he would have expected to pay for it all. Even a more temperate critic like Noel Baker could not see why we had not another four or five divisions to spare for Malaya. But behind the immediate absurdity of these questions there is the very serious ultimate question whether our system of Government, based on a very low level of military expenditure and effort, can subsist anywhere in the world? Of course, the answer of the future may not be military conscription in numbers, but heavy expenditure on special weapons and possibly industrial conscription behind it.

Even that wouldn’t help—every rifle made & to be made in all the Democratic Front countries for 2 years is fully mortgaged!

L.
In either event how is India to be defended in future? Is she capable of organising that type of defence for herself? If not, must she remain under our control (or fall under someone else’s) and be organised and taxed on a higher military scale? In spite of Atlantic Charters and all that sort of stuff, it looks as if the world were moving steadily towards more intensive national organisation and if so, our Empire may have to follow suit or fall into the hands of others.

4. Meanwhile, I was very glad to get your telegram approving of my draft of a reply by Winston to Sapru and Co. I have now passed it on to Winston, with your approval, Attlee’s and Anderson’s, to study over the week-end, and only hope he will see his way to accepting it.

[Paras. 5 and 6, on the wearing by Indian members of the Executive Council of national ceremonial dress in place of full dress uniform, omitted.]


2 No. 37.

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**49**

*The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery*

*Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22*

**IMMEDIATE**

30 January 1942

No. 191–S. In the forthcoming sessions of the legislature we shall have to answer questions relating to the Atlantic Charter. Govind Deshmukh has put down a question for February 12th referring to an interview alleged to have taken place between Sir Shanmukham Chetty and President Roosevelt and asking whether the Leader of the House is now in a position to state that the Atlantic Charter is applicable to India. Lalchand Navalrai also has a question for the same date referring to your own statement to the effect that His Majesty’s Government’s pledges in India, though given independently of the Atlantic Charter, are in complete accord with the general principles affirmed in that declaration, and asking in that connection whether the Atlantic Charter itself in whole or in part applies to India, and if not, which principles applying to India are in accord with the Atlantic Charter.

2. In fulfilment of undertakings given in the course of the debates in the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly on the Atlantic Charter during their last sessions, copies of those debates are being sent to you departmentally by fast bag. You will see that in the Council of State on the 18th November Sir Akbar Hydari, as spokesman for the Government, argued that the Prime Minister had not declared that the Charter did not apply to India but had himself stated that the principles of the Atlantic Charter were embodied in the declarations about India which had previously been made by His Majesty’s Government. In the Legislative Assembly on October 29th Mr. Aney for the Government took the line that the Government of India were not a party to the Charter and that those who signed it were the proper persons to say what was in their minds when they signed it. The situation in this respect, as you will appreciate, has now been changed by the separate adherence of the Government of India to the Washington Declaration, which itself endorses the Atlantic Charter. I have little doubt that the Government of India will be challenged in the legislature as to the interpretation which they put upon the Charter in authorising their representative to append his signature to the Declaration.

3. In this connection I would draw your attention to a public statement made by Sir Sultan Ahmed, on January 15th. He said:

*Begins. Secondly, the Atlantic Charter of last August was a statement not of terms, but of principles. Their application, various as it must eventually be in meeting various aspirations, has never been limited in its possible extent. Any misunderstandings arising out of Mr. Churchill’s subsequent statement on the Atlantic Charter, and any feeling that its effects would be felt only in Europe, should vanish with the effective realisation that the war is now world-wide and that India’s name stands beside those of the 25 other nations pledged to see it through to victory, and to construct upon that victory a peace on the broad principles of the historic Churchill-Roosevelt Declaration. *Ends.*

4. I would therefore value your views as to how we should now deal with questions and resolutions in the legislature relating to the Atlantic Charter and its applicability to India. The matter is, as you see, rather urgent.

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3 See No. 5, note 7.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

31 January 1942, 2.40 pm

Received: 31 January, 1.45 pm

No. 199—S. Mudaliar broached with me today question of constitutional position. He says reflection has convinced him Congress has no intention of taking the least responsibility for Government at this awkward turn. Muslim League is like-minded. We should therefore make no change at the Centre. We ought to resist clamour to hand over Finance and Home portfolios from Europeans now holding these to Indians. Mudaliar is of course a non-Brahmin but this downright attitude on his part is significant. He added that he would like to see impending lapse of Section 93 met by statutory provision for setting up Council Government in Provinces and rebirth of Governor in Council as legal entity. This would be dubbed reactionary by leftist elements but would bring comfort to wide range of moderate opinion which recognises Parliamentary Government impossible under existing circumstances, deplores absence of non-service Indians from counsels of Local Government, but would not be satisfied by addition of non-officials to Advisers to Governor under Section 93. I shall of course be addressing you in due time about lapse in November next of Section 93.

2. Raghavendra Rao brought me yesterday a message at second hand from Rajagopalachariar that he wishes to be sent for by me. Raghavendra told me he did not wish to press me to see him. I am confident Rajagopalachariar cannot deliver the goods and has no intention of cutting himself adrift from Gandhi and his clique in Working Committee but that he covets for his own ends the personal prestige to be derived by personal contact with Viceroy. I do not for the present intend to send for him.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: ff 156-8

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, 31 January 1942, 10 pm

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

132. Your private and personal telegrams 177-S¹ and 188-S.² Subject to comments in paragraphs 2 and 3 I concur generally in your proposals for reconstruction of Executive Council. These, except as regards substitution of Usman for Hydari and the addition of a Sikh, are on lines on which we are already generally agreed. As their announcement would necessarily follow closely on release of Prime Minister’s reply to Sapru (it would seem definitely undesirable that it should precede this) I shall have to consult Prime Minister before going to the Palace on the appointments you recommend. I have already raised with him your proposal to station a member of your Council permanently here. You will appreciate that he may not wish to go beyond his promise (see my personal telegram 8279 of 17th July) to arrange for attendance of Indian representatives at particular Cabinets and for this reason and also to enable a Prince to attend as well I have put to him as a possible variant that there should be a succession of short visits by Members of Council and Princes. We shall of course have to decide how to occupy profitably here the time of Indian representatives in the intervals of their attending Cabinets. But we can discuss this as soon as we know what the War Cabinet is prepared to accept.

2. Transfer of Firoz Khan Noon to Information seems an excellent move. It occurs to me that Ambedkar might be more acceptable in Labour portfolio than Usman. But I realise that you may have in mind possible need for replacement of Sarkar should his health not permit of resuming duty as well as replacement of whoever is selected to come here. Who have you in mind? In these circumstances you may perhaps prefer to leave Ambedkar and the Sikh for the present without specific portfolio.

3. I have no ground for disputing your choice of Usman who seems to have an unimpeachable record in Madras though I should have been glad to see post found for Mirza Ismail.

4. I appreciate what you now say as to importance of appeasing Sikhs though no doubt weakness of their personnel constitutes a considerable difficulty. I am content to accept your judgment on that point.

5. I will let you know as soon as the Cabinet decides about the question of representation here. Prime Minister’s reply to Sapru must necessarily await
decision on that general point. Meantime I am sounding Dalton about release of Benthall and will let you know as soon as possible with a view to obtaining your full proposal for reconstruction of Council to put before Prime Minister.

1 No. 45.  2 No. 47.

52

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&J/8/544: f 194

India Office, 31 January 1942

Prime Minister

In your minute No. M. 720/1 of 9th July last you accepted my proposal that I should arrange with the Viceroy to send over one of his Members of Council, accompanied by a representative of the Indian States if he considered that also advisable, as soon as should appear convenient after the expansion of his Council. You also promised to summon these representatives to particular Cabinets, especially when any Indian matter was under consultation.

With this promise, which the Viceroy has greatly appreciated, in mind, I suggested in my draft for your reply to Sir T. B. Sapru an assurance that the Indian Government would be free to select representatives for attendance at the War Cabinet as well as other inter-Imperial and inter-Allied organisations here.

The Viceroy, who had concurred in the draft reply I proposed, now suggests that one Member of his Council should be permanently stationed in London "ostensibly for consultation with Secretary of State and with the War Cabinet"—more accurately expressed perhaps as "for the purpose of representing the views of his colleagues in India directly to Secretary of State and so to the War Cabinet". He urges that any arrangement that puts India in the picture as drawn for Dominions representatives in London will have a wide welcome in India and that Indian goodwill in this matter will be immensely important to the war effort.

I support the Viceroy’s proposal and hope that if you agree he may find it possible also to send an Indian Prince. The two representatives could attend with myself meetings of the War Cabinet, at times when the war effort with especial reference to India is under discussion. I think we could find other tasks for them in the intervals which would keep them occupied and help to illustrate India’s vital role in the war. A possible variant, however, would be for the Viceroy to arrange for successive visits of several Executive Councillors and Princes in turn to whom the same privileges would be extended.

1 Enclosure to No. 15.  2 See No. 47.
As this question is intimately linked with the terms of your reply to Sapru’s telegram and with the assurance given to the Dominions I hope you will be able to consider it and reach a decision before your reply to Sapru issues. If you agree a few words to that effect could be added to the Sapru letter.

L. S. A.

53

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/791: ff 103–4

PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 31 January 1942, 7.15 am

1831. Press control. It occurs to me that developments of the War near India and consequent danger of internal trouble to which you have referred so impressively in para. 14 of your telegram of 21st January, No. 104–S1 may compel you before long to impose a stricter control of internal repeat internal press messages and comment than is at present exercised. It may also be necessary to institute a stricter scrutiny of inward and outward messages with a view to stopping widespread circulation in India and elsewhere of ill-informed comment and mischievous propaganda calculated to inflame political passions and increase difficulties of administration.

2. You might perhaps feel some reluctance in superseding present “gentlemen’s agreement” with the Press, which so far as I know has worked fairly well, but the conditions of an emergency would amply justify more rigorous measures. I presume you already have in reserve either in Defence Regulations or in draft in some other instrument all the powers needed for the purpose, but it seems essential also that the necessary machinery should be ready in advance in order that action can be taken in the exercise of such powers if need be at very short notice. On this you may feel that preliminary consultations with Low of the Times of India would be valuable.

3. I should be glad to have your views on the matter generally which I fully realise has many implications and needs the most careful consideration.2

1 No. 23.
2 Lord Linlithgow replied in telegram 1008–S of 12 April that in his opinion the Government of India’s powers of Press control were for the present purposes sufficient, taken with Rules 17, 18 and 41 of the Defence of India Rules. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 349

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 31 January 1942, 4.10 pm

From Secretary of State to Viceroy 1844 repeated to Chungking No. 163 and Governor of Burma No. 270.

Your telegram 161–S\(^1\) and my 1595\(^2\) dated 26th January. Cabinet last night asked me to let you know that they attach importance to invitation to Chiang Kai-shek being one to visit yourself and Members of your Council and to avoiding creation of impression that primary purpose of visit is meeting with Gandhi and Nehru. They feel therefore that right course is for you to ask Chiang on arrival what other persons he would like to see and for invitations to meet him to come from you, conveying Chiang’s wish to see those invited, rather than from him direct. They also felt, and I feel sure you will agree, that he should meet other representative Indian personalities besides leaders of Congress and Moslem League. Sikander and Ambedkar seem obviously suitable, but you will know best whom it would be useful and convenient for him to meet in the time available.

\(^1\) No. 39. \(^2\) No. 40.

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 355

SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, 31 January 1942, 10.30 am

1906. Chungking to Foreign Office No. 138, 30 January, repeated to India. Your telegram No. 154.\(^1\) Chiang Kai-shek proposes to leave Chungking on February 4th to spend February 5th in Rangoon, February 6th in Calcutta and arrive Delhi on February 7th.

2. He is averse from asking the three Indian leaders to go to Delhi to meet him because Chinese ethics may lay it down that visitor should pay first call. He proposes therefore to spend February 8th with the Viceroy, to devote next three days to visiting the three leaders and to spend February 12th with the

\(^1\) Telegram 154 of 28 January requested itinerary and dates of Chiang Kai-Shek’s visit to India and Burma. L/P&S/12/2315: f 360.
Viceroy if latter wishes to have further talk with him. He would like to see some Indian troops and might be willing to stay at Delhi until February 14th when he would start on his return journey to China.

3. He would be ready to (group corrupt) messages which Viceroy has suggested. He will be happy to accept any hospitality which may be offered him in India but he begs that he may be allowed to stay either in hotel or in house outside the precincts of the Government House both in Calcutta and Delhi. I assume it would not be difficult to put a house and servants at his disposal. He is anxious that his visit should be as unofficial as possible. He will be travelling in his own plane.

4. I am informing Burma and Calcutta in separate telegram.

5. Please mark any subsequent telegrams Personal and Secret.

2 See No. 39.

56

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE
SECRET. PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 1 February 1942, 2.25 am
Received: 1 February, 12.15 pm

No. 209-S. Your No. 19061 of 31st January. Generalissimo’s intention to leave Chungking 4th February arriving Calcutta 6th February and Delhi 7th February leaves no time for me to adjust proposals with you before I communicate with Ambassador Chungking and make all arrangements here.

2. While I agree entirely with Cabinet’s views as conveyed to me in your No. 1844,2 Personal, of 31st January, I must now do the best I can in circumstances of Chiang’s plans and declared wishes, and in the light of my appreciation of his nature. I judge that what most matters is that he should leave India pleased and in friendly mood. I have therefore sent Clark Kerr telegram3 copy of which follows immediately. You will see that I have said nothing about Nehru, Gandhi and Jinnah. I suspect that Generalissimo imagines that these gentlemen live in New Delhi. I have felt that if I describe remoteness of Wardha and absence of landing ground, Generalissimo will at once suspect that I am trying to deter him from visiting Gandhi. He may well decide to visit Nehru at Allahabad on his way from Calcutta to Delhi, but I do not attach overmuch importance to seeing Nehru before he talks to me. To attempt to manage Chiang will, I feel sure, make him cross and suspicious, while if he makes his
own plans and these go amiss, he will only have himself to blame. I think I can handle him well enough and I shall be surprised and disappointed if I don’t send him home as pleased as Punch.¹

¹ No. 55. ² No. 54. ³ Not printed.
⁴ Mr Churchill minuted on this telegram on 3 February: ‘Secretary of State for India. All this is contrary to Cabinet decision.’

57

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 53

L/PO/6/166b: ff 500–3

Indian Constitutional Questions
Memorandum by Secretary of State for India
India Office, 1 February 1942

1. Proposed Reply to the Telegram from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru
And Others to the Prime Minister

The text of the reply which, with the full agreement of the Viceroy, I recommend should be sent to the telegram (Appendix A) addressed to the Prime Minister by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and others will be found at Appendix B. In drafting the reply I have followed the general line advocated by the Viceroy at the end of his telegram of the 21st January (W.P. (42) 43),² namely, that of setting our refusal of the Sapru proposals against the background of our very far reaching and generous Declaration of August 1940, and of the pledges there given to the Muslims and the Princes. Similarly, the draft emphasises the importance of the interim advance already made, the value of the present Executive and the objections to displacing it.

2. Indian Representation at Meetings of the
Imperial War Cabinet

The general assurance given in paragraph 7 of the draft reply to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru as to India’s status in inter-Imperial and international affairs really only conforms, at any rate in outward form, to what has been the established practice since the last war, though, of course, questions of personnel and their instructions have naturally been, and would continue to be, subject to informal consultation with the Viceroy. In the light of the decision with regard to Australian and New Zealand representation at the War Cabinet, the Viceroy has himself suggested³ that there would be advantage in posting a Member of his Council.

¹ The War Cabinet print is dated 1 February, but the date 2 February is printed at the foot of the Secretary of State’s Memorandum.
² See No. 43, note 5.
³ See No. 47.
in London who would be available to represent the views of his Government to me and in the Imperial War Cabinet. In view of India’s at least equal interest in the Far Eastern situation, I strongly support the Viceroy’s proposal. The question of a representative of the Princes also coming over (as at previous Imperial Conferences and War Cabinets) may possibly arise later.

The precedents for the Government of India’s representation in addition to representation by the Secretary of State for India at the Imperial Conference and in the Imperial War Cabinet date back for 25 years, Indian representatives associated with the Secretary of State having attended both these bodies in 1917 and in 1918. As regards the latter, the Prime Minister announced in Parliament on the 17th May, 1917, that the Imperial War Cabinet had accepted his proposal that at future meetings “the Imperial Cabinet should consist of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such of his colleagues as deal specially with Imperial affairs, of the Prime Minister of each of the Dominions or some specially accredited alternate possessed of equal authority, and of a representative of the Indian people to be appointed by the Government of India.” It was subsequently arranged that in addition to the full Member nominated by the Government of India, a representative of the Indian States would attend at the invitation of the Prime Minister. At subsequent meetings of the Imperial Conference, the Secretary of State has continued to lead the Indian delegation, which, normally, in addition to himself has consisted of a representative of British India and a representative of the Indian States selected by the Viceroy in (private) consultation with the Secretary of State and acting under instructions prepared in India but similarly approved by him. It had been contemplated that, after the inauguration of an Indian Federation, the Secretary of State would still lead the Indian delegation, although associated with Indian representatives appointed by and answerable to Indian authorities. The Federal constitution, of course, envisaged that the Governor-General would exercise “reserved” functions in regard to external affairs and defence, whereas at present these matters are not reserved to the Governor-General, but, in principle fall within the scope of the Governor-General in Council—and the Governor-General’s Council is responsible not to the Indian Legislature, but through the Secretary of State to Parliament. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and those associated in his representations to the Prime Minister have urged as part of their claim that the Government of India should become forthwith responsible to the Crown only, and not to the Crown in Parliament, that Indian representatives should in future be controlled by the Government of India and not by the Secretary of State or His Majesty’s Government. The reply to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru which I have proposed does not concede this claim. In any case, whatever may be the formal position as between the Secretary of State and representatives of the Indian Government, as at present constituted, attending an Imperial War Cabinet, the nature of the discussions and the procedure
there need not be held to be an obstacle to the free expression of the views of the latter in so far as they may be independent of those of the Secretary of State.

3. NEW APPOINTMENTS TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL’S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Certain changes have to be made in the Viceroy’s Executive Council owing to the recent death of Sir Akbar Hydari, Member for Information, and the impending appointment of Sir A. Clow, Member for Communications, to be Governor of Assam. The Viceroy’s consequent proposals for reconstructing his Government are connected with the question of its representation in this country. I set out below the names of the existing posts and their holders, and of those proposed to succeed them where changes are contemplated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Old Holder</th>
<th>New Holder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
<td>General Sir A. Hartley</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>Sir R. Maxwell</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>Sir J. Raisman</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications (now to be reconstituted and renamed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Sir A. Clow</td>
<td>Sir E. Benthall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Health and Lands</td>
<td>Mr N. Sarker</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Sir R. Mudadiar</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Sir Firoz Khan Noon</td>
<td>Sir Muhammad Usman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Sir Sultan Ahmed</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians Overseas</td>
<td>Mr Aney</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Sir A. Hydari</td>
<td>Mr Firoz Khan Noon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Sir H. Mody</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member without Portfolio</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Mr Ambedkar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member without Portfolio</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>A Sikh (at present unnamed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that the Viceroy proposes no change in the number (4) of Europeans in the Government, but an increase of Indians from 7 to 9. Of the new Members, Sir E. Benthall, who is senior partner of Bird & Co., Calcutta, has a high standing with the European business community. He is at present employed in the Ministry of Economic Warfare here. Sir Muhammad Usman is a respected Muslim politician in Madras who has acted as Governor. Like the other Mohammedan Members of the Council, he is not a member of the Muslim League. Mr. Ambedkar is the political leader of the depressed classes, of whose rights he has been a doughty champion. The Sikh Member is needed to give a

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4 Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 11.  
5 Nos. 45 and 47.  
6 Mr Amery omitted the name of Mr E. Raghavendra Rao, who had been appointed Member for Civil Defence on 21 July 1941.
voice to a small community, which nevertheless is strongly represented in the fighting forces of India. One of the two Members at present designated to be without portfolio would be available for posting to the office vacated by the Member of the Viceroy’s Council whom he proposes to send home to represent his Government’s views.

It must, of course, be recognised that the proposed additions, while strengthening the Council as an organ for transacting India’s war business, will not afford any satisfaction to the main political parties in India or be regarded as contributing to meet the desiderata of Sir T. B. Sapru and his associates, except in so far as they facilitate provision for direct representation of the Indian Government here by one of its Members.

To summarise, I propose:

(1) A draft reply from the Prime Minister to Sir T. B. Sapru and his associates;

(2) that a representative of the Indian Government and, when desired by the Viceroy, an Indian Prince, should attend with myself meetings of the War Cabinet at times when the war effort with especial reference to India is under discussion;

(3) that the expansion of the Governor-General’s Executive Council proposed with a view to enabling one of its Members to visit this country be approved.

L. S. A.

Appendix A to No. 57

TELEGRAM FROM SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU AND OTHERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER, DATED 2 JANUARY 1942.

[See enclosure to No. 2]

Appendix B to No. 57

PROPOSED REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU AND OTHERS.

[The draft which follows is identical with that transmitted to Lord Linlithgow (see No. 34), except that it incorporates the amendments he suggested in No. 37. The note below is at the foot of the draft.]

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

Since receiving the Viceroy’s agreement to the draft set out above I have, in the light of recent developments, drafted a somewhat more guarded assurance with reference to representation as a possible alternative to the last sentence of paragraph 77 of the draft. This is as follows:

“I can readily give you the assurance that the Indian Government will be afforded full opportunity for the presentation of their views when matters affecting the defence of India are under discussion in the War Cabinet, or
in any other inter-Imperial or inter-Allied body which may be set up during the war and that His Majesty's Government here have no desire to dictate to the Government of India the selection of any Representatives that they may wish to send for this purpose. The Viceroy has been invited to put forward his Government’s suggestions in that connection. I need hardly add that at the eventual Peace Conference India will have her own Representatives, and that in this connection, too, His Majesty’s Government have no desire to dictate the selection of them, nor the instructions on which they will act.”

L. S. A.

7 Namely the para. beginning 'On the other hand, leaving on one side...'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 2 February 1942

There is yet another mail off this afternoon and I might as well take the opportunity of sending just a line.

2. I had hoped to bring up various Indian matters, viz., the reply to Sapru, the decision as to Indian representation at Cabinet meetings, more help for India in respect of personnel for munitions factories, &c., this afternoon, but I have just heard from No. 10 that this is postponed till Thursday. If the Cabinet agrees to representation here, a reference to that might be inserted at the last moment in the Sapru letter. Personally, I am all for an Indian representative to attend both the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee. Mudaliar, if you can spare him, would, I imagine, be the best man, as you would hardly wish to send Firoz back after so short a spell in India. On the other hand, you might perhaps prefer to send a series of Indian representatives in rotation, each for a few months at a time. I don’t know quite how that would fit in with the work of their departments. If you had the ideal man available you might make him additional Member for Defence and send him here in that capacity without disorganising any business. I suppose the most suitable man from that point of view might be Sikander, but then I hardly imagine you could spare him from the Punjab.

3. Notwithstanding the Australian and New Zealand preference for representation on the Pacific Council at Washington, I still think that Indian interests will be much better looked after from London and so through our representatives

1 5 February.
2 Sir Firoz Khan Noon had been High Commissioner for India in London from 1936 to 1941.
on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee at Washington. It is the latter who really will decide things and the British members will naturally go by the instructions they received from here. I admit the whole organisation resulting from Wavell’s appointment is somewhat lopsided. His post covers only a part of the operations against Japan and more particularly only controls the naval forces when those in command of the forces have decided to enter his area. On paper at any rate, the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington are concerned not with the war against Japan as a whole, but with the questions raised by Wavell, and there is therefore some force in the Australian and New Zealand contention that they want to be represented on some Council which covers their own area. However, it will all get straightened out in time, I expect.

4. I hope you may do Chiang Kai-Shek good while he is staying with you and I am sure you will send him away happy. I don’t see why he doesn’t want actually to stay with you, but I dare say the Hartleys will be able to make him happy. As for Nehru and Gandhi, if he does see them, I hope he will size them up for the niggling unpractical creatures they are. I greatly like your idea of persuading Clark Kerr to spend a fortnight in India on his way to Moscow and have sent a line to Eden backing up the suggestion.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICE-ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 2 FEBRUARY 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

4. In paragraph 5 of your latest letter¹ you ask whether I have considered setting up a small branch in my Secretariat to collect and classify material of all sorts bearing on the constitutional problem. That is, of course, what my Reforms Office are doing all the time. I have given Hodson to understand what I want, and his tours (you will by now have seen his interesting account² of his latest tour) are productive of much useful material, and, I am sure, of first class experience for himself. You know my views about Gwyer: I do not think that just at present he would fill the bill as a Royal Commission on the Indian Constitution. His arthritis is, I am sorry to say, gaining ground very rapidly and he is almost a cripple, and his health in other particulars has been indifferent of late. Coupland, I fear, is handicapped by his anxiety to find a solution of the Indian problem before he leaves India.
8. Another contentious question, so far as the short term policy is concerned, relates to the sort of armament with which Provincial forces should be supplied if they are to afford substantial relief to the Army in dealing with internal disorder. The demands received from certain Provincial Governments for automatic weapons and so on, have, I think, been based to some extent on misapprehensions (which have been encouraged rather than otherwise by the local military authorities) as to the kind of duties that the police may be called upon to perform. These misapprehensions, and with them, some of the demands themselves may be removed by the letter\(^2\) to Provincial Governments; but the character of police armaments is a question on which I feel that Provincial Governments are likely to return to the charge. I propose in any case to ask Hartley to consider whether the General Staff’s insistence on the strict limitation of police equipment is not over-rigid and does not proceed perhaps more from their anxiety to discourage militarization of the police in the abstract than from a realistic understanding of the necessities of the case. Up to now, I have not thought it reasonable to ask Hartley to apply his mind to this question, in face of his preoccupation with problems of reinforcement and reorganisation of the army, and his own lack of familiarity with so many current problems.

9. So far as the long term policy is concerned, there is only one further remark I consider it necessary to make with reference to paragraph 4 of your letter, where you suggest the possible formation at the Centre of a reserve of military police for use in the form of mobile detachments to reinforce Provincial police services where necessary. The pros and cons of some kind of Federal Police Force were examined pretty closely some years ago, and the conclusion was then reached that for the time being at any rate the proposal should not be pursued. That proposal, in any case, had reference primarily to the possible need for such a force to protect the property of the Central Government. It would, I am sure, be constitutionally awkward for the Centre to maintain any kind of police force to supplement the ordinary responsibility of the Provinces in the matter of Law and Order, and in my opinion, if any such Central force is to be maintained, it must be of a military nature if we are to avoid an invasion of the sphere of Provincial Autonomy. On the other hand, it seems that there is nothing to prevent arrangements being made by the Provinces themselves under which additional police forces maintained for one Province would be available, by agreement, for employment in another Province.

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1 No. II.
2 Annex to No. 30.
3 Paragraph 7 referred to this letter as having been recently issued by the Home Department after consultation with and with the concurrence of the Defence Department and General Staff. It sought to correct the impression that the military forces normally allocated to internal security duties were likely to be attenuated owing to the demands of the war.
I have read with interest the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 42) and the telegram from the Viceroy (W.P. (42) 43), but I am unable to accept the conclusion that nothing can or should be done at the present time. This seems to me to result from a dangerous ignoring of the present situation.

2. It is, I think, agreed, as pointed out in the Simon Report, that India has been profoundly affected by the changed relationship between Europeans and Asiatics which began with the defeat of Russia by Japan at the beginning of the century. The hitherto axiomatic acceptance of the innate superiority of the European over the Asiatic sustained a severe blow. The balance of prestige, always so important in the East, changed. The reverses which we and the Americans are sustaining from the Japanese at the present time will continue this process.

3. The gallant resistance of the Chinese for more than four years against the same enemy makes the same way.

4. The fact that we are now accepting Chinese aid in our war against the Axis Powers and are necessarily driven to a belated recognition of China as an equal and of Chinese as fellow fighters for civilisation against barbarism makes the Indian ask why he, too, cannot be master in his own house.

5. Similarly, the success against the Axis of a semi-oriental people, the Russians, lends weight to the hypothesis that the East is now asserting itself against the long dominance of the West.

6. If the successful outcome of the war is recognised as due to the cooperation of the big four: Britain, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China, the two Asiatic Powers will claim a powerful voice in the settlement. A Pan-Asiatic movement led by Japan has been recognised as a danger; a Pan-Asiatic bloc of our Allies is a possibility that should not be ignored. Incidentally, American sentiment has always leaned strongly to the idea of Indian freedom.

7. The increasingly large contribution in blood and tears and sweat made by Indians will not be forgotten and will be fully exploited by Indians who have not themselves contributed.
8. The Secretary of State thinks that we may weather the immediate storm by doing nothing; but what of subsequent storms? Such a hand-to-mouth policy is not statesmanship.

9. After having tried to assist in dealing with the constitutional problem of India for some five or six years I have no temptation to ignore the complexities of the problem, complexities which are made harder, not easier, by the war, more and not less urgent by the approach of the war to the confines of India.

10. The Viceroy, in paragraph 14 of his telegram, points out that "India and Burma have no natural association with the Empire, from which they are alien by race, history and religion, and for which neither of them has any natural affection, and both are in the Empire because they are conquered countries which have been brought there by force, kept there by our control, and which hitherto it has suited to remain under our protection." This is an astonishing statement to be made by a Viceroy. It sounds more like an extract from an anti-imperialist propaganda speech. If it were true it would form the greatest possible condemnation of our rule in India and would amply justify the action of every extremist in India. But it is not the whole truth. All India was not the fruits of conquest; large parts of it came under our rule to escape from tyranny and anarchy. The history of at least 150 years has forged close links between India and the United Kingdom.

It is one of the great achievements of our rule in India that, even if they do not entirely carry them out, educated Indians do accept British principles of justice and liberty. We are condemned by Indians not by the measure of Indian ethical conceptions but by our own, which we have taught them to accept.

It is precisely this acceptance by politically conscious Indians of the principles of democracy and liberty which puts us in the position of being able to appeal to them to take part with us in the common struggle; but the success of this appeal and India's response does put upon us the obligation of seeing that we, as far as we may, make them sharers in the things for which we and they are fighting.

I find it quite impossible to accept and act on the crude imperialism of the Viceroy, not only because I think it is wrong, but because I think it is fatally short-sighted and suicidal. I should certainly not be prepared to cover up this ugliness with a cloak of pious sentiment about liberty and democracy.

11. While I have little or no faith in the value of "gestures," I do consider that now is the time for an act of statesmanship. To mark time is to lose India.

12. A renewed effort must be made to get the leaders of the Indian political parties to unite. It is quite obvious from his telegram that the Viceroy is not the man to do this. Indeed, his telegram goes far to explain his past failures.

1 Mr Attlee.  2 No. 43.  3 See No. 43, note 5.  4 Cmd. 3568. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. 1, 1930, para. 463.
His mental attitude is expressed in paragraph 8 when he talks of regaining lost ground after the war. He is obviously thinking in terms of making minor concessions while resting on the status quo.

There are two practical alternatives:

(a) To entrust some person of high standing either already in India or sent out from here with wide powers to negotiate a settlement in India; or

(b) To bring representative Indians over here to discuss with us a settlement. The first alternative seems to me preferable, because Indians sent over here would be in the position of delegates bound by their instructions and unable to abate a jot or tittle of their demands.

I consider that the best chance of getting a settlement would be by the method of private and informal meetings of a very few men.

13. It would be necessary to give to our representative very wide powers both as to the future and as to the present, though I consider that the demands for steps to be taken now are likely to be far less important than demands for the post-war period.

14. There is precedent for such action. Lord Durham saved Canada to the British Empire. We need a man to do in India what Durham did in Canada.

15. There is no virtue in delay or in mere dilatory action. In all probability the time saved will be less than the duration of the war. Delay will only make the problem harder.

16. My conclusion therefore is that a representative with power to negotiate within wide limits should be sent to India now, either as a special envoy or in replacement of the present Viceroy, and that a Cabinet Committee should be appointed to draw up terms of reference and powers.

C. R. A.

61

Mr Amery to Sir R. Dorman-Smith

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 330

MOST IMMEDIATE

BURMA OFFICE, 3 February 1942, 8 pm

PERSONAL. VERY SECRET

Addressed Governor of Burma No. 63, repeated Governor of Bengal and Viceroy for information (No. 141). Will you please arrange if possible that message in my immediately following telegram from Prime Minister to Generalissimo is communicated in Burma by Clark Kerr to Generalissimo.
(Text has also been repeated to Viceroy and Governor of Bengal). If owing to
time factor this cannot be done in Burma, will Governor of Bengal please
secure delivery through same medium?
Please acknowledge and report action taken, repeating to Governor of Bengal
and Viceroy.

1 No. 62.

62

Mr Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
(via Burma Office and Governor of Burma)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: ff 332–4

Most Immediate

10 Downing Street, 3 February 1942, 9.20 pm

Personal. Secret

Addressed Governor of Burma, No. 64; Governor of Bengal, No. 142; Viceroy,
No. 142. Following is personal message from Prime Minister to Generalissimo

1. It gave us all the greatest pleasure to know that Your Excellency would
visit India and consult with the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief upon
all the measures we must take in common to safeguard Burma and the Burma
Road and thus ensure the steady flow of munitions and supplies upon which
the efficient action of the brave and successful Chinese armies depends. How-
ever I am sure you will understand that such a visit could only be made as the
guest of the Viceroy, staying either at Government House, or, if secrecy is
specially desired, at one of his private houses on his own estates either at Delhi
or Calcutta.

2. With regard to your seeing persons like Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru, who
are in a state at least of passive disobedience to the King Emperor, this you
will readily see is a matter which requires very grave consideration. It might
make a most grievous impression in Great Britain and throughout the British
Empire if anything of this kind occurred otherwise than by arrangement with
the Viceroy after you and he have talked over the whole position.

3. In any case, if you begin seeing the leaders of the Indian Congress Party
it would be necessary that you should also see Mr. Jinnah representing 80,000,000
Moslems, and representatives of the 40,000,000 depressed classes and of the
Indian Princes who rule over 80,000,000, to whom the Imperial Government
is bound by solemn treaties. I must point out that the Congress Party, although
successful some years ago in the provincial elections, in no way represents the
martial races of India who are fighting so well, in their allegiance to the King-
Emperor, to defend the very objects upon which the safety of India and the
interests of China equally depend.

4. I must therefore beg that Your Excellency, with whom I hope to collabor-
ate in the closest possible way in conjunction with President Roosevelt and
Premier Stalin, not only in this war but in the world settlement which will
follow it, will be so very kind as to consider these serious words of mine. Pray
accept my best wishes for your safe and pleasant journey. Ends.

63

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 331

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL SECRET

143. Your personal telegram, 1st February, 209–S.1 Following is personal
message to you from Prime Minister. Begins. I have sent in immediately pre-
ceding telegram2 message for Generalissimo for delivery at best point of in-
terception (either Burma or Calcutta to both of which it has been telegraphed),
and I trust that you will be most careful to be guided by it. It represents view
taken by Cabinet in assenting to the visit proposed. We cannot possibly agree
to Head of Foreign State intervening as a kind of impartial arbiter between
representative of King Emperor and Messrs. Gandhi and Nehru. I hope indeed
that when he has seen you and Members of your Council he will not wish to
have discussions with parties mentioned and that you will guide him to that
conclusion by showing how necessary it will be for him also to see repre-
sentatives of other masses of the Indian public. In no circumstances must he
be allowed to see Nehru, as you apprehended, by getting off at Allahabad or
wherever Nehru may be. There could be no possibility of such meeting re-
mainin secret and nothing would be more likely to spread pan-Asian malaise
through all the bazaars of India. Ends.

1 No. 56. 2 No. 62.
S[ecretary] of S[tate]
It may be worth your while, à propos this memo[andum],¹ to glance through the Report of the Lords debate of 3rd Feb[ruary].² Tho[ugh] the Duke³ believes that L[ord] Faringdon was not put up to fly a kite there is a curious coincidence between his suggestion in Col. 590 and the appearance of the L[ord] P[rivy] S[ecretary]'s Memo[andum].

The last para[graph] of the memo[andum] is v[ery] near a motion of censure on the present Viceroy.

There are two alternatives (a) to send an accredited negotiator working independently of the Viceroy (whose authority would be pro tanto diminished): (b) to replace the present Viceroy by another charged with the special duty of negotiating a settlement.

(b) seems to impose on the Unknown the superhuman task of carrying on the administration and negotiating for its replacement—more, I think, than was asked of L[ord] Durham.

(a) seems an almost equally difficult proposition. It is true that Mr. Montagu did not displace L[ord] Chelmsford but was associated with him: nor did the Simon Commission displace L[ord] Irwin. But neither of these were “negotiating”; they were investigating with a view to a Report to Parl[iament]. Mr. Attlee seems to want a plenipotentiary who would sign seal and deliver a bargain which Parliament would be required to honour.

It may be questioned whether there is much scope left for further investigation: but since ten years have passed since the Simon Commission reported it may be that what is required—despite the discouraging precedent afforded both by the reception of that Commission by Indians and by the treatment of its Report—is a repetition of the investigating process, by a duly authorised person or body of persons. (Unofficial investigation, such as Mr. Coupland’s, however valuable, will not take the matter as far as Mr. Attlee wishes). Such investigation might produce such a statement of the problem as to make it clear that only one solution was practicable, and that one acceptable by the Indian elements that count. Or, of course, it might not.

There might be something to be said for an investigation by a single person—or a body of not more than 3—during rather than after the War: it might

¹ No. 60.
³ Of Devonshire.
excite less attention and if confined to the Central problem need not create such a disturbance of activity in India as the Provincial peregrinations of the Simon Commission did.

D. T. M

65

**Viscount Simon to Mr Amery**

*L/PO|6|106a: f 25*

**HOUSE OF LORDS, S.W. 1, 5 February 1942**

My dear Leo,

I am sorry not to have replied sooner to your inquiry as to my view of your draft\(^1\) of a reply to the Indian Liberals. I have been very hard pressed, and I am afraid that I overlooked the urgency.

My feeling is that, while the general lines of your reply are all right, the answer ought to set out firmly and clearly the difficulty that the Indian Liberals’ Resolution does nothing to bring about an adjustment between the views of the Congress Party and the Moslem League. I note and very much approve what you said last night. It seems to me that since the Prime Minister’s reply to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru will go all over the world, this is a great opportunity to inform the public of the difficulty which it must be for Indians themselves to help to solve.

Yours ever,

JOHN.

May I respectfully urge that the phrase “only too anxious” should be eschewed. It occurs *twice* within two pages! (It would be “only too kind” if it was altered.)

J. S.

\(^1\) Enclosure to No. 15.
66

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 16th Conclusions, Minutes 1–3.

5 February 1942

Minute 1

L/P&J/8/560: f 239

INDIA

Representation in London

The War Cabinet had under consideration the proposal put forward by the S/S for India in his Memorandum (W.P. (42) 53),¹ that a representative of the Indian Government, and, when desired by the Viceroy, an Indian Prince, should attend, with the Secretary of State, Meetings of the War Cabinet at times when the war effort, with special reference to India, was under discussion.

In discussion it was suggested that the Australian Government might think that this proposal, if agreed to, would derogate from the right which had been granted to them, that their accredited representative should be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and direction of policy. If they took this view, it could be pointed out that the present proposal went no further than the arrangements made for the Imperial War Cabinets of 1917 and 1918.

The War Cabinet:

Decided that the proposal outlined in the Secretary of State’s paper should be agreed to.

Minute 2

L/P&J/8/544: f 152

The Governor-General’s Executive Council

The War Cabinet considered certain suggested changes in the Governor-General’s Executive Council set out in a Memorandum by the S/S for India (W.P. (42) 53). The number of Europeans would remain at 4 (one of whom would be a person of high standing in the European business community): and the number of Indians would be increased from 7 to 9, a representative of the depressed classes and a Sikh member being added.

The War Cabinet approved this proposal.

¹ No. 57.
Minute 3
L/PO/6/106b: f 497

Constitutional questions

The War Cabinet had before them the following Papers:

(a) A telegram from the Viceroy, dated 21st January (W.P. 42) 43). 2
(b) A Memorandum by the S/S for India, setting out his views on the Indian political situation. (W.P. 42) 42). 3

The upshot of this Memorandum was that the S/S agreed with the Viceroy's conclusion (set out in his telegram) that there was no further interim constitutional advance which we could make; that we had in the present Central Executive and National Defence Council as representative and as efficient an instrument for associating India with the war effort as we were likely to get at this juncture without aggravating her internal discord; and that we should do all we could to make the most of this instrument, not only in matters of Imperial and international status, but in the attitude of H.M.G. towards it:

(c) A Memorandum by the S/S for India (W.P. 42) 53) dealing (besides the matters covered in the two preceding Minutes) with the reply which it was proposed should be sent by the Prime Minister to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru:

(d) A Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. 42) 59)4 urging that a renewed effort should be made to get the leaders of the Indian political parties to unite; that delay would only make the problem harder; and that a representative, with powers to negotiate within wide limits, should be sent to India now, a Cabinet Committee being appointed to draw up terms of reference and powers.

The following were the main points in a preliminary discussion:

(1) It was argued that it was dangerous to stand on the present position without making every effort to see whether some way out of the present Constitutional deadlock could not be found. We ought not to be content to take the view that we could make no further advance and that the next move was with Congress.

(2) The whole position in Asia might change very rapidly. We should not exclude the possibility of a Pan-Asiatic movement. But our rule in India had influenced Indian opinions and ideals, and if we took the right line we should be able to maintain the ties between India and this country.

(3) On the other hand it was difficult to see what further step we could take by the way of any interim Constitutional advance which would not prejudice the ultimate position. It was clearly impossible to attempt any final settlement of the Constitutional position at the present moment.

After further general discussion, the War Cabinet agreed as follows:
(a) The proposed answer to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru should be deferred:
(b) The S/S for India was invited to prepare an alternative draft statement, on the basis of the discussion.

2 See No. 43, note 5. 3 No. 43. 4 No. 60.

67
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery
Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
No. 232–S. Can you give me any indication when the Prime Minister intends to release his reply to Sapru?

68
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery
Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
No. 241–S. Chiang-Kai-Shek and party arrived in Calcutta this morning from Lashio. He did not go to Rangoon and so did not meet Dorman-Smith or Wavell. He met Hutton at Lashio. Prime Minister’s personal message1 to Generalissimo was delivered to Clark Kerr on arrival at Calcutta. Latter considers that delivery of text of message, particularly paragraph 2, will make an extremely bad impression on Generalissimo. He is therefore representing this to Foreign Office, and will convey the purport of the message to Generalissimo verbally. Owing to slight indisposition of Madame, present plan seems to be for the party to travel by train to Delhi arriving on 8th, and to remain in India until 15th, leaving their movements in my hands for most of the time. Apparently also he intends to break his incognito after arrival in Delhi. Clark Kerr’s view, as telephoned to my Private Secretary, is that Generalissimo’s principal object in visit was proposed meeting with Nehru, whom he already knows, and Gandhi: and that any attempt to deflect him by persuasion is unlikely to succeed, while if he is prevented he will regard himself as having been tricked.

1 No. 62.
Ambassador considers that he will be in other respects reasonable and will meet such representatives of other parties as we may desire. The meetings with Nehru and Gandhi would according to Generalissimo’s present intentions take place in Delhi. My inclination is to leave the arranging of any meetings for him until after his arrival in Delhi and that of Clark Kerr, but that I should have a free hand to permit meetings with Gandhi and Nehru as well as others should circumstances in my judgment require it in order to retain the Generalissimo’s confidence and goodwill. I should rely on Ambassador’s judgment about delivering text of Premier’s message, but if His Majesty’s Government directs that the message is to be delivered, this could be done on Generalissimo’s arrival in Delhi.

69

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr Eden (via Governor of Bengal and India Office)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: ff 314–15

IMMEDIATE SECRET

CALCUTTA, 5 February 1942, 11.30 pm
Received: 6 February, 3.45 am

31. Following from ex-Ambassador China for Foreign Office, repeated to Viceroy.

I have received the Prime Minister’s message to Chiang-Kai-Shek. While I appreciate that some such message is appropriate I venture to think there is much in the form and text which in the present circumstances it would be unnecessary and even injudicious to convey to him, all the more so because the Generalissimo knows no English and I cannot count upon a faithful translation reaching him.

Before we left Chungking I made it clear to him that he would be the guest of the Viceroy, that he would stay at one of His Excellency’s houses, that he would do nothing without the fullest consultation with the latter, and that inasmuch as he proposed to see the Congress Leaders, he would have also to see the representatives of all other political elements. All this he readily understood and agreed.

It will be remembered that after paying his respects on Viceroy and establishing personal contact and understanding Chiang-Kai-Shek’s other purpose in visiting India was to see the realeitriants in the firm belief that his personal influence upon them would serve common cause. Any suggestion made at this stage which would cast doubt upon his good faith and discretion such as is implicit in paragraph No. 2 of message would I fear make a most painful im-
pression. I am therefore concerned to hear from Private Secretary to the Viceroy that instructions have been received in Delhi to dissuade Chiang-Kai-Shek from his purpose. This would I think be a very grave mistake.

For myself I have complete confidence both in his decency and his discretion. I do not think His Majesty’s Government need to contemplate the talks he wishes to have with least misgiving. I submit therefore that latter part of paragraph No. I be omitted and that second paragraph be amended to read after word “matter” something like this “of great delicacy and I hope that before putting your intention into effect you will talk the whole position over with Viceroy” then omit first three words of paragraph No. 3 and continue “who will explain to you that if you begin by seeing leaders,” etc.


1 No. 62.

70

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 313

MOST IMMEDIATE

IO DOWNING STREET, 6 February 1942, 3 am

PERSONAL AND SECRET

154. Following from Prime Minister.

1. Your telegram No. 241—S.¹ On what grounds would he regard himself as having been “tricked”? He proposed himself and will be an honoured guest, but he has no right to intervene between the Government of the King-Emperor and any of the King’s subjects. It would be disastrous if you put yourself in a position where we had Gandhi and Nehru on the one side and the Viceroy of India on the other, with Chiang Kai-Shek arbitrating between the two.

2. If you could bring about the desired result according to telegram No. 142² without showing him the actual text of the message there is no objection to your withholding it, but I rely on you to see that the result is achieved. Do not hesitate to use the message if there is any real necessity for it.

¹ No. 68. ² No. 62.
71

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 311

MOST IMMEDIATE PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

155. My immediately preceding telegram.¹ I think Prime Minister may be somewhat misjudging Chiang Kai-shek’s motive and that latter may have no idea of posing as arbiter but only of appealing on behalf of China for Indian unity in her support. Anyhow you must use your own judgment in the light of Prime Minister’s very definite views on the subject.

¹ No. 70.

72

Mr Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (via India Office and Governor of Bengal)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 304

MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET

Addressed to Governor of Bengal, repeated to Viceroy. 2331. Reference your telegram No. 31¹ repeated Viceroy. Following from Foreign Secretary for Sir A. Clark Kerr.

Prime Minister agrees to the amendments you propose and is content to leave it to you to decide whether message should be delivered.

¹ No. 69.

73

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 252-S. Your private and personal telegram No. 155¹ of 6th. I will do the best I can. I do not myself expect the least trouble of the kind which Prime Minister anticipates. I hope to please Chiang and to get valuable anti-Japanese and anti-Fifth Column propaganda out of his visit.

¹ No. 71.
74

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 303

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 6 February 1942, 9.10 pm

162. Your private and personal telegram 6th February 252–S.¹ You will now have seen message to Clark Kerr in my telegram No. 2331² to Bengal repeated to you. This eases your situation and at any rate removes any need for reply to my telegram No. 154³ though I do not suppose you contemplated one.

¹ No. 73. ² No. 72. ³ No. 70.

75

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/18/558: ff 190–1

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 6 February 1942, 7 pm

2287. Atlantic Charter and India. Your telegram of the 30th January, 191.–S.¹ I dealt at length with this issue in my Manchester speech of 14th November and suggest that your spokesman might treat it on similar lines. I presume an adequate version of the speech by now is available to you but if you wish I will telegraph extracts. A point useful for debating purposes as illustrating Sultan Ahmed’s point² that the Charter contains principles not terms is the particular application to India of the expression “peoples” used in Article 3—Congress would claim that it applies to all the inhabitants of British India taken together but Moslems might well claim to be treated separately as a “people”. But obviously the point needs to be handled with care.

2. Sultan Ahmed’s comments with reference to the Washington Declaration seem also much to the point. I think you should have no difficulty in defending India’s signature in the light of the Prime Minister’s explanation³ that H.M.G.‘s declared policy is “entirely in harmony with the high conception of freedom and justice” which inspired the Atlantic Charter or indeed that Charter is only a general reaffirmation of principle already affirmed by us more than once with regard to India and to which further precision was given by declaration of August 1940.

¹ No. 49. ² See No. 49, para. 3. ³ Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 374, 9 September 1941, col. 69.
76

Mr Churchill to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106b: f 496

10 Downing Street, 6 February 1942

Prime Minister's Personal Minute. No. M. 28/2

Most Secret and Personal

Secretary of State for India

Pray convene the Lord President, the Lord Privy Seal and no others, and let me have a note implementing the project we discussed in Cabinet tonight.1 It is understood that they would have at least a week to think it over in Delhi before any final decision was taken. The object is to discuss war matters with Wavell.

W. S. C.

1 It is clear from Nos. 66 and 89, paras. 1–3 that the Cabinet meeting in question took place on Thursday, 5 February. An explanation of the discrepancy might be that Mr Churchill’s Minute was written after midnight on 5/6 February.

77

Note by Mr Amery1

L/PO/6/106b: f 493–5

7 February 1942

Proposed Expansion of Defence Council

Composition

It was agreed that the total numbers should be about 100 of whom say 25 should be Princes or their representatives, i.e. about the same proportion as on the present National Defence Council.

It was agreed that the most convenient and acceptable constituency for the British Indian members would be the existing members of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures.

The simplest method of election would be to elect the whole lot by P[roportional] R[epresentation] at one election. Sir J. Anderson’s experience in Bengal2 leads him to believe that this can be quite easily managed. This would give a result proportionate to the last election results.

If this is considered too favourable to Congress, the numbers of each community to be elected might first be fixed in proportion to the last census, or
by the proportions fixed by the India Act for the elected members of the Central Assembly. (This last basis would be more favourable to the Moslems).

Personally, from the point of view both of defence liaison with the provincial war effort and from that of future constitution-making, I would prefer that the representatives should be elected by each Provincial Legislature separately. The resulting under-representation of the smaller minorities would then have to be corrected. I believe strengthening Provincial sentiment is the best corrective to the present over-centralised party dictatorships.

Functions

(a) Present. Full discussion, in public or private session as may be expedient, of the conduct of the war and liaison between the war effort at the Centre and the effort throughout India. This is the function of the present National Defence Council which has worked admirably. To make the offer worth while it would have to be clear that the expanded Council will have to meet more frequently or for longer sessions than the present one which meets for two or three days every second month.

The idea that the Government of India’s representative at the War Cabinet should be chosen by the Defence Council appealed to us. If a Hindu were chosen he could be balanced by a Moslem Prince, and vice versa.

(b) Future. My colleagues both think that nothing should be said beyond the announcement that this Council shall after the war be the representative body to frame the Constitution.

I do not think it possible to get away with that. The Moslems will at once ask whether its decisions, both as to procedure and as to the Constitution itself, will be by majority vote, and will boycott the whole business unless it is made quite clear that our 1940 pledge\(^3\) to the minorities stands in its entirety and that we should not look at any constitution arrived at otherwise than by agreement.

Nor do I think it possible to get away without some reference to what we intend with regard to the powers we mean to reserve, e.g. Defence, the rights of the Services, etc. To say that the constitution framed by the Council will have to be revised by Parliament in order to insert our reservations will almost certainly cause Congress to boycott the scheme. I still think the only way we can get round that corner is to say that they will be embodied in an agreement for a period of years. This preserves “Dominion Status”, and the agreement will be effective so long as we keep troops and aeroplanes in India, and Indians are afraid of losing them—and that will be for a good while. (I did not discuss this last point with the others).

L. S. A.

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1 Apparently written after discussion with Sir J. Anderson and Mr Attlee; see No. 76.
2 Sir J. Anderson had been Governor of Bengal from March 1932 to November 1937.
3 Contained in the ‘August offer’ of 1940; see Appendix 1.
78

Note by Mr Amery (?)
L/PO/6/106b: ff 490–2
7 February 1942

NOTES ON AN EXPANSION OF THE DEFENCE COUNCIL

Composition

The present National Defence Council is on a provincial basis, and it is essential to maintain that basis in some measure in order to provide that liaison between local defence effort and the Centre. The present Council has worked very well in that respect. Also any selection purely on party and community lines would cut out the present Governments of Bengal and Sind which are predominantly Moslem but not Moslem League.

On the other hand a purely provincial basis would for that very reason be unacceptable to Jinnah and include N.W.F.P. as a Congress province.

The best solution would be one which I think both Sikander and Zafarullah have made for the basis of a Constitutional Conference, viz. a body composed half by representatives of provincial governments and half by communities through their organisations. My suggestion would be a body of some 60 or 70 representatives of British India, half nominated by the provincial governments, including the Congress Ministries who, if Congress is prepared to play, would presumably resume office: the other half to be nominated by Congress, Moslem League, Mahasabha, and Depressed Classes in such proportions as may be agreed upon.

The Princes would be represented in similar proportions to those on the present National Defence Council, i.e. by about 20 representatives.

Functions

(a) Defence. To make the offer at all worth while the expanded Council would have to meet a good deal more often than the present one, which meets every second month for two or three days. The idea I gather is that it should exercise the functions now exercised here by the House of Commons in its non-legislative capacity, i.e. public and private discussion and debate, questions, etc.

It would probably greatly sweeten the offer if the expanded Council itself were invited to recommend to the Viceroy a representative to attend the War Cabinet here on behalf of the Government of India. The original constitution of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1918 did in fact refer to the British Indian representative as “the representative of the people of India”. I do not think it likely that such a representative, chosen in the atmosphere of acceptance of the scheme, would be troublesome here, and he might learn a great deal. The
Imperial War Cabinet scheme of the last war referred to the representative of the Princes as invited by the Prime Minister. That was before the Viceroy was also Crown Representative. Possibly he too might be at any rate suggested by the Princes members of the National Defence Council.

(b) Constitution making. In describing the functions of the expanded Council in the future shaping of the constitution, it should be made clear that whatever the numerical proportions of the different elements on the council the principles of 1940 hold good, namely that conclusion at every stage of the discussions is to be reached by agreement between the principal elements and not by majority vote. It may possibly be necessary to indicate the principal elements at any rate sufficiently to meet Nehru's assertion that we mean to give the Parsees or the European group a veto on the constitution.

It will also have to be clear that we set no limit to the discussion, i.e. that Jinnah is at any rate at liberty to state the case for Pakistan. Otherwise he will veto the scheme from the outset.

It should also be clear that while the actual constitution cannot be decided until after the war it would be entirely in accordance with our pledges of 1940 that the Defence Council should, to whatever extent it had the time or the inclination to do so, discuss the future or set up committees of its own members or of co-opted experts, to collect facts, financial, ethnographical, etc., to study other constitutions and generally to prepare the groundwork essential to any sort of agreement by so large a body as the proposed Council.

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1 This appears to be by Mr Amery, though it is unsigned. Its probable date has been determined from its place in the file.

2 Namely the principles of the ‘August offer’ of 1940; see Appendix I.

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79

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

7 February 1942

No. 254–S. Reuters report Cripps as saying that he might visit India later on though he has no present intention of doing so. I trust that you will dissuade him, and if possible prevent further reports about any such visit, effect of which in existing circumstances would be in my view disastrous.
80

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

7 February 1942, 12.35 pm

No. 255–S. Catto’s speech, coming on top of Faringdon’s has I fear done a good deal of damage. A full summary was sent by Reuters of both, and Catto’s has since been reprinted in full in Statesman from which other papers have copied extracts. My Indian colleagues are embarrassed by this exhibition of defeatism which they say places them in an awkward position since they can hardly afford to appear to be less pro-Indian than Catto. My European colleagues and Maxwell in particular show concern at effect of speech on political feeling here. I quite realise that you cannot control speeches of such as Catto, but can something not be done to prevent them being disseminated and getting a prominence and importance here out of all proportion to that given to them where they were made? If no censorship is being applied in London to press or private cables exporting poison of this kind for consumption here, it will become very difficult to hold the position; and we shall have to consider seriously whether establishment of some machinery here for restricting import is not imperative, in spite of obvious disadvantages.


2 Ibid., cols. 621–5.

81

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

7 February 1942

No. 265–S. At request of several Indian colleagues I called meeting of Council last evening to discuss question of India’s representation in Imperial War Cabinet.

2. They pointed to Prime Minister’s statement cabled on February 5th, in which he referred to offer to the other Dominions of same facilities provided for Australia. They deplored the absence of any such offer to India. They quote representation given to India in Imperial War Cabinet last War from 1917 onwards, and feel that omission now complained of constitutes serious relapse from that position.
3. I appreciate that in the last War the Secretary of State represented India on the War Cabinet along with representatives from British India and Indian States: and I see no reason why similar arrangement should not again hold good provided that representatives from British India are appointed by the Government of India and not by the Secretary of State.

4. You will have in mind that Prime Minister's draft reply to Sapru\(^2\) refers to representation in Imperial War Cabinet, 1917–18, and at the Peace Conference: also in League of Nations and Imperial Conferences. I do not doubt that when this reply is published the absence of reference to India in the Prime Minister's latest speech will be duly pointed out and condemned.

5. My colleagues were discouraged by me from sending you any formal communication, but they (including Europeans) requested me to ask you to draw the attention of the Prime Minister to the omission, and to beg that India may now receive the same offer which has been made to each of the Dominions and that this may be made public. I earnestly hope you may succeed in persuading the Prime Minister to respond. My Indian colleagues are under very heavy criticism from nationalist quarters for their support of what is dubbed a reactionary policy, and I think they deserve encouragement whenever this is possible.

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\(^1\) See No. 86, para. 2. The reference here is evidently to a press cable.

\(^2\) See No. 57, Appendix B; and Enclosure to No. 15, para. beginning: 'On the other hand, leaving on one side...'.

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82

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL

GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, 7 February 1942

REPORT NO. 100

This report covers the last half of January.

1. Public Morale. There is nothing outstanding to report, and I think it can be said that there is no deterioration in the position. We have still to see whether there will be any exodus of mill-workers to their villages when they receive their bonus in the middle of this month. We have, however, embarked upon some propaganda, which was started by a broadcast by myself and is now being followed up. The line is that, at present, the danger to Bombay is remote and that it would be wrong for those with work to do to leave. So far, this line appears to have been taken well, and the public appears to be somewhat reassured.
There is a noticeably increased interest in Civil Defence, and there are signs—on which I shall say more in a later paragraph\(^1\)—that even Congress people are anxious to co-operate.

There has been very little political activity, and Independence Day\(^2\) passed off without creating much impression. One may say, therefore, that, at the moment, public morale is fairly steady. The first shock of the nearer approach of the war has been taken, but a further shock, such as the fall of Singapore or Rangoon, would, I have no doubt, revive marked uneasiness.

The most uneasy feature of public opinion remains the political resentment which Congress inspires amongst the educated classes, and the danger that, when this resentment is played upon by real fear, there will be a swing towards making peace with the enemy. This could provide a good field in which enemy propaganda might work. There is, as you know, a fairly general demand that the Prime Minister should make a statement to remove what are said to be doubts about British intentions. After so much has been said in the past few years, it is difficult to see what "magic" could be devised to remove these doubts. Fairly steady, therefore, though public feeling is at the moment, this political resentment, with its dangerous potentialities, remains in the background.

\(^1\) Not printed.

\(^2\) Since 1930 Congress had celebrated its aim of Purna Swaraj (complete independence) on 26 January.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 240–1

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

166. Your private and personal telegram of 7th February, No. 265–S.\(^1\) At meeting on Thursday night last\(^2\) Cabinet decided in principle to invite Government of India to send representative to attend meetings of War Cabinet on war matters concerning India. I might no doubt have communicated this broad decision to you earlier and so anticipated representations by your colleagues, but as you will appreciate decision on corresponding matter vis-à-vis Dominions has not been quite so simple as would appear from Prime Minister’s statement of 5th February and I was anxious before communicating invitation to you to dispose of corresponding concealed difficulties in relation to India and also to set moving subsidiary matters consequential on main decision. Furthermore, this matter of representation on War Cabinet is somewhat closely connected with question of reply to Sapru, tenor of which is still under discussion. I hope
however to despatch to you tonight a group of telegrams which had already been provisionally drafted when your 265-S was received. But I have no objection to your letting your colleagues know in confidence the broad decision if you think it desirable to do so in anticipation of the appropriate moment for publication.

1 No. 81.  
2 See No. 66, Minute 1.  
3 Nos. 84, 85 and 86.

84

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 227–31

IMMEDIATE  
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL  
INDIA OFFICE, 8 February 1942, 11.30 pm

167. My private and personal telegram of 8th February No. 166. Prime Minister is not quite happy about suggested reply to Sapru and has in view an alternative which I expect will take another week or so to work out. Meanwhile Cabinet have agreed in principle both to representation of Government of India in War Cabinet and also to your proposals for expansion of your Council. For convenience of future correspondence I will deal with latter in separate telegrams.

2. As regards representation of Government of India I am sending in separate telegram text of invitation addressed to Canada, New Zealand and South Africa and of statement by Prime Minister in House of Commons on 5th February. You will note from former document that words “formulation and direction of policy” (which emerged from proposal by Australian Government) may be interpreted, in light of opening reference to consultation on matters connected with the war in light of developments of particular significance to situation in Pacific, as being restricted to a particular category of questions. I imagine that for purposes of published invitation to Government of India you would regard it as important that formula should be in as nearly as possible same general terms as that used to Dominions. But you should know that formula which I submitted to Cabinet and which was actually approved was that “representative of the Indian Government and when desired by Viceroy an Indian Prince should attend with myself meetings of the War Cabinet at times when the war effort with special reference to India is under discussion.”

1 No. 83.  
2 See No. 66, Minutes 1 and 2.  
3 No. 86.  
4 See No. 57, p. 106, sub-section (2).
This conveys more conspicuously appearance of restriction than invitation to Dominions does. No doubt question of particular occasions for attendance will in practice be disposed of as now by *ad hoc* considerations, but it is important that invitation to India should not appear narrower than that to Dominions, but at same time should not be in terms so wide as to give cause for disappointment and recrimination hereafter. In these circumstances I suggest following: 

*Begins.* “Arising out of the suggestions made for closer consultation with His Majesty’s Government and other members of the British Commonwealth on matters of urgency connected with the war in the light of the position resulting from the entry of the U.S.A. into the war and the extension of the war to the Pacific area, with which the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand are so directly concerned, the Governments of those Dominions were invited to appoint, if they so desired, a representative who should be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and direction of policy. His Majesty’s Government have issued a similar invitation to the Governor-General of India in Council to nominate a representative who would also attend meetings of the War Cabinet for a like purpose.” *Ends.* Then would follow such reference to Princely representative as you think fit. Please let me have suggestions on this in light of paragraph 5 below for incorporation in announcement.

3. Suitable occasion for announcement (which would also constitute invitation) is afforded by Question in Parliament for Thursday next’s "what representative from India it is proposed to approve to the newly formed Empire War Directorate."

4. Subsidiary question for disposal at more leisure is whether representation of Government of India should be by individual stationed more or less permanently in London or by some rotational arrangement among certain Members of your Council.

5. As regards Prince, Cabinet also agreed that representation of India should include Prince if and when desired by you. You will remember that the invitation to a Princely "representative of India" to come to London was issued in 1918 by the Viceroy and the invitation to him to attend meetings of the War Cabinet from time to time was in form from the Prime Minister. Nowadays there is the Crown Representative from whom presumably the invitation to come to London should issue, and I should be glad of your views as to the appropriate method of formally regulating his activities here if you do decide to send one. He would, of course, be a representative of India, not of the Princely order.

6. As regards timing of publication of invitation, I expect that you will feel that the sooner public opinion in India is satisfied on the subject of representation here the better, and that there would be no harm, indeed rather the con-
trary, if it preceded reply to Sapru, which, as you see, is likely to be delayed. This would result from announcement on 12 February, as suggested in paragraph 3. Timing of publicity on these three inter-connected matters requires careful consideration on which I should welcome your views. See also in this connection separate telegram\(^6\) about Executive Council.

7. Questions of representation below Ministerial level on organisations subsidiary to War Cabinet are being dealt with in departmental telegrams\(^7\) (a) to Governor-General in regard to Defence and External Affairs, (b) to Supply Department.

\(^5\) 12 February. \(^6\) No. 85. \(^7\) Not printed.

85

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/544: f 151

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 8 February 1942, 9 pm

168. My private and personal telegram of 8th February, No. 167,\(^1\) paragraph 1. I presume that you will now proceed to take soundings of the persons whom you propose to add to your expanded Council. On my part I am getting in touch with Bentall now that proposal in regard to him is approved in principle and will let you know as soon as I can ascertain whether he is willing. When we have full team selected I will go to the Palace with a view to announcement at most suitable moment, but I imagine that you will prefer to postpone announcement of Council expansion until after Prime Minister’s alternative reply to Sapru has been made (which will not be for another week or more), for standing by itself announcement of expansion of Council would inevitably be target of adverse criticism as implying rejection of Sapru proposal in that regard.

\(^1\) No. 84.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&EJ/8/560: ff 232–4

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
INDIA OFFICE, 8 February 1942, 10 pm

169 Please refer to para. 2 of my private and personal telegram No. 167 of 8th Feb. (1) Following is text of telegram sent to Canada, New Zealand and South Africa on 27 Jan.:

Begins. We have been thinking over the machinery for consultation between ourselves and the other members of the British Commonwealth on matters of urgency connected with the war in the light of the new position resulting from the United States entry into the war and recent developments in the Pacific. We have also received requests from the Australian Government for some change in the existing system, more particularly expressing the desire that “accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government will have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction of policy.”

2. We are now informing the Commonwealth Government that we are prepared to agree to this request, and Sir Earle Page, who is at present in London as the special representative of the Australian Cabinet, will attend meetings of the War Cabinet here for the purposes indicated.

Canada

3. We feel that New Zealand should know this in case they feel disposed to avail themselves of the new arrangements on a similar footing to Australia. Ends.

170. (2) Following is text of Question and Answer in the House of Commons on 5th February.4

Begins. Sir T. Moore asked the Prime Minister when the new Imperial War Cabinet or Directorate will begin to function; and whether it has yet been decided who shall be its members?

The Prime Minister: The proposals which I referred to in my statement the other day for associating Dominion representatives with the War Cabinet do not involve any change in the United Kingdom membership of the War Cabinet. The proposal of the Australian Government was that they should have a representative at the War Cabinet who should have the right to be heard in the formulation and direction of policy. I replied that we were in agreement with this proposal, and for a good many months past Sir Earle Page has been exercising these rights. We have informed the Governments of Canada,
New Zealand and the Union of South Africa that the same facilities are available for them if they wish to take advantage of them. We have as yet had no formal reply from New Zealand. I understand that Canada and South Africa are satisfied with the existing arrangements for consultation—indeed they expressed themselves strongly on this point—and do not at present wish to attach special representatives to the War Cabinet here.

Sir T. Moore: Could the Prime Minister say, in the case of those representatives who do wish to attend our War Cabinet, whether they will have a say in the decisions or whether they will merely be there to give advice?

The Prime Minister: Giving advice is having a say in the decision. It is not the custom to decide these matters by counting heads. Ends.

1 No. 84.
2 Para. (2) was sent separately as telegram 170.

87

Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

SEVAGRAM, WARDHA, C.P., 8 February 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

As I have suspended civil disobedience, I make bold to write this letter for humanity’s cause.

The statutory law says that charitable institutions, though they make profits, are free from income-tax. I am the founder and President of the All-India Spinners Association. I can give you my word that it is a purely charitable association. It exists to serve the poorest in the land through hand spinning and hand weaving. But simply through legal quibbles, disbelief of the evidence tendered and I apprehend for its connection with the Congress in that it got its charter from the Congress, the officials have decided to levy the income-tax. The profits are not denied but they have never been used for private or personal gain. The whole of the Executive of the Association is honorary. The Association has gone to the High Court of Bombay which has thrown out its petition on a legal flaw. It is appealing to the Privy Council. I do not know what will be the result. Meanwhile the Association has already paid a certain amount of the tax and is likely to be called upon to pay up to five lacs. They will not stay the levy pending the proceedings. But my request is for you to intervene and save the five lacs for the poor. Let me tell you that during the past 20 years of its existence the Association has distributed among the poor nearly four crores as wages.
I am not burdening you with further facts or any papers. You can have these for the asking.

You will forgive me for inflicting this on you when every moment of yours is pre-mortgaged for winning the war. Though I cannot sympathise with your enterprise, much less help in the manner you would wish, you will believe me when I say that I am as much today a friend of your people as I ever have been. Hence I can understand what a strain it must be for you and Lady Linlithgow.

When you write to Lady Anne¹ and Southby, please send my love to them. I have purposely refrained from acknowledging their letters in answer to my congratulations. I hope they with the baby are faring well.

I am
Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI.

¹ Lady Anne Hope, eldest daughter of Lord Linlithgow, had married in 1939 Lieut.-Commander Patrick H. J. Southby, R.N.

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88

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICE ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 9 February 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have had a busy week, with three days presiding over the National Defence Council,—which was a success, and about which I have sent you a telegram—and also with preparations for the visit of the Generalissimo and his entourage. I am much relieved that my visitors decided to break their incognito after arrival in Delhi, for I am sure that their arrival could not have remained secret very long. My first impressions are that the Generalissimo is a thoroughly sound person. He is most friendly, and his observations are very much to the point. Unhappily he cannot speak a word of English or of any other language that I can compass; but the interpreters are efficient, and the interchange of ideas flows easily. He is, I should say, entirely Chinese in his mental furniture, and—while he evidently depends a great deal upon his wife for help and counsel—I should judge that he is accustomed in essentials to depend upon his own understanding of the business in hand. Madame is an amusing study. She is a typical product of the American “Co-ed” system, complete with lipstick and “blue-stocking”! She has a perfect command of the American language, and is never at a loss for the right word. I suspect that in the highly sophisticated upper
layers of her mind, she is a typical American liberal whose enthusiasms are unimpaired by any restraining considerations of a practical kind. That, I think, may well be her approach to the political problems of India. But, underneath the westernised layer of Madame’s mind, I think, I detect a caution and a conservatism which, in fair fight, would prevail over the more flashy and spectacular elements in her nature. Her person is attractive and she dresses well.

89

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 9 February 1942

At last I was able to bring my various Indian questions before the Cabinet last Thursday.¹ As regards the composition of your Council they accepted without discussion. The only point raised was the question whether, à propos of Reid’s finishing in Assam, it is necessary at a time like this to cease employing people who are still useful in order to keep up the normal circulation of offices. I see in a telegram² from you today that you have a further use for Reid³ and that answers the question. Bentall is coming to lunch with me today and I hope then to hear from him that he is willing to accept.

2. As regards representation at the War Cabinet, the matter was at once agreed in principle, though not without certain flourishes from Winston as to the necessity of hiring the Albert Hall for Cabinet meetings, &c. Anyhow, it was generally accepted that your representative should attend not only the War Cabinet but the Defence Committee and the Pacific Council—to which latter the Australians have now agreed, realising that it is far more effective in London than it would be in Washington. Meanwhile, there is a little confusion still about the actual form of the invitation and the public notice. I had drafted a memorandum⁴ at an earlier date referring to the Indian representative attending when India’s special interests were involved, and though the discussion at the Cabinet turned entirely on the assumption that the Indian representative would come on the same footing as the Australian, the Cabinet minute used the earlier expression⁵ and I am trying to straighten that out now. Meanwhile, telegrams⁶ have gone to you and I have no doubt it can be fixed up satisfactorily.

¹ See No. 66. ² Not printed. ³ Sir Robert Reid, due to retire from the Governorship of Assam in May, was to take up an appointment as China Relations Officer, Calcutta. ⁴ No. 57. ⁵ See No. 66, Minute 1. ⁶ Nos. 83, 84, 86.
The question of the actual person to represent India is affected by Winston’s latest and certainly sensational project.  

3. We then came on to the proposed reply to Sapru, but after starting the discussion of that it was suggested that it could only be dealt with in the light of our decision on the major issue of policy, *i.e.*, whether the Cabinet should do what I recommended, namely, make the most of the authority and *izzat* of your new Executive and of the N.D.C. but otherwise stand pat for the time being till we saw a better opportunity for bringing the parties together, or considering Attlee’s demand that we should take some definite step now towards breaking the deadlock. After a good deal of ragging of his Labour colleagues, with an occasional eye-wink at me, Winston suddenly propounded the great scheme which you will have had long before you get this, not only in my telegrams, but probably in Winston’s actual delivery. I won’t say more at this moment about the details of the project, because it may have been knocked about or even dropped in the next few days. All I would say is that it has in it some characteristic strokes of Winston’s genius. It leaves the executive and Legislative position untouched; it gives the proposed Defence of India Council some interesting sugar plums in the shape of democratic representation here and at the Peace Conference, while it also fulfils our pledge to promote bringing the Indian parties together on the constitutional issue by offering to accept this body as the future constituent body. This as it were combines the Congress demand for a body based, at any rate at second remove, on democratic election, while it can and must be made perfectly clear that its procedure throughout must be governed by agreement between the representatives of the main elements, and not by majority decision.

4. Even with Winston’s personality and reputation I confess that the odds still seem to me that Congress will contemn it as not giving India immediate self-government, while Jinnah will look askance at any body in which the Muslims are represented only more or less in proportion to population and in which he may not be the actual leader of the Muslim community—though on the other hand, he will presumably be elected himself and acquire control of the Muslim group on the Defence Council and so for constitutional discussions afterwards. However, Winston does not feel that failure of his effort would discredit him or the Government, but would show our goodwill and only expose the unreasonableness of Indian parties.

5. I also got through without discussion a long paper* on the Indian war effort with a concluding request for War Cabinet instructions to Ministers concerned to be more helpful. This I got, and I hope the result will be fruitful. Meanwhile on the vexed question of the pay of officers attached to or transferred to the Indian Army, Margesson has decided to put it up to John Anderson for
arbitration and has put up his paper, to which I will duly put up an answer and hope we may get a good deal of our contention, at any rate I hope more than you were prepared to accept in a recent telegram. I enclose the Cabinet papers concerned with these matters, so that you can have the story in your mind. The Cabinet also had before them your telegram No. 104-S of 21st January.

6. I am afraid Winston’s impetuous ways must have worried you a certain amount in connection with the Chiang Kai-Shek visit. But all was well in the end and I hope the visit has been in every way a success: also that you have been able to make really good contact with Clark Kerr and send him to Russia properly primed with the Indian situation.

[Para. 7, on a note about Patiala, and para. 8, enclosing a cutting from The Times about the group of small producers for munitions production, omitted.]

9. I have tried to get Winston to come to some sort of decision as to Dill and Bombay, but he says he won’t discuss the matter till May. Dill is in immense favour with the President and the entire American Military Staff, who eat out of his hand and from that point of view Winston would like to keep him there, if not for the whole war at any rate for a good many months ahead. The question will therefore arise very soon whether Lumley is willing to stay on an extra six months or even an extra year and keep the place warm for Dill, or whether a new appointment will have to be made. I wonder if you would sound Lumley about it at your convenience?

7 Namely, the project to expand the National Defence Council. 8 Not printed. 9 Not printed. 10 Not printed. 11 No. 23. 12 See No. 22, para. 9.

90

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: ff 481–3

INDIA OFFICE, 9 February 1942

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. P. 1/42

Prime Minister
I had a very useful talk with the Lord Chancellor yesterday morning and also discussed details further with Sir D. Monteath. I enclose a note of conclusions based on these talks.

1 Viscount Simon.
I also enclose draft\(^2\) of a telegram to the Viceroy explaining in general outline the nature of your proposal and should be glad if you could let me know as soon as possible whether it conveys the proposal correctly and whether you approve of it in other respects, as it is important to get the Viceroy's reactions in the next few days.

I think you need not yourself read more than the first five paragraphs and the last.

L. S. A.

\(^2\) Not printed.

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Enclosure to No. 90

DEFENCE OF INDIA COUNCIL

(Further notes after discussion with the Lord Chancellor and Sir D. Monteath)

Composition

The British Indian members should be elected mainly by the Lower Houses in the Provincial Legislatures, partly by the Central Legislature, with a small additional list to be nominated by the Viceroy to secure the inclusion of eminent individuals or of some deserving element otherwise left out.

The Provincial members should be chosen by each Province separately. This is important both from the point of view of defence liaison between the Central Executive and the Provincial effort and also from that of future constitution-making.

The most convenient and uncontroversial method of election would be that already provided for election to the Central Legislative Assembly under the India Act.\(^1\) This provides for 250 members and it would be difficult to secure sufficient representation for Moslems and Scheduled Castes if less than one-third of this figure were taken (the lesser minorities are already grouped in a single constituency).

These would not necessarily be themselves members of the Provincial Legislatures. But to avoid excessive dissipation of votes under P[roportional] R[epresentation] candidates should be definitely nominated and seconded by members of the Legislature.

The elected members of the existing Central Legislative Assembly\(^2\) should, also by P[roportional] R[epresentation], elect another 16–20 members. The Viceroy’s list need not be more than, say, a dozen.

Some 30 Princes in all, divided into panels, attend the present National Defence Council. The simplest solution is that they should all attend (in person or through their dewans) the new Council.
This would give a total of 140–150, somewhat larger than at first contemplated, but none too large for the vast area, population and variety of interests to be represented.

Functions

(a) Present. Full discussion, in public or private session, of the conduct of the war, and liaison between the war effort at the Centre and in the Provinces. The Provincial representatives might hold sessions with the Provincial Governments in between the meetings at the Centre. (If Congress accepts the scheme at all it will probably be willing to resume office in the Section 93 Provinces.)

The proposed representative of the People of British India at the War Cabinet should be nominated by the Council. But he should then be appointed by the Viceroy to his Executive and attend as a representative of the Government of India and look to that Government for his instructions. The same should apply to the British Indian representative or representatives at the Peace Conference.

(b) Future. The Defence of India Council shall after the war be the body which itself, or through such body as it may set up, shall frame the future constitution of India, and be empowered to negotiate with the Government of the United Kingdom as to the manner in which the latter’s obligations as to Defence, and in other matters, are to be fulfilled.

Both the Lord Chancellor and Sir D. Monteath agree with me that it is essential, if the Moslems and Princes are not to reject the scheme out of hand, to make it clear from the outset that our 1940 pledge stands and that we should not consider any constitution arrived at otherwise than by agreement.

1 Government of India Act 1935, First Schedule.  
2 Ibid., Ninth Schedule.

91

Mr Attlee to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106b: f 480

11 Downing Street, Whitehall, S.W. 1, 10 February 1942

Secretary of State for India

DEFENCE OF INDIA COUNCIL

The further notes¹ return to all the features to which I took objection on the first paper while adding some others.

(1) I had understood that it was agreed that the Central Legislatures having been elected a very long time ago² were out of date and should not form part of the electoral panel.

¹ Enclosure to No. 90.  
² In 1934.
(2) Further they give additional weightage to the Moslems although this is amply provided for already in the provinces. Hindus already have a legitimate grievance.

(3) The inclusion of individuals selected by the Viceroy entirely defeats the whole conception of a body representing the elected representatives of the Indian peoples. Smaller minorities are sufficiently provided for in the provincial assemblies. This suggestion will be taken as an attempt to pack the new body.

(4) Unless the Council is to be unwieldy in size selection by each province especially when some part of the Council is to be chosen by the members of the Central Legislature while a large contingent of Princes is to be added will inevitably mean that in the smaller provinces either the minority or the majority community will be misrepresented. If, for instance, Sind and Orissa have no more than two members each the Hindu and Moslem minorities respectively must be either denied representation or be over represented. Even if they are given three seats each the minorities will be over represented with one each. To give these provinces more seats would be to overload the Council or give them a disproportionate weight if it is kept a small body. The suggestion of P[roportional] R[epresentation] by an electoral college of all the elected members gets over this difficulty. The provincial nexus will be retained but not overstressed.

We want a body representing the peoples of India not a number of separate provinces.

(5) Thirty is an excessive representation of the Princes and will certainly be resented.

(6) 140 to 150 is too large to make an effective body.

(7) Insistence on the 1940 pledge at this stage will kill the scheme dead. Far better say nothing at this stage but allow the new body to work as a National Council. There is no need to bid the devil good morning.

C. R. A.
92

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

Immediate

Private and Personal

10 February 1942

Generalissimo arrived Monday afternoon. Party went first to two houses
prepared for them on this estate in which they will live. My wife and I received
him and Madame in this House. Later I introduced them to my Council, and
Marshal and I exchanged formal speeches. Neither Generalissimo nor Madame
has the least notion of the position of Indian politics. I dare say their activities
among political leaders may bring about some awkward situations, but I feel
pretty confident that neither has the wish to be mischievous. Whole party most
friendly. I have had a two-hours talk with the Marshal this Tuesday afternoon
which I will report by separate telegram—the conversation was very friendly
and entirely satisfactory. We are entertaining them to a dinner party to-night
with more speeches.

93

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

10 February 1942

Private and Personal

No. 277–S. Reference my private and personal telegram No. 258–S¹ of 7th Feb-
uary. Would you please have a message from me conveyed to Gandhi verbally
and urgently in the following terms:

Begins. I have been given to understand that His Excellency Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek would value an opportunity of meeting during his visit to
Delhi where he will be for the next five or six days. Ends.

I suggest that this should be conveyed through the Deputy Commissioner,
Wardha, or as you think best. Would you please telegraph the result as early
as possible and whether you think he is coming?

¹ Not printed.
94

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/36

IMMEDIATE

10 February 1942

No. 129–C. I gave His Excellency the Viceroy’s message personally to Mr. Jinnah. Much as he would like to meet the Generalissimo, Mr. Jinnah very much regrets that his engagements in Bengal prevent his being in Delhi before February 20th. Jinnah leaves Bombay tonight and arrives Calcutta February 12th A.M. He leaves Calcutta February 13th P.M. for Saranjang to attend Provincial League conference and arrives back from Calcutta February 16th by 10 A.M. He will be in Calcutta till February 18th P.M. and reaches Delhi February 20th.

Jinnah was quite clear that any change in his programme was impossible but he would be glad to avail of conversation if there were opportunity of meeting in Calcutta between 16th and 18th.

95

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106 b: ff 477–8

INDIA OFFICE, 10 February 1942

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. P. 2/42

Prime Minister

Attlee doesn’t like the composition of the proposed Defence of India Council as agreed by Simon and myself and would prefer that the whole body should be elected by the Provincial Legislatures voting as a single constituency and that there should be none nominated by the Viceroy. He feels that the simplest possible scheme will have the biggest effect. Anderson also leans that way, but not so strongly. I still feel that it is very important to keep alive the feeling of provincial representation and of local responsibility in connexion with defence now and constitution framing afterwards.

I also think that there would be an outcry if the Central Legislature were wholly left out, and that some really good men would fail to be elected. But I am quite willing to drop the Viceroy’s little supplementary list and leave them to ask for it when they find some good men are still outside. I can put the alternatives to Linlithgow in my telegram.¹
Anyhow, I don’t see that you need go into such details in your appeal, which must be in the broadest terms, leaving it to me and Linlithgow to tidy the edges, probably after discussion with Indian political leaders.

L. S. A.

P.S. I should of course have no objection to putting Attlee’s alternative plan for composition to the Viceroy and attach a draft of a paragraph which might be inserted after paragraph 6 of the original draft telegram to Linlithgow.

1 See No. 112. 2 Not printed.

96

Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/6/106b: ff 475–6

INDIA OFFICE, 10 February 1942

My dear Clem,

I am quite willing to put your alternative to the Viceroy and in any case the question of the Viceroy’s little supplementary list need not be mentioned when the proposal is outlined and need only come into effect if it is subsequently found that some obviously desirable individual or community had been overlooked. I attach very little importance to that point, though Simon did.

On the other hand I do attach the greatest importance, both from the point of view of the present and the future, to the basis of representation being mainly provincial: I mean that the representatives elected by a particular province should regard themselves as representatives of that province. Surely, the most useful work this body can do is as liaison between the Centre and the Provinces? They will no doubt discuss, criticise, ask questions, at the Centre for so many days at a time. But to be of any real value in responding to the Prime Minister’s appeal they will translate what they have learnt into local effort, whether in connection with recruiting, with munitions, with A.R.P., or whatever it may be. Again from the point of view of the constitution of the future, the more the provincial outlook is stressed the less likely are you to get the complete deadlock between two over-centralised communal parties.

As for the figures, I see no difficulty in the total Council running up to 150, i.e. a quarter of the House of Commons. This is not a particularly large assembly for the kind of purpose in view, i.e. questioning and discussion, and the provincial delegations would be none too large for their purpose. Nor would it be too large a body for ultimate decision on the constitution, though no doubt it would have to set up sub-committees.
As regards the Moslems, the main danger of what now looks on the face of it as a highly unitary scheme for India will be Moslem opposition, and the kind of representation provided for the Moslems by the Act seems to me the least that they are likely to look at. As you know, Jinnah throughout demands 50/50 on the footing that he speaks for a people of equal status with the Hindus. As for the smaller minorities, the Act already provides for these being treated as a single constituency for all India for the purposes of the Legislative Assembly, and that could be followed in the present case.

As for bidding the devil good morning, I know my devil sufficiently to be certain that he will want to have an answer to his questions at once and will refuse to play unless he gets it. There can be no question of our going back on the 1940 pledge and that being so nothing but mischief could come from anything that looked like evading that issue.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

97

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET


2. I enclose the official report¹ for the second half of January. This as usual gives a balanced appreciation of the situation. Congress workers are, as indicated in paragraph 3 of the report, rather in doubt as to what they should do to re-establish their position. Having regard to the difference of opinion between the members of the Working Committee, these doubts and difficulties of their followers are not surprising. I have recently seen a letter written by Nehru to Rajagopalachari saying how distressed he is at some of his speeches (presumably, he was referring to speeches such as that in which Rajagopalachari said: “We do not want to be with the Nazis or with the Japanese. We want to be with you (the British)”). Nehru went on as follows (I quote the letter in full as it is so interesting):

[The text of the letter which follows was circulated to the War Cabinet by Mr. Amery on 17 April; see No. 628.]

3. One has of course always realised that Nehru stymied the reasonable group. Nehru’s reference to the “organisational or constructive programme of Congress” and to “the crisis ahead” goes to show that he is still thinking in terms of revolution. I have not seen full reports of his recent speeches, but
the newspaper reports show that his main theme is that the British Empire is crumbling and that the Congress must be ready to seize power as soon as their weakness makes the British unable to maintain it. It is significant that after the Wardha meetings, he went off at once to Gorakhpur, the district in which he was convicted. The Commissioner whom I have seen recently said he was indulging in attacks on Government servants, including the District Magistrate who sent him to jail and was in his view “trailing his coat”. He, as far as I know, refrains from openly attacking war effort, but his propaganda is none the less dangerous, or I would say more dangerous, for he is stirring up anti-British feeling and anti-Government feeling. I will watch all his activities and speeches most closely, so as to have what I hope may be regarded as a convincing case when the time for action comes.

That is the way.

L.

4. I have referred to anti-British feeling; that I think from various minor indications is growing among the intelligentsia and Higginbottom, whose opinion I value, gave me this opinion. It is hardly surprising; the educated classes were always jealous of the position of British officers and it does more harm than good, at least in India, to refer, as did the Duke of Devonshire in the recent debate in the House of Lords, to the small number of British civilians in India; the answer is that it is the British civilians who hold the key posts and to reply that that is due to the fact that there are more British officers in the senior ranks of the I.C.S. does not improve the position. We must keep off this question of the small number of British officers in India.

A good point.

L.

5. But apart from this, the constant demands put forward by some newspapers in England and by people such as Sorensen that you or the Secretary of State or His Majesty’s Government must solve the deadlock only aggravates the situation, and I agree with some comments which I recently saw in a Bengal official fortnightly report that Reuters should be influenced to refrain from reproducing comments of this nature. I admit the difficulty; Reuters must be impartial, but in time of war should they broadcast the half-baked opinions of some leader writers who know little or nothing about our difficulties? Amery’s most recent speech was in my humble opinion excellent, but he always excites adverse criticism out here.

Don’t tell them so!

L.

Is it because he is just a wee bit inclined to preach?

L.

1 Not printed.  
2 Mr H. S. Ross, I.C.S.  
Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

IMMEDIATE

11 February 1942

No. 248–M.S. Reference Your Excellency’s telegram No. 277–S1 dated February 10th. Deputy Commissioner, Wardha, conveyed message about 20 hours on February 10th. Immediately on communication Gandhi replied that he had already received telegraph message from Delhi intimating that Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek will be visiting Wardha on February 12th or 13th. Deputy Commissioner understood this visit was almost certain. Gandhi further suggested to Deputy Commissioner to reserve Wardha Circuit House for February 12th and 13th and to arrange for extra petrol for car probably from Nagpur to Wardha.

Deputy Commissioner endeavoured to elicit origin of message from Delhi without putting a direct question but failed. My Secretary has already communicated gist of above to Donaldson by telephone. I should be delighted to entertain Generalissimo and party if this course presents any advantages. It would probably be more convenient than a stay at Wardha Circuit House which would involve provision of food, servants and cars.

1 No. 93.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

SECRET AND PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 11 February 1942, 6.55 pm

Received: 11 February, 5.50 pm

No. 284–S. I am having a little trouble with the Generalissimo and Madame about their desire to visit Gandhi at Wardha. It appears that good manners in China require that the first call should be paid by the younger to the older person.

2. Following are the facts. On Monday evening I made it very clear to Clark Kerr that I had no intention of allowing the Chinese to go to Wardha or to Allahabad. I explained to him that it was my strong opinion that for good political reasons we could not tolerate a visit of this kind, and that in any event I had had specific instructions from His Majesty’s Government and
the Prime Minister himself to prevent any such visit taking place. I told Clark Kerr that if the Marshal could not be dissuaded from this visit I intended, even at the risk of offending him, to prevent him from going. Yesterday (Tuesday) I spoke to Madame Chiang Kai-shek myself, made it clear that I could not allow a visit to Wardha, and appealed to her to help me in this matter. She again pleaded the point about Chinese ethics, but I reminded her that we were in India and must measure these matters by Indian standards. She appeared then to be ready to abandon the proposal. Believing that I had disposed of the Wardha visit in my conversation with Madame I did not touch directly upon this to the Marshal. I said however that I knew he was anxious to speak to persons of various political views, and that I was therefore quite prepared to communicate through the proper channels with Messrs. Jinnah and Gandhi to suggest their coming to Delhi in order to meet the Marshal. To this he appeared to agree. I immediately asked\(^1\) the Governor of the Central Provinces to send a message to Gandhi, but received a telephone message this morning to say that Gandhi had expressed his inability to come to Delhi since he expected the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang to visit him at Wardha.

3. Jawaharlal Nehru arrived in Delhi Tuesday morning and saw the Chiangs last evening. I have a strong suspicion that he has been urging them to visit Wardha. No doubt he appreciates the great publicity value of such an occasion to Congress.

4. I have again seen Clark Kerr and reminded him of my conversation on Monday reported above, and told him that I expect him to make it abundantly clear to the Generalissimo and Madame that neither of them can go to Wardha, and that all idea of such a visit must be abandoned. I have asked Clark Kerr to give this message to the Generalissimo in writing. I have further told Clark Kerr that I have taken steps to prevent the Generalissimo from obtaining transport to Wardha whether by train, air or road, and that at whatever risk of offending his feelings it is my firm intention to compel him to respect my wishes in this regard.

5. Twynnam has suggested\(^2\) that if the Chiangs are to go to Wardha, it would be better that they should stay with him at Nagpur. I do not think that this arrangement, though no doubt preferable to their staying in the local circuit house, would remove extreme undesirability of their visiting Wardha.

\(^1\) No. 93. \(^2\) No. 98.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

M O S T  I M M E D I A T E
P RIVATE AND PERSONAL

11 February 1942

No. 285-S. Your private and personal telegram No. 167 of February 9th. It is important that invitation to India should follow as exactly as possible those to Dominions. I would suggest the following alternative to the draft formula in your second paragraph as answer to the question in Parliament tomorrow:

_Begins._ His Majesty’s Government are anxious that India should be afforded a similar opportunity to the Dominions of being represented at the War Cabinet for purposes of the formulation and direction of policy for the prosecution of the war. They have accordingly invited the Government of India to arrange for such representation if they so desire._ Ends.

I think at this stage it would be well to avoid specific mention of the Princes, as it is a delicate constitutional point which will need further consideration, whether a Princely representative should be nominated by the Crown Representative or by the Governor-General in Council.

2. You will note that the formula suggested would cover whatever device we may eventually decide upon, and I do not think that any further elucidation will be called for until the names of our nominees are announced. The representation will in any case be of India as a whole, and I am at present inclined to think that the Governor-General in Council is the proper authority for the nomination of both the Princely and the other representative. Certainly it is highly desirable that both should act in responsibility to the same authority, which must clearly be the Governor-General in Council. This answers your question about regulating the representative’s activities, though obviously both he and his colleague will act in the closest association with yourself.

3. As regards timing, I agree that the earlier an announcement is made on the subject of representation the better, and that it need not be held up for the reply to Sapru, or for the changes in the Executive Council. The timing of the announcement of the latter requires careful consideration, and I shall cable separately about that.

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1 No. 84. 2 Mr Amery’s telegram 167 was despatched at 11.30 pm on 8 February.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 472–4

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Received: 12 February 11 February 1942

1–U. Please (1) take strongest peg you can before continuing. (2) Prime Minister proposes to broadcast to India possibly Sunday¹ appealing to Indians to come together to save India and, leaving past and present constitutional controversies on one side, join in an enlarged Defence of India Council of all the best men from every community and province. This to have similar functions to and presumably replace existing N.D.C. (Princes would also join in no doubt in similar proportions) but to sweeten offer will be invited (a) to nominate for you to appoint to your Executive and send here representative of your Government to War Cabinet etc. (b) similarly to nominate representative or representatives to Peace Conference. (c) to be the body which after the war is to frame the future constitution and be empowered to negotiate with H.M.G. as to method of continuing fulfilment of our obligations.

This is very rough sketch but further telegram² with suggestions as to composition and numbers follows in few hours as soon as P.M. has approved it. It is a bold and imaginative attempt which he alone could make and which we must do our best to help make a success of.

P.M.’s suggestion of broadcasting Sunday is linked with his hope that Chiang Kai Shek may be able to stay over for it.

I realise that this project, if it proves acceptable, is unlikely to be operative for some weeks and if in the meantime you wished to send Indian representative here we should be ready to receive nominee of your Government on understanding that he would later be replaced by nominee of new Council.

As regards broadcast itself what would be best time at your end? I hope it will be possible to make arrangements at short notice for relay by all Indian transmitters as otherwise audience would be limited. I shall of course arrange for text of broadcast to be telegraphed verbatim for publication.

¹ 15 February. ² No. 111.
IO2

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 469

MOST IMMEDIATE
INDIA OFFICE, 12 February 1942
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2–U. No question now of broadcast Sunday or of delaying Chiang Kai-shek’s departure. Broadcast probably not for at least a week.

Fuller telegram¹ submitting proposals for your consideration will I hope get despatched this evening. Afraid whole matter has been rushed on you very precipitately.

¹ No. 111.

IO3

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
12 February 1942

No. 1–U. Your telegram No. 1–U¹ of February 11th. I am much surprised that Prime Minister should contemplate announcing a scheme of such profound constitutional significance without fullest consultation with me and my advisers.

2. I propose to telegraph to you, as soon as I can adjust it, a reasoned criticism² of the Prime Minister’s proposals. Those proposals are in my opinion founded upon a complete failure to comprehend the true nature of our difficulties in India.

3. If the Prime Minister is to broadcast on Sunday there is little time in which to adjust our respective views. Would it not be possible to postpone announcement for a few days? Best time for broadcast from London is 20.30 hours I.S.T. (14.00 G.M.T.) Reuters should carry a brief announcement of the broadcast and the time not less than 24 hours before.

¹ No. 101. ² See No. 121.
104

Mr Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek
(via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: ff 290-1

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL SECRET

12 February, 2.45 am

No. 2676. Following from Prime Minister for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:

Begins. We think here in the Cabinet that your suggested visit to Mr. Gandhi at Wardha might impede the desire we have for rallying all India to the war effort against Japan. It might well have the unintended effect of emphasising communal differences at a moment when unity is imperative, and I venture to hope that Your Excellency will be so very kind as not to press the matter contrary to the wishes of the Viceroy or the King-Emperor. I look forward most hopefully to the increasing co-operation of the British, Indian and other Imperial forces with the valiant Chinese armies who have so long withstood the brunt of barbarous Japanese aggression.

I take the occasion to convey my respectful compliments to Madame Chiang Kai-shek and trust that her all too brief sojourn in India has been interesting and agreeable. Ends.

105

Mr Eden to Mr Churchill

R/30/1/1: ff 26

P.M. (42) 21

Prime Minister

FOREIGN OFFICE, 12 February 1942

I have just seen Governor of Burma’s telegram No. 148\(^1\) to the Secretary of State for Burma, private and personal, describing the military situation in Burma, and also your personal telegram to Chiang Kai-shek 2676,\(^2\) which was apparently despatched early this morning.

This Gandhi business is very troublesome, and I can well understand the disadvantages of Chiang Kai-shek’s journeying off to Wardha to see Gandhi. At the same time there is another side to the picture which becomes increasingly clear. If things do go wrong in Burma, it will be most difficult to keep China in the war and Chiang Kai-shek would be our only hope. Therefore it is of the utmost importance not to cause him offence at this critical juncture.

\(^1\) Not printed. \(^2\) No. 104.
Is there no alternative between a meeting at Delhi and one at Wardha? Could not Chiang Kai-shek meet Gandhi at the residence of one of the Provincial Governors? If anything of this kind were practicable, it would surely be preferable to restraining Chiang Kai-shek forcibly from going to a meeting with Gandhi.

I am sending a copy of this minute to Amery.

ANTHONY EDEN.

106

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 37

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, 12 February 1942
No. 184. Your private and personal telegram No. 255-S.¹ I agree that the speeches of Faringdon and Catto were unhelpful. But their points were countered in Devonshire’s reply in terms with which I should have thought that the European and Indian members of your Council could associate themselves.

2. Censorship here has no power to prevent transmission of press messages to India or elsewhere unless they contain information of value to the enemy and I am sure you will agree that it would be highly dangerous to attempt to exercise pressure here on press correspondents in regard to handling of speeches on India in Parliament. I shall be dealing officially with your Information Department telegram No. 959² suggesting improvements in Reuter’s service. I am ready to see what can be done but there are considerable difficulties.

3. As regards censorship in India of incoming messages, please see my personal telegram No. 1851³ of January 31st. But I could not approve its extension to proceedings of Parliament which could not fail to be discovered and inevitably produce violent protest.

4. I hope that when the Prime Minister’s reply to Sapru becomes available such embarrassment as speeches in the recent debate may have occasioned will be relieved and will see that everything possible is done to secure improvement of reporting of future debates.

¹ No. 80. ² Not printed. ³ No. 53.
I07

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 222

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

186. Your private & personal telegram 285-S. Prime Minister has approved formula in your paragraph two subject to following alterations:

(1) For "a similar opportunity to Dominions" substitute "the same opportunity as the Dominions".

(2) after War Cabinet insert "and on Pacific War Council".

I shall give reply accordingly between eleven and twelve o'clock British Summer Time today. You will no doubt make simultaneous announcement in India.

1 No. 100. 2 Namely, the second section of para. 1 of telegram 285-S.

I08

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/7/5069: f 5

NEW DELHI, 12 February 1942, 8.55 pm
Received: 13 February, 1 am

24D/42. Following are points from Press report of speech made by Nehru at large public meeting in Delhi on February 11th. Begins. My talks with Chiang-Kai-Shek have given rise to much speculation. Some people think there might be changes in Congress Policy towards war; it is absurd to suggest he has come to India to interfere in Indian affairs. Old world is crumbling and cannot revive. Our lot may possibly become worse in New World as path of revolution is path of turmoil as shown in China. China has had to pay heavy cost and India will have to pay same price. Slogans will not create revolution for us. Revolution must and will come. We want freedom for India and will not bow to any Foreign Power; we want neither Germany nor Japanese to come, nor British to stay. People who ask whether Japanese or Germans are better than Britshers suffer from slavish mentality. As result of Government short-sighted policy, we find ourselves in helpless position and if administration of country is entrusted to us today it is questionable whether we can prepare
ourselves in several weeks or months to defend our country with arms. But we will not surrender to anybody and we will not refuse responsibility for defending the country merely because it is entrusted to us at dangerous time. Government policy of industrialisation in India is unimaginative and suicide. Air Raid Precautions measures are inadequate; we are not opposed to Government A.R.P. measures but should supplement thereby [them by?] better and more efficient organisation of our own. People should not succumb to panic. Ends.

109

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 20th Conclusions, Minute 6

L/PO/6/106b: f 444

12 February 1942

INDIA

Constitutional Questions

The War Cabinet gave preliminary consideration to a draft telegram from the S[ecretary of] S[ate] for India to the Viceroy, about the alternative draft statement which the S[ecretary of] S[ate] for India had been asked to prepare at the Meeting held on 5th February. The object of this telegram was to ascertain the views of the Viceroy on the general line of a proposed statement by the Prime Minister.

The War Cabinet:

Agreed that, while the text would require further consideration, a draft telegram on the lines proposed should be despatched without further reference to them.

1 See No. 66, Minute 3.

110

Mr Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 285

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

188. Following from Prime Minister for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek:

Begins. As you know we have formed in London, with President Roosevelt’s full agreement the Pacific War Council on the Ministerial level consisting of
British, Indian, Australian, New Zealand and Dutch representatives. We should feel honoured if you would allow your Ambassador in London or any other representative you may nominate to sit with us as a member. This would enable us to consider the problems of the war against Japan as a whole. I have ascertained from President Roosevelt that this would in no way prejudice or complicate your contacts and relations with the United States in Washington. I hope you will therefore authorize a representative to attend our next meeting. Ends.

III

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 455–7

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

3–U. The Prime Minister feels strongly that draft reply to Sapru manifesto in which you concurred will be regarded not only in India but elsewhere as merely argumentative and negative in substance and as pushing back on Indians responsibility for making next move in order to cover our own incapacity to give any clear lead. He therefore has now decided upon entirely novel method of in effect answering Sapru’s letter by broadcast appeal to India in near future, of which following paragraphs give preliminary outline. The detailed application of his proposal will require a good deal of working out and on this your advice and help will be invaluable as well as your personal impression of the scheme as a whole.

2. The general line of his broadcast (I am not of course attempting to give the wording), will be to this effect:

(1) India is in grave danger. All must unite and cooperate wholeheartedly to save her. For this purpose we must all leave aside our controversies and make our contribution to the present and to the future.

(2) This is no time to make profound changes in the Executive Government or hamper the authorities who are carrying on the war.

(3) My appeal to you is that India’s best and most representative men from every community, party and province, as well as the Princes to whom we are

1 This telegram is the first of those referred to in the Résumé of Telegrams dealing with Cripps Mission printed as Appendix v.

2 The original reproduced above shows that Mr Churchill authorised this telegram on 12 February, but does not show when it was despatched. The copy printed for the Cabinet (R/30/1/1: f 2) and MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 both give the date as 13 February.
joined by Treaties, should now come forward to serve India in her hour of need and to lay the foundations for a new future. The basis of that future must be India’s complete freedom to control her own destiny, continuing, as I both hope and believe she will, within the fellowship of the British Commonwealth.

(4) As our own contribution I make the following proposals to the People of India and I ask them as their contribution to come forward and make a success of them by their co-operation with us and with each other.

(5) For this purpose I invite you to come together in a representative Indian Council of Defence to be elected, so far as British India is concerned, by the existing members of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures in such manner as to enable every community to secure the same proportion in the Council of Defence as in the electing body. I suggest that the total number for British India might be about 100, to whom would be joined, as in the existing nominated National Defence Council, the due proportion of representatives of the States.

(6) The main duty of this Council, during the war, would be to serve India by consultation with the Government on the progress of the war and to help the war effort throughout India in the raising of men, the production of munitions, the organising of Air Raid Precautions and the steadying of the population in case of raids or invasion.

(7) Its further duty will be to nominate for inclusion in the Viceroy’s Executive Council the representative of the People of India who is to attend the meetings of the British War Cabinet and of the Pacific War Council.

(8) At the end of the war it will similarly be its duty to nominate the representative or representatives of India at the Peace Conference.

(9) After the war its duty will be to set to work without delay to hammer out India’s future constitution.

(10) As in the case of every other constitution-framing body, the main operative decisions on this matter will naturally have to be, in their nature and in the processes by which they are formulated, an expression of the desire of the people of India as a whole to adopt the proposals so framed. The procedure by which effect is to be given to this principle will be discussed with the Council as soon as practicable. I, on behalf of the British Government, now declare that we undertake to accept in advance a constitution so arrived at.

(11) The Council will also be empowered to negotiate with the British Government with regard to the conditions, and the method by which the existing and continuing obligations of the British Government can best be fulfilled.

3. For some further explanatory notes on points of detail see my immediately succeeding telegram.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 446–50

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, 13 February 1942

Received: 14 February

4–U. My immediately preceding telegram. For composition of British Indian portion of Defence of India Council the scheme sketched in this paragraph seems to us the simplest and most likely to appeal as based ultimately on popular election. It will clearly require a great deal of detailed examination and we should be most grateful for your observations and suggestions.

Provincial Lower Houses should constitute a single constituency for electing say 100 representatives of British India to the Defence of India Council (which of course will take place of existing National Defence Council) in such a fashion as to secure representation in it of the different communities and other elements in the various Provincial Legislatures in the same proportions as they are found in this electing body. Method of election would no doubt be proportional representation. Candidates would be drawn either from members of the Legislatures or persons qualified to become members and would have each to be nominated by a member of a Provincial Legislature.

2. An alternative method of composing the British Indian element which has been suggested would be by elections as follows: each Provincial Lower House, acting separately, would elect a quota of persons in accordance with paragraphs 19, 21 and 22 of Schedule I of Act of 1935, the size of the quota being approximately 2/5ths of the component elements of the Federal Assembly, as laid down in Schedule I of the Government of India Act, 1935, giving a total of approximately 100–110, allowing some latitude for the elimination of fractions. To make good omissions either of eminent individuals or communities that would be excluded from representation by election, Council when constituted might have power to co-opt another 10, subject to the original communal balance not being disturbed.

3. Indian States should be represented in the same proportion to the British Indian total as on the present National Defence Council (and as now by nomination by the Crown Representative).

4. As regards persons nominated to represent India in War Cabinet and Peace Conference, they must, since they are charged with duty of helping in formulation of policy, be responsible to, and therefore formally appointed by, the existing Executive authority in India. The Princes would presumably resist

1 No. 111.
any suggestion that British Indians should have a voice in nominating their representative, and British Indian element correspondingly would object to Princely members of Council having a say in nomination of British Indian representatives. In any case neither element in the projected Council, which has no statutory basis, will have any executive authority, and it seems to us that the correct procedure would be for the British Indian element to recommend to the Governor-General in Council a person for appointment to his Council for the purpose of being the Government of India’s representative, it being understood that the Governor-General in Council would accept Defence Council’s recommendation. It is suggested similarly that the Princely element would recommend a nominee to the Crown Representative who would accept the recommendation and appoint him. The Governor-General in Council could, we think, hardly appoint a Princely representative responsible to him in Council as proposed in paragraph 2 of your 285-S² in the light of Sections 3 and 313 (5) of the Act, but might adopt a Resolution that the Princely representative nominated by the Crown Representative should be associated with the British Indian representative.

5. As regards constitution-making function at the end of the war, guiding principle is as stated in paragraph 10 of my preceding telegram. Of course if Jinnah and the Princes are not to denounce this scheme from the outset it will be essential to make it clear that H.M.G. stands by the 1940 pledge to minorities. On the other hand it is desired to avoid antagonising Congress unnecessarily by creating impression that Jinnah and the Princes are to be given an unlimited veto. Language of paragraph 10 of preceding telegram has been worded with special regard to this danger.

6. It is recognised that this considerable enlargement of the present National Defence Council, particularly if it has to meet more frequently or for longer sessions than the present one, would entail a very considerably increased burden for yourself, so much so as perhaps to involve question of a deputy President of it. But this is only one of many details to be examined later.

7. The Prime Minister is most anxious to have your reactions to the plan as soon as possible. While I had myself previously advised the Cabinet that there was nothing that could be done for the moment beyond strengthening the authority and prestige of your existing Executive and National Defence Councils, I am greatly attracted by proposal which makes no immediate change in the constitutional position but gives you a popularly elected Defence Council and simultaneously affords an instrument for the eventual solution of the constitutional problem on lines which Congress cannot denounce as undemocratic and which can be commended to Muslims and Princes as maintaining our 1940 pledges. The imaginative boldness of the scheme and the Prime Minister’s
personality might together succeed in putting the plan across, even with Congress and the Muslim League, at a time when danger to India herself is so obvious. If it does you will be able to carry on with your Executive Council expanded as you have proposed and with a larger, and we hope better, consultative body which while perhaps more openly critical than the existing National Defence Council, might also be more effective in promoting the Indian war effort throughout the Provinces. If, on the other hand, the appeal fails, and if the offer is rejected, the public here, in America, in China and in a large measure even in India, will realise at last that the real difficulty lies in the unreasonableness of Indian politicians and the incompatibility of their respective domestic policies.

2 No. 100.

II13

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 445

MOST IMMEDIATE 13th February 1942
PERSONAL AND SECRET

5–U. Following from Prime Minister. The following is amplification of Secretary of State’s telegram No. 3–U2 and supersedes it where necessary. No broadcast will take place for ten days. The possible fall of Singapore must be considered in timing. You are authorised to consult the three Presidency Governors,3 but otherwise secrecy is essential to success. There is no need to trouble Chiang to remain so long. Cabinet is unitedly in favour, but we also feel the need to consult Ministers of Cabinet not in War Cabinet. Pray let us have your reply as soon as possible, not only on merits of scheme, but whether body proposed would hamper prosecution of war by Executive. The more we have thought about it the more set we feel for it; having regard both to United States of America and China.

1 The original reproduced above shows that Mr Churchill authorised this telegram on 12 February, but does not show when it was despatched. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 13 February.
2 No. III. 3 Namely, of Madras, Bombay and Bengal.
114

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106 b: ff 456–60

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 13 February 1942, 4.5 pm

190. Now that Government of India have been invited to be represented in War Cabinet and Pacific War Council I presume that your Executive Council will wish to appoint its representative without delay. I think that this should certainly be done without regard to the proposal in scheme under separate discussion between us for alternative method of recommendation to Governor-General in Council of such representative by a projected elected body; for even if that scheme were accepted a considerable time must elapse before the organisation contemplated by it could be constituted and longer still before it could become operative and perform its proposed function in regard to India’s representation.

2. Similarly, I think that steps might well be taken at once for appointment of Princely representative of India in War Cabinet if that is desired. But I hesitate to endorse suggestion in paragraph 2 of your private and personal telegram of 15th February, 285–S¹ that Prince should be nominated by Governor-General in Council. While both Princely and British Indian representatives will be representatives of India as a whole in the sense indicated in paragraph 2 of Birkenhead’s secret despatch No. 1² of 13th May, 1926, I cannot recall any precedent for nomination of Prince for purposes of external representation being expressed to have been made by Governor-General in Council who moreover have under Government of India Act executive authority in relation to British India only and comprise no States element. Nomination of Prince by Governor-General in Council at this juncture might therefore be held to prejudice future constitutional position of States. Would it not be preferable therefore that, when your Council have agreed in principle that it is desirable and appropriate that Prince should be included in India’s representation in War Cabinet, etc., it should be announced that particular Prince has with their concurrence been invited by Crown Representative to represent India in association with British India representative appointed by Governor-General in Council? Please see in the same connection relevant passage in the telegram³ dealing with points of details in the scheme which has been put before you in separate correspondence.

3. In order to regularise immediate position I am sending in a separate telegram⁴ to the Governor-General pro forma invitation to “Government of
India” (of which the Crown Representative is surely a component) in terms of reply to question in Parliament of 12th February.

1 No. 100.  2 L/P&J/8/560: ff. 215–6.  3 No. 112.  4 No. 117.

II5

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

13 February 1942, 5.8 pm

No. 304–S. Your personal and secret telegram No. 2676 of 12th February. Following from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for Prime Minister:

Begins. Since my arrival at Delhi I have decided to modify my itinerary and given up the intention of visiting Wardha. Please be assured that my personal movement is a matter of small concern to me when the interests of our joint war efforts are involved. Madame Chiang joins me in expressing to you our heartfelt appreciation of the cordial hospitality that is being extended to us during our stay in India and in sending you our warmest personal regards. Chiang Kai-shek. Ends.

1 No. 104.

II6

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

13 February 1942

No. 499. I learn on reliable authority that local Muslim League circles are very suspicious of Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek’s visit. Frequent contacts with Nehru and talk of cultural affiliation [affinity?] appear to be responsible for this suspicion. Jinnah is not necessarily a party to it as he left Bombay several days ago for Bengal, but I would emphasize the importance, if at all possible, of a meeting between Marshal and Jinnah. This would, I think, put a stop to growing uneasiness among Muslims here.
117

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&EJ/8/560: f 214

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 13 February 1942, 2.30 pm

2764. His Majesty’s Government are anxious that India should be afforded the same opportunity as the Dominions of being represented in the War Cabinet and in the Pacific War Council for the purposes of formulation of direction of policy for the prosecution of the war. I am accordingly authorised by H.M.G. to convey an invitation to the Government of India to arrange for such representation if they so desire.

1 The telegram was addressed to the Governor-General in Council.

118

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

13th February 1942

No. 3–U. I am greatly relieved that we are to have time to criticise the Prime Minister’s scheme. I agree with you in thinking that the Viceroy has been ill-used in this business and I most devoutly hope that he may count upon the Secretary of State for India who is his natural protector to see that nothing of the kind should occur again.

1 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 14 February. The date given here is taken from L/PO/6/106b: f 441. Both MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 and L/PO/6/106b give the date of Lord Linlithgow’s telegram 4–U (No. 120) as 13 February.

2 In L/PO/6/106b the telegram number is followed by the words ‘Private and personal. Please cancel my telegram 2–U.’ No. 2–U warned the Secretary of State to expect No. 121. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
I19

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 440

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 13 February 1942
Received: 14 February

6–U. Your 1–U and 3–U.¹ I am sure Prime Minister did not wish to treat you inconsiderately but you know his sudden ways. In this case he had meditated flying to Delhi and launching his scheme there insisting on my saying nothing at the moment to anybody. This would have given a few days for your consideration and comment, but when that idea was dropped he was seized by the idea of broadcasting scheme while Chiang was still with you and I could only give you hurried (and unauthorised) outline. But you have been badly treated and I am truly sorry. As to project itself I am awaiting your first criticisms.

¹ Nos. 103 and 118.

I20

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

13 February 1942

No. 4–U. My immediately following telegram No. 302–S contains my comments on Prime Minister’s scheme. I am sending it in S cypher owing to length and in order to avoid delay.

I21

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 13 February 1942, 4.50 pm

No. 302–S. My immediately preceding telegram. Following are some interim comments on the merits of the Prime Minister’s scheme. I have not yet received the promised statement¹ of details but I cannot imagine that these could render much more acceptable a plan to which I see so many powerful objections of

¹ No. 112.
principle. As I understand it the plan involves the creation of an enlarged Defence Council in which different parties, communities and areas would be represented in proportions determined by ourselves and by persons who would in form be nominated by me even though many would be in practice selected by their political parties. This body would not only be entrusted with continuously advising me, the Commander-in-Chief and my Executive Council as a whole on defence matters but would supersede my Council as authority for selection of India’s representatives at War Cabinet and at Peace Conference (and presumably other Imperial or international meetings) and would moreover be the body which is to frame a new constitution after the war.

2. I would anticipate that such a proposal would be rejected out of hand by the principal Indian parties on various and sometimes conflicting grounds; as a flagrant breach of our pledges, and as an attempt to hand over both present and future power to a nominated body with neither constitutional nor popular sanction behind it. Although my own case against the proposed body is largely based on the assumption that it would achieve real power, the Congress could and would abuse it as a mere façade. Even taking it for what it was worth, they would insist upon its reflecting their own numerical superiority, whereas I would expect the Muslims to refuse to serve on any body in which they would be an ineffective minority.

3. If, however, the proposed Council were ever to come into being there would ensue the following grave results:

(a) Strong resentment would naturally be felt by many members of the present National Defence Council. They deserve a better reward than to be thrown over in favour of a Council which must be constituted with an eye as much upon the constitutional views of its members as upon their capacity to contribute to the conduct of defence. Apart from this warping of its composition, such a body would never be content to sit occasionally and to conduct business by way of commenting upon official material laid before it, but would certainly insist upon more or less continuous sessions and upon rules of business which would virtually stamp it as a parallel executive-cum-legislature. No Viceroy could possibly undertake the Chairmanship of such a body, compatibly with all his other duties, whereas his Chairmanship of the National Defence Council (sitting for three days every two months) has been the key to its utility as a link between Government and public opinion, and to our ability to bring representatives of British India and Princes round a table. I very much doubt the willingness of the latter to join a body representative of the British Indian political parties as such, more especially when they would be implicitly accepting its authority to draft a constitution for all India after the war.

(b) The bitter communal rivalries which are inseparable from the constitutional problem would be imported entire into the conduct of the war, since
it is too much to hope that such a Council would think with one mind about
the present and with another about the future.

(c) Since Indian public opinion, speaking generally, is more concerned about
the communal aspects of the future constitution than about anything else, the
new body would be bound to gain popular prestige at the expense of my Council.
I would expect the latter either to come into dangerous conflict with the new
body or to become subservient to it and to be distracted by political and com-
munal faction from the proper conduct of its current war work. Nor do I
like the idea of handing over to an extra-constitutional body very important
executive functions like the choice of representatives in London or at the Peace
Conference which fall within the constitutional responsibility of the Governor-
General in Council.

(d) The Legislature, which despite its staleness and its somewhat shallow
popular support is a valuable part of the constitutional machine, would be
sidetracked, and as far as anything to do with conduct of the war or planning
for the post-war world is concerned (and this covers almost everything of
importance) would have to be content to ratify the conclusions of an extra-
constitutional body. It is the legislature or rather legislatures to which Indian
opinion properly looks for continuity of parliamentary government as India
advances to nationhood. Moreover I would view with alarm the prospect of
having to press a reluctant legislature to pass supply for measures prompted
by an extra-constitutional body and perhaps having to use my powers of
certification to obtain it.

(e) The minorities certainly, and even any sections of the Hindus who felt
themselves under-represented in the new body, would complain with every
reason that we had torn up our pledges, first, not to effect fundamental con-
stitutional changes during the war (for this would in effect be a bequest of
power which must inevitably become a live transfer); secondly, to seek friendly
agreement among Indians themselves upon the form of the post-war body,
which will devise the framework of a new constitution; and thirdly not to
transfer responsibility for the peace and welfare of India to any system of
government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements
in India’s national life, as the authority of the contemplated Council would
probably be denied.

(f) The move would be regarded as a direct challenge to Pakistan, and
whatever may be said for throwing down such a challenge, now is scarcely the
moment for it.

4. To sum up, it is to my mind a fatal defect in the Prime Minister’s proposal
that it precipitates the whole constitutional controversy, which is so largely
communal and on a present view irreconcilable, into the conduct of the war

2 Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 67B.
and the day-to-day government of this country. This marriage of two elements which both our pledges and the interests of India command us to keep apart renders the proposal not more but less likely to obtain the co-operation of the political parties, especially those of the minorities.

5. At the same time, I sympathise with and share the spirit that animates the Prime Minister's proposals; what I press for is further consideration by us all of way of giving it practical form which will not make the task of government here more difficult, nor throw India into a communal turmoil at this critical moment.

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/7/5069: f 4

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 14 February 1942, 9.45 pm
Received: 15 February

2885. Parliamentary question for Tuesday morning asks whether in view of impression made by Chiang Kai-Shek's consultations with Nehru "it is proposed that they should meet Viceroy officially respecting issues of immediate and future significance to the peoples of India, China and the Far East".

2. I propose to reply to effect that Marshal's visit to India has been of great military value and proof of solidarity of our common front against the Axis. The Viceroy was glad to arrange during the visit for the Marshal to meet Mr. Nehru informally but it has not been suggested by either of these gentlemen that Mr. Nehru should take part in the Marshal's official consultations with the Viceroy nor does it appear from a speech he has made since meeting the Marshal that he would wish to do so (your telegram of 12th February 24-D.).1

3. Please telegraph urgently any comments.

1 No. 108.
123

Minutes by Sir D. Montech and Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106b: f 437

14 February 1942

S[ecretary] of S[tate]
It is quite clear, from internal evidence, that the Viceroy's 302–S replies, not to the "main telegram" outlining the P[reme] M[inister]'s projected broadcast and the offer to Indian politicians that he proposes to include in it, still less to the "following telegram" containing details of the plan, but to the preliminary telegram which you sent warning the Viceroy of what was in contemplation.

I would suggest, that being the case, that it would be hardly fair to the Viceroy to circulate his 302–S till he has been able to send his informed criticisms of the whole plan, in the light of the two telegrams which had not been before him when he telegraphed.

Not but what there is a very great deal of force in what the Viceroy says in his 302–S, which is not much affected by his erroneous assumption that the enlarged Defence of India Council is to be nominated whereas it is to be elected.

If, as I suggest, the telegram be withheld from circulation till the Viceroy's fully informed comments are received, I will refrain from any comment on it save this: that the argument in (c) might well be pushed further viz: that, notwithstanding the handing over to the new Defence of India Council of certain functions, in effect if not in form executive, the executive authority of British India will still remain with the G[overnor]-G[eneral] in C[ouncil] subject, as now, to the control of the S[ecretary] of S[tate]—that is, of the Crown in Parliament, and that this control will extend to the Member of Council nominated by the new body but appointed by the King, on the recommendation of the G[overnor]-G[eneral] and the S[ecretary] of S[tate]. It will not take Congress very long to detect this feature of the plan, which they will then denounce as a sham—while the Moslems and other minorities will denounce it as one more "surrender of our friends to placate our enemies"—which is the sense of (e).

I hope that, if only to prevent the despatch of a reply to 302–S which would cross the Viceroy's further comments and probably confuse the issue, you will find it possible to keep 302–S back till the further telegrams are received.

D. T. M.

P[reme] M[inister] asked for this; I told him it was based on a misunderstand but he wished to see it.

L. S. A.

1 No. 121.  
2 No. 111.  
3 No. 112.  
4 No. 101.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

SECRET

14 February 1942, 5.10 pm

No. 5-U. Following for Prime Minister:

Begins. I do hope you may not allow yourself to become wedded to any particular part of your plan until you have given your most serious attention to my comments. I am sure that the public interest requires that you should hear with an open mind the views which I and my immediate advisers will put before you. With Halifax away, you have with you no one who has borne the burden of Government at the Centre or has had administrative experience on the all-India scale. Anderson for whose mind I have the highest respect has had no direct experience of the Muhammadan North and West in its uneasy relationship to the great reservoirs of Hindu nationalism in the United Provinces and Gujerat, and no personal touch with the problem of the Indian States in the complex of India. I am well aware of the gravity of the military position in Burma and the Malay Archipelago, but that is no reason for doing anything hasty or unsound. Above all we must have anxious regard for the continuing soundness of the Indian Army which alone stands between the Japanese and their ultimate objective which must be a union, military and economic, with the German Army on the Persian Gulf. For if the Germans get licked the Japs will forfeit all they may have acquired. If we go about things the right way I think we can keep them apart, despite the weakness of the sea position as it is now developing. In India, if they invade, we shall have elbow room and ground and climate that suit us. But we must regard the morale and fighting value of the army as more important than U.S.A. opinion or that of any minorities in the U.K. For reasons which I will develop at length to Amery,¹ I am quite clear that an important element in your scheme would damage gravely our power of resistance to Japanese invasion. That element is your proposal to give the Defence Council the function of constitution-making as well as the duty of advising about the war. I shall show reasons which in my judgment render it imperative that you should jettison utterly any notion of these separate functions residing in a single body.

2. I shall be prepared, if you will kindly agree to consider them, to do my best to offer through Amery constructive alternatives to those parts of your scheme which I find myself bound to criticize.

3. It is a great comfort to me to feel that I shall find you, like another great Churchill,² magnanimous and unruffled in the hour of crisis, and that whatever
may befall us our relations will continue to be softened by mutual sympathy for each other’s public difficulties and warmed by private affection. *Ends.*

1 See No. 129.


125

*The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery*

*Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22*

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

**PERSONAL AND SECRET**

14 February 1942

No. 7–U. Your telegram No. 6–U¹ of February 14th. Whole series now deciphered and before me. By tomorrow Sunday evening shall send telegram² adjusting criticism of scheme contained in my telegram No. 302–S³ of 13th to details revealed in your later telegrams chiefly No. 4–U.⁴

¹ No. 119; the date should be 13 February. ² See No. 129. ³ No. 121. ⁴ No. 112.

126

*Mr Amery to Mr Churchill*

*L/PO/6/106b: ff 430–1*

**INDIA OFFICE, 15 February 1942**

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. P. 3/42

Prime Minister

I attach two documents which you should see in connection with your Indian broadcast.

The first is an extract from a letter from a leading missionary which asks you to do precisely what you are doing—you need only glance through it.

The second is the conclusion of the Nagpur resolution¹ of the Moslem League of December 27th last. The Moslems will be very suspicious of anything that looks like a going back on our 1940 pledge, and nothing could be more dangerous than giving any ground for that suspicion. It would be far better

¹ See Appendix iv.
for your proposal to be rejected by Congress than to have it accepted by Congress and treated as a breach of faith by the Moslems.

That is why I am dead against anything which could possibly imply that the future Constitution can be framed otherwise than by substantial agreement. I have acquiesced, in view of the Lord Privy Seal's strong objection to the use of the word "agreement" or of any reference to our pledges of 1940, in the rather involved draft in paragraph (10)\(^2\) of the outline of your proposed broadcast. But I am quite sure that if Linlithgow is asked by Jinnah next day whether our 1940 pledges to the minorities hold good he must say "Yes".

L. S. A.

\(^2\) See No. 111, para. 2 (10).

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**Enclosure to No. 126**

*The Rev. J. McKenzie to the Marquess of Linlithgow*

**MSS. EUR. F. 125/13\(^1\)**

**WILSON COLLEGE, BOMBAY, 29 December 1942**

Your Excellency,

On the 4th February last the Revd. Dr. J. Z. Hodge, the Revd. C. J. G. Robinson and I had the privilege of meeting you and telling you something of what was passing in the minds of many British missionaries in India regarding the political situation. Things have happened since then that have greatly changed the position. I think I may assure Your Excellency that there has been general and hearty appreciation among British missionaries of the measures which you have been instrumental in carrying through, particularly the enlargement of your Executive Council, the establishment of a Defence Council, and the release of Satyagrahis. It is clear at the same time that leading members of Congress have been coming to realize that their negative methods have been leading them nowhere, and that in view of the growing menace to India from without their policy needs revision.

But there are still some disturbing features in the situation. I have for many years been in close touch with the student community and with the educated classes in Bombay city and to some extent throughout the Province. Among them there is great discontent, and I do not think that this discontent is becoming less. The outbreaks of intense political agitation which have been taking place every few years are the periodic welling-up of these deeper springs of discontent. Its sources are various, but the chief of them are economic; and it has been exploited to the full by political leaders. Whereas until the end of the last war there was fairly general agreement that the British connection had been beneficial to India, the belief has been inculcated in more recent times that it has been always and in almost every way harmful. Congress has belittled every
advance that has been made towards self-government, and has used every means to create distrust in the motives and intentions of Government. It has sought to teach the younger generation that whatever political progress has been made has been the fruit of its struggle with a hostile British Government, which has been moved only by fear of the growing strength of Congress. It has diverted their attention from all the difficulties in their path and from the tasks that the people of India must face if self-government is to become a reality, and has led them to believe that all difficulties, including their communal dissensions, have been brought into being by a Machiavellian ruling power.

It is not only Congress leaders who have been influencing the students in this way. I have reason to believe that in many Colleges influences are at work, even from the side of the teachers, that are leading to distrust of Government, and to hatred and contempt of the British. At almost any gathering of students a speaker has only to quote from the latest speech of Mr. Amery or any other British statesman regarding India to evoke roars of laughter. There is among the students very little political thinking, and very little orderly discussion of political questions, but one is conscious of the existence of a great store of violent emotion which can be drawn upon and exploited by designing people. Argument has given place to angry assertion and ridicule.

It is surprising and distressing to find that this spirit has spread even to circles that one has been accustomed to think of as temperate and loyal. For example, it has been said to me again and again by people whose loyalty is regarded as above suspicion that the British will never part with any power in India until they are compelled to do so. And many of my most moderate Hindu friends have an uneasy feeling that they are being disloyal to their own people if in any controversy they happen to take the British side.

All this shows that the problem which we have to face is more a psychological than a political one. The spirit of distrust and hostility has to be removed. It cannot be removed while the belief persists and is being propagated that abuse and ridicule have been the most potent weapons in wresting "concessions" from the British in the past, and that they are likely to be so in the future. It cannot be removed while people continue to think of self-government as a commodity that can be handed over at a certain date. If India is not to suffer irreparable disaster from the present political agitation there is need for a change of mind and heart on the part of her leaders. It will not be easy to bring this about, but I would with great respect offer two suggestions which I think would help—

1. I would support the suggestion which has been made in many quarters, and which we made to Your Excellency in February last, that the Prime Minister should make a clear and definite statement setting forth the policy of

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1 Mr Amery’s Private Secretary had received a copy of this letter among the enclosures to a letter of 8 January from Lord Linlithgow’s Private Secretary.
His Majesty's Government in regard to the political future of India. There are two reasons for this. Indian people generally believe that he is not in sympathy with Indian aspirations or with what is understood to be the declared policy of Government in regard to India. Secondly, whatever he says will be listened to in India and throughout the world. Incidentally, a statement from him would have a most salutary effect in America, where our cause has suffered more than most people realise from misrepresentation of our Indian policy. If in making his statement he could in his own inimitable way give some idea of the amazing progress which has been made towards self-government since the Morley-Minto Reforms, it would do much to silence ill-disposed and ill-informed people, who allege that no progress has been made at all.

2. A statement of policy and of facts, even if made by Mr. Churchill, would not silence those who are predisposed to be hostile or who live by hostility. But I think it would make all the difference if India and the world were at the same time told that Government is prepared immediately to open discussions with representatives of the people of India with a view to giving effect to their declared policy of granting self-government to India. If the people of India hope to govern themselves, they must themselves decide how they are to do it. If they cannot come to agreement on a scheme for self-government before it comes into operation, they are hardly likely to do so afterwards. Therefore the onus of deciding India's future should be transferred from the shoulders of the British to those of the Indians themselves. It will not be easy to convince the political leaders of this, for the habit has been long fixed in them of playing the part of critic to schemes made by others. But we should put ourselves right with the world, and in the end with the people of India, if we made it clear to them that self-government was the accepted goal, that the lines of any new constitution must be determined by agreement among themselves, and that the British Government was willing to give every help in bringing together representatives of all sections of the people for the formulation of a scheme. Both Congress and the Muslim League would doubtless make difficulties at the outset about the composition of the representative body and about its procedure. I think these difficulties could be overcome. On the other hand, unless some action on these lines is taken, it seems that we shall have to face increasing distrust, bitterness and hatred.

As I am writing, the Congress Working Committee is meeting, and before this letter reaches Your Excellency they may have passed some resolution designed to show a way of ending the present deadlock. I cannot believe that it will be really helpful. If I am right in saying that the problem is fundamentally a psychological one, then it would seem that Government would do well to get behind the strife of parties, and on the basis of its own declared policy bring representative Indians together for common thinking and common planning.
I have written this letter without consultation with any of my missionary friends, because I thought it might be of some value to Your Excellency to have a frank statement based on the experience of an individual missionary. I have reason to believe that many would agree with me in essentials. I am aware that my practical suggestions do not go much beyond Your Excellency’s statement of August 1940, some of the most important undertakings of which have been implemented in spite of the failure of the great political parties to co-operate or even to make a responsive gesture. What I have urged is that the Prime Minister should make a statement reaffirming the policy of Government in terms which even our most inveterate enemies could not misunderstand; also that he should make it clear to the people of India that, while Britain will give them every help in her power, the main responsibility for the carrying out of this policy must inevitably rest upon themselves, and that, while no one can say that within one year or two years after the war they will have finished their work and self-government will have become a reality, it will be greatly expedited if they will begin now and together seek to frame a plan.

I have the honour to be,
Your Excellency’s most obedient servant,
JOHN MCKENZIE.

² Embodied in the Indian Councils Act 1909.

I27

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: f. 429

MOST SECRET

II2 EATON SQUARE, S.W. 1, 15 February 1942

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. P. 4/43

Prime Minister,
I am not sure my reply to you on the telephone just now was sufficiently explicit. Congress is bound to be the largest element on the proposed Council, but it would not have a clear majority over all the others combined. Of 110 British India seats it would sweep the 44 Caste Hindu seats and might get some support from the 10 depressed Caste Members, the 4 Commerce and Industry, and 2 Labour. I don’t think it would be sure of getting 50 per cent. of the British Indian representatives to support it, and the Princes would of course vote against it on most issues. But it might certainly get its nominee elected as the British India party’s representative here—though the influence of the
other parties might lead to a compromise or a moderate like Rajagopalachari rather than Nehru.

That prospect doesn't alarm me nearly as much as that of antagonising the Moslems who will be less than \( \frac{1}{4} \) of the British Indian representatives and—as the Princes are mainly Hindu—less than \( \frac{1}{4} \) of the whole body. Please see my Minute P. 3/42\(^1\) attached which had not been sent off when you rang up.

Since you rang up the Viceroy's personal telegram\(^2\) to you has just reached me, and you will have seen it. Much of his interim comment is based on the mistaken assumption that the new Council was to be nominated.

L. S. AMERY

\(^1\) No. 126. \(^2\) No. 124.

128

**Lieutenant-Colonel Cawthorn to Major Mackenzie**

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 426

**important**

3062/G cipher 14/2

Your 69148 (M.I. 2)\(^1\) 6/2

Personal for Mackenzie from Cawthorn.

One. General situation India. General fear of consequences invasion by Japan. Defeat ex India hoped for but no strong antipathy Japanese. Open expressions sympathy however confined Hindu forward bloc elements. Congress non-cooperative also lesser extent Muslim League. Political leaders generally appear waiting last possible moment in hope concessions their demands by Government before admitting imminent danger. Communist propaganda has temporarily ceased as party policy supports war as measure expediency but little support forthcoming from party.

Two. In Bengal left wing speakers have professed readiness support Japanese invaders and danger active Fifth Column undoubtedly exists. Heavy exodus from East India Industrial Areas and Madras prompted by fear bombing also expectation rioting, communal troubles, looting in event confusion resulting raids.

Three. Military implications. Danger diversion field troops to internal security duties appreciated. Provinces were warned necessity acceptance increased police responsibilities but police forces and armed police still inadequate. Danger to communications from sabotage also realised. General situation has not yet necessitated increase allotment internal security troops but formations will be moved East India north-east frontier and coast defence near future. Situation had no adverse effect on Indian Units in India whose tone is good.
Four. Anti-war and defeatist rumours being spread especially recruiting areas. Strong suspicion these organised and fostered by enemy agents or at least anti-British elements. Some effect becoming noticeable on recruiting especially of educated technical personnel but funk may be factor in this.

Five. Have been sending you air mail weekly internal Intelligence summary.

1 Not printed.

I29

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 16 February 1942, 1.15 am

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Received: 16 February, 3.20 am

No. 324-S. My telegram No. 302-S.2 I have now received your telegrams Nos. 3-U and 4-U3 and can adjust and expand my comments in the light of the further details which you have sent me. Please note that I have not repeated below all the points of criticism in my telegram No. 302-S that should be read with this telegram. I recognise that some of my particular objections must be modified. Thus the proposed council would not be exposed to the charge of being merely nominated, though the method of composition suggested is open to criticism of a different order which I shall advance later. Again, the method proposed would be based on parliamentary institutions, and the comment in sub-paragraph 3 (d) of my telegram must be correspondingly qualified, though the reference to the Central Legislature is unaffected. Still more important is the proposal that the main operative decisions of the constitution-framing body must express the desire of the people of India as a whole, and that this condition should reinforce rather than replace His Majesty’s Government’s 1940 pledges to minorities. This in itself would plainly help to allay the hostility of the minorities, particularly the Muslims, of which I otherwise have such grave fears.

2. Nevertheless the objection of principle which I summed up in paragraph 4 of my telegram under reference remains unshaken, and is indeed in some respects reinforced by the details now disclosed. The constitutional function which is to be added to the proposed council of defence may seem to us secondary because it cannot begin to be discharged until victory is won, which

1 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 15 February. The dates and times of despatch and receipt given here are taken from L/PO/6/106b: f 423.
2 No. 121.
3 Nos. 111 and 112.
is the prime consideration, but in Indian eyes it would altogether overshadow the council’s present influence upon defence policy as the justification for its existence and the criterion of political attitudes towards it. Hence whatever formulae may be used on the one hand to pledge acceptance of the body’s constitutional decisions, and on the other to reassure the minorities that these will not be taken by counting heads, from the start such a body would be bound to take on the violently communal character of the constitutional controversy itself. This would not only gravely handicap the higher conduct of the war in India but would also be liable to produce a communal upheaval which might make a heavy and prolonged call upon troops for internal security and upon the resources of civil administration while dislocating communications and war production generally. Worse still it might precipitate a dangerous communal reaction in the forces themselves. I cannot express too strongly my fear that the plan in its present form would before long infect the army with communal fever of the most catastrophic kind.

3. As one special example of these dangers I would mention the certainty that such a body would be keenly interested in the communal proportions in recruiting to the forces and in the question of Indianisation. The interference and intrigue to which this would give rise could only have lamentable effects upon the discipline and morale of the forces themselves. This danger cannot perhaps be altogether averted in any scheme of political advance in India during the war, but there is no need to heighten it by using the same body as must fight out the constitutional issue to guide our present administration of defence.

4. I profoundly hope therefore that I can persuade you and the Prime Minister to separate the incongruous purposes of solving the post-war constitutional problem and securing wider political co-operation in the conduct of the war. In this hope I propose to examine the detailed plan for establishing a Council of Defence on the assumption that the same ad hoc body would not also be loaded with the constitutional function.

5. If compelled to choose between the two methods of election outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your telegram No. 4–U I would prefer the second, (a) because the first would require an impossibly complex electoral system with several hundred candidates facing a single electorate of about sixteen hundred voters, (b) because the second would give a fairer representation both to the Muslims and to the other minorities and special interests (approximately 33 and 25 respectively out of 100, against 30 and 20). If the resultant body were to have constitutional functions, the second method would enjoy the further advantage that the expected federation or confederation of provinces would be negotiated by accredited representatives of the provinces themselves. If, on the other hand, as I trust, those functions are to be dealt with by distinct machinery, it becomes
unnecessary now to go beyond hinting at the kind of constitution-framing conference which might in due course prove acceptable to Indian opinion.

6. Even on this assumption, however, both your alternative methods of election for the war time body are open to the following grave criticism if they are applied to the existing provincial assemblies. These were elected more than five years ago on issues very different from those which now present themselves. The Congress might well be content with the overwhelming position which they would acquire in the resultant council and which they would be unlikely to repeat if fresh elections were held now. The Muslims, on the other hand, would be enraged; for it is part of their case that only as a result of Congress rule in seven provinces from 1937 to 1939 were their eyes fully opened to the danger to Islam. Jinnah in particular could claim with reason that since 1937 the Muslim League which was then very weak in some provinces has been strengthened enormously in organisation and public support. This is one of the main grounds of my belief that any such proposal would from birth fail hopelessly to secure its express object of communal solidarity during the war, but would only make matters much worse. On the other hand, to hold fresh elections now, expressly on the constitutional and therefore communal issue, might well plunge large areas of India into bloody civil war. Even without general elections, the necessary by-elections would be apt to produce the same result in a somewhat smaller scale. The omission from the electoral college of the Central Legislature, which contains a number of leading politicians who would have little chance of election by Provincial Legislatures, is a secondary defect.

7. Assuming, however, that these initial difficulties were overcome, I can see no escape from the dilemma that a council of defence of this kind must either have real power, in which case it must destroy the responsibility of the proper executive, or not have real power, in which case it would be of little use, a fact that would not need to be pointed out to Indian public opinion. It is the attempt to escape from this dilemma by adding to an advisory body tempting but incongruous functions that in my view lies at the root of the error in the plan as I see it.

8. My own expectation would be that the new council would soon acquire real power which would prove more than embarrassing to Government. This indeed is implicit in proposal to entrust it with selection of representatives at War Cabinet and Peace Conference. Whoever nominally appoints and instructs them, such representatives must in practice be answerable to the body that selects them, gives them its confidence and can if it wishes insist on their recall. This breakdown of my Council's responsibility would spell weakness just where strength is most needed. As a further example, I shudder at the

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4 The year when elections to the Provincial Legislatures were last held.
prospect of allowing such a body to take on, as you propose, the organising of air-raid precautions, since the efforts of political bodies to do so are already a potential source of grave difficulty to provincial authorities. I set my face firmly against anything smacking of parallel government.

9. I do not imagine that it would have been thought necessary to reconstitute an advisory defence council as such on a representative political basis had the later constitutional function not been in view; but while reserving final comments on the merits of such a proposal, if it is to be considered alone I see many objections. Even if we isolate the plan to reconstitute the advisory defence council on a representative political basis, while reserving final comments I see many objections, apart from the dangers of the proposed electoral method to which I have already alluded. There is a world of difference between a nominated council whose main purpose is to keep Provincial and States representatives informed and give them a sense of importance and a body which without responsibility would want to run the war. We could not, for instance, impart military secrets to its elected personnel. Then there is the obvious difficulty of getting the Princes to co-operate in such a body. Nor do I think that my point about the difficulties associated with the Viceroy's Chairmanship is fully covered by your suggestion that I might be assisted by a Deputy President. Apart from the problem of finding such a person who would be acceptable without usurping my own functions, I see almost equal difficulties about the attendance at the new council of the Commander-in-Chief, the Members of my Executive Council, the Chiefs of Staff, the executive heads of my Supply Department, and others concerned with the execution of defence policy. The best elements in the provinces would likewise be distracted from their proper duty of helping to carry on the provincial administration.

10. Turning to the constitutional problem, which I am now assuming will attract an attempt at solution separate from that of the current war effort, I appreciate the momentous importance, both in itself and in its likely effect upon opinion in India and elsewhere, of the proposed pledge or rather scheme of pledges outlined in the last sentence of paragraph 3 and in paragraphs 10 and 11 of your telegram No. 3-U. I would prefer not to comment upon it in the present context, but to link my comments, which I may say are entirely favourable in principle, to any positive plan that I may find myself able to offer, if this is desired of me, as an alternative to the proposals which I have been obliged so strongly to criticise.

11. Finally, I would beg the Prime Minister not to overdo the references to India's danger with which he would propose to introduce any revised offer. It is not only that public opinion here is not tough like that which the Prime Minister is accustomed to addressing, but is liable to waves of dangerous de-
pression and needs tonics rather than purgatives; but I also want to save him from exposing himself to the criticism that only when the enemy was at the gate and British power to hold India already flagging did he hear her cry for freedom. Let him rather stress the rising need for India to take her place in the world’s councils of war and reconstruction, and to consolidate the status which her soldiers, sailors and airmen have already been winning by their valorous part in the defence of her integrity and her ideals.

12. I note from paragraph 47 of your telegram No. 4–U that although you had previously endorsed my view that there was nothing to be done for the moment beyond strengthening my existing Executive and National Defence Councils you had been swayed from this judgment by what you describe as a bold imaginative plan. While I am anxious to accept any sound constructive plan, I would ask you to read again my telegram No. 104–S8 of the 21st January in which I gave you my considered view of the political situation here. Nothing that has happened since either in India or elsewhere has done anything to alter the broad outline of that view or of the conclusions to which it gave rise. Indeed they have rather been fortified by the recent unfortunate course of the war, which has rendered it all the more dangerous for us to risk a crumbling of Government in India and an outbreak of communal strife.

5 The words in italics omitted in decipher.
6 Namely last sentence of para. 2 (3) and paras. 2 (10) and 2 (11).
7 This should read ‘para. 7’.
8 No. 23.

130

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: f 422

INDIA OFFICE, 16 February 1942

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. P. 5/1

Prime Minister
I don’t see how we can override the Viceroy on a matter on which he feels so strongly, even if I did not feel that his arguments were as convincing as I fear they are.

You will see that at the end of paragraph 10 of his telegram 324–S2 he offers to send his own alternative suggestions if that is desired. If you agree I will ask him for these at once.

L. S. A.

1 The rest of the serial number is illegible.
2 No. 129.
131

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 16 February 1942, 6.20 pm
Received: 16 February, 3.15 pm

No. 334-S. Your telegram No. 28851 of 14th. Parliamentary question. I took no part in arranging Nehru’s meeting with Generalissimo. We had best be on the safe side and I suggest following amendment after word “Axis” begins Neither the Generalissimo nor Mr. Nehru has suggested that the latter should take part in the Generalissimo’s official consultation with the Viceroy nor ends continuing as in your telegram. I am giving you background in a later telegram.

1 No. 122.

132

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Madame Chiang Kai-Shek

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

PRIVATE

THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 16 February 1942

Dear Madame Chiang,

I must send you this final word of farewell before you leave us, to wish you and the Generalissimo a safe and comfortable journey. I am quite sure that Sir John Herbert in Bengal will see to it that the final stages of your journey are made as pleasant as possible.

I mentioned to you at dinner last night that I propose to ask you to accept a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs from my War Purposes Fund, to be disbursed by you in China upon such objects as you may find appropriate. We are arranging a “China Day” to take place shortly after you leave. The preparations could not be put through in time for the Day to be held while you are still in this country. I think it will be best that I should refrain from making public the gift from my fund until the results of the “China Day” can be joined to the 5 lakhs, which may well appear as my gift to the China Day Fund. But I will see to it that the language used in inviting the public to support “China Day” will in no way hamper your free choice of purposes on which to spend the fund.

I am a little disturbed by the appearance of the newspapers this morning, because it is clear that a deliberate attempt has been made to neutralise and to spoil the very deep impression which your speech to the Women’s meeting created when you recommended them to fight the Japanese for all they are
worth, and when you describe the cruelty and cunning of the enemy. I am not here concerned with the philosophical or political aspects of non-violence. But it is plain beyond a doubt that the military effort [effect?] of that cult must be fatal to everything for which the Generalissimo and you are struggling, and that your mission to India—on its public side—will have failed if you do not succeed in leaving behind you when you depart for [from?] our shores, an invigorated determination, on the part of the general public, to get together behind the war effort. I hope you will ponder this matter with due care, and that, in your own clever way—you will take steps before you depart to acclaim more than once and as loudly as you may, your profound conviction that India must fight, like one of her own tigers, this wicked aggression. In this regard, I attach the highest importance to the final message which His Excellency the Generalissimo will, I trust, give to India as he leaves.

It is a great comfort to me to feel that I may write as I have without the least fear of being misunderstood. Indeed I agree with you in holding the friendships framed [formed?] during your visit as amongst the most precious of its fruits.

With an expression of my high esteem for you both, and with sincere good wishes from my wife and myself—I remain,

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

I33

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek (via Private Secretary to Viceroy and Secretary to Governor of Bengal)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

No. 337-S. Following message may please be conveyed personally or by safe hand to Generalissimo on arrival:

Begins. Following for Generalissimo from Ambassador. Personal. In the unlikely event of Mr. Gandhi's not accepting your invitation to meet you at Santiniketan,¹ I hope that you will have no objection to letting it be known in India that you have asked him to come. Please let me know. Ends.

¹ See No. 141.
I34

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 421

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

16 February 1942
Received: 17 February

7-U. Following from Prime Minister:

_Begins._ I am greatly obliged to you for your telegram.¹ You may be sure every aspect will be most carefully considered. My own idea was to ask the different communities of India—Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, Untouchables, etc.—to give us their best and leading men for such a body as has been outlined. However, the electoral basis proposed which was the best we could think of here, might have the effect of throwing the whole Council into the hands of the Congress Caucus. This is far from my wish. _Ends._

¹ No. 124.

I35

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICE-ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 16 February 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

The Chinese and Winston between them have left me little time for a letter this week. We have said good-bye to the former this morning, and seen them off on the first stage of their homeward journey.

2. The visit has been a success, and well worth all the trouble we have taken over it; but the unwillingness of our guests to make up their minds up to the last moment on any detail of their programme, and to stick to their decision, was at times quite maddening. I was anxious to avoid the appearance of pushing them in any particular direction, but I did succeed in getting the Generalissimo to have a word with all the Members of my Council as well as with the Jam Sahib and Bhopal. Nehru and his sister, Mrs. Pandit, monopolised the greater part of the afternoons that they were in Delhi, and made them difficult of access. I hope now that the Generalissimo will see Jinnah in Calcutta, and he fully intends to see Gandhi at Santiniketan, if the old man will make the journey. These meetings, if they come off, will give the lie to the absurdly tactless and misinformed comment of the _Times¹_ that Jinnah and Gandhi had refused to see
him, which has promptly evoked from Nehru a strong insinuation that, in the case of the meeting with Gandhi, difficulties were put in the way.

3. As for formal functions, I summoned my Council to meet the Generalissimo and Madame on the day of their arrival: there was a brief speech of welcome by me and reply from Chiang, followed by a tea party. The next day we had a banquet and more speeches, and on the third day a parade was arranged. On Friday Chiang went off by air to the Frontier, saw the Khyber and returned on Saturday, with a halt for lunch with Glancy and Sikander at Lahore. I am glad that we were able to arrange this trip, as I am sure he thoroughly enjoyed a couple of days among soldiers, and it was, I have no doubt, a good thing that he should have made, even in so brief a time, the acquaintance of Muslim India. Madame went off at the same time to Agra, to have a look at the Taj.

Last night we had a reception at which the conferment of the G.C.B. was announced, and this was followed by a small informal dinner party.

4. We have told the Generalissimo and shown him everything we could in the time, believing that this is the only basis upon which we can expect him to co-operate with us to the best purpose. We have frankly exposed shortages and weaknesses where they exist, and his reaction has been entirely satisfactory. He quite failed to understand the complex of Indian politics, except that it is all a good deal harder than he had been led to believe. He has been most careful (so far) to avoid putting his foot into trouble, but he stresses strongly (and, goodness knows, we agree!) that civilian morale in modern war is as important as military, and he recommends us to get the public behind us as far as that is humanly possible. Hartley and the General Staff are impressed by his grip, military balance and general acumen. He is most keen on communications, and rightly so. He is very anxious to have his troops early in direct contact with ours, which I think he feels will be good for prestige, and practice in combined operations. His mind takes a big sweep, and he has perfectly clear notions about the vital importance of the Russo-German struggle and the need to prevent any union between the Japs and the Germans in the Persian Gulf.

Madame is a very clever and competent little lady, but, in my opinion, great only in courage and devotion. She and her husband hunt together and she is clearly invaluable to him. When they are on a big job she starts with the family trousers firmly fixed on her limbs, but by the final stage of any venture the Generalissimo is invariably discovered to have transferred the pants to his own person. The process is well worth watching.

1 In its third leading article of 14 February 1942.
2 At a Press Conference in New Delhi on 15 February. 3 9 February. 4 13 February.
5 On 16 February it was announced in the press that the King had conferred on Chiang Kai-Shek 'the insignia of an Honorary Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (Military Division), in recognition of his outstanding achievements in the Allied Cause.'
5. I am announcing before they leave that I propose to celebrate a “China Day” in the near future, on which day my War Purposes Fund will be thrown open to contributions for war relief in China. I will supplement the money so received with a gift from my War Purposes Fund, and I think that the total will amount to quite a handsome present to Madame.

6. We have been in close touch by telegram over the question of the Prime Minister’s proposed broadcast, and I will not add anything here to what I have already said, at length, by telegram.

But I am still, for the first time in my life, really cross with you all over this business, and I do again beg of you to see to it that I should be in some measure cushioned by you and your Office from the full impact of these explosions in the Prime Minister’s mind. I am carrying here, almost single-handed, an immense responsibility. Indeed, I do not think it is to exaggerate to affirm that the key to success in this war is now very largely in my hands. I am debarred by the Prime Minister’s own instructions and indeed, to some extent, by the circumstances of my position out here, from consultation with any considerable number of persons on a matter of this kind. In this current issue, and deprived as I am of the help of Laithwaite, I am dependent on Hodson, and Maxwell, whom I have taken into my special confidence for this particular purpose. I have been pinned down by numberless social duties in connection with the visit of the Generalissimo, and, as always, by the enormous volume of business and the number of interviews which the Viceroy has to face. With these slender means, I am invited at the shortest notice to comment on a scheme which, on grounds that I have telegraphed to you, I am forced to regard as dangerous and amateurish to a degree. I am invited to make my comment in face of the Prime Minister’s observation that he and the War Cabinet, the more they consider this precious scheme, find themselves the more wedded to its excellence. As if this were not enough, I hear from you by telegram, first that the Prime Minister proposed to deliver his broadcast by Sunday last, the 15th, and then that there is need that I should send you urgently my constructive alternatives. Let me only tell you that in my careful judgment, the manner in which I have been used over these past ten days is not in tune with the treatment which anyone holding my charge is entitled to expect from His Majesty’s Government, and that this sort of method of conducting the King’s business is not in accord with the public interest.

17 February 1942

7. I am sending you by this bag a copy of the paper which Maxwell read to the National Defence Council about fifth-column activities, and of the letter which I have addressed to Governors about the formation of a National Defence Front. My present idea is to launch the scheme at the beginning of March. You can imagine that the fact that it is linked so closely, both in name and in origin,
with the National Defence Council makes me all the more unwilling to see that body, which after careful nourishing has struck its roots pretty firmly, and which has established its reputation throughout the country, pulled up and thrown on the rubbish heap, which would be the effect of Winston’s proposals.

The object of the National Defence Front will be to do everything possible to help and maintain morale; that is to say, to strengthen the war resistance of the people; to eradicate all elements which tend to undermine it, and in particular to counteract fifth-column activities of all kinds, including especially all talk, thought, writings and rumours likely to produce a defeatist mentality; to inculcate faith, courage and endurance; and to consolidate national will to offer a united resistance to Nazism and Fascism in every shape or form, whether within or without the country.

I do not think that it will be easy to establish this Front, but short of victories in the field, it is the only tonic which we can at present give the people of this country, and I believe that it has immense possibilities.

6 7 March 1942 was celebrated as ‘China Day’. 7 Nos. 121 and 129. 8 See No. 113.
9 Sir G. Laithwaite was prevented by illness from performing his duties from circa 20 January to 11 April.
10 See No. 113. 11 No. 101.
12 This seems to indicate that Lord Linlithgow had received No. 137. 13 No. 143.

136

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 17 February 1942, 10.5 am
Received: 17 February, 9.15 am

No. 338–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 190. I am putting the invitation you sent on behalf of His Majesty’s Government before my Council but I have no doubt that they will accept both for the War Cabinet and for the Pacific War Council and will wish to appoint representatives without delay. I agree that this should be done without reference to the proposal under separate discussion between us.

2. The proposal that a Princely representative should be nominated by the Governor-General in Council was framed in light of Birkenhead’s despatch to which you refer and of the principle, to which we all agree, that both the Princely and British Indian spokesmen should sit as representatives of India as a whole. This seems to imply a single authority for appointment and instruction

1 No. 114. 2 No. 117.
of delegates. For British India this must clearly be the Governor-General in Council which is charged with executive responsibility in the sphere of defence and external affairs. Incidentally, my advisers do not accept as correct your assumption that the Crown Representative is a component of the Government of India. While the States are not subject to the Governor-General in Council, in this sphere they have no formal status at all. No water-tight solution is therefore possible but in my view and that of my advisers including the Political Adviser the solution best fitting both the legal position and the practical needs of the case was for the Governor-General in Council in consultation with the Crown Representative to invite a Prince to join with its own nominee to represent India. It would follow that in instructing the representatives Governor-General in Council would consult with the Crown Representative on any matters which particularly concerned the interests of Indian States. Your own overriding authority in relation both to the Governor-General in Council and to the Crown Representative would of course remain unimpaired.

3. On the practical needs I would remind you that matters discussed in the War Cabinet may involve decisions regarding such matters as movement of troops or the acceptance of liability for expenditure, and that it is only the Governor-General in Council who can authorize action in these matters. Whatever formula we may adopt for appointment, I would therefore urge that in practice instructions to the representatives acting together should come from the Governor-General in Council, as they must in any case for the British Indian representative, but in consultation where necessary with the Crown Representative.

4. At the same time, I appreciate the force on grounds of expediency of your view as to appointment, and if you and my Council agree, I would propose to follow the procedure indicated in the following draft announcement:

_Begins._ His Majesty’s Government have invited the Government of India if they so desire to arrange for the representation of India at the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council. This invitation has been accepted and the Governor-General in Council has accordingly nominated ABC for this purpose and has invited His Excellency the Crown Representative to nominate a member of the Order of Princes to join ABC in representing India at the War Cabinet. His Excellency, in consultation with the Governor-General in Council, has nominated His Highness XYZ to serve for the present in this capacity. _Ends._

This formula could of course be suitably adjusted if a Prince is to be included among our representation on the Pacific War Council. Is it the intention or is there any objection to the representation of India on the Pacific War Council also including a Prince, and to the representatives of India both on the War Cabinet and on the Pacific War Council being the same individuals?

3 Sir H. Craik.
137

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: 420

INDIA OFFICE, 17 February 1942, 2.10 am

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

206. Your telegram No. 324–S,1 para. 10. I should be glad of your alternative suggestions as early as possible.

1 No. 129.

138

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL 17 February 1942

No. 9–U. Your telegram No. 206–S.1 I will do my best to respond. Please wire me urgently as to how Winston and others are taking my criticism.

1 No. 137.

139

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE 17 February 1942, 5.20 pm

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 355–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 2061 of 17th. I trust Members of Cabinet other than War Cabinet may see all papers including my first appreciation telegram No. 104–S2 of January 21st. Please reassure me of this.

1 No. 137. 2 No. 23.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

NEW DELHI, 17 February 1942, 2.45 pm

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL AND SECRET

Received: 17 February, 1.15 pm

No. 344-S. Generalissimo and party left yesterday by train for Calcutta. Jinnah is in Calcutta at present, and Generalissimo has agreed to meet him this evening at 5 o'clock. Before going Generalissimo made it clear that he still hoped to meet Gandhi and thought that good would result from such meeting. He proposed therefore to spend tonight in Calcutta and tomorrow to visit Santiniketan with which institution he already has previous contacts and which he has all along been anxious to see. He was then hoping that Gandhi would be willing to meet him at Santiniketan. I presume he sent invitation to Gandhi: at any rate I am informed today that Gandhi left Nagpur for Calcutta this morning.

2. Chiang's visit to Delhi has been a great success and he and Madame and their entourage left in excellent spirits and most friendly mood. Short of someone dropping a brick over the next two days I can report that we have got through the visit most satisfactorily. I shall telegraph a short report of salient features of his talks to me and Commander-in-Chief. I would have done so before, had not the load here been rather over heavy during last weeks.

1 No. 157.

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&S/12/2315: f 281

INDIA OFFICE, 17 February 1942

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 6/42

Prime Minister

Please see the attached telegram from the Viceroy about Chiang Kai Shek's meeting with Gandhi at Santiniketan. This is, of course, quite a different matter from his going to Wardha. Santiniketan is Rabindranath Tagore's centre of spiritual meditation and has always been thought well of by the authorities. There could be no suggestion about his meeting Gandhi there that he had gone to a rival headquarters of authority in India, such as would have been the case
if he had gone to Wardha. Also, he has been meeting Jinnah before Gandhi, and cannot be said to have committed himself to Congress.

This is, in fact, the kind of solution that the Foreign Secretary suggested in his Minute P.M. (42) 21, in which he laid stress upon the importance of not giving any offence to Chiang Kai Shek, who is our only hope in keeping China going if Burma should go wrong for the time being.

1 No. 140.  
2 No. 105.

I42

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek (via Private Secretary to Viceroy and Secretary to Governor of Bengal)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

SECRET  

17 February 1942
No. 356–S. Following for Generalissimo from Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. Personal:

Begins. The longer I stay in India the clearer it becomes to me that the Indians have no conception of what would be the horrors of a Japanese occupation. If you could see your way to lay some special emphasis on this in your farewell message I think that you would render a handsome service to the common cause. Ends.

I43

The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

THE VICE ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 17 February 1942

Dear ——,

An interesting discussion arose in the National Defence Council out of a paper read by Maxwell on the subject of fifth-column activities in this country and defeatism generally. A copy of the paper1 together with a summary of the discussion has been sent semi-officially to your Chief Secretary for the information of your Government, as it was felt that they should be kept thoroughly in the picture with a view to securing their co-operation in the further action which will be necessary. Tottenham’s covering letter2 (which you will no doubt see), gives an indication of the action to be taken on various points

1 Not printed.  
2 Not printed.
through the official channel and the object of this letter is to discuss the subject more generally and to enlist your assistance in the new propaganda campaign which is foreshadowed in paragraph 2 of Tottenham’s letter.

2. A perusal of the paper read to the N.D.C., and particularly of the last two parts of it, will give you a general idea of the situation with which we have to deal, of which, of course, we have long been conscious. The National Defence Council, hearing these things for the first time, showed considerable perturbation at the extent to which pro-enemy activities are prevalent in the country and of the harm which is being done to public morale by the spread of defeatist sentiments and systematic attempts to undermine confidence in Government. I was much impressed by the general demand for a more forward policy in combating these elements and by the readiness expressed on all sides to support Government in this object. We were assured that there would be a large body of the more solid opinion in the country which would welcome a more open lead from Government and I feel that, taking advantage of the general realisation of the danger now threatening India, it is our duty to do everything possible to mobilise public opinion and to counteract the insidious effects of political blackmail. This means open propaganda on a very much larger scale than anything attempted hitherto. The moment is favourable while the Congress and other disaffected parties are uncertain of their own ground and pulling different ways and the visit of Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek has directed thought towards the bigger issues of the war.

3. We must not, of course, neglect the preventive side which rests mainly with Government, viz., to use to the full the powers provided in the Defence of India Rules to deal with really prejudicial activities. The Home Department letter has dealt to some extent with this side of the matter and I would emphasise the need of hunting out and punishing the authors of defeatist rumours who are often, I am informed, persons interested in influencing the market. We shall take up further with you the question of action against the Forward Bloc and it may be necessary to put some brake on the activities of so-called volunteer organisations which, under cover of helping civil defence, are probably seeking to establish the nucleus of a parallel organisation competing with the authority of Government and spreading defeatist ideas. We cannot, however, as was explained to the National Defence Council, spend more time than is absolutely necessary in taking “repressive” measures against the enemy within our gates. Our main object should be so to increase the resistance of the people that deleterious propaganda may become ineffective and confidence may be maintained. This is the main object of the propaganda drive which I have in contemplation. We must fill the gap and not allow fifth-columnists to have the field too much to themselves.
4. There are two elements in this plan. One is the creation of the "front" itself and the other is the organisation which will be necessary to make it effective. I shall deal with these two points separately.

5. The "front" must be something which will appeal to the popular imagination and stimulate the will to resist. The question of a name is important and, after considering various suggestions, I have decided to call it the "National Defence Front". This name will immediately link it up with the National Defence Council, in which it may be said to have originated, and will not easily lend itself to malicious misconstruction or attack. The next thing is to be able to describe in concise terms, which will have a suitable and positive appeal, what the "front" stands for. I propose that its objects should be defined as follows:

The object is to do everything possible to help and maintain public morale: that is to say, to strengthen the war resistance of the people; to eradicate all elements tending to undermine it; and in particular to counteract fifth-column activities of all kinds, including especially all talk, thought, writings and rumours likely to produce a defeatist mentality; to inculcate faith, courage and endurance; and to consolidate the national will to offer united resistance to Nazism and Fascism in every shape or form, whether within or without the country, until their menace is finally overthrown.

Persons enrolling themselves as supporters of this Front would need only to subscribe to these objects and pledge themselves to do their utmost to give effect to them. I would propose nothing in the nature of a formal "league", since this would be liable to reduce itself to mere talk—like the Aman Sabhas in the last war—and eventually to peter out. What we have to aim at is something which will exist in the will of each supporter and be translated into continuous, positive work backed by every resource of organisation. It should be understood from the first that every person pledging himself in support of the Front has a definite task to perform.

6. Besides giving a content to the Front we must give it a platform too. Ideas of the sort of platform required will readily occur to you after reading the last part of the paper which I have sent. But I append a summary\(^3\) of some of the points which might be useful and which will give a general idea of the line to be taken. You will observe that there is nothing political about it except in so far as it aims at putting politics into a back place and concentrating for the present on the main issue. So also we should generally avoid direct attacks on parties or individuals and, of course, keep entirely off the communal question. But we need not be afraid to pillory any speeches, writings or public statements which might tend to encourage fifth-column activities or defeatist mentality. The object should be to make people regard these things as dangerous and

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\(^3\) Not printed.
anti-national. Another line which is likely to yield good results is to appeal to national honour, pride and self-respect. This is ground on which we cannot easily be attacked by disaffected elements and there are many who will respond to it. If we can get it across to the public that it is a matter of national prestige that Indians should face danger not less bravely than the Chinese or other nations, and that any exhibition of panic, or talk or thought of yielding to an invader, would lower India in the world’s esteem, public opinion will grow against these ideas and against those who attempt to disseminate them.

7. I now come to the question of organisation. It is obvious that while we at the Centre can supply much useful material—and we are making plans to do so—local activities must be the care of each Province and make full use of provincial publicity organisations. The work will, I think, require a full-time organising Secretary in each Province who need not be an official but must have the requisite energy and drive together with a reasonable flair for publicity. I would suggest that it would be much better if the management of the provincial organisation could be entrusted to a prominent non-official or a small group of non-officials, including perhaps local members of the National Defence Council. While no secret need be made of the fact that the Front has the full backing and support of Government, the less it bears the official label the better and greater freedom of action and method would be possible where responsibility was in non-official hands. Officials will, of course, have to act in the background as organisers everywhere in the districts, but the platform should, as far as possible, be filled by non-officials. Here I would suggest that every effort should be made to invite well-known persons to identify themselves with this movement irrespective of their political views. The last issue of the Bi-Weekly Guidance Notes from the Bureau of Public Information contained quotations from the speeches of several politicians which, if meant, would seem to identify them with our Front provided that they could be persuaded to leave politics out of the matter. It is not impossible, indeed, that some of them, who are genuinely anxious to exercise a steadying influence, might welcome such an opportunity of helping. The members of the National Defence Council representing the Province would probably also be ready to become active helpers and if they did not feel able to take the platform themselves they could no doubt help in obtaining others. The policy should be one of active proselytization extending right down to the villages and our object should be to establish a really widespread organisation of voluntary helpers who will be supplied with material, directions and ideas. We must aim at a process of infiltration by which ultimately there will be members of the movement in every village, hunting out, reporting and contradicting rumours and loose talk and helping in every way possible to stiffen morale. Most Provinces, I think, already have propaganda units and these should be pressed into service and
increased to the maximum extent possible. I hope to be able to arrange that a larger share of the expense of this organisation should be borne by the Centre and distributed in the form of lump grants of which an account could be rendered afterwards. The Central grant could of course be supplemented to any extent by funds raised locally. An approach should also be made to the local newspapers asking them to join the common Front. Many of those which help to disseminate defeatist ideas either do not realise that they are playing the enemy’s game or at any rate, if tackled, protest that it is not their intention to encourage defeatism. Such papers would probably hesitate to refuse to join the National Defence Front and friendly newspapers might be willing to make their contribution by providing a space on some prominent page in which either daily or at frequent intervals a simple message can be put across to the public. A single sentence each day is far better than a long argument. If space cannot be obtained in this way, it can probably be hired. We are taking up this matter with the All-India Newspaper Editors’ Conference and will do what we can here to stimulate their support.

I do not contemplate that support for the Front should be enlisted only in the form of individuals. I was assured at the meeting of the N.D.C. that a number of trade unions would be only too glad to identify themselves with the movement and it was suggested that there were other party organisations which would be willing to do the same. If parties or groups can be enlisted as such it will be all the better, since they will be able to carry on the work through their own organisations. Some of them will probably be ready to offer themselves at once in response to a public invitation.

8. The launching of this propaganda Front will require careful preparation and every step should be synchronised and timed for completion within a given period. I propose to make the initial move myself on an early date of which you will be notified later. This first step will probably take the form of a broadcast which will be recorded for repetition and be followed up by other special items arranged by the All-India Radio. Soon afterwards the theme should be taken up by all Governors using whatever suitable platform presents itself. They would be followed by at least some Members of my Executive Council and thereafter by a programme of other speakers, proceeding downwards until the message reaches the village speaker. All this time we should, of course, be doing our best to arrange for continuous publicity in the Press. It is of the greatest importance that the movement, once launched, should not be allowed to die out. We shall arrange here for a good man to provide a continuous stream of propaganda material of which I can trust you to make the best use through your own agencies. At the same time, the district and village workers should be actively engaged in securing fresh supporters and organising constant contact and influence on an ever-widening circle of the public. I had
thought of the possibility of introducing some simple badge for those who have enrolled themselves as members of the Front. This is a matter which requires consideration and I should be glad to know as soon as possible your views on it together with any other suggestions which you can make. I need scarcely add that the National Defence Front will not compete with or supersede any organisation which you may already have established with similar objects. It is a Front which any member of any organisation not opposed to its objects can readily support.

9. I have written at length in order to give you a full idea of the scope of the work which lies before us, so that you may be in a position to think out the arrangements and be ready for synchronised action. I have no doubt that you have been doing all that you can on these lines already, but I think that what is wanted at the moment is an open and concerted propaganda drive on a scale never attempted hitherto. I am by no means satisfied that morale in this country is proof against a Japanese attack, such as may develop at any time, and much has been done by the fifth-columnists to undermine it. It will be uphill work, I know, but it is our clear duty to give a lead at the moment and if we can succeed even to a limited extent it will be worth the money in terms of war production and freedom from the troublesome symptoms which must accompany any loss of confidence in India. I am sure I can count on your fullest co-operation.

P. J. Griffiths, with whose organising ability and flair for publicity you are already aware, will be in charge of this branch of work at the Centre: and it will be a convenience if when you have selected your own man for this purpose, you will allow Griffiths to correspond directly with him on matters of detail.

Yours ——,

LINLITHGOW

I44

Note by Sir D. Monteath

L/PO/6/106b: ff 418–9

17 February 1942

Assuming that the initiative is to be taken by Government there are two main alternative courses of action, each with two variant forms:

A. No legislative action: i.e. retention of the 3 “official” members (Schedule IX S.36 (3))—viz. Defence i.e. the C.-in-C. in India, Finance and Home.

(i) Fill up the vacancies (vice Sir A. Hydari and Sir A. Clow and possibly Mr. N. Sarkar) and 2 new portfolios as already proposed by the Viceroy; or
(ii) Keep the present members (less Mr. Sarkar on account of his ill-health) and offer the Hydari vacancy, the Sarkar vacancy and the 2 new posts (plus that vacated by Sir A. Clow, abandoning the proposal to appoint Sir E. Bent- hall to it) to "the Parties"—total 5.

B. Legislate to abandon the 3 official posts; and either
(i) Keep the present members and offer the resulting 8 posts including Defence, Finance and Home to "the Parties" on the assumption that they agree how to share them; or
(ii) Start from scratch: call on the present members to resign and offer to fill the whole Council by nomination from panels put forward by the Parties in agreement as to the shares.

Comment. Under A (ii) and still more under either variant of B the Governor-General would increasingly be faced with the need to over-rule an important element in his Council, often the majority element, in the interests of Imperial strategy etc., etc. He would tend to look more rather than less to Whitehall for support, so that the statutory control by the Secretary of State would be more rather than less in evidence.

The alternative is to abrogate, by convention not by legislation, the statutory control of the Secretary of State and treat the whole Council including the Governor-General as responsible only to itself in form (Sapru’s idea), and in practice, as to a large extent, to the contesting parties. This would shortly precipitate the Pakistan issue—probably preceded by a series of political resignations from the Council.

To judge by the news in the Manchester Guardian of 18th February there is a possibility that under the influence of Chiang-Kai-Shek Congress and the Moslem League may after bargaining with each other make an offer of cooperation: it remains to be seen on what terms.

The case for course A (i)—i.e. making no substantial change—rests on the considerations

(a) The present Council—a fusion of eminent non-official Indians selected on their merits, with an element of official experience—works reasonably well. It is sufficiently "responsive" to Indian opinion without being at the beck and call of irresponsible parties. It would be very dangerous at this crisis to swap horses and entrust the administration to untired hands.

(b) Though the C.-in-C., who now functions largely in obedience to the C.O.S. and H.M.G., might no doubt function fairly effectively outside the Council, his continued membership of Council would strengthen the hands of the Governor-General in getting the right decision on military matters. Per contra, if Defence were transferred to a non-official the C.-in-C. would have

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1 The probable date of this note has been determined from its place in the file.
3 See Nos. 45, 47 and 57, para. 3.
4 See Enclosure to No. 2, subsection (i).
to rely on his advocacy, with that of the Governor-General, to secure efficient administration, financial measures etc., for military purposes. Moreover the Federal constitution provides for the statutory appointment of a C.-in-C.\(^5\) who would be the technical adviser of the Governor-General to whom Defence is, under that constitution, reserved.\(^6\)

(c) Similarly the Federal constitution provides for a Financial Adviser\(^7\) to the Governor-General who is to have a special responsibility\(^8\) for financial matters. In the present Council régime it is proper that the Governor-General should make his own choice of an experienced financial expert in a position to argue his case in Council on a level with other Members.

(d) In present conditions with government in several Provinces being exercised personally by Governors under the personal supervision of the Governor-General, it would be inviting trouble to entrust the Home Department, through which that personal supervision is discharged, to either a Moslem or a Hindu whose intervention in the affairs of any Province would be suspect by the Hindu majority or Moslem minority (and tend to precipitate communal trouble and the Pakistan issue).

(e) Is the incorporation in the Council of representatives of Congress and/or the Moslem League likely to improve the "war effort" or to make for steadying morale? So far as concerns the latter point, Congressmen, if sincere in their antipathy to Japanese aggression, will exert their influence in the districts unofficially. (The maintenance of morale depends largely on the efforts of non-officials in any case). N.B. Congress is not the dominating force in Bengal or Assam.

(f) If the Executive Council were expanded or re-constituted on any of the bases other than A (i) (i.e. by persons selected on their merits and not on account of party affiliations) it would be extremely difficult for the Governor-General to get rid of any Member who proved inefficient or unable to work with the rest, except at the cost of an open quarrel with the party or political organisation by which he had been put forward; and such quarrel might have wide repercussions.

If it is the case that the scheme recently put to the Viceroy may be regarded as now out of court, and if, nevertheless, some "forward move" on the part of H.M.G. in the direction of enlisting the co-operation of Congress and the Moslem League at any rate is held to be required, then A (ii) seems the least bad of the courses open, on the foregoing analysis. It would enable a representative of the disgruntled Sikh community to be included, and an equal number of portfolios (two each) to be offered to Congress and Moslem League respectively—the previous balance between Hindu and Moslem remaining undisturbed.

But it would be best to await the Viceroy’s positive suggestions.

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\(^5\) Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 4.  \(^6\) Ibid., Sec. 11.  \(^7\) Ibid., Sec. 15.  
\(^8\) Ibid., Sec. 12 (i)(b).
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 414

MOST IMMEDIATE

8-U. Your 9-U. ² Winston and others absorbed by critical situation and I may not now secure discussion for a day or two. Meanwhile my personal impression is that your very effective criticism will probably dispose of scheme in its original form.

¹ MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 18 February. ² No. 138.

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

SECRET

No. U.P.—123.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I consider it necessary to address you about Jawaharlal Nehru. I address Your Excellency direct, partly because the greater part of the correspondence about Nehru's release was in this form and partly—and this is the more important point—because Your Excellency should be in a better position than the Home Department to answer the specific question which I raise at the end of this letter.

2. I have had Nehru's recent speeches carefully examined; of these two were delivered on January 23rd, 1942 in Benares and the other two in the Gorakhpur district on January 31st. This was the district of course in which he was convicted. Though I am afraid it involves rather a mass of material, I enclose a careful analysis made by my Chief Secretary of his most important or dangerous speech, for without this somewhat detailed analysis it is not easy to make his attitude clear. Generally speaking, his point is that his position has in no way altered, there can be no question of co-operating with the Government, which is in any case bound to end very shortly and so need not be actively opposed; a revolution with disorder and economic distress is inevitable and for this Congress volunteers must be enrolled to save the people when Government breaks down; if the Japanese or anyone else should conquer the country, then, apparently, the Congress would non-co-operate with them, though he recognises that this might be rather dangerous. These speeches seem to be addressed
partly to Government and partly to his people. In the challenge to Government he says that he is quite unrepentant and, without saying it in so many words, implies—"Touch me if you dare". His appeal to the people to organise themselves so as to meet the difficulties which may arise owing to the war situation, outbreaks of disorder, shortage of food or other supplies is not open to objection, if it were not based on the assumption that Government is entirely incompetent and cannot deal with these problems and that therefore it is necessary to set up a parallel government. It is really pathetic that Nehru, realising as he does the danger which threatens India, is still so obsessed with the need for destroying British Imperialism, that any form of co-operation is anathema to him. He still seeks to destroy all confidence in Government and the dangers of this were well brought out in the last paragraph of Maxwell's statement to the National Defence Council.

3. Though his other speeches were not so bad, concentrating more on the necessity for village organisation as a measure of self-defence and to deal with economic problems, yet it seems to me that speeches such as these definitely tend to cause fear or alarm in the public mind or to bring the Government established by law into hatred or contempt. When the position of a district officer is none too easy in these critical days, it makes his position a hundred times more difficult if speeches such as these are delivered; they cannot but lower the prestige and authority of all Government officers and may indeed have the undesirable effect of encouraging the defeatist attitude, of which there are already some signs, in particular among Hindu officers.

4. The Government of India in Item (4) of Home Department's letter of 11th February 1942, of which I annex a copy for convenience of reference, clearly recognise the danger of this form of propaganda and the necessity of taking action against it, and I am in full agreement with their views. It was indeed recognised when Nehru was released that his re-arrest might become necessary at an early date. In the Home Department telegram No. 6416 of November 14th, 1941, the recommendation made to the Secretary of State was quoted which was as follows:

"We fully appreciate arguments of Governor of the United Provinces and indeed consider it probable that his re-arrest may become necessary at an early date. We feel, however, that if, even with Russia as an Ally he again gives cause for action and grounds for it are given the fullest publicity both in India and abroad, public opinion, especially in England and the United States, would realise that he must be irreconcilable and criticism of his reincarceration would be silenced."

5. Much has happened since that opinion was given. But the most important point is that in recent days Nehru has met the head of an Allied nation, Marshal
Chiang Kai-Shek on terms of equality and under conditions which convey the impression, certainly to people outside India, that Nehru represented the people of India. To take drastic action against Nehru at this stage would clearly create great difficulty and it is because of this that I have referred the whole matter to Your Excellency. Nehru’s speeches, though perhaps cleverly camouflaged, were dangerous and even though they may not as yet have had any very obvious bad effects, yet the continuance of such a campaign at this very critical stage of the war might have the most devastating effects. Of course we can wait and see what Nehru’s next move is, also what is the general effect of the surrender of Singapore, but I felt it right to give you my appreciation of the recent speeches and to ask you in turn to give me some indication if possible of the interviews between Chiang Kai-Shek and Nehru and also Your Excellency’s appreciation of their general effect on the position.

6. I send this letter and its enclosures in triplicate so that you can if you think fit pass on a copy to the Secretary of State and also the Hon’ble Home Member.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. Hallett.

P.S.V.—I await Home Member’s comments. Put down for Friday morning’s interview. L.—11-2.

Enclosure 1 to No. 146

CHIEF SECRETARY’S ANALYSIS OF NEHRU’S SPEECHES

(Pages in the enclosure below refer to pages in the U.P. Secretariat file.)

Attitude towards the war effort and Government. To show that recent events have made no difference to Nehru’s attitude towards Government or the war, I would refer to page 4 where he says: “I have come to Gorakhpur today and want to say to him (the District Magistrate) that I am prepared to repeat the same words which I uttered at that time and that I am uttering those words even now and would continue to utter them in future also”. Again, lower down on the same page, he says: “I think that there is only one duty for an Indian to perform. Although there are many duties for the Indians to perform there are always many questions before us in our politics such as those in connection with war and relating to internal politics, but as far as the British Government is concerned the duty and conviction of every individual in this country is one and the same, namely to oppose it and to revolt against it. This is a straightforward utterance. I wish the District Magistrate to note it down that I think it to be my duty and creed to revolt against the British Government so far as its rule over us is concerned”. On page 5 there is a good deal more in the same strain. Later on when dealing with A.R.P. he says on page 23: “Some
of the steps being taken by Government are right while others are worthless, but the way in which they do it, is all useless. We are not co-operating with the A.R.P. work in any way. The Congress does not co-operate with the Government in its activities". On page 25 he definitely opposes the war effort. He says: "That we should get men recruited for the armies of the British Government is a worthless thing. Our old policy for following which we went to jails is still in force". He is not very happy in explaining why the satyagraha movement was called off. He goes on to say: "But there is one thing. The satyagraha that was introduced has now been withdrawn. All right, then why did we come out? Not because there is difference of opinion amongst us or there is something else but because Mahatmaji thought that some more far-reaching problems had cropped up than the individual satyagraha. Take for instance that bombs can fall over the city of Calcutta. Japanese aircraft can bomb that city. If at that time we go to Calcutta and ask the residents to offer satyagraha it will be a useless thing. Or should they offer satyagraha? The people there are disturbed today. Six to seven lakhs of people have evacuated Calcutta. Should they protect themselves or go to jails by regularly offering satyagraha?" The next result is that he, and presumably the Congress for which he speaks, is as opposed to help in the war as ever and the anti-war satyagraha was not called off because of any change in the attitude to the war, but because there was more important work for people to do.

Government doomed. The next step in his argument is to explain what this work is and why it is important. He starts by asserting that the Government is doomed any way, so an anti-Government agitation is unnecessary. Referring to his sentence of four years imprisonment, he says on page 3: "Even at that time I had the doubt whether or not the British Government would survive in this country for four years. I was not, therefore, particularly affected (by the sentence) in any way". On pages 5 and 6 he says: "What else can be said about the things they have done except that the death of their government is writ large on their very foreheads and that they are undermining themselves and digging their own graves". Again towards the end of his speech he says on page 27: "But the real thing to be remembered is that such things are happening in the world today that no one can say what will happen after six months. After six months the British Government may not remain in India". His position is most completely stated on page 8. He says: "Why should a thing which is vanishing be resisted. This is coming to an end, even before my eyes, in our country. Today I notice that their Imperialism is disappearing from here. Their real power is coming to an end before our own eyes and that would in fact disappear. This question does not come to my mind that we should resist the British Government. There is only one thing in my mind, i.e., how to organise my country on the eve of the revolution. Such important matters
are engaging and will engage my attention that disputes are likely to crop up among ourselves; anyhow to settle them. The question that India has to decide is how to administer the country after this Imperialism has come to an end. I am therefore not very keen about resisting the British Government or whether or not we should offer satyagraha or do something else”.

Volunteers to maintain peace and supplies. When Government ends, or even before, he points out that there will be a danger to law and order and also economic distress. On page 20 he says: “At such occasions, you know, there are a large number of people in villages and cities who want to take advantage of this situation, who want to loot and plunder, or whatever they may like to do it is not proper for you that you should be perturbed by the plunder of twenty or fifty people. Let all these people plunder, but we should make our own arrangements. We should not expect that police will protect us. It does not matter whether police protects or not, we should provide for our safety”. On pages 13 and 14 he says: “Prices of things are rising every day. All the commodities which used to come from abroad have ceased to come. The number of railway trains have also been reduced. All the trains may perhaps cease to run within six months. The commodities coming from outside into Gorakhpur are not available (in the bazar). Not to say of high prices, things are not even available. Ahmedabad and British made clothes have become very costly. War has completely stopped the import of British made cloth but you will very gladly wear the cloth of Ahmedabad mills. Tomorrow wagons will cease to bring cloth from outside and the cloth dealers will have to close their shops. Those who have means to purchase this cloth will not find it. If it is at all available, very high prices will be asked for it. If you will not be able to pay such a high price you will not get the cloth. The foodstuffs brought for your consumption by the wagons from outside will also cease to come and the prices of the same will naturally go up”. He develops this theme for several pages. To deal with this situation there must be Congress volunteers. On page 20 he says: “In every village there should be a person responsible for that village. The responsible man of the village will not only go to the meetings, but his responsibility will be to establish contact with the people of the village and to meet them and make them prepared. At present we are not enrolling volunteers either for offering satyagraha or for continuing the struggle with the British Government, but for defending our villages and cities. We tell you that they will have neither to do much with drills and parades nor we will ask them to go elsewhere from their villages. They will live in their villages. Ten or twenty youths should get themselves enrolled (in it)”. This organisation would be capable even of running the government. On page 24 he says: “You must have your organisation in every village and even in cities. Among every ten, twenty, or fifty men there should be one such man as may establish contact with your family members.
Through such an organisation you will be able to fulfil great tasks. If your organisation is strong you can do whatever you like. You can even carry on the administration of Swaraj government through that organisation”. In order to show that reliance on Government is useless he ridicules A.R.P. On page 22 he says: “British officers are getting much useless matter published in connection with the A.R.P. We often hear about these things. It is said that pamphlets have been distributed in Allahabad which tell you that you should sleep beneath your bedsteads immediately on hearing the sound (people laughed). That is to say it produced laughter in you. It is something which produces laughter, but it can never be of any advantage. But the thing is that though they have given you some instructions, they themselves do not know what should be done in connection with the A.R.P. work (vague). I do not know much about A.R.P. Your officers know something more than me. Before the outbreak of this war at least I twice had been in two big cities. Aircraft dropped bombs on them. I saw it myself. In Spain, Barcelona is a big city. Bombs were regularly dropped on it. I stayed there for five days. Every day in the night bombs were dropped and houses were damaged. From this I acquired some experience. Then I went to China. There I saw it for twelve days. To some extent I knew and to some extent I had seen. These people who come from Europe and make collections here, do not know anything nor have they seen or heard anything”.

*Action if country conquered by Japan*. As regards what is to be done if the Japanese conquer the country, he says on page 7: “Have we done all this for ultimately making ourselves slaves of some other power instead of the British? This is quite impossible in the sense that we cannot agree to this. This is absolutely impossible and no one would wish it. But this should be borne in mind that so far as the Congress is concerned if any foreign power ever tries to come to India we cannot bow down our heads to it. We can resist it and will have to put up a strong resistance. Whoever it might be, we cannot bow down our heads before it. Remember that it is not done in the time of war that if the army refuses to offer resistance it is sentenced for six months, a year or four years and is sent to jail. That is done only when martial law comes into force and then anybody who raises his voice against the martial law is at once shot dead. He is not sent to jail. The question is not raised whether he should be given ‘A’ class, ‘B’ class or ‘C’ class. Therefore having understood this, we have to resolve that we cannot bow our heads to any power that comes here”.

*Effect of these speeches*. The question is whether Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru should be allowed to continue making such speeches to large audiences. There can be no doubt that he is as opposed to helping in the war as he ever was and that he will do whatever seems most effective in the circumstances of the moment to oppose India’s participation in the war. Anti-war slogans are now out of fashion. Public opinion killed the satyagraha movement and the Japanese advance
has since destroyed the basis on which it was founded—that the British would win anyhow. Now the doctrine preached is pure defeatism. That was obviously what underlay the Wardha resolution.¹ The course of the war between Bardoli and Wardha was not such as to encourage people, who were probably conscious that they could do little to help, to join in on the side of the British. Pandit Nehru does not say that the Japanese will win but he does say that the Government will inevitably be destroyed. Why then should any one join the army or invest in Government securities? If Mr. Nehru’s doctrine were to be widely spread, the effect on the war effort would be very serious indeed. Nor does Pandit Nehru put forward the idea, which is not uncommon, that as Buddhism and Hinduism are allied therefore the Hindus need fear nothing from the Japanese and need not therefore oppose them. But in assessing the effect of his argument it is necessary to bear in mind that doctrine. The two are in a way complementary. "Government is bound to fall. Therefore to assist them is useless. Even if by our efforts we could prevent the fall of the Government why should we try as the Japanese will not harm the Hindus”. The danger of helping the Government is great and the advantages highly problematical, while the danger of keeping on the right side of the Japanese is not great, even though they lose. This is pure defeatism and must be stopped, unless public opinion is further to deteriorate. The extent to which it has deteriorated is shown by the following extract from a leading article headed “The Marshal’s Mission” in today’s National Herald; “It is idle folly even to imagine that the visit might lead to the beginning of a genuine Asiatic federation. . . A federation of that nature will be impossible till all the Western Powers are kicked out of their present holdings in Asia lock, stock and barrel”. This might have come straight from a Japanese broadcast. It is from Pandit Nehru’s own paper.

¹ See Nos. 16 and 17.

Enclosure 2 to No. 146
COPY OF ITEM (4) FROM HOME DEPARTMENT VERY SECRET D.—O.
LETTER NO. 21/10/41—POLITICAL (l.), DATED FEBRUARY 11TH, 1942

Item (4), Preventive action—Prosecutions

There may have been some natural reluctance since the release of satyagrahi prisoners to prosecute the leading personalities in the Congress Party and they have hitherto been allowed great liberty of speech. The recent utterance of the Congress President to the effect that “Indians would not raise a finger to help Britain so long as they were deprived of freedom and thus had to remain helpless spectators of the struggle” is a typical example. Although for the present we should wish to be informed before a prosecution is instituted against any leader of all-India importance, we hope there will be no hesitation in
proposing action in any bad case that may occur, especially if clear grounds can be shown for basing the prosecution on Defence Rule 34 (6) (g) (causing fear or alarm to the public).

The question of calling upon Provincial Governments to declare the Forward Bloc to be an unlawful association and to proceed vigorously against its members is under separate consideration and will form the subject of a further communication.

I47

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

18 February 1942
No. 11-U. Your private and personal telegram No. 8-U1 of 18th February. I am working urgently on constructive proposals which I hope to send in a day or two.

1 No. 145.

I48

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 413

IMPORTANT
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 18 February 1942

215. Please treat as a Superintendent telegram.

Your telegram 355-S1 dated 17th February. Your No. 104-S2 was circulated to War Cabinet and all Ministers. At present stage Prime Minister has directed that the subsequent telegrams be seen by War Cabinet, Lord Chancellor, and the three Service Ministers in addition to myself. Restricted circulation of this kind is not unusual in case of action papers of high degree of secrecy and I think it would be unwise at present stage to ask for it to be widened.

1 No. 139. 2 No. 23.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: ff 208–9

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 18 February 1942, 10.10 am
Received: 19 February

3102. Your telegram of the 17th February, 338–S.¹ Imperial War Cabinet etc. Last sentence. I regret if I should not have made it clear that representatives on War Cabinet and Pacific War Council will be the same persons. It is only in view of their special knowledge acquired from attendance at War Cabinet that their advice on Pacific Council would be of value.

2. As regards terms of draft announcement I think it preferable that Prince should be said to be invited and not nominated. Following should therefore be substituted for relevant passages: (a) “has suggested to His Excellency the Crown Representative that he should invite a member” etc., and (b) “has invited His Highness XYZ to serve for the present in this capacity and His Highness has accepted the invitation”. Otherwise I agree with your draft.

3. Your paragraph 3. I agree with what you say as to procedure for formulating instructions and presume that your intention is to consult me as necessary in advance on particular points arising.

4. Before communique actually issues I should be glad to be informed of the names of proposed representatives and date of publication.

¹ No. 136.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 18 February 1942

My dear Generalissimo,

It gives me very much pleasure to send you, at the request of the Hon’ble the President of the Legislative Assembly, the copy which I enclose of a motion moved by the Hon’ble Mr. M. S. Aney and adopted by the Indian Legislative Assembly on the 17th February 1942.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.
Enclosure to No. 150

COPY OF THE MOTION ADOPTED BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ON THE 17TH FEBRUARY 1942

"That upon the occasion of the visit to India of Their Excellencies Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Madame Chiang, this Assembly do place upon record its high appreciation of the honour done thereby to India and its heartfelt admiration of the outstanding services rendered by the Generalissimo to China and the world in combating a power against whose aggression China and India are now happily allied."

151

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: f 412

INDIA OFFICE, 19 February 1942

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 7/42

Prime Minister

I understand that Sir Tej Sapru’s conference\(^1\) is meeting again this coming week-end, and I am afraid it would create a bad impression if he were simply to announce that he had had no sort of reply from you since your acknowledgment\(^2\) of his memorandum\(^3\) in December.\(^4\) Even otherwise well-disposed people might be critical of what they might think a lack of courtesy. So I suggest that you might send something in the nature of a short interim message, pointing out that you have met at any rate one of his suggestions. I enclose a draft\(^5\) of the kind of thing I have in mind.

L.S.A.

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1 See No. 2, note 2. The third session of the Non-Party Leaders Conference took place at New Delhi on 21 and 22 February.

2 See No. 12.

3 Enclosure to No. 2.

4 It is clear from the context that Mr Amery meant to write 'January'.

5 See No. 152, para. 2.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 408-9

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 19 February 1942, 6.15 pm

2138. As it is improbable that full reply to Sapru’s message to Prime Minister can be made for some little time, and as Sapru’s group is reported to be meeting next week-end Prime Minister has approved following interim reply which please transmit if you agree as to desirability and suitability.

2. Message Begins. “In the normal course I should have replied earlier to the telegram¹ which you and your distinguished colleagues sent to me at Washington. The pressure of public business connected with the grave events of recent weeks has however prevented my doing so. I trust that you will not think on that account that I have given no attention to your representation. You will be aware that on two of the points which you have raised with me effect has been given to your views in that an invitation² has been issued to the Government of India to be represented, if it so desires, in the formulation of policy in the War Cabinet in London and on the Pacific War Council. We shall welcome unreservedly the presence at these meetings of whoever may be chosen to fulfil these responsible duties.

The other proposals which you put to me raise far-reaching issues in regard to which I hope to give you my considered answer before long.” Ends.

¹ Enclosure to No. 2.  
² No. 117.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 19 February 1942, 2.35 pm

Received: 19 February, 2 pm

No. 375-S. Leaders of Congress-Nationalist, Muslim League and Independent Parties in Central Assembly have asked for secret sessions for free exchange of views on war situation. I have discussed the request with Aney, Leader of Assembly, this morning and he strongly favours. I am advised that I have no power to summon joint secret session, so I fear Commander-in-Chief will have to face secret meeting of Council of State as well as of Assembly. We should
have to make it plain that secret sessions cannot be repeated often. The idea has attractions as associating Legislature with war effort but I realise risk of embarrassment to Commander-in-Chief and disappointment of Members at his necessary reticence. I shall of course take fullest account of his views. Meantime I should be glad to have your reactions at earliest possible moment.

154

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/509: f 49

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 19 February 1942, 8.30 pm
Received: 20 February

3161. Your telegram of the 19th February, 375-S. My inclination would be to meet request for secret sessions. I feel it would be politically unwise to discourage what might be represented as a move in the direction of co-operation and might even be so handled as to bear some useful fruit. But you will no doubt be largely guided by the Commander-in-Chief's views. The complete secrecy of the sessions can obviously not be relied on, but I should hope that if the sessions are held he will find it possible to be as frank as considerations of security permit. My own experience of secret sessions is that what makes the difference and gives them value is not so much the secret information if any that is given as the frankness in dealing with subjects and particularly with foreign relations etc.

1 No. 153.

155

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

20 February 1942

398-S. Your private and personal telegram No. 2081 dated 18th February. I can find no one else approaching Benthall's quality, and must take your telegram as an acceptance from him. It is important that he should be here before the appointments are made: otherwise he would lose seniority in his place at the Council table which is important having regard both to his personal value
and to his position as a European member. I suggest therefore that he should leave for India as soon as possible without disclosing reasons, travel by swiftest route, and be here on the spot ready to take office.

2. I am now not happy at the idea of having Baldev Singh as a Sikh representative. Glancy has reason to believe that Baldev Singh made substantial contribution to a fund for getting Subhas Bose out of India and into Germany. I may be forced to accept Jogendra Singh whom I regard as an extinct volcano. But I am making further enquiries and will let you know the result.

3. It has been represented to me that the appointment of Begum Shah Nawaz would make a great appeal to Indian women and we are in need of the support of Indian womanhood. She has brains. But the inclusion of Begum Shah Nawaz and Firoz Khan Noon, both from the Punjab, would make a bad territorial distribution, and I doubt whether I could carry them both.

4. If it is proposed to appoint a high-grade representative at Chungking (a matter of great importance) I would be glad to know your reactions to the idea of sending Firoz Khan Noon to Chungking, putting Begum Shah Nawaz in his place on the Executive Council and asking Usman from Madras to make up the team. I shall be glad to have your views on this.

5. As a result of further enquiries I am convinced that Ambedkar is the right and only proper representative for the Depressed Classes.

6. I imagine that your view remains that the Prime Minister should make his announcement before any changes are made in my Executive Council. I hope to send you my constructive suggestions on the constitutional question in the course of the next three days, and Benthall, I presume, could not get here before 15th March. If you think it probable that the Prime Minister will have time to decide on a scheme and compose a broadcast before that date, the announcement could be made first and the Council changes later. If however the Prime Minister’s announcement is unlikely, in view of his other preoccupations, to be ready by the time that Benthall arrives it occurs to me as an alternative that we might stand for the present on the sedative reply given by the Prime Minister to Sapru’s memorandum and allow the changes in Council to go through as soon as Benthall can get out. The Prime Minister could then make his statement when times are quieter.

7. The announcement of Clow’s appointment is connected with this, vide your telegram No. 168 dated 8th February. Clow is to take over on 20th April, and needs a month or five weeks leave before that. He must have time to clear

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1 Conveying Sir E. Benthall’s readiness to accept appointment to the Executive Council, while pointing out certain obstacles arising from his work in London and Lady Benthall’s health. L/P&J/8/544: F148.
2 The words in italics omitted in decipher.
3 No. 152, para. 2.
4 No. 85.
up his work, but cannot do so without strengthening speculation about his appointment which has been current gossip for a couple of months. I therefore suggest that Clow’s appointment to Assam should be announced at once. There is also gossip about Benthall, but we can hold up his announcement till he arrives. He should however move fast.

156

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Gandhi

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICE ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 20 February 1942

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I have now been able to ascertain the position about the Income-tax demanded from the All-India Spinners Association.¹

2. You may rest assured that the action taken to assess the profits of the Association to tax was not dictated by any ulterior motive on the part of my Government or of the higher Income-tax authorities, but was a simple performance of his duties by an officer who is bound under the law to take action to assess the profits of any business within his jurisdiction. The Bombay High Court which decided the case was, I am informed, prepared to admit the charitable nature of the objects of the Association, but could not hold the Association exempt from the liability to pay Income-tax because the property of the Association is not held under trust or other legal obligation for charitable purposes.

3. As the law stands my Government are themselves powerless to grant an exemption from the provisions of the law and cannot refrain from giving effect to the Court’s decision unless it is reversed, but as an earnest of their good-will instructions have been issued to stay the collection of the tax pending the result of the Privy Council appeal which has been lodged.

4. In this state of affairs I think you will agree that the Association would be well advised so to arrange its affairs legally as to come within the exemption conferred by law on property held under trust for charitable purposes. But the exemption that would follow from such a course would be prospective only, and I regret that it is beyond the power either of my Government or myself to make such exemption retrospective if the present decision of the Court stands.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW
P.S.—The closing paragraphs of your letter are kindly, and I understand, even when I cannot agree.

I will give your message to Southby and my daughter, and I know they will value it. We hear often from her. "Richard" is the most wonderful baby in the world, and the very flower of the flock! So life will triumph in the end, despite all our blunders!!

L.,—20-2-42.

1 No. 87.

157

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

20 February 1942

IMMEDIATE

No. 397-S. Hartley tells me he has communicated substance of his and General Staff talks to Chiang Kai-Shek in telegram No. 3272—G1 of February 18th which you should see.

2. Short summary of my two talks with him is as follows. Political. He told me he did not understand India and though he was anxious to do good he did not know how to achieve it. It soon became evident that he regarded Gandhi and Nehru as only Indians politically important. I do not think he knew the names of any others. I told him about communal position and stressed importance of Muslims in army and munition making, and introduced topic of China's large Muhammadan population. He appeared to be interested and impressed. He was particularly keen to hear about Gandhi's attitude at commencement of war and showed surprise when I exploded myth about our having forced India into war without due consultation and despite alleged readiness of nationalists to rush to our aid had we only given them a chance. I gather that he had largely corrected his views about Congress before he had left Delhi. He reported to me that he had done his best to persuade Nehru to play up but had failed. He hoped for better luck with Gandhi. He stressed connection between political contentment and capacity of people to resist enemy propaganda. In these days the army alone could not produce success. It was necessary to have determined support of civil population willing to endure sacrifices. Therefore if he were the British Government he would offer India a firm promise of Dominion Status; while if an Indian, he would ask for nothing more. I explained some of our difficulties.

3. Later I discussed war with him when he repeated most of the points carried in Commander-in-Chief's telegram to Chief of Imperial General Staff of

1 Not printed.
February 18th. I was much struck by the wide sweep of his mind and his quickness in taking a point. Inevitably he is deeply preoccupied about Indo-Burmese communications with China and the urgent need for us to maintain touch with China’s armies and, if this is broken, to strive to re-establish it. The Generalissimo seemed to me to be an able and determined man.

158

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

GOVERNOR’S CAMP, BENGAL, 21 February 1942

Your Excellency,
On the eve of our departure for China, I wish to express our hearty appreciation of the hospitality that you and Lady Linlithgow have shown to Madame Chiang and myself during our visit to India. Although our stay has been short, yet I am glad that satisfactory decision has been reached on a plan for our concerted action against aggression and for the parts both nations are to play.

I am further gratified that close military co-ordination between China and India has been successfully worked out, thereby laying the foundation for our common victory in the Pacific Ocean and that this alone is more than sufficient to make up for the recent loss of Singapore.

In leaving India I am taking away with me a firm conviction that our two countries will spare nothing in striving for further consolidation of their joint war efforts and for the early destruction of the force of lawlessness.

Yours sincerely,

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

159

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

NEW DELHI, 21 February 1942, 6.40 pm

Received: 21 February, 5 pm

IMPORTANT

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET

No. 410-S. Prime Minister’s broadcast. I send by separate telegram the substance of replies received from Presidency Governors whom I have taken into my confidence on the proposals contained in your telegram No. 3–U3 dated 13th February. I have found my task of submitting constructive alternative
proposals more engrossing than I had expected, and I hope therefore that you will not press me for a day or two. I am working at high pressure and want to be able to give you my best possible effort.

1 Deciphered as 'Immediate'. 2 No. 160. 3 No. III.

160

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET

No. 411–S. Prime Minister's proposed broadcast.1 Following are reactions of Presidency Governors whom I have taken into my confidence:

Madras. Utterly opposed and considers (1) His Majesty's Government's proposals might hinder war effort, (2) no chance of Congress accepting, and (3) even if they did Muslims and Princes would be antagonized.

Bengal. Objects to linking constitution-framing body with war effort. Defence Council would not co-operate in war effort without executive power. Would be too unwieldy to stimulate recruitment, munitions production, &c. Minorities, especially Muslim League, would regard it as breach of faith if elected from Assemblies. Declaration on lines of items (3), (10) and (11) all that is possible in the way of constitutional advance: but if major political parties were promised consultation in setting up body to frame constitution, the onus of refusing to co-operate with it would be on them.

Bombay. While difficulty of producing any proposal which does not risk accentuating existing divisions is great, call by Prime Minister, with minimum conditions and details, urgently needed and has great possibilities. There is need to dispel doubts about our intentions. End of item (3), end of item (10) and item (11) would be important contributions to that end, but wording of first part of item (10) vague and unlikely to reassure Muslims. Proposed new Council might occupy itself solely with task of considering future constitution, though not ideal body for purpose, and at risk of non-co-operation Muslim League. Onus of deadlock would anyway be removed from our shoulders, wholly opposed to proposed elected body being an Advisory Defence Council. Nationalist opinion demanding national government would ridicule offer. Better stick to language of item (2) or express hope that clarification of intentions will lead to formation of national or coalition governments. Persons outside Provincial Legislatures should be eligible for any body which may be set up.

1 See No. 111.
161

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

21 February 1942

IMPORTANT

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 412—S. I have considered further in consultation with Maxwell the question of European recruitment for the I.C.S. during the war in the light of paragraphs 14-16 of your letter of the 5th January. I have no alternative but to accept the position stated in your letter as regards securing the release of young officers from the Forces in England. At the same time it is not possible to contemplate any withdrawal of officers now undergoing military training here as suggested in your paragraph 15. Indeed, owing to the shortage of officers to meet military requirements, pressure is being put on us to release more young officers from all Civil Services here for military service and the drain is thus in the opposite direction. If, therefore, the position is accepted that no European recruitment is possible during the war the question must arise whether there should be any Indian recruitment to the I.C.S. during the same period. One-sided recruitment will produce exactly what happened during the last war, viz., an over-Indianised bloc in the Service which will not either now or in future help much in maintaining its intended character. If, however, we are to bring recruitment to a full stop now we must do so with our eyes open realizing that there is little probability of its resumption later in the changed conditions envisaged in paragraph 14 of your letter. I fully realise that a final decision to stop I.C.S. recruitment at this stage would involve an important change of policy. But since circumstances have forced us, temporarily at least, to take a step in this direction, perhaps this would be a convenient occasion to consider the practical aspects of the matter now. If there is to be cessation of recruitment with no practical possibility of resuming it after the war, it would seem inexpedient to conceal our intentions from the public in either England or India and thus sacrifice any political advantage which the announcement would bring in this country where continued recruitment to the I.C.S. is regarded as an indication of our intention of staying here indefinitely. Although a decision on the question of policy is not immediately urgent, I should be glad of your preliminary reactions to this idea.

1 No. 5.
162

Minute by Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106b: f 390

INDIA OFFICE, 21 February 1942

The attached telegram from the well-informed and moderate Delhi correspondent of the *Times* strikes me as a very clear statement of the dual problem which confronts us in India, namely how to convince Indians of our sincerity as to the future and how to give them further responsibility at the present time without prejudging the communal issue. It will be noted that he does not endorse the Sapru proposals but only asks for a "reconstructed" Central Government with considerable latitude but within the present constitution and retaining the Governor-General's special responsibilities. As to the future he insists, rightly I think, on the necessity of a much fuller and clearer indication of how we propose that the new constitution should come about.

_L. S. A._

1 Mr Amery's minute was circulated on 21 February to Mr Churchill, Mr Attlee, Sir J. Anderson, Sir S. Cripps, and Viscount Simon.

2 Not printed; it appeared in *The Times* of 21 February 1942.

3 Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 12.

163

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 21 February 1942

The last week has been completely taken up by Cabinet crises as well as by the urgent situation following on the fall of Singapore and the menace to Rangoon. Consequently there has been no chance of any discussions on India and I doubt whether Winston has had time to give the matter any serious thought. In any case his deferred broadcast which was to have taken place tomorrow looks like being deferred for another week at the very least.

2. Meanwhile your criticism has come in and so far as I am concerned, is conclusive. The idea of linking the immediate interim concession with the future constitution, however attractive for the purposes of eloquence here and in America will not, I fear, stand the test of Indian jealousies. What we have got to face is that India wants—

1 Singapore had surrendered on 15 February.  2 No. 129.
(a) a clearer indication of the future;
(b) an instalment of power today; and
(c) some method of dealing with both (a) and (b) that does not preclude
the eventual character of (a).

The whole position is really very well set out in a long telegram from Inglis
in this morning's Times which I cannot help feeling owes something to your
inspiration. My own mind is crystallising towards the conclusion that we must
be more definite both as to time and method with regard to (a) and go sub-
stantially further, but not the whole way asked for by Sapru and company,
in regard to (b).

3. What I mean by being more definite as regards (a), is first of all to make
it clear that the constitution framed by Indians will be accepted by us subject
to negotiation of the method by which our existing and continuing obligations
are to be fulfilled. This really comes back to my 1940 conception of an agree-
ment for a period of years written into the constitution so as to give it the
legal effect. Winston reacted violently against that then but has in effect come
round to it now. As regards time, what has occurred to me and what I am putting
into a telegram3 I am sending you today is that we might say that if Indians
have not themselves agreed upon the nature of the constituent body which
is to frame the constitution within six months of the end of the war we will
do so ourselves. I am also tempted to say that if they have not agreed on a
constitution within two years of that date we shall frame one ourselves to the
best of our abilities. The really difficult point is how to reconcile our pledge
about agreement with the criticism that we are deliberately holding up all pro-
gress by giving a blackmailing veto to the minorities. On that, my mind which
has always been working in the provincial direction, has not [now?] definitely
turned towards the solution normally accepted in the Dominions and indeed
accepted with regard to the States in the present India Act, namely, that if there
are sufficient Provinces who want to get together and form a Dominion the
dissident Provinces should be free to stand out and either come in after a period
of option or be set up at the end of it as Dominions of their own. Jinnah could
not quarrel with that nor, on the other hand, could Congress feel that it is
denied the opportunity of complete independence for that part of India which
it controls. Such a solution no doubt bristles with practical difficulties, but they
are not insuperable and my belief is that if that prospect were offered, the parties
would very possibly all come to agreement.

* * *

11. I have been reading Hallett's letter of the 10th December (No. U.P.-117)
about the general situation in his Province, in which he is concerned to excuse
himself for not writing more often. I must say that I find his reason entirely
convincing. His letters, as in the present case, generally deal with some particular problem of importance and treat it fully. I find this very useful. You have been so generous to me in the matter of keeping me thoroughly posted about events that I need have no hesitation in saying that I hope you will not—indeed I am sure you will not—press Governors and officials to write for the sake of filling their log when they have nothing especially important to say. Let me say once more that this does not imply any sense of ingratitude for the very full reports which you have consistently supplied to me on all points of conceivable interest. Quite the contrary, for you know exactly how useful they have been.

12. I am afraid the mail is just off and I must say no more. All my sympathies are with you in the heavy ordeal which you will have to face during the coming months with an India which may contain hundreds of thousands of recruits but precious little in the way of modern weapons. I only hope you may be able to push through the communication with Burma and so with China before the Japanese can get hold of Upper Burma. You handled Chiang Kai-shek admirably and I love your telegram of instructions to Dorman-Smith.

All good luck to you.

3 See No. 165, para. 3. 4 Not printed; it is similar to No. 135, para. 4.

164

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET

No. U.P.–124

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

There is one rumour going round, in particular in Congress circles, regarding Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek’s visit which is in my view definitely dangerous. You may have heard of it from other sources, for I notice a reference is made to it in a recent report by the C.I.D. of the Central Provinces. There is of course much speculation about the Marshal’s visit and this speculation has increased on account of his close contact with Nehru throughout his visit. As some of my officers put it, people are wondering why in these very troubled times Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek continues to meander through India with Nehru sticking to him like a burr. The rumour is roughly that the Marshal has come to ascertain to what extent India can help in Burma and elsewhere against the Japanese and that if he finds that India cannot give much help, he will on his
return to China consider the question of coming to terms with Japan. His constant association with Nehru rather than with the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff is no doubt the reason for this rumour, for we know pretty well what Nehru with his anti-British bias will tell him. I recognise of course that the official statement from Chungking, dated February 19th,¹ to the effect that an alternative to the Burma Road through Rangoon had been decided upon goes to contradict the idea which I have suggested, but a statement of that kind may be overlooked when the Press as a whole gives more publicity to the Marshal’s discussions with Gandhi and his visit to Shanti Niketan. Speeches also such as those of Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and others go to show that China is never likely to make peace with Japan.

2. Your Excellency has recently written about the necessity of fighting against this defeatist attitude and this seems to be a typical example of the way in which the defeatist attitude is encouraged. The people are ignorant of what the position is; they tend to put the worst interpretation on such information as they get and to accept all kinds of rumours, such as this rumour that China will come to terms with Japan. Underlying this suggestion is of course the idea of an “Eastern Federation” and some sort of alliance between China and Congress as representing India.

3. I have thought it desirable to let you know this rumour; we are all a bit in the dark about the Marshal’s visit and if some authoritative statement can be issued, it would stop all this dangerous speculation.

4. As regards the League attitude towards General Chiang Kai-Shek I have nothing very definite, but Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman told my Chief Secretary recently that Jinnah was to tell him that the League was willing to help in the war but owing to Congress demands were unable to do so, as Congress would oppose the war effort more vehemently because of the League support.

5. Then there is rather an interesting report which started from the Hindu Mahasabha, that there were secret negotiations between Congress and the League. Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman with reference to this told Mudie as follows:

“Just before he went to the League Conference in Bengal, he was approached by Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai on the subject of an understanding between the Congress and the League. He said that many Congressmen now desired this and asked whether Khaliq would see Nehru on the subject. Khaliq, however, said that was useless as Jinnah and Nehru would eventually have to talk. Jinnah was told of this by Khaliq in Bengal, but so far has not been approached by Nehru. He had however been approached in the same sense by Bhulabhai Desai. Khaliq told Kidwai that the League’s Christmas resolution² stood as regards co-operating with any party within the present constitution if they
were given a reasonable chance of power. As regards the Centre, this would mean that the Congress and the League would join the existing Viceroy’s Executive Council and in Section 93 Provinces it would mean Ministries. Khaliq’s reaction is two-fold and I do not think that he can make up his mind. He feels that an understanding coupled with taking office might disarm criticism and so make Government’s position easier. On the other hand if the League took office without doing so jointly with the Congress and so closing their mouth, the result might be definitely bad for the war, as the fact that the League were openly pro-war would make the Congress more certainly anti-war than they are at present. On the other hand he realises that Congress Ministries, pursuing a pro-war policy, would probably be unable to keep their Left Wing in order, which would make things difficult. He is also doubtful about “swapping horses, &c.”. I asked whether he thought that Nehru would be able to swallow so much that he has only recently said. He agreed that that would be difficult; although Kidwai gave the impression that Nehru might think as he (Kidwai) did, that was by no means certain”.

All this goes to show once again how Nehru dominates Congress policy.

6. I am very grateful to Your Excellency for consulting me about the question of Herbert’s meeting with Nehru. The Nehru problem grows more and more difficult. We have told District Magistrates to take action against the small fry who indulge in abuse of Government; and some action is being taken; in all cases it seems to me fully justified. But it puts local officers in a difficult position if action is not taken against leaders; it was Nehru’s arrest on the last occasion that eased our position in this Province. I have already told you about the Gorakhpur speeches; after that he went on to Cawnpore to the All-India Trade Union Congress and the following is the District Magistrate’s report:

"On the 8th he addressed the Congress and attracted an audience of 10,000 people. He said that the British Empire was crumbling and the audience should make their own arrangements. Government’s A.R.P. organisation was ridiculous. The British would not win any battle. The only battle they had won so far was the battle of Kalanga in Malaya when the Australians refused to fire on tea plantation strikers and Indian troops did so on the command of British officers. Nehru became very annoyed at pro-war slogans shouted by one section of his audience and finally lost his temper and threatened to take no part in the proceedings. Next morning he addressed about 2,000 students and condemned the communist group for favouring war effort. Next day addressing an audience of about a thousand in the city he repeated his argument that disorder and panic could only be avoided by the Congress and he ridiculed Government’s A.R.P. organisation. He,

1 See The Times, 20 February, p. 4. 2 Namely the Nagpur Resolution; see Appendix iv.
however, said that he did not wish to oppose it ‘but our idea is that its way of
doing this work is also worthless like all its other works’. He also addressed
three meetings in the rural area, two of which were attended by 9,000 people,
at which he prophesied the end of the British rule and the necessity for people
to organise themselves through the Congress”.

7. I have not myself seen the full report of the speech but I will examine it
carefully. The only satisfactory feature is that he stirred up opposition from the
pro-war communists. This is from another report of the meeting:
“The communists, handicapped by the absence of capable leaders in jail,
were faced with a strong combination of Socialists and Congressites with
J. L. Nehru to add the prestige and influence of his presence and personal
advocacy. Despite this opposition the communists, while faring badly in the
actual elections, managed to secure 60 per cent. of the votes on the war issue,
and their strength made it impossible for the opposition to carry the delegates
with them in a clear-cut victory for non-co-operation in the war. Nehru
did not emerge with any credit from the proceedings and dissatisfaction was
expressed at his failure to appreciate and champion the cause of workers
generally. As a result of the rivalry of the two main parties the Congress
was largely a failure, and the Labour Conference was completely over-
shadowed. On balance the various meetings held tend to demonstrate the
existence of an increasingly strong section of Labour in favour of co-operation
in the war effort. Though exaggerated demands are made in resolutions
passed by Cawnpore Labour, the likelihood of any direct action on a con-
certed basis is small at the moment”.

As I have said in my earlier letter, I recognise the difficulty of taking action
when Nehru is so closely connected with Chiang Kai-Shek, but if he goes
further off the deep-end, another break with Congress seems to be inevitable.

Yours sincerely,
M. G. HALLETT

165

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 379–86

IMMEDIATE
SECRET. PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
232. Please treat as Superintendent telegram.
1. Pending arrival of your suggestions I would like to put forward for your
consideration certain suggestions of my own. They are purely personal and
have not been discussed with colleagues.
2. Assuming that Cabinet will accept your view as to danger of directly linking interim proposals for associating India with the war effort with machinery for constitutional future the question is what further advance can be made or is worth while making in either direction?

3. As regards constitutional future we can of course give more precision to our past assurances on the lines of paragraphs 3 and 10 of my 3–U. There is also the question of date of which so much has been made. I still have doubts as to a fixed date, but should be glad to know if you thought we could risk it. Would it in your opinion indicate our positive desire to make early progress if we were to say that if Indians do not come to an agreement within 6 months of the end of the war as to the nature and composition of the constitution forming body we will set up ourselves the kind of body we think most suitable for the purpose. In any case is there any real objection to saying that while obviously nothing can be done in face of the immediate danger we should not ourselves insist on waiting for the actual end of the war if the situation became less critical and if the atmosphere of co-operation created by the common effort made Indian leaders themselves feel that they could take the matter in hand?

4. The real difficulty is the one dealt with in paragraph 113 of 3–U. We cannot go back on our 1940 pledges to the Moslems and Princes or beat about the bush in answer to the questions that are bound to be asked. On the other hand Congress, and many people here, will say that in insisting on agreement we are in fact inviting a recalcitrant element to blackmail the rest of India by vetoing all progress unless it gets its full pound of flesh. Is not the right ultimate solution really to be sought on the lines which have been followed in the case of every previous federation and which, in fact, were adopted in the present Act with regard to the Princes, i.e. to let the federation be formed as soon as a sufficient number of the federable units have agreed, leaving the dissidents to stand out for the time being and possibly altogether? Why not say, as we have said about the Princes, that we are prepared to let the new federal constitution go ahead as soon after the war as say a majority of the Provinces (including a majority of the population of British India) are agreed upon it, but that no Province is to be coerced into joining? That meets Jinnah in principle. Congress on the other hand will feel that it isn’t held back indefinitely from securing the freedom it aims at; but at the same time will have very strong inducement to come to terms with the Moslem provinces in order to secure a united India. I should not be surprised if in the event they did not all come in. If not there would be practical difficulties of various kinds but not insurmountable. A common tariff for instance might be retained as in the case of Burma for a fixed period of years

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1 See No. 129, paras. 2–4.
2 No. 111, paras. 2 (f) and 2 (10).
3 Namely para. 2 (11).
4 See Appendix I.
5 Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 5.
pending a decision of the dissident provinces to adhere or set up as separate dominions. Similar interim arrangements would have to be made as regards Defence.

5. As regards an interim advance I fully realise your objections to an elected Advisory Council of the sort suggested and to giving it the nomination of representative here. In any case neither Congress nor the League would I believe look at it standing by itself. The only question to my mind is whether we stand pat on your Executive, with the additions already sanctioned, and your National Defence Council or go another step forward not only in Indianisation but in bringing in the Party leaders. The practical advantages of carrying on with your present team are obvious. The objections to a wholly Indian and wholly political Executive such as Sapru suggests are even more obvious. Apart from the sacrifice of all continuity and administrative experience there would be the danger of deadlock with yourself and His Majesty’s Government or, no less likely, between themselves.

6. Is however a half-way house between the two altogether unworkable or likely to be unacceptable to the Parties? (If acceptable in the face of the now imminent common danger it is also more likely to work while that danger is there). What I mean is that you should retain your existing team and in lieu of your present proposals for filling vacancies invite the Parties to come in. You have two vacancies. Dropping Sarkar would give you a third, the War Cabinet representative here a fourth, while you might possibly send another of your present team to Chungking. By itself the offer of these places would certainly not be sufficiently attractive. But might it not if you offered Finance to Congress and Defence to the Moslem League, transferring Raisman to Communications or some other department and keeping the Commander-in-Chief in the Council responsible for Defence Policy as distinct from administration (this is the normal division on the Continent and, indeed, now in this country where the Prime Minister is responsible for defence policy) and the Defence Member responsible for administration. Finance is much less controversial now that India is ceasing to be debtor country and that most of her military expenditure is paid for by His Majesty’s Government. Maxwell you would certainly want to keep as Home Member for your own good reasons. But I cannot imagine either Congress or Jinnah agreeing to let the other control internal security.

7. You would thus, in effect, have six vacancies of which you will give say three to Congress, two to the League, one to Ambedkar and create yet another place for your Sikh, i.e. a total Council of three Europeans, four Moslems, six Hindus, one Sikh, one Scheduled Caste and one Parsi or sixteen excluding yourself of whom, however, one would be in London and another in Chungking. Assuming the two absentees balanced communally you would have, even
on the assumption that Hindus, Sikh and Ambedkar voted together on some issue of Congress or communal policy, a casting vote with the help of Europeans, Moslems and Parsi.

8. If Congress were prepared to come in on this it would no doubt be also prepared to resume government in the Provinces. If so it might help if the Provincial governments, in addition to their Premiers, were to be given the right of nominating a second member on the National Defence Council. This would give them something further without making the Council unduly unwieldy.

9. An interesting suggestion which has been made to me is that as the conduct of the war is an all-India matter, your Government might invite two or three Princes to sit with your Executive, not as Members, but on the same footing as the Dominion and Indian representatives at the War Cabinet here, for the formulation and discussion of war policy, at meetings other than those devoted to purely internal British India questions.

10. I should be glad of your immediate comments on the Executive Council side of the above suggestions as they impinge and may possibly conflict with your suggestions in your 398–S just received.

6 No. 129, paras. 7–9.  
7 See No. 66, Minute 2.  
8 No. 155.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 371

IMMEDIATE  
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL  
INDIA OFFICE, 22 February 1942, 7.40 pm  
Received: 24 February

239. Please treat as Superintendent telegram. My telegram No. 2321 of 21st February, paragraph 3. It occurs to me that main objection to fixing date namely that parties would sit back making no real effort to agree would be largely overcome by the local option proposal in paragraph 4 for neither party would then have same interest in holding up the other.

1 No. 165.
167

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 434-S. Your private and personal telegram of 18th, No. 215. I agree. But you will understand my wish that if crucial decisions are to be taken by whole Cabinet all members should be fully seized of my views.

1 No. 148.

168

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, 23 February 1942, 10.55 pm
Received: 24 February, 1.15 am

No. 431-G. Following is summary of press account of second day’s session of Non-Party Conference at Delhi on February 22nd:

2. Conference passed resolution appreciating honour done to India by visit of Chiang Kai-Sheks, and admiring heroic struggle of Chinese.

3. Resolution was passed urging that India’s representatives on War Cabinet and Pacific War Council should be non-official Indians commanding confidence of public.

4. Main resolution expressed profound dissatisfaction that all real power in Central Government is still concentrated in British hands as four key portfolios are withheld from Indians; and urged that His Majesty’s Government should immediately adopt following measures: Declaration that India should no longer be treated as dependency ruled from Whitehall, and that henceforth her constitutional position and powers will be identical with those of Dominions. (2) During war Executive Council shall be reconstructed as truly national government on basis of joint and collective responsibility and consisting entirely of non-officials enjoying public confidence and in charge of all portfolios subject to responsibility to Crown and without prejudice to Commander-in-Chief’s position. (3) British Government should recognise right of India to direct representation through persons chosen by national government in all
Allied War Councils and at Peace\textsuperscript{2} Conference. (4) National Government should be consulted on same footing and to same extent as Dominions.

5. In moving main resolution Jayakar said that for 150 years Government had been telling people of country they need not worry about country’s defence as British Government would look after it. But now in Singapore, once declared immune from all attack, they confessed there was no food, water and munitions. What guarantee did Government give that these three “Nos” would not be repeated in this country? “This Government has proved itself absolutely incompetent to conduct war without co-operation of people. We want to tell this Government ‘move aside, we shall take charge of conduct of war before it is too late’”.

6. Conference passed resolution that Section 93 rule should forthwith cease and popular governments enjoying public confidence should be established.

7. Following are points from Sapru’s concluding speech: Begins. (a) I resolutely refused to walk into Amery’s trap of forming middle party. (b) England must tell her agents here to identify themselves with us and get over their present mentality which is responsible for cleavage between them and us and between various communities. Present Government exists because it is independent of our votes. (c) August offer pleased neither Congress, nor Muslim League nor Mahasabha, so Amery is bereft of all moral support in India. (d) Communalism has played havoc with us and cannot be exorcised till England declares India self-governing country. (e) I endorse Arthur Moore’s suggestion\textsuperscript{3} to broaden basis of Indian Army; I do not share Governors’ complacency on efficiency of A.R.P. organisations and Civic Guards which should be brought more under non-official\textsuperscript{4} control. (f) If leaders of big national parties come to working arrangements among themselves, they will have earned lasting gratitude of country; occasion demands that we must cease to think in terms of communalism. Ends.

8. Press accounts mention scarcely any Muslim as attending Conference.

\textsuperscript{1} Namely Defence, Home, Finance and Communications. \textsuperscript{2} Omitted in decipher.
\textsuperscript{3} In first leading article ‘Evolving an Army’ in The Statesman of 4 February.
\textsuperscript{4} Deciphered as ‘arms’.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICE ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 23 FEBRUARY 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have just received three letters from you, dated 30th January, 2nd February and 9th February.¹ I fear I shall not be able to answer them adequately before the mail leaves, but most of the important points will have been covered by our telegraphic correspondence before this reaches you.

2. On the question of the adequacy or otherwise of India’s war effort, I agree generally with your comments in paragraph 3 of your letter of the 30th January. It wouldn’t help much to put tens of millions of trained troops into the field when every rifle made and to be made in all the Democratic Front Countries for two years to come is fully mortgaged. To the latter part of the same paragraph my only reply is “can any mainly agricultural country compete?”.

3. I think you have had from the Commander-in-Chief and myself a fairly comprehensive picture of Chiang’s visit. I have so far not seen any definite reports as to what passed between the Generalissimo and Gandhi; but we may soon have some indication of what was said. The reason, I feel sure, why the Chiangs did not want to stay in Vice Roy’s House is that she was anxious to be able to see as much as she wanted of Nehru and his sister, Mrs. Pandit, whom the Chiangs had entertained in China. I have heard that Gandhi has been proof against the blandishments of the Generalissimo, just as Nehru was when the Marshal tackled him in Delhi. I fancy Chiang has a much better understanding of my difficulties than was the case before his visit to India.

4. We had a roving discussion in Council a few days ago on war matters generally, which displayed a genuine anxiety to help in the war, but also displayed a not unnatural failure to appreciate how little Cabinet Ministers not immediately concerned are told about the internal affairs of other Departments, especially operational matters and secret intelligence. I was able to enlighten them on this matter, and followed this up a couple of days later by another meeting at which the Commander-in-Chief gave them a brief review of the general situation including enough information to make them feel in the picture without, of course, disclosing anything of an operational nature. This is one of the big difficulties with which we should have to deal in any expanded Executive Council with politicians.

¹ Nos. 48, 58 and 89.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/509: ff 66–7

NEW DELHI, 23 February 1942, 6.50 pm
Received: 23 February, 10.45 pm

33D/42. Muslim League Working Committee met at Delhi on February 21st and passed resolutions about war emergency, Indians in Malaya and Far East, behaviour of Fazlul Huq, welfare of Kazaks and Khaksar Leader. Following is summary of first resolutions.

Begins. Committee draw attention of Indian Muslims to growing danger of war to India and call upon them to face danger with equanimity and courage. Committee are confident that in grave emergency Muslims will stand united and help the suffering. Committee call on Provincial Leagues to strengthen Muslim National Guards organization to enable it to assist in maintaining peace and order and help the suffering. Ends.

2. Jinnah was unanimously re-elected President of League for the year.

3. Following is summary of resolution passed by Working Committee on February 22nd. Begins. If British Government are misled into accepting proposals of Non-party Conference Muslim India will without doubt revolt against any such decision, for these proposals clearly mean virtual transfer of all power and authority to Central Government on basis of India as single national unit enjoying Dominion Status in action thereby establishing Congress of [or?] Hindu Raj for all practical purposes. Real object of these Hindu Leaders is to coerce British Government to surrender and torpedo Pakistan demand; this

1 The last three resolutions mentioned were non-official resolutions adopted by the Council of the League.

2 The resolution expressed concern for the Muslim Kazaks who had come into India from Soviet Russia and requested the Government of India to provide for their welfare and to allow them to settle peacefully in some part of North-West India.

3 The Khaksars (lit. 'humble') movement was founded in 1911 by Inayatullah Khan (Allama Mashriqi), a former officer of the Indian Educational Service, with the avowed aim of organizing Muslims for social service. The Khaksars paraded with spades, the symbol of the movement, and came to have the appearance of a private army. In 1940, after disorders in the Punjab, Inayatullah Khan was imprisoned by order of the Central Government. Agitation for his release led in June 1941 to the Khaksars being declared an unlawful organization. In January 1942 Inayatullah issued a conciliatory statement, on the strength of which he was released from prison in Madras but was banned from leaving the Presidency. The resolution referred to above expressed appreciation of his release and asked for the removal of the restriction on him.

4 The objects of the Muslim National Guards organization (established in 1938) were defined by a Muslim League Working Committee resolution of 17 June 1940 as 'to train and discipline Muslims in co-ordinated activity for social and physical uplift of the Muslims and to maintain peace, tranquillity and order in the country'.

will be clear breach of pledges of His Majesty's Government reaffirmed by Amery in Leeds speech\(^5\) on February 4th. Committee deplore attack by conference and Sapru on Amery who has refused to resile from pledges given to Mussalmans. Committee trust that British Government despite present difficult war situation will not submit to coercive methods adopted by Hindu India and will remain true to their pledges. Ends.

4. Council of League also met on February 22nd while considering confirmation of Working Committee resolution on war emergency passed on previous day. Jinnah, in reply to question whether League Members should or should not co-operate with Government and others in Civil Defence work, said that League had never given slightest hint of non-co-operation with any organization or Government.

\(^5\) In the course of his speech to the Leeds Luncheon Club on 4 February, Mr Amery stated that Britain would stand by pledges given to India, 'both by our general pledge as to India's future freedom, and also by our pledge to the different main elements in India's national life that they shall not be coerced under a system of government which they are not prepared to accept'. L/II/1412: f405.

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I71

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, 23 February 1942

D.-o. No. 387

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

The Premier has just been round to see me and has asked me to pass on the following suggestions to you in case, as he says he has good reason to believe, a further statement about constitutional developments in this country is likely to be issued in the near future.

He urges that the preamble of any such statement should stress the fact that India has earned by the valour of her soldiers on the field the right to a position of full equality with the Dominions within the Empire.

Secondly, he asks that the part played by those who have actively helped in the War should be given a prominent mention in any announcement about the ultimate intentions of the British Government. He suggests that a statement should be made to the effect that when the War is over the British Government will either establish a constitution for India as devised by the main parties concerned in agreement with one another or, failing that, will set about devising one itself, taking into counsel all those who have bestirred themselves to defend the country in the time of danger.
I do not know whether Sikander is right in thinking that a further announce-
ment is contemplated in the immediate future. If he is correct, I think there
is much to be said in favour of making it the occasion for encouraging those
who are already helping the Empire’s cause and for trying to enlist the support
during the remainder of the War of those who have so far done little or nothing
in the way of active assistance. But I fully realise the intense difficulties of evolv-
ing any statement that is likely to be free from objection from all points of
view.

Yours sincerely,
B. J. GLANCY.

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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to Mr Churchill

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 271

23 February 1942

To the Right Hon. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister: I returned to Chung-
king yesterday from my visit to India. I was accorded a warm reception and
kind hospitality by the authorities of India, for which I am deeply grateful.
I am happy to be able to assure you that another step forward has been made
toward closer military collaboration and solidarity between China and India.

With regard to your invitation extended to me to participate in the Pacific
War Council in London, I hereby appoint Dr V. K. Wellington Koo, Ambas-
sador to the Court of St. James’s to be my representative and to attend the
meetings of the Council.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: ff 279–80

NEW DELHI, 23 February 1942, 1.30 pm
Received: 23 February, 3 pm

No. 31D/42. Following is full summary of message released by Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-Shek from Government House Calcutta on evening of February
21st. Begins.

During fortnight in India I have had opportunity of discussing very frankly
with highest Civil and Military authorities and my Indian friends questions concerning joint plans against aggression and objective of our common efforts. I am happy to find full sympathy and general understanding between us. On eve of departure I wish to bid farewell to and thank all my friends in India and address following message to them.

2. There exists among people of India unanimous determination to oppose aggression. China and India comprise one half of world’s population; their common frontier extends to 3,000 kilometres. In two thousand years’ intercourse there has never been armed conflict which is irrefutable proof that our two peoples are peace-loving by nature. Today they have not only identical interests but same destiny so they are in duty bound to side with anti-aggression countries and fight shoulder to shoulder to secure real peace for whole world. Our two peoples have in common outstanding virtue of spirit of self-sacrifice. For sake of justice and righteousness this traditional spirit should move them to self-negation for salvation of mankind and has prompted China to be first to take up arms against aggression and in present war to ally herself unhesitatingly with any anti-aggression countries.

3. At this most critical moment in history of civilization our two peoples should exert themselves to utmost in cause of freedom for all mankind. For only in free world could Chinese and Indian peoples obtain their freedom. Furthermore should freedom be denied to either China or India there could be no real peace in world. Present international situation divides world into two camps. All those opposed to aggression and striving for freedom of their country and mankind should join anti-aggression camp. There is no middle course and no time to await developments. Issue before us does not concern dispute of any one man or country nor any specific question pending between one people and another. Any people joining anti-aggression front co-operates not with any particular country but with entire front.

4. Pacific war is turning point in history of Nationalism. Method however by which peoples of world could attain freedom might be different from what it used to be. Anti-aggression nations now expect that in this new era people of India should voluntarily bear full share of responsibility in present struggle for survival of free world in which India must play part. Vast majority of world’s opinion is in full sympathy with India’s aspirations for freedom. This sympathy which is so valuable and so difficult to obtain cannot be appraised in terms of money or material and should therefore by all means be retained. Should anti-aggression front lose war civilisation of world would suffer set-back for at least hundred years and there would be no end to human sufferings.

5. (Then follows graphic description of Japanese barbarities in China.) In these horrible times of savagery and brute force people of China and India should
give united support to principles embodied in Atlantic Charter and in joint declaration of 26 Nations and ally themselves with anti-aggression front. I hope latter will whole-heartedly join Allies namely China, Britain, America and Soviet Union and participate shoulder to shoulder in struggle for survival of free world until complete victory.

6. Lastly I sincerely hope and confidently believe that our ally Great Britain without waiting for any demands on part of people of India will as speedily as possible give them real political power so that they may be in position further to develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realise that their participation in war is not merely aid to anti-aggression Nations for securing victory, but also turning point in their struggle for India’s freedom. From objective point of view I am of opinion that this would be wisest policy which will redound to credit of British Empire. Ends.

I74

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/509: f 71

NEW DELHI, 23 February 1942, 6:50 pm
Received: 23 February, 10.45 pm
34D/42. Following is summary of statement made by Jinnah to Associated Press on February 22nd.

Begins. Marshal Chiang Kai Shek told me he knew nothing of political and constitutional problems of India, but in parting message he has advised British Government to give real political power and freedom to India. India is not one national State, its two major nations being Hindus and Mussulmans and one third of India is under Princes. It is unfortunate that Marshal should have indulged in generalities without understanding political situation and necessary constitutional adjustments. I fear he is saturated with ideas of those who surrounded him most while in India. While Muslim India yields to none in desire to achieve freedom for all people of India it cannot accept machinations of those who speak in name of freedom for Hindu India only. We want our Hindu brethren to be free but do not want to be ruled by them; both Hindu and Muslim nations should be free equally in respective homelands and zones, any attempt militating against Pakistan demand will lead to gravest disaster in India at this critical moment. I trust British Government and public will not be carried away by generalities in which Marshal has indulged after fortnight’s visit. Ends.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 441-S. Your private and personal telegram No. [2]31 of 21st February. At Chiang Kai-shek’s own request I placed at his disposal two houses on my Estate with separate entrance, for the sole use of himself and his party.

2. No attempt was made to restrict his movements or to prevent him from seeing any visitors he wished to receive. Indeed neither Viceroy nor his Government are aware precisely who were the persons whom the Generalissimo received. Nehru was a frequent caller and also Mrs. Pandit, Nehru’s sister.

3. Generalissimo was asked not to go to Wardha because that has become a place of pilgrimage, as Secretary of State knows; but he arranged to see Gandhi and Jinnah, leaders respectively of Congress and Muslim League. Generalissimo was offered choice of tours possible in the short time available, for which naturally we had to make arrangements. He chose to visit Khyber, Rawalpindi and Lahore. At the same time Madame Chiang went to Agra accompanied only by members of her own staff and Nehru’s sister.

4. So far as we know, there was no moment of difficulty during the visit. The feelings on all sides were most friendly and cordial. Generalissimo and Madame Chiang and the whole of their staff were much liked by all who came into touch with them. My Commander-in-Chief and General Staff report that there was complete accord.

5. Generalissimo was particularly pleased at being told everything in connection with military matters and repeatedly expressed his satisfaction on this score to the Viceroy. Apparently he was much gratified at being regarded as an equal and an Ally and not as a “backward boy”.

6. His own departing message to me, published today, is a good answer.

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1 Requesting material with which to controvert any allegation that Chiang Kai-Shek had not been free in his movements and could go nowhere nor see anyone unless the Government had arranged it.

2 No. 158.
176

Mr Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (via H.M. Ambassador, Bagdad)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 246

FOREIGN OFFICE, 24 February 1942, 12.40 am

218. Please pass to Sir A. Clark Kerr on arrival. Personal.
I should be grateful for your personal comments on Chiang Kai-shek's visit to India.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICE ROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 24 February 1942

Your Excellency,
I deeply appreciate Your Excellency's message,¹ and assure you that Lady Linlithgow and I will long retain the happiest recollections of your visit and that of Madame Chiang.

I fully share your satisfaction that substantial results have been achieved in concerting our joint action against aggression and in the close co-ordination of military plans.

Here in India we will take to heart and follow the good advice which Your Excellency has given us out of the plenitude of China's bitter experiences. We will unite to resist the ruthless and brutal aggressor. We will stand shoulder to shoulder with the brave Chinese army and people whose strength is in Your Excellencies' wise and constant leadership. Come what may, we will be with you until the Japanese power is utterly broken.

I trust Your Excellency and Madame Chiang are well and rested after the fatigues of so crowded and strenuous a visit.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

¹ No. 158.
THE TRANSFER OF POWER

178

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 24 February 1942, 11.5 pm

No. 444-S. I have today seen Reuters report, dated London, 23rd February, of anticipations of a new approach to the Indian problem. I cannot but be sorry that this should have happened because expectations must be raised and any announcement by the Prime Minister must to that extent fall flat. I propose explaining this away privately as an echo of the Prime Minister's promise of further consideration in his reply to Sapru.

1 No Reuter report of 23 February such as Lord Linlithgow describes has been traced. However, he may have seen on the 24th the Reuter message dated London, 24 February, which appeared in The Times of India of 25 February. This said that Chiang Kai-Shek's appeal that Great Britain should give India 'all political power as speedily as possible' was noted with sympathy by the British Government. The message concluded that the War Cabinet was going thoroughly into the whole situation. 'As the Prime Minister has indicated to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, he will make a comprehensive statement on the attitude and intentions of the British Government before long.'

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 24 February 1942

My dear Hallett,

I am very glad you wrote to me about Nehru and was most interested to hear your views.1 My Home Department, as you know, have been making a collection of his reported speeches since his release, although they had not received the particular ones to which your letter refers; and they, and also I myself, agree entirely with your analysis of his attitude. He has not changed an atom and he is so obsessed by his hatred for us—or what he calls British Imperialism—that he is blind to the harm that he is doing to his own countrymen. That is not the mark of a big man; and therefore the questions I ask myself are whether we may not only add to his stature by prosecuting him, and—what is far more important—whether there are not other and better ways of taking the wind out of his sails. The danger lies not in what he says, but in the effect it produces. Let us see then what can be done to neutralise the kind of poison that he and
others are instilling by the more positive plan of action which I put to you in my letter of February the 17th\(^2\) regarding the formation of a National Defence Front. In particular I would refer you to what I said towards the end of paragraph 3 of that letter. If we can show that we have got another answer besides putting people in jail, that we are not incompetent, and that we can lead and help the people in the present emergency, we shall have done more to discredit Nehru than any number of prosecutions. If what we can achieve in those directions does not come up to expectations—and we shall require to have at least a section of the people actively behind us—I do not dismiss the possibility that even more drastic action than mere prosecution may eventually be needed against Nehru and people of his sort.

2. Apart from this you will, I am sure, agree that it would be difficult to choose a worse moment than the present to proceed against Nehru—just after his repeated conversations with Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek and almost before the Generalissimo’s back is turned. On whatever grounds we might base a prosecution, no one would believe that it had not some sinister connection with those conversations, and the effect on world opinion, and particularly in America, might well be disastrous. As regards the conversations themselves I can only tell you that I am myself well satisfied with the Marshal’s attitude towards us. I was impressed by his determination to bring India in wholeheartedly against the Japanese and I believe that his contacts with Nehru will make it definitely more difficult for the latter actively to oppose our war effort. It was indeed noticeable that the speech that Nehru made to a very large audience in Delhi on February the 11th\(^3\) was moderate in tone—so much so in fact that his audience is reported to have been definitely disappointed.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.
THE INDIAN ARMY IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY

1. COMMUNAL AND PROVINCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY

The latest available figures for the class composition of the Indian Army are for the 1st January, 1941. These show that out of a total of 418,000 Indian Army personnel at that date, 155,000 (approximately 37%) were Mohammedans and 263,000 were Hindus and other religions (including 51,000 Sikhs). Of this total, the Punjab contributed 201,000 or 48%, of which 96,000 were Moslems and 51,000 Sikhs. Nepal contributed 46,000 (11%). No other area contributed as much as 10% of the total. 35,000 (8%) of Mohammedans came from the North West Frontier Province. The principal Congress strongholds (Bombay, Central Provinces, United Provinces and Bihar) together contributed only 63,000 or 15.2%. Of the 104,000 non-Mohammedans from the Punjab, 28,000 were Dogras, 14,000 were Jats and 51,000 were Sikhs, i.e., a large proportion was confined to particular classes within the Province. The Bombay contribution of 18,700 was almost entirely from the martial class of Mahrattas.

Since these figures were compiled, there has been a vast expansion of the Indian Army which now totals about 1 million. In this expansion recruits have been drawn from Bengal, Assam, Bihar and Orissa as well as from the Provinces previously drawn upon. Recruits from new classes of the population have also been obtained from the Provinces previously drawn upon as well as large increases from the ordinary sources of supply.

2. EXTENT OF CONGRESS INFLUENCE IN THE INDIAN ARMY

It is difficult to assess the influence of Congress with the soldiery. In the pre-war Army it is probably safe to say that it was negligible. The soldier’s reaction to Congress was limited to an apprehension of what his own future would be if the British Raj were to abrogate its powers and he, the soldier, were left at the mercy of a body of Indian politicians, drawn mainly from parts of India of which the bulk of the soldiers knew little and whose inhabitants they in many cases regarded almost as foreigners. There is still a strong feeling that the British officer is the surest guardian of the soldier’s interests. India is not yet a nation. The Pathan or Punjabi soldier is as much a foreigner in, say, the C.P. or Southern India, as the British officer. The Bengali is to many classes in the Army an object of contempt. Except in the U.P., where Congress has
some influence in the villages from which men are enlisted, there are no classes
which one could say were specially susceptible to Congress influence.

There is no reason to suppose that the feelings of the now greatly expanded
Army, drawn mainly from pre-war classes, is any different from that of the
old. There is no evidence whatever to show that concessions to Congress would
have any beneficial effect on recruiting or the fighting spirit of the Armed Forces.
At the same time if concessions to Congress were made as the result of agree-
ment between all Indian political parties, the Army would be unlikely to be
adversely affected. But such agreement seems extremely unlikely. What does
seem likely is that any concessions to Congress would produce a violent reac-
tion from the Moslem League. Should this happen, and should Mr. Jinnah and
his party attempt to stir up serious trouble, the effect upon the Army might be
disastrous. Communal feeling, at present almost non-existent inside units, would
be aroused. The soldier overseas, whether Hindu or Moslem, would un-
doubtedly feel great and natural anxiety about affairs at Home, and morale
and efficiency would most certainly suffer. Mohammedan recruiting might
cease.

To sum up. It is difficult to say how any concession to Congress would assist
the war effort in respect to the Military personnel of the Army. On the other
hand it might result in the ruin of the Indian Army as at present constituted.

The Sikhs present a somewhat separate problem from other classes. They
are a separate, warlike, and politically minded community. In 1940 there was
considerable anxiety over the Sikh situation and the number of recruits de-
sired was difficult to obtain. One of the main reasons for this reluctance to
enlist, as well as for the number of desertions which occurred, was the current
opinion that if Sikhs went overseas their lands and villages would be seized
by the Mohammedans who were plotting to seize power in the Punjab. Sikhs
were therefore wanted in India to protect the community against the Moham-
medans. The Sikhs might welcome concessions to Congress if they did not
involve concessions to the Moslem League.

1 Circulated to the War Cabinet Committee on India.
2 The probable date of the document has been determined from its place in the file.
Prime Minister
Any declaration of Indian policy for the future must make it clear, unequivocally, that we stand by our pledge of 1940, to the Moslems and the Princes, that they are not to be coerced into any system of Indian Government of which they disapprove. This is in any case vital at present, in view of possible effects upon the Moslem element in the Indian Army.

On the other hand, our insistence on agreement has been widely taken as giving Mr. Jinnah a veto on all constitutional progress in India, and as a mere excuse on our part for doing nothing. This has peculiarly infuriated Hindu leaders, vide Sapru's comments\(^1\) on myself as the most disastrous Secretary of State India has ever known.

There is only one way of meeting this criticism, and that is to couple with a reaffirmation of our pledge to the minorities, the positive affirmation that the majority can go ahead of itself if it wants to.

Happily, the distribution of Moslems and Hindus is such that this can be done on a purely provincial basis, by declaring that if a majority of provinces agree upon a constitution, we will accept it so far as they are concerned, leaving dissident provinces to stay out for the time being or even altogether.

This is indeed the logical consequence of the whole attitude we have taken up once we have left it to Indians to frame their own constitution. That has in fact meant treating them like the Dominions, in whose case federation or union has invariably come by agreement and with freedom to stay out on the part of any particular unit.

In the case of Canada, the original Dominion of 1867 consisted only of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Manitoba and the North West only came in in 1870, British Columbia in 1871 (with a definite promise to have a transcontinental railway provided for it); Prince Edward Island in 1873. Newfoundland, which was included in the original constitution, never came in at all, but became a somewhat precarious Dominion afterwards.

In the case of Australia, New South Wales stipulated that it would only come in on a referendum in which it decided itself the size of the majority which was to count for adhesion. In 1898 the referendum gave a clear majority of some thousands, but not enough to meet the arbitrary figure laid down by New South Wales. Adhesion was only secured by a second referendum in
1890. Western Australia only came in after a referendum in 1900. New Zealand decided to stay out altogether and became a separate Dominion.

In the case of South Africa, Natal insisted on having a special plebiscite. Provision was made for Southern Rhodesia and the Protectorates coming into the Union. Southern Rhodesia for many years joined the Union for customs purposes, but has otherwise firmly decided to stay outside and hopes to be a Dominion on its own. The Protectorates have up to date decided to stay outside, under direct British authority.

Even in India, Burma was separated on the ground of its essentially different character and in view of the trend (by no means unanimous) of public opinion there. As regards the States, it was never suggested that they should be compelled to come in, but only that the adhesion of a certain proportion of them was required to justify us in launching the Federation.

In all these cases the staying out, temporary or permanent, of particular units has involved some complications. In the case of Burma, the Customs Union was maintained for a definite period and there was a difficult financial adjustment. Similar difficulties would occur—and indeed occur now—in the case of States standing outside an Indian Federation. They would occur similarly in the case of any province or group of provinces that stayed outside. They are none of them insuperable. On the other hand, unless the principle of freedom to individual provinces is conceded, the deadlock remains insuperable and every section in India is increasingly embittered against ourselves and against each other.

As a matter of fact, the practical reasons for maintaining some sort of unity in India are so great that, once freedom of choice is conceded, I believe they will all come in. The one thing that is certain to bring about Pakistan in its extreme form and with both Moslem and Hindu India antagonistic to ourselves, is to shirk the issue.

I therefore urge that the first essential of any declaration we may make is to make it clear that our pledges to the smaller elements do not preclude the rest from going ahead if they wish to.

L. S. AMERY.

1 Made during the course of his Presidential Address to the Non-Party Leaders Conference at Delhi on 21 February.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 449–S. It has been strongly represented to me by certain of my advisers that no constitutional declaration by the Prime Minister would carry conviction unless he were definitely to say at this stage that the eventual post-war constitution of India would contain no provisions for the safeguarding of British interests as such, and that such interests would be regulated by diplomatic negotiations between an autonomous Government of India, when set up, and Great Britain and respective Dominions.

2. I am not prepared to deny the effectiveness of such an approach, but the support of the British commercial community, shortsighted as they may sometimes be, is as experience has shown, of the greatest possible importance to the Governor-General, and it would be of vital importance if our present scheme fails; and I cannot lightly risk jettisoning it. I have been at particular pains (and with some success) to try and carry them with me and with His Majesty’s Government, and am most anxious to continue to do so. I should myself therefore be most reluctant now to appear to initiate any such approach as that suggested which will certainly be regarded¹ by Europeans as gratuitous sacrifice to the Birlas and Walchands.²

3. On the other hand if His Majesty’s Government share the view expressed by my advisers, and find it possible to get heads in London of major firms³ to accept it and to allow me to do some lobbying in secrecy pointing out that they would not do too badly under treaty arrangements, the position might be different. I would welcome your views on this.

4. You should know that there is a strong element of opposition in Calcutta to Catto’s attitude,⁴ and that if any such proposition was to be got across, solid support from other major firms, and probably some degree of direct consultation between them and their representatives here, would be essential. For the moment I have included the suggestion in a sketch declaration⁵ being telegraphed to you today. But it must be regarded as subject to what I have said in this telegram and I am wholly uncommitted regarding it pending receipt of your views.

¹ Deciphered as ‘appreciated’.
² The Birla brothers and Hirachand Walchand were respectively proprietors of some of the largest Indian-owned industrial concerns.
³ ‘major firms’ deciphered as ‘major Indian firms’.
⁴ See No. 80.
⁵ See No. 183, para. 5, Point 3.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

25 February 1942

Received: 25 February, 8 pm

No. 451-S. Prime Minister's broadcast—constructive suggestions.

(1) In a succeeding telegram I set out the background and explanation of my suggestions which I hope will convince you that I have gone to utmost limit that my conscience and any Viceroy's capacity to bear the burden will admit.

(2) To save delay I send a sketch of declaration in this telegram. Obviously if Prime Minister makes any declaration it ought to be added that this declaration is not a hasty expedient consequent upon deterioration in military situation or forced by Cabinet changes in England and that Viceroy will do his utmost to implement it for sake both of India herself and in order to make every possible contribution to common cause of ourselves and allies.

(3) I have not attempted under heavy pressure to be meticulous in my choice of words. We may gain much by presenting our plan in a form and under a name that will appeal to the man in the street all over the world. For this purpose the master hand of the Prime Minister himself would be of the greatest value; and I venture to suggest that if the framework indicated in this sketch finds acceptance in principle you might secure and send me a draft framed with a view to its appeal and allow me to suggest precise modifications of verbal expression which, while not damning it in Indian eyes, would not commit us to the impossible.

(4) Points in the originally proposed broadcast by the Prime Minister are dealt with as follows:

Point 1. I would not overstate the danger to India: what may work as a tonic in Great Britain may have reverse effect here.

Points 2, 3 and 4 would be incorporated.

Points 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 would be dropped; but representatives of India in points 7 and 8 would be nominated and instructed from India.

Point 10 (acceptance of constitution so arrived at) is widened in its scope in my point 11, but restricted in its ultimate operation by the conception of our obligations stated in my point 4. My point 9 tries to keep the field open for something of a zonal nature in the initial post-war stages without referring to it specifically now.

1 No. 184.   2 'appeal' was received corrupt.   3 No. III.
4 'reverse' deciphered as 'death sentence'.   5 'from India' omitted in decipher.
Point 11 is replaced by my points 3, 4, 7, which are wider in scope and face consequences involved.

As regards point 3 (British interests) please emphasise most strongly difficulties represented in my telegram No. 449-S, dated 25th February. We don’t want to sacrifice our last friends in India on a gamble.

Second sentence of point 6 ("while...British interests") is also connected.

Reference at end of my point 6 is to possibility of creating a portfolio of Defence Co-ordination which already has a Secretary and can handle urgent and important matters involving close liaison between operational and civil departments.

(s) Following is sketch outline:

Point 1. India is in grave danger and the times demand the united efforts of her sons and daughters.

Point 2. Opinion in India and among our friends in the world is puzzled by the Indian problem. Almost universal opinion in England wants to give India her freedom, and cannot understand why if the difficulties that His Majesty’s Government set forth are real they should not be appreciated by political opinion in India. While the fighting forces of India by their valour in the field have won the respect of the world and have achieved real equality with free men the world over, political opinion in India is baffled and disturbed by a sense of frustration approaching to bitterness at what they regard as our failure to solve the problem. I believe that in past year many in India have progressively realised that there is a problem to be solved, and I sometimes wonder whether an apparent reluctance to admit this boldly from the public platform is not due to a fear that any such admission would be exploited by ourselves to maintain our grip on India for the preservation of our own interests, whether Imperial, strategic, commercial or professional.

Point 3. At the outset therefore His Majesty’s Government declare that they have no intention of impeding the attainment of India’s freedom in any way for the preservation of purely British interests. As proof of this they now declare that they make no insistence on provisions in the post-war constitution of India for the safeguarding of British interests as such. Such interests will be the subject of diplomatic negotiation in the post-war period to culminate in a series of bilateral pacts between a then autonomous Government of India on the one hand and His Majesty’s Governments of Great Britain and the respective Dominions on the other.

Point 4. His Majesty’s Government regard the obligations which history has laid upon them as entirely separate from British interests, and construe those obligations as requiring His Majesty’s Government to see that full power is transferred to a Government in India under which the different races, communities and interests in India may have the prospect of living and surviving
without fear, and of developing their religious, cultural, economic and political life, not without trouble—for that cannot be—but without despair or bloodshed; our promises are to be read and understood in the light of this declaration.

Point 5. This is no time to make profound changes in the existing machinery of Government, or hamper the authorities who are carrying on the war, and I appeal to the leaders of the great political parties and communities to sink their differences and take their full share in the power and responsibility of Government, both at the Centre and in the Provinces. With this end in view the Viceroy will renew his attempts to bring together the leaders of parties in order that both his Executive Council and the Governments in the Provinces may, within the framework of the present constitution, enjoy the overwhelming support of the people of India.

Point 6. His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the great importance attached by Indian opinion to the disappearance from the thus reconstituted Executive Council of the official Members. While on the one hand they categorically assert that such Members will not be retained in any sense for the preservation of purely British interests, they regard this not as a political matter but as a purely practical matter of war-time administration which must be considered from time to time as the form of Government they envisage develops in practice. They decline therefore to make any promise on this matter as a pre-requisite of a political truce in India. But if while leaving this point in abeyance the political leaders in India can see their way to respond to the renewed efforts which the Viceroy will make for the attainment of a political truce, the question is one which he will be prepared to discuss round the table as a practical problem of administration with such leaders as may emerge as likely to be those from among whom his future colleagues in a National Government will be drawn. The position of the Commander-in-Chief must remain unimpaired, but it may well be found possible to associate a non-official member much more closely with the problems of co-ordination of the Defence.

Point 7. Consistently with their desire to see brought into being an autonomous Government of India as soon as possible after the war, and to recognise without delay the de facto status of India under a National Government, His Majesty’s Government also declare that during the interim period such control as the India Office exercises under the present constitution over Indian affairs will be exercised with a progressively lighter hand, and that the relations of the India Office with His Majesty’s Government will become progressively more of diplomatic and less of a departmental character. They instance, in particular, their desire that India’s chosen spokesmen at the meetings of the British War Cabinet and of the Pacific War Council, shall be instructed from India, likewise they desire that the representative or representatives of British India at the Peace Conference shall be nominated by, and be directly responsible

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6 No. 182. 7 Deciphered as 'commercial'. 8 Deciphered as 'internal'.
to, a Government in India which will have earned the confidence of its peoples by leading them to a partnership in the common victory.

Point 8. His Majesty's Government stand by their pledges to afford to a body representative of the parties, communities and interests of India, and brought into being in accordance with the wishes of her leaders, the fullest opportunity to devise the framework of a constitution after the war.

Point 9. A time-limit after which Britain would impose her own form of Dominion Status upon India would only handicap agreement in India itself and would whittle down the fundamental principle which the Prime Minister now reasserts with all emphasis—that the basis of India's future after the war must be her complete freedom of control of her own destiny. He makes this assertion in the hope that in the exercise of that freedom she will be able eventually to preserve and re-establish on firmer foundations that unity of India as a whole which history has shown to count so much for her dignity among the powers of the world and even for her survival. He confidently hopes that in the exercise of that freedom she will continue within the fellowship of the British Commonwealth and play a worthy part in the great tasks that lie ahead of all peoples when victory has been secured.

Point 10. His Majesty's Government undertake to do all in their power within the shortest practicable time after the end of the war, to promote the peaceful setting-up of autonomous government in India, and believe that the experience of co-operation, in attaining victory, between the parties and communities of British India and the Rulers of the Indian States, will itself go far in promoting mutual respect and esteem and allaying apprehensions.

Point 11. His Majesty's Government, with the support of all political parties in Great Britain, undertake for themselves to accept in advance and (though constitutionally they cannot bind their successors) have no doubt that their then successors will recommend to Parliament for legal ratification, any constitution framed as contemplated in this declaration and therefore representing the will and desire of India as a whole.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

26 February 1942, 4.10 pm

No. 459-S. In my telegram No. 451-S¹ I have sent my constructive suggestions in the form of a sketch announcement for Prime Minister. I have given them deep thought in the midst of heavy war preoccupations of which the Prime
Minister will fully appreciate the urgency and burden. I have done my best to meet his difficulties and those of His Majesty’s Government by taking every risk I can including the loss of European support—a risk against which I feel it vital to be protected. But I cannot take risks which I feel would be decisive against successful conduct of the war in this theatre.

2. Left to myself I would have held to the position expressed in my telegram No. 104—S² of 21st January. I fully appreciate—and the Prime Minister must appreciate better than I can—the moral advantages to be gained outside India by a striking new declaration. But in my view the necessity does not arise primarily from difficulties here, and the immediate internal gain in the prosecution of the war is more than doubtful. I cannot say that any declaration would have tangible effect, for example, in keeping factory labour at work under threat of air-raids; less still will declaration or anything else inspire the people of Eastern India to “fight the invader from house to house”. On the other hand I do agree that in arousing enthusiasm of the intelligentsia, middle classes and students lies the most hopeful possibility of arousing enthusiasm of masses, and I do not underrate the importance to our troops operating, if they must, against invader on Indian soil, of having behind them a population which without undue danger to itself might actively co-operate, for example, in local supplies, transport facilities and information. To this extent we might get tangible benefit from a new declaration if it caught on. But never forget the historical readiness of the masses of India to attorn to whatever Ruler can succeed in conquering the country. Political leaders may talk big now—they know that we shall keep the gloves on in fighting them. Many of them would truckle to the Japs if they thought we were losing.

3. I am not at all sanguine that my sketch declaration would either win over or split the Congress and we shall be taking a risk of upsetting the Muslims as well as the Europeans. If Congress did split the line of cleavage would probably leave Gandhi and Nehru (spell binders Nos. 1 and 2) on the wrong side.

4. I can only hope that a new declaration on these lines would not rattle the services. We should perhaps have to tell them that an efficient and contented public service will be so essential to a workable constitution that they need not be alarmed. I have grave misgivings on this.

5. I would far prefer if possible to postpone a declaration until Military situation had clarified. Declaration would be worth much more after even a temporary improvement in our position than at a time when we might be represented as unloading ill-gotten gains in a panic. On the other hand it is

¹ No. 183. ² No. 23. ³ Deciphered as ‘active’.
important to forestall the Axis. By the time a decision is taken on this matter the immediate situation may be better or worse, and we may not have a free choice of timing.

6. I need not reiterate the objections to the Prime Minister’s original proposals which I stated in my telegrams No. 302-S\(^4\) dated 13th February and No. 324-S\(^5\) dated 15th February and which are shared by all Presidency Governors, vide my telegram No. 411-S\(^6\) dated 21st February. In my view, a view in which I am supported by the best and most unprejudiced advice available to me, there are fundamental and utterly insuperable objections, which I have already stated, to combining in one body (which incidentally would leave out the fighting men who are going to have a say after the war) the post-war functions of constitution-making and the war-time functions of an extra-constitutional caucus of political representatives, which must inevitably press for power without possessing responsibility or organisation.

7. I have considered as a possibility making a firm declaration now of the kind the Prime Minister has in mind, but of taking no action to implement it until after the war, that is to say of limiting our practical steps at the moment to that expansion of my Executive Council which we have been recently discussing between ourselves. But if the new offer caught on and powerful politicians were prepared to co-operate, we should have to take them in.

8. In considering what we can offer I have borne in mind the following overriding considerations:

(1) If we are going to offer transfer of power the transfer must be effective. We must take the risks with our eyes open.

(2) Such transfer of power must be based on the employment of existing organs and machinery of Government, however expanded or modified, to suit the purpose. In that process of expansion or modification we must be prepared if necessary to seek rapid amendment of the present Act in matters of detail when they arise. But Parliament must without any question retain enough eventual control to ensure—

(a) That we shall be in a position after the war to discharge our obligations as defined; and

(b) That I shall be supported during the period of "interim National Government" in resisting developments which would impede our war effort either by placing an intolerable burden upon the Governor-General or by creating administrative or communal confusion within the Government itself or by giving rise to such alarm on the part of the Muslims and others as would threaten serious internal trouble. These last words have particular reference to Jinnah’s fears that in the absence of some real citadel of Parliamentary control, a National Government consisting of an Executive Council nominally re-
sponsible to the Crown would in fact soon become responsible to political parties
in the Legislature and could not long remain amenable to leadership or the
moderating influence in communal affairs of the Governor-General. Sapru’s
friends must realise this, but perhaps dare not face the issue in public. There was
not one Muslim of consequence at their last meeting, and you must have seen the
League’s “revolt” resolution7 following upon Sapru’s meeting of 22nd February.
(3) The essential necessity of co-operation and co-ordination between British
India and the States both during the war and afterwards.

(4) The equal necessity of not breaking our word of August 1940 to the
Princes, Muslims and Minorities or jettisoning our genuine obligations.

(5) We cannot give a time-limit without exasperating the Muslims but must
give some hint of abandoning after the war a purely sitting back attitude.

9. If it is said that these postulates will whittle down the scope of anything
we may say to a mere elaboration of the August 1940 offer, my answer is that
we cannot get over hard facts, but that if the attitude of the political parties
is at all susceptible to alteration, some hope lies in the manner of approach.
The question is not merely one of promises however large. It is equally one of
getting Indians to believe that we mean them. Indians generally suspect that
when we talk about our obligations we mean to use them as an excuse to keep
our fingers in the pie and look after our own interests. I have suggested an
approach on these lines in the forefront of my sketch declaration, but I repeat
the danger to European Commercial opinion here. We can only reassure them
by urging that we must base our appeal on confidence in victory rather than
on panic, and a Britain that emerges from the war as a first-class power need
not be afraid of driving as good a bargain as she wants with India, especially
when there will be no further excuse for Members of the British Parliament
to be briefed by Indian vested interests adverse to those of Britain. If this is to
be got across (and it is very important to me that it should) we must be able
to prepare the ground. My telegram No. 449–58 dated 25th February explains.

10. We can stand on our obligations once they are separated from our
interests. My sketch formula for dealing with them is the positive converse
of the negative pledge to Muslims, Minorities and Princes in the August 1940
declaration. Its wording will need careful scrutiny.

11. My attitude about official Executive Councillors is contained in point 6
of my sketch. We must not impair the position of the Commander-in-Chief;
to give defence administration to a non-official Indian would create a com-
munal dog-fight about the army.9 To give him defence policy would be un-
thinkable. We already have Benthall in mind for Transport. As regards Home
and Finance, if I could relegate the question to the field of practical necessity

4 No. 121. 5 No. 129. 6 No. 160. 7 No. 170. 8 No. 182. 9 Deciphered as 'notion'.
and remove it from the sphere of political controversy, I might conceivably
achieve by appealing to political leaders destined to become my colleagues a
more objective approach to this problem than is possible so long as it remains
a predominantly political and racial issue. On the other hand, I must em-
phatically stipulate that the discontinuance of official membership should not
be promised as part of any declaration. I must ask the Prime Minister to realise
the enormous burden that would be thrown upon any one man who tried
to hold the office of Governor-General and Crown Representative within the
framework of the present constitution, with the addition at the Centre of an
active Cabinet of politicians with no practical conception of the difference
between policy and administration.

The Viceroy would have to bear—

(a) A greater burden in war time in his capacity as Governor-General alone
than Anderson had to shoulder in Bengal in 1937. He can be asked what it was
like in peace time;

(b) The Defence burden;

(c) The burden of his arbitral position as between the Centre and the
Provinces;

(d) The burden of his position as intermediary between the Secretary of
State and any Province in which Ministerial Government might not be func-
tioning; and

(e) His position as Crown Representative.

(a) and (b) alone are in war time more than enough for the whole time
energies of any human being. (c) and (d) if they are to be effectively discharged
in any but the highest fields of policy, are the business not of a man but of a
corporation represented to some extent at present by my Public and Reforms
Secretariats, and (e) can at times be a very heavy addition. Though it is possible
by subterfuges to disguise the largely impersonal nature of the control in (c)
and (d), and (given an Adviser of adequate quality) to delegate much of that
in (e), no such impersonation is possible in (a). The appointment of Advisers
in direct association with myself for Finance and Home may not be as easy
as it looks. I have grave doubts how long a really powerful Council would
tolerate the interposition between myself and them of permanent non-political
Advisers. Given peace time conditions it might have been possible for one
man to bear the burden for a period in the hope that he would in due course
be substantially relieved by the Prime Minister of a Federation. In war time I
doubt whether any man could stand the pace. Complete subordination of the
Provinces to Departments of the Government of India might partly solve the
administrative difficulty, but would be politically impossible, because the pro-
spect would exasperate the Muslims and constitutionally unwise because of the
vital necessity of protecting the integrity of an eventual Federation of which
Provincial and State Autonomy is an essential feature. Short therefore of
appointing one Governor-General for the Central Government, another for
the control of Provincial Governors and a super-Governor-General in an arbitral
position between them it might prove impossible to prevent the burden from
becoming entirely intolerable except by having a certain number of permanent
Advisers in the Executive Council itself.

12. I have given you all I can and I wish the necessity had not been forced
upon me. It is for the Prime Minister to decide when he sees what is involved
whether he can carry it and make it possible for me to carry it also.

10 ‘Public’ omitted in decipher.

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War Cabinet
Committee on India. I (42) 1st Meeting

L/PO/6/106b: ff. 332–3

Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1.,
on Wednesday, 26th February, 1942 at 6.0 pm

Present
The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.,
Prime Minister (in the Chair).
The Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs.
The Right Hon. Sir John Anderson,
M.P., Lord President of the
Council.
The Right Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P.,
Secretary of State for India
and Secretary of State for Burma.

Secretary... Sir Edward Bridges.¹

The Meeting had before them:
(a) A Note by the Secretary of the War Cabinet, circulating telegrams be-
    tween the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy (W.P. (42) 87).²

¹ The particulars above are reproduced in the form in which they appeared in the original document.
In subsequent cases they are summarised.
² Sir E. Bridges’ note, dated 18 February, circulated Nos. 111, 112, 121, 124 and 129 to the War
   Cabinet, by direction of the Prime Minister.
(b) Two Notes by the Secretary of State for India, circulating further telegrams (I. (42) 2 and 3).  

Preliminary discussion took place on the terms of the proposed statement. It was suggested that the question could conveniently be considered under the two following heads. First, the terms of any fresh public announcement, which should make clear beyond any doubt the nature of what we promised to India. Secondly, whether any further Constitutional advance should be made at the present time.

In discussion, it was also suggested that a new sentence should be added in paragraph 10 of the outline of the proposed statement (Telegram 3-U dated 13th February, from the Secretary of State, in W.P. (42) 87), after the sentence ending “an expression of the desire of the people of India as a whole to adopt the proposals so framed”. This sentence should embody a suggestion made by the Secretary of State for India in a Minute4 which he had sent to the Prime Minister, and should be on the following lines:

“It may be that some of the Provinces would not come into the scheme; but this would not prevent other Provinces from going ahead with the scheme if they so wished.”

No decisions were recorded, and the Committee agreed to meet again at 5 p.m. on the following day.

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3 Mr Amery’s two notes, dated 26 February, circulated Nos. 182, 183 and 184 to the Committee on India, by direction of the Prime Minister.

4 No. 181.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

26 February 1942

No. 460-S. Your telegram No. 31491 of 19th February. Armbindia telegram No. 3062-G2 is dated February 14th and since then events have happened which have tended slightly to alter the situation, but the comments I give below are not entirely based on changes which have occurred during the last ten days.

2. Telegram tends to emphasise the darker side of the picture. My detailed comment is as follows:

Paragraph 1. For various reasons, to which the recent visit of Generalissimo largely contributes, antipathy towards the Japanese has noticeably strengthened. Open expressions of sympathy are indeed almost entirely confined to Forward Bloc elements, but the use of the term “Hindu” in describing these elements is rather misleading. The Congress is rightly described as non-co-operative
notwithstanding the conditional co-operation tendered by certain leaders, but
the Muslim League as an organisation is no more co-operative, although mem-
bers are permitted to co-operate as individuals and many are doing so. Political
leaders are in fact still holding back, but there is not the least doubt that danger
to India is now universally admitted. As regards Communists and the War,
I would say that little practical support is forthcoming from the party although
there is lip service in plenty. A few young professing Communists have applied
for commissions in the Army.

Paragraph 2. I would qualify the second sentence by saying that the labour
situation on the whole is not yet very disturbing.

Paragraph 3. Reference to police. Shortage is apparent in varying degrees
in certain provinces but elsewhere situation is not unsatisfactory. Expansion
of armed police is held up by lack of arms.

Paragraph 4. The spread of anti-war and defeatist rumours is universal,
although the effect from the military point of view is more marked in re-
cruting areas than elsewhere. Possibility of there being enemy agents at work
has not been overlooked, but apart from certain instances linked with Forward
Bloc activities there is no clear indication at present of enemy agencies. Re-
cruting has indeed been adversely affected, but I would be inclined to say that
bad news from the front and fear of the troubles outlined in the second sentence
of paragraph 2 of the telegram have been mostly responsible as deterrents.
Funk is definitely a factor: protection of property and dependants is another.

3. Following are my views on the general situation. The fall of Singapore
did not come as a surprise to the public and the shock was somewhat softened
in consequence; but the immediate effect on the general public has been per-
ceptibly to increase the alarm. There is widespread apprehension that Japanese
attack on the land of India by sea, land and air cannot be long delayed. Reports
from coastal towns indicate consternation and in one or two areas preparations
were intensified for a large-scale dispersal to places of greater safety. Industrial
centres have not so far been appreciably affected, but a certain amount of
labour unrest in Calcutta is causing anxiety. In several parts of the country,
fear of internal disturbances, possibly communal, is gaining a hold on the
public mind. Press has bitterly criticised neglect of the defences of eastern out-
posts of the Empire. Contributory causes of defeatism are Axis broadcasts,
alarmist rumours circulated by evacuees from Burma and the Far East, and
the irresponsible utterances of political speakers. There are also indications of
a preparedness on the part of individual Indians to sit quiet and bow to the
inevitable if it has to come.

4. On the credit side, there is growing evidence of an appreciable hardening
of opinion against the Japanese which may in the course of time become

1 Not printed.  2 No. 128.
widespread enough to do something towards restoring morale. Some attribute this development to the visit of Chiang Kai-Shek, others to an awakening to the implications to [of?] the fall of Singapore. Another satisfactory feature is noticeable in the good reception recorded [accorded?] in the press to the Commander-in-Chief’s frank views in the Legislative Assembly in [on?] the East and the gravity of what the future may hold in store. But the historical readiness of the masses to accept a new conqueror must not be underrated especially when they know that he will fight with the gloves off.

5. Some indication of the feeling in the country is reflected in withdrawal from Savings Banks and discharge of Cash Certificates. These are on a far lower scale than in June and July 1940 after the fall of France. The figures for the last week which possibly indicate some increase are not yet available, but the totals for the period December 7th, 1941, to 14th February 1942 were Rs. crores 3·84 (Savings Bank) and 1·99 (Cash Certificates) respectively. Corresponding figures for the period 1st June to 31st July were Rs. crores 11·43 and 4·49. One reason for this marked contrast may be the fact that weak holders have already withdrawn their savings and only a crore of the deposits have been left. The price of gold has tended to rise indicating a sense of insecurity and a tendency to hoarding.

3 Apparently a reference to the Commander-in-Chief’s remarks in answer to a question in the Council of State on 18 February.

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Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

SEVAGRAM, WARDHA, C.P., 26 February 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
Very many thanks for your kind letter and all the trouble you took over the matter about the A.I.S.A. referred to you by me. Your decision tides over my present difficulty.

Your postscript breaks the pervading gloom. I wish the general public had the privilege of knowing that your cheerfulness never forsakes you. May God be with you always.

I am,
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI.

1 No. 156.
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Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

SEVAGRAM, WARDHA, C.P., 27 February 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
I am stupid I forgot to tell you yesterday that the A.I.S.A. had tried to keep within and under the law. But I will not weary you with the technicalities. You know how the law often floors the lawyers. This case is one such. But no more at the present juncture.

I am,
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/509: f 83

NEW DELHI, 27 February 1942, 1.15 pm
Received: 27 February, 3.15 pm

370/42. Following is summary of Press statement made by Ambedkar at Bombay on 25th February.

Begins. Main difficulties of giving effect to Chiang Kai Shek’s appeal to British Government are that Congress does not agree that future constitution of India must have the consent of certain important elements in national life of India; and that the British Government does not realize its responsibilities. Congress forgets (? Hindu)ism is thoroughly Anti-Democratic Political Ideology of the same character as Fascist or Nazi Ideology. Not only Muslims but Depressed Classes and non-Brahmins consider Hindu majority let loose will be menace to those outside Hinduism. If India is to be made safe for democracy, some arrangement of check and balance must be agreed on before power is transferred from British to Indian hands. But Amery cannot stop telling the Indians to produce agreed solution of their constitutional differences. Final responsibility for settling differences rests on the British Government because they deny Indian people the ultimate means of settling the Constitutional deadlock, namely civil war.
2. British Government should make declaration in the following terms: (1) That it is proposed to raise India to status of Dominion within 3 years from the date of peace; (2) That the elements in national life of India shall produce agreed solution of constitutional differences within one year of signing of Armistice; (3) That failing agreement British Government will submit dispute to International Tribunal for decision and (4) that when such decision is given British Government shall undertake to give effect to it as part of Dominion Constitution for India.

3. This declaration would meet point of view of Jinnah and Depressed Classes, and also Congress view that no elements should be allowed to veto birth of Dominion Constitution. The war is argument in favour of making such declaration, as it will bring to (corrupt group) people appreciation of war purpose.

4. No interim National Government should be established if it means conceding Jinnah’s 50 per cent claim. National Government cannot do more in war effort than what is being done, as British Government failed to develop India’s capacity in peace time. India must look to England for her defence and ask her to send out means of defence which she is hoarding for her own safety. Ends.

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*War Cabinet*

*Committee on India. Paper I (42) 4*

*L/PO/6/106b: ff 316-24*

**MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA COVERING DRAFT DECLARATION**

**INDIA OFFICE, 27 February 1942**

The problem before the Committee falls into two clearly separate, though interrelated, parts. The first is the redefinition and clarification of our policy with regard to India’s future status and constitution. The second is the question of what interim powers can be conceded to political India now and in the light of our future policy.

The aim of our future policy has been repeatedly defined as Dominion Status in the fullest sense of the word. By the Declaration of August 1940 we laid down that this was to be under a constitution devised for themselves by Indians, but only by agreement. That declaration has been welcomed by Moslems, Princes and other minorities. But it has been regarded with suspicion by political India (a) because our insistence on agreement is regarded as an excuse for encouraging an indefinite deadlock; (b) because we have not actually said we
would accept the Indian-devised constitution; (c) because our reference to our historic obligations is held to imply that we shall impose so many safeguards and restrictions, more particularly in the interests of British trade, that Dominion Status will in fact be nullified.

I attach an attempt to clarify this position and remove doubts in the form of a declaration by the Prime Minister. I believe if we go as far as this draft we shall have gone a long way to meet American and even Indian criticism and to create an atmosphere in which such interim concessions as we can offer might possibly be accepted or, if rejected, leave us very much in the right.

I also attach notes on various alternative schemes.

L. S. A.

**Annex 1 to No. 190**

**Draft Declaration**

In accordance with the principles for which we are fighting, principles which have been the life blood of the British Commonwealth and with which the Atlantic Charter is in complete harmony, I declare that His Majesty’s Government recognises India’s rightful position as a Dominion, equal in every respect to the United Kingdom, in no respect subordinated to it, but associated with it in the free and equal partnership of the British Commonwealth and thereby in the fellowship of independent and freedom-loving nations. Within that association, based not on compulsion, but on mutual interest and common ideals, I both hope and believe that India, controlling her own destiny, will wish to remain.

It is obvious that the high and difficult constitutional task involved in giving effect to this declaration cannot be carried through to its fulfilment when the enemy is at India’s gates. For the moment all our efforts must be devoted to the immediate object of preventing the avowed enemies of freedom everywhere from destroying all prospect of freedom, in India and in the rest of the world. But I can at any rate define the principles and the procedure in accordance with which our purpose can, in my opinion, be most speedily and surely fulfilled.

It is our view, already expressed nearly two years ago, that the constitutional framework under which a free India is to live, should be of Indian devising, and correspond to Indian social, economic and political conceptions, and to the peculiar conditions of her complex structure. In this we are only following the principles which have prevailed in the case of every Dominion constitution.

In the case of the Dominions, as, indeed, of every coming together of separate or differing elements into a common political union, that union has been based on free agreement, and there has never been any question of any
unit being compelled to come in under a constitution to which it objected. It was in conformity with that principle that we made it clear in the Viceroy's declaration of August 1940 that His Majesty's Government could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life or be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a government.

That does not, however, imply, in India, any more than it has elsewhere, that progress is to be indefinitely held up by the veto of any one element, whether State, Province, or Community. We believe that, in spite of all the wide divergencies of her internal structure, there is an underlying unity of interest and of outlook in India which is worth preserving, and we sincerely trust that Indians will be able to find agreement upon some constitutional scheme which, while giving the fullest freedom to the various elements to develop their own traditions and way of life, will preserve and establish on firmer foundations that essential unity of India as a whole which the course of history has shown to be of such vital importance both to her internal peace and prosperity and to her security and dignity in relation to the outside world. But if there are Provinces or States which are not prepared to adhere to the constitutional scheme which commends itself to the majority of their fellow-countrymen, we do not consider that the inauguration of that scheme should be held up on that account. Though the difficulties and inconveniences would be great it should not be impossible to devise interim arrangements making provision for the subsequent adhesion of units which had refrained in the first instance, or, if they should eventually so decide, for their subsequent separate political life.

As for the procedure by which India's future constitution is to be framed, that, like the constitution itself, should, in our opinion, be decided by agreement among Indians themselves. All I would observe in this connexion is that the natural basis here, as elsewhere, would seem to be, in the main, the political units, i.e. the several Provinces and States, which are to make their home in the wider framework of union, and will therefore no doubt wish to decide upon the character of their representation at such constitution-framing Conference or Convention as may be agreed upon as well as upon the character of the constitution itself if it is to be acceptable to them.

As for the time-table, that, too, is, in the main, within the decision of Indians themselves. While it is obviously impossible to put into effect an entirely new system of government in the stress of imminent danger, there is no reason why preliminary negotiations with a view to an agreed solution should not take place even now between Indian political leaders. Nor need the setting up of the constitution-framing body necessarily await the technical termination of hostilities if, in the opinion of those concerned, the immediate danger has been
sufficiently removed to enable the public mind of India to concentrate upon constitutional issues. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned I am prepared to undertake that the new Indian constitution shall come into effect within two years of the date on which it is transmitted to His Majesty's Government.

The Declaration of August 1940 drew attention to the responsibility imposed on His Majesty's Government by the obligations arising from Great Britain's long connexion with India. Certain of these are obligations operative within India in relation to Indian constitutions or communities, such as the rights of minorities or of backward communities, or of the existing members of the public services, for the due fulfilment of which provision will have to be made in any constitution to which His Majesty's Government is to transfer its authority. Similarly provision will have to be made to assure the continuing fulfilment of the obligations of the Crown towards the Indian States which will remain unimpaired except in so far as they may have voluntarily transferred powers to a future Indian Central authority, as well as the fulfilment of existing treaties with other Governments. Subject to these conditions His Majesty's Government will be prepared to accept and implement by legislation in Parliament the constitution which Indians will have framed for themselves.

On the other hand it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to stipulate for the inclusion in the future Indian constitution of any provisions designed to safeguard the interests whether commercial, political or professional of Governments, institutions or private persons extraneous to India, beyond such minimum period as may be necessary to enable such matters to be settled by negotiation between the new Indian Government and the Governments or the parties affected.

If and to such extent as the new Indian Government will wish to continue to avail itself of the assistance of His Majesty's Government in respect of India's defence that matter likewise will, after a corresponding period of transition, remain to be dealt with by free negotiations between the two Governments.

Annex 2 to No. 190

NOTES ON ALTERNATIVES FOR INTERIM MEASURE

Alternative A. To invite the Indian political parties to join in a War Advisory Council which is to be authorised to nominate the Government of India's representatives at the War Cabinet and at the Peace Conference and also to be the constitutional body to frame the future constitution.

The scheme is at first sight attractive but is open to objections which are regarded by the Viceroy as conclusive. It would, I think, be rejected out of hand by Congress as giving Indians no real power, but only foisting them off with an Advisory body. The Moslem League would object to a body which
stereotyped the position when Congress was at its strongest and the League at its weakest. It would, I think, object more especially to such a body nominating India’s representative at the War Cabinet and at the Peace Conference, as he would certainly be the Congress nominee and an active propagandist for the Congress point of view. It would, in the Viceroy’s opinion, precipitate the whole constitutional controversy. If it came into existence at all it would, he thinks, be a grave embarrassment to the conduct of the war.

I confess the Viceroy’s criticisms seem to me conclusive. In any case we can hardly force such a scheme upon him, especially as two at least of the Presidency Governors are at least as definite in their condemnation of it as he is.

Alternative B. The Sapru scheme. This is to replace the existing Executive, lock, stock and barrel by Indian politicians. Administratively this would probably be disastrous. It would leave the Viceroy in an impossibly difficult position if he disagreed with his Executive. It would probably, just because of the extent of the power conferred, at once open up the communal controversy in its acutest form. Jinnah has threatened direct revolt\(^1\) if it were accepted.

Alternative C. To retain the existing members of the Executive, official and non-official, but to make use of existing vacancies and the prospective vacancies afforded by representation in London and at Chungking, in order to offer six or seven seats to Congress, Moslem League, Untouchables and Sikhs. This would avoid the direct issue of domination as between Congress and Moslem League, would preserve for the Viceroy the services of experienced members and a casting vote in any controversy of a communal or anti-British character.

It might be accepted by both Congress and League if the new members were given the portfolios of Finance and Defence which have always figured so prominently in Indian demands as being the real repository of power. I myself see no real difficulty about finance, now that India is fast becoming a creditor country and as most military expenditure in India falls on the British Treasury anyway. As for Defence, it could be broken up, leaving the control of operational policy and promotion with the Commander-in-Chief, who would remain as a Member of the Council, and giving administration to the new Defence Member.

The Viceroy was himself at one time prepared to advocate an Indian Defence Member and I think he might, with some demur perhaps, accept this alternative.

If Congress came in on this it would no doubt resume office in the Provinces and so take an active part in the existing National Defence Council.

Alternative D. Sir G. Schuster has suggested\(^2\) that the Executive should be left as it is, but that a small number of political leaders should be invited to form a “War Cabinet” to direct the general war policy. This is interesting but would probably be suspect as not giving real administrative power, would at once
raise the Moslem League’s demand for 50/50 representation, and would be embarrassing to the Viceroy.

*Alternative E.* Stand pat and do nothing to meet the demand for transfer of power at present, except for such filling up of vacancies on the Executive as the Viceroy has already contemplated.

Of these alternatives C seems to me much the best. If accepted it would not seriously weaken and might indeed indirectly strengthen the war effort. If rejected by Congress it could be carried through with the League and minor parties, or dropped in favour of E. In either event we should be credited with having, in conjunction with our broader declaration for the future, made a really generous offer.

1 See No. 170, para. 3. 2 Parl. Debs., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 378, 24 February, col. 87.

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*War Cabinet*

*Committee on India. I (42) 2nd Meeting*

*L/PO/6/106b: ff 310–2*

*Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 27 February 1942 at 5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)*

The Meeting had before them, in addition to the Papers already circulated, a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India covering a draft Declaration (I (42) 4).1

The following were the main conclusions reached in discussion:

1. **THE PROPOSED DECLARATION**

   (1) The declaration should be a very short, simple document, drawn in perfectly explicit language, and not open to argument.

   (2) As a matter of procedure, it was suggested that the declaration should be published in Parliament at about the same time as a broadcast speech to India by the Prime Minister, to which the greatest importance was attached.

   (3) The declaration should start by saying briefly that we proposed to give effect to our past promises (which need not be recited), and should then explain how we proposed to do so.

1 No. 190.
(4) We should lay down the procedure for setting up the constitution-making body, unless Indians themselves agreed on some other procedure.

(5) The procedure proposed was that after the war there would have to be new elections for the Provincial Assemblies. The new members should be consolidated into a single electoral college, which would elect by proportional representation a Constitution-making body. (Consolidation into a single electoral college would, it was thought, give a fairer representation to minorities than if each Provincial Assembly elected a certain number of members to form part of the Constitution-making body).  

(6) Provision should be made for adding to this body representatives of such Indian States as wished to be associated with it.

(7) It should be made clear that, when the new Constitution had been agreed upon, any Province in British India deciding through its Legislature that it was unwilling to form part of the new Indian Union, [was?] to have the right not to accede thereto but to remain, for the present, part of British India. Indian States would also have the right to determine whether or not they would accede to the new Union.

(8) The Constitution framed under the procedure proposed would be accepted by His Majesty’s Government as the Constitution of the Dominion formed by the Provinces and States so adhering.

(9) The obligations of the British Government inside India (e.g. towards States [and ?] minorities) as well as the interests of Government[s,?] institutions or individuals outside India, should be provided for, not in the Constitution, but in a Treaty to be negotiated with a Constitution-making Body and to come into force simultaneously with the new Constitution.

(10) Provision should also be made by Treaty in respect of any assistance towards its defence which the new Indian Dominion may wish to secure from His Majesty’s Government.

(11) We should explain that it was impossible for us to fix a date for the coming into force of a Constitution to be settled by agreement between Indians; but as soon as we received an agreed Constitution and the associated agreed Treaty, His Majesty’s Government would proceed forthwith to give legal effect to it. (This was preferable to stating that the new constitution should come into effect within say, two years of the date on which it is transmitted to His Majesty’s Government.)

(12) The new Indian State would have the full status of a Dominion, including freedom to remain in, or separate itself from, partnership with the British Commonwealth.  


II. INTERIM MEASURES

(13) These were discussed. The conclusion reached was that we should rely, for the effect which it was hoped to produce on Indian opinion, on the declaration; but that we should add that, provided the declaration was accepted, we were ready to consult with the leaders of opinion in India as to the best way in which they could reinforce the war effort.

(14) THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA undertook to prepare a draft declaration on the lines proposed, for consideration at a Meeting to be held at 11.0 a.m. on the following morning.

2 Against this sentence, Sir D. Montenath noted: ‘But can one regard these minorities as just numerical minorities? They each amount in no. to the population of a very large State.’
3 Against the words from ‘including’ to ‘Commonwealth’, Sir D. Montenath noted: ‘Why say this? It is implicit in D[ominion] S[tatus].’

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

SECRET
No. 135–G.B.

3. Congress politics have been completely in the background and public attention has been focussed entirely on the Sapru proposals, the Chinese Generalissimo’s appeal to the British Government, Stafford Cripps’ inclusion in the Cabinet, and Jinnah’s threat of “revolt”. While the Congress Press continues to sneer at the Sapru proposals and affects not to bank too much on Stafford Cripps it was obviously delighted to use Sapru’s savage attack on Maxwell1 as a text for an essay on the “Real Fifth Column”. It claims that Chiang Kai-Shek’s message is a full-blooded support of the Congress demand for independence and refuses to contemplate anything in the nature of a compromise. Moderate opinion on the other hand has ceased to be moderate in its demand for constitutional modification. It is in full expectation that the British

1 During the Non-Party Conference at New Delhi on 21 February Sir T. B. Sapru made a speech which, according to a Press summary, contained the following passage: ‘I wonder whether the Home Member [Sir R. Maxwell] in delivering his recent speech in the [Legislative] Assembly about fifth columnist and defeatists considered whether he would serve the interests of the country or the enemy by encouraging the enemy to believe that India is seething with disaffection. May I ask this Honourable Member, this relic of ancient times, to adjust himself to present conditions and come into the midst of the people. As a confirmed supporter of the British connection I deplore the division of India into watertight compartments of officials and non-officials. Speeches like this are my despair and I hope that the Indian representatives in the Government of India will not take it lightly.’
Government is on the point of being stampeded into something in the nature of a “forward” step—Stafford Cripps’ statement in Parliament\(^2\) which was reported yesterday morning lends colour to that view—and its tactics are those of “Squeeze”: “The British Government is in a hole, let us make the most of the occasion.” There have been continued, and increasingly spiteful, attacks upon the Secretary of State, and the Prime Minister himself has not escaped censure for his alleged casual treatment of the Sapru message. However impervious one may be oneself to this type of “Blitz” it has been impossible not to remark that it is having an effect on some of our more reliable Indian officers whose nerves are, naturally, not a little shaken by events in Malaya and Burma. I do not think that they believe that an acceptance of the Sapru proposals would amount to very much in assisting our war effort but they would certainly welcome a cessation of the attack upon the administration of which they form a part by those with whom they have many affinities and sympathies. In particular there is a certain amount of impatience with the supposed reluctance to call Jinnah’s bluff. I am convinced that this malaise is very widespread amongst those whom we expect to be our staunchest supporters.


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War Cabinet
Committee on India Paper I (42) 5

L/PO/6/106b: ff 313–5

Draft Declaration, circulated by the Secretary of State for India

India Office, 28 February 1942

His Majesty’s Government have decided, in order to give full effect at the earliest possible date after the war to their pledges with regard to India’s constitutional future, upon the following procedure.

Failing previous agreement between the principal elements in India’s national life upon the composition of a constituent body to frame India’s future constitution, the Government of India will set up such a body constituted in the following manner. The members of the Lower Houses\(^1\) of the Provincial Legislatures shall, immediately after the first Provincial elections after the war, compose a single electorate for the purpose of electing by Proportional Representation, a constituent convention of approximately one hundred members for British India. To these shall be joined delegates from such States as wish to
be represented on the convention, in numbers proportionate to the populations
of the States so represented.

Such constitution as may be agreed upon by the convention shall be subject
to ratification by the Legislatures of the Provinces or by the Governments of
the States acceding to it and, if ratified by more than half the provinces of
British India, will be accepted by His Majesty’s Government as the constitution
of the union of the Provinces and States acceding to it. Provinces and States
which decide not to accede will retain their present constitutional position,
subject to subsequent accession or to further arrangements, in the case of non-
acceding Provinces, for their separate political status.

Provision for the fulfilment of the obligations of the Crown towards the
States, (which will remain unimpaired except in so far as they may have voluntaril
ly transferred them to the new Indian Union,) and of the obligations of His
Majesty’s Government towards minorities or backward communities and to
wards the existing members of the public services, and as regards matters
affecting the interests of governments, private institutions or individuals extraneous to India, as well as for such assistance in respect of defence as the new
Indian Union may desire to receive from His Majesty’s Government, shall not
be included in the constitution, but shall be made in a separate Treaty or
Treaties to be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the Constitute
Constitution and to be ratified by His Majesty’s Government and by the
Government of the Indian Union on the coming into effect of the constitution.

No date can be fixed in advance for the coming into effect of a constitution
which depends upon Indian agreement. But His Majesty’s Government will use every effort to expedite the negotiations for the draft Treaty or Treaties
so that the new Indian constitution may come into effect at the earliest possible
date after the constitution itself has been approved by the Provinces and States
acceding to it.

The status of the new Indian Union shall be that of a British Dominion,
equal in every respect to the United Kingdom, in no respect subordinate to it,
and free to remain within or separate itself from the equal partnership of the
British Commonwealth of Nations.

In the hope that this declaration and the procedure outlined in it will be
accepted as a sincere fulfilment of their pledges and of their goodwill, His
Majesty’s Government are willing to enter into consultation with the leaders
of Indian public opinion as to the best way in which they could co-operate,
within the existing framework of the Indian Constitution, in order to secure
the most effective prosecution of the war.

L. S. A.

1 Government of India Act 1935, Secs. 60–1 and Fifth Schedule.
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War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 3rd Meeting

L/PO/6|106b: ff 306–9

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 28 February 1942 at 11 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

The Committee had before them
(a) a draft declaration circulated by the Secretary of State for India (I(42) 5).¹
(b) an alternative draft² prepared by the Lord Privy Seal.

In discussion the Committee prepared and agreed to the revised draft declaration appended hereto.

Annex to No. 194

Draft Declaration

His Majesty’s Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, equal in every respect to the United Kingdom and the other Dominions of the Crown, and free to remain in or to separate itself from the equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

His Majesty’s Government therefore make the following declaration:
(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, there shall be set up in India in the manner described hereafter an elected body with the power to formulate a new Constitution for India.
(b) His Majesty’s Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to:
(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for subsequent accession or for other arrangements for their separate political status, in the case of non-acceding Provinces.
(ii) the signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the constitution-making body covering all necessary matters relating to the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands.
(iii) the adjustment of treaty arrangements with the Indian States so far as they do not exercise their choice to adhere to the new Union.

(c) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the Provincial Elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to send representatives, in the same proportion of the total population as the average for British India.

(d) While during the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for India’s defence, they desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the Councils\(^3\) of their nation to give their active and vital help in the discharge of that task.

\(^1\) No. 193.  \(^2\) This document has not been traced in India Office or Cabinet Office records.  \(^3\) See No. 200, para. (10).

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**195**

*Mr Amery to Mr Attlee*\(^1\)*

*L/PO/6/106b: f 328*

**INDIA OFFICE, 28 February 1942**

My dear Clem,

Since this morning’s meeting, I have looked up the actual ‘Balfour’ definition\(^2\) and see that the phrase with reference to the Crown was “united by a common allegiance to the Crown” and that the words “freely associated” were used in connection with the Commonwealth.

The whole definition runs as follows:

“They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic

\(^1\) Copies of this letter were sent to the other members of the Committee on India.

or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and
freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”.
I think it might strengthen our reference to India if we included the words—
“in any aspect of her domestic or external affairs”. Myself, I should certainly
like also to keep the phrase “united by a common allegiance to the Crown”.
It is surely conceding enough to Congress to admit the fact that future India
can walk out of the Empire, and other elements both in India and here are
surely entitled to have some affirmation of the fact that we wish to preserve the
unity of India with us under the Crown.

There is some point in Grigg’s criticism that it reads a little incongruously
to refer to unity under the Crown and follow that up immediately by em-
phasising India’s freedom to walk out. I should prefer to invert the order of
the “Balfour” definition and speak of India as a “Dominion united (or asso-
ciated) with the U.K. by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to it
in status in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs
and free to remain within or separate from” etc.

Yours ever,
L.S.A.

196

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 304-5

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 28 February 1942, 6.45 pm
Received: 1 March

259. Please treat as Superintendent telegram.
1. Prime Minister has set up India Committee of Cabinet under Attlee’s chair-
manship with myself, Anderson, Simon, Cripps and Grigg. We have decided
in view of your criticisms to abandon the idea of setting up now an advisory
body which is also to be the future constitution-framing body and favour a
clear declaration as to the future both as regards procedure for arriving at the
new constitution and as regards India’s future status, coupling with it an in-
vitation to Indian leaders to come in and help now but retaining our present
responsibility for India’s defence.

2. The main new features of the declaration in its present draft form are (a) ex-
plicit acknowledgment that future Indian Dominion can secede if it so wishes;
(b) that we definitely mean to set up what we consider the most suitable future
constitution-making body immediately after the war if Indians have not pre-
viously come to agreement on the subject themselves; (c) that any Province that
does not wish to accede to the new constitution can stand out (this is to meet the Moslem League but it will have to be made clear that by so doing it does not sacrifice its prospect of attaining Dominion status); (d) that the whole field of our obligations, as well as of such continued military assistance as India may need, is to be dealt with by a separate treaty to be concluded with the constitution-framing body and to come into force simultaneously with the new constitution.

3. The declaration ends with an invitation to Indian leaders to participate in the counsels of their nation and give their active help. This, as at present drafted, leaves the field open for negotiation. The alternatives most likely to be acceptable if the general declaration finds acceptance, as well as most workable, would seem to be either (a) inclusion in your Executive of party leaders on the lines suggested in paragraphs 6 and 7 of my 232 of February 22nd; (b) some modification of Schuster’s suggestion of a non-departmental War Cabinet in the nature of a small Defence or War Policy Committee of leading non-officials without portfolios but in regular session with yourself and the Commander-in-Chief or as occasion required with your Executive.

4. My immediately succeeding telegram contains our first draft of the proposed declaration. I shall follow it with a telegram with further comments and with various amendments I would wish to propose myself. As War Cabinet will probably be discussing the whole subject on Monday evening I am most anxious to have your own comments and suggestions as quickly as possible. I fully realise what all this means on top of your urgent preoccupations with the war effort, but with a situation which must for some time ahead get worse instead of better we cannot afford to delay our announcement of policy much further.

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1 No. 165. 2 2 March.

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197

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 299–301

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 28 February 1942, 6.40 pm
Received: 1 March

260. Please treat as Superintendent telegram. Following is text of Declaration referred to in my immediately preceding telegram: 1 [There follows the text of the Annex to No. 194. In para. (b)(i) ‘or for other arrangements’ was deciphered as ‘to implement other arrangements’; and in para. (b)(iii) ‘do not exercise’ was deciphered as ‘do not materially lose’].

1 No. 196.
Sir Firoz Khan Noon to Mr Amery\(^1\) (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 291

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 28 February 1942, 2.40 pm

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL SECRET

No. 481-S. Firoz Khan Noon has asked me to send to you following private and personal telegram. It is worth attention as showing what the Viceroy will be up against. Text of telegram. Begins. Sapru Conference not non-party but all Hindu parties conference. Sapru and his colleagues although moved by patriotic sentiments have been serving as agents of Congress. Their aim is that if during the war India cannot become a Dominion, Government of India should pass into Indian hands under the existing Constitution, and thus establish Hindu Raj immediately. Moslems are at the moment extremely (?) apprehensive) that H.M.G. are step by step yielding to agitation of a vociferous party and giving way contrary to pledges which they have always given to Moslems, Princes and other minorities. Immediate Indianisation of the whole Cabinet will remove European element, on whom minorities can now depend for assistance in cases where Hindu majority makes a combination against them. Even now Cabinet overweighted against Moslems, three against five other Indians. If H.M.G. indianise whole of Indian Cabinet, then in the absence of safeguards which in any case have proved useless in the Provinces and in order to protect Moslems and other minorities, Moslems must have 50% seats in Indian Cabinet: else whole of non-Congress India, through sheer desperation, will create a serious situation adversely affecting the war effort. If H.M.G. contemplate making an immediate declaration of creating India Dominion, Moslems' demand for Pakistan must be conceded in the same statement. If you are about to declare that after the war India will be made Dominion, then Moslems (?) expect) that you will also declare that if Hindus fail to come to an agreement with Moslems Pakistan will also be granted. Otherwise Moslem India will be up in arms and you will have North West Frontier problem also. Congress believe they can force the hands of H.M.G., and that is why they have made not the slightest move to win agreement of Moslems.

Only reason why Congress have not been able to create disturbances in India is that Moslems are not with them. But once H.M.G., through hasty or ill-considered decision, are forced to push Moslems into open opposition, Congress (?) may) decide to join hands with them and (?) create) greater (?) difficulties) than ever. Moslems here apprehensive that new elements in power in London may enforce a policy of reconciling the irreconcilables, forgetting that the cup of patience of other parties already full. No one can ignore the
part that Indian Princes and Moslems are playing in the war effort, nor can it be forgotten that in spite of Congress opposition sixty-five per cent of new recruits are non-Moslems. If H.M.G. makes peace with the Congress agitators, (?) they) do so at very heavy cost. Congress already feel that they made mistake by going out of office in the Provinces; and so far as my information goes, they do not wish frankly to come forward and give an undertaking that they will help in war effort if restored to office, but they wish to use Sapru and others in securing for them Governments and Offices which they themselves are not willing to ask for, because in my opinion they do not intend to play cricket. Similarly at the centre, H.M.G. will be playing with fire, if they establish Hindu Raj in defiance of all the friendly elements who are responsible for great war effort of India at the moment. I feel it my duty to draw attention of H.M.G. through yourself to the great danger that faces India if H.M.G. give in to browbeating by anti-British elements (?) in this) country, and against their pledges given to Moslems and others. It will be a betrayal of trust which Great Britain has always claimed to hold on behalf of all peoples of India and not only on behalf of those who are in the Congress camp. Irrespective of any pressure which may exist from China or from America, quarters which know little about India and (?) look) at British Commonwealth with eyes different to our own, I hope that H.M.G. will firmly stand by their duty which (?) involve)s protection of best interests of the peoples of India as a whole. Firoz Noon.

1 Circulated to H.M. the King, the War Cabinet, the Cabinet, and the Committee on India.

199

War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 7
L/PO/6/106b: f 286

MINUTE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE WAR CABINET
(Circulated for the information of the Committee)

1 March 1942

Sir Edward Bridges
The India business will be brought before the War Cabinet at noon on Tuesday.1 Thereafter, in consequence of the gravity of the decision, it will be necessary to consult certainly all the Ministers of Cabinet rank, and probably all the Under-Secretaries. Moreover, the King's assent must be obtained at an early date, as the rights of the Imperial Crown are plainly affected. You should bring

1 3 March.
this to the notice of the India Committee forthwith. The necessary meetings should be arranged during Tuesday and Wednesday.

I am favourably impressed by the draft, but we must not run the risk of a schism, and I must see the reaction upon a larger body than our present small group.

W. S. C.

28.2.42

200

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 294-6

MOST IMMEDIATE

3832. Please treat as Superintendent telegram.

Following are alterations to draft declaration1 which I propose to press for:

(1) In first paragraph omit the words from “as to the fulfilment” down to “clear terms” and substitute “as to the future of India, have decided to define”.

Reasons. To avoid the implication that hitherto we have deliberately avoided being either clear or precise as to their intention or as to the means of its fulfilment.

(2) Towards end of first paragraph. Delete after “Dominion” and substitute “associated with the United Kingdom by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to it in status, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs and free to remain within or to separate from the partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations.”

Reasons. It sufficiently meets demand for “independence”2 to state that India can secede and is desirable to mitigate shock to other elements here and in India by reaffirming fact that an essential attribute of a “Dominion” is its allegiance to the Crown.

(3) For the last eight words of sub paragraph (a) substitute “object of formulating a constitution acceptable to the whole of India”.

Reasons. This is more consistent with the hope of creating a new Union comprising all units on the one hand and on the other recognition of probability that some will refuse to come in.

(4) In paragraph (b) for “forthwith” substitute “without avoidable delay”.

Reason. Provisos (ii) and (iii) require time to be fulfilled before the constitution can be implemented.
(5) In paragraph (b) sub-para. (i) after word "retain" insert "for the time being", and for the words following "separate" to end of sub-paragraph substitute "constitutional" advance on the lines of this declaration".

Reason. No Province at any rate which stands out will be content in the mere provincial autonomy for long and if it intends to stand out permanently will require that it should be able to acquire powers amounting to Dominion Status. Compare pledge given to Burma in 1931 in event of separation.  

(6) Last few words of paragraph (b), sub-paragraph (ii) should read: "responsibility in respect of the Union from the British to Indian hands".

Reason: The body that frames constitution of projected Union will not be competent to negotiate in respect of matters outside the scope of the Union.

(7) Paragraph (b) (iii) should read "The negotiation of revised treaty arrangements so far as these are required by the new situation."

Reasons: The word "adjustment" is calculated to alarm Rulers as implying unilateral overriding of treaty rights. As drafted the proviso recognises only the need to adjust matters of common administrative concern to one or other adhering State and the Union (e.g. transport questions, postal rights, etc.). What the States—particularly those that do not adhere—are likely to regard as far more important is the question of the maintenance of the treaties establishing their dynastic relations with the Crown.

(8) Paragraph (c), last paragraph. After "invited to" delete "send representatives" and substitute "appoint representatives with the same powers as British Indian members of the constitution-making body".

Reasons: The constitution-making body is described in (a) as elected. It is important to leave Rulers the right to appoint their representatives, and to make it quite clear that the States' representatives should be on an absolutely equal footing with those from British India.

(9) Paragraph (d). For words from "can be framed" down to "defence" substitute "His Majesty's Government cannot divest themselves of responsibility for the defence and good government of India."

Reasons: "Defence" in the restricted sense is not enough to secure the position, and duty of ensuring good government is clearly ours in the Provinces now administered under Section 93; while even in those under Ministerial Governments duty is at least shared by His Majesty's Government as the result of the "emergency section" 126A.

(10) Seventeenth word from the end "Councils" should of course be "counsels".

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1 Annex to No. 194.  
2 Deciphered as 'future'.  
3 'constitutional' omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.  
5 Of the Government of India Act 1935.
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA
INDIA OFFICE, 1 March 1942

After further consideration of the draft declaration attached to the minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Committee on India I would suggest (and have put tentatively to the Viceroy) the following amendments, for the reasons shown:

(1) Page 1, lines 3–5. [2–3] Omit the words "as to...clear terms" and substitute "as to the future of India, have decided to define."

Reasons. As at present worded the sentence is open to the implication that hitherto His Majesty’s Government have deliberately avoided being either clear or precise as to their intention to fulfil their promises or as to the means of doing so.

(2) Page 1, lines 8–14. [6–8] Delete after "Dominion" and substitute "associated with the United Kingdom by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to it in status, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs and free to remain within or to separate from the partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

Reasons. It is surely sufficient concession to Congress’ demand for "independence" to state the fact that India is at liberty to secede from the Empire: other elements in India, and elements here are surely entitled to have the shock of that admission mitigated by a re-affirmation of the fact that an essential attribute of a "Dominion" is its allegiance to the Crown.

(3) Page 1, paragraph (a). For the last line substitute, "object of formulating a constitution acceptable to the whole of India."

Reasons. In the first paragraph of the Declaration the object is stated to be the formation of a new Indian Union, which it is hoped will comprise all the component units of India. But paragraph (b) recognises the possibility of some units refusing to come into the Union. It seems clear therefore that the function of the constitution making body should be to frame such a constitution as is most likely to be accepted by all the components and not simply a constitution "for India" which ex hypothesi, is likely to contain elements not included in the Union. The word "power" in these circumstances seems hardly appropriate.

(4) Page 1, paragraph (b) second line. [first line] The word "forthwith" is, in fact, misleading since provisos (ii) and (iii) will entail, the first a considerable, and
the second probably a very long time before the constitution formulated can be implemented. I recommend that "forthwith" to [be ?] either omitted or replaced by some less embarrassing phrase such as "without avoidable delay".

(5) Paragraph (b), pages 1 and 2. In regard to the content of (i) it seems to me clear that no Province which decides to stand out from the projected Union will be content, for more than a limited time, to continue in its present constitutional position only: and that, in particular, a Province (or a group of Provinces) with a Moslem majority would refuse co-operation unless assured that, in the event of abstention, it will have a prospect of complete self-government (and, therefore, of itself becoming a Dominion.)

I recommend therefore the insertion after the word "retain" of the words "for the time being"; and the substitution for the last eight words after "separate" of the words "constitutional advance on the lines of this Declaration."

As regards the content of proviso (ii) I recommend that as we have to contemplate the possibility of some Provinces—not to mention States—standing out of the Union, on terms not yet ascertained, the last line should read "responsibility in respect of the Union from British to Indian hands."

As regards (iii) it is recommended that the word "adjustment" which is calculated to alarm the Rulers should be avoided and that the proviso should read "the negotiation of revised treaty arrangements so far as these are required by the new situation."

Reasons. As drafted the proviso appears to recognise only the need to adjust matters of common administrative concern to one or other State and the Union (e.g. transport questions, postal rights, etc.), and these between the Union and States do adhere. What the States—particularly those that do not adhere—are likely to regard as far more important is the question of the maintenance of the treaties establishing their dynastic relations with the Crown. Their apprehensions on this score would be enhanced by the word "adjustment" which might suggest an intention of unilaterally overriding treaty rights.

(6) Page 2, paragraph (c), last paragraph. After "invited to" delete "send representatives" and substitute "appoint representatives with the same powers as the British Indian members of the constitution-making body."

Reasons. The constitution-making body is described in (a) as elected. Few States are in a position to and few Rulers would be willing to send elected representatives: it is important to leave Rulers the right to appoint their representatives. It is important too to make it quite clear that the States' representatives should be on an absolutely equal footing with those from British India: the present wording does not do so.

1 Annex to No. 194. The page numbers in the text are references to that document in its original format. The line numbers as they appear in the present volume are given in square brackets.
2 See No. 200. 3 Cf. No. 195.
(7) Page 2, paragraph (d). Though at the present time Defence is very obviously a matter for which responsibility must be retained by His Majesty’s Government, “defence” in the restricted sense is not enough to secure the position. I suggest that the third and fourth lines [2nd and 3rd lines] should be replaced by “be framed, His Majesty’s Government cannot divest themselves of their responsibility for the defence and good government of India.” (The duty of ensuring good government is clearly that of His Majesty’s Government in the Provinces now administered under Section 93: even in those administered by Ministerial Governments that duty is at least shared by His Majesty’s Government as the result of the “emergency section” 126A.)

In the third [second] line from the end “Councils” should be “counsels.”

L. S. A.

202

War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 8

L|PO|6|106b: ff 289–90

INDIA OFFICE, 1 March 1942

I circulate for consideration at tomorrow’s meeting of the Committee a note by Sir David Monteath.

L. S. A.

Annex to No. 202

NOTE BY SIR DAVID MONTEATH

1 March 1942

On thinking over the draft Declaration1 I am increasingly alarmed by the probable effect of saying in terms that India may leave the Empire when she likes.

I gather that Firoz has protested emphatically: I have not yet seen his telegram2 but will leave him to make his point about Moslems in British India.

What I would like you to consider is the probable effect on the tribes of the N.W. Frontier and possibly on Afghanistan, and to cast your mind back to 1919.

On the whole the Frontier was fairly quiet between 1914–18, even though there were factors then which are absent now, which made for trouble—notably the fact that we were fighting Turkey.3 Yet we won the war in 1918.
But immediately after there was a flare-up among the tribes and the IIIrd Afghan War of 1919.4

What caused this sudden worsening after we had won the war?

There were no doubt a lot of contributory causes; but most people would agree that the really disturbing factor was the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms which, misunderstood, exaggerated and garbled were interpreted in N.W. India and on the Frontier as an indication of abdication by His Majesty’s Government in the near future. In the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province the Moslems got ready for the “good time coming”; the Sikhs ditto—leading to Amritsar.5 On the Frontier the tribes thought they had better get moving so as not to be late for the fair, and Amanulla took advantage of the unrest. So the IIIrd Afghan War.

If that was the effect on the unsophisticated of a misinterpretation of so modest a dose of self-government as the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms (discussed in 1918–19 and legislated in 1919), what is likely to be the effect of a garbled version of a declaration that India may get out of the Empire when she likes—i.e. that the British will get out of India on request?

The fact that that is not to become possible till after the war will go for nothing on the Frontier.

I see no great harm in stating the meaning of Dominion status in the terms of the Balfour declaration:6 the intelligentsia know it already and know its implication of the “right to secede”. The uneducated don’t but won’t be alarmed by “equal in status”, “in no respect subordinate” etc. etc. But to say in terms to the masses that it means the end of the British Raj is asking for trouble which we are in no condition to face. And it is the masses, not the intelligentsia, who matter.

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1 Annex to No. 194.  
2 No. 198.  
3 Apparently an allusion to the effect of the alliance with Germany of Turkey, whose Sultan was head of the Islamic world, in causing unrest among the tribes of the North-West Frontier. In Afghanistan a 'War Party' favoured active intervention against Britain; and some Indian nationalist leaders were allowed to set up a 'Provisional Government of India'.
4 Habibullah Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, was murdered on 19 February 1919 and, on 28 February, after a brief political crisis, Amanullah Khan (one of Habibullah’s sons) was proclaimed Amir. With a view to consolidating his position, gaining the support of the 'War Party' and profiting from the disturbed situation in India, Amanullah embarked on a war with Great Britain in April 1919. Peace was signed at Rawalpindi on 8 August 1919.
5 For disturbances at Amritsar in April 1919 see Cmd. 534 (1920) Reports on the Punjab Disturbances April 1919; Cmd. 681 (1920) Report of the Committee appointed by the Government of India to investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab etc.; Cmd. 705 (1920) Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State for India on the Report of Lord Hunter’s Committee.
6 See No. 195.
203

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 285

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

India Office, 1 March 1942, 12 noon

I am circulating Firoz Khan Noon’s telegram1 to Cabinet but you will have seen that proposed declaration includes Pakistan option as regards future and that there is no question of accepting Sapru’s scheme as war interim. I leave it to you to give Firoz such reassurance as you think politic at this juncture.

1 No. 198.

204

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/106b: f 292

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

India Office, 1 March 1942, 7 pm

Received: 2 March

263. Superintendent Series. What effect immediate or subsequent would proposed reference to secession from Commonwealth have on (a) Nepal (b) Afghanistan and North-West Frontier (c) Princes (d) Army.

205

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

New Delhi, 1 March 1942, 11.55 pm

Received: 2 March, 6.5 am

No. 496–G. Following are points from account of address made by Nehru to big gathering of Congressmen at office of Bengal Provincial Congress Committee in Calcutta on February 22nd, published in Amrita Bazar Patrika, dated 23rd February just brought to notice:

Begins. 1. This war is not due to ambitious designs of Hitler and Mussolini, but to certain serious maladjustments; war might end rapidly without mal-
adjustments being righted but this would be only the armistice. The war will not end in military way. I believe it will not end for another two or three years. It is not easy to see how Japan and Germany can be defeated easily, nor how America or Russia are going to be defeated.

2. New economic and political order will emerge out of this war. British Empire as we know it is passing. There might be union with America on economic and political basis; but British Government is reactionary. I do not know what Hitler stands for, but at least he represents something against effete order and therefore gives his people psychological strength apart from military strength. I dislike all Hitler stands for with his hideous gospel. I will resist Hitler and Japan with all my might. But British Government are still hugging old methods. Present war might lead to stalemate and there might be revolutions out of this stalemate.

3. Responsibility might come to Congress any moment, when it will be too late to raise army for effective defence. The war has proved that ineffective resistance is greatest folly. Spending money on ineffective defence is waste of money. From practical point of view we must not surrender. It is no question of stopping invading army. We do not know exactly what we will do. We might have recourse to Satyagraha which might lead to shooting which would sow the seeds of resistance. Certainly we will not be tools of British. We must raise people's tone by psychological and organisation[al?] means. Ends.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: ff 282–3

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Winston,

You will have seen Firoz's appeal.¹ I am sure we cannot afford to let down the Moslems or the Princes, above all at this moment.

As regards the future, the declaration² as so far drafted by the Committee substantially covers the Moslems by giving the Moslem Provinces the right to opt out of the future constitution (the Princes have that anyway). But I think it is essential to make it quite clear that the Provinces which do stay out will have an equally good prospect of Dominion status, and I am proposing an amendment³ to make this explicit.

The present draft of the declaration does not refer to the Crown except

¹ No. 198. ² Annex to No. 194. ³ See No. 201, para. (5).
indirectly by reference to the "other Dominions of the Crown". Both the Princes and the Army attach tremendous importance to being under the King Emperor, and both Simon and I feel strongly that it should be quite clear that the new Dominion of India is under the Crown, at any rate to start with, even if we explicitly admit its freedom to secede (you will note that Cripps has given way on the right to secede). I am suggesting words taken from the famous "Balfour" definition of 1926 and hope the Committee will agree. If not I may have to appeal to you in Cabinet on the point.

As regards the interim position Firoz's telegram shows the danger of accepting Sapru's proposal and brings out clearly that the Moslems regard Sapru simply as a Congress stooge. I think the last paragraph of the declaration may want strengthening on this point.

I trust you will support me against being rushed by Cripps and Attlee on either the wording or the date of the declaration. The whole future of India is at stake. Whatever his failings as a stylist or as a negotiator with Indians Linlithgow knows what he is dealing with, has served the Empire faithfully, and is at least entitled to have his views carefully considered. I have asked him to let me have his comments on the draft declaration by tomorrow (Monday) night. Even if he can do that there will be minor points to clear up, and I do not see how the declaration can possibly issue before Tuesday week.

I think Linlithgow may well feel in any case that he is being unfairly rushed and I should not be altogether surprised if he talks of resignation. Cripps and Attlee are very eager to secure this anyhow, and there may be much to be said for a new man to carry out a new policy. But it would be disastrous to create the impression in the Army and Civil Service that the Viceroy has been sacked to please Congress. In any case we must first see if there is any response to our declaration. We should look silly if we pushed out the Viceroy for lack of enthusiasm about our policy and then found that lack of enthusiasm equally shared by India!

4 See Nos. 195 and 201, para. (2). 5 See No. 196, para. 4. 6 10 March.

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War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 4th Meeting

L/PO/6/106b: ff 279–81

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee's Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 2 March 1942 at 10.30 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)
TEXT OF DECLARATION

The Committee had before them:

(1) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India suggesting certain amendments to the draft Declaration (L. (42) 6).

(2) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India covering a Note by Sir David Montefith (L. (42) 8).

The Committee again considered the draft Declaration and agreed to a number of amendments which are set out in the Annex to these Minutes.

The Committee:

Agreed to submit the draft Declaration as revised, for consideration by the War Cabinet at their Meeting at 12 Noon on the following day.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that he would feel bound to raise with the War Cabinet the amendment proposed in his paper dealing with allegiance to the Crown.

Procedure and time-table

The suggestion was made that the most effective procedure would be if the Declaration was to be read out in the House of Commons at the same time as the Prime Minister made his broadcast to India.

The date on which the Declaration should be made was also discussed. It was thought that it would not be practicable to make the Declaration as early as Thursday, 5th March. The view was expressed that a postponement until the following Tuesday, 10th March, involved too long a delay. It was suggested that the matter might be dealt with at a Special Session of the House at, say, 3 p.m. on Friday, 6th March, which would be a convenient time for a broadcast to be heard in India.

It was also pointed out that it would be necessary to tell the Dominion Prime Ministers what was proposed before the Declaration was made.

Annex to No. 207

AMENDMENTS AGREED UPON IN DRAFT DECLARATION

Paragraph (a) should read as follows:

"Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India."

After (a) insert a new paragraph (b), as follows:

"Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the Constitution-making body."

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1 No. 201.  2 No. 202.  3 Annex to No. 194.  4 See No. 215.
5 See No. 201, para. (a).
6 Mr Amery transmitted these amendments to Lord Linlithgow in telegram 274 of 3 March, pointing out that they had been made before receipt of Nos. 209 and 214. L/PO/6/106b: ff 259–60.
Old paragraph (b) now becomes paragraph (c).
In (c) (i) insert, after the word "retain", the words "for the time being".
Paragraph (c) (i) should end at the word "Accession", and the following new sentence [be?] added:
"With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, H.M.G. will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution following the lines laid down above."
Delete (iii) and insert the following new sentence:
"Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate revised Treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new situation."
Paragraph (d), formerly paragraph (c): the last sentence should read as follows:
"Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion of the total population as the average for British India, and with the same powers as the British Indian members."
Paragraph (e), formerly (d), should end as follows:
"...the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task so vital and essential for the future freedom of India."

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Mr Amery to Sir A. Hardinge

L/PO/6/106b: f 271

India Office, 2 March 1942

My dear Alec,

Here is the Declaration¹ as drafted by the India Committee under Attlee’s chairmanship which is to come before the Cabinet tomorrow morning and subsequently to a larger meeting of the War Cabinet and other Ministers of Cabinet rank, possibly even Under Secretaries, in order to make sure that there is a substantial body of agreement behind it.²

As I said to you after lunch, I think its bark is really more formidable than its bite. Beyond setting up a procedure for creating the future constitution-making body, it adds very little to what Linlithgow and I were agreed upon in July of 1940. The settling of our obligations, Services, Army, etc., which we were then prepared to have fixed by a separate treaty and which Winston then violently objected to, is now reinserted.

The argument that our insistence upon agreement was meant to hold things back indefinitely is now met by letting the Provinces that disagree with the
proposed Constitution stand out, leaving the others to go ahead without them. This is the first public admission of the possibility of Pakistan, i.e. an India divided between the Moslem and Hindu parties. But the very fact of this admission will compel Congress to try and woo the Moslems instead of trying to bully us into forcing the Moslems under them and is more likely to contribute to the eventual unity of India than anything else.

All this, of course, refers to the future. As regards the present, you will see that the Declaration insists upon our bearing full responsibility for the present and not going beyond inviting collaboration. This in fact turns down Sapru.

There remain the two important points, which to me certainly are more than points of form, in the opening paragraph. As it stands, you will see that the only reference to the Crown in [is?] indirect and that there is an explicit admission of freedom to secede. My own proposition, which I shall bring before the Cabinet, is that after the word “Dominion” we should insert the following: “associated with the United Kingdom by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to it in status, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs” and leave out the “freedom to secede”. The above words are taken from the famous “Balfour” definition (just as much “Amery” definition in fact) of 1926, with the one slight variation that I shall substitute “associated” for “united” in the passage about allegiance to the Crown, simply to avoid the assonance of “united” with “United Kingdom”.

We are, of course, all agreed that a Dominion, if substantially united on the subject, may walk out of the Empire without let or hindrance. Whether it is desirable to proclaim that publicly is another matter. It might well be in the case of South Africa, for example, that if a majority of the whole Union so decided, Natal and Eastern Cape Colony might stand out and ask us to help them. In the case of India, Princes adhering to the new Union in certain respects will still look to the Crown as paramount in many matters, including secession [succession ?], etc., and will certainly have to be protected if they should dissociate themselves from an Indian union that wished to secede. There is also the very delicate question of what might be the effect upon Nepal and Afghanistan of such an explicit declaration of freedom to secede. I have telegraphed to Linlithgow for his opinion on that and his comments should, no doubt, reach you in the next day or two.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

P.S. All the same I attach vast importance to the explicit insertion of allegiance to the Crown, and have a more open mind on the freedom to secede—it has its advantages psychologically in America and in some Indian quarters.

1 Annex to No. 215. 2 Cf. No. 199. 3 No. 204.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

2 March 1942

No. 497-S. Your telegrams No. 259,1 dated 28th February, No. 260,2 dated 28th February and No. 3832,3 dated 1st March, have reached me before I could send off a considered reply to your telegrams No. 232,4 dated 21st February and No. 239,5 dated 24th February. I of course had these telegrams in mind in framing my sketch declaration6 but considered myself at that time as under an obligation to produce in response to Prime Minister’s need proposals as far reaching as possible including promises for the future, made with a preamble designed to inspire trust and linked with tangible immediate advances.

2. The form of the new draft7 has the great advantage, while limiting itself to a definition of steps to be taken, of leaving intact our 1940 assurances without the necessity of repeating them in the same or different terms.

3. Its line also is one which I prefer as containing clear promises for the future without specifically committing us during the war to replace an Executive Council of selected and representative individuals by one of a purely political complexion.

4. I must however enter a caveat: if a declaration in the form now proposed did result in securing the active co-operation of the Congress and the League I very much doubt whether they would be content with a seat here and there on my Executive Council. I should expect them to demand entry in strength, followed by a demand for the disappearance of official membership and at any rate a relaxation8 of control from Whitehall. In that event the situation envisaged in points 5 and 6 and 7 of my sketch might develop de facto, but with this advantage that our hand would not have been shown in advance.

5. We must also reckon on the possibility that consequent upon the “desire and invitation” referred to in the last sentence of your draft I should be called upon9 in fact to renew attempts at bringing the major political parties together. In that case also the same train of events would probably be set in motion.

6. We must therefore realise the possible consequences and know our own minds in the event of such a situation developing, and I ought to know whether points 5 to 7 are in general terms an acceptable presentation of the hand to be played.
7. Time prevents my discussing in this telegram the suggestions contained in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 259, dated 28th February. In general I doubt our ability to limit developments to this scope. In particular I do not like the idea of a non-Departmental War Cabinet but will pursue these and similar matters separately.

8. I recognise that local option is an essential counterpart of the promise to implement recommendations of what is virtually a Constituent Assembly—a promise which exonerates us from the charge of delaying tactics. I had fought shy of advertising local option now (though it was wrapped up in point 9 of my sketch) because it would produce—

(a) an immediate howl from Bengal and Punjab Hindus and from Sikhs; and

(b) probably a delayed action howl from Bengal Muslims who on second thoughts might fear that it would be far too easy for Hindus to buy enough Muslim M.L.A.s. to get a majority for adherence.

I am prepared to take this risk for the sake of a precise and brief declaration which does not tie our hands in advance regarding the immediate future of the Executive Council—but we are bound to be asked by Jinnah how the willingness of a Province to accede will be determined,—e.g., by whom and by what majority. I can see no way of anticipating this question in the declaration or indeed of answering it satisfactorily at present. The stipulation for example of a majority exceeding fifty per cent. in a Provincial Legislature, while arousing Hindu resentment, would not allay Jinnah's fears since the constituent body (which on proposed basis is bound to include a substantial majority of anti-Muslims) could not be prevented from altering Provincial boundaries and so nullifying any such stipulation. Once we venture on questions of this nature we get into deep waters which we had better avoid.

9. As regards the States.

(a) The Declaration should make it clear beyond doubt that the States will have a free choice to adhere or not to adhere. The alternative for (b) (iii) suggested in paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 3832 does not adequately meet this requirement. I suggest the following: “The negotiation of revised treaty arrangements with Indian States so far as these are required by the new situation, it being clear that any State may withhold its adherence to the Union”.

(b) The States may take exception to the number of their representatives being based on population which would give them roughly one-quarter of

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1 No. 196. 2 No. 197. 3 No. 200. 4 No. 165; the date should be 22 February. 5 No. 166; the date should be 22 February. 6 No. 183. 7 Annex to No. 194, transmitted to Lord Linlithgow in No. 197. 8 'a relaxation' deciphered as 'the absence at all events'. 9 'called upon' deciphered as 'bound to uphold'. 

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the total representation, whereas Section 18 (2) of the 1935 Act contemplated a maximum of 125 States members in Federal Assembly against 250 from British India. This argument however would be fallacious. Under 1935 Act they could get one-third seats after joining in Federation: that is no reason for giving them one-third in the constituent body together with complete freedom to join or not to join in the resultant constitution. Moreover the States are largely Hindu. They might weigh the balance heavily against the Muslims in the constituent body and then back out in large numbers and leave British India\textsuperscript{10} to face the consequences.

(c) Your suggested wording\textsuperscript{11} “appoint representatives” is certainly preferable; the Declaration should not adumbrate method of appointment.

10. The following relates to wording of Declaration:
(a) Paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 3832. I agree.
(b) Paragraph 2 of your telegram. Having gone so far why boggle at the word “independence” with all its appeal in India? I suggest that end of first sentence should read “realisation of Self-Government and Independence for India”.
(c) Paragraph 3 of your telegram. In sub-paragraph (a) of Declaration I would omit the word “elected”. It prejudices the method of selecting States representatives, and would give grave offence to Rulers.
(d) Paragraph 4 of your telegram. I far prefer “forthwith” to the expression “without avoidable delay” which would be attacked as hedging.
(e) Paragraph 5 of your telegram. For the words “to retain for the time being its present constitutional position”, which are not strictly accurate, I would substitute the plain expression “to remain outside the union”. I presume that “and” has been omitted between the words “accession” and “to”.\textsuperscript{12} I suggest that the last words should read as follows: “separate political status and advance\textsuperscript{13} in the case of the non-acceding Provinces”. This avoids awkward questions about currency, &c.
(f) Paragraph 6 of your telegram. I agree with your revised wording “in respect of union”, but point out that if the signature of the treaty is a prerequisite to acceptance of agreed constitution we are again open to the charge of obstruction in order to protect our own interests—but you are fully aware of my own dilemma on this point.
(g) Paragraph 7 of your telegram. I have suggested a redraft in paragraph 9 (a) of this telegram.
(h) Paragraph 8 of your telegram—vide my comments in paragraph 9 (c) of this telegram.
(i) Paragraph 9 of your telegram. I prefer the original wording. The revised wording is too reminiscent of past controversy. In particular I strongly urge avoiding the term “good government”. It will give great and avoidable offence.
I suggest therefore "must inevitably bear the responsibility for India's defence and ultimate responsibility for her internal stability".

11. I will try to send some further comments in time for your meeting of March 2nd evening.

10 'leave British India' deciphered as 'undertake alternately'.
11 See No. 200, para. 8.
12 See No. 197.
13 Deciphered as 'position'.

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Minutes by Sir D. Montecath and Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106b: f 278

2 March 1942

Secretary of State

I understand that the Governor-General's telegram 497-S,1 together with those to which it refers, is being circulated to the Cabinet.

Paragraph 2, which states that the new draft Declaration leaves intact the 1940 assurances, is perhaps literally true, but it is very doubtful whether the "depressed classes" would accept it as true in fact in relation to themselves. For the principal minority community, viz. the Moslems, the position is in theory safeguarded by the option afforded in the draft Declaration to geographical units in which they are in a numerical majority to contract out; and this safeguard could no doubt be improved if the constitution-making body were to exercise the power which the Viceroy foresees that it will possess, of revising provincial boundaries. Even the Sikh community, which stands to be swamped in the probable Moslem bloc in North-western India, might be safeguarded in this way; but the "depressed classes", which are to be found in every province to an extent which, except in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, entitles them to a proportion of reserved seats, cannot hope for any such safeguarding on a geographical basis. Their only hope lies in the proviso that the constitution-making body shall negotiate a treaty with the British Government in all matters affected by the transfer of control from British to Indian hands. But the influence that the depressed classes are likely to exercise in a constituent body composed on the basis proposed is not likely to be very effective—for the "depressed classes" have not a long purse on which to draw.

Mr. Ambedkar's statement in tele[gram] 370/42² of 27th Feb. is very relevant. The transition from the conception of agreements between elements to agreements between units will hit him & his community hard.

D. T. M.

1 No. 209.
2 No. 189.
Against the sentence 'and this safeguard...provincial boundaries' Mr Amery minuted: I don’t think we have the power of doing more than suggesting—the existing Prov[incial] legislatures would still be the people to examine the option.

At the foot Mr Amery minuted:
Nothing can help the depressed except (a) such treaty provision as we can make, (b) converting the mind of Hinduism, (c) turning Moslem or X'tian!

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

2 March 1942

No. 500-S. Superintendent Series. Your private and personal telegram No. 263,1 dated 1st March. I am sending separately my immediate personal reactions2 but request permission to take Commander-in-Chief and Cunningham into confidence before committing myself to a considered opinion.

1 No. 204. 2 See No. 224.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 274

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

India Office, 2 March 1942, 10.45 pm

270. Superintendent Series. Your private and personal telegram 500-S.1 By all means consult C-in-C and Cunningham and let me have their views with least possible delay. The latter might repeat his to me direct. You may also consult Hallett and Glancy. If possible views should reach me on Wednesday. Tomorrow's Cabinet will not be final one.

1 No. 211.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr. Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 2 March 1942, 8.5 pm
Received: 2 March, 8.45 pm

No. 502-S. The growing conviction that important constitutional announcement is impending is placing some of my non-official colleagues on the Executive Council in considerable difficulty. Mody approached me this morning on behalf of himself, Mudaliar and Sultan Ahmed to represent the embarrassment that they were feeling and to ask me if I could not take them into confidence and tell them nature of the proposals and allow them to discuss any such proposals on merits. I was obliged to inform him that I could not; but in view of Press speculations and Cripps' utterance¹ I could not possibly pretend that nothing was afoot.

2. You will understand that my new colleagues, who have their own non-official contacts, are in this matter in a difficult personal position and one that is entirely different from that of former executive councillors. I can hardly advise His Majesty's Government to instruct me to consult my colleagues in Executive Council formally at this stage owing to delay that would be involved and to consequent obstruction of other business by discussions, possibly heated. But obviously they would be both hurt and embarrassed if the first intimation that they received of any decision came from the Press, and I consider it most important that I should be able to acquaint them with the details of any announcement that may be decided upon very shortly before it is made. If you agree I would be grateful if you would telegraph the full text of any proposed announcement in time to allow of this procedure, and authorise me to disclose it to my Council at a stated time.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

2 March 1942

No. 504–S. With reference to paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 497–S¹ dated 2nd March, I now send for urgent consideration the following further points of importance.

2. With further reference to paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 3832,² I would retain original wording (power to formulate a new constitution for India), but would add the following sentence:

"It will be for that body so to achieve its task as to ensure that the authority of the resultant system³ of government would not be directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life.” I feel strongly that the offer of local option, while adequately meeting the case of the Muslims in provinces where they are in a majority, is no substitute for our existing pledges in the eyes of Muslims elsewhere, for instance, in the United Provinces where communal feeling is particularly bitter, or of other minorities like Sikhs, Scheduled Castes and backward communities who have also regarded the undertakings given in August 1940 as a charter of their rights. It is therefore necessary to repeat some of the language of those undertakings in such a way as to link up with our new pledge to accept and implement “the constitution so framed”.

3. Sub-paragraph (c) of draft declaration cuts straight across our promise to let Indians themselves agree on the form which the post-war constituent body should take. The qualifying phrase beginning “unless leaders of Indian opinion” is without practical effect since no community or interest would agree upon any alternative method which gave it less representation than under our proposals, while many would agitate for more. Therefore I propose substituting for this sub-paragraph the following: “The character of the constitution-making body shall be such as may be agreed among representative Indians and His Majesty’s Government will meanwhile seek to promote such agreement among them. In its absence, however, within six months after the cessation of hostilities, His Majesty’s Government themselves undertake to set up a representative body reflecting as far as British India is concerned the composition of the Lower Houses of provincial legislatures as resulting from the elections which will be held as soon as hostilities are ended. Indian States would be invited to appoint representatives in same proportion to total population as average of British India”.

This also meets the important objection that while according to the draft declaration British India may change, by agreement, the basis of the constituent
body, the States have no such latitude. The point may be immaterial in practice but is important as a matter of prestige. As a consequential amendment, first sentence of sub-paragraph (a) would read—"immediately upon cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India...". In any case phrasing of declaration must allow for possible delay in provincial elections for climatic reasons.

4. If, however, His Majesty’s Government feel that in order to add precision to our undertakings they must go into details about the constituent body, I would recall your attention to paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 324-S\(^2\) of 15th February in which I criticised method of election by single electoral college comprising all provincial Lower Houses and expressed my preference for alternative procedure which you had adumbrated. I presume that the intention of His Majesty’s Government is (a) to secure a body of all-India prestige rather than a collection of provincial coteries, and (b) by keeping the electoral college large and more scattered to lessen the opportunities for gerrymandering (though these would still subsist).

5. I would also like it to be made clear, if any details are to be propounded now, that non-members of provincial legislatures would be eligible as candidates for election to constituent body.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 105

L/PO/6/106h: f 266

INDIA

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS

II, DOWNING STREET, S.W. 1, 2 March 1942

On the 25th February the Prime Minister asked me to preside over a Cabinet Committee to consider the present position in India, and to make recommendations.

I now submit, on behalf of the Committee, for the consideration of the War Cabinet, the draft of a Declaration by His Majesty’s Government, regarding the future government of India.

C. R. A.
Annex to No. 215

Draft Declaration

His Majesty’s Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, equal in every respect to the United Kingdom and the other Dominions of the Crown, and free to remain in or to separate itself from the equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

His Majesty’s Government therefore make the following declaration:

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the Constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty’s Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to:

(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain for the time being its present constitutional position, provision being made for subsequent accession.

With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty’s Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution following the lines laid down above.

(ii) the signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the constitution-making body covering all necessary matters relating to the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate revised Treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(d) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the Provincial Elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.
Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion of the total population as the average for British India, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(e) While during the critical period which now faces India, and until the new Constitution can be framed, His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for India’s defence, they desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task so vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/509: f 45

NEW DELHI, 2 March 1942, 6.55 pm
Received: 2 March, 9.45 pm

39 D/42. Following is summary of Resolution passed by Board of so-called All India Azad Moslem Conference held in Delhi on Feb. 28th. and March 1st, Khan Bahadur Allah Bux presiding. Amongst those reported present were Fazlul Haq, Asaf Ali, Iftikharuddin, Nurie (Ex-Minister Bombay) and Ibrahim (Ex-Minister United Provinces). Begins. India is no longer distant spectator of war but is within zone of imminent danger. To avert fate of those who have succumbed [to ?] aggression no effort should be spared to knit all people of India into united endeavour. Country’s will should be galvanised and its immense potential effectively developed for task of defending country and thereby establishing its freedom in world free of aggression. Board is convinced there is general unanimity in India that country must forthwith cease to be dependency if end is to be achieved and that it should have the freedom enjoyed by other free countries including England and Dominions. Representing nine constituent Moslem organisations and speaking for bulk of Indians, Board fully supports this demand. Spacious plea of Secretary of State and British Government that Moslem League is Authoritative Spokesman Moslem and that its

1 The All-India Azad (or Independent) Muslim Conference was first convened in April 1940 by Maulana Azad and other Congress leaders. In his address to the Conference Maulana Azad, who was at that time President of Congress, put forward proposals for overcoming the constitutional deadlock and challenged the Muslim League’s claim to represent the Muslims of India. On 28 April 1940, the Conference passed a resolution which included a declaration beginning: ‘India, with its geographical and political boundaries, is an indivisible whole and as such it is the common homeland of all citizens, irrespective of race or religion, who are joint owners of its resources.’
attitude and demands constitute insuperable obstacles in the way India's freedom is indefensible subterfuge to mask disinclination of British Government to part with power. Serious gravity of situation occasioned by menace of early invasion imperatively demands British Government should immediately recognise India's freedom and transfer real power enabling representatives of people to assume complete responsibility for defence of country as a whole in full and mutual collaboration with other free countries of the world. Ends.

Board also passed resolution observing that independence of nearly all Moslem countries has been held to ransom, conveying heartfelt sympathy to Moslem and the other inhabitants of the countries exposed to horrors of war, and hope that Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Persia will emerge from present plight strong and free in a world free from aggression and exploitation.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 107
L/PO/6/106b: ff 236–8

INDIAN POLICY
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INDIA, COVERING A NOTE BY MAJOR-GENERAL
R. M. M. LOCKHART, C.I.E., M.C.

INDIA OFFICE, 2 March 1942

I circulate for consideration a note by my Military Secretary, Major-General Lockhart, in regard to the probable effect on the Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers and Other Ranks of the Indian Army of the proposed Declaration.

L. S. A.

Annex to No. 217

NOTE BY MAJOR-GENERAL LOCKHART

2 March 1942

EFFECT ON THE INDIAN PERSONNEL OF THE INDIAN ARMY
OF CHANGES IN INDIA'S CONSTITUTION

[This note is summarised in para. (iii) of No. 228]
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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE

I expect your head is in a whirl, as is mine, over the developments of the last few days. There is a certain sense of humour in that Winston, after making infinite difficulties for both of us in respect of whatever constructive suggestions we put forward, has now, as is his wont—seen the red light (especially the American red light) overnight. There is equal humour in the fact that Attlee and Co., from whom I had practically no support before, are now in full cry behind Cripps in clamouring for the maximum!

2. As a matter of fact it seems to me that the bark of the new declaration is in many ways more alarming than its bite. After all, the idea that our outstanding obligations should be settled by treaty, and that before the constitution comes into force, is only what you and I agreed upon in July 1940 and Winston said then he would fight to the death.1 We have safeguarded the Muslims over Pakistan. Last, but not least, we are turning down Sapru and only offering in general terms some opportunity for co-operation to the Indian party leaders if they accept our general declaration for the future. Points I am not altogether happy about and propose to raise again in Cabinet, though so far overruled by the Committee, are the omission of a more definite statement about the Crown and the positive declaration about the future India's freedom to secede. This is, of course, in one sense self-evident, but its open announcement at this moment may mean trouble both as regards Nepal and Afghanistan and I have sent you a short telegram2 about this.

3. My impression as to the whole business is that Congress will not accept. Gandhi may like it, but there must be many elements, of what I might call the Mahasabha Wing of Congress, who will be shocked by the idea that India may be divided if they are not prepared to make terms with the Muslims. Again, while some of the Congress leaders may be well content in fact that we reject the Sapru scheme of an all-Indian non-official executive, they will probably feel bound in practice to denounce us for it. My impression is that the most likely result will be a grudging admission that some advance has been made by us, but that it is not sufficient to warrant Congress taking a part in the government of the country beyond helping with A.R.P., &c., locally. I am not sure that that would not be the best solution. Whether in that case you would still enlarge your Executive by some Muslim League and minor party representatives

1 Cf. No. 163, para. 3.  
2 No. 204.
or by someone like Rajagopalachari, who might possibly break away from Congress over it, you will have to judge for yourself.

4. As things go I am having to fight very hard to prevent the statement being issued at once without giving at least some reasonable time for your comments. The Cabinet are discussing them tomorrow and probably again on Wednesday and Thursday, and there is a push for a statement on Friday.\(^3\) Personally I am inclined to think it would be better for the statement to be postponed till Tuesday, with two days’ debate on Wednesday and Thursday to follow. Anyhow that will all be settled before you get this. But what you will no doubt have to do immediately after the statement is to consider how to follow up the invitation addressed at large to the leaders of Indian political opinion to come forward to co-operate, both provincially and at the Centre. By the way, the idea is that the statement should first issue as a direct broadcast by the Prime Minister to the people of India, being read out simultaneously by the Leader of the House in each House. This is getting away from the normal practice of a declaration by the Viceroy, but is I think justified by the peculiar circumstances and by Winston’s peculiar position at this moment in the war.

5. The war indeed is a much bigger issue, but changing from day to day too breathlessly for comment and I will say no more. Keep fit and keep up your courage. You will need all of it.

\(^3\) 6 March.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

The Viceroy’s House, New Delhi, 2 March 1942

Private and Personal

Conditions in Burma have upset our telegraphic communications. Dorman-Smith has been getting his replies through quickly, but very little from us is getting through, though I have verified that the landline is working well up to Mandalay, from which place telegrams of high priority had been cleared by yesterday morning. I foresee that we shall have to make greater use of the Army and Air Force wireless link with Burma.

2. Meanwhile, not having had any reply to my telegram\(^1\) of the 26th February about putting Wood in charge of arrangements on the Burma Road, I have issued an order today making Wood, for practical purposes, the Govern-
ment of India, in order to push on with the construction of the road and to regulate refugee traffic from Burma, with power to give orders to all authorities, civil or military, central or provincial, to that end. I am determined that there should be no avoidable delay in this matter.

3. Wavell arrived here on the 27th and flew straight off to Burma. He and Dorman-Smith both seem to have got together to good purpose as I have just seen his most heartening telegram that he has decided not to blow the demolitions but to defend Rangoon and to send reinforcements.

4. The position in Burma makes me sad. I have seen trouble coming there since 1936 (see private and personal correspondence—paragraph 6 of my letter dated 25th May 1936 to Zetland and my sketch appreciation that accompanied it). In this and subsequent communications, I urged the making of the road between Burma and India which we are now trying to put through at high speed in face of enemy pressure. But our well-intentioned efforts to set Burma up as a Dominion apart from India have proved expensive in the military field, as indeed most of us feared they might. Little or nothing was done to make Burma ready for war, and now the price of unpreparedness must be paid. It might conceivably have been possible to do a little more by way of preparation had we not had to face frequent changes in the Chief Command in India, and had Burma not been whisked away from our operational control at the time Wavell was first sent to the Pacific Command. But the real damage was done between 1937 and 1942.

5. Events are moving so fast that I have decided not to inaugurate the National War Front (which is the new name for the National Defence Front mentioned in paragraph 7 of my letter of the 16th/17th February) by broadcasting myself. I have to consider very carefully the timing of such public utterances, and I cannot feel that the time is ripe at this precise moment. It was to have been inaugurated today. I propose, however, to put out a message on the 6th March, after which Provinces and States will take up the campaign, for which they have been supplied with a detailed programme.

6. I have sent you a long appreciation of the internal situation here as a result of the fall of Singapore. I think the D.M.I.'s telegram tended to underline rather heavily the dark side of the picture; though one cannot describe the feeling in the country as one of confidence, there are remarkably few signs of panic. If Rangoon can be held for any length of time, I believe that morale may make quite a rapid recovery. I have just seen a report from my D.I.B.

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1 Not printed.  
2 Not printed.  
3 In January 1942 Burma, which had been included in the India Command since 12 December 1941, was placed under General Wavell's newly formed ABDA Command.  
4 No. 135.  
5 No. 186.  
6 No. 128.
in which he describes public feeling throughout India as reasonably calm and
says that popular leaders are showing a more rational appreciation of the current
phase of the war. There is of course a good deal of despondency, but this is
most marked in the urban areas. There has, inevitably, been an increase in the
withdrawals of savings in some parts of the country, and this can no longer
be described as normal; but as I reported in my telegram, the recent rate of
withdrawal of savings, compared with the bad part of 1940, has been remark-
ably small. Withdrawals have been most heavy, naturally enough, in Bengal
and Assam, and this can partly be explained by the efflux of people from Calcutta
and their need for ready money to set up new homes elsewhere.

7. I mentioned to you in my last letter that we have had the Hopes staying
with us for a few days. He looked a good deal fitter than for some time past.
We took advantage of the opportunity of discussing the political situation
generally. Since they left, on the 27th, I have been looking through the notes
of my talks with him and find there are a few points that I might mention
to you. Hope reports that there is a good deal of nervousness in Madras city
and in most of his larger towns. I do not, however, gather from him that this
deterioration is any more serious or more extensive than one would expect,
given the general military position in the Far East and the fall of Singapore in
particular. There has been a fairly extensive exodus from the capital of those
who can afford to clear out; but that is all to the good. He reports the Services
and the Police to be in good fettle. Like every other Governor, Hope wants
more rifles than we can give him, in order to expand his armed police. We are
in point of fact producing quite a few weapons for Madras, and I think Hope
is well satisfied on this score. He is a little anxious about the Moplahs,7 though
from what he told me, I am inclined to think that such public nervousness as
exists in Malabar is due more to the anxieties of the Hindus than to any evil
intention on the part of the Moplahs.

He tells me his Chief Justice8 is anxious for an extension of his term. I will
look into this and let you hear later on how the suggestion looks to me.

He was interesting on the question of recruiting medical officers (of which,
as you know, we stand in great need). He attributes the shyness of suitably
qualified persons to be in great part due to the meagreness of the contractual
provision for the man’s family in the event of his being killed or completely
disabled, the amounts provided being insufficient to keep the widow and any
children in decency and the bare necessities of life. This is being looked into.

8. Lewis has been up here to discuss his Defence problems. He is most con-
cerned about the vulnerability of his coastal districts, and particularly of
Cuttack—and with it of himself and his whole Government—which, he feels,
could be taken by a comparatively small party of the enemy, landing, say, at
Puri. I quietly explained to him that because of the general military position
I cannot protect Orissa and do not propose to squander troops in erecting a mere façade which would crumble if the Japs landed. I have tried to explain that war does not respect even the Secretary of State's services! I think I failed to convince him.

9. Herbert has just arrived and has a number of matters to discuss with the Defence and Civil Defence people up here, the most important of which are the extent to which a "scorched earth" policy can be applied in Bengal if necessary. Coast protection and internal security. I shall have something more to tell you of his problems when next I write.

10. I fear that the announcement on 13th February about India's representation on the Pacific War Council did not get the good Press which it deserved in this country. The announcement itself was prominently shown in most of the important English dailies, a notable exception being the _Statesman_, which, whether through incompetence or for other reasons, tucked it away, in both the Calcutta and Delhi editions, in a back page. The nationalist Press of course belittled the offer, and this was in keeping with its general attitude at the moment towards any attempt to improve political relations between Great Britain and India which did not fulfil completely the nationalist demand. Another factor accounting for the poor publicity which this announcement received was that the Press at the time was completely preoccupied with the visit of Chiang Kai-Shek and the impending fall of Singapore. A subsidiary factor was that Seth Jammalal Bajaj had died on the 11th February and the nationalist Press was devoting considerable space and attention to his merits.

11. You mentioned in your letter of the 20th January your feeling that we are not doing enough in the matter of air-borne troops. I entirely agree. From what I have heard, there is very little being done, the chief adverse factors being lack of gliders, glider pilots, troop-carrying aircraft and tug aircraft. These factors, coupled with the difficulty in provision of statichutes, are affecting adversely our own efforts to provide a parachute brigade (four battalions) and an air-borne division. We have got these parachute battalions under training in Delhi, but owing to other demands we have had to convert the nucleus of the fourth battalion into a Depôt and "Holding Unit". I doubt if we shall have our three battalions ready before July 1942 at the earliest—perhaps not then. We have only old Valientia aircraft available for training, and so far, in spite of all efforts, we have been unable to obtain aircraft from home. Certainly some Hudsons have been sent, but these are entirely unsuitable for the purpose, and in the emergency we have had to put them to other uses.

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7 A Muslim sect of Malabar, among whom there was a serious insurrection in 1921.
10 No. 22, para. 6.
The crux of the matter is that no suitable aircraft for training parachutists—or transporting them—are in sight, or (so far as I know) are being designed. The same applies to the provision of gliders and glider pilots.

I do feel that some radical change of heart and policy at the Air Ministry may be necessary, and that the Army should get some more of the types of aircraft and air components it requires as against heavy bombers and fighters. I dare say P. J. Grigg will have a go at the Air Ministry about this and kindred matters. I notice that Sinclair put in a plea that the Ministry should be left to do its own job in a speech he made last week, and wonder whether this may not be a reaction to Grigg’s initial approach.

[Para. 12, replying to para. 8 of Mr. Amery’s letter of 9 February (No. 89), and para. 13 on Indian industrial trainees in the United Kingdom, omitted.]

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Sir Alexander Hardinge to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106b: ff 269–70

CONFIDENTIAL

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, 3 March 1942

My dear Leo,

I am very grateful for your letter of yesterday evening enclosing a copy of the draft Declaration which is being considered at this morning’s Cabinet. I have since received copies of the telegrams which have passed between you and the Viceroy on the subject.

I note that while the amendment suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 3832 includes a reproduction of the “Balfour definition” of common allegiance to the Crown, it also recognizes the right of secession. I imagine that on the constitutional side Mr. Berriedale Keith and others will have a certain amount to say; but apart from this The King, who has read all these papers with much interest, cannot help wondering if anything is to be gained by drawing attention publicly to this rather delicate subject, which has always been avoided in the case of other Dominions. Moreover it would seem to be hardly necessary, if India is to be promised “self-government and independence” as the Viceroy recommends. All these considerations will doubtless be before the Cabinet, and His Majesty will be much interested to hear what conclusions are reached.

Ever yours,

ALEXANDER HARDINGE

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1 No. 208.  
2 See No. 222, note 3.  
3 No. 200.
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War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 9

L/PO/6/106b: ff 234-5

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, 3 March 1942

I circulate herewith a note by Sir Herbert Emerson, Governor of the Punjab from 1933 to 1938.

L. S. A.

Annex to No. 221

3 March 1942

I would make the following observations on the draft Declaration¹ shown to me by the Secretary of State for India.

1. It seems to me essential that action should be avoided at the present time which might create a political or communal crisis in India, and thereby gravely impede the prosecution of the war. From the latter point of view, it is very desirable not to give a blow either to Congress or to the Muslims. But if one or the other is inevitable, then in no circumstances should action be taken which might make the Muslims actively hostile. This would be disastrous. Subject to the above, I recognise the necessity of a Declaration which will commit the Government to positive action as soon as possible after the war, and I agree with the principle of a constitution-framing body, which would frame a constitution for a unified India, to be accepted by the British Government; or, if a unified India cannot be attained, then of the setting up of more than one constitution-framing body for the purpose of framing constitutions for the relevant parts, to be accepted by the British Government. Such acceptance would be accompanied by a Treaty covering all necessary matters relating to the transfer of responsibility.

2. I would, however, most strongly advise against the inclusion at the present time in the Declaration of a statement of an irrevocable and rigid character specifically defining the form and character of the constitution-making body. I would equally strongly depurate fixing the province at the present time as the unit for contracting out. Under the scheme now proposed, no-one can accurately forecast the communal character (a) of the Primary Electoral College and (b) of the Secondary Electoral Colleges. The constitution of these is to depend on elections to be held after the war, and since these bodies will

¹ Annex to No. 215.
permanently decide the future of India, the importance attaching to the post-
war elections will be enormous. Corruption and bribery will be on a scale
commensurate with the issues involved, and in this respect the Muslims, as the
poorer community, will be at a very great disadvantage. Every sort of intrigue
will start as soon as the Declaration is made, introducing a new disturbing
factor into Indian conditions at the very time when the military danger is
greatest. Moreover, while the political organisations will regard the matter from
the broad political point of view, individuals and groups of individuals will
look at it as it vitally affects their own future. To take the Punjab, for instance,
the province I know best. It would almost certainly contract out, and this is
the assumption that would be made by non-Muslims. There is no suggestion
in the Declaration about transfer of populations or adjustment of boundaries.
The province is the irrevocable unit. The immediate conclusion of the Sikhs
would be that they are doomed for ever to Muslim rule. So also for the Hindu
Jats of the South-East of the province. Both the Sikhs and the Jats are fighting
men, and are very largely recruited for the Indian army. How could they be
expected to put their whole weight into the war?

Even if it be necessary after the war to split up India into different parts—
and it may be necessary—this is not the time to rub the consequences into those
who will be vitally affected and who are fighting our battles.

3. While, therefore, for the sake of the Muslims, a Declaration should make
it clear that the possibility of division is not ruled out, this should not be ex-
pressed in such explicit and detailed terms as to exclude from the outset the
prospect of negotiations and give-and-take between the parties concerned re-
garding machinery, boundaries, transfer of population, etc. I would confine
this part of the Declaration to something on the following lines:

"Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities the British Government will
set up in India a fully representative body consisting of Indians charged with
the task of framing a new constitution. The aim shall be a constitution for a
unified India, but, failing agreement between the representatives of the
principal communities or, as regards the Indian States, between them and the
representatives of the States, then provision will be made for the framing of
separate constitutions for separate parts by appropriate representative bodies.
The British Government will accept and implement the constitution or con-
stitutions so framed, subject only to the signing of a Treaty . . . ." etc.

4. On the other hand, I would go further than is suggested in giving an im-
mediate earnest of British intentions. Subject to the Viceroy keeping effective
control over the safety of India and internal order, and the Commander-in-
Chief retaining his responsibility for defence, I see no insuperable objection to
reconstituting the Viceroy's Executive Council, adding a Defence Minister,
and bringing in representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League. This
would, to my mind, be far less dangerous, and far less prejudicial to the waging of the war—indeed it might be helpful—than the proposals contained in the Draft Declaration. The latter as it stands may well offend Congress or the Muslims or both, and will create concrete fears and doubts in the minds of large groups of Indian soldiers and whole classes of the population regarding their future. At the same time, it gives nothing at once.

H. W. EMERSON.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 27th Conclusions

R/30/1/1: f 30

3 March 1942

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 20th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

The War Cabinet had before them the following Papers:

(a) A Note by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, covering a draft of a Declaration to be made by His Majesty’s Government (W.P. (42) 105).²

(b) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, covering telegrams exchanged with the Viceroy (W.P. (42) 106).³

(c) A Note by the Secretary of State for India, covering a Memorandum by the Military Secretary to the India Office (W.P. (42) 107).⁴

The War Cabinet had a preliminary discussion of the proposed Declaration. The view generally expressed was that the balance of advantage lay in favour of making a Declaration on the lines proposed, which, in effect, only made explicit the undertakings we had already given.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to arrange for a further Meeting of his Committee that evening to prepare a revised draft of the Declaration, after taking into account the points made by the Viceroy, and referred to in discussion.

The Committee were invited to consider, in particular, the following points:

(1) The wording used in the first paragraph in regard to allegiance to the Crown.

¹ No. 109. ² No. 215.
³ Mr Amery’s memorandum was a covering note, dated 2 March, circulating Nos. 196, 197, 200, 209 and 214.
⁴ No. 217.
(2) The position of small minorities, raised by the Viceroy in his telegram 504-S of the 2nd March.

(3) Whether any amendment was necessary to make it clear that the Declaration represented finality.

(4) Whether paragraph (c) of the draft Declaration should be made more explicit, and, if not, what answer should be given when we were asked in what way we hoped that the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people would participate in the counsels of their country.

The War Cabinet took note that the Prime Minister proposed to take an early opportunity of consulting all Ministers of Cabinet rank as soon as the text of the Declaration had been revised.

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**Draft Declaration**

In accordance with the decision reached by the War Cabinet at their meeting that morning, the Committee gave further consideration to the text of the draft Declaration, and had before them:

(a) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, covering telegrams exchanged with the Viceroy (W.P. (42) 106).

(b) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, covering a Note by Sir Herbert Emerson (L. (42) 9).

The Committee agreed on the following amendments to the draft Declaration:

*Paragraph 1, Line 6 [line 6 in the present volume]:* After “Dominion” read: “associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs, and free to remain in or separate itself from the equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations”.

*Paragraph (c) (i):* Lines 3 and 4 [lines 2 and 3 in the present volume] should read:
"present Constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides".
Paragraph (c) (i): last line: Delete "following the lines laid down above" and substitute "on lines analogous to those here laid down."
Paragraph (c) (ii), last line but one: for "revised Treaty arrangements" substitute "a revision of its Treaty arrangements."

Paragraph (d): The last three lines should read as follows:
"Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same power as the British Indian members."

Paragraph (e): The Committee considered the question, which had been raised at the Meeting of the War Cabinet that morning, as to what answer should be given if we were asked in what way we hoped that the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people would participate in the counsels of their country.

The Committee agreed that this point should be met by draft instructions to the Viceroy, and expressed general approval of the text of the draft instructions prepared by the Lord Privy Seal (a copy of which is appended to these Minutes). It was further suggested that the Viceroy should be authorised to send copies of these instructions when finally approved to the Governors of the Provinces, for their information.

The Committee considered whether any amendment should be made to the declaration to deal with the position of e.g. the depressed classes. The view taken was that they should be dealt with in the explanatory speeches.

The Committee considered whether any amendment should be made to the draft Declaration to make clear that the Declaration represented finality and that we were not prepared to bargain in regard to it.

The Committee, who attached cardinal importance to the Declaration being read in the House of Commons and also broadcast to India by the Prime Minister, decided to recommend to the Prime Minister that in his introductory passage, before reading the Declaration, he should use words which would convey an atmosphere of precision and finality.

Procedure. Great importance was attached to very careful steps being taken to prepare the Press and public opinion both in this country and in India. It was suggested that people of influence in this country, and associated with different lines of thought, should make a short broadcast, either separately or jointly, emphasising the significance of the Declaration.

It was also suggested that, after the Declaration had been made, two or three days should elapse before discussion took place [in] Parliament in regard to it, or explanatory speeches were made by Government Spokesmen, who would then know the reactions of Indian opinion.
Annex to No. 223

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO VICEROY ON CLAUSE (e) OF THE DECLARATION

You are authorised to negotiate with the leaders of the principal sections of Indian opinion, upon the basis of paragraph (e) of the declaration, for the purpose of obtaining their immediate support for some scheme by which they can partake in an advisory or consultative manner in the counsels of their country.

This does not preclude you offering them—if you consider it wise or necessary—positions in your executive council, provided this does not embarrass you in the defence and good government of the country during the present critical time.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

3 March 1942

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 506–S. Your telegram No. 263,1 dated 1st March. Following are my immediate personal reactions. I await permission to consult Cunningham and Commander-in-Chief.

Proposed reference to secession would I personally think have effects as follows:

(a) Nepal. Nepal would probably require definite assurance that Gurkha troops would not serve under an autonomous Government in India but would not, we hope, at once withdraw his troops or damp down recruiting if he received this assurance and did not interpret declaration as defeatist.

As regards long range position, especially in view of local option, it is sufficient to look at the position of Nepal on the map with reference to—

(i) Position of Muslim Provinces, Punjab and Bengal separated by Hindu bloc of Bihar and United Provinces.

(ii) The fact Nepal is a military power and her treaty obligations are not to Indian Government but to British Government.

(b) Afghanistan. Immediate effects would be definitely unsettling. The Afghan Foreign Minister told our Minister2 before the August Declaration that the question of Afghanistan’s direct access to the sea would become pertinent if control of India’s ports passed into India’s hand.

North-West Frontier Province. Much would depend on whether North-West
Frontier Province remained pro-Congress or swung away: but there is a risk that the Frontier generally would interpret declaration as beginning of disintegration. I would expect Muslims to take a new interest in the 350,000 rifles in our tribal areas. Frontier tribes are quiet at present but Faqir of Ipi is known to be active. I do not doubt he will use promise of independence for India with considerable effect and we shall have to be prepared to meet consequent trouble. Any extensive flare up would of course tie up considerable forces which could ill be spared.

(c) Princes. No immediate harm, but mention of independence would probably frighten many Princes away from the Union for some time.

(d) Immediate effect on the Army would be manageable; but the whole scheme must inevitably end in intrusion of communal politics into the Army. Real answer is probably that an independent India could, as far as human foresight can foretell, never have an efficient and politically disinterested Army drawn from all the communities.

1 No. 204. 2 Lt. Col. Sir W. K. Fraser-Tytler. 3 The Faqir of Ipi (a place in Waziristan) was a mullah of the Tori Khel tribe of North Waziristan on the North-West Frontier. In the years 1936-7 he aroused the religious passion of the Muslim tribesmen against the Hindus and the Government, and organized serious tribal disturbances. Military operations were required to restore order. Although in 1937 the Faqir was forced into hiding, he continued to harass the authorities thereafter.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

No. 513-S. Following is reaction of External Affairs Department to question what would be effect, immediate or subsequent, of proposed reference to secession on (a) Afghanistam and North-West Frontier Province, (b) Nepal.

2. General. Right to secede must be viewed in perspective against Provincial right of option to accede or otherwise. Local option has to be considered against—

(i) Hitherto different political allegiance of North-West Frontier Province and Punjab;

(ii) Fact that both Provinces in North-West India have powerful and indigestible minorities;

(iii) Probability that Nepal would be faced by two acceding Provinces but that strong influences for non-accession would exist on both her flanks.
Announcement is in terms of action after war, but would set in motion all above currents at once. It is therefore doubtful whether distinction between immediate and subsequent effect is real. From external angle picture is one of foreign States with irredentist or territorial claims faced by an arena where struggle for power has been intensified and important elements will seek foreign backing, e.g., Muslim League plus Afghanistan, Hindu Mahasabha plus Nepal.

3. Afghanistan and North-West Frontier Province. Shortly before Declaration of August 1940 Afghan Government evinced nervousness on issue of Dominion Status. Minister, War,\(^1\) reminded that treaties are with British Government not India, and that grant of independence to India, spelling failure to guarantee Muslim minority, would lead to change in Afghan policy. Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs\(^2\) said that question of direct access to sea would become prominent if control of ports passed to India’s hands. Axis propaganda plays on same theme. Irredentism will be strengthened by promise of right to secede, and position unlikely to be saved by right of Provincial option owing to cross-currents in North-West India set up by latter proposal. Tribes would see prospect of removal of all steadying factors, e.g., allowances, and regard announcement as invitation to cash in before dissolution. Morale of irregulars, on whose steadiness Frontier peace depends, would suffer. The only steadying factor now present is alliance with Russia, which would incline Afghan Rulers to hold back in fear of threat to Northern Provinces. Nevertheless success of last 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) years in keeping Frontier steady could scarcely continue, and it would be necessary to look to the rear while engaged to the East. Any success by Germany in Middle East would have added dangers.

4. Nepal. At time of 1940 Declaration His Majesty’s Government were made aware of Nepalese anxiety as to (a) safety of Nepal’s frontiers with India: (b) maintenance of present position of Gurkhas in Indian Army. Behind (a) lies Nepalese ambition for territorial gains in India. Any doubt as to (b) will affect nearly 100,000 good troops. Maharaja is likely to see in Declaration shadow of defeat and his loyalty, great as it is, may not be proof against advice to withdraw his subjects from our Armies before it is too late. He has Advisers who will suggest to him the opportunity for extending his frontiers. In any case it would probably be necessary in order to save Gurkhas to accompany Declaration with announcement that these troops will in future become Imperial force outside Indian Army. Even so Declaration must shake Nepal’s confidence in our cause and give rise to acute speculation regarding future of that State.

5. In both Afghanistan and Nepal Declaration will prove powerful aid to Axis theme of dissolution of India and stimulus towards territorial gain at India’s expense.
Repeated to H.B.M. Minister, Kabul, and Governors of the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, and the United Provinces.

1 His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud. 2 Ali Muhammad Khan Mirza.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 3 March 1942, 11 pm

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 518-S. Your private and personal telegram No. 270. 2 I am consulting Cunningham, Glancy and Hallett regarding effects on (1) North-West Frontier Province (2) Punjab (3) Nepal and United Provinces, respectively, of a declara-
tion containing

(a) A clear indication that India will be promised the right to secede if she so wishes after the new constitution; and

(b) local option of Provinces to accede or not to accede.

I have added that in declaration going so far as regards secession His Majesty’s Government from the purely internal point of view might well use the actual word “Independence”, 3 and have asked them for reactions in that event.

2. I have also assumed your permission to consult Wylie regarding Afghanistan; and in view of urgency have asked them all to repeat their replies to you. 4

1 Circulated to the War Cabinet. 2 No. 212. 3 Deciphered as ‘Independent’.
4 This telegram summarizes Lord Linlithgow’s telegram 511-S of 3 March to Sir F. Wylie, Sir G. Cunningham, Sir B. Glancy and Sir M. Hallett. Lord Linlithgow had transmitted the text of the draft Declaration as conveyed to him by No. 197 with the amendments suggested in No. 200 in his immediately preceding telegram 510-S of 3 March. For these two telegrams see MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.

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Mr Churchill to President Roosevelt

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 224

4 March 1942

Former Naval Person [to President]

No. 34. We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion status after the war carrying with it if desired the right to secede should be made at this critical juncture. We must not on any account break with the
Moslems who represent a hundred million people and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards thirty to forty million untouchables and our treaties with the princes' states of India, perhaps eighty millions. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion.

2. Meanwhile I send you in my immediately following telegram\(^1\) two representative messages I have received and a summary of a memorandum by the Military Secretary, India Office.

3. I will keep you informed.

\(^1\) No. 228.

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*Mr Churchill to President Roosevelt*

*Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 226–9*

4 March 1942

Former Naval Person to President

No. 35. Following is paraphrase of messages and the summary referred to in my telegram No. 34:\(^1\)

(i) Message\(^2\) from Mr. Jinnah (President of the Moslem League and the accepted head of the most powerful Moslem organisation in India).

*Begins.* The Sapru conference of a few individuals with no following and acting as exploring and patrol agents for the Congress have put forward plausible subtle and consequently more treacherous proposals.\(^3\) If the British Government is stampeded into the trap laid for them Moslem India would be sacrificed with most disastrous consequences, especially in regard to the war effort. The Sapru proposals virtually transfer all power immediately to a Hindu all-Indian Government, thus practically deciding at once far-reaching constitutional issues in breach of the pledges given to the Moslems and other minorities in the British Government's Declaration of August 8th, 1940, which promised no constitutional change, interim or final, without Moslem agreement, and that Moslems would not be coerced to submit to an unacceptable system of Government. The Sapru proposals would introduce major changes on the basis of India becoming a single national unit thereby torpedoing the Moslem claim for Pakistan which is their article of faith. Moslems entertain grave apprehensions and the situation is tense. They call upon the British Government in the event of any major constitutional move being intended to declare their acceptance of the Pakistan scheme if His Majesty’s Government wish to have free and equal partnership of Moslems. *Ends.*
Note. The Pakistan scheme contemplates the creation of separate Moslem States in the Moslem majority areas independent of the rest of India, except so far as they accept joint control negotiating as separate political entities.

(ii) Message* from Sir Firoz Khan Noon (a Moslem member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council from the Punjab and a representative of the Moslem point of view).

Begins. Sapru “Non-Party” Conference is in fact an all Hindu parties conference. Its members, although inspired by patriotic sentiments, are in fact acting as agents of the Congress. Their aim is that if India cannot become a Dominion during the war, Government should, under the existing constitution, pass into Indian hands. Thus Hindu raj would be immediately established. Moslems are extremely apprehensive that His Majesty’s Government are gradually yielding to vociferous agitation and giving way contrary to pledges given to Princes, Moslems, and other minorities. Immediate Indianisation of whole Executive Council would deprive minorities of assistance of European elements on whom minorities depend for assistance in cases where Hindu majority combine against them. Council is even now overweighted against Moslems who have three out of eight Indian members. If His Majesty’s Government Indianise whole Council, Moslems must have 50% seats or whole of non-Congress India will, in the absence of safeguards which have proved useless in Provinces, from sheer desperation create serious situation adversely affecting war effort. In any declaration creating Indian Dominion Moslem demands for Pakistan must be simultaneously conceded. If it is declared that India will be made a Dominion after the war Moslems expect simultaneous declaration that Pakistan will also be granted if no Hindu–Moslem agreement is reached. Otherwise Moslem India will be up in arms and the problem of the North West Frontier will again arise. Congress believe they can force His Majesty’s Government’s hand, and they have therefore made absolutely no move to win Moslem agreement. Only reason so far preventing Congress from creating disturbances in India is that Moslems are against them. If His Majesty’s Government by hasty or ill-considered decision push Moslems into open opposition Congress may unite with them and create even greater difficulties. Moslems fear that new elements in London Cabinet may enforce reconciliation of irreconcilables forgetting that other parties’ cup of patience is full already. War effort of Indian Princes and Moslems should not be ignored, and it should be borne in mind that in spite of opposition of Congress to recruiting 65% of new recruits are non-Moslems. Any peace with Congress agitators will only be made at very heavy cost. Congress now feel that their relinquishment of office in Provinces was mistake. They do not wish to give frank undertaking that they will assist in war effort if restored to office. They wish to use Sapru and others

1 No. 227.  
2 Original not traced: cf. No. 170, para. 3.  
3 No. 168.  
4 Paraphrase of No. 198.
to secure for them offices and Governments which they will not themselves ask for because they do not intend to act straightforwardly and wholeheartedly. If His Majesty’s Government establish Hindu raj in the Central Government in defiance of all friendly elements they will be playing with fire. I consider it my duty to draw His Majesty’s Government’s attention to the great danger which will face India if they yield to browbeating by anti-British elements in India and against their former pledges. It will be a betrayal of trust which Great Britain claims she has always held on behalf of all the peoples of India and not on behalf of Congress only. I hope His Majesty’s Government will stand firmly by their duty to protect best interests of Indian peoples as a whole, irrespective of pressure from outside quarters which regard British Commonwealth from different angle. Ends.

(iii) Summary of Memorandum by Military Adviser.

PROBABLE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN INDIA’S CONSTITUTION ON INDIAN PERSONNEL OF ARMY

1. It is assumed that both Congress and Muslim League are reasonably satisfied by proposed declaration of policy and that neither will attempt to stir up agitation among masses. Nevertheless such a declaration will react on soldiers both in India and overseas.

2. Classes from which Indian Army is drawn cannot be geographically divided by Provinces. Although bulk of Mohammedans come from the North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab, Rajputana, Central India, United Provinces, Bihar and Madras all contribute. Large numbers of martial class Hindus (Dogras, Jats, etc.) as well as Sikhs, come from Punjab. Gurkhas from Nepal, which is foreign territory, are a large and separate element. Particular reactions of any one class cannot be gauged till general reception of Declaration is known but immediate general effect on Army can be forecast.

3. Indian soldiers are voluntary mercenaries. They fight for their pay and to support their families, also in the hope of rewards of gratuities, pensions and possibly grants of land, but above all, being drawn from classes with long martial traditions, they take pride in their profession, in which a leading element is personal loyalty to their British officers and general loyalty to the British Raj. Any indication of a fundamental change in the conditions or the authority under which they have accepted service, whether as affecting their material prospects or their creed as soldiers of the British Crown cannot fail to have at once an unsettling effect.

4. From experience in troubles of 1931 and under Congress provincial rule since 1937, many Indian soldiers believe Congress is inimical to martial classes. There is therefore every reason to suppose that the general reaction of the
Indian soldier, whether Moslem or Hindu, to a pronouncement that the Government of India was to be placed in the hands of Indians—which he would naturally assume to be the hands of the majority community—would be one of great apprehension as to his own future and, more, that of his family. He will not at once understand the implications, as they affect himself, of the "contracting out" proposal: but when he does it will have an equally disturbing effect according to the area from which he comes.

5. Much of the foregoing does not apply to Gurkhas whose families are in Nepal and who return there on completing service. But they also are professional soldiers inspired by as complete loyalty to the British Raj during their service as to their Maharajah. Their professional allegiance is to the British Crown not to any Indian Government. Any idea, however ill-founded, that their allegiance is to be transferred, will inevitably upset their somewhat childish mentality.

6. Any pronouncement made will reach the Indian soldier accompanied and followed by a host of rumours and exaggerations. These will augment his natural apprehensions, and, in the case of the soldier overseas at least, it is difficult to see how the effect on his morale can be anything but adverse. In India itself it seems certain that announcement will lead to greatly increased political activity and manoeuvring to obtain adequate representation at post-war elections. This must react upon the soldier. It may well result in a reluctance to enlist or, at least, in a reluctance to serve overseas.

7. It is recognised that constitutional proposals in Declaration are not to begin to be put into operation until after war, and that purpose of Declaration is to induce spirit of cooperation which will ensure maximum war effort by India. It is not for me to say whether the support of those now hanging back is likely to be forthcoming, or would add substantially to India’s war effort if it were, but I feel it my duty to express the conviction that the effect of the Declaration so far as the Indian Army is concerned will be to create grave apprehensions in the minds of Indian soldiers and thereby (a) to induce hesitation to enlist and reluctance to leave India for service overseas and (b) to affect adversely the morale and fighting efficiency of Indian troops already overseas.

8 See Annex to No. 217
NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS
II DOWNING STREET, S.W. 1, 4 March 1942

I submit, on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on India, for the consideration of the War Cabinet, a revised draft of a Declaration by His Majesty’s Government regarding the future government of India.

C. R. A.

Annex to No. 229

DRAFT DECLARATION

His Majesty’s Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs, and free to remain in or to separate itself from the equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

His Majesty’s Government therefore make the following declaration:

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the Constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty’s Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to:

(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain for the time being its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides. With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty’s Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution on lines analogous to those here laid down.

(ii) the signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the constitution-making body covering all necessary
matters relating to the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands. Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(d) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the Provincial Elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(e) While during the critical period which now faces India, and until the new Constitution can be framed, His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for India’s defence, they desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task so vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 219–20

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

276. Superintendent series. Following is text of draft declaration as finally revised by Cabinet India Committee last night1 and recommended to Cabinet. It is not expected that further amendments of substance will be made in it. All your proposed amendments were put before Committee with full text of your telegrams and considered by them—[There follows the text of the Annex to No. 229. 'it will be necessary to' in para. (c)(ii) was received corrupt.]

1 See No. 223.
My dear Winston,
If the statement is made by me it will inevitably be regarded as a mere India Office affair, and Congress will be specially hostile to it because they regard me as pro-Moslem.

On the other hand, if Cripps makes it, it will at once send the Moslems off the deep end. They are convinced that he is a pure Congress-man, a close friend of Nehru, etc., and most of their excitement recently has been because of his entry into the War Cabinet. Nor would an announcement by Attlee inspire anyone.

Forgive my being quite blunt; but if this thing is done at all—and on the whole I think it ought to be—you are the only person who can make it either interesting or attractive. The Indians all have a tremendous admiration for you, which is not in the least diminished by your past opposition to the India Act. On the contrary, the fact that you now make this declaration will add enormously to its value in their eyes.

I do not see how this thing can be safely launched on Friday. It is of the first importance that the army should have guidance as to what it means—not only the army in India, but Auchinleck and Quinan’s forces as well. Officers must be in a position to tell them that there is nothing in this that affects their service to the King-Emperor, their pensions, land grants, or anything else.

Again, the statement in black and white that a Dominion is free to walk out of the Empire may be very embarrassing to Smuts at this moment and give a great handle to his Republican opponents. Surely he is at least entitled to put his views to the War Cabinet before any decision is taken? Similarly, we must give time to warn our Ministers in Nepal and Afghanistan what they are to say when it is announced that India is going to be free to leave the Empire. The sentence about freedom to go out of the Empire is indeed the crux of the Declaration from the point of view of effect upon the army, the Princes, and neighbouring States.

All this over and above the innumerable questions which will be asked of the Viceroy and to which I must supply him with some sort of answer. You suggested this morning that even this should be a matter for Attlee’s Committee. I am arranging this with Attlee for some time tomorrow. But that surely leaves no time to the Viceroy before the announcement comes out.

I am quite prepared to do my utmost to make a success of the Declaration.
After all, except for the particular composition of the constitution-making body, there is very little in it that I did not suggest in July 1940, and the main addition, namely provincial option in order to solve the deadlock, is for that matter mine as well: but I do consider that as I have to see the thing through my views as to how it should be dealt with deserve more consideration than they received this morning.

Yours ever,
L.S.A.

P.S. Since dictating this I have received the enclosed note\(^2\) from Sir David Monteath, which shows incidentally that time is required between a decision and the broadcast.

\(^1\) 6 March. \(^2\) Annex to No. 232.

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*War Cabinet*

*Committee on India. Paper I(42) 10*

*L/PO/6/106b: f 212*

**MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**

**INDIA OFFICE, 4 March 1942**

I circulate herewith, for consideration by the Committee, a note by Sir David Monteath, regarding the arrangements for an announcement on Indian policy.

L.S.A.

**Annex to No. 232**

**NOTE**

4 March 1942

If, as I understand, this Declaration is to be announced by means of a statement in the House of Commons followed at once by a broadcast to India, time is required for the B.B.C. to arrange the necessary link up to and throughout India. This cannot be done in less than \(48\)\(^1\) hours after definite notice has been given to the B.B.C. of the hour at which the special broadcast is to be made.

Time is also required after final approval has been given by the full Cabinet for the formulation and issue to the Viceroy of instructions as to the line he is to take and as to the line which the Governors of varying Provinces are to take with the many questioners who will at once seek enlightenment.

\(^1\) [By Sir D. Monteath] 36 hours at a pinch.
Time similarly is required for the Foreign Office to inform and guide His Majesty's representatives in Kabul, Katmandu, Chungking and Washington.

If any attempt is to be made to mitigate to Indian troops serving out of India the uncertainty and apprehension which it is feared that the Declaration may create in their minds, authority is required to inform Generals Auchinleck and Quinan of the Declaration and time required to enable them to instruct the Commanding Officers of Indian units as to the preparation of the minds of their men for the reception of the Declaration, which will undoubtedly reach many of them by broadcast.

Finally, is any attempt to be made to prepare the minds of the press in India, in this country, and more particularly in the U.S.A., for the reception of the Declaration? If so, the Press Relations Officers of the India Office and the Government of India, at any rate, and presumably also the appropriate Departments of the Ministry of Information, should be given some guidance as to the lines of that preparation. This is not a matter which can be handled independently on a departmental basis without some co-ordinating guidance.

D. T. MONTEATH

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 28th Conclusions, Minute 3
L/PO/6/106b: f 215

4 March 1942

INDIA

The War Cabinet had before them a Note by the S/S for Dominion Affairs, covering a revised draft of the Declaration to be made by H.M.G. (W.P. (42) 109).¹

The War Cabinet were informed that the Cabinet Committee on India had considered whether any amendment should be made to the draft Declaration to make clear that the Declaration represented finality and that we were not prepared to bargain in regard to it. The view taken had been that this point should be dealt with in an introductory paragraph prefixed to the draft Declaration. This would be better than to insert words in the opening paragraph of the declaration, since this paragraph did not cover the question of responsibility for carrying on the Government during the war.

The War Cabinet's conclusions were as follows:

(1) Approval was given to the terms of the revised draft declaration as amended,² and it was agreed that it should be circulated to all Ministers of
Cabinet rank, who should be invited to attend a Meeting on this matter at 12 noon on the following day.

(2) The S/S for Dominion Affairs was invited to communicate copies of the draft Declaration to the Dominion Prime Ministers, for their personal information.

(3) Great importance was attached to a period of, say, two or three days elapsing after the Declaration had been published, during which time the Declaration should be left to make its effect on public opinion, both here and in India. During this period, public statements explanatory of the Declaration should be avoided. The House of Commons should be informed that it was undesirable that the matter should be debated until the Indian reaction to the Declaration was known.

1 No. 229. 2 Annex to No. 229.

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War Cabinet Paper

L/PQ/6/106b: ff 213–4

4 March 1942

INDIA

In accordance with the decision reached at this morning’s Meeting of the War Cabinet, arrangements have been made for a Meeting of Ministers to be held in the Prime Minister’s Room, House of Commons, at 12 Noon, on Thursday, 5th March.

The Prime Minister hopes that this Meeting will be attended by all War Cabinet Ministers and Ministers of Cabinet rank.

I enclose a copy of the Notice which has been sent to Ministers, other than those who were present at this morning’s Meeting of the War Cabinet. The Papers enclosed with the Notice are not annexed, as copies have already been issued to you.

E. E. BRIDGES
Secretary of the War Cabinet

Enclosure to No. 234

4 March 1942

INDIA

I enclose for your personal information a draft Declaration by His Majesty’s Government, which has been drawn up by the War Cabinet, in regard to the future government of India.
I also enclose the following documents, all of which were before the War Cabinet when they drew up the draft Declaration:
(a) The Sapru Manifesto, dated 2nd January.¹
(b) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, covering a Note by Major-General R. M. Lockhart, Military Secretary to the India Office (W.P. (42) 107).²
(c) A telegram from Mr. Jinnah to the Prime Minister, dated 2nd March.³
(d) A telegram from the Viceroy, enclosing a message from Sir Firozkhan Noon.⁴

It is the intention that it should be made clear that the Declaration is to be regarded as a final decision.

These Papers are sent in order that you may have an opportunity of studying the matter before the Meeting of Ministers arranged to take place in the Prime Minister's Room at the House of Commons at 12 Noon tomorrow, Thursday, 5th March.

E. E. BRIDGES
Secretary of the War Cabinet

¹ Enclosure to No. 2. Circulated to the War Cabinet as Appendix A of W.P. (42) 53 (No. 57).
² No. 217. ³ See No. 228, para. i. ⁴ No. 198.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/509: f 43

INDIA OFFICE, 4 March 1942, 7.50 pm
Received: 5 March 4017. Reference your telegram of the 2nd March, 39D/42.¹ I note that Board of All-India Azad Moslem Conference denies claim of Moslem League to speak on behalf of all Indian Moslems. I should be grateful if you could let me have a brief appreciation of the present state of Moslem opinion indicating the approximate strength of Jinnah's following and the degree of importance attaching to this conference as the mouthpiece of non-League Moslems and whether influence of either is to be found in particular areas only.

¹ No. 216.
Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 208

Most Immediate

Lahore, 4 March 1942, 7:40 pm

14–G. Addressed to Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State for India. Secret and personal. Your telegram No. 511–S, 2 March 3rd. My views as to first point namely effect on Punjab of declaration now that India will have the right to secede after new Constitution are as follows. Responsible section of Mohammedans who constitute majority in this Province are quite unshakable in their view that Britain must hold the ropes until a constitution acceptable to their community is devised. They will undoubtedly be worried that constitution framed as now contemplated, whether the word "Independence" is specifically mentioned or not, will place power in hands of Hindus and that Hindus whom they already suspect of pro-Japanese tendencies will be set on seat. Consequently they will align themselves elsewhere and will be diverted effectually from working for the defence of India as a whole just at a time when this is most essential. One result will be unprecedented intensification of bitterness between Moslem and Sikh, relations between which communities are already dangerously strained. Recruitment will be very seriously affected as all communities will wish to keep their young men at home to defend their own interests. Disorder will be inevitable and security troops now greatly reduced are likely to be insufficient. Moslem League may be expected to gain great accession of strength in the Punjab and will (? use) (? their) (?) influence) ruthlessly for disruption. I anticipate that Premier with most or all of his Ministers will resign. This will further very seriously affect situation and it would be quite impossible to find any substitute capable of holding the Punjab together and helping in the war as Sikander has done.

As to second point namely declaration that Provinces will have option of acceding or not acceding this cannot counteract effect of declaration with which first point is concerned. Punjab even if it were able to stand by itself is not homogeneous but made up of communities antagonistic to each other and internal trouble within Province will be unavoidable. I do not anticipate that Punjab would accede. Majority community would tend to form a bloc with Moslem neighbours elsewhere.

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1 Circulated to the War Cabinet.

2 See No. 226, note 4.
Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 210

LUCKNOW, 4 March 1942, 11.25 pm

G/210. Addressed to His Excellency the Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State for India. With reference to Viceroy’s telegram No. 511–S dated March 3rd. Most secret and personal. Declaration involving right of secession should satisfy moderate Congress body especially as it includes constitution-making body not unlike Constituent Assembly. But Nehru and left wing Congress may take the line that power to frame constitution will devolve on them after the war as Nehru’s speeches show that he regards collapse of British Empire imminent. His views may prevail over those of the moderates. Congress may also contend that we are doing nothing during the war and this may receive support from Sapru and other Hindus.

Provided paragraph regarding option of accession makes it clear that non-acceding provinces will have advance on the lines of declaration and thereby (omission) Pakistan possible, which I assume is the intention of paragraph B (1), Moslems should accept it provided they are also satisfied that no constitutional change is contemplated during the war, which I assume is the implication of paragraph (d) of declaration.

I consider with the exception of the left wing Congress and other extremists few really want independence or complete severance with British connection. Use of word “independence” most undesirable as conveying the impression of undue concession to left wing Congress and will therefore be resented by other political parties besides having very demoralising effect on Indian Army and on all supporters of British connection and war effort.

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1 Circulated to the War Cabinet. 2 See No. 226, note 4. 3, 4 These references pertain to the earlier version of the draft Declaration (Annex to No.194).
Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106 b: f 209

MOST IMMEDIATE PESHAWAR, 5 March 1942, 2.40 am
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Your Excellency's telegram No. 511-S² March 3rd.

2. I deprecate the use of the word Independence or Azadi because (a) it was chief slogan of Red Shirts³ and then of Congress and would be disliked by our well-wishers (b) many people would assume it is foregone conclusion that right of secession will in fact be exercised.

3. On the question of general effect in this Province and Afghanistan my comments are—(a) We may expect considerable political excitement. Congress and Moslem League will start mutual recriminations on familiar lines. But I do not think this will last long, as practical effects of announcement are still some years distant. (b) Moslem opinion on both sides of the border (excluding extreme Congress Moslems) will not be perturbed as provincial local option will be considered sufficient safeguard. (c) I do not think Afghanistan will necessarily feel that now is opportunity to press claims for hegemony over Pathans or access to the sea. From her point of view position is not greatly changed from that of August 1940. The way is not closed to a Northern Indian Moslem State in the future (corrupt group) be friendly to Afghanistan. (d) There will be risk of lessening of allegiance to British rule in mind of Indian officials and non-officials, but recruiting which is immeasurably our most important war work is not likely to suffer. (e) Criticism will be made on both sides of the border that this advance has been forced from us owing to reverses in Burma and Malaya.

4. As I have no authority to consult Indian opinion I give foregoing views with some (?) diffidence. My general conclusion is that (?) effects here need not cause apprehension.

Addressed to Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State for India.

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¹ Circulated to the War Cabinet.
² See No. 226, note 4.
³ The organization formed in the North-West Frontier Province by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in 1930, combining Muslim religious zeal and Congress politics.
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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 29th Conclusions,¹ Minute 4

L/PO/6/106b: f 203

5 March 1942

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 28th Conclusions, Minute 3)²

The War Cabinet:
Invited the India Committee to hold a further Meeting, at which consideration should be given to the points raised at the Meeting of Ministers³ held at 12 Noon that day, and to report to a Special Meeting of the War Cabinet to be held on Monday, 9th March, at 12 noon.

¹ The reference number has been supplied by the Cabinet Office.
² No. 233.
³ The Cabinet Office have no record of this meeting.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: f 206

INDIA OFFICE, 5 March 1942

My Dear Winston,
The one thing that stands out from this morning’s meeting⁴ is that the declaration will be damned by everybody if it is issued without the fullest accompanying explanation of what is the deadlock we are trying to solve and so to bring Indians into cooperation now, what we mean to insist upon in the Treaty, etc. etc. It was quite clear to me that hardly any one who spoke had really grasped what the declaration is driving at. The only way to make a success of it is to have it accompanied simultaneously by an explanatory statement in both Houses, and with careful arrangements by Linlithgow to see that it is made clear to the Indian Army everywhere that they remain the King Emperor’s soldiers and that, whatever happens after the war, he will look after them.

On that basis of full explanation the thing can go through and will satisfy Moslems and just possibly some of Congress, as well as Americans and Left Wing here. But we shall have to think again very carefully before proclaiming to the world and the Indian soldier that India can walk out of the Empire.

The only alternative, which would give a little time, would be for me to
fly out, charged with the task of getting Indians to agree to co-operate now on the basis of a general understanding as to the future. Anybody else going out would be a slap in the face for Linlithgow. If I succeeded a declaration would be published with much greater authority and be a real charter for India’s future. If I failed the reasons would be so convincing to the world that we might be left alone for a while to carry on the war.

Do let us have a proper talk. In the whole of this business I have not had ten minutes with you alone.

Yours ever,

L.S.A.

1 See No. 234.

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Sir Hassan Suhrawardy to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

5 March 1942

No. 528-S. Following for Secretary of State from Sir Hassan Suhrawardy:

Begins. Flying 7th March, hope arrive before Easter. Duty compels me advising result of my observations and contacts during past six months.

Congress despite its nationalist creed is dominated by caste-ridden Hindus in overwhelming majority. Muslims seriously apprehend suppression and destruction their economic life, culture, religion and political self-expression. Jinnah is difficult, has given umbrage to several senior workers of Muslim League, who would like to serve its cause. Muslim League is undoubtedly exponent of Indian Muslim opinion and has achieved mass support.

Azad party¹ just formed by some prominent individuals does not command Muslim confidence. Muslims perturbed lest Hindu domination be established. Muslims have contributed and are eager to contribute all material support in war effort in much greater proportion to their population strength. They will resent any far-reaching decision without adequate investigation and hearing different groups. Ends.

¹ See No. 216.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE 5 March 1942
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 533–S. Could you please inform me most immediately when it is expected that Prime Minister’s actual announcement will be made and authorise me to communicate declaration to my Executive Council very shortly before Prime Minister makes his announcement in the House of Commons. I have stressed the necessity of this in my telegram No. 502–S dated March 2nd.

I would also like to telegraph early text to all Governors and Ministers at Kabul and Kathmandu in secrecy before announcement is made.

I should propose to arrange Press conference to follow immediately after Prime Minister’s broadcast, designed to promote as favourable a Press reaction as possible. If you contemplate the same in London perhaps you could telegraph sketch of what you propose to say so that we may keep in step.

1 No. 213.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 204

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 5 March 1942, 8 pm

281. Superintendent Series. Your telegram No. 533–S.1 I do not now expect that announcement will be made earlier than Tuesday2 and probably not till later in next week. I will inform you further as soon as intention is clearer. Draft declaration is to be further considered by Cabinet and some modifications may be made. If you have any further comments please let me have them by Sunday.3 I will bear in mind your desire to be in a position to communicate text to your executive Council, Governors and Ministers at Kabul and Kathmandu, before announcement and will seek authority for this when final text of declaration is being approved by Cabinet.

I shall be addressing you separately regarding arrangements for dealing with Press and line to be taken in doing so.

1 No. 242.  
2 10 March.  
3 8 March.
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Field Marshal Smuts to Mr Churchill1 (via U.K. High Commissioner in South Africa and Dominions Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 151

IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET

5 March 1942, 6.10 pm
Received: 6 March, 7.45 pm

No. 388. Your telegram D. No. 121.2 Following for Prime Minister from General Smuts.

Although Dominion advice on United Kingdom Government’s proposal is not invited I take liberty to raise following points for consideration:

1. Express opening left for partition may be taken as a British invitation or incitement to partition and may lead to most unfavourable reaction in India as a whole or among majority of its people. It may be argued that Irish tactics of partition is once more followed and India may decline to accept free constitution on such terms not without much public sympathy. Unless Indian opinion has been prepared for an announcement of such a character it may come as a great shock and do more harm than good.

2. Would it not therefore be preferable to drop the partition provisions from (d) (i) and simply to add a paragraph to the effect that if irreconcilable differences should unfortunately emerge in constituent body the British Government will use all the influences at its command to compose such differences and to assist India as a whole in securing her full and unfettered liberty in free association with British Commonwealth of Nations.

1 The Dominions Office sent copies of this telegram to the War Cabinet Offices and the members of the Committee on India.

2 Dominions Office circular telegram D. 121 of 4 March transmitted the text of the draft Declaration to Dominion Prime Ministers. R/30/1/1: ff 32-4.

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Mr Curtin to Mr Churchill (via Dominions Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 152

6 March 1942, 1 am
Received: 6 March, 2.56 am

No. 169. Prime Minister to Prime Minister.

Your D. No. 120,1 D. No. 121.2

We congratulate you upon the text of proposed statement foreshadowing a new Indian Union to become an associated British Dominion.

The Government’s attitude towards the question was expressed by the
Minister for External Affairs in the House of Representatives on February 25th last in the following terms "We are aware of the great struggle of the Chinese people to maintain their integrity and re-build their nation, just as we recognize and sympathise with the aspirations of the Indian people to become one of the self-governing British nations and as such to take part in the defences of the Allied cause in Asia".

1 Dominions Office circular telegram D. 120 of 4 March to Dominion Prime Ministers explained that the proposals contained in D. 121 were put forward 'not as bargaining points but as a final and definite scheme for ending present deadlock and for implementing policy already declared', and expressed the hope that they would cause no difficulty from the recipients' point of view. R/30/1/1: f 31.
2 See No. 244, note 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 6 March 1942, 4.15 am
Received: 6 March, 3.30 am

539-S. Your telegram No. 270. Following is brief summary of Commander-in-Chief's views: Present percentage composition of Indian Army is Hindu 41, Muslim 35, Sikh 10, Gurkha 8½, other 5½. The Punjab supplies 50 per cent. of the whole.

2. (a) Taken by itself knowledge of future right to secede would probably have no immediate effect if properly put out; but declaration of local option would have immediate effect of great unsettlement which will probably become dangerous as communal struggle over these proposals develops. Local option will be interpreted as acceptance of Pakistan and effect will be particularly bad on Punjab. Muslims of all ranks from provinces not likely to accede will ask how non-accession provinces will be governed; will they have army of their own, and if not how will they defend themselves against rest of India or against own minorities, e.g., Sikhs? In the result the minds of all will definitely be taken off task of fighting our enemies: as a sequel recruitment will be gravely imperilled.

(b) General tendency would be to discourage martial races, but bring forward large numbers from non-martial classes who would be worthless against external enemies and only desire to be armed against internal enemies.

In any case, if, as seems probable, widespread communal disturbances develop in India, task of suppressing them with Indian troops will be impossible.
Ultimately possibility\(^2\) of communal warfare in the Indian Army cannot be excluded.

\(^{c}\) Probable effect on States Forces not clear.
\(^{d}\) Serving Gurkhas unlikely to be affected.
\(^{e}\) Effect on British Officer is likely to be dispiriting while his difficulties are increased. Number of volunteers for Indian Army from England is likely to diminish.

3. Summing up, Commander-in-Chief considers that generally effect of contemplated announcement on fighting services would be disastrous. He is quite certain that contemplated announcement will take soldier’s mind sooner or later off fighting our enemies and start him looking over his shoulder. Finally, present time, when things are going wrong, would be particularly unhappy for such announcement.

\(^1\) No. 212. \(^2\) ‘Ultimately possibility’ deciphered as ‘A possibility’.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST SECRET

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 14-U. Following from Viceroy for Prime Minister:

Begins. The Draft Declaration on India has clearly now reached its final stage, and I have no wish to worry you with details. I do however beg of you to incorporate\(^1\) pledge to minority in declaration. Many of our best fighting men come from minority communities, and incorporation of\(^2\) pledge is all we can now do towards mitigating risks of deep disquiet,\(^3\) of a falling off in recruitment and of a strong urge amongst serving soldiers here and overseas to get back to their villages before communal trouble begins. I am telegraphing to Amery\(^4\) who will be able to put the point at issue concisely to you. Ends.

\(^1\) Deciphered as 'insert'. \(^2\) ‘incorporation of’ was received corrupt.
\(^3\) ‘mitigating risks of deep disquiet’ deciphered as ‘mitigation of disquiet’. \(^4\) See No. 248.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE 6 March 1942, 10.1 am

No. 540–S. My telegram No. 518–S, dated 3rd March. You will be receiving by direct repetition views of Cunningham, Glancy and Hallett on the points referred to in my telegram No. 518.

2. In order to allow them to see these specific points in perspective I had to give them the whole picture, namely, the full text of draft Declaration as it then stood, with variations given in your telegram No. 3852, dated 1st March. In so doing I permitted them to offer personally to me any comments they wished on the scheme as a whole; Hallett and Glancy have offered general comments but these will not have been repeated to you.

3. Hallett is not unduly alarmed though he is apprehensive of intensified Congress agrarian agitation in consequence. I feel however in view of Commander-in-Chief’s reactions (separately telegraphed) that I should be doing wrong in keeping from you Glancy’s reaction, which is briefly—

(a) contemplated declaration will dumbfound Indian elements who have hitherto helped in the war and they will cease to co-operate;

(b) nothing will convince Muslims that framing a constitution as contemplated in proposed declaration will not amount to betrayal;

(c) effect on services will be serious;

(d) Sikander will probably resign.

4. I cannot disregard Governor of Punjab and Commander-in-Chief’s views and something must be done to meet them.

5. I am not suggesting that His Majesty’s Government can at this stage abandon the essentials of their plan, and I need hardly say that it is far from my desire to mobilize opinion against it. But I do earnestly request you to see at least that the pledge to minorities is reiterated as an integral part of our new declaration, as suggested in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 504–S of 2nd March.

6. A promise of local option by itself is no comfort to minority Muslims in the U.P. and Bihar, and must rouse gravest apprehensions and bitterest feelings among Sikhs in the Punjab unless accompanied by specific renewal of our pledge.

7. I do not pretend that mere incorporation of this pledge would solve Commander-in-Chief’s difficulties. Nothing short of removal of local option
(which involves restoring\(^8\) ourselves as guarantors of all minorities in unified\(^9\) British India) would do that. If local option remains the incorporation of the minority pledge may (in his view) at best be a temporary palliative to such extent as it might reassure civil opinion among minorities affected. But within framework of His Majesty’s Government’s plan this is the best that I can suggest.

8. The method of insertion that I have proposed is neither obstructive nor offensive, and is consistent with the basic policy of throwing on Indians the responsibility of solving their own problem. It is the only hope I can see of mitigating effect of communal apprehensions without destroying basis of present declaration.

9. In view of Governors’ reactions, I am very glad to see that word “Independence” is not in latest draft, though I myself had suggested it.\(^{10}\) Clearly it ought to be avoided.

\(^{1}\) No. 226. \(^{2}\) See Nos. 236, 237 and 238. \(^{3}\) Namely Annex to No. 194. \(^{4}\) This should read 3832, i.e. No. 200. \(^{5}\) No. 246. \(^{6}\) No. 214. \(^{7}\) Namely the pledge to minorities contained in the August Offer. See Appendix 1. \(^{8}\) The letters ‘restor’ omitted in decipher. \(^{9}\) Deciphered as ‘the unification of’. \(^{10}\) See No. 209, para. 10(b).

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 156

India Office, 6 March 1942, 10.45 pm

No. 13–U. Your No. 540–S.\(^1\) Health of declaration precarious too early yet to say whether moribund. Phrase explicitly admitting secession will almost certainly be modified or\(^2\) drop out.

\(^{1}\) No. 248. \(^{2}\) ‘modified or’ deciphered as ‘(allowed to?)’.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

M ost I mmediate

P rivate a nd P ersonal

6 March 1942, 5.30 pm

No. 545-S. Please assure me that whole Cabinet will be reminded of my
No. 104-S\(^1\) of January 21st. It would I think be wrong as well as unfair to me
that whole Cabinet should not be made aware that I am not myself in favour
of proposed declaration at this time.

\(^1\) No. 23. See also Nos. 139 and 148.

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W ar C abinet

C ommittee on India. Paper I(42) 11

L/PO/6/106b: ff194-7

I ndian P olicy

M emorandum by the S ecretary of S tate f or I ndia

India Office, 6 March 1942

I circulate herewith, for consideration by the Committee, a draft telegram to
the Viceroy.

L. S. A.

Annex to No. 251

1. Obviously there are many questions to which it will be necessary for you
to be prepared to give at any rate some sort of answer as well as matters on
which it is of the greatest importance that guidance should be given before-
hand to your Executive Council, Provincial Governors and others most affected,
including the Press. I agree (vide your telegram of the 3rd March, 502-S)\(^1\)
that full text of Declaration should be available to you and your Council
shortly before its issue and I will arrange accordingly.

2. The most serious point in this connexion is of course the explicit admission
of freedom to secede. So far as Afghanistan and Nepal are concerned I suppose
the best answer for our Ministers is to point out that this by no means implies
that secession will follow any more than in the case of the Dominions and that
they had better understand that one way or another the British Government is going to see that India’s frontiers remain inviolate. As regards the Gurkhas it will no doubt be as well to reassure Nepal as you have already suggested that the control of the Nepalese troops would not be transferred to an autonomous Indian Government.

3. As regards the Princes our treaties with them hold good, subject to revision by negotiation. If they consider joining a federation whether the main Union or a Pakistan one they are fully entitled to stipulate that they only do so on the express condition that it remains under the Crown. If they stay out we shall naturally make provision for their protection by treaty.

4. As regards the Army it is essential that senior officers should be instructed to make it quite clear to all subordinates that nothing is happening now that affects their position as the King Emperor’s troops and that if and when a constitutional change does take place in the future their personal rights will be safeguarded in every respect. This should be immediately communicated to troops in Middle East and other stations outside India.

5. Similar assurances should be given through Governors to the Services protected under the present Government of India Act.

6. Paragraph (c). There is no proviso as to the maximum number of Provinces or States adhering. I imagine the answer is that this can be settled by the constitution-making body itself.

7. Paragraph (c) (i). The main argument for this is that it substantially fulfils our pledge to the Moslems and yet enables the other Provinces to get ahead. The awkward boundary questions raised may ultimately be resolved by re-adjustment: whether by the constitutional Convention, by negotiation, arbitration or referendum, can be left open for the present. The Provinces whose legislatures may exercise a right of non-accession are the Provinces as they now exist.

8. Paragraph (c) “lines analogous” means that if say the three North Western Provinces stand out they can hold their own convention, together with such States as might wish to adhere to them, frame their own Dominion Constitution, unitary or federal, and have it accepted subject to a treaty corresponding to that in (c) (ii).

9. The treaty will obviously cover our obligations to States, to minorities, and to existing personnel of Services. It will equally cover whatever arrangements the Convention will wish to make with His Majesty’s Government for the continuance of assistance in the shape of British armed forces. This would

1 No. 213; the date should be 2 March. 
2 See Annex to No. 229.
probably be for a period of years subject after that to notice for some agreed period. I should be inclined, following the line of your previous suggestion, to say that we shall not make stipulations for the future of British commercial interests in India in the pre-acceptance treaty, but leave them for negotiation after the new Government has come into existence.

10. Paragraph (d). It is important to emphasise that we are not imposing our view of what should be the constitutional convention, and that Indians are perfectly free to agree upon a different body, but that we are giving a definite lead and refusing to envisage indefinite delay.

11. Paragraph (e). You are authorised to negotiate with the leaders of the principal sections of Indian opinion on the basis of this paragraph for the purpose of obtaining their immediate support for some scheme by which they can partake in an advisory or consultative manner in the counsels of their country. This does not preclude your offering them if you consider it wise or necessary position in your Executive Council provided this does not embarrass you in the defence and good government of the country during the present critical time. Similarly if there is evidence of real willingness to cooperate you could offer representation as members of your Executive at War Cabinet and at Peace Conference.

3 See No. 182, para. 1, and No. 183, para. 5, Point 3.

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War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 12

L/PO/6106b: ff184–93

INDIAN POLICY
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, 6 March 1942

The attached memorandum and proposed alternative draft declaration have been submitted by Sir David Monteth. I commend them to the careful and earnest consideration of the Committee.

L. S. A.
Annex 1 to No. 252

MEMORANDUM

6 March 1942

The draft Declaration in W.P. (42) 105¹ is open to criticism on the following grounds.

(1) The insistent demand in India (and in this country) is for complete Indian control or a fuller Indian share in control of India's war effort now. Sir T. B. Sapru, in his telegram of 2nd January to the Prime Minister definitely relegated "detailed discussion of the question of a permanent constitution... until after victory is achieved":² Nehru and Rajagopalachari similarly claim that India cannot pull her full weight now unless Indians are given control of her present war effort, but they too seem tacitly to recognise that constitution-making should stand over. But the draft Declaration concentrates on the future constitution and does not deal at all with the present, except in the last paragraph and then without precision and only in very general terms.

(2) By concentrating on the future problem and making specific suggestions for its solution the draft Declaration exposes surface for criticism: this both diminishes whatever possibility there ever was of Indians responding to the 1940 invitation to find their own solution and diverts energy from the war effort in the present to manœuvring for position in the future.

(3) The suggestions for constitution-making are sufficiently precise to commit His Majesty's Government on fundamental points, and sufficiently detailed to provoke a volume of questions on supplementary points, but neither precise enough nor detailed enough to furnish satisfactory answers (if there are any at this stage) to these further questions—thus creating controversy, apprehension and misgiving as to His Majesty's Government's sincerity or capacity to solve the problem.

(4) By offering units—Provinces and States—the right to stand out from the promised Dominion, the draft Declaration meets the Moslem League's demand (in respect of the areas where the Moslem community is in the majority) for safeguards against subjection to a Hindu all-India Government. But to the same extent it offends Congress, whose aim is control over a united India. I submit therefore that the offer fails as a bait with which to secure the immediate co-operation of both these parties in the war effort.

(5) Nor does this concession to the Moslem League afford any comfort to the Moslem minority in a preponderatingly Hindu area, nor to the Hindu minority in a Moslem area (another cause of offence to Congress) nor to the Depressed Classes and other smaller minority communities which pervade all the component units. The protection of these is left to the provisions of a Treaty to be made between the future Dominion Government (or Dominion

¹ Annex to No. 215.
² Enclosure to No. 2, first para.
Governments) and His Majesty’s Government for the fulfilment of which the
draft Declaration suggests no guarantee or method of guarantee.

(6) The right granted to each Province (or State)—or combination of
Provinces and States—to stand out from the future union is accompanied by
a promise that it, no less than the union, shall, if it desires, be a Dominion:
but it is not accompanied by any conditions as to size, or financial or economic
stability or other necessary qualifications. His Majesty’s Government are there-
fore committed in advance to the possible partition of India into an uncertain
number of Dominions (or, under the right of secession, foreign States) of un-
certain character or capacity.

(7) Whether the inclusion in the draft Declaration of a statement in terms
of the right of the prospective union to secede from the Empire would have
any value as a concession to Congress, is open to question. It certainly will
not appeal to the Moslem League, nor to the Depressed Classes, nor to the
Indian Rulers, nor to any other element in India’s population. But whatever
its merits as a make-weight, surely the present is the worst possible moment
for making this concession. We have just sustained a series of defeats for the
first time in history at the hands of an Asiatic power: we have just lost our
two principal Far Eastern colonies and are in danger of losing Burma, recently
a Province of India. To announce at this moment the right of India—or of
any part of India—to secede will surely be interpreted in the whole of the
East as showing that we have lost our nerve, and will be a gift of the most
valuable material for enemy propaganda.

The opinion of the Governors who have been consulted is that the un-
certainty, apprehensions and anxiety engendered by the draft Declaration might
lead at once in some areas to acute communal tension or violence; this danger
is emphatically stated by the Governor to exist in the Punjab. In Bengal, whose
Governor has not been consulted, and where the Moslems though in a slight
numerical majority are outweighed by the Hindus in wealth and capacity, this
is no less the case. The opinion of the Commander-in-Chief and other military
authorities is that the effect is more than likely to be to diminish the morale
and efficiency of the Indian Army. It is clear from these and the considerations
stated in the foregoing paragraphs that the draft Declaration fails of its primary
purpose, which is to enlist the active co-operation of all elements in India’s
national life in a stimulation of India’s war effort now.

It is, however, equally clear that the expectation in India, in this country
and in America of an early declaration has been worked up to such a pitch
that it is not possible to refrain from making one. In these circumstances I
venture to append the skeleton of an alternative draft Declaration, which, if
approved, could no doubt be clothed in appropriate language. For this draft
I am much indebted to Sir Findlater Stewart, whose mind I found to be working
on much the same lines as my own.
In view of his telegrams 449-S and 459-S it is essential to obtain the prior concurrence of the Governor-General in paragraph A. 3; for on him will fall the burden of negotiating the composition of his Council and controlling it in operation.

D. T. M.

3 See Nos. 236, 237 and 238.  4 See No. 246.  5 E.g. No. 217.
6 Nos. 182 and 184.

Annex 2 to No. 252

Draft Declaration

1. His Majesty’s Government unequivocally declares its recognition of India’s right—on account of her size, importance and established place in the Councils of the world—to be a Dominion, with the attributes of self-government which the United Kingdom and the other Dominions possess. Recognition in practical form of this right has recently been accorded by the invitation to India to have her own representatives in the War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council and to have her own representatives in the U.S.A., at Chungking and elsewhere as may be required.

2. In 1935 the British Parliament enacted a Constitution which gives the Provinces of British India autonomy in their own sphere as components of a larger whole; it was designed also to afford a means by which the possession of the powers and responsibilities of self-government, independent of external control, which is the attribute of a Dominion, should pass gradually and without any dislocating shock to the machine of government into Indian hands. To our great regret that constitutional scheme has proved unacceptable. But the process of devising other means of giving His Majesty’s Government’s recognition of India’s right to be a Dominion the legal form of an all-India Constitution is too complex a task to be undertaken in the course of the life and death struggle in which the whole world is now engaged, and, as Sir T. B. Sapru has said, it must be relegated to the period after victory is achieved. But we are pledged to undertake the task, and a little later on I will explain in broad outline how we propose to fulfil our pledge.

3. The immediate task before us all is to throw our full energies, each one of us to the best of his particular capacity, into the task of winning the war and so bringing nearer the date at which India may become complete mistress of her own destiny.

A. For the Period of the War

1. His Majesty’s Government must retain its responsibility for the safety of India and control of the means of discharging this responsibility.
2. Subject to this overriding requirement imposed by war conditions and strategical exigencies we desire the fullest co-operation of Indians. I appeal to Indian leaders to resume the responsibilities of Government in the Provinces on the basis of coalition Governments in which the main political elements in each Province may co-operate.

3. As regards the Central Government we desire that the Governor-General’s Executive Council should be representative of every important element in India whose leaders are prepared to give their counsel and support to the Governor-General in the conduct of the war, and I appeal to the great parties now unrepresented on it to accept places upon it.

During a total war it is essential that the Commander-in-Chief should have the powers accruing to a member of the Executive Council. It would be unwise at such a critical stage in the war to discard the services of experienced administrators. Though the three officials now members of the Council happen to be Europeans His Majesty’s Government, in seeking to retain them for the present at any rate, are not animated by any desire to protect particular interests; their sole motive is the maintenance of efficiency at the highest pitch; His Majesty’s Government will not refuse to take the necessary measures to relieve the Governor-General of this statutory obligation if later that should seem expedient. In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government now offer to Indian leaders representation on the Executive Council on the following plan. The Council will be enlarged to a total of fourteen members exclusive of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief. Of the eleven seats thus available for Indian non-official members one seat each would go to representatives of the Depressed Classes and the Sikh community, and the Viceroy will fill the remainder by nomination after discussion with the leaders of the different parties, bearing in mind the need to secure due representation of India as a whole.

B. AFTER THE WAR IS WON

1. It is the firm intention of His Majesty’s Government that the future constitution of India should be framed by Indians themselves, and it is their desire that this task should be undertaken by them immediately after the conclusion of the war.

2. The method by which the constitution-framing body of Indians is to be composed is clearly a matter which should be settled by agreement amongst Indians themselves. But failing substantial agreement on the question of method within six months (?) of the termination of hostilities, His Majesty’s Government will themselves devise the composition of the constituent body, which shall contain representatives of the Indian States as well as of British India.
3. Nothing is to be gained by His Majesty's Government attempting now to lay down a hypothetical scheme for the composition of and procedure for the constitution-making body. Any such attempt would raise more questions, all of them hypothetical, than it would answer, and it would stimulate political controversy at a time when the conciliation of political parties and their mutual co-operation is more than ever necessary. In any case, His Majesty's Government would not undertake the task of establishing such a body until Indians had failed to do so within a reasonable time, and their sole endeavour would be, in the circumstances then obtaining, to make it as fully representative of all elements in India's national life as possible and as fully disposed to agreement as would be practicable.

4. It is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the result of the efforts of the constitution-making body would be a constitution embracing all India and every component unit—whether Province or State—in India as now constituted, and accepted by every substantial interest in India. In that event, His Majesty's Government would accept its conclusions and implement them by legislation, subject to the making and ratification of a treaty between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body, which would cover all matters arising out of the obligations created by Great Britain's historical association with India (such, in particular, as are dealt with by the reservation provisions and special responsibilities and powers of the Governor-General or Governors in the present Act) which cannot appropriately be disposed of in a constitution establishing the internal government of India. It must be emphasised that it is essential, if the constitution is to live, that the authority of the system of government so set up should not be directly denied by any large and powerful element in India's national life.

5. But His Majesty's Government cannot blind themselves to the possibility that important components in India's polity may not in the end be willing to accept the recommendations of the constituent body for the government of a single Indian Union. They would regret any such development leading to the partition of India as it now exists, but if in the event certain units or combinations of them, capable of undertaking the responsibilities of complete self-government, were to be formed, His Majesty's Government would feel bound to extend to them as to India as a whole the same measure of self-government as is possessed by a Dominion, but the same condition must again be stipulated that the authority of the system of government so set up in any separate unit or group of units must not be directly denied by any important element in it.

It would be a consequential of any such process of the partition of India that arrangements must be made in respect of matters of common concern to the resultant political units, such as defence, communications, currency, etc., either
by mutual engagements or by the establishment, by agreement, of some common co-ordinating authority.

6. The relations between the Crown and the States and their mutual rights and obligations would so far as they are not superseded by arrangements voluntarily entered into in the course of negotiations under either of the two preceding paragraphs become the subject of separate discussion and negotiation between the States themselves and the Crown Representative.

7. Finally, His Majesty's Government recognise that however earnestly they may strive to promote self-government in India, it may prove beyond their power to achieve a purpose the fulfilment of which must depend ultimately upon the voluntary decisions of Indians themselves. They are unwilling to leave themselves open to any charge of having wilfully or by negligence obstructed India's progress towards complete self-government. They propose, therefore, that if the attainment of India's full freedom as a Dominion or a federation of Dominions consistently with this Declaration and the Declaration of August 1940, is not in sight at the end of two years after the conclusion of peace, they will refer to an independent person or body of persons the determination of the responsibility for the failure to attain this purpose; and in so far as they themselves are found to be responsible for the failure, they will take steps to amend their action in accordance with the finding and recommendations of the authority to whom the question has been referred.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 6 March 1942, 11.30 pm
Received: 6 March, 10.55 pm

No. 549-S. With reference to my telegram No. 539-S dated 6th March (Commander-in-Chief's views).

2. I feel that there is some danger of communal position in the Punjab being misunderstood, and suggest that following considerations be put clearly before Cabinet with particular reference to "local option".

3. Punjab Muslims, if they held together, could no doubt ensure exercise of Punjab option to remain separate from predominantly non-Muslim Central Union: but for reasons explained in following paragraph this does not allay their own communal apprehensions.
4. Prospect of a predominantly Muslim and separate Punjab would frighten the Sikhs and start them preparing for trouble. Certainty that Sikhs would get troublesome causes Punjab Muslims to look to their own defences. Therefore idea of a separated Punjab still keeps both sides embittered. There are known to be a good many clandestine arms in the Punjab.

5. Nothing short of a guarantee that we will ensure moderation and peace either in a separate or a federated Punjab can prevent further inflammation of communal passions.

6. Latest report in ordinary course from the Governor of the Punjab referring to serious deterioration of public morale as result of bad news from Malaya, the East Indies, and Burma says "As danger approaches relations between Muslims and Sikhs are becoming more and more strained, and each community is eyeing the other with growing distrust".  

1 No. 246.  
2 'this does not' deciphered as '(? it is necessary to)'.  
3 Sir B. Glancy's letter, dated 5 March, is in MSS. EUR. F. 125/91.

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Note by the Advisers to the Secretary of State

L/PO/6/106b: ff 180-2

6 March 1942

On Tuesday last¹ the Secretary of State asked his Advisers to give him their opinion on the probable reactions in India to an announcement which it is proposed to make on future Constitutional developments. The Advisers felt that the extemporary opinions which they then advanced were inadequate and feel it is their duty, after maturer consideration, to give a further opinion on the vitally important issues involved.

The Advisers have held a meeting (which Sir H. Strakosch was unable to attend) and have come to the following unanimous opinion.

They feel that the proposed announcement, as briefly sketched out to them is likely to lead to increased agitation and to disturbance of the peace not only in the Provinces but also in the States. This would seriously affect the war effort and might extend both to the armed forces and to the factories engaged on war work. The announcement they fear lends itself to the interpretation that His Majesty's Government, in the event of Indians failing to put forward an agreed solution, will after the war take measures which may result in India being disintegrated. They suggest that the announcement might easily be

¹ 3 March.
represented as a direct threat to at least one of the opposing parties, or at least as an indication that His Majesty’s Government are losing patience at a time when the situation demands a more sympathetic attitude than ever before.

So far as the immediate present is concerned, they consider that there is advantage and little danger in taking bold and dramatic action. They recommend that the Viceroy’s Executive Council should be forthwith Indianised within the framework of the present Constitution. They believe that in no other way can His Majesty’s Government give clear proof of their determination to implement those promises which though repeatedly given have so far been viewed with suspicion in many quarters both in and outside India. In the Provinces they recommend that Governors be directed to include non-official Indians among their Advisers either in substitution for or in addition to those already holding office. They do not consider that these proposals would be detrimental in any way to India’s war effort: indeed they believe that they would undoubtedly further it.

With reference to the announcement dealing with the steps which His Majesty’s Government propose to take in the event of Indians failing to reach agreement as to the machinery for devising the future Constitution, the Advisers would much prefer that this should be confined to a reiteration in even clearer terms of His Majesty’s Government’s intention, within six or twelve months of the cessation of hostilities, themselves to initiate measures enabling Indians to decide the particular form of Dominion Status they wish to enjoy. But they realise the force of the arguments in favour of making more concrete proposals to attain this end. If such a statement has to be made they feel strongly that the form in which they understand the proposed announcement will be couched, is fraught with grave danger suggesting as it does that His Majesty’s Government have irrevocably made up their mind as to the machinery they propose to employ and as regards the consequences of disagreement. The Advisers feel that more deference is due to such Indian opinion as may be advanced between now and the time in question and therefore feel it would be wiser for His Majesty’s Government to offer some variety of possible expedients. For instance in regard to machinery they suggest that areas or regions may be substituted for Provinces as the electoral basis for the constitution-making body. This alternative would possibly satisfy communities such as Sikhs in the Punjab and Hindus in Western Bengal. A further alternative might be for the body to consist of representatives nominated by the main political organisations in British India and by the Princes. This would have the advantage of securing the representation of views and interests which would be excluded by the application of the present electoral system. No doubt His Majesty’s Government have had under consideration other possible solutions of the problem to which brief reference might be made.

The Advisers’ chief anxiety is that His Majesty’s Government should not at
this juncture appear to associate themselves with any of the alternative proposals more especially with one which appears to open unnecessarily wide the door leading to the disintegration of India.

[Initialled by Sir Joseph Clay, Diwan Bahadur S. E. Runganathan, Sir Atul Chatterjee, Sir Horace Williamson, Sir Courtenay Latimer, Sir John Woodhead, Sir Gilbert Wiles.]

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Mr Butler to Mr Amery

L|PO|6|106b: ff 176-8

BOARD OF EDUCATION, 6 March 1942

Dear Leo,

I have put down my thoughts on paper. Here they are—if any use.

Yrs,

R. A. BUTLER

Enclosure to No. 255

MEMORANDUM BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
BOARD OF EDUCATION

6 March 1942

1. It may be difficult for those, who have been in the midst of the Indian papers for the last few weeks, to realise the effect of the impact of the Draft Declaration on the mind of one, who has only just seen a few relevant papers.

2. The impression created is that the unity of India—the goal of British policy hitherto—must be set aside. This is because there is no mention of any central government. It must be clear to anybody, who reads the document, that the only provinces which will “contract in” will be those south of the Nerudda, with the probable addition of the United provinces. In Bengal there will be a rift, which will make conditions in that province as difficult as they have ever been. Therefore, when the Paper talks of the “new constitution” for India, it slides over the inconvenient fact that the “new constitution” would apply only to the Hindu provinces. It is mentioned that there will be analogous constitutions for those provinces who “contract out” but no mention is made of a constitution which will tie up at the centre Pakistan, the Hindu world, and the Indian states.
3. It is in respect of the Indian states that the Paper is most vague. It is because of the Indian states that some central nexus in India is necessary. It will be difficult to maintain any reality in our relationship with the mosaic of the states, if there is no central nexus, and if British India is divided into two camps—Moslem and Hindu.

4. One cannot avoid the conclusion that Indian unity is still worth aiming for, and that the British connection is indispensable for India. Would it not be better to face these two facts at the start? There is nothing shameful in the idea that Great Britain has a necessary role to play, provided one can overcome the question of the status of Indian government in the respective parts of India.

5. Therefore the device adopted of allowing certain provinces to “contract out” seems to me a new and a good one. Could not the question of status be settled by allotting status, as is described in the Paper, to the different parts of India, which would emerge after some such procedure as is suggested in the Draft Declaration is carried out?

6. There remains the element of confusion about the constitution. As I have said in paragraph 2, references in the Draft Declaration to the “constitution” do not make it clear whether a constitution for a part of India, i.e. the Government of Hindu India and/or Moslem India, or alternatively the Union of India, is intended. Should we not aim from the beginning to secure that Moslems and Hindus will frame their local constitutions, and that it is only in respect of the central nexus that they will come together with the states? In order to avoid, at the centre, the problem as to which community shall have power, it is suggested that the central nexus shall simply be representative of the units, not unlike the present Chamber of Princes within its own limited sphere. The future duties to be undertaken by a central “union” can only become clear with time, usage and sufferance. But we should surely face the need for some central body now.

7. The plan would then be that, in respect of our local military dispositions and the safeguarding of minorities, Great Britain would make treaties with Pakistan, with Hindu India and, mutatis mutandis, with the confederations of Indian states, which will probably emerge. When we wish to reach understandings with an all-India body, the central representative Union will be there.

8. The benefits of such a plan would be that the status of the parts would be assured, and the unity of the whole retained.

9. It may be said that this would constitute too blunt an expression of the view that the British influence must and shall remain, in some capacity, in India. I think this is preferable to the course outlined in the Paper, which
burkes this fundamental issue. We cannot attain in one coup in India what Campbell-Bannerman achieved in South Africa, and I think it will be positively misleading if we don’t say from the beginning what I am told is implicit in the Draft Declaration, namely that Great Britain has still some rôle to play in India.

R. A. B.

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Sir F. Wylie (Kabul) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 128

MOST IMMEDIATE

KABUL, 6 March 1942, 3.30 pm
Solo. 41. Addressed to Viceroy and repeated to Secy. of State for India.¹ Your Excellency’s most immediate telegrams No. 510-S,² 511-S,³ 513-S,⁴ dated March 3rd. Declaration by His Majesty’s Government regarding post-war constitution in India.

2. By coincidence while these telegrams were being decyphered I received urgent visit from U.S.A. Military Attaché who is about to leave Kabul for Tehran via India. Director-General of Political Branch of Foreign Office sent for him (¿ yesterday)—Katodon 17⁵ of January 26th perhaps explains why interview was not with Minister for Foreign Affairs—and said: (a) that Japanese invasion of India was imminent (b) that British would be unable to hold Japanese (c) that America should therefore extend Lease and Lend facilities to Afghanistan at once to enable the latter to defend herself. (d) (¿ Meantime) Afghanistan “would make any return which America required of her” and (e) that Afghan Government wanted message to this effect passed to Washington at once. Military Attaché formed the impression that Afghan Government were most gravely perturbed and that they regarded war as now at their very doors.

3. I have no great faith in Major Endors [Enders?] or for that matter in Director-General of Political Department either (¿ omission) think that latter would probably not have dared to hold language of this order except under (¿ instructions) (¿ of) Prime Minister. I quote Military Attaché’s statement however as it is no bad introduction to my comments on Your Excellency’s telegrams.

4. General attitude which Afghan Government have in the past adopted to question of Indian Constitutional reform will be found in the following:

¹ Received at the India Office 7 March, 8.45 am. ²³ See No. 226, note 4. ⁴ No. 225. ⁵ Reporting that, according to Major Enders, the Afghan Government had received information that the U.S. Government intended to appoint a Minister Resident to Kabul, but were ‘holding out’ for a Minister Plenipotentiary. L/P&S/12/1931: f 115.
(a) para. No. 16 of Kabul despatch No. 69 dated (corrupt group) (? 1938).
(b) paras. Nos. 9 & 10 of Kabul despatch 3 dated Jan. 10th 1940.
(c) Kabul despatch 54 dated June 28th 1940.
(d) Kabul despatch 70 dated Sept. 3rd 1940.6

5. I have no doubt at all but that publication of declaration by His Majesty’s Government on the lines of the Draft contained in Your Excellency’s telegram No. 510–S will cause misgivings of most profound sort in the minds both of Afghan Government and of Afghan people. But estimates of immediate reactions of Government clique somewhat as follows:
   (a) Britain must be getting near the knuckle to make this wholesale declaration at present juncture.
   (b) whatever the outcome of war may be the position previously occupied in the East by His Majesty’s Government can never be restored.
   (c) whole previous balance of power in Central Asia therefore goes.
   (d) if Allies win the war Afghanistan will be at the mercy of Russia, (? strongest) (? indigenous) Government in India being no effective counterbalance to the inevitable Russian designs on (? integrity) of Afghanistan.

6. If, however, Afghan Government really believe—which is by no means impossible—that Japanese are about to occupy India I would expect no reactions e.g. in the direction of overt irredentism for the moment. I would on the other hand expect Afghan Government to sit tight, watch events and in the meantime privately re- (? insure) with Axis through Legations here.

7. As far as Afghan people are concerned areas most affected will be Eastern and Southern provinces and unless war situation alters radically and in adverse sense I should expect that Afghan Government for a time at any rate will be able to control (? situation) (? adequately). There may be presently attempts to open intrigues with tribes on Indian frontier but Afghan Government are at the moment so overawed by events that even this I would not expect just yet.

8. I come now to two points on which Your Excellency specifically requires my opinion. I would not myself be alarmed at implication that India under reformed constitution will have right to secede from British Commonwealth of Nations. If Your Excellency will very kindly refer paragraph 4 of Kabul Despatch No. 54 dated June 28th 1940 you will see that Minister for Foreign Affairs—and we may take other members of Government as well—is well aware of the fact that Dominion Status of the usual variety implies right of secession. There is also immense difference between right to secede and actual decision to do so. Prime Minister is first and last politician and he knows supremely well that in such matters there is often wide gulf between practice and theory. He has first hand knowledge of India also and must realise that
(India) without British aid on defence side will be unable to stand on her own legs perhaps for generations to come.

9. As regards point (b) in your Excellency's telegram 511-S grant of local (Indian) option (to) Provinces will provide most useful argument here against accusation that we are abandoning our control of India without implementing our promises to provide safety of (the latter). I do not think this provision will (at this stage) necessarily encourage irredentist feeling amongst Afghans though later on if North West (India) exercises its option such result may well follow.

10. I am not clear in exactly what context word "independence" would be (used) but from local point of view word should be avoided if possible. It is hardly consistent with formulas used in the first part of draft declaration and it rather suggests that Union of India will necessarily secede from British Commonwealth. This last I personally take leave to doubt.

11. If your Excellency will very kindly refer to (Government of India) telegram 464-S.C. dated August 7th 1940 you will see that question was then considered whether Afghans should receive any preliminary warning when important constitutional (change) (was) contemplated (in India). I agree of course that they have no right to receive such warning but I feel that it might pay us later if I were allowed e.g. (to inform) Prime Minister day before declaration actually issues. Hashim Khan is easily most important single individual in this (part) (of) the world and during coming months much (may) depend on how his mind works. If we tell him in advance again no damaging precedent is now likely to be created if only because important pronouncements about India after this one issues will (presumably) be largely unnecessary.

12. (There is) one last point. I am not myself at all sure that declaration now contemplated will not be welcomed by younger Afghans. We have been perhaps in the past a little inclined to think (that) what Hashim Khan and the

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6 The main points urged by Afghan Ministers, as reported in these despatches, were that Afghanistan's treaties were with Britain, not India; that once the British connection was removed, Afghanistan might be led to intervene in India to support her co-religionist minority against Hindu domination; and that the Afghan Government might also reorientate its policy as a result of the inability or unwillingness of a purely Indian Government to maintain, in the way the British had, the Central Asian balance of power between Russia, India and Afghanistan. Mention was also made of the Afghan Government's concern that the tribes of the North-West Frontier should not pass under the control of a Hindu-dominated Government of India; and of their anxiety to ensure for their trade continued access to the sea. L/P&S/12/3235: ff 48-56, 149-51; L/P&S/12/3155: ff 47-52.

7 Noting that H.M.G. could not admit a right on the part of the Afghan Government to be warned in advance of Indian constitutional arrangements or be consulted about them, and suggesting arguments to set at rest fears raised in the mind of the Afghan Government by the August offer. L/P&S/12/3155: f 61.
older men here say about political reform is what all educated Afghans think. This is not so and I should expect younger element here to take very different view of advancement of (India's) Status from that professed by Prime Minister and his contemporaries. Former will of course, like all Moslems, feel strongly about possibility of Hindu domination over Moslem minority in which connection, if I may venture the suggestion, last clause in (a) of draft declaration is much to be preferred to alternative clause immediately preceding it.  

8 Namely, Sir F. Wylie preferred the amendment of the concluding words of para. (a) contained in No. 200 to the original version in the Annex to No. 194.

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Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr Eden (via H.M. Ambassador, Bagdad)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 245

IMMEDIATE

6 March 1942, 7.30 pm
Received: 7 March, 3.20 am

250. Your telegram No. 218.1

Following from Sir A. Clark Kerr.

Apart from some slightly rough places visit passed off, I think, as smoothly and successfully as could be expected. At the beginning it suffered from impossibility of arranging a clear-cut programme and from promptness with which Mr. Nehru asserted his influence as an old friend. This issue was brought to bear mainly on Madame Chiang Kai-shek and through her on the Generalissimo, and Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on going to Gandhi at Wardha was in the first instance inspired by Madame Chiang Kai-shek. You will remember that when he gets an idea fixed in his head it is hard to shake it out of him. It cost me therefore, a great effort to persuade him that this pilgrimage was, to say the least, inappropriate.

From the moment this difficulty was disposed of things took a better turn. The Generalissimo formed a very high opinion (which was, I think, reciprocated) of the Viceroy's personal character. For the first time he was taken fully into our confidence, all our difficulties, hopes and fears were laid bare to him, and he was promised the fullest support which India could give to China. This pleased him and made him feel that at last he was being treated as an equal. For myself, I think that this, combined with the really happy relations established between his generals and our military authorities, was about the best result of the visit.

Chiang Kai-shek was impressed by what he saw of our troops in Delhi and still more by his visit to North-West Frontier, but he felt the gravest concern about the state of the public mind in India and contrasted the spirit of the
Chinese with the apathy and lethargy of the Indians, which he tended to
attribute not to inherent characteristics but to lack of appropriate leadership.
He left India, I think, with the conviction that if we went about things the right
way it would be possible to inspire in the Indians a spirit similar to that of his
own people. To this may be attributed probably, the peroration of his farewell
message\(^2\) which was designed to bring home to the Indians the barbarities
of the Japanese and to suggest to us a line of policy. The first was inspired by
myself, the second I had nothing to do with.

In a letter written from Calcutta dated February 24th, Madame Chiang told
me that she and the Generalissimo were “in great hopes”, and the Generalissimo
believed that as a result of his talk with Gandhi the visit would bear results,
and that after their departure there would be “tangible fruits”. She went on
to assure me that they had done everything possible to sow the seeds of a united
war effort, and taken every opportunity to pave the way for co-operation
between the peoples of India and China.

Several concrete and useful things emerged from the visit, such as an inter-
change of representatives between Delhi and Chungking, visits to China by
eminent Indians, immediate construction of alternative roads etc. but upon these
points the Government of India will doubtless have reported direct.
Repeated to Government of India Saving.

\(^1\) No. 176. \(^2\) No. 173.

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Mr Mackenzie King to Mr Churchill (via Dominions Office)\(^1\)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 150

\textbf{MOST IMMEDIATE} \hspace{1cm} 6 March 1942, 6.49 pm
\textbf{SECRET} \hspace{1cm} \textit{Received: 7 March, 1.16 am}

No. 73. Reference your telegrams D Nos. 120\(^2\) and 121.\(^3\) Following from Prime
Minister for your Prime Minister\textit{ begins}. The Canadian Government heartily
welcomes the statement of policy laying down the steps it is proposed to take
for the earliest possible realization of complete self government in India. We
attach the highest importance to its early issue and believe it is in the interest
of all the United Nations that the utmost expedition should be exercised in
promulgating the new programme. We believe that a fully self governing
India has a great part to play in free and equal association with the other
Nations of the British Commonwealth and that a free India fighting alongside

\(^1\) In addition to the Prime Minister, the Dominions Office sent copies of this telegram to the War
Cabinet Offices and the members of the Committee on India.
\(^2\) See No. 245, note 1. \(^3\) See No. 244, note 2.
the other free peoples of the world will strengthen immeasurably the common cause. We have had under consideration from time to time advisability of exchanging representatives with the Government of India and would be glad to make an early appointment of a High Commissioner for Canada in India if it was thought that such action on our part would help to signalize India's emergence as an equal member of the Commonwealth. Ends.

259

Mr Mackenzie King to Mr Churchill (via Dominions Office)\(^1\)

*Telegram, L/PO/6106b: f 198*

**SECRET**

6 March 1942, 9.43 pm

Received: 7 March, 1.16 am

No. 74. Following for your Prime Minister from Mr. Mackenzie King. Begins. Personal and Confidential.

Your telegram No. 120\(^2\) regarding self government India and my reply today.\(^3\)

His Excellency Dr T. V. Soong Chinese Foreign Minister at present residing at Washington visited Canada within the last few days. One of his sisters, as you doubtless know, is the wife of General Chiang Kai Shek.

Soong told me that in a communication which he had received direct from Chiang Kai Shek since his interviews in India Chiang Kai Shek had stated that he doubted if Britain could count on the necessary support in India to save situation there unless immediate action were taken to insure to India full Dominion status. He said Chiang Kai Shek himself felt that the alleged difficulties which might arise between Mohammedans and Hindus had been greatly exaggerated. Chiang had done all he could to convince leaders that their interests like those of himself and the people of China lay in giving Britain all possible support but was convinced that unless self government problem could be met immediately this would not be forthcoming to the extent necessary to save existing situation which he regards as extremely precarious. You no doubt have this information which Soong has communicated to United States Government and possibly also to British Ambassador.

I have felt however that you might like to know that I was much impressed by what Soong said to me and that all my colleagues in the Government are very strongly of view that no time should be lost in accepting and making known the proposals set forth in your telegram. Ends.

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\(^1\) In addition to the Prime Minister, the Dominions Office sent copies of this telegram to the War Cabinet Offices and the Secretary of State for India.

\(^2\) See No. 245, note 1.

\(^3\) No. 258.
A special meeting of the War Cabinet will be held at No. 10, Downing Street, S.W. 1., on SATURDAY, 7th MARCH, 1942, at 10.30 a.m. to discuss INDIA.

Attention is drawn to the following telegrams:

(a) Telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, of the 6th March (No. 14-U)\(^1\) and Telegram No. 545-S\(^2\) from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India—(W.P. (42) 114)\(^3\) to be circulated.

(b) Telegram from the Viceroy dated 6th March No. 539-S\(^4\) containing a summary of the Commander-in-Chief’s views—already circulated.

(c) Telegrams from the Viceroy No. 540,\(^5\) dated 6th March, 504-S\(^6\) dated 2nd March—already circulated.

The following Papers were circulated by the Secretary of State for India, for consideration at a Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on India at 10 a.m. Saturday morning:

I. (42) 11 and 12.\(^7\)

E. E. BRIDGES
Secretary

The meeting will be attended by:
War Cabinet Ministers.
Lord Simon.
Mr. Amery.
Sir James Grigg.
Sir Archibald Sinclair.

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1 No. 247.  
2 No. 250.  
3 Nos. 247 and 250 were circulated under this reference, dated 6 March.  
4 No. 246.  
5 No. 248.  
6 No. 214.  
7 Nos. 251 and 252.
262

War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 6th Meeting
L/PO/6/106b: ff 142–3

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 7 March 1942 at 10 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary).

The Committee had a short discussion prior to the Meeting of the War Cabinet.

The main point dealt with was the last two lines of paragraph 1 of the draft Declaration (W.P. (42) 109)\(^1\) in regard to secession.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS said that, at the meeting of the High Commissioners on the previous day, it had become clear that they did not like the formula in regard to secession.

In discussion, the view was expressed that it was misleading to use words which implied that there was an admitted constitutional right to secede. The position was that if a situation arose in which a Dominion wished to secede, the other Dominions would not in fact try to restrain it.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL proposed the following amendment:

Delete the last two lines\(^2\) of paragraph 1 and add after the fourth line of paragraph (c) (ii):

“Such treaty will not preclude the Indian Union from a right of secession from the British Commonwealth of Nations, and shall provide for suitable safeguards of all those minority rights as to which undertakings have been given by His Majesty’s Government.”
This amendment was regarded as an improvement, but it was felt that something more might have to be said in regard to the rights of minorities. No final decision had been reached when the Committee adjourned to attend the Meeting of the War Cabinet.

1 No. 229. 2 Namely, beginning 'and free to remain in...'.

263

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 30th Conclusions (Extract)

R/30/1/1: f 25

7 March 1942

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 29th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

The War Cabinet gave further consideration to the Indian position in the light of the following:

(a) Telegram No. 539-S., 2 dated the 6th March, from the Viceroy, reporting the views of the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) Telegrams Nos. 540-S., 3 545-S. 4 and 549-S. 5 from the Viceroy.

(c) A speech by Jawaharlal Nehru, reported in that morning's newspapers, to the effect that any promise of reforms at the end of the war was mere quibbling, and that in the immediate present a Provisional National Government should be formed, responsible to the Indian people, and not to the Viceroy or to the British Government.

After discussion, the War Cabinet agreed as follows:

(1) The India Committee was invited to prepare a further revise of the draft Declaration.

This revision should be carried out on the basis that the Declaration represented His Majesty's Government's considered scheme for settling India's constitutional position, and irrespective of—

(a) whether the Declaration was to be issued at once or its issue deferred until after an improvement in the military situation;

(b) whether soundings should be taken of Indian political leaders before the Declaration was issued.

(2) The draft Declaration, so revised, should be submitted for consideration by the Special Meeting of the War Cabinet to be held at 12 noon on Monday, the 9th March.

(3) A further Meeting of all Ministers of Cabinet rank would be held on Tuesday, the 10th March, at 12 noon.

1 No. 239. 2 No. 246. 3 No. 248. 4 No. 250. 5 No. 253.
264

War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 7th Meeting
L/PO/6/106b: ff 144–7

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 7 March 1942 at 3 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

DRAFT DECLARATION

1. The Committee resumed consideration of the text of the draft Declaration (W.P. (42) 109).

The Committee agreed to the amendments set out in Annex I to these Minutes, and asked that the Declaration, as so revised, should be circulated to the War Cabinet.

The Committee:
Invited the Secretary of State for India to telegraph the revised text of the draft Declaration to the Viceroy. The Viceroy should be informed that further consideration had been given to the Declaration in the light of the views which he and the Commander-in-Chief had represented to His Majesty’s Government. He should be asked to telegraph as a matter of urgency to what extent the alterations made met their views.

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE VICEROY

2. The Committee considered the draft telegram to the Viceroy prepared by the Secretary of State for India (I. (42) 11) giving him guidance on points which would be raised on the draft Declaration.

The amendments made by the Committee are set out in Annex II to these Minutes.

The Committee:
Asked that a revised draft telegram, embodying these amendments, should be submitted to the War Cabinet for consideration at the Special Meeting to be held at 12 noon on Monday, the 9th March.

Annex I to No. 264

AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT DECLARATION

Paragraph 1
Delete last two lines. (See however paragraph (c) (ii) below.)
Paragraph (c) (i) line 2
Delete "for the time being".

Line 6 [line 5 in the present volume]
For "a new Constitution" read "new constitutional arrangements".

Paragraph (c) (ii)
Delete first four lines and substitute the following:
"(ii) the signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This Treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other Member States of the British Commonwealth".

Paragraph (e), line 3
For "India's defence" substitute "the Defence of India".

Last two and a half lines.
Should read as follows:
"...in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India."

Annex II to No. 264

AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE VICE ROY

Paragraph 2
In view of the amendment made to the draft Declaration, the first two sentences dealing with secession were unnecessary. The last sentence should be re-drafted in the following sense:
"The prospect of a new Constitution for India may cause anxiety to Nepal. It may be well to assure the Maharajah of Nepal that his Treaty with His Majesty's Government will hold good, subject to revision by negotiation. Control of Nepalese troops will not be transferred to the new Indian Union."

Paragraph 3
The last sentence might read as follows:
"If they stay out we shall naturally fulfil our obligations to ensure their protection."

1 No. 229. 2 Annex to No. 251. 3 Namely, beginning ‘and free to remain in...’.
Paragraph 5
The Secretary of State for India undertook to enquire whether the scope of the assurances that it was proposed should be given was sufficiently wide.

Paragraph 6
This should be deleted.

Paragraph 8
A sentence should be added to the following effect:
"The same might apply to Bengal. But of course we do not envisage a multitude of Dominions."

Paragraph 9
The second sentence should read as follows:
"It will cover whatever arrangements the Convention may make in agreement with His Majesty's Government for the continuance of assistance in the shape of British Armed Forces."

A sentence should be inserted to the effect that, as in the case of the other Dominions, any British troops lent would be for purposes of external defence and not for the maintenance of internal security, save with our specific assent.

The last sentence should be made more definite.
"You are authorised to say that we shall not make stipulations for the future of British commercial interests... etc."

Paragraph 10
This might be redrafted on the following lines:
"You will appreciate that it is our hope that Indians will devise their own constitution-making body. But to avoid the reproach that we are relying on their disagreement, we are now setting out the procedure we should adopt to set up a constitutional Convention, failing agreement among Indians."
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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 115
L/PO/6/106b: f 137

India

Note by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, 7 March 1942

I submit, on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on India, for the consideration of the War Cabinet, a further revised draft of a Declaration by His Majesty’s Government regarding the future government of India.

C. R. A.

Annex to No. 265

Draft Declaration

His Majesty’s Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty’s Government therefore make the following declaration:

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the Constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty’s Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to:

(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides.

With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty’s Government will be prepared to agree upon new constitutional arrangements on lines analogous to those here laid down.

(ii) the signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the constitution-making body. This Treaty will cover
all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty’s Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other Member States of the British Commonwealth.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(d) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the Provincial Elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(e) While during the critical period which now faces India, and until the new Constitution can be framed, His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for the defence of India, they desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.
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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 170

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 7 March 1942, 5.10 pm

Received: 8 March

294. Superintendent Series. Declaration unlikely now to be announced in the present form though underlying scheme may remain basis of policy for further discussion. Cabinet meetings Monday\(^1\) and Tuesday and possibly simplified declaration may issue Thursday.

\(^1\) 9 March.

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Sir H. Seymour to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 242

CHUNGKING, 7 March 1942, 7 pm

Received: 8 March, 5.20 pm

276. Repeat to Washington (Foreign Office please pass) telegram No. 26.

Your telegram No. 296\(^1\) (not to Delhi and Washington).

The public reactions to Chiang Kai-shek’s visit have been enthusiastic and full use has been made of it to bolster public morale by emphasising its skilful timing, the symbol of union of the two most populous peoples of Asia and its hope for the future. While Chiang Kai-shek’s own statements received pride of place, equal prominence has on the whole been given to British and Indian declarations. At the same time public comment has been extremely frank in its advice to the British authorities to take to heart Chiang Kai-shek’s farewell message to the Indian people to “give Indians their freedom” and to profit by lessons of Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma and “give Indians something to fight for”. Difficulties of the situation and India’s domestic differences have not been entirely over-looked but on the whole the impression has been given that the remedy lies with London. For this reason the Prime Minister’s statement on India is eagerly awaited.

2. Private comment has been on similar lines. Chiang Kai-shek is given full credit for his timely initiative in making the visit and some realisation is shown

\(^1\) Telegram 296 of 3 March requested a report on ‘Chinese reactions both public and private’ to Chiang Kai-Shek’s visit to India.
of the importance of India’s resources and industries, of the valuable help India is giving to China and of the fighting qualities of the Indian troops. I have not heard it suggested as indicated in the first paragraph of your telegram under reference that the visit was perfunctory and on the whole I think the Chinese have been impressed by the manner in which Chiang Kai-shek was able to see Nehru and Tagore College\(^2\) as well as the Commander-in-Chief and the North-West Frontier.

3. On the other hand a favourite theme of comment is the alleged lack of attention given in India to the moral as opposed to the material aspects of war-time training. Feeling is widespread that Indian masses (it is admitted however the “lesser evil” of British Imperialism is preferable to the greater evil of Japanese or Axis domination) are not yet as fully mobilised behind the war effort as they should be and it is freely hinted that the British have much to learn in such matters from China where, it is true, questions of morale, “political training”, “spiritual mobilisation” and the like at present receive very considerable attention. The views of Chiang Kai-shek on the necessity for mobilising support of the civil population (see last part of paragraph two of the Viceroy’s telegram No. 397-S\(^3\) of February 20th to the Secretary of State) are widely shared and based on the conviction, derived from experience not only in China but in Hong Kong, Malaya and Burma, that the civilian morale depends on other factors besides efficient propaganda; notably sense of responsibility based on feeling of national unity and confidence in the Government and the provision of adequate air raid protection and assistance in the event of personal disaster. Such points have been freely discussed since Chiang Kai-shek’s visit, in connexion with India’s ability to withstand assault.

4. In general however it may be confidently asserted that the visit was timely and the results from a Chinese point of view have done a great deal to tide them over the shock of events in Singapore, Java and Burma. Repeated to Government of India No. 114.

\(^2\) At Santiniketan: see No. 141.

\(^3\) No. 157.
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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106 b: f 135

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

295. Superintendent Series. Cabinet Committee have given careful consideration to your telegrams\(^1\) and those of Commander-in-Chief,\(^2\) Glancy, &c.,\(^3\) and have amended text of Draft Declaration contained in my private and personal telegram 276\(^4\) in the following respects: [There follows the text of Annex I to No. 264.]

Cabinet would be glad to know most immediately how far these amendments meet your views and those of the Commander-in-Chief. As regards the Army, it would be proposed in any case to send round order to troops explaining that their position and rights remain fully guaranteed.

\(^1\) Cf. No. 260, paras. \((a), (b)\) and \((c)\).
\(^2\) No. 246.
\(^3\) Nos. 236, 237 and 238.
\(^4\) No. 230.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

NEW DELHI, 7 March 1942, 8.40 pm

Received: 7 March, 9.45 pm

No. 557–G. Reference your telegram No. 4017,\(^1\) dated 4th March. All-India Azad Muslim Conference. Full description of genesis of Conference and Board will be found in Director of Intelligence Bureau’s Weekly Report No. 17 of 1940. See also paragraph 17, Quarterly Survey No. 11,\(^2\) and Weekly Reports Nos. 18, 27 and 29 of 1940. Board has never sat between July 1940 and recent session, and organisation has been in abeyance. This session was stage-managed by Asaf Ali, who drafted resolution and arranged Press publicity. “Nine constituents Muslim organisation” mentioned in resolution cannot all be identified,

\(^1\) No. 235. See also No. 216.
\(^2\) For February–April 1940. “paragraph 17” should read “paragraph 87”. Neither the Weekly Reports nor the Quarterly Survey here referred to are printed.
but may include Ahrars,3 Jamiat-ul-Ulema,4 extremist Shias,5 a section of Momins,6 Ittilad-i-Millat,7 and Red Shirts. None of these bodies is important, and their combination would be artificial. Only influential non-Congress Muslims attending session were Fazlul Huq and Allah Bakhsh.

2. Muslim League members so far as known have never been counted, and cannot be estimated with any accuracy. Distinction should be drawn between strength of League in Provincial Legislatures and outside. (a) As regards former, League has had recent setback in Assam and Bengal. Of 117 Muslim seats in Bengal Assembly, Huq commands slightly more than half; but his following is largely on personal grounds, and Bengal Muslim League’s demand for a general election is significant. In Punjab of 84 Muslim seats not more than 12 at most are in opposition, and almost all remainder, following Sir Sikander’s lukewarm lead, are members of Muslim League. In Sind, parochialism and personal factions are even stronger than elsewhere; of 33 Muslim seats, about half support Allah Bakhsh, and about 11 are members of League. (b) As regards latter, in Frontier Province, League has never counted for much. In Muslim minority provinces, support for Jinnah is strong. In Bengal and Punjab, support for League is at present probably stronger outside Legislature than within. In Assam and Sind, whatever allegiance League can claim, no other Muslim organisation exists.

3. Two Momin leaders are reported in today’s Press to have cabled8 to you repudiating Jinnah’s leadership of Momin (weaver) community. Press has published no account of alleged meeting of all-India Momin Conference. This body is quite unimportant and many Momins are members of Muslim League.

3 Ahrars (lit. ‘free’, ‘free men’) were among the most militant of the Nationalist Muslims who supported Congress and they strongly favoured Civil Disobedience. In 1940 approximately 5,000 persons were estimated to belong to Ahrar volunteer organizations, the main strength of which lay in the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province and the United Provinces. See L/P&S/8/678.
4 Lit. ‘Association of learned men’. During the course of his Presidential Address to the thirteenth session of the Jamiat ul-Ulema i Hind on 20 March 1942, Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madni advocated a federal solution to the Indian constitutional problem and argued that the Pakistan scheme would strengthen the hands of Imperialism.
5 The Shias were a minority among Indian Muslims, and fear of domination by the Sunni majority led some of them to oppose the Muslim League. But Shia opponents of the League could not be said to be fully representative of the Shia community as a whole. Several prominent Shias—including Mr Jinnah himself—were Muslim League.
6 The All-India Momin Conference, with headquarters at Cawnpore, aimed at the social, political and economic advance of the Muslim weavers community (known as Momins).
7 The Ittilad i Millat (lit. ‘Unity of the Community’)—also known as the Blue Shirt Volunteers—was formed in 1935 by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan to work for the return of the Shahidganj Mosque at Lahore from Sikh to Muslim possession. In 1940, it was officially estimated to number 200. See L/P&S/7/886 and L/P&S/8/678.
8 See L/P&S/8/693.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MARCH 1942

MOST IMMEDIATE

7 March 1942

No. 15-U. Your telegram No. 13-U.1 Infinitely more serious than secession is the matter of local option in the form proposed. Further reflection and advice has absolutely convinced me that in face of Commander-in-Chief’s views I could not possibly stand for a declaration containing local option in this form. My personal and secret telegram No. 558-S,2 dated the 7th March, explains further.

2. I am sending you two private and personal telegrams Nos. 559-S3 and 568-S4 which you may find more constructive if needed, but I leave it to you to use them or not as you please. I am prepared to go a long way to help if help is really needed, but you may decide whether or not to put them forward.

1 No. 249. 2 No. 273; the date should be 8 March. 3 No. 274. 4 No. 275.

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Mr Churchill to President Roosevelt

Telegram, R/30/1/1: f 24

7 March 1942

To President Roosevelt from Former Naval Person

In pursuance of my plan of keeping you informed about our Indian policy, and in continuation of my telegram No. 39,1 in which I gave you Wavell’s views, I now send you telegram2 from the Viceroy, just received, as well as one from the Governor of the Punjab.3 These are not, of course, the only opinions on these matters, but they are very serious when the enemy is battering at the gate and when the Punjab supplied 50 per cent. of all fighting troops which can take part in the defence of India. We are still persevering to find some conciliatory and inspiring process, but I have to be careful that we do not disturb British politics at a moment when things are increasingly aquiver.

Following are Viceroy’s comments with relation to Wavell’s appreciation:

There is danger of communal position in Punjab being misunderstood at home, and following considerations are therefore put forward with particular reference to proposal for local option to remain separate from Central Union.

1 This telegram evidently transmitted General Wavell’s views in No. 246.
2 No. 253. 3 No. 236.
Punjab Moslems if they remained united could no doubt ensure exercise of option to remain separate in case of Punjab, but for following reasons their own communal apprehensions must be allayed. Sikhs would be alarmed at prospect of predominantly Moslem and separate Punjab and would begin to prepare themselves for trouble. Certainty of such trouble arising would cause Punjab Moslems to look to their own defences. Idea of a separated Punjab would therefore still keep both sides embittered. Number of arms known to be hidden in Punjab gives cause for additional anxiety. Further inflation of communal passions can only be prevented by guarantee that we will ensure moderation and peace either in separate or federated Punjab.

Latest routine report from Governor of Punjab refers to serious deterioration in public morale as result of bad news from Far East, and to growing mutual distrust and strain in relations between Moslems and Sikhs. Following is telegram from Governor of Punjab:

Following are my views on effect on Punjab of immediate declaration that India will at future date be given right to secede from Empire. Responsible section of Moslems, who are majority, hold unshakable view that until constitution acceptable to Moslem India is devised, Britain must continue to hold the ropes. They will certainly be worried that constitution on lines contemplated would place power in hands of Hindus, whom they already suspect of pro-Japanese tendencies. They will therefore be diverted from working for defence of India as a whole and seek to align themselves elsewhere. Unprecedented intensification of bitterness between Sikhs and Moslems, between whom relations are already dangerously strained, will result. All communities will wish to keep their own men at home to defend their own interests, and recruitment will as a result be very seriously affected. Disorders will be inevitable and present greatly reduced scale of security troops likely to be insufficient. Moslem League will probably greatly increase strength in the Punjab and will use influence ruthlessly for purpose of disruption. Premier of Punjab will probably resign with most or all of his Ministers. This would have very serious effect, as no one else could help in the war and hold the Punjab together as present Premier has done.

Declaration that provinces will have local option of acceding to Central Indian Union will not counteract effect of declaration that India will have right to secede from Empire dealt with above. Punjab is not homogeneous, but composed of communities antagonistic to each other, and internal trouble would be unavoidable. Punjab would probably not accede to Union. Moslem community would tend to form bloc with co-religionist neighbours.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

7 March 1942
No. 554-S. I am anxious to let other Governors know about the recent activities of Nehru. Have you any objections to them seeing our recent correspondence\(^1\) for secret and personal information?

\(^1\) See Nos. 97, 146, 164 and 179.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

NEW DELHI, 8 March 1942, 1.10 am
Received: 7 March, 10.45 pm

No. 558-S. I wish to take this last opportunity of warning His Majesty’s Government against consequences of a precise declaration of local option as in paragraph (b) (i)\(^4\) of draft declaration. I have already emphasised vital necessity in any event of renewed minority pledge.\(^2\)

2. You may be told that my present warning is an after-thought and is inconsistent with paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 497.\(^3\) I must remind you that on the morning of March the 1st I was confronted with a draft declaration\(^4\) breaking entirely new ground, and was given approximately 24 hours\(^5\) (allowing for cyphering) to send you my comments on it without at that stage being permitted to consult even the Commander-in-Chief. In these circumstances I expressed myself as being prepared to take the risk which I then foresaw, that is of alarm and recriminations on the part of political-communal groupings: and I confess to some extent to being caught on the rebound with relief at the abandonment of proposals calculated immediately to wreck my Executive. Even so, however, I pointed out at once the impossibility of answering questions that must at once arise on this declaration. I must also emphasize that the minority pledge was very much in my mind though it took a few more hours to suggest a formula which would recall\(^6\) it without breaking the framework of the whole draft declaration.

\(^1\) Lord Linlithgow is referring to the draft in the Annex to No. 194.  \(^2\) No. 248.
\(^3\) No. 209.  \(^4\) See No. 197.  \(^5\) See No. 196, para. 4.
\(^6\) ‘recall’ deciphered as ‘(? protect)’.
3. The views which I was on 2nd March\(^7\) permitted to obtain of the Commander-in-Chief\(^8\) and the Governor of the Punjab\(^9\) were received on March 5th and 4th nights respectively and put the risks on an entirely different level. They bring out with emphasis the results of this specific declaration of local option upon the complex communal situation of the Punjab, and the practical certainty that if declared in this form it would seriously threaten the internal security of the Punjab and seriously damage our capacity to wage war.

4. I am quite prepared to admit (and indeed had implied as much in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 451–S\(^10\) dated 25th February) that local option is a course to which we might have to resort after the war but that is an entirely different matter from declaring it in terms while we are fighting the enemy.

5. I have reflected anxiously on this matter and I am convinced that I must give the gravest possible warning to His Majesty's Government of the consequences likely to ensue on a declaration in this form—consequences for which, as I have made clear (my telegram No. 540\(^11\) of 6th March), the formula which I had suggested (my telegram No. 504\(^12\)) would be at best a doubtful and temporary palliative.

\(\text{\#7 See Nos. 211 and 212.} \quad \text{\#8 See No. 246.} \quad \text{\#9 See No. 236.} \quad \text{\#10 No. 183.} \quad \text{\#11 No. 248.} \quad \text{\#12 '504' (No. 214) deciphered as '540'.}\)

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*The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery*

*Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22*

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

NEW DELHI, 8 March 1942, 1.30 am

No. 559–S.\(^1\) My telegram No. 15–U.\(^2\) Before setting out my alternative scheme I will mention briefly the considerations that I have had in mind in framing it.

The fatal defect in the present draft is the precision given by the local option pledge to the still shadowy prospect of a decisive struggle for power after British\(^3\) authority departs among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in areas where none of them holds an obviously commanding position and above all in the Punjab. I realise that the local option pledge is in view of the Pakistan agitation a necessary counterpart of detailed undertakings in regard to post-war constitutional procedure, intended to assure the majority community in India as a whole that we mean business by our existing policy of affording Indians the opportunity of framing their own constitution. It follows that any fresh undertakings with this intention must be confined to generalities on procedure, while being as clear and persuasive as possible on our main purpose. I recognise too
that this dilution of detail in our pledges for the post-war period will compel us to add greater precision than His Majesty’s Government have hitherto had in mind to our policy of enabling Indians to share power and of encouraging India to assert a higher practical status in world affairs meanwhile. You know well my difficulties over the first side of this policy. I think it would be the gravest possible error for His Majesty’s Government to commit themselves to language\textsuperscript{4} which would tie the Governor-General’s hands to forming a Council composed entirely of party politicians and debar him in advance from including others whether non-party men or service members or non-official Europeans or representatives of minorities other than the Muslims. Moreover once we go beyond a broad offer we shall be obliged to define prematurely our attitude towards communal proportions and thus take upon ourselves a responsibility which it is essential should be left to Indians. Our contribution on this aspect will have to be an offer to try once more in consultation with party leaders to bring about an interim communal truce. We must be able to parry the common charge that we always leave the initiative to others. With these considerations in mind, and keeping as far as possible the spirit and general plan of His Majesty’s Government’s draft declaration, I send you in my telegram No. 568–S\textsuperscript{5} an alternative which I believe will do as much to meet Indian opinion while avoiding the pitfalls that render the present draft so disastrous.

\textsuperscript{1} Deciphered has the prefix ‘Private and Personal’ but omits ‘My telegram No. 15–U’.
\textsuperscript{2} No. 270. \textsuperscript{3} Deciphered as ‘real’.
\textsuperscript{4} Deciphered as ‘contract’.
\textsuperscript{5} No. 275.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 8 March 1942, 3.35 am

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Received: 8 March, 2 am

No. 568–S. Following is text of alternative draft declaration referred to in my telegram No. 559–S.\textsuperscript{1} I must emphasise that it is to be read as a whole—

\textit{Begins. 1. In order to remove any doubt or anxiety as to the fulfilment of promises made in regard to the realisation of self-government in India after the war, His Majesty’s Government now declare that their object is the creation at the earliest possible moment after the cessation of hostilities of a new Indian Union based on goodwill and consent and on the free association of its constituent elements. This free Union will constitute a Dominion associated with

\textsuperscript{1} No. 274.
the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs and free to remain in or to separate itself from equal membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

2. In pursuance of this policy, immediately upon the cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India a body charged with the task of framing a new constitutional structure. The character of the constitution-making body shall be such as may be agreed among representative Indians, and His Majesty’s Government will meanwhile seek to promote such agreement among them. In its absence, however, within twelve months after the cessation of hostilities His Majesty’s Government themselves undertake to set up a representative body designed to reflect popular opinion throughout British India as it will then be ascertained by constitutional process and enable the views of all major groups and opinions to be fully expressed and embodied in the resultant decisions. Indian States will be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion of their total population as in case of representatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as British Indian members.

3. It will be for that body so to perform its task as to ensure that the resultant constitutional structure shall attract the loyalty of the people of India in their different groups, communities and areas and represent a freely accepted association of its constituent elements, and that its authority will not be directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life.

4. Parallel with the framing of a constitution, a treaty or series of treaties will be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the constitution-making body covering all necessary matters relating to complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands. Revised treaty arrangements with the Crown will also be negotiated as necessary with Indian States to accord with such position as they agree to accept in or in relation to the new Indian Union.

5. His Majesty’s Government undertake to accept and recommend to Parliament for ratification a constitutional scheme which is framed in accordance with this procedure and which would thus discharge with the consent of those concerned their obligations to India’s peoples both majorities and minorities.

6. A time-limit after which Britain would impose a Dominion Constitution upon India failing agreement among her own leaders would only handicap such agreement and would deny the fundamental principle that the basis of India’s future after the war must be her freedom to decide and control her own destiny. If, however, failing the success of the procedure now proposed to produce an agreed constitutional structure within two years after the cessation of hostilities, the leaders of India’s principal parties and communities
themselves invite His Majesty’s Government either to frame a new constitutional structure for India or to refer this task to some other appropriate authority, His Majesty’s Government will accept this responsibility.

7. Meanwhile His Majesty’s Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of leaders of the Indian people in the task of government and defence of India. To this end, they have authorised the Viceroy to renew his attempts to secure a political truce among those Indian political leaders who desire to play their part in combating the enemy until final victory is won, and so to enable him to reconstruct his Executive Council in order that within the framework of the present constitution it may enjoy the overwhelming support of the people of India. While the detailed implementation of this policy must depend upon the nature of the political truce itself, and while His Majesty’s Government must continue in the critical period ahead to bear the full responsibility for India’s defence with the consequence that there can be no impairment of the position of the Commander-in-Chief in India, His Majesty’s Government will not rule out any solution acceptable to Indian opinion which gives India a strong and determined government for the prosecution of the war. There would remain many practical problems in the formation of a new administration which the Viceroy would be prepared to discuss round the table with the leaders who will emerge as those from among whom his future colleagues will be likely to be drawn.

8. A political truce would further manifestly encourage a return to parliamentary government in a fashion reflecting the truce itself in those provinces where the present refusal of the majority to carry on the government has caused it to be suspended.

9. The Governor-General’s Executive Council reconstructed on National Government lines will of course have the responsibility of appointing British Indian representatives to the War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council and to any other gatherings of Allied Governments at which India is to be represented. Just as India has been included on an equal footing with the Dominions in the invitation to sit with the U.K. War Cabinet and upon the Pacific War Council, so His Majesty’s Government will continue as far as it lies with them to encourage and enable India to exert in practice, pending her attainment of legal equality, her proper stature as a partner in the affairs of the British Commonwealth and the Allied Nations.

10. This will apply, of course, most prominently to the Peace Conference or Conferences for reconstruction of the world after the war. His Majesty’s Government hope that a prolonged political truce will enable India to be

2 Deciphered as 'popular'.
3 Deciphered as 'ratifying'.
represented then by delegates fully able to speak for the needs and aspirations of her people, nominated and instructed by a government in India which will have earned their confidence by leading them to a partnership in a common victory. Thus India will be able to play a full and equal part not only in the councils of war but also in world reconstruction. 

Ends.

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War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 13
L|PO|6|106b: ff 124–5

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, 8 March 1942

I circulate for the information of the Committee a note by Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency, Governor of the Punjab 1928–33.

L. S. A.

Annex to No. 276

I have been too long away from the Punjab to give an opinion of value and have not really heard enough of the plan to judge its probable reactions.

If it can be assumed that the Muslim portion of the Punjab Cabinet and Legislature is not led away by Mr. Jinnah into wild courses, I do not think the reactions on the Jats or the Sikhs are likely to be serious.

The Jats will desire to remain attached to the Punjab and connected with its Government so long as the National Unionist Party’s flavour attaches to the latter. They are small peasant proprietors and are bitterly anti-Mahajan. Though not fond of the Muslims, they like working with them in the Government of the Punjab, because their policy is consistently anti-Mahajan and is directed towards ameliorating the economic position of the peasant proprietor by curtailing the profits of the Mahajan money lender and the Mahajan Middleman in produce markets. The Muslims, like the Jats, are also strong supporters of the Land Alienation Act. The Jats like a close connection with the Government that controls the administration of irrigation which benefits their districts, often subject to monsoon failures. They believe that a link with the strong Soldiers Board Organization in the Punjab will enable them to exercise pressure on authority after the war to retain a substantial Jat element in the fighting services and provide their surplus young men with continued employment. While appreciating Hindu influence in the Central Government, they consider it can
be bought too dearly if it involves Mahajan influence in questions affecting agriculturists’ interests. They have a Minister in the Punjab Cabinet.

The Sikh position is more complex. There is always an extreme element which hates the Muslims on historical grounds as the successors of Moguls who persecuted Sikhs and the Gurus and hates the British because they brought Sikh rule to an end in the Punjab. They cherish vague ideas that general disturbance is not a bad thing because it may give birth to opportunities for the restoration of Sikh Rule in the Punjab. There has never been a Sikh of real importance on the All-India political stage or one prominent as a leader in Congress circles. Sikh interest is definitely centred on the Punjab. The majority of the Sikhs recognise that they hold a very strong political position in Punjab politics. On account of their weightage, they have a block of voters in the Punjab Legislature which is sought by both the Government Party and the Opposition. Mainly interested in rural and agricultural policies, they can get what they want in that direction by using and supporting the National Unionist Party, while in religious and purely Sikh matters they can usually count on the Opposition supporting them against the Government Party. Their good will is cultivated by both sides of the House: and they get the best of both worlds. They have always had a Minister in the Cabinet. Some of the extreme elements may desire agitation so as to be able to fish in troubled waters; but the mass of Sikhs will keep in line with the Cabinet and the majority party in the Legislature.

1 A non-communal party confined to the Punjab. Since the 1937 elections when it had won a clear majority, its leader—Sir Sikander Hyat Khan—had held office as Prime Minister with a Cabinet consisting of 3 Muslims, 2 Hindus and 1 Sikh.

2 The basis of agrarian legislation in the Punjab was the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900, which had placed restrictions upon the sale or mortgage of land to urban non-agriculturists.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 116

L/PO/6/106b: ff 119–121

INDIAN POLICY

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, 8 March 1942

I circulate herewith for consideration by the War Cabinet the draft of a telegram to the Viceroy,¹ in the form approved by the Committee on India.²

L. S. A.

¹ This telegram was never despatched to Lord Linlithgow; but the text was transmitted by Mr Clauson to Mr Turnbull as telegram 390 of 27 March. See also Nos. 282, Conclusion (5), and 283.

² See No. 264, para. 2.
Annex to No. 277

1. Obviously there are many questions to which it will be necessary for you to be prepared to give at any rate some sort of answer as well as matters on which it is of the greatest importance that guidance should be given beforehand to your Executive Council, Provincial Governors and others most affected, including the Press. I agree (vide your telegram of the 3rd March, 502-S) that full text of Declaration should be available to you and your Council shortly before its issue and I will arrange accordingly.

2. The prospect of a new Constitution for India may cause anxiety to Nepal. It may be well to assure the Maharajah of Nepal that his Treaty with His Majesty’s Government will hold good, subject to revision by negotiation. Control of Nepalese troops will not be transferred to the new Indian Union.

3. As regards the Princes our treaties with them hold good, subject to revision by negotiation. If they consider joining a federation whether the main Union or a Pakistan one they are fully entitled to stipulate that they only do so on the express condition that it remains under the Crown. If they stay out we shall naturally fulfil our obligations to ensure their protection.

4. As regards the Army it is essential that senior officers should be instructed to make it quite clear to all subordinates that nothing is happening now that affects their position as the King Emperor’s troops and that if and when a constitutional change does take place in the future their personal rights will be safeguarded in every respect. This should be immediately communicated to troops in Middle East and other stations outside India.

5. Similar assurances should be given through Governors to the Services protected under the present Government of India Act.

6. Paragraph (c) (i). The main argument for this is that it substantially fulfils our pledge to the Moslems and yet enables the other Provinces to get ahead. The awkward boundary questions raised may ultimately be resolved by re-adjustment: whether by the constitutional Convention, by negotiation, arbitration or referendum, can be left open for the present. The Provinces whose legislatures may exercise a right of non-accession are the Provinces as they now exist.

7. Paragraph (c) “lines analogous” means that if say the three North Western Provinces stand out they can hold their own convention, together with such States as might wish to adhere to them, frame their own Dominion Constitution, unitary or federal, and have it accepted subject to a treaty corresponding to that in (c) (ii). The same might apply to Bengal. But of course we do not envisage a multitude of Dominions.
8. The treaty will obviously cover our obligations to States, to minorities, and to existing personnel of Services. It will cover whatever arrangements the Convention may make in agreement with His Majesty's Government for the continuance of assistance in the shape of British Armed Forces but as in the case of the other Dominions any British Troops lent would be for the purposes of External defence and not for the maintenance of internal security except with our consent. This would probably be for a period of years subject after that to notice for some agreed period. You are authorised to say that we shall not make stipulations for the future of British commercial interests in India in the pre-acceptance treaty, but leave them for negotiation after the new Government has come into existence.

9. You will appreciate that it is our hope that Indians will devise their own constitution-making body. But to avoid the reproach that we are relying on their disagreement, we are now setting out the procedure we should adopt to set up a constitutional Convention, failing agreement among Indians.

10. Paragraph (c). You are authorised to negotiate with the leaders of the principal sections of Indian opinion on the basis of this paragraph for the purpose of obtaining their immediate support for some scheme by which they can partake in an advisory or consultative manner in the counsels of their country. This does not preclude your offering them if you consider it wise or necessary position in your Executive Council provided this does not embarrass you in the defence and good government of the country during the present critical time. Similarly if there is evidence of real willingness to co-operate you could offer representation as members of your Executive at War Cabinet and at Peace Conference.

3 No. 213; the date should be 2 March.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET AND PERSONAL

No. 574-S. Yesterday I explained to Craik proposals for Provincial option. Till then he had as Political Adviser been shown only those parts of the Draft Declaration touching the position of Indian States on constituent body. Craik is of course a Punjab Officer and an ex-Governor of that Province. His immediate reaction was that Declaration would be taken by Muslims as "Greatest
betrayal in history”, but if this were countered by emphasis on option of non-accession Sikhs would get alarmed. Civil war or at least serious disturbances in Punjab would result.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 117–8

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 8 March 1942, 1.30 pm

No. 299. Superintendent Series. Your 558, 559 and 568–S1 are being circulated and will receive fullest consideration. I recognise merits of your alternative scheme. On the other hand I am not sure that it grasps the nettles of the communal difference sufficiently to meet Jinnah. I have shared your anxieties about unnecessary precision involved in giving details of Constitution-making body with consequential explicit condition of Provincial option and have drafted simplified Declaration containing following passage:2

“His Majesty’s Government realise the inherent difficulties in finding agreement between the main communities in India, though they believe that they can be surmounted by goodwill and constructive resource. In the final event however of failure to obtain agreement upon an All-India Constitution, they do not feel that the fulfilment of their general promise to India should be indefinitely postponed by disagreement and would be prepared on similar conditions and without impairment of their future status to accept separate Constitutions framed in respect, on the one hand, of a majority of the Provinces of British India and of such States as might wish to adhere to them, and, on the other, of such minority region or regions as might feel unable to associate themselves with the majority.”

This throws the stress on the need for not holding up things indefinitely and leaves the precise nature and boundaries of Provincial option undefined.

Please reply immediately how far this would go to meet your anxieties. I might add that this corresponds to a suggestion made by Emerson3 who largely shares Glancy’s apprehensions.4 Hailey5 and Montmorency6 differ, believing military and land policy of Punjab and dislike of Mahajans sufficient to make Sikhs and Jats content to stay with it outside Hindu India.

1 Nos. 273, 274 and 275 were circulated to the War Cabinet.
2 The remainder of this draft has not been traced in India Office Records.
3 See No. 221. 4 See Nos. 236 and 248, para. 3.
5 It is not known how Lord Hailey communicated his views to Mr Amery.
6 See Annex to No. 276.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 249

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 8 March 1942, 7.45 pm
Received: 9 March

4288. Following from Washington to Foreign Office 1355 repeated to you as No. 53. Following from Agent General.

MOST SECRET

Following impressions of Chiang Kai-shek’s recent visit gleaned from source close to Chinese here may be of interest. Both before and after the visit, the Generalissimo has been in touch with the President. He (Chiang Kai-shek) considers the political situation in India grave, not because of the fear that Congress will help the Japanese, but because without the vital impulse for active freedom, which alone is worth fighting for, Japanese invasion of India will not encounter rigid resistance. Confusion and panic created by blitz attacks on selected centres will rapidly become powerful, wide-spread and, in the absence of effective realistic stimulus which has been so effective in the Philippines and China, Indian morale will show little resilience. While avoiding any public gesture that might embarrass an ally, China will do everything possible behind the scenes to press for immediate liberal solution of the Indian problem. According to this source, American administration is quite satisfied with the results of the visit in respect of Indo-Chinese collaboration in the matters of immediate military and administrative importance.

2. The fear of breakdown of Indian morale is being worked to death by the American press as argument for the grant of Indian independence without delay. This morning’s papers feature the report by Associated Press from London that Subhas Bose’s supporters have majority where India’s most martial people are concentrated, namely in the North West Frontier province, the Punjab and Maharashtra. I suggest that something be done to check these alarmist fantasies at the source. I shall take such effective counter-action as I can locally.
Note by Sir S. Cripps
L/PO/6/106b: ff 99–103

SUGGESTED LINES OF INDIAN STATEMENT

8 March 1942

There has in recent weeks, owing no doubt to the critical situation which is developing in the Far East, been a great deal of discussion both in the Allied countries and in India as to the precise intentions of His Majesty’s Government with regard to the future of India.

In August 1940 a fresh assurance was given to the Indian people as to the granting of Dominion Status, and it was hoped that the difficulties between the various Indian communities could be overcome by discussion amongst the leaders of those communities so as to devise some practical means by which India might take her place as a free partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

This problem of Constitutional development of India has now for many decades vexed the minds of British and Indian politicians alike, and has proved itself to be one of unparalleled difficulty.

The Indian sub-continent is not, unfortunately for constitutional development, peopled by a homogeneous race, nor are its political and religious institutions shared in common by her whole people. For two centuries now British rule in India has served to bring the various races and religions into a closer harmony and has worked towards the unity of India. Closest regard, however, has always had to be observed towards the stubborn facts of the fears which existed amongst the minorities lest they should be subjected to oppression by majorities. These minorities are so large in size and so different in character to the majorities and to one another that in some cases they are almost separate nations rather than mere racial minorities.

It has now become apparent that if the problem of the solution of India’s freedom is left to discussion amongst the leaders of the various communities in India it will be impossible to resolve the deadlock. Unfortunately owing to this fact an impression has gained ground in some quarters that His Majesty’s Government have relied upon this now obvious inability of the Indian communities to come to an agreement amongst themselves in order to postpone indefinitely the granting of Dominion Status to India.

His Majesty’s Government have therefore taken steps to work out a plan, upon which the Members of the War Cabinet are all agreed, by which this deadlock can be overcome. But it will be appreciated that such a plan, to be successful, must meet with the support of a large section of the Indian people, since His Majesty’s Government are not desirous of forcing upon the Indian
peoples any plan which would not seem to them fair and just. At the same time, His Majesty's Government cannot envisage the possibility either of the majority desire being held up by a dissentient minority, or of large minorities being subjected to conditions which they consider unfair or unsafe for their communities in the future.

The military situation in the Far East has, however, introduced another and an over-riding factor in the solution of this problem since to-day a powerful and aggressive enemy stands almost at the Gates of India.

For the safety of India His Majesty's Government have undertaken and will exercise their responsibility, and at this moment of crisis they are bound by the obligations of history to do their utmost to discharge that responsibility to the full and to do nothing which in their opinion would weaken their power to rally every element in India to the defence of their country in order that it may be possible, when the danger has passed, to create that free India which is the object of all its peoples. To announce at this moment some great new Constitutional change which had not previously received the consent of the majority and the principal minorities of the Indian peoples would be to divert the energies and thoughts of the Indian peoples from their own immediate dangers and to turn them to the discussion of Constitutional questions which, though of profound importance for the future of India, cannot assist its immediate defence.

It is in these circumstances that His Majesty's Government has decided to send immediately to India a Member of the War Cabinet with full power to discuss with the leaders of Indian opinion the scheme upon which the War Cabinet has agreed, with a view to seeing whether it meets with that generous measure of acceptance which would be vital to its success. If such is the case, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to announce their decisions and to call into immediate consultation the leaders of all the principal sections of Indian opinion, whether in British India or in the Indian States, with a view to reinforcing the determination of the Indian peoples to preserve their country from the threatening aggression.

1 This note is unsigned, but is evidently by Sir S. Cripps; see No. 291.
The War Cabinet had before them:

(a) A further revise of the draft Declaration prepared by the India Committee (W.P. (42) 115).²

(b) A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, covering a draft telegram to the Viceroy (W.P. (42) 116).³

The War Cabinet first considered the revise of the draft Declaration, which was approved.

The timing of its issue was next considered. The Prime Minister said that events had shown that the immediate issue of the Declaration, without any preliminary sounding of public opinion in India, would be most unwise. This course would probably lead to the rejection of the Declaration by Congress, and would give rise to divisions of opinion here. In the circumstances, he thought that the right course was to accept the very generous offer made by the Lord Privy Seal to visit India and discuss matters with the leaders of the main Indian political parties. The whole War Cabinet were greatly indebted to the Lord Privy Seal for this offer, and he would go with the fullest confidence of all of them. The Lord Privy Seal would take with him the draft Declaration as the plan which he would discuss with the leaders of Indian opinion, with a view to seeing whether it met with the measure of acceptance vital to its success.

The next question concerned the date of the announcement of the Lord Privy Seal’s mission. In discussion, Wednesday 11th March was regarded as the most appropriate day.

The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet a first draft of the statement which he proposed should be made.

This met with general approval.

Importance was attached to this statement making it clear that the Lord Privy Seal was taking out to India a specific scheme approved by the War Cabinet. Otherwise, it would be said that he was going out to negotiate.

The War Cabinet:

(1) Approved the revised draft Declaration (W.P. (42) 115), and agreed that it should be circulated forthwith to all Ministers of Cabinet rank, who had been invited to attend a further Meeting at 12 Noon on the following day.⁴
(2) Approved the proposal that the Lord Privy Seal should visit India, with authority to discuss the scheme embodied in the Declaration with the leaders of Indian opinion, in order to see whether it met with the measure of acceptance vital to its success.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for India to send a telegram to the Viceroy informing him of this decision.

(4) Agreed that an announcement of the decision in (2) should be made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Wednesday, 11th March, a corresponding announcement being made in the House of Lords.

(5) Invited the Committee on India to consider the draft telegram to the Viceroy, prepared by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 116), which would require re-casting in the light of the decision in (2).

1 No. 263. 2 No. 265. 3 No. 277.
4 The Cabinet Office have no record of this meeting.

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*War Cabinet*

*Committee on India. I(42) 8th Meeting*

*L/PO/6/106: ff 122–3*

*Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 9 March 1942 at 1 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)*

*INDIA*

(Previous reference: W.M. (42) 31st Conclusions, Minute 1.)

The Committee considered which of the further telegrams received from India in regard to the proposed Declaration ought to be circulated to all Ministers of Cabinet rank.2

The Committee decided:

That, in the light of the decisions reached by the War Cabinet that morning, it was unnecessary for any of these further telegrams to be so circulated. The Prime Minister should, however, be asked to inform the Ministers present at the Meeting on the following day that a number of further telegrams had been received urging that the Declaration, in its present form, should not be issued in the immediate future.

1 No. 282. 2 Cf. No. 250.
The Committee then considered the draft telegram of Instructions to the Viceroy, prepared by the Secretary of State for India and amended by the India Committee (W.P. (42) 116).3

The Committee:

Agreed on a revised form of paragraph 10 (dealing with paragraph (e) of the Declaration) (See Annex to these Minutes). This revised paragraph would form an essential part of the instructions to the Lord Privy Seal, and should be read to the Meeting of Ministers on the following day.

In the altered circumstances, the remaining paragraphs of the telegram were no longer required.

Annex to No. 2834

You are authorised to negotiate with the leaders of the principal sections of Indian opinion on the basis of paragraph 1 (e) of the “Statement of Policy” for the purpose of obtaining their immediate support for some scheme by which they can partake in an advisory or consultative manner in the counsels of their country. You may offer them, if you consider it wise or necessary, positions in the Executive Council, provided this does not embarrass the defence and good government of the country during the present critical time. In relation to this matter you will, no doubt, consult with the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, and will bear in mind the supreme importance of the military situation.

Similarly, if there is evidence of a real willingness to co-operate, you could offer representation as members of your Executive, at the War Cabinet and at the Peace Conference.5

3 No. 277.
4 The text of this Annex was transmitted by Mr Clauson to Mr Turnbull as telegram 5668 of 28 March (No. 424). See also No. 300, para. 1.
5 The final sentence reproduces the final sentence of the draft telegram to Lord Linlithgow at No. 251; the expression ‘your Executive’ was evidently retained in error.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 9 March 1942, 1 pm
Received: 9 March, 11 am

No. 579-S. Your private and personal telegram No. 295,1 dated March 7th. I appreciate the distance you have gone in the attempt to meet our difficulties about the minority pledge while retaining your own local option proposal.
The proposed amended declaration keeps us in indefinitely as parties to a bilateral treaty and therefore amounts to a continuing\textsuperscript{2} pledge.

2. I have put the full draft as amended by your telegram No. 295 to Glancy and the Commander-in-Chief. Glancy is on tour and I await his final views. The Commander-in-Chief regards it as no less disastrous than before. I repeat his views in a succeeding telegram.\textsuperscript{3} You will understand the deep anxiety with which, given the present war position, I am bound to regard this opinion of my principal military adviser.

3. From my point of view the draft declaration as amended by your telegram No. 295 would be a calamity. The insertion of the minority pledge in this form would be regarded by all Hindu opinion as retrograde compared with the 1940 declaration. It would also destroy the whole policy of throwing the primary responsibility on Indians to settle their own internal problem.\textsuperscript{4} In the result the declaration would fall flat and I should be left with a disgruntled India and in a worse position than before. Hindus and Muslims would be relieved of the need to settle their own differences and would continue to lay the blame on Britain and to direct their propaganda at and against her since their future relations would depend not on their own agreement but on the terms\textsuperscript{5} that they could squeeze out of Britain in the treaty negotiations.

4. The only way to get out of the dilemma is to drop the advertisement of local option which in turn involves dropping from the declaration the detailed specification of the post-war constitutional procedure.

5. In this dilemma I have taken the unusual step of showing to the Commander-in-Chief without commendation the draft declaration sent with my telegram No. 568–S,\textsuperscript{6} dated March 8th. The Commander-in-Chief sees no serious trouble arising from this, \textit{vide} my succeeding telegram.

6. I am not trying to force the hands of His Majesty’s Government but must put it on record that I have offered a constructive and generous way out.

\textsuperscript{1} No. 268. \textsuperscript{2} Deciphered as 'continuity'. \textsuperscript{3} No. 285. \textsuperscript{4} Deciphered as '(? business)'. \textsuperscript{5} 'the terms' deciphered as 'their own (? terms)'. \textsuperscript{6} No. 275.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE 9 March 1942
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 580-S. Following are the Commander-in-Chief's observations referred to in my telegram No. 579-S.¹

Begins. The alterations in the Government draft² do not affect at all the opinions I put forward in my letter of which Viceroy telegraphed home a summary.³ The objections I urged apply with equal force to the new declaration and I still regard the probable effect on the army of such a declaration as disastrous. The suggestion of the Secretary of State of an explanation and guarantee to the army is meaningless and worthless.

From the point of view of the army I am prepared to accept the Viceroy's alternative declaration. It will undoubtedly provoke much discussion in the army as elsewhere but I do not think it should be harmful. Ends.

¹ No. 284. ² No. 268. ³ No. 246.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

MOST IMMEDIATE 9 March 1942

No. 16-G. Your telegram No. 575-S.¹ I am not entirely clear about the precise wording of the proposed announcement as now revised but it appears to me to contain elements which will make it less disturbing than the original draft to the majority in the Punjab though their apprehensions will certainly not be wholly allayed. I think therefore that the revised draft is definitely to be preferred to the original. At the same time I anticipate that prominence given to elected constitution-making body will result in very strong protest from the Muslim League which is likely to have serious repercussions in the Punjab and may well lead to collapse of Ministry with grave effects on the war effort. If on receipt of the full amended text I have any further comments I will telegraph again.

Above is text of message sent to Secretary of State. I am not in position to speak for Congress strongholds in India but I doubt whether any material satisfaction will be caused by an announcement which will obviously be interpreted in various ways. I again suggest definite advance on previous announce-
ments might be provided by declaring that if main parties in India fail to reach common agreement then other parts of the Empire who have already attained Dominion Status and possibly also America will be asked to devise fair solution either (a) in collaboration with the British Government or (b) without such collaboration. This might serve to counter Congress propaganda that Britain will never willingly part with power. It might also help in steadying world opinion. This suggestion seems outside terms of present reference made to me but I ask you if you see no objection to pass it on to His Majesty’s Government.

Repeated to Secretary of State.  

1 Telegram 575-S of 8 March (MSS. EUR. F. 125/110) transmitted sub-para. (c) (ii)—though referring to it as sub-para. (b) (ii)—of the draft Declaration as in the Annex to No. 265.

2 Although this text of the telegram concludes with these words, it is clear from the first sentence of the second paragraph and from No. 287, para. 1, that only the first paragraph was repeated to the Secretary of State.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 9 March 1942, 11.35 pm

Received: 9 March, 10.15 pm

No. 588-S. You will have received direct Glancy’s views¹ on the declaration as amended in your telegram No. 295.² I should explain that time only permitted me to send him in full the revised clause (b) (ii)³ of your draft with indications that there were other changes of which the omission of last two lines of preamble (secession) was specifically mentioned. I may hear further from him when he has the full text, but I doubt whether it will make much difference. In a postscript to myself not repeated to you he puts forward a suggestion that failing post-war agreement between Indian parties other Dominions⁴ or possibly⁵ also America might be called in to devise a solution either with or without British collaboration. The underlying idea is not excluded⁶ by paragraph 6 of my suggestions in telegram No. 568–S⁷ but this is not the time to put it forward in terms. Its relevance in Glancy’s suggestion at this juncture lies in his anxiety to avoid a specific declaration of the post-war procedure.

¹ See No. 286.  ² No. 268.
³ See No. 286, note 1. By the amendments contained in the Annex to No. 207, the para. to which Lord Linlithgow referred as clause (b) had been renumbered as para. (c).
⁴ 'Dominions' was received corrupt.  ⁵ Deciphered as 'proposal'.
⁶ 'excluded' was received corrupt.
⁷ No. 275.
2. Punjab being so much the crux of our present difficulties I have shown Craik your telegram No. 295. The following is a summary of his views thereon:

Begins. The draft represents some improvement in view of the omission of specific reference to secession and the inclusion of some sort of undertaking to implement guarantees to minorities. But clear specification of elected constituent body will certainly be interpreted by Muslims as betrayal and they will not be reassured by offer of treaty negotiations for protection of minorities. It is not impossible that under Jinnah’s lead Muslims may refuse to send representatives to constituent body. If however they co-operate in it with view to eventual formation of Pakistan (which moderate Muslims in the Punjab do not really like) communal feeling in the most intense form will be provoked either on an all India or Provincial scale. Sikhs will certainly resist by force inclusion in Pakistan. Ends.8

8 Cf. No. 278.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 589-S. Your telegram No. 299, dated March 8th and received March 9th.

My immediate personal reactions for your personal information are as follows:

1. Failure to grasp the nettle. If we go too far towards meeting Jinnah we are bound to get into trouble either with Sikhs (and consequently in Punjab with Muslims) or Hindus or both. Hence my anxiety to have a formula, such as I have suggested, which avoids laying down precisely the post-war plan, and does not exclude Pakistan but does not advertise local option.

2. I may be right in thinking that your present formula is an attempt to meet my requirement of not upsetting the Punjab or the Army. From my point of view this formula would be fatal to the declaration in Hindu eyes. They would interpret it as a virtual promise not merely of Pakistan but of Sikhistan also, and as containing greater possibilities of disintegrating India than even Jinnah claims. They would observe that not even a majority in a Provincial Assembly would be needed to detach some particular region from the Union. They would regard it as still further empowering minorities to force separation on exorbitant terms by mere refusal to agree. I do not object to giving the
minorities a strong position in the future deliberations, but if we promise too much strength now the declaration will be reviled by Hindus. We are back again to the old dilemma.

3. Hailey's and Montmorency's views relate to the distant future. I am not so much concerned about what may be the ultimate fate of Pakistan but I am vitally concerned with the necessity of not causing trouble at present which would impede our war effort and also of not having a declaration that would fall absolutely flat with the Hindus.

4. Avoidance of holding up things indefinitely. I fully appreciate the necessity of avoiding the charge of sitting tight and holding up all hope of constitutional progress. The quasi time limits in my alternative draft declaration (telegram No. 568)\(^2\) are the best contribution that I can see, given the difficulties of the case, to this end.

\(^1\) No. 279. \(^2\) No. 275.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 9 March 1942, 11.35 pm

Received: 9 March, 10.30 pm

No. 590-S. My telegram No. 586-S,\(^1\) dated March 8th. It occurs to me in view of the anxieties expressed in various quarters about the right of secession that the following alternative version of the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the draft declaration contained in that telegram has the advantage of emphasizing the voluntary nature of the Commonwealth association without openly mentioning secession. You will observe that it follows closely the wording of the Balfour Report of 1926—

Begins. This free Union will constitute a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations equal in status to the United Kingdom and the Dominions, voluntarily associated with them in common allegiance to the Crown, and in no way subordinate to them in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs. Ends.

I put this forward for consideration by the Cabinet Sub-Committee.

\(^1\) This should read '568-S', i.e. No. 275. \(^2\) See No. 195, note 2.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

SECRET

9 March 1942, 3.20 pm

16-U. I have said little to you thus far about my own difficulties because I have been so anxious to avoid least suggestion of a threat. But the position now requires that I should tell you that if the declaration is to go out in the form now before Cabinet Committee (Your telegram No. 295) I shall have to resign.

2. My own views are before the Cabinet and I need not recapitulate these at length. Briefly I feel that I could not contemplate sharing with H.M.G. responsibility for a step which in the opinion of my Commander-in-Chief would gravely hurt the fighting value of the army. Nor could I usefully continue in my charge if after high expectations raised here by very unwise publicity from London of H.M.G.'s intention to make a major contribution in constitutional field, the declaration should prove, as the present draft most certainly would prove, a complete flop. With the Japanese at the gate I should have to handle an embittered India, with Congress and the Muslim League relieved of the restraints imposed upon both by my offer of August 1940 (which put upon them the sobering prospect of having to agree together to build the new constitution) and therefore free to direct their venom against myself and my government.

3. I should propose immediately before the announcement is made to telegraph to Winston my resignation in a form suitable for publication. I know I can rely on you to see that Parliament and the public may not be led to think that the scheme in your telegram 295 has my support. I trust too that you will find it possible to tell Parliament that during the formative stage of the declaration neither I nor mine have been either obstructive or illiberal in our approach to this problem. You are at liberty if you so desire to communicate substance of this telegram to Prime Minister.

4. Question arises of what may best be done about getting me out of India. It will be awkward and I suggest inexpedient that I should continue in the charge once my resignation becomes public property. For I could hardly hope, once it is known that I disapprove of essential parts of the scheme, to be an effective advocate. How would it do to fly me home ostensibly for consultation and to put Lumley in to act for me and retain him as acting Governor-General until permanent successor can arrive? I imagine that on security grounds I ought to complete flight to London before any announcement were made, though at the moment I am not clear how this could be done at this end.
5. I look to you as an old and trusted friend to protect me from the slightest suggestion that I am trying to threaten the Cabinet into acceptance of my own alternative which acceptance would make my position possible. Believe me, I am neither so foolish nor so lacking in duty.

1 Deciphered as 'Most Secret'.
3 Deciphered as 'it has (sic)'.
6 Deciphered as 'ingenious (sic)'.
8 No. 275.
2 'to you' omitted in decipher.
4 No. 268.
5 'upon both' omitted in decipher.
7 'mine' deciphered as 'my advisers'.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: ff 83–90

INDIA OFFICE, 9 March 1942

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. P.I4/42

Prime Minister

I enclose some suggestions with regard to your proposed statement on Wednesday.¹ For convenience sake I have incorporated them in a single document, underlining the passages which have been added to or where I suggest an alteration of Sir Stafford Cripps’ text.² Some of the alterations are purely drafting, but I have numbered and comment below on the reasons for the more important ones.

1. I think it is better to talk of the attainment of Dominion status than the grant of it. "Grant" jars on Indian susceptibilities. Also I think there are advantages in using the actual language of our pledge of August 1940 and reminding them that the constitution is to be framed by Indians themselves. This helps to explain the argument in the rest of the sentence.

2. While it is essential that Sir S. Cripps should work to a definite set of instructions, and that there should be no idea that he is going out on a purely roving commission, I think there are serious objections to referring to his instructions as if they were an absolutely cut and dried plan (even though from our point of view they are something fairly near that). To do so seems to me to fetter the Cabinet’s emissary’s discretion too much and will tempt Indians to begin by asking him to disclose the whole of his plan instead of letting him unfold it in discussion.

3. This again is from the August 1940 pledge and helps to remind Moslems that you are sticking to that pledge. This is specially important in view of the

¹ 11 March. See No. 282, Conclusion (4).
² No. 281.
fact that they are likely to be alarmed by your sending out someone known to stand so close to Congress circles.

4. This is the same point as 2.

5. This is a necessary insertion. The Viceroy is going to be put in any case in a very embarrassing position and we must do what we can to preserve his authority.

6. The wording in the original text might suggest that Sir S. Cripps was going to talk to Congress and other political leaders in the States. It would certainly create trouble if that impression got about, whereas the wording as amended would refer naturally to the Princes themselves or to their Ministers.

Enclosure to No. 291

SUGGESTED LINES OF INDIAN STATEMENT

There has in recent weeks, owing no doubt to the critical situation which is developing in the Far East, been a growing volume of discussion, both in the Allied countries and in India, as to the precise intentions of His Majesty's Government with regard to the future of India.

In August 1940 a fresh assurance was given to the Indian people as to the attainment of free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth under a constitution framed by Indians for themselves, and it was hoped that the difficulties between the various Indian communities could be overcome by discussion amongst the leaders of those communities so as to devise some practical means by which India might take her place as a free partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

This problem of constitutional development of India has now for many decades vexed the minds of British and Indian politicians alike, and has proved itself to be one of unparalleled difficulty.

The Indian sub-continent is not, unfortunately for constitutional development, peopled by a homogeneous race, nor are its political and religious institutions shared in common by her whole people. For two centuries now British rule in India has served to bring the various races and religions into a closer harmony and has worked towards the unity of India. Closest regard, however, has always had to be observed towards the stubborn fact of the fears which exist amongst the minorities lest they should be subjected to oppression by majorities. These so-called minorities are so large in size and so different in character from the majorities and to one another that in some cases they are more nearly separate nations than mere racial minorities.

It has now become apparent that if the problem of the solution of India's
freedom is left to discussion amongst the leaders of the various communities in India there is little prospect of the deadlock being resolved. Unfortunately owing to this fact an impression, mistaken but widespread, has gained ground in some quarters that His Majesty’s Government have relied upon this inability of the Indian communities to come to an agreement amongst themselves in order to postpone indefinitely the fulfilment of their pledges.

His Majesty’s Government are determined that this deadlock shall, if possible, be overcome, and have accordingly come to certain definite conclusions, upon which the members of the War Cabinet are all agreed, as to a line of policy which they believe can achieve the object in view. But it will be appreciated that any plan, to be successful, must meet with the support of a large section of the Indian people, since His Majesty’s Government are not desirous of forcing upon the Indian peoples a plan which would not seem to them fair and just. At the same time, His Majesty’s Government cannot envisage the possibility either of the majority’s desire being held up indefinitely by a dissentient element, or of large and powerful minorities being subjected to a system of government which they consider unfair or unsafe for their communities in the future, and whose authority they would directly deny.

The military situation in the Far East has, however, introduced another and an over-riding factor in the solution of this problem, since to-day a powerful and aggressive enemy stands almost at the Gates of India.

For the safety of India His Majesty’s Government have undertaken and will exercise their responsibility, and at this moment of crisis they are bound by the obligations of history to do their utmost to discharge that responsibility to the full and to do nothing which in their opinion would weaken their power to rally every element in India to the defence of their country in order that it may be possible, when the danger has passed, to create that free India which is the object of all its peoples and of His Majesty’s Government. To announce at this moment some great new constitutional change which had not previously received the consent both of the majority and of the principal minorities in India would be to divert the energies and thoughts of the Indian peoples from their own immediate dangers and to turn them to the discussion of constitutional questions which, though of profound importance for the future of India, cannot assist its immediate defence.

It is in these circumstances that His Majesty’s Government, which has been anxiously studying various means of possibly solving the deadlock, have decided to send immediately to India a member of the War Cabinet fully apprised of their deliberations and furnished with instructions approved by them, to discuss the problem with the Viceroy and the leaders of Indian opinion, with a view to seeing whether it is possible to secure that generous measure of acceptance which is vital to success. In that event His Majesty’s Government will be prepared to announce their decisions and to call into immediate consultation the leaders of all the
principal sections of opinion in British India as well as leading representatives of the Indian States, with a view to reinforcing the determination of the Indian peoples and States to preserve their country from the threatening aggression.

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Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps

L/PO/6/106b: ff 91–2

9 March 1942

My dear Cripps,
I enclose a simplified version of the plan, leaving out the detailed composition of the constituent body with the consequential details about local option which have created so much anxiety, which I drafted on Saturday, in case it was still thought desirable to proceed by way of immediate public declaration. It has now become superfluous and I am not circulating it. But I send it along to you as I think there is something to be said both for the new opening sentence, and for the slightly revised lay-out. You may care to have it with you when you come to drafting the final outcome of your talks in declaration form. There are also some quite good points in Linlithgow’s long alternative, more particularly the point that the treaty negotiations would be conducted concurrently with the constitution-making, no doubt by a delegation from the Convention.

We must have a really good talk before you leave. Would you and Lady Cripps dine quietly with us on Tuesday or Wednesday at 7.45? Do you include fish and eggs in your diet (when procurable!) or are you a vegetarian of the straider sect?

Anyhow all possible good luck to you on your venture. The one mathematical problem we did not touch upon at lunch yesterday was squaring the circle—that has been left to you to accomplish by negotiation.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

Enclosure to No. 292

L/PO/6/106b: ff 154–5

ABRIDGED DRAFT DECLARATION

His Majesty’s Government having considered the anxieties which have been expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made with regard to the future of India make the following declaration:

(a) His Majesty’s Government recognises the right of India to attain to the same position of freedom and of international status as is enjoyed by the United
Kingdom. It looks to the earliest possible realisation of that position by the creation, by Indians themselves, of a new Indian Union, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by the common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect and in no way subordinate in any respect of its domestic or external affairs.

(b) They propose that immediately upon the cessation of hostilities there shall be set up a constituent body or convention, which shall include representatives of the States as well as of the Provinces, with the object of framing the constitution of a future Indian Union. Failing previous agreement upon the composition of this body, they will set up themselves such body as, in their opinion, is most suitable for the purpose and is likely to command the greatest measure of support.

(c) His Majesty’s Government undertake, if, as they sincerely hope, such a Union for All-India can be agreed by the principal elements concerned, to accept and to implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to the signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the constitution making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising from the transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty’s Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other member States of the British Commonwealth.

(d) Failing agreement upon a constitution for India as a whole, His Majesty’s Government, in fulfilment of pledges given, is prepared to recognise the right of those provinces or regions of India which do not accept the proposed constitution, to remain outside. Such non-acceding areas will be entitled to make new constitutional arrangements for themselves which His Majesty’s Government will accept, subject again to corresponding treaty provision for the protection of minorities and in respect of other matters arising out of the transfer of responsibility.

(e) Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to one of the above constitutions it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required by the new situation.

(f) While during the critical period which now faces India, and until the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for the Defence of India, they desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections

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1 7 March.  
2 See No. 275, para. 4.  
3 This appears to be the correct enclosure, though its place in the file and its lack of signature or date make certainty on the point impossible. Mr Amery evidently drafted another ‘simplified Declaration’; see No. 279.
of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give the active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICE ROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 10 March 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

If you get a much shorter letter than usual this week, you must blame the series of constitutional bombs which have been exploding under my tail at regular intervals throughout the week. I need not elaborate to you the extreme difficulty of the situation in which I find myself when I am asked to take, at the shortest notice and with the minimum opportunities for consultation with those from whom I should normally look for advice, decisions of the gravest importance affecting every corner of an area as large as Europe, as diversely populated and quite as prolific of thorny political and racial problems: and all this at a time when the Japanese are walking up our front drive and I am changing my Commander-in-Chief for the fourth time.

2. I do not feel disposed to comment at length upon the copious interchange of telegrams we have had over the draft Declaration except to observe, in all gentleness, that our democratic system of government yields results that are at times very strange! We are putting together a pronouncement which must affect, deeply and permanently, the whole future of our relations with India, and the outcome of which must bear very directly upon the issue of victory or defeat for the Allies. Yet we work at breakneck speed, with little time for consultation, and that although there is no apparent ground for such a hustle, and despite the fact that we might perfectly well have begun the process many weeks ago. So anxious are we to secure for the declaration the propaganda value of surprise that the Viceroy is at first specifically debarred from consulting anyone except the three Presidency Governors, even the views of the Commander-in-Chief not being, in the earlier stages, available to the Viceroy and the Cabinet; though in India, as elsewhere, we are confronted by a military crisis of the first order.

3. Rangoon has fallen, and I have decided that the National War Front must be launched now or never. Governors have been warned, and detailed instructions have been sent to Provincial Governments, so that the ground will
have been prepared unobtrusively during the last few days. I have issued a short
message, which will be published in tomorrow morning's papers. I have had
considerable doubts about this scheme, which have been reinforced by doubts
expressed by Governors, especially Hallett and Stewart. I confess that I am
not even now confident that it will have any very considerable success in the
country, but at least it can do no harm and it may well serve to rally and hearten
the many people of goodwill, who at this time are looking for some such move.
The scheme has had the strong support of Maxwell, whose balance and judgment
weighs a good deal with me, and the plans have been worked out by P. J.
Griffiths, a retired Civilian, whose drive and enthusiasm are likely to carry the
scheme a long way.

4. I am sending with this letter copy of a statement that I had to make to
my Executive Council on the 4th March. It contains a slight prevarication as
Presidencies have now in law become Provinces, but the whole position
is so difficult at the time, that one is lucky to get away with so technical a fib
as this.

Enclosure to No. 293

His Excellency the Viceroy's statement to the Executive Council

4 March 1942

I have realised for a week or two past that there must have been widespread
conviction that something was afoot in the nature of plans for a new Declara-
tion regarding India; and I was so to that extent relieved when His Majesty's
Government decided to state the fact publicly a day or two ago. I fully appreci-
ate, however, that this only aggravates the embarrassment caused to my
Colleagues, especially those who are here because of their standing in public
life and the trust which I have reposed in them. They may well feel it strange
that decisions vitally involving the future of this country are under active dis-
cussion without any hint being given to them of the nature of those discussions,
or any opportunity of putting forward their views.

My Colleagues will appreciate my own difficulty in this matter. Owing partly
to the speed with which events of the gravest importance are moving in in-
ternational affairs, the effect of which on India the Prime Minister and his
Colleagues are perhaps in a better position than ourselves to judge, it has not
been possible for His Majesty's Government to authorise me to acquaint
my Colleagues with the progress of His Majesty's Government's own deliber-
ations. Nor have I been able to confide in Governors of Provinces, whose

1 See No. 113. 2 See No. 310, note 1. 3 Cf. No. 213.
4 See second para. of enclosure. 5 See Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 46(1).
responsibilities, as you well know, cover not only the execution of internal policy which the Governor-General in Council may formulate, but also include Provincial functions of high importance for which the Governor-General in Council has no constitutional responsibility.

I am afraid we must accept this position with as little sense of embarrassment as possible, and I feel sure that we can do so without lessening our mutual trust.

I hope that at any rate I may be in a position to ensure that my Colleagues will not learn from the Press or the News telegrams the terms of any announcement by the Prime Minister before they have learnt them from me, but of this I can give no present guarantee.

I myself do not yet know what precise form the final decision may take. But though I have not been able to ask you for your views, I have tried my best to keep myself in the closest contact with expressed opinion of all shades in India, and to see that the implications of these various opinions are not lost upon His Majesty’s Government. I think I should be fairly interpreting your common attitude in saying that we all want to heighten the stature of India and to find a solution to her baffling internal problem. For my own part at least I must hope that whatever decision is taken, it will not involve a loss of stability and continuity in the Government of British India at the present stage of the war.

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Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 70–2

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, 10 March 1942

PERSONAL AND SECRET

14–U. Prime Minister to Viceroy. 1. I agree with you that to fling1 out our2 declaration without knowing where we are with the Indian parties would be to court outcome of what you rightly call a flop and start an acrimonious controversy at the worst possible3 moment for everybody. Yesterday before I was shown your 16–U4 we decided not to publish any declaration now but to send a War Cabinet Minister out to see whether it could be put across on the spot5 because otherwise what is the use of having all the trouble? Stafford Cripps, with great public spirit, volunteered for this thankless and hazardous task. He will start almost immediately. In spite of all the differences in our lines of approach, I have entire confidence in his overriding resolve to beat Hitler and Co. at all costs. The announcement of his mission will still febrile agitation and give time for the problem to be calmly solved or alternatively proved to be for the time being insoluble.
2. The document on which we have agreed represents our united policy. If that is rejected by the Indian parties for whose benefit it has been devised, our sincerity will be proved to the world and we shall stand together and fight on it here, should that ever be necessary.

3. I hope therefore that you will await Lord Privy Seal’s arrival and go into the whole matter with him. He is of course bound by the draft declaration which is our utmost limit. Moreover, he will give full weight to the military and executive position in which India is now placed.

4. It would be impossible, owing to unfortunate rumours and publicity, and the general American6 outlook to stand on a purely negative attitude and the Cripps’ Mission is indispensable to prove our honesty of purpose and to gain7 time for the necessary consultations.

5. My own position is that nothing matters except the successful and unflinching defence of India as a part of the general victory, and this is also the conviction of Sir Stafford Cripps. Do not therefore think of quitting your post at this juncture, for this might be the signal for a general collapse in British Indian resistance with serious rupture of political unity here. We have a very bad time immediately ahead but nothing like so bad as what we have already forced our way through. The Secretary of State will apprise you further by official telegram.8

1 Deciphered as ‘put’.  2 ‘our’ omitted in decipher.  3 ‘possible’ omitted in decipher.  4 No. 290.  5 See No. 282.  6 ‘American’ omitted in decipher.  7 Deciphered as ‘concede’.  8 No. 295.

295

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 81–2

MOST IMMEDIATE  INDIA OFFICE, 10 March 1942, 6 am
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
303. Superintendent Series.

1. War Cabinet have decided in view of difficulties and objections which you and others have indicated not to proceed with publication of1 declaration. Prime Minister will make announcement on Wednesday2 to the effect that War Cabinet have their plan for solving the deadlock but are not for the time

1 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has ‘public’ for ‘publication of’.  2 11 March.
being at any rate publishing anything but are sending out Sir S. Cripps to
eavour to see if he can by negotiation with Indian political leaders secure a
sufficient body of agreement upon their policy. I will try and let you have text
of Prime Minister’s statement as early as possible.

2. Sir S. Cripps will be going out not on a roving mission but with the
plan embodied in the draft declaration as his general instructions. His further
general instructions as to the interpretation to be put on paragraph (e) of the
draft declaration will be sent in a separate telegram and will of course have to
be discussed with you in detail.

3. Sir S. Cripps will probably be flying out at the end of the week. It would
I think be appropriate if he stayed with you for the first two or three days and
then perhaps like Generalissimo have his own quarters where he could receive
visitors informally.

3 Annex to No. 283; but see No. 300, para. 1.

296

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 76–7

INDIA OFFICE, 10 March 1942

15–U. 1. Decision to send out Cripps taken over week-end has superseded
publication for the time being and consequently also consideration of your
alternative draft for publication. Cripps will naturally have this alternative
with him as material for consideration, but Cabinet definitely want him to
treat their draft as the basis of his instructions. If he fails to secure agreement
then presumably no declaration will issue. If he succeeds the dangers anticipated
by you and others will not materialise.

2. The policy to which Cripps is to work is in essence a fairly conservative
one, at any rate as compared with what everybody seems to be expecting.
On the other hand I am much afraid of immediate reaction of his being the
emissary on Moslems who will think we are selling out to Congress, and you
may find it necessary to convey beforehand some sort of assurance to Jinnah
(which indeed will I think be clearly implied in Prime Minister’s statement)
to keep him quiet till Cripps arrives. As for Congress their adverse reaction may
be all the greater when they discover that they are not going to get a Saprui
type of government and that the nest contains the Pakistan cuckoo’s egg.
But they have got to face the fact that it is for them to find a compromise
which will induce the Moslems to drop Pakistan. The sooner they are made to realise that the better.

3. From all I know of Cripps he will I think not endeavour to go outside his brief and try to commit you and the Cabinet to really dangerous courses. His instructions will in any case be to keep in closest touch with you and Commander-in-Chief from point of view of not embarrassing military situation.

4. I need not tell you that I tried my best though without success to see that you were consulted and had proper notice of this latest development. It might have saved you sending 16–U.4 For the feelings expressed in that telegram I deeply sympathise, but hope Winston’s telegram5 will have set your mind at rest. You are now at any rate relieved of your immediate anxieties about the declaration and whether Cripps succeeds in squaring the circle or not he will no doubt bring back to the Cabinet a fuller realisation of all your difficulties. Incidentally you and Wavell may be able to enlist his effective help in connection with what matters far more, namely India’s war effort.

1 No. 275. 2 Annex to No. 265. 3 See Enclosure to No. 2. 4 No. 290. 5 No. 294.

297

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 602–S. Your telegram No. 303,1 dated 10th March. Please telegraph time at which Prime Minister will make his announcement so that I can inform my Executive Council immediately before. I am making arrangements for visitor as suggested in your paragraph 3. Please tell him I will do all I may for his comfort and convenience.

1 No. 295.
298

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

10 March 1942

IMMEDIATE

No. 17-G. I am still¹ most gravely apprehensive of the results which proposed announcement will produce. Whether Congress Party will be in any way satisfied appears to me extremely doubtful and still more doubtful whether any kind of material help can be expected from them in consequence. But I feel convinced that effect on minorities and particularly on the Punjab will be disastrous and subversive of all war effort. Minorities can surely derive no satisfaction from promised provision for protection unless they are assured as to way in which such a promise can be implemented.

I am not sure whether guarantee to the Army is to be mentioned in the main announcement² but it seems preferable that it should be included now rather than be left over for subsequent announcement. Guarantee to consider other services, fulfilment of financial and other obligations also require inclusion. If minorities and other interests concerned are not to be utterly confounded I would endeavour (group corrupt) that instead of mere mention of provision for protection the announcement should state that transference of responsibility will depend on adequate arrangements being made for protection of such interests and on His Majesty’s Government being convinced that these arrangements will be duly carried out in practice.

¹ Since the despatch of No. 286, Lord Linlithgow had transmitted the full text of the draft Declaration to Sir B. Glancy in telegram 576-S of 8 March, sent by post. MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.
² The last sentence of telegram 576-S reads: ‘As regards the Army, it would be proposed in any case to send round order to troops explaining that their position and rights remain fully guaranteed.’

299

Mr Turnbull to Mr Pinnell

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/509: f 58

INDIA OFFICE, 10 March 1942, 4.25 pm
Received: 11 March

308. Pinnell from Turnbull. Prime Minister has received following telegram from Fazlul Huq, Khan Sahib and Alla Bux—

Begins. Most earnestly urge gravity situation occasioned by menace early invasion India imperatively demands immediate transfer India real power and recognition freedom enabling really representative Indians establish repre-
sentative government with full powers assume responsibility defence country in effective collaboration other free and democratic countries resist aggressors. This represents general view Indian Musalmans also. Ends.

If you see no objection grateful if you would acknowledge on behalf of Prime Minister.

300

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 59

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
313. Superintendent Series.

1. I referred in my previous telegram¹ to instructions to be given to Cripps with reference to para. (e) of draft. On further consideration it would seem more appropriate that this should be left for discussion between you on his arrival.²

2. I am telegraphing separately³ giving you Cripps' ideas as to his programme and a provisional list of people whom he thinks he should see. On this he would I know be glad of your advice.

3. If Coupland has not left India it would I suggest be a good thing to get him to postpone his departure to enable him to give Cripps his impressions both on the problems generally and on personalities, while for the purpose of his own report it may be important to see whole reaction to Cripps' negotiations.

¹ No. 295, para. 2.
² The instructions were eventually sent on 28 March; see No. 424.
³ No. 313.

301

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 60

MOST IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 10 March 1942, 7.30 pm
Received: 11 March

4407. Your telegram March 10th. 303.¹ Statement will be made at noon British Summer Time. I cannot guarantee telegraphing it in advance as Prime Minister is working on it overnight but I understand it will be very brief.

¹ Evidently a mistake for 602-S (No. 297).
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, R/30/1/1: ff 20-1

INDIA OFFICE, 10 March 1942
Received: 11 March

16-U. Your 16-U. I sincerely trust you will not let your very natural feelings lead you to hasty decisions. We cannot spare you at a moment like this and anyhow there is no question now of a declaration. But apart from a declaration there is nothing much amiss with the main items of the Cabinet policy properly put, viz. (a) if no agreement on constitutional body then we set up the best we can: (b) if our desire to see a united India under some agreed constitution is not fulfilled we shall acquiesce in some sort of Pakistan sooner than see self-government in India indefinitely postponed; (c) our other obligations etc. are to be provided for by treaty: (d) we are prepared to bring in political leaders in some form or other without surrendering control of the Executive for war purposes. By the time these matters have been discussed by Cripps and accepted or more probably rejected India will be up against much more urgent issues than the possible eventual setting up of Pakistan. We shall have shown our good will to the world and India, clearly brought out to both world and India the inherent difficulties, and shall be in a position, with or without cooperation of party leaders, to concentrate on the fight against Japan. This may be an optimistic estimate but "If hopes are dupes fears may be liars."  

1 No. 290.  
2 Deciphered as 'balanced (?).'
3 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has 'saying' for 'treaty'.  
4 Deciphered as '(important ?)'.
5 'possible eventual' omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
6 'and India' omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
7 A. H. Clough: 'Say not, the struggle naught availeth.' In Mr Churchill's copy 'are' is corrected in manuscript to 'were' as in the original.

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 61

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 10 March 1942
Received: 11 March

No. 17-U. Meeting of all Ministers of Cabinet rank who have seen your objections and those of Commander-in-Chief and to whom Prime Minister even communicated substance of your 16-U greatly relieved by dropping
of declaration and unanimously approved policy now decided upon. I had hoped to secure postponement of announcement till Thursday* but Prime Minister has just decided that danger of leakage is now so great that he must make it tomorrow. Have just had long talk with Cripps who I am convinced is determined to be helpful and quite prepared to face unpopularity with the left wingers which may result from identifying himself with a policy falling so far short of their crude ideas. All my best wishes to you through your anxieties which I understand fully, but I believe it may greatly simplify things for the future if once Congress is brought to realise (in private discussion and not by a publicly proclaimed declaration) that it cannot get a united India by political pressure here but must come to some sort of compromise with the Moslems.

1 See No. 282, Conclusion (1).  
2 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has 'had'.  
3 No. 290.  
4 12 March.

304

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

Your various telegrams, as well as those of the Commander-in-Chief and others more immediately affected, convinced the Cabinet of what I had felt from the first, namely, that the scheme worked out by the Cabinet Committee—and with which I did not disagree, so far as its main principles were concerned—was entirely unsuitable to figure as a public declaration. Even with the fullest simultaneous explanation in the House—and at one time the Cabinet wanted to have no explanation at all till the Indian reaction was ascertained—the thing would, I am sure have had an adverse reaction in all sorts of quarters, and be damned from the outset. Consequently, the only way out, and incidentally a way of gaining a little time, was to send someone to discuss and negotiate in order to find out how far Indians, when really brought up against the logic of the situation, would accept its conclusions. After all, once it is laid down that there must be agreement, and no coercion of important minorities, then the only conclusion is that things must wait indefinitely till there is agreement, or that the majority who agree go ahead, leaving the minority standing outside, which is indeed what has happened in the case of every British Dominion, where provinces have either stayed outside for a time, or made special conditions for coming in, or finally stayed out altogether, e.g., Newfoundland, New Zealand and Southern Rhodesia. What we have been up against all the time is the hope on the part of Congress that its influence with
the members of the Left Wing here and in America would push us into going back on the pledge of 1940 and make us, either as regards the future, or as regards the immediate present, take some step which prejudged the situation in their favour and against the Muslims and the Princes. Once they have been definitely told in so many words, and by someone whom they regard as not unsympathetic, that their game is up and that they must either find ways and means of compromising with the minority elements, or face the disadvantages of a divided India, they may really for the first time, take seriously into account what I have been trying to preach for the last two years, namely, the devising of some entirely new constitutional solution to meet the inherent difficulties of the situation. The same indeed applies to the Muslims, who will have to realise what Pakistan may involve in respect of Muslim minorities elsewhere, of the Sikh difficulty, of holding down the richer and more numerous Bengal Hindu minority, and last but not least of economic dislocation. In fact, I would say that every one of the objections you and others have seen to the declaration is an effective argument for the line of policy we are pursuing, both as a matter for discussion now with Indian leaders and for any future constitution-framing body.

2. The next question, then, was who should go out? I confess I felt at first that, both from your point of view and from mine, it might have been better if I had gone. The Secretary of State is in many ways the more obvious person, and you and I know each other’s minds so well. Also, it might have given me an opportunity to go into the whole military and munitions situation with you and not only perhaps help you on my return, but also possibly to make a more effective defence in the House of Commons against the attack which is sure to be made upon the Government of India and upon the Government here, for India’s not being more effectively prepared for her own defence. Nor did I think that I should have been altogether incapable of reasonable skill in negotiation, and I should at any rate have come enjoying a good deal of confidence from the Muslims. On the other hand, I am afraid my going would have been generally interpreted as committing the Government to nothing more than a very limited policy of talking about agreement. The Sapru crowd in particular resent all that I have said in the past in the way of bringing out the inherent difficulties of the Indian situation.¹ From the point of view of putting across what is essentially a Conservative policy, both as regards the future and as regards the immediate refusal to transfer control of the Executive, there is much to be said for sending out someone who has always been an extreme Left Winger and in close touch with Nehru and the Congress. The immediate effect on your Muslims, as with my Tory friends here, may be alarming, but the result in the end should be both to increase the chances of success, slight as they are, and to mitigate any blame thrown upon the Government as a whole for failure.
3. I think Cripps fully realises the difficulties in front of him, and the prospect of his being denounced both by Congress in India and by the Left Wing here, for having lent himself to so reactionary and limited a policy. I have just been having a long intimate talk with him and I feel confident that he really means to play the game by the Government policy and by you. In these Cabinet Committee discussions I have found him, though sometimes a bit abrupt, and dogmatic in stating his views, always inclined to see the other point of view and anxious to come to agreement. I am assured by all my lawyer friends that he is first-rate and most moderate when it comes to settling a case out of court, and that is precisely what he is being told to do now.

4. I am sending with him Turnbull, my first Private Secretary, who knows the whole situation very well, and is a young man with both initiative in making helpful suggestions, and courage when it comes to warning his chief of the possible consequences of a mistake. No doubt you will also be turning Hodson on to him, who by now must know a great deal about the personalities whom Cripps could most easily influence to begin with, so as to secure their support with the more intractable ones afterwards. From that point of view I hope Coupland will still be in India when Cripps arrives and am wiring you suggesting that he should postpone his return if he has not already started.

5. As regards Indians, he will of course be inundated by people who want to see him and no doubt you could help him greatly by getting out at any rate a preliminary selective list and perhaps intimating to some of those who you think he ought to see, and who live in remoter parts of India, that it might be worth their while coming up to Delhi and seeing him. His idea is that a fortnight ought to be enough to show whether he can succeed in his mission or not. If he feels that he really can, he might then possibly stay on a little longer to complete things. Otherwise he would break off and fly home. He would like to see Gandhi, but quite realises the undesirability of a pilgrimage to Wardha, especially at an early stage of his visit. It is of course possible that he might fly to Calcutta and see Gandhi there on his way through. Anyhow, that is a matter which he can discuss with you when he arrives. Winston's view was that he ought clearly to stay with you for the first two or three days, but that after that he might, like Chiang Kai-Shek, be in his own house where he can see his visitors informally and unofficially.

6. I have felt very much for you over all this business. But I do hope you will not think, either that I have not attempted to defend your position, or that the Cabinet have been intentionally inconsiderate in handling the whole question. The fact is that when you and I at the beginning of the year took the view that for the moment there was nothing to be done, ³ we did so both

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¹ E.g. see No. 168. ² See No. 300, para. 3. ³ See Nos. 23 and 43.
in view of the merits of the situation in India itself and also in view of Winston’s own vehement attitude, as indicated not only by our difficulties over the release of prisoners, but by his special telegram to you while he was away in America. Meanwhile, the pressure outside, upon Winston from Roosevelt, and upon Attlee & Co. from their own party, plus the admission of Cripps to the War Cabinet, suddenly opened the sluice gates, and the thing moved with a rush. You must not forget how terribly preoccupied Winston and indeed others have been with the terribly serious situation as it has developed in the East, and how inevitably he has grudging the time and labour he has given to trying to do, what he has never done before, master even the elements of the Indian problem.

He was, I think, profoundly impressed when he realised for the first time the difficulties involved in carrying out his first “happy thought”. But the whole business has been a tremendous extra strain upon him, and I hope you will allow for all this in judging of the manner in which it has all been rushed through. There has been a real limit to what I have been able to do in representations to him or to the Cabinet Committee in so far as they involved delay or reconsideration of the document in part or as a whole. I really don’t know what would have been the effect upon Winston of your considered alternative, if he had not, by the time it came in, already made up his mind to have no declaration at all.

7. My own belief is that in the outcome the frank discussion of these matters with Indian leaders by a man like Cripps will have greatly cleared the air and eased the position for the future, whatever the immediate outcome. It will I think also have cleared the air both here and in America, and that is not unimportant from the point of view of the prosecution of the war. Lastly, by the time the discussions are over you may be up against a position in India in which even the ultimate question of the Punjab boundary may seem a detail compared with immediate and possibly devastating dangers.

Anyhow, be assured of one thing, and that is that neither Winston nor I feel that you can possibly be spared from your place at this juncture. Apart from the loss involved to the drive behind the whole war machine, your going at this moment would have precipitated the whole question of policy into acute party conflict and might well have broken up the Government here. So, old friend, whatever else happens, you must see this thing through.

All good luck to you.

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4 This telegram has not been traced. Mr Amery was possibly thinking of Mr Churchill’s telegram to Mr Attlee of 7 January (No. 6).
5 Sir Stafford Cripps entered the War Cabinet on 19 February.
6 No. 275.
305

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

10 March 1942

17–U. I am sure it has occurred to you that if in the ultimate event it is my fate to remain in India and attempt to work a scheme negotiated with political parties by Cripps, it is most essential that my position in Indian eyes should be protected in all that the Prime Minister may say and in the general instructions under which Cripps may represent the Cabinet. I need not go into further details.

1 'with political parties' omitted in decipher. 2 Deciphered as 'important'.

306

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

11 March 1942

MOST IMMEDIATE

18–U. I appreciate your very kind and considerate telegrams 16 and 17–U. I think that my views and the grounds of my personal difficulty are sufficiently before you. I must now wait and see. Because of the speed at which things have been forced, I have had to give you my advice often at very short notice but I hope that you will forgive me for feeling that it is not I who have been rushing into hasty decisions.

1 'Most Immediate' omitted in decipher. 2 Nos. 302 and 303. 3 'my views' deciphered as 'Indian Government's views'.

307

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

11 March 1942

No. 604–S. Your telegram No. 303. I would naturally not wish to tie Cripps' hands in any way in advance, but would suggest that he avoids commitments as to his programme until he arrives here. For example, it might be unfortunate if he were in active touch with the Congress leaders before being in touch with

1 No. 295.
Sikander who occupies a particular position in relation to war effort in the Punjab. There are many similar matters which he might consider on arrival, but, as I say I do not wish to tie his hands in advance.

2. I presume that he would, while in India, enjoy the precedence normally given to a Cabinet Minister, other than the Secretary of State for India, when visiting India, and thus would take rank as a Privy Councillor immediately after the members of my Executive Council?

308
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow
Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 52-5

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 11 March 1942, 4.50 am

314. Superintendent Series. Following is text of statement which subject to final revision Prime Minister is proposing to deliver in House of Commons today Wednesday at 12 noon British Summer Time. I will telegraph whether any alterations are made:

Text begins. The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the advance of Japan has made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life to shield their land from the menace of the invader.

In August 1940 a full statement was made about the aims and policy we are pursuing in India. This amounted in short to a promise that as soon as possible after the War we would confer upon India Dominion status as expressed in the Statute of Westminster, provided that the various Indian communities could agree among themselves upon the constitution and that Great Britain was honourably cleared of its obligations to minorities, to the Indian Princes to whom we are bound by Treaty, and to the Depressed classes, together with certain minor matters incidental to our long association with the fortunes of the Indian sub-continent. We also said that any fundamental change in the structure of Indian Government or alteration in the balance of power must be broadly acceptable to the main Indian communities. That was our position then, and that in essence is our position still.

However in order to clothe these general declarations with precision and to convince all classes, races and creeds in India of our sincere resolve, the War Cabinet have now agreed unitedly upon a proposal which if it were accepted in India as a whole would avoid the alternative danger either that the resistance of a powerful minority might impose an indefinite veto upon the wishes of the majority, or that a majority decision might be taken which would be resisted
to a point destructive of internal harmony and fatal to the setting up of a new constitution. We had thought of announcing this further attempt to aid India in the realisation of full self-government by a constructive British contribution. We are however apprehensive that to make this announcement at such a moment might do more harm than good. We must first assure ourselves that our scheme would win a reasonable and practical measure of acceptance and thus promote the concentration of all Indian thought upon the defence of the native soil. We should ill serve the common cause if we made a declaration which would be rejected by essential elements in the Indian world and which provoked fierce constitutional and communal disputes at the moment when the enemy is at the gates of India.

Accordingly we propose to send a Member of the War Cabinet to India to satisfy himself upon the spot by personal consultation that the declaration upon which we are agreed, and which we believe represents a just and final solution, will achieve its purpose. My Right Honourable Friend the Lord Privy Seal has volunteered to undertake this task. He carries with him the full confidence of His Majesty’s Government and he will strive in their name to procure the necessary measure of assent not only from the Hindu majority but also from those great minorities amongst which the Muslims are the most important.

The Lord Privy Seal will at the same time consult with the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief upon the military situation bearing always in mind the paramount responsibility of His Majesty’s Government to shield the people of India from the perils which now beset them. We must remember that India has a great part to play in the world struggle for freedom, that her helping hand must be extended in loyal comradeship to the valiant Chinese people who have fought alone so long. We must remember also that it is from India that one of the strongest counter blows must be struck at the advance of tyranny and aggression.

My Right Honourable Friend will set forth as soon as convenient and suitable arrangements can be made. I am sure that he will command in his task the heartfelt good wishes of all parts of the House and that meanwhile no words will be spoken or debates be held here or in India which would add to the burden he has assumed in his mission or lessen the prospects of a good result.

During my Right Honourable Friend’s absence from this House his duties as Leader will be discharged by my Right Honourable Friend the Foreign Secretary. Text ends.

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1 *Parl. Debts.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 378, 11 March 1942, cols. 1069–70, where the text differs in some minor respects from that in this telegram, as amended by No. 309.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 57-8

MOST IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 11 March 1942, 1 pm

315. My private and personal telegram 314.1 Following are final revisions to text:

(1) First paragraph, for “shield” substitute “guard”.
(2) Second paragraph. Substitute following: “In August 1940 a full statement was made about the aims and policy we are pursuing in India. This amounted in short to a promise that as soon as possible after the war India should attain Dominion status in full freedom and equality with this country and the other Dominions under a constitution to be framed by Indians by agreement among themselves and acceptable to the main elements in Indian national life—subject of course to the fulfilment of our obligations for the protection of minorities including the Depressed Classes and of our treaty obligations to the Indian States and to the settlement of other matters arising out of our long association with the fortunes of the Indian sub-continent”.
(3) Third paragraph. For first three sentences substitute following: “However in order to clothe these general declarations with precision and to convince all classes, races and creeds in India of our sincere resolve the War Cabinet have agreed unitedly upon conclusions for present and future action which if accepted by India as a whole would avoid the alternative danger either that the resistance of a powerful minority might impose an indefinite veto upon the wishes of the majority or that a majority decision might be taken which would be resisted to a point destructive of the internal harmony and fatal to the setting up of a new constitution. We had thought of setting forth the terms of this further attempt to aid India in the realisation of full self-government by a constructive British contribution. We are however apprehensive that to make a fuller announcement at such a moment as this might do more harm than good.”
(4) Fourth paragraph. First sentence. For “declaration” substitute “conclusions”. For “its purpose” substitute “their purpose”. Last sentence for “Moslems are the most important” substitute “Moslems are the most numerous and on many grounds pre-eminent”.
(5) Fifth paragraph. First sentence. After “H.M.G.” insert “by every means in their power”. Last sentence substitute “we must remember also that India is one of the bases from which the strongest, etc.”

1 No. 308.
310

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: f 56

IMMEDIATE PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 11 March 1942, 2.15 pm

316. Your call to action[1] is splendid prelude to Prime Minister’s announcement.[2] This was redrafted by him late last night and I had very little time this morning to suggest alterations but I hope you will have considered it all right. House of Commons took it very well on all sides.

1 In his 'Message to India' on 10 March 1942 Lord Linlithgow had invited Indians to enrol in the National War Front. Stating that this was 'a call to action for every one of us', he urged Indians to close ranks against the aggressor, and looked forward to Indian participation with China, Russia, America, Britain and others in a swift and sure victory. MSS. EUR. F. 125/147.

2 See Nos. 308 and 309.

311

President Roosevelt to Mr Churchill

Telegram, L/PO/6/106b: ff 105–6

WASHINGTON, 11 March 1942

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON PURELY PERSONAL

Received: 11 March, 10.25 am

No. 116. I have given much thought to the problem of India and I am grateful that you have kept me in touch with it.[1] As you can well realise, I have felt much diffidence in making any suggestions, and it is a subject which, of course, all of you good people know far more about than I do. I have tried to approach the problem from the point of view of history and with a hope that the injection of a new thought to be used in India might be of assistance to you. That is why I go back to the inception of the Government of the United States. During the revolution, from 1775 to 1783, the British Colonies set themselves up as thirteen States, each one under a different form of government, although each one assumed individual sovereignty. While the war lasted there was great confusion between these separate sovereignties, and the only two connecting links were the Continental Congress (a body of ill-defined powers and large inefficiencies) and second the Continental Army which was rather badly maintained by the thirteen states. In 1783, at the end of the war, it was clear that the new responsibilities of the thirteen sovereignties could not be welded into

1 See Nos. 227, 228 and 271.
a Federal Union because the experiment was still in the making and any effort to arrive at a final framework would have come to naught. Therefore, the thirteen sovereignties joined in the Articles of Confederation, an obvious stopgap Government, to remain in effect only until such times as experience and trial and error could bring about a permanent union. The thirteen sovereignties, from 1783 to 1789, proved, through lack of a federal power, that they would soon fly apart into separate nations. In 1787 a Constitutional Convention was held with only 20–5 or 30 active participants, representing all of the states. They met, not as a parliament, but as a small group of sincere patriots, with the sole objective of establishing a federal government. The discussion was recorded but the meetings were not held before an audience. The Present constitution of the United States resulted and soon received the assent of two thirds of the states.

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group, covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies—this group to be recognized as a temporary dominion government. It would, of course, represent existing governments of the British Provinces and would also represent the Council of Princes, but my principal thought is that it would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent government for the whole country—this consideration to be extended over a period of five or six years or at least until a year after the end of the war. I suppose that this central temporary governing group, speaking for the new dominion, would have certain executive and administrative powers over public services, such as finances, railways, telegraphs and other things which we call public services.

Perhaps the analogy of some such method to the trials and problems of the United States from 1783 to 1789 might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism. I hope that whatever you do the move will be made from London and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion. For the love of Heaven don’t bring me into this, though I do want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making.
312

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106b: f 48

INDIA OFFICE, 12 March 1942

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P.16/42

Prime Minister
I thought it desirable to supplement your reply\(^1\) to Linlithgow's 16-U\(^2\) suggesting resignation by purely personal telegrams\(^3\) to convince him that there is no longer ground for the fears he expressed so vehemently. I have now received his reply,\(^4\) which shows that he is in a happier frame of mind.

From all I hear, yesterday's announcement has been well received in every quarter.

L. S. A.

1 No. 294.  2 No. 290.  3 Nos. 302 and 303.  4 No. 306.

313

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

321. Superintendent Series. Following is provisional outline of Cripps' plans:

(1) He expects to arrive Karachi by air about March 21st/March 22nd but will notify you later of precise date. He will be accompanied by Turnbull from this office and A. D. K. Owen and Graham Spry as Secretaries but will be grateful if you will make arrangements for confidential Secretariat assistance.

(2) If agreeable to you he would like to spend first two days or so with you and to have discussions with yourself, Commander-in-Chief, Governors, Members of Council and other official Advisers whom you think he should see. He particularly desires to see Hallett, Glancy, Herbert and Lumley but doubts whether he need see other Governors except possibly Cunningham if he can come to Delhi.

(3) Thereafter he would like to move to a private house and there begin conversations with Indian leaders. His intention is not to stay longer than about a fortnight unless it becomes clear that there is a definite prospect of doing business and on the basis of War Cabinet's policy. If conversations develop
favourably he would probably have to stay longer. He does not however want to undertake a general tour of Provinces although he does not exclude possibility of visiting the more important if that became essential. He wishes to confine his conversations in Delhi at any rate in the first instance to a representative but restricted selection of people of real influence and following. On this subject he thinks that he should certainly see in the first instance those named in paragraph 4 and would be glad if you would advise them privately that they will be invited to see him and ask to hold themselves in readiness to come to Delhi between approximately March 26th and 5th April. He desires this because he is anxious that it should not be possible for any of them to say that they were precluded from seeing him through inability to travel to Delhi at short notice but it would clearly be best not to send out these invitations until as near the time as is consistent with this requirement. Cripps may suggest further additions to the list and would be glad of your advice as to whether you consider that there are any important omissions from it bearing in mind point of view represented by Members of your Council whom he will meet in any case.


He would probably also desire to see representatives of Europeans and Anglo-Indians but this can be arranged later.

314

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

322. Your telegram No. 604-S,¹ March 11th. Many thanks. I am communicating your suggestion to Cripps but I think he is already fully conscious of danger indicated. I am telegraphing separately² outline of his ideas as to his programme.

2. I agree as to precedence.

¹ No. 507. ² See No. 313.
315

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 643

PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 12 March 1942, 9.5 am
Received: 13 March

4518. I have sent you through private channel¹ text of Statement made by Prime Minister today² and you are also in possession of draft declaration³ on general policy which is not now to be published. Cripps has two-fold mission in relation (1) to immediate problem of securing full Indian co-operation in war effort, and (2) to long-term policy which is necessary background to (1). As to former he will consult with you (and of course such other persons as you advise in this regard) and as to latter he has, as the framework within which to conduct discussions with political leaders, the draft declaration.

Apart from this he has no specific instructions.⁴

¹ See Nos. 308 and 309.  ⁡² Mr Amery authorised this telegram on 11 March.
³ See No. 268.  ⁡⁴ Cf. No. 300, para. 1.

316

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 638

IMPORTANT

NEW DELHI, 12 March 1942, 4.50 pm
Received: 12 March, 5.45 pm

620–G. Following is summary of immediate reactions of political leaders to Churchill’s statement.

Begins. (1) Nehru declined to make any comment, saying that time for comment would be later.

(2) Maulana Azad recalled that Cripps had seen him when he visited India in 1940, and said he would welcome him as a friend when he visits India again.

(3) Rajagopalachari expressed pleasure that British Government had at last realised gravity of situation and selected a good Ambassador. Without knowing what Sir Stafford has got to present, he could say nothing more than what he had been saying from many platforms during last two months.

(4) Sapru. “On the whole I welcome Cripps’s forthcoming visit and would not like to say a word which might prejudice his great mission in which I hope he will achieve as much success as he has in Russia. In view of increasing danger to India delay is regrettable, but it is as well that a man of Sir Stafford’s
status of [and ?] independence of mind and democratic antecedents should visit India and see things with his own eyes”.

(5) Jayakar. “From what I have known of Sir Stafford in London, I am not without hope that he will do full justice to tremendous task he has undertaken”.

(6) Jinnah. “I cannot possibly give any opinion anticipating decision of Moslem League Working Committee, meeting of which is being called as soon as possible to consider situation and announcement”.

(7) Savarkar; Hindu Mahasabha cannot attach much importance to endless discussions and conferences even if conducted by member of British War Cabinet like Cripps unless and until we have definite proclamation bringing into operation immediately status of co-partnership equal with Great Britain in Indo-British Commonwealth and representation of Hindu majority and Moslem minority which is perfectly democratic and in proportion to population. I welcome Cripps, but regret that scheme itself should have been still “a cat in the bag”.

317

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 623—S. Cripps’ visit. Nalini Sarker talked to me about this this morning. He asked whether reference by Prime Minister to Cripps’ consulting Commander-in-Chief and myself on the military side¹ without any specific reference to consultation on political side implied that Cripps would not discuss policy with me at all? I pass this on to you as indicating the way such statements are scrutinized and the kind of inference that may be exploited. In this particular matter you might think it worth while, if a convenient opportunity offers, to make the position clear. For my own part I have apparently succeeded in getting it conveyed to the Press that I welcome the visit.

2. Sarker also gave it to me as his own opinion that it would be very much better that Cripps should summon to Delhi or wherever else he makes his headquarters all leaders whom he might wish to consult and see them in no other place. Sarker observed that if Cripps went even to Wardha, Jinnah’s sense of importance might require that he should also go to Bombay and so on ad infinitum. Bearing in mind Sarker’s Congress leanings and his veneration of Gandhi, I think there is much in what he says.

¹ See No. 308.
Sir G. S. Bajpai to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

12 March 1942

Received: 13 March

4602. Following for Viceroy from Washington, telegram No. 3:

Begins. Following from Bajpai for His Excellency the Viceroy. I had my first interview with President today.\(^1\) Synchronisation with date of Prime Minister’s statement in London was purely coincidence. Mr. Roosevelt did most of the talking during the forty-five minutes I was with him. The theme was co-operation with India; shorn of historical review of origins of federal constitution of U.S.A. points made by President were these—

(1) British policy in relation to India has for the last twenty or thirty years moved in one groove. Today India needs the inspiration of a “new thought”.

(2) Dominion Status is right objective but type of government that will entirely suit India will have to be evolved by trial and error which Indians must be enabled to make. It took six years of confusion under confederation to make the thirteen American colonies realise value of federal unity. India will also learn by experience how to perfect structure of self-government that may be given her provisionally now but prompt creation of such a structure embracing Congress, Muslims and Princes appeared essential. With my comment that substantial agreement among parties mentioned seemed essential to smooth functioning of such structure the President expressed assent.

(3) Fixation by United States of America of date by which Philippines would become independent had accelerated realisation of Filipino solidarity. Without explicitly stating the conclusion the President obviously intended it to be inferred that similar device may lead to comparable result in India.

(4) China and India were acutely oriental nations with a long tradition of pacifism often unprovoked even by aggression. They were two powerful props of peace-loving democracy which United States of America and Great Britain must strive to strengthen and support.

The President disclaimed all official concern in Indian problem and described views I have summarised as purely personal. I gather however that he has made them known to Prime Minister.\(^2\) Ends.

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\(^1\) Apparently 11 March, the date of the Prime Minister’s statement.

\(^2\) See No. 311.
The Nizam of Hyderabad to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

12 March 1942

I read with great attention and interest the Prime Minister of England’s recent far-sighted statement of March 11th regarding political situation in India as well as those various communities that live in this sub-continent and also the special reference made to the pre-eminent position occupied by Muslims in India to say nothing of the particular and thoughtful regard paid to the Indian States which are proud to be called the strong pillars of the Indian Empire if I am allowed to say so. In my opinion this broadminded statement will go a long way to clear the existing somewhat obscure situation beyond any doubt and also to accelerate the pace of war effort thinking that what has been done so far or will be done in future has been acknowledged or appreciated by His Majesty’s Government. No doubt all the credit of this far-sighted policy goes to the rôle Your Excellency is playing as Crown Representative in shaping the destiny of India and whose broadminded statesmanship deserves eulogy beyond measure. In conclusion I may be permitted to say that this acknowledgement of the position of Muslims in India by British Government and that too just in time will no doubt bind them all the more in their historical loyalty to the British Crown and they will also feel highly honoured by this gracious act a fact I am quite convinced of.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 636

NEW DELHI, 13 March 1942, 6.47 pm
Received: 13 March, 10.45 pm

46D/42. Following is summary of further reactions of political leaders to Cripps Mission. Begins.

(1) Gandhi declined to make any comment.
(2) Vallabhbhai Patel. Cripps is coming at a time when the sands are running out fast and it might be almost impossible for the British to give us anything or for us to take anything. If the British Government had listened when Cripps came to India two years ago things would have been quite different. Now Indians are being called upon to help when all these years out of suspicion they were kept unarmed and untrained in modern warfare.
(3) K. M. Munshi. It is wise step and if backed by bold and imaginative statesmanship on Great Britain’s part would make for effective progress in successful mobilisation of India against invaders.

(4) Sikander Hyat Khan. Procedure outlined indicates desire of the British Government to promote agreement between the major communities and interests but it will take some time before Cripps arrives and the time factor is of extreme importance in view of the situation on the Eastern Frontier. Cannot prominent leaders of various organisations get together and settle the more important principles leaving details to be worked out later? This will help Cripps’ task and eliminate avoidable delay. I have recently sounded a few prominent leaders and found genuine desire for settlement on both sides and differences in basic principles reduced to very narrow compass and capable of being composed without much difficulty. It would be far more graceful and patriotic to agree voluntarily between ourselves than wait for decision superimposed by British Government. Ends.

321

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/509: f 125

PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 13 March 1942, 6.25 am

4612. Prime Minister would be grateful if you would convey to Sir T. B. Sapru a message from him to effect that as he will no doubt appreciate, the statement made in Parliament and the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to India are in effect the answer to Sapru’s telegram of 2nd January.¹ The P.M. hopes he will therefore excuse him from sending a detailed reply at this juncture.

¹ Enclosure to No. 2.
2. Public uneasiness. It was written before the loss of Rangoon was made known, and now requires to be read in the light of subsequent events. There has been so close a connection between Orissa and Burma (and Rangoon is a town well known to so many) that the fall of Rangoon has inevitably had a profound effect here with a marked increase in the general uneasiness. I have already reported to Your Excellency the immediate reaction on the part of the Ministers in coming urgently to me on the morning that the fall of Rangoon was known to suggest an immediate adjournment of the Assembly to enable legislators to go home. However, as I suggested at the time, this proposal for which there was no other backing appeared to be probably not free from a party purpose to escape possible defeat on demands for grants. Evacuees from Burma have contributed in some measure to spread alarm. Incendiaryism continues to be reported from Puri in spite of special police precautions. These are all signs of growing unsettlement, but it is still correct to say that it would be exaggeration to describe this as panic.

3. The Ministers have agreed that the Provincial Government should put out a notice that this coastal belt is not immune from risks of air raid or even occasional landings, and that while people who have their livelihood here should go about their business in the ordinary way, others may wish to take an early opportunity to go to less exposed areas further inland. The draft which was in fact written by myself was accepted by Ministers some time ago without change but it has hitherto been held up as they have anticipated that, while it is necessary that this should be said, there may be some increase of alarm. There has therefore been some initial preparation by way of prior intimation to district officers and to the Press. I expect that the notice will be out now within the next day or two.

1 Namely the Chief Secretary’s Report for the second half of February (not printed).
2 Rangoon fell on 8 March.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: ff 634-5

NEW DELHI, 14 March 1942, 10.25 am
Received: 14 March, 11.30 am

47D/42. Following are points touching Cripps mission from speeches in Central Assembly during discussion on Finance Bill March 12th, reported in Press.

Begins.

(1) Sardar Sant Singh (Sikhs). We are not concerned with motives of British Government in their action with regard to India at this late hour. Peril to Indians is greater than to handful of Englishmen in India. Bureaucracy has been guilty of many misdeeds and should hand over administration of country to representatives of the people. Recalling experiences of Montagu’s visit, Indians must be careful about results of Cripps’ visit. (2) P. J. Griffiths (European Group). Sant Singh’s speech is particularly unfortunate, being permeated with suspicion and harking back to the past. It is more helpful to stop talking of points of difference and to talk of points of common agreement. Every member of the House wants to see India united, self-governing and strong for war; this can only be brought about by avoiding recriminations and bickering. Cripps’ record guarantees sincerity of British Government’s intentions. (3) Rao Sahib Sivaraj (Scheduled Castes). India has been grave of many reputations. I hope Cripps will succeed. When Cripps last came to India he was not recognised by British Parliament and was shadowed by Special Police. He forgot then that the depressed classes existed; he saw a few Congressmen and went away. My community will do nothing to exaggerate our claim or overstate our case so as to obstruct any attainable settlement. Ends.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: f 637

NEW DELHI, 14 March 1942, 7.25 pm
Received: 14 March, 10.5 pm

48D/42. Following is summary of Press account statement made by Allabux in Sind Legislative Assembly on 12th March (after stating case relating to constitutional difference between Ministry and Governor was under preparation
[for ?] forwarding to Secretary of State). Begins: I exhort leaders of Political and Communal organisations to subordinate sectional differences in larger interest of the Motherland and co-operate with Cripps in shaping India’s future constitution as equal partners in Commonwealth of free nations. Mr. Churchill’s announcement will be cordially received by all men of goodwill as constructive step towards the solution of India’s long standing constitutional problems. Decision to send Cripps kindles hope that vested interests and parties to disputes will alike give way to the voice of reason and that baffling problems will at last be handled in spirit of harmonious co-operation and mutual understanding. Personal discussions will afford effectual ways of resolving deadlock. Cripps has given numerous proofs of earnest desire to help India attain freedom; it is gratifying to note that he is coming not only as ambassador but as plenipotentiary vested with full powers to act on behalf of His Majesty’s Government.

Ends.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/WS/1/1271: ff 94–7

IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, 14 March 1942, 10.40 pm

Received: 15 March

4764. Drastic military measures may shortly be required within India to prepare for an imminent threat of invasion or to carry out operation against enemy forces. I note from your Defence Department telegram of the 9th March, KLL/1017, that the whole subject is receiving urgent consideration. As one aspect of it His Majesty’s Government would be grateful for your views on the problems that will arise regarding the several responsibilities of His Majesty’s Government and the military and civil authorities in India.

2. Committee of Imperial Defence (paper 172 dated 10.4.29) when considering the analogous problem of an attack on India by Russia through Afghanistan considered that a campaign of such magnitude must be under the control of His Majesty’s Government; that the executive command of the whole of the operations both in Afghanistan and in the areas inside India which it might be desired, in consultation with the Government of India, to treat as war areas, must be exercised by a special commander, directly responsible to His Majesty’s Government; and that there must be a clear-cut division of responsibility between this Commander and the Commander-in-Chief, India. They considered that the normal responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, India, to the Governor-General in Council for internal security, etc., in the
parts of India not declared war areas would persist, and that if the Commander-in-Chief, India, should be selected by His Majesty’s Government for command in the Field another officer would have to be appointed as Commander-in-Chief, India.

3. It was thus contemplated that there should be (a) a Commander-in-Chief in the Field directly responsible to His Majesty’s Government, and (b) a Commander-in-Chief, India, responsible as in normal circumstances to the Government of India for the non-war areas. I should welcome your early views as to the extent to which the Committee of Imperial Defence plan is appropriate by analogy to present circumstances. The Commander-in-Chief, India is at present responsible to His Majesty’s Government for the conduct of operations outside India in both Burma and Ceylon, and other considerations apart it would doubtless be logical that he should also have supreme charge of military operations against the same enemy in India itself. But the question arises whether he should do so in direct subordination to the War Cabinet. Affirmative decision on this question would involve the position of the Governor-General in Council in relation to questions arising in or affecting non-operational areas of India but having a direct bearing on conduct of operations, e.g., removal of forces from the North-West Frontier to operational areas in Eastern India. It would appear that strictly speaking Governor-General in Council could, by virtue of Section 314 of the Act, be required to comply with demands of Commander-in-Chief as instructed by His Majesty’s Government. No doubt the matter could be regulated by some ad hoc convention but I should be grateful for your views.

4. Whatever answer be found to foregoing question it does not seem necessarily to follow from assumption by Commander-in-Chief, India, of control of operations in the Field, that, as contemplated in paragraph 14 of Committee of Imperial Defence Paper 172-D, another Commander-in-Chief in India should be appointed to take over the normal duties of that post and your Defence Department telegram No. KIL/1091 of 13th March received after this telegram had been drafted suggests that in your view the situation would be better met by the Commander-in-Chief remaining responsible in principle for the whole of his normal duties but assisted by a Deputy Commander-in-Chief, India, who would, in practice, relieve the Commander-in-Chief of many of his normal administrative functions.

5. A question no doubt under consideration is whether the Commander-in-Chief would not need a separate staff for the conduct of operations. If so

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1 The original draft having been damaged, part of the text printed here is taken from the copy in I/PO/6/106: ff 98-101.
2 Not printed.  
3 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has ‘in fact’.
4 ‘India’ omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.  
5 Government of India Act 1935.
6 ‘instructed’ omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.  
7 Not printed.
present General Headquarters would presumably continue to function as at present but under the immediate direction of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

6. As regards the relationship between the military and the civil power some of the difficulties were considered in the correspondence leading up to your Defence Co-ordination Department telegram of the 1st May 1941, No. 2642. (Incidentally I should be glad to learn what measures have been taken as the outcome of that correspondence to strengthen the hands of the civil authorities in giving support to the military in an emergency.) The authority of the Commander-in-Chief in the Field must necessarily be supreme within a war area, but he would naturally require full co-operation of the civil authorities and must receive all possible support from them. The civil authority would not necessarily be ousted from a war area and it is indeed of primary importance (as events in Burma show) that it should be kept in being as long as possible, subject of course to any overriding directions from the military commander. Compare the arrangements for Ceylon—see War Office telegram 74694 of the 6th March to Commander-in-Chief.

7. The constitutional and geographical factors in India are of course different, and the determination of war areas will vary with local circumstances; for example, it may well be that war areas will not in all cases be co-terminous with Provinces, so that the Governor and Provincial Government may function normally in part of the Province and the local authorities in the other part be subject to directions from the military commander. But whereas military necessity might lead to complete supersession of a Provincial Government it seems unlikely that the whole of India would be declared a war area with the consequent complete subordination of the Governor-General in Council to the military authority of the Commander-in-Chief. In any case I presume that for any action required to ensure that the military authorities receive the full co-operation of the civil authorities sufficient legal basis is available in your power to act by Ordinance or by Rules under the Defence of India Act.9

8. I have no doubt that all aspects of the problem are present to you and your Advisers and I should be glad to learn as soon as possible your plans for dealing with the general administrative difficulties that may arise.

9. Question has not yet been put before Defence Committee or Chiefs of Staff and present telegram is intended solely to ascertain your views before this is done.

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8 Not printed. 9 Of 1939.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE 14 March 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 636-S. Your private and personal telegram No. 321.¹ Cripps’ plans—

(1) I will make all necessary arrangements for his comfort in India and for
confidential Secretariat assistance.

(2) I shall be delighted to put him and his staff up on his first arrival and will
arrange for discussions with those mentioned.

It may seem strange to omit Hope in the circumstances and I would be glad
to have Cripps’ views on this at once if possible.

(3) I am arranging to have a Member of Council’s house placed at his
disposal for as long as he needs it in Delhi, and will see that those whom he wishes
to interview receive due notice. I will telegraph to him en route if necessary
certain additional suggestions regarding the list. But it occurs to me that the
principal political organisations may wish to choose the persons to be seen on
their behalf.

¹ No. 313.

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Note by Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/6/106c: J 145

INDIAN DECLARATION 14 March 1942¹

1. On Thursday, 5th March, the Chancellor of the Exchequer attended a
meeting of Ministers² to consider the draft of a Declaration regarding the future
Government of India (W.P. (42) 109).³ In the course of his remarks at the
meeting he made certain comments upon the wording of the Declaration and
in particular he drew attention to the undesirability of the phrase in paragraph (e)
to the effect that “His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full
responsibility for Indian defence”. He pointed out the serious financial problem

¹ The originals of Nos. 327 and 328 are undated. Subsequent references to the date on which they
were handed to Mr Amery vary between 13 and 14 March, but in view of Sir D. Monteath’s
specific reference to the occasion as a Saturday afternoon (see No. 336), Saturday 14 March has
been given here.
² See No. 234. ³ No. 229.
which existed today and would continue to develop to our detriment as between India and ourselves and he suggested that if, as he assumed, the intention was to undertake either military or political responsibility for the defence of India the Declaration should say so in specific terms, thus excluding any idea of complete financial responsibility. No minutes of the meeting were circulated, but it was understood that the Chancellor's point was accepted and that the Declaration would be amended accordingly.

2. Apparently the next step was that after a meeting of the War Cabinet which was held at 10.30 on the morning of 7th March the Cabinet Committee on India reconsidered the terms of the Declaration and, though no minutes of that meeting were circulated and no intimation was given to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Committee seemed to have rejected the Chancellor's drafting suggestion. The resulting revised Declaration was circulated as W.P. (42) 115.

3. A meeting of the War Cabinet was held on Monday, 9th March at 12 noon and at that meeting approval was given to the Declaration as revised in W.P. (42) 115. Again the Chancellor of the Exchequer had no knowledge of this decision. He was under the impression that over the weekend the plan had been changed, the urgency about the exact form of the Declaration having disappeared owing to the new decision that the Lord Privy Seal should proceed to India.

4. A meeting of Ministers, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was summoned for Tuesday, 10th March, but unfortunately the Chancellor was unable to attend owing to the Vote of Credit Debate in the House of Commons which he had to open with a general statement. He had considered the possibility of circulating a note emphasising the view which he had expressed at the meeting of Ministers during the previous week but, under the impression that the urgency about the exact wording of the Declaration had now disappeared, he decided against this course. Again no minutes of the meeting of Ministers were circulated and it was not until detailed enquiry was made of the Cabinet Office of the course of events that it was appreciated that the War Cabinet had actually registered approval of W.P. (42) 115 and that the Chancellor's point had gone by default.

5. The drafting alteration desired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer is of first-class importance and if, as is understood, it is the intention that the phrase should mean responsibility for the military defence of India, it is most desirable that this alteration should be made. It is suggested, therefore, that a telegram should be sent to the Lord Privy Seal to the effect that the Declaration which he has taken with him should be amended in the sense desired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

6. If the Chancellor had attended the meeting of Ministers on 10th March he would also have questioned the suggestion in paragraph 8 of W.P. (42) 116
that the Viceroy might be authorised to give an assurance that we would not make stipulations for the future of British commercial interests in India. There can be little doubt that any such assurance would be received with consternation in certain parts of the United Kingdom and more especially in Lancashire. It is surely unnecessary to give such a far-reaching assurance without any guarantee of fair treatment from the Indian side.

4 See No. 263.  5 See No. 264.  6 No. 265.  7 See No. 282.  8 Ibid., Conclusion (1).  9 No. 277.

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Note by Sir Kingsley Wood

L/F/7/2861: f 247

INDIAN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE: AIDE-MÉMOIRE

TREASURY, 14 March 1942

1. The present arrangements for the division of Indian defence expenditure between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of India were reached in the very early days of the war.

2. They were summarised in a statement in Parliament on the 29th February 1940,¹ and briefly they provided that India will pay her ordinary defence expenditure adjusted for the measures undertaken by India in Indian interests, plus a contribution towards the extra cost of certain troops while employed outside India. All defence expenditure over this amount incurred by the Government of India is to be met by the British Exchequer.

3. This agreement has developed in a manner which those who negotiated it did not foresee. In its early days it dealt with sums which were of manageable dimensions and so far as balances accumulated in India’s favour there was a useful outlet for their disposal by way of repatriation of India’s sterling loans.

4. In the year 1940/41 the British contribution was £40 million against an Indian contribution, excluding non-effective charges, of £49 million. In 1941/42 the original estimate was that the British contribution would be £82 million against an Indian contribution of £62 million.

5. Later estimates show striking increases on these figures. The revised estimates for the current year put the British contribution at £150 million, against an Indian contribution of £71 million, while the latest estimate for the British contribution for 1942/43 is as much as £270 million.

6. These British payments which are substantially, though not entirely, payments of sterling against expenditure incurred by India in rupees, have led to the growth of India's sterling balances at an alarming rate.

7. It is clear that unless steps are taken in the very near future to reduce substantially the rate at which these balances are growing, a position will be created of extreme difficulty which will be far beyond the possibility of solution by the resumption of exports. We shall be quite unable to convert these immense sterling sums into gold, dollars or other currencies except very gradually. They will, therefore, have to be blocked and we shall be told that the City of London is obtaining a forced loan from the impoverished Indians or we shall be accused of defaulting on our debt to India. This would be most dangerous politically.

8. The only practicable remedy for this situation appears to lie in a revision of the financial arrangements governing defence expenditure. It is not the purpose of the present memorandum to indicate ways in which that memorandum could be revised. There are clearly a number of possibilities which could be explored if it was once agreed that it was necessary to secure a result substantially different from the present position.

9. The War requires all resources to be pooled: our part should be to supply everything that calls for payment in sterling and India's all that calls for payment in rupees. This principle underlies the Lend-Lease Act and Canada's contribution of 1 billion dollars.

10. Under the Indian Budget the war debt incurred by India in the present financial year is £12,750,000 and the estimated debt to be incurred next year is £26,000,000. This is indeed an astonishing position for a country defending its existence with the invader at its gates. It may also be pointed out that India's war expenditure represents under 3% of that of the United Kingdom and little more than one-third of that of Canada.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 145/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 15 March 1942

336. Your private and personal telegram of 14th March, No. 636-S.¹ Cripps is most grateful. He quite agrees that Hope should be invited.

¹ No. 326.
Mr Mackenzie King to Mr Churchill (via Dominions Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/105e: ff 172–3

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

15 March 1942

Received: 16 March 1942, 1.20 am

No. 79. Following for Churchill from Mackenzie King. Begins.

I have been giving much thought to the situation in India. It occurs to me that it might be of assistance to the Government of the United Kingdom and to the success of Cripps' mission were Cripps to be fortified by an expression from each of the self-governing Dominions of their readiness to co-operate at the time of the peace negotiations in ensuring immediate recognition of India's status as one of equality with the other self-governing parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations. This I should think could be arranged by communication with the Dominion Premiers in a manner which would avoid necessity of any public discussion or debate. As evidence of readiness of Dominions to accord recognition of Dominion status to India in so far as that may be possible while war is in progress an exchange of High Commissioners between the Dominions and India might be immediately arranged. Having regard to the evolution of self-government in Canada and the position taken by Canada in peace negotiations after the last war, and at subsequent Imperial Conferences with respect to equality of status of all self-governing parts of the British Commonwealth. It might well be that strong assurances to India on the part of Canada as to the helpful role we would be prepared to take on her behalf, might not be without some real effect at this time. Without ascertaining in the first instance the views and wishes of yourself and Amery I naturally hesitate to make an official move of any kind. If however the War Committee of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom felt that an association of the self-governing Dominions with the Government of Great Britain in Cripps' present mission to India would be at all helpful, I should like you to know that my colleagues and I would be ready to lend any good offices that may be within our power. I feel quite sure that Smuts, Curtin and Fraser would be equally ready to give assurances on parallel lines.

I have thought it best to communicate direct with you in this personal and confidential manner before discussing the suggestion with anyone, even Amery. I should be obliged however if you would let Amery know of the contents of this communication which I would like to have regarded as intended equally for him.

1 The date of despatch has been determined from the time of receipt and from Mr Amery's reference to this telegram in No. 349, para. 7.

2 Cf. No. 258.
I should perhaps add that when Dr. Soong was in Ottawa I told him that he could feel wholly assured that the Dominions and in particular Canada were wholly sympathetic with India's desire for self-government and that their influence to that end might be relied upon in conferences immediately succeeding the termination of the war. I have no doubt that this word has been passed on by Soong to Chiang Kai-Shek. Ends.

3 See No. 259.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via H.M. Ambassador, Cairo)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

MOST IMMEDIATE

15 March 1942
No. 658-S. For Sir Stafford Cripps. Reference Secretary of State's private and personal telegram to me No. 321, dated 12th March.

I hope my telegram No. 636, dated 14th March, to Secretary of State reached you. I shall of course be delighted to put you and your staff up on first arrival and am making all necessary subsequent arrangements.

2. Owing to difficulties of accommodation it would be more convenient if Hallett, Glancy and Cunningham came after the Presidency Governors. I trust you will agree.

3. It occurs to me that we might be inviting a snub by sending our preliminary invitations to individual Congress and League Members direct instead of through their Party Headquarters, as these organisations may claim to select their own representatives. I will hold up issue of the letters till 17th March when unless I hear from you to the contrary I will have a suitable letter sent simultaneously to the Party Headquarters saying that these gentlemen have been given preliminary intimation to avoid possibility of their being asked to come to Delhi at short notice.

4. Chamber of Princes is expressing its desire to choose its own representatives and I take it that I may inform them that you will be glad to see those chosen who will probably include Nawanagar, Bikaner and Patiala. I am informing Bhopal and Kashmir though I am less certain of the need of seeing the latter. I feel certain that the omission of Patiala from this first list would be misinterpreted and am taking upon myself the responsibility of informing him also.

5. I suggest that simultaneous information be given definitely to—

(i) Parlakimedi (Prime Minister, Orissa).
(ii) An Indian Christian whom I may select.
(iii) Khaliquzzaman—the only prominent League man in a Muslim minority Province.
(iv) Mohammad Usman—Madras Muslim.
(v) Rajah for Depressed Classes.
(vi) Jamnadas Mehta and M. N. Roy for Labour.
6. The following additional names are for your consideration en route—
(i) Gandhi—probably difficult not to see him?
(ii) One Prince from Central India, Rajputana and Kathiawar respectively.
(iii) Dewans of Mysore, Travancore, Indore and possibly Cochin or Rampur.
(iv) Liberals—Setalvad and Jehangir.
(v) Mahasabha—S. P. Mookerji the only prominent Mahasabha man in actual office as a Minister (Bengal).
(vi) Members of National Defence Council—Srivastava and Biren Mookerji.
(vii) Non-Brahmins—Sir A. Patro.
(viii) Selected Members of Central Legislature.
(ix) Possibly a Depressed Class man from Bengal.
These can be discussed if you so wish after your arrival.

No. 313.  
No. 326.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

THE VICE-GERAL'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 16 March 1942

3. Nehru's letter which you quote in paragraph 2 of your report is most interesting. I entirely agree that we must watch his activities and speeches very carefully, and you have of course since followed this up with your letter of the 17th February, which I have thought it well to send to other Governors.

4. You make a good point in paragraph 4 of your letter about the need for avoiding references to the small number of British Civilians in India, as to which I entirely agree.

You mention also the mischief done by the irresponsible utterances of Sorensen & Co., and by Reuters' faithful reproduction of them. I heartily agree with what you say and I am almost tired of pointing it out to His Majesty's

Nos. 97 and 640.  
No. 146.  
No. 97.
Government. (I have often wondered myself what it is in Amery’s speeches to account for their unfortunate reception in India; I am inclined to think that it may be that he is just a wee bit inclined to preach.)

* * *

6. I shall be interested to know of your reactions and those of your Province to the Prime Minister’s announcement. Personally I feel that the statement that there now is a definite plan upon which His Majesty’s Government are united, is all to the good. And reading between the lines of Churchill’s statement one may guess that the chief difficulty is one of presenting such a plan in a form that will evoke a response without at the same time evoking a correspondingly violent reaction. Whether it is wise to be specific at a moment when we cannot afford to have a row, remains to be seen. If Cripps can get agreement—good and well. But if parties won’t play we must expect some rise in the political temperature and some increase in our difficulties for some time to come. I think we can rely completely on Cripps’ determination to see Hitler beaten, and that in consequence he will do what he can to avoid presentation of His Majesty’s Government’s policy in a form which would provoke acute communal bitterness and so take the eyes of the Indian soldier off the enemy and start him looking back over his shoulder for trouble at home.

I also attach the greatest importance to the opportunity that Cripps’ visit will give us of securing a powerful spokesman in London for the most urgent of our Defence and Supply requirements.

4 Cf. Nos. 30, para. 28, and 349, para. 3.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 46

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 16 March 1942

338. I understand that in view of the close bearing the military situation has on our immediate political problem, Cripps contemplates raising with you and Commander-in-Chief various matters of military import.

2. First question which he is likely to raise is, I think, pay of Indian troops. He feels that suggestion in my private and personal telegram, 18th February, No. 9–U¹ (which was inadvertently sent in that series) if adopted as straightforward increase all round might afford opening to Japanese propaganda. I confess I do not feel so myself. There may, however, be other more suitable means of achieving same purpose. For example, in view of the grave prospect
of invasion might it not be suitable, in connection with reorganisation of Commands proposed in your Defence Department telegram, 9th March, KLL/1017, to mobilise or at any rate bring on to active service conditions and concessions some at any rate of the forces in question? I realise that complete mobilisation would involve various administrative difficulties. Action of this nature is no doubt already engaging the attention of Commander-in-Chief, and if or when considered desirable on its merits would, no doubt, be put into effect irrespective of Cripps’ enquiries. I should be glad to be kept informed.

3. I deal for convenience in separate telegram with certain other questions of detail which have been under informal discussion here with Cripps before his departure and which he is likely to follow up.

1 Not printed. 2 Not printed. 3 No. 334.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: ff 46–7

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

339. My private and personal telegram of 16th March, No. 338, paragraph 3. Among other points which Cripps is likely to discuss are:

(a) Use of all possible methods of transport alternative to motor transport during period of construction of roads between Assam and Burma. Cripps mentions that Chinese even use hand-carts. As to these please see paragraph 79 of his Report on the position in China (Foreign Office Print, printed 9th April, 1940). This, however, seems to refer to use of hand-carts on existing highways whereas subsidiary forms of transport used on rough tracks are indicated in paragraph 80 as mainly animal transport and coolies. Burma Government reported in November, 1940, that Representative in Rangoon of Chinese Ministry of Communications had no information about hand-trucks being used on Burma-Yunnan highway and doubted feasibility on steep gradients. Rubber tyres of course are now at premium.

(b) Organisation in Eastern India of guerillas coupled with suggestion that officers of Civil Services might be used in Defence Organisation in areas where owing to hostilities normal civil administration could no longer function, for example, as leaders of guerillas formed under armed police. Question of using in Eastern India tribesmen from North-West Frontier with their own rifles under selected scout or ex-scout officers may also be raised, though I understand

1 No. 333.
that guerillas' value depends on local knowledge for which co-operation and goodwill of local populace essential. In connection with this question you may know that in December, 1940, Government of Burma organised levies two to three hundred strong on Karenni-Thailand border round nucleus of few picked men selected by Teak Company's Local European Forest Officer. Main functions were to be to obtain and pass on information, to remove or destroy supplies or transport useful to the enemy and generally hamper hostile advance. Armament was to be such rifles as could be made available and shot-guns called in or borrowed locally. Similar organisation on larger scale was authorised amongst Kachins in Northern Shan States in Autumn of 1941, but I have no information as to value of either.

2 A group of States lying to the east of Mandalay and for the most part west of the Salween River.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: f 633

NEW DELHI, 16 March 1942, 8.40 pm
Received: 16 March, 11.35 pm

49D/42. Following are points from press account of speech by Nehru at large mass meeting at Allahabad on March 14th. Begins.

If today we were masters of our own destiny we would ask people to get ready and defend the country with all their might. Unfortunately obstinate worthless and incompetent Government still has its grip tight on us. Amazing and disgusting that officials should tell us that we are in danger as if we did not know it and it was not our duty to defend ourselves. Who is responsible for this war? Who is responsible for bringing this war to India's gate? Who made us helpless? These vital questions make us bitter. But we can no longer bow our heads to anybody. We will face the enemy whoever that might be. We have never advocated obstruction in Air Raid Precautions work but have always told people to carry out its ordinary instructions. But it does not rouse enthusiasm and confidence, being too official and wooden. Terrible times are ahead but people should not be unnerved. People should not come out on the roads when asked to be indoors. Women should learn nursing. Ends.

Following is extract from article by Gandhi in Harijan of 15th March dealing with evacuation of non-essential persons from cities to villages and attitude of evacuees in villages. Begins. Greatest problem the newcomers will have to tackle will be dealing with looting and dacoities. If non-violent way
is not clear to them they should organise themselves with co-operation of villagers for armed defence against robbers and dacoits. We have too long looked to the Government to do this elementary work for us. Government cannot do much if anything at all at this critical time. Work has perforce to be done by evacuees violent non-violent or both ways. Ends.

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Minutes by Sir D. Monteath and Mr Croft

SECRET
16 March 1942

Mr Croft
This is the first of two notes\(^1\) handed to the Secretary of State by the Chancellor on Saturday afternoon.\(^2\)

The first five paragraphs seem to boil down to the suggestion in paragraph 5 that a telegram should be sent to the Lord Privy Seal to make it plain to him that the retention for the present by H.M.G. of “full responsibility for the defence of India” means no more than strategical responsibility for military measures required to effect the defence of India and carries no financial implication.

I should not myself see any particular objection to doing this though I should think it perhaps hardly necessary. One might hope that if Sir S. Cripps’ mission is successful, the Government of India might find it possible to be a bit more forthcoming about India’s financial contribution to the cost of the war—and in this connection this point links up with the contents of the second memorandum handed to the Secretary of State by the Chancellor—but I am not sure that it would conduce to the realisation of any such hope to make it plain now that H.M.G. are disowning any additional financial responsibility for the defence of India.

As regards paragraph 6, the draft instructions contained in W.P. (42) 116,\(^3\) copy attached, never issued. I am not sure whether the Chancellor is aware of that fact or whether it affects his purpose in paragraph 6. In this connection, however, you may care to see a letter\(^4\) from Sir E. Benthall attached, the second paragraph of which is relevant. In the course of a conversation making my reply by telephone to this letter, he made the point that the European commercial community in India might feel a little denigrated by the suggestion that their fortunes are a matter of “lesser importance”; but he proposed to

\(^1\) Sir D. Monteath enclosed No. 327. The second note was No. 328.
\(^2\) 14 March.
\(^3\) No. 277.
\(^4\) Not printed.
take the line, if necessary, that it must be recognised that compared with a political settlement of the Indian controversy they, in fact, are. If so it might be possible to argue to the Chancellor how much more unjustified would be a revolt by Lancashire against the suggestion that Lancashire’s trading position in India must be a matter for negotiation with the future Indian Government; it already is, in fact, with the present Indian Government.

D. T. M.

Against the word “already” in the final sentence Mr Croft minuted:
No not as regards e.g. penal tariff discrimination.

W. D. C.

I did not mean to overlook the statutory “safeguard” but only to indicate that, except in extremis, Lancashire has to negotiate as an equal with India.

D. T. M.

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Minute by Mr Croft

L/PO/6/106c: f 143

17 March 1942

Sir David Monteath

I think that the Treasury and the Chancellor are fussing themselves quite unnecessarily about this.¹ Surely the phrase about full responsibility for the defence of India hasn’t got any specific meaning, whether military or financial. It is simply used in the constitutional sense and is simply a polite way of saying, in effect, that whatever we may be prepared to do with the two other crucial portfolios we are going to retain in the Defence Portfolio a man upon whom we can fully count and who will be responsible to the Viceroy and, through the Viceroy, to the Secretary of State and H.M.G. It does not mean that we accept any particular responsibility for finding men, materials or money for the defence of India. That sort of responsibility continues to belong to the Government of India as it always has hitherto.

If the Chancellor insists upon some explanation being sent to Sir Stafford Cripps, I hope it will be done in a way which will make it clear that the object of it is to relieve him (the Chancellor) from anxiety and that we ourselves have no misunderstanding. It would, of course, as you suggest, prejudice the possibility of India increasing her financial contribution in the event of Cripps’s mission being successful if the precaution which the Chancellor advocates were to be made public, and it would introduce a quite unnecessary element of controversy. I think, therefore, that if any such message is sent it should be sent for the Lord Privy Seal’s personal guidance and for use only in the event
of it becoming clear in the course of his discussions that there is a misunderstanding, and not for the purpose of amending the declaration, which, if I understand the position rightly, he is not in any event going to use textually in the course of his discussions.

As regards the commercial interests, I think we might take the line that the Chancellor's point on this subject lapses in view of the fact that the draft instructions contained in W.P. (42) 1162 never issued. The Chancellor and Benthall are, of course, concerned with different sides of the commercial interest, the Chancellor being concerned rather with the U.K. export trade and Benthall with the position of the European business firms in India. I don't think there is any doubt that both these interests will have to receive less attention than in connection with the Act of 1935. I should think myself that Lancashire must by now have given up the Indian trade as a bad job to a greater extent than the Chancellor realises, and that there will be a correspondingly reduced force in their reaction when they discover what is happening. But their position is in fact at present safeguarded to a greater extent than you imply at the end of your note, viz. by the special responsibility of the Governor-General to prevent action which would subject U.K. imports to discriminatory or penal treatment (12 (i) (f)). Making difficulties about commercial interests would certainly not be calculated to facilitate a revision of the arrangement for dividing war expenditure in favour of the United Kingdom.

I am discussing the Chancellor's other note about India's share in the expenses of the war with Mr. Baxter and Mr. Grist and will let you have something further about this later.

W.D.C.

1 See No. 336.  2 No. 277.  3 Government of India Act 1935.  4 No. 328.

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Mr Amery to Mr Mackenzie King

L/PO/6/105e: ff 168-9

INDIA OFFICE, 17 March 1942

My dear Mackenzie King,
The Prime Minister has just shown me your most generous and helpful telegram1 about India, as well as his reply.2 It is of course perfectly true, as he points out, that the problem is one of immense difficulty, that Congress has committed itself to extreme policies, and that we cannot afford any immediate settlement which would shake the loyalty of the Army or interfere with

1 No. 330.  2 No. 346.
recruiting. For all these reasons it would no doubt be as well that you should stay your hand, so far as any public declaration goes, until we know how far the Cripps Mission has succeeded or failed.

Personally, I fear that the latter is the more probable alternative, and that the bulk at any rate of Congress will reject our policy because it does not give Indian political leaders the immediate control of the conduct of the war. The practical objections to that are obvious, but there is the equally serious political objection that by this the Congress leaders mean control for themselves and the opportunity to shape the future of India to their liking, regardless of the wishes of the minorities or of the Princes. That is why even a moderately extensive degree of co-operation in the present Government of India is only possible if Cripps can bring about some measure of agreement on the future.

By “failure” I mean, of course, immediate failure to bring about an agreement between Indians and the immediate co-operation of the political parties. That need not be altogether failure from the long-term point of view. For two years I have been trying to tell Indians that if they want a free and united India they must shape it themselves by agreement, just as every Dominion has framed its own constitution, that the suggestion that they cannot agree and must therefore have a constitution imposed by us which they can then all criticise, is evidence of a real unreadiness to shoulder the responsibility of freedom. Now Cripps is going to bring this home to them in even more direct fashion and make it clear, I hope for good and all, that if they cannot agree they are not going to secure what they want by belabouring the British Government. From that point of view Cripps’ Mission, even if it fails in its immediate object, may help to pave the way for Indian agreement a little later on.

Meanwhile, I do feel that, agreement or no agreement, the interest that would be shown in India and the recognition of India’s status implied in an exchange of High Commissioners between India and Canada, would be of the very greatest help with a sensitive people like that of India, and I hope to take up that suggestion of yours with the Viceroy without delay. ³

Similarly, no doubt, when the peace negotiations come in sight, a lead from the senior Dominion in welcoming the Indian delegates to the Peace Conference as in the fullest sense equals, would be immensely helpful. By then, whatever happens to Cripps’ Mission, the political situation may have ripened further and it may become possible for India to be represented at the Peace Conference by men representative, not merely of the official Government of India, but of the main elements in her political life.

Once again, let me express my warm appreciation of your generous initiative, which I am sure will bear useful fruit.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

³ See No. 345.
339

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

India Office, 17 March 1942

Received: 18 March

345. Congratulations on excellent and most timely address\(^1\) to Chamber of Princes. Your welcome to Cripps will be most helpful.

\(^1\) On 16 March. See the Marquess of Linlithgow: Speeches and Statements (New Delhi, Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, 1945), pp. 319–25.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to the Nizam of Hyderabad

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

The Viceroy's House, New Delhi, 17 March 1942

My dear Nizam,

I send Your Exalted Highness my warmest thanks for your telegram of the 12th March\(^1\) and the personal references in it which I greatly appreciate.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

Linlithgow.

\(^1\) No. 319.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via H.M. Ambassador, Cairo)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

Most Immediate

18 March 1942

No. 684–S. For Sir Stafford Cripps. I have not yet received your Gibraltar telegram\(^1\) but have received your Bathurst telegram dated the 16th March.\(^2\) I foresee difficulty about limitation of State numbers. Larger States do not attend Chamber and if Bhopal and Kashmir are included Chamber representation

\(^1\) See No. 348. \(^2\) This telegram has not been traced.
would be reduced to two as against an essential minimum of three, namely, Nawabganj, Bikaner and Patiala. I am anxious not to overburden you but equally anxious that avoidable offence should not be given.

2. I therefore propose to inform Congress and League Headquarters that you would like to see representatives selected by them, preferably not exceeding four but up to six if they so desire.

I am also giving intimation to—

(a) Three Sikhs.
(b) Two Liberals.
(c) Two Mahasabha.
(d) Two Depressed Classes.

I will await reply to this telegram and my telegram No. 658-S, dated 15th March, before taking action on names mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of my telegram No. 658-S.

3 No. 331.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via H.M. Ambassador, Cairo)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

MOST IMMEDIATE

18 March 1942

No. 687-S. Following for Sir Stafford Cripps:

Begins. In continuation of my telegram No. 684-S of 8th March. Intense desire manifest in all quarters to discover nature of His Majesty’s Government’s proposals. Hitherto there has been no sign of the smallest leak. But I am sure you will realise that the first representatives who hear the detailed scheme from you will immediately put it about and may well do so with a bias favouring their own sectional point of view. Whole Press will then be in full cry.

2. I mention this because you may wish to consider expediency of announcing and yourself explaining the proposals perhaps to a Press Conference very soon after your arrival, unless you feel able to explore the minds of parties without disclosing details—this is merely a suggestion and I of course will not move until I know your wishes. Ends.

1 No. 341; the date should be 18 March.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via H.M. Ambassador, Cairo)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

18 March 1942

No. 689–S. Following for Sir Stafford Cripps:

Begins. With further reference to my telegram No. 684–S\(^1\) of 18th March. On further consultation with my Political Adviser I feel it would be impossible to reduce size of the Delegation decided upon by the Chamber of Princes which includes five Rulers and three Dewans, a total of eight. I am therefore mentioning no limit of numbers to the Chancellor of the Chamber. I do not think that either Congress or League would demand eight merely because the Chamber sent eight.

2. This eight however excludes Bhopal and Kashmir. It would be impossible to see Bhopal at the same time as the Chamber Delegation since he has absented himself from the present Session as a result of serious disagreement with the Chancellor. Kashmir as I previously remarked is a somewhat doubtful case for seeing. I am therefore, for the present, not giving intimation to Bhopal and Kashmir. Ends.

\(^{1}\) No. 341.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via H.M. Ambassador, Cairo)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

18 March 1942

No. 691–S. Following for Sir Stafford Cripps. In paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 684–S\(^1\) of 18th March, please add new item as follows:

(e) two non-League Muslims (Bengal and Sind Premiers).

\(^{1}\) No. 341.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PEJ/8/220: f 89

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 18 March 1942, 7.30 pm

349. In the course of telegraphic correspondence1 keeping Dominion Prime Ministers informed about proposals out of which Cripps’ mission emerged, Mackenzie King mentioned that his Government had been considering from time to time exchange of representatives with Government of India and would be glad to make early appointment of High Commissioner for Canada in India if that would help to proclaim India’s emergence as equal member of Commonwealth.2 Such a lead from the senior Dominion might very possibly be followed by Australia and New Zealand, both of whom expressed warm approval of policy designed to promote India’s position as free self-governing partner in present struggle for liberty. Reciprocal appointment of Indian High Commissioner in Canada (even if not yet in Australia and New Zealand also) might prove useful possibility to have in hand in connection with any early reconstitution of your Executive Council resulting from Cripps’ conversations. He no doubt saw telegrams from Dominions Prime Ministers when received, but it might be as well to remind him and consult with him how best to take advantage of their attitude at whatever moment developments of his mission may indicate to be most fruitful.

1 See Nos. 244, 245, 258, 259 and 330. 2 See Nos. 258 and 330.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Mackenzie King (via Dominions Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/1056: f 171

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

18 March 1942, 11.45 am

63. Following from Mr. Churchill for Mr. Mackenzie King. Begins.

Your No. 79.1 Question which has to be solved is not one between British Government and India, but between different sects or nations in India itself. We have resigned ourselves to fighting our utmost to defend India in order, if successful, to be turned out. Congress have hitherto definitely refused Dominion Status. Moslems, a hundred millions, declare they will insist upon Pakistan, i.e. a sort of Ulster in the North. We have our Treaties which must be respected with Princes in India, over ninety millions. There are forty million
Hindu Untouchables to whom we have obligations. These are the grim issues which Cripps is valiantly trying to settle. There can be no question of our handing over control during the war. This would break up the Indian Army, 85 per cent of which cares nothing for Congress and is loyal only to the King-Emperor. It would render the defence of India impossible. I should strongly recommend your awaiting developments till we see how the Cripps Mission goes. I have shown your telegram to Amery. Ends.

1 No. 330.

347

The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Members of the National Defence Council

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 18 March 1942

My dear ——,

You will remember how at the last meeting of the National Defence Council, after the statement made by the Hon’ble the Home Member and the discussion which followed it, Members joined in pressing Government to take definite steps to combat defeatism and the Fifth Column, and urged the formation of an Anti-defeatist Front. In fulfilment of my promise to take this matter up, I am launching a campaign with a message, which has appeared in the Press recently. I have adopted for the movement the name “The National War Front”. I have preferred to call it the “War Front” rather than the “Defence Front” or the “Anti-defeatist Front”, because I want the appeal to be positive rather than negative, active rather than passive. My message, a copy of which I enclose, covers, I believe, all the points which at this critical moment it is desirable to stress: unity, comradeship, the defence of India’s past and future inheritance, loyalty to our fighting men, the combating of enemies at home, whether avowed or unconscious, steadfastness in defence, determination to win.

Governors and their Governments have been informed of my ideas and will be taking early steps to launch the campaign throughout the country, and to carry its message down to the smallest village. Ample funds are being provided. But though official support will be freely forthcoming, the movement must, I believe, draw its inspiration from, and to the greatest possible extent depend

1 The letter in this form was sent to the members of the Council from British India. The letter sent to the Rulers of Indian States who were members of the Council differed in some respects. Also in MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.
2 Sir R. Maxwell.
3 The enclosure (not printed) consisted of Lord Linlithgow’s ‘Message to India’. See No. 310, note 1.
4 No. 143.
for its organisers upon, the voluntary efforts of non-official men and women, if it is to take root and be a success. May I, therefore, ask you to lend the movement your whole-hearted support with voice and action. I suggest that you should put yourself in touch with His Excellency the Governor.

Yours ——,
LINLITHGOW.

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Sir S. Cripps to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via H.M. Ambassador, Cairo)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

MOST IMMEDIATE 19 March 1942
No. 68. Following from Sir Stafford Cripps for Viceroy. Have just received your telegram, Nos. 658–S,¹ 679–S² and 684–S³ I agree to proposals in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 684–S and will reply to other points tomorrow and to your No. 689–S.⁴ My telegram from Gibraltar was as follows:

Begins. Many thanks. I agree I should see Hope and that leading political organisations should be asked to name persons to be interviewed. Kindly inform them that my conversations with Indians will be opened by interviews with representative delegations chosen by the League, Mahasabha, States, Congress, Scheduled Castes and Sikhs. Delegation should not exceed four persons. I propose after these meetings to pursue discussions as necessary with individuals including those already mentioned in telegram No. 321⁵ from Secretary of State. Can you let me have an I.C.S. officer to work with my Secretaries? He should have about 12 years’ service. Ends.

¹ No. 331.   ² This telegram has not been traced in India Office Records.
³ No. 341.   ⁴ No. 343.   ⁵ No. 313.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE  INDIA OFFICE, 19 March 1942
Your letters of January 23rd/27th and February 2nd¹ have just come in, but I have barely had time to glance at them and have just been told that there is a fast mail leaving the first thing tomorrow morning. So I must leave for another
letter my answer to any points in them that need answering. As a matter of fact, the universe, both in the field of war and in the field of politics, has changed so much since they were written that much has answered itself, which will no doubt be true of this letter as well.

2. Here and in the Dominions and America, the Cripps Mission has had a very good send off. But I already detect a note in the Left Wing papers of a readiness, if Cripps does not succeed, to denounce the whole thing as a Right Wing fraud, endeavouring to put a Churchill-Amery policy across under cover of Cripps, the innocent victim of our machinations. Nor are there lacking those who are prepared to suggest that Winston is sending an inconvenient potential rival out of the way on a mission from which he can only return with diminished credit. That is, of course, entirely untrue. Winston is genuinely sorry to miss Cripps as Leader in the House and no less genuinely appreciative of Cripps’ courage in going. As for Cripps, he is quite intelligent enough to know the risk he runs, but I think genuinely feels that if only he can pull off some sort of settlement it may make a very big difference to the whole war, both in India itself and outside. I dare say he overestimates the actual military value of any political settlement. But certainly it would have some value and, as I have said before, on the political side it may help the situation in the long run even if he fails and does nothing more than convince the party leaders that they can only get a united India by compromise and agreement. Even failure may help the world outside, and possibly even the world in India, to realise the complexity of the situation. The unfortunate thing is that this sort of good effect lasts a very little time, and then the completely unteachable elements here and elsewhere start again by saying “Why don’t you do something?” “Why don’t you take the initiative?”

3. What you say in one of your letters of the effect of my speeches on Indian political leaders, at any rate on the Hindu side, is very true and I have been conscious of it from the first. My only hope has been that, in spite of their professed annoyance, a certain amount of what I have said has got in under the skin, even with them, and may have had some influence with a wider circle of readers behind them. If so, it may have done some good either as paving the way for Cripps or for the still possible settlement of the future. In any case it was about the only thing that I could have contributed to the situation during these last eighteen months.

4. All this is, however, overshadowed by the imminent danger to Eastern India. I am inclined to agree with Wavell that the next Japanese move will probably be a creep forward from Burma along the coast under the shelter of their air umbrella, and that the all-important thing is to get sufficient air force into Eastern India, both fighter and bomber, to prevent this. On the other hand,
the Navy are desperately anxious to have every bomber that can be sent out for the purpose of naval reconnaissance, laying stress both on the importance of traffic in the Bay of Bengal, on the need for proper warning of a Japanese attack on Ceylon, and last, but not least, on the point that the Indian Ocean west of Ceylon is the main artery of supply both for India and the Middle East. Whichever is to get the aeroplanes that is in its turn at the expense of Middle East. It is all incredibly difficult and anxious.

5. There is, of course, the alternative that the Japanese may for the present neglect India and concentrate on Northern Burma and on pushing into China by the Burma Road, so as to bring about an early collapse of Chungking and liberate troops for Siberia or elsewhere. Winston inclines to this view, but somehow I can’t help feeling that the temptation of starting up trouble and panic in India will appeal more to the Japanese and will also be more to the liking of their Axis Allies.

[Para. 6, on Mr Corfield’s impressions of his visit to Khairpur, omitted.]

7. Mackenzie King sent Winston a telegram on the 15th suggesting that it might be of assistance to us here and to the success of Cripps’ Mission if he were to be fortified by an expression from each of the self-governing Dominions of their readiness to co-operate at the time of the peace negotiations in ensuring immediate recognition of India’s status as one of equality with the other self-governing parts of the British Commonwealth. He also added the suggestion that an exchange of High Commissioners between the Dominions and India might be immediately arranged and that in any case Canada, as the leader in the evolution of self-government in the Empire, could promise India to be helpful on her behalf. Winston has replied pointing out in somewhat blunt terms the difficulties of the problem—“the grim issues which Cripps is valiantly trying to settle”—and after referring to the danger to the Indian Army of handing over control now, strongly recommended him to wait and see how the Cripps Mission goes.

8. I think Winston was right in deprecating any demonstration from the Dominion Governments before ascertaining the result of Cripps’ Mission, but I do think Mackenzie King’s move a generous and helpful one. I have written to tell him so and expressed the view that, whether the Cripps Mission succeeds or not in its immediate object, an exchange of High Commissioners between India and Canada would undoubtedly appeal to Indian sentiment and that Canada’s help when it comes nearer the Peace Conference would certainly be warmly appreciated.

9. If you don’t want to use the opening afforded by an Indian High Commissionership to Canada in connection with re-arrangements of your Executive, it might, I think, be well worth while considering whether Lall is not deserving of promotion. From all I have been able to see of him and of his work I have formed a very good opinion of his capacity as well as of his social qualifications.
He has really kept up his end as Acting High Commissioner remarkably well and seems to have friends in every direction. Mrs. Lall is a very attractive little lady, with a perfect eye for the colour of her sari, and a very good hostess. I have also been told that she can make a pleasant and quite competent speech to a gathering of ladies, and that is the kind of thing that would of course go down well in Canada.

3 No. 330. 4 No. 346. 5 No. 338.

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President Roosevelt to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, 19 March 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have made choice of Colonel Louis Johnson to be my Personal Representative in India with the rank of Minister.

Colonel Johnson, who, as my former Assistant Secretary of War, has had broad experience with problems relating to military supply, has been selected for this important mission because of his outstanding ability and high character. In this time of crisis when ruthless aggressors are seeking to impose their will upon millions of the peoples of the world, I consider him specially qualified to further the mutual interests of the Government of India and of the Government of the United States. I commend him highly to Your Excellency.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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Sir S. Cripps to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via Minister of State, Cairo)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

MOST IMMEDIATE

1. Following from Sir S. Cripps:

Begins. Your telegram No. 687-S. Press arrangements. I am most anxious to meet Press representatives at the earliest possible moment and shall be grateful if you will make arrangements at suitable time on day of my arrival. At the

1 No. 342.
meeting I would speak to them in general way as to objects of my visit stressing urgency of reaching decisions and would let them know as far as possible whom I shall be seeing. I would also undertake to receive Press for short time every other day during my stay.

2. I realise danger of leakages after disclosure of proposals to party representatives. But it is impossible to publish full text and issue of any modified version would inevitably lead to misunderstandings. I hope to restrain Press by making it clear that access to me will stop if secrecy of proposals is not respected. *Ends.*

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*Sir S. Cripps to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via Minister of State, Cairo)*

*Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130*

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

20 March 1942

Following from Sir S. Cripps. Paragraph No. 2 of your telegram No. 658-S, dated 16th March. I agree but should like to see as many Governors who are coming as possible during first two days.

2. Princes. In view of your No. 658-S. I agree to Chamber delegation of 8 but hope it will not be more. Invitations need not be sent to Kashmir and Bhopal pending discussion with you on my arrival. If any further difficulties arise as to Princes in the meantime please deal with them as you think best.

3. I am not sure whether you have yet issued warnings to those named in paragraph 4 of Secretary of State’s telegram No. 321 of 12th March but if you have I agree that Parlakimedi and an Indian Christian be also warned. Others mentioned in paragraph No. 5 of your No. 658-S might await consideration on arrival with those named in paragraph 6. If you have as yet issued no warning invitations to individuals except those referred to in your telegram No. 691-S3 I now think that in view of decision to allow interests to nominate their own representatives that they might be confined to those following who are likely to be unable to attend at short notice: Joshi, Sikander, Khan Sahib, Parlakimedi, Indian Christian. I shall not be ready to see them until fifth or later day after my arrival.

4. I appreciate importance of seeing Sikander at an early stage as suggested in your No. 604-S4 to Secretary of State but feel some difficulty in seeing him officially before meeting Congress and League delegations. It might be best if I could meet him casually with you on 2nd or 3rd day and have some private conversation with him. I would of course see him a week later.

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1 No. 331. 2 No. 313. 3 No. 344. 4 No. 307.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 20 March 1942, 6.20 pm

Received: 20 March, 6.15 am

No. 724-S. Your most secret telegram No. 4764. Following is the text of Commander-in-Chief’s views on the matter:

Begins. My view is very definitely that we should not make a change but that we should press for the Deputy Commander-in-Chief to be appointed. I do not think any difficulty has arisen in working as at present and I do not see why any should arise. It would on the other hand be most difficult to lay down any clear-cut division of responsibility between the Commander in the Field and the Commander-in-Chief, India, and to provide a separate staff for each would lead to waste of personnel and duplication of work.

I do not think the analogy of an attack on India through Afghanistan previously considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence is applicable to the present situation. That was a campaign which would have been fought either outside India or on the frontiers of India and would have had comparatively little effect on the rest of India. The air threat was little developed, there were no airborne troops or parachutists at that time and mechanical warfare was much less developed. The present threat covers practically the whole of India.

I recommend therefore that we reply that we consider the present organisation should remain with a Deputy Commander-in-Chief to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of the main burden of administrative work and internal security. Ends.

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1 This time of receipt given by the decipher is evidently incorrect. It should probably read '6.15 p.m.'

2 No. 325.
354

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 237

Washington, 20 March 1942, 12.51 am
Received: 20 March, 9.10 am

1600. My telegram No. 1473.

We have learned confidentially that the United States Ambassador at Chungking has sent the following report of a conversation with the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek about their visit to India.

2. Chiang Kai-shek said that he was very apprehensive about the Indian situation, and that His Majesty’s Government still refused to recognise realities. British policy in India must undergo a radical change before any solution can be reached, but it was unlikely that there would be such a change because the authorities refused to recognise the (grp. undec?: serious) nature of the situation. He attributed considerable significance to a final question put to him by Sir A. Clark Kerr as to whether he thought the British would “collapse” in India.

3. Madame Chiang said that she thought that Dominion status would not satisfy the Indians since they had neither racial affinity nor a common destiny with England. Indians realise that they could not obtain independence overnight, but real responsibility and political strength should nevertheless be given to them.

4. Chiang Kai-shek complained that the British never inform their allies when they decide to withdraw or surrender. In translating this remark Madame Chiang commented that British strategy is invariably “super-secret”. Chiang Kai-shek also complained that Chinese staff officers are not received by the British.

5. According to Mr. Gauss, official and public circles in Chungking are critical of and angry with the British.

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1 Mr Amery had repeated this telegram to Lord Linlithgow in telegram 344 of 18 March. It advised the Foreign Office that Sir G. S. Bajpai had kept the State Department fully informed of the Indian Government’s efforts to ensure the success of Chiang Kai-shek’s visit; and that the Head of the Near East Division had volunteered the information that the criticisms of the U.S. Commissioner in Delhi were probably confined to the results of Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts in the field of Indian politics and did not extend to military matters. L/P&S/12/2315: ff 239-40.
355

Sir F. Wylie (Kabul) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 45

KABUL, 21 March 1942, 7.15 pm
Received: 22 March, 5.30 am

53. Solo. Addressed to Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs No. 53 dated March 20th. Will Your Excellency very kindly refer to my telegram 41 of March 6th. Declaration by His Majesty’s Government regarding post-war constitution in India.

2. I have had two conversations with Afghan Ministers since this telegram was sent and at both this question was under discussion.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 17th took more or less stereotyped line, viz. that discussed in despatches quoted in para. No. 4 of my previous telegram—though with no great appearance of conviction.

4. Prime Minister at long interview which I had with him yesterday made no mention either of treaty or of tribes. He said that China had been able to resist Japanese aggression largely because will-power of the Chinese people was with Chungking Government. For successful defence of India it was essential that interests of Government and people should be similarly united. He refused to believe that if legitimate aspirations were met country would at any time in foreseeable future wish to separate itself from British Commonwealth of Nations and he thought even (?) late date genuine effort to conciliate Indian opinion should be made. If India was put into real shape for defending itself Afghanistan, if necessary, would resist Axis aggression by all means in its power. If however India remained divided against itself what could Afghan- stan do against German threat to her independence, Axis having by that time ex hypothesi overrun Russia?

5. Prime Minister may be adjusting himself to probable shape of things to come but I am not sure. As stated in para. No. 12 of my previous telegram I had always myself been reluctant to believe Afghan opinion was opposed to constitutional reform in India. I had expected however that sympathy with Indian aspirations would have been confined to younger (?generation). This is however not so and Prime Minister let fall number of expressions yesterday which made it quite clear where his own personal sympathy lay.

1 No. 256.
356

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via Governor of Sind)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/98

IMMEDIATE
SECRET AND PERSONAL

No. 726–S. Following for Sir Stafford Cripps. I suggest that you should very early after your arrival meet my whole Executive Council as a body in addition to such subsequent individual interviews with Executive Councillors as may be arranged. I sense the feeling, among non-official members, that they would regard this as due to the position of the Governor-General in Council as the present Government of India. It would of course be entirely for you to decide what and how much to say to them at this initial stage.

2. You know I am anxious that your mission should have most favourable possible start, and for this reason I venture to put to you suggestion that you might on first arrival say something, for example in the course of an interview, to discuss [dispel ?] fears among Muslims arising from their conception of your last visit to India. In their public utterances regarding your present visit they have been scrupulously correct so far, but I have ample evidence that these fears exist and have been at pains to discount them. An early word to emphasise your complete openmindedness would I think be of great value.

357

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via Governor of Sind)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/98

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 733–S. Following for Sir Stafford Cripps. Press Conference. I will arrange for Press Conference on the evening of your arrival, but would like you to meet my Executive Council before this for reasons given in my telegram No. 726–S1 sent to Karachi.

2. Governor of Punjab is here and Presidency Governors, Hallett and Cunningham on the 24th. Warnings have been issued to Fazlul Haq, Allah Bakhsh, Sapru, Jayakar, Ambedkar, Rajah, Joshi and three Sikhs, but not to individual Congress, League or Mahasabha men as President was asked to select. I am now warning Parlakimedi, and keeping Indian Christian name till you come. I am sending warning to Sikander as a Premier but not to Khan
Sahib as he comes under Congress wing. I will try and arrange casual meeting with Sikander if possible.
Repeated to H. M. Consul, Basra.
1 No. 356.

358

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps (via Governor of Sind)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/98

MOST IMMEDIATE 21 March 1942
No. 737—S. Following for Sir Stafford Cripps. Congress President in reply to invitation says, "If Sir Stafford Cripps desires preliminary interchange views I shall gladly meet him. My Committee do not consider it necessary to suggest additional names".

2. This may delay matters but any attempt from here at this stage to intimate a provisional date to other Congressmen would certainly be misconstrued.

3. Jinnah’s answer is in effect same as Congress President’s. But I can take no action except to have Sikander informed privately of reasons for not sending him an advance invitation.

4. Others invited have replied helpfully, and general Press reactions to studied leakage of these invitations have been on the whole satisfactory. I am having it made clear that these are not exhaustive but are in preparation only for your first two or three days.

5. Representations from others are beginning to come in and will be acknowledged and held pending your decision on them.
Repeated to H.M. Consul, Basra.

359

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

IMPORTANT 21 March 1942
No. 42—M. Enthusiasm for Cripps’ visit seems to be slightly cooling off. Many people think it impossible that Government can give way sufficiently to placate Congress at the same time not antagonise Jinnah. Moderate opinion is however hopeful that if something definite is offered all sides may compromise.
2. I agree with you that something concrete has been offered for future and that is all to the good; but I am pessimistic about the opting-out-by-provinces clause, and absence of anything definite for the present.

3. However everyone thinks, and I agree, that visit will do good and clear the air, generally opinion being that if Cripps cannot do it no one can, and that he would not have agreed to come here if terms were unfair.

4. Minorities are worried that they may be ignored in any major (group omitted). I would suggest that in addition to Muthiah Chettiar following should be invited. Sir K. V. Reddi, Sir Muhammad Usman (as a dissenting Muslim) and either Dr. John or Albert Jesuudasen, representing Christians. M. Chettiar, I think, must come first as leader of Opposition but others are important. Ends.

Please insert “Sir C. R. Reddi” before “Sir Muhammad”.

360

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/6/106c: f 139

PERSONAL-SECRET

My dear Kingsley,

I have thought very carefully over the two points in regard to the “Indian Declaration” which you make in the memorandum so entitled, which you handed to me on 13th March.

I should not myself have thought that there was any need to telegraph to Cripps about the implications of the phrase “full responsibility for the Defence of India” which appears in paragraph (c) of the draft Declaration. It is true of course that that document was at one stage approved as a declaration of policy to be made publicly by His Majesty’s Government, and it may be that, if that plan had been carried out, it would have been prudent to study with even greater care the implications that might be read into this or that phrase by critics in India, who are notoriously disposed to combine with a microscopic examination of words a very liberal interpretation of their intention. But in the event the draft Declaration has not been made public. Cripps has it in his pocket as the basis for his discussions with Indian leaders; but a basis for discussion is a very different thing from a published declaration, by each word of which the authors are bound. I feel, myself, quite sure that in any discussion of the subject matter of paragraph (c) Cripps will convey that what was in mind in regard to the defence of India is simply that in such a critical military situation as confronts India it is not possible for His Majesty’s Government to
hand over the control of defence measures which they have hitherto exercised and on which they have built up their plans, to untried Indian hands, however far they may be prepared to go in other directions in giving Indians representative of political parties a share in the administration. I cannot bring myself to believe that the phrase to which you take exception could, even if it were discussed textually (which is not likely to be the case), be interpreted either by Cripps or by any of his Indian interlocutors as conveying that His Majesty's Government are accepting any financial liability—or any specific liability in respect of the provision of men, munitions or other material—over and above what they have hitherto thought proper or might find necessary for discharging the obligation which history has laid on them to secure the defence of India against the enemy. Per contra, I think it might have unfortunate results if it were indicated to Cripps that he should be at pains to make it clear that by the phrase in question His Majesty's Government are not undertaking any additional financial liability; such "clarification" might, by introducing avoidable controversy and a bargaining atmosphere, have the unwelcome effect of reducing such hopes as may be entertained that, if Cripps were to pull off an acceptable solution of the immediate political problem, his success would bear fruit in the voluntary acceptance by Indian leaders and the Indian Legislature of a bigger share of the financial burden than that which India now bears.

The apprehensions expressed in paragraph 6 of your note, dealing with the question of the future of British commercial interests in Burma [India?], may perhaps be allayed by the knowledge that the draft telegram to the Viceroy in White Paper (42) 116 was not sent—nor anything in a similar sense. Any such instructions became unnecessary when the decision was taken to withhold the draft Declaration from publication and to send the Lord Privy Seal to India instead. It is however the case that Cripps’ prospects of getting the Indian leaders to accept the plan contained in the draft Declaration as the basis on which to build a constitution for India, would be much diminished if it were to be insisted that the Treaty with the constitution making body, envisaged in paragraph c (ii) of the draft Declaration as forming in effect part of the constitution, should cover such extraneous matters as the position and protection against discriminatory treatment of British commercial interests, whether trading with, or carrying on their businesses in, India. Such matters are probably better left for disposal by negotiation with the prospective Government of India on which will fall the responsibility of honouring the commitments into which it enters.

I am looking into the complex financial questions you raised in your other memorandum3 and will let you have a reply shortly.

Yours ever,

L.S.A.

1 No. 327.  
2 No. 277.  
3 No. 328.
IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 22 March 1942, 6.40 pm
Received: 22 March, 5.30 pm

No. 751-S. Your telegram No. 47641 of 14th March. I have sent you Commander-in-Chief’s views verbatim in my telegram No. 724-S.2 I fully agree with them.

2. I need not stress the incongruity of the 1929 plan with the present policy of enhancing India’s de facto status vis-à-vis the Dominions and the practical steps taken by representation in the War Cabinet and Pacific War Council. I feel pretty confident that even my existing Council would blow up if they were told they were to bear no responsibility in a campaign for the defence of India.

3. I do not overlook the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief to His Majesty’s Government. But my own view is that only solution lies in recognizing Commander-in-Chief as having a dual responsibility and recognizing also that under present military and political conditions his responsibility to the Government of India should not be obscured.

4. The 1929 plan would ignore the consideration that the views of the Government of India and the Viceroy (who represents sole co-ordinating authority between British India and the States some of whose territories will almost certainly be involved by a Japanese attack from the East) should be given due weight by War Cabinet. There is not the least probability of divergence in view between Wavell and myself regarding conduct of the war, but I can conceive of mixed issues of high policy and strategy arising on which it might be necessary for the Viceroy to make representations to the Secretary of State, of course with the knowledge and in all probability the consent of the Commander-in-Chief, for consideration at the highest level. On this ground also I should be bound to oppose a system tending to create a single closed channel of control in India between the Imperial General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief.

5. To sum up I regard the 1929 proposals as a complete anachronism and founded upon the requirements of a campaign different in almost every essential characteristic from that with which we are now confronted. Those proposals would in my opinion prove fatal to any prospect of Indian co-operation except on the assumption that His Majesty’s Government could completely shield India from attack by the employment of a small professional Indian army supplemented entirely by British troops and British equipment.
6. I will send separately the details desired in paragraph 6 of your telegram and foresee no legal difficulties in securing assurance of full co-operation for military from civil authorities.

7. I feel\(^1\) and I think Wavell shares my views that 1929 proposals would in practice inflict upon us a cumbersome and inelastic apparatus of military control and direction ill suited to the circumstances of such a campaign as we must expect and singularly ill adapted to the essential and delicate business of getting the most in terms of active and timely co-operation out of civil Governments in India and out of Indian public support.

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\(^1\) No. 325.  \(^2\) No. 353.
\(^3\) 'I feel' deciphered as 'Brierley'. At the India Office, it was thought that 'Hartley' might have been intended.

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362

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

SECRET

GOVT. HOUSE, GUINDY, 22 March 1942

REPORT NO. 2 OF 1942

Since I saw you in Delhi, the chief items of interest here have been the fall of Rangoon and the prospective visit of Cripps.

2. I do not think the former has had any marked effect on the public who, I am afraid, are getting used to these evacuations, but there is no doubt that our prestige is very low, and there is a terrible amount of defeatism.

3. Rajagopalachari has been touring a great deal and I must say has done good in telling the people not to panic and saying that India has nothing to gain from the Japanese; on the other hand, his openly defeatist attitude that Britain can no longer defend India and that if “freedom” were granted the nation would miraculously be able to defend itself, is causing a lot of harm.

4. As regards Cripps’ visit, this is generally welcomed, but the non-Congress element are nervous that we are going to give everything away and leave them in lurch. However, people are prepared to await events, but the first enthusiasm for the visit is inclined to evaporate as the tremendous difficulties are realised. As I have already told you, I am not optimistic, as I have long thought, and still do, that Congress will take nothing short of independence. Also, although the after-the-war proposals are concrete, the opting-out suggestion will, to my mind, stultify the whole scheme, attractive though it may be to Jinnah.
Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

GOVT. HOUSE, PESHAWAR, 22 March 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Will Your Excellency please refer to your letter of 19th March¹ regarding the Prime Minister’s recent announcement?

2. As regards the reactions of the Province generally, I have today included in my fortnightly appreciation² a summary of all I have heard up to date; I do not think I have anything to add to it.

3. My own instinct is that Mr. Churchill’s statement was required and will do good. I have remarked in my fortnightly appreciation on the general feeling among educated Indians—i.e., among our educated Muslims just as much as among Hindus—that at the end of the war India expects to be placed on a footing of equality with the Dominions. They have hitherto felt that there was some hidden reservation in the mind of His Majesty’s Government on this point, and a statement by the Prime Minister was probably the only way to satisfy people that there is a definite plan.

4. There is at the same time quite a clear opinion among most of our Muslims that, though they would like to know now where India stands, they do not want any major change to take place during the war.

5. I suppose the three main ways in which Muslim interests can be safeguarded are:
   firstly, equality—or something very near equality—of representation at the Centre;
   secondly, something on the Pakistan line; and
   thirdly, transference of such power to Provinces that domination from the Centre would not greatly matter.

6. I think that most of the educated people here feel that the first way is the one which gives far the greatest probability of success. If it were to be adopted, the second and third problems are solved—or rather disappear.

7. I confess that I see great practical difficulties in the way of working the scheme provisionally decided upon by His Majesty’s Government, if some Provinces exercise the option of remaining outside. Nor do I think that the average educated Muslim here looks on the Pakistan idea as a practical solution.

8. The one thing that must be avoided is a decision which will give Muslims
reason to say that they are going to be under Hindu domination. That would lead to internal disturbances which could not fail to have a serious effect on recruiting.

Yours sincerely,

G. CUNNINGHAM.

1 Not printed. 2 No. 364.

364

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR’S REPORT NO. 6
DATED THE 22ND MARCH 1942

There has been little public comment in this Province about Sir Stafford Cripps’ coming visit to India, but it seems to be generally felt that His Majesty’s Government have taken a wise step in sending him. However much the Hindu and Muslim views may diverge, most people hope that some decision is shortly to be made which will at any rate put a stop to political controversy during the war. Another point on which I think there is agreement among educated Indians is that at the end of the war India ought to be put as far as possible on the same footing as other self-governing Dominions of the Empire.

The disagreement comes—as it always has come—on the practical details of any such advance. Hindus and probably some Congress Muslims are pleased to think that Sir Stafford is a friend of Nehru’s and hope that the practical difficulties will be solved in a way acceptable to Hindus and Congress; I think they hope above all that a Pakistan solution may be avoided. It is true that Dr. Khan Sahib, who now represents this Province on the All-Indian Congress Committee, has stated in an interview that nothing that Cripps can do can now satisfy Congress. But from what he said to me privately I would judge that this statement was only “for the shop-window”.

Educated Muslim opinion is interested only in the provision of sufficient safeguards for their community. But it is very difficult to get any constructively helpful ideas out of them. A discussion generally ends in something like this: “Whatever happens, we must not be under Hindu domination.” But Muslims are gratified that at any rate His Majesty’s Government will not come to a decision without giving Jinnah a full opportunity to represent the Muslim case to Sir Stafford.
The official Muslim League attitude has been stated in one or two unimportant meetings (the so-called “mass meeting” of 10,000 Muslims in a big Peshawar mosque was a myth); resolutions were passed to the effect that, if His Majesty’s Government made any declaration favourable to Hindus and Congress, the League would make “any sacrifices” necessary to protect Muslim interests.

2. All that I have written merely re-states the old problem. But as everyone seems at the moment to be reserving judgment, pending Sir Stafford Cripps’ visit, it is difficult to say more. I have noticed a considerably increased speculation on the likelihood of Congress Ministries returning to office. There has also been the inevitable comment that Mr. Churchill’s announcement was forced out of him by our reverses in Malaya and Burma. I have heard no suggestion that the unexpected step of sending Cripps to India was the result of disagreement in Government circles as to future Indian policy.

365

Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

D.-o. No. 116/C.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have just received your letter of the 19th asking for an appreciation of the effect of the Prime Minister’s announcement. I am to meet Sir Stafford Cripps today, so I am writing at once in order that what I say may not be coloured by anything that he may say to me on the subject.

Firstly, as to my own reactions. The fact that the plan to be brought is the agreed plan of the British cabinet, when individual views on Indian problems must vary very widely, should be some augury that it is a workable one, and likely in its main features to be acceptable to the majority of reasonable men. The choice of Sir Stafford Cripps as envoy, and his investiture with plenipotentiary powers, should go a great way to shake the intransigence of the small knot of unreasonable men whose influence in Indian politics is so great. I cannot, therefore, think of any measures open to His Majesty’s Government which would have a greater chance of success than the course they have taken.

I write, of course, in entire ignorance of what the plan is. But it seems to me that no plan is likely to gain the immediate acceptance of all parties, and in some ways the resulting position will be more difficult if it is acceptable to one of the main parties (which I take to be Congress and Muslim League), than if it is acceptable to neither. In the first alternative we are merely back at the
present stalemate, with the hope that Sir Stafford may be able to induce an attitude of mind favourable to its resolution. But in the second, the British Government will be accused of abject surrender to the demands of the other party.

Ultimately, I see little hope of a solution that will not involve coercion of an unreasonable minority, and the proper objective would seem to be to reduce the minority to the smallest possible limits and to ensure that its opposition shall be forced into constitutional and not violent channels.

I have always felt that Jinnah would compromise on “Pakistan” if he could be assured of a system that would give the Muslims the same permanent dominance in the Punjab and Bengal, with their narrow Muslim majorities, as is already secured to the Hindus in the south and Centre, and the more so if this were coupled with the reduction to the essential minimum of the functions of the Central Government. I do not know how this could be brought about, whether by weightage or rectification of boundaries: difficulties in the way are very great, and I am not unmindful of the history of the partition of Bengal. Also the position of my own Province, where the Muslims with their large majority might be enjoying Pakistan in peace and quietness if they could only agree with each other, but which is actually being run by the Hindu minority, indicates further difficulties of such a solution. There is no denying that the Muslims are politically backward, and

“While the Plough tips round the Pole
The trained mind outs the upright soul”.2

Within the Province of Sind the reaction to the Prime Minister’s message has been almost entirely favourable. My own Premier is very pleased about it,3 and the Hindu Press has welcomed it eagerly. The Muslim Leaguers are more reticent, but it has to be borne in mind that most people who call themselves Muslim Leaguers in Sind know or care very little about the League’s policy or affairs, and are actuated almost entirely by opposition to Allah Bakhsh and his Hindu supporters. There are hardly more than half a dozen Muslim Leaguers in Sind who have any contacts with Leaguers outside the Province.

Yours sincerely,

H. DOW.

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1 Not printed.  
2 John Masefield: The Everlasting Mercy.  
3 See No. 324.
No. 754-G. Following is summary of leading article by Gandhi entitled “Scorched Earth” in Harijan, dated 22nd March:

Begins. Can we contemplate with equanimity or feel glow of bravery and sacrifice at prospect of India’s earth being scorched and everything destroyed in order that enemy’s march may be hampered? I see neither bravery nor sacrifice in destroying life or property for offence or defence. I would far rather leave crops and homestead for enemy to use than destroy them for sake of preventing their use by him. There is reason, sacrifice and even bravery in so leaving my homestead and crops, if I do so not out of fear but because I refuse to regard anyone as my enemy—that is out of a humanitarian motive. Unlike Russia India’s masses have no national instinct developed. India is not fighting. Her conquerors are. Supposing that conquerors are worsted and Japanese come, inarticulate masses will not even notice change for the time being or for a long time. Intelligentsia are divided on issue of war. India’s soldiers are not national army but professionals who will as soon fight under Japanese or any other if paid for fighting. In these circumstances policy of scorched earth would be wholly indefensible. It is satisfactory that Indian opinion is being expressed against that policy. I know nothing of requirements of military, but they can never be allowed to supersede national or humanitarian considerations which nation may have accepted. Military must thus be arm of dominant civil power, not its substitute. Government of India will ease situation and allay anxiety by declaring unequivocally that they will not apply, if occasion ever arise, scorched earth policy to India, special regard being had to her peculiar position. Ends.

Note by Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Sir Stafford Cripps arrived to time and was received at the New Delhi Aerodrome by the M.S.V. and an A.-D.-C. and at The Viceroy’s House by the P.S.V. who introduced the secretarial staff (Mr. Cook; D.P.S.V.; and A.P.S.V.). Sir Stafford then introduced his staff.
2. After lunch the party went for a short walk in the garden for photographs, during which H.E. mentioned to Sir Stafford Cripps the Executive Council meeting that afternoon, and remarked to him that it would be possible to avoid the necessity of any formal statement if Sir Stafford met the Council informally in one of the drawing rooms, was introduced, and spoke generally, adding perhaps a word to individuals. Sir Stafford preferred a formal meeting at which he would speak.

3. After the photograph His Excellency had a talk with Sir Stafford Cripps, and the two staffs, including the Reforms Commissioner, had a liaison meeting at which arrangements for work were settled.

4. At 3.30 p.m. Sir Stafford Cripps met the Executive Council, and was welcomed by H.E.; he made a statement, which will appear in the Council minutes, in which he explained the decision of H.M.G. to have their plan presented by a Cabinet Minister rather than published forthwith, as so much depended on presentation. He asked Members of Council to be patient with his not presenting them with the full statement at this stage.

5. The Council having broken up Sir Stafford Cripps proceeded to discussion with the Commander-in-Chief. Members of Council, however, did not leave Viceroy's House, and Sir Reginald Maxwell informed P.S.V. that they were all extremely resentful at the idea that the details of the plan might be communicated to outside politicians before being communicated to the Council. If this was to be so they regarded today's meeting as a waste of time; and desired to see the Viceroy before matters went further. P.S.V. having reported to H.E., H.E. obtained the necessary assurance from Sir Stafford Cripps, and Council reassembled (without Council Secretary). H.E. informed the Council that he had had a further talk with Sir Stafford since the meeting and that Sir Stafford was very anxious to have a longer time at which he might tell the Executive Council the whole scheme before meeting party leaders. H.E. consulted the Council as to what time would be most convenient, and it was agreed that 6 p.m. the following evening (Tuesday, 24th March) should be fixed. H.M. Sir Homi Mody enquired whether there would be opportunities for individual meetings thereafter, to which H.E. replied that that might be left to him. Members of Council were fully agreed that there should not be individual meetings until the scheme as a whole had been disclosed to the Council.

6. Mr. Turnbull was present, by invitation, at the first of the above Executive Council meetings, but not at the second.

7. Sir Stafford Cripps decided, on the 23rd evening, to open conversations with party leaders beginning on 25th March.

Approved. L. 24.3.42.

1 Mr H. V. Hodson. 2 See No. 373.
23 March 1942

The Viceroy was generally very helpful and expressed himself as being willing to do all he could, without going into the question of the merits of the scheme, which he accepted as a War Cabinet decision. He insisted, however, that so far as the transitional stage was concerned the implementation of para. (e) should be done by him as Governor-General.\textsuperscript{1} With this I agreed; the ultimate responsibility lay with the War Cabinet but if it was merely a question of collecting the right personnel in India that was obviously a matter for him. I said I hoped to discuss with him at a later stage my ideas of a reconstituted Executive Council and we agreed to return to this matter another time.

\textsuperscript{1} See Nos. 300, para. (1), and 315.

\section*{369}

Press statement by Sir S. Cripps

\textit{MSS. EUR. F. 125/141}\textsuperscript{1}

NEW DELHI, 23 March 1942

I have come to India to discuss with the leaders of Indian opinion conclusions which the War Cabinet have untedly reached in regard to India. I am here to ascertain whether these conclusions will as we hope be generally acceptable to Indian opinion. Obviously it would not be appropriate for me to say anything further about the precise nature of the proposals at this stage beyond the indications which were given by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{2} Their chief object is to set out finally and with precision the practical steps which His Majesty’s Government propose as the method of fulfilling their past promises of self-government to the Indian peoples. We believe that a generally acceptable line of practical action can be laid down now, and that thus the main obstacle to India’s full co-operation in her own defence will have been removed. We feel confident that with the political atmosphere thus clarified the leading political organisations will be enabled to put forward their maximum effort in preserving their country from the
brutalities of aggression. How best their effective participation in the counsels of their country can be immediately arranged will be another matter for discussion.

I have come here because I am, as I have always been, a great friend and admirer of India and because I want to play my part as a member of the War Cabinet in reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties which have long vexed our relationships. Once these questions are resolved, and I hope they may be quickly and satisfactorily resolved, the Indian peoples will be enabled to associate themselves fully and freely not only with Great Britain and the other Dominions but with our great Allies, Russia, China, and the United States of America so that together we can assert our determination to preserve the liberty of the peoples of the world.

There is no time to lose and no time for long discussions. I am sure that in the circumstances of today the leaders of the main parties and interests in India will be ready to take quick decisions.

My intention is to stay at Delhi for two weeks, for there are many urgent and important matters to be attended to in England, and I believe that within that time, with energy and goodwill, the essentials of success can be achieved. During so short a visit I shall, of course, not be able to travel about in the country and see everyone I should like to meet. I hope that my friends in India will understand that my time is short and will forgive me if I am unable to see them before I leave. My association in the past has been more close with my friends in the Congress than with the members of other parties or communities, but I am fully impressed with the need in any scheme for the future of India to meet the deep anxieties which undoubtedly exist among the Muslims and the other communities. I shall therefore embark upon my task with a mind equally open to all points of view—Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and others. I believe that the proposals of the War Cabinet will appeal to the Indian leaders since they are the unanimous result of the deliberations of a body of people who were known in the past to have widely differing outlooks upon the Indian question.

I shall be spending the first two days with the Viceroy, who has cordially welcomed my mission, and shall then have the opportunity of meeting the Commander-in-Chief and other Members of the Executive Council and the Provincial Governors. The Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, the Chamber of Princes and the Hindu Mahasabha have been asked to nominate their own representatives to hold discussions with me and representatives of the Sikhs, the Liberal Party, and the Scheduled Castes have also been invited to meet me. I shall of course see other representative people including Provincial Premiers.

1 Enclosed in a letter of 27 March from Sir S. Cripps' Private Secretary to Lord Llithgow's Private Secretary. The text of the statement was communicated to the Minister of Information on 23 March.
2 See Nos. 308 and 309.
I am confident that both the Indian press and the press in other interested
countries will give their help in the great cause of Indian self-government
and defence and will not by untimely speculation or by the spreading of un-
informed and ill-considered rumours prejudice the chance of a successful settle-
ment of the outstanding issues.

370
Note by Sir S. Cripps
L/P&J/10/4: f 13

MY INTERVIEW WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

24 March 1942
I had a long talk with the C.-in-C. covering a wide range of Defence matters.
So far as India was concerned, he reiterated his anxiety as to the possible effects
of the declaration on Punjab troops¹ but did not seem very certain as to how
it would affect them adversely except that the secession of the Punjab hint
would alarm them as it would create uncertainty concerning their own future.
He seemed to think that it was the Pakistan idea which would cause them most
concern, the other proposed changes were unlikely to have any serious adverse
effect.

On the other hand he thought that the apparent loss of prospects of British
officers in India might affect their morale. In reply I suggested that if changes
in pay were announced at the same time and if publicity were given to our
undertaking to guarantee the position of all British officials, whether officers
or otherwise, much of the unsettlement which he feared would be avoided.

¹ See No. 246.

371
Note by Sir S. Cripps
L/P&J/10/4: f 14

MY INTERVIEW WITH THE GOVERNOR OF THE PUNJAB¹

24 March 1942
The Governor was anxious about the situation particularly as it concerned
Moslem-Sikh relations in his own Province.² The Sikhs were troublesome any-
way and if there were a hint of secession they would concentrate on getting
ready to fight the Moslems and this would diminish their contribution to the war effort. He admitted, however, that if the leaders of the Sikhs and Moslems agreed on the scheme trouble was hardly likely to arise.

He thought Jinnah would not agree even though Sikander did. Sikander might agree at first but was liable to change his mind under the influence of Jinnah at a later stage.

While he was nervous as to the situation, the Governor agreed that something should be done and his suggestion was that a promise should be made that we would set up after the war a body consisting of representatives of the U.S.A., the Dominions and Great Britain to work out a constitution for India, which the British Government would agree in advance to accept. He realised, however, there would have to be a number of reservations in practice. My reply was that such a scheme would suffer from too much definition to be acceptable to every section of Indian opinion.

1 Sir B. Glancy.  2 Cf. Nos. 236, 248, 286 and 298.  3 See No. 286, para. 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 24 March 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Cripps and his party arrived up to time yesterday, looking very fit. He is in good heart and seems very confident of success. I only hope that experience here may not disillusion him. You may be sure that I will give him every possible assistance and do my utmost in every way to make a success of his mission. He had a busy afternoon after his arrival, meeting Wavell and Glancy, and addressing a Press conference. Lumley, Hope, Herbert, Hallett, and Cunningham are seeing him today. He is to have a talk to my Council this evening, having met them for a few minutes yesterday. I shall be very interested to see how they receive the sketch of His Majesty’s Government’s scheme, which I believe he means to give them.

2. I have just had time to look over your letter, dated the 10th March. It brings home to me how clearly you have understood my difficulties and makes plain to me the extent of your own, and indeed those of Winston and the rest of the Cabinet. I hope that Cripps may be able to get the scheme over in such a way that even if it is not accepted its presentation may not cause

1 No. 304.
serious mischief to our war effort, or lasting damage to what remains of goodwill and support on the part of Indians towards our position in India. I am sure that if the Declaration had been put over without explanation or special advocacy, its effect upon this country would have been disastrous. I am glad to know that you yourself have so clearly appreciated this. We are by no means out of the wood, but I now have considerable hopes that whether the scheme succeeds or fails, that is to say, whether it is accepted or rejected, there may be, looking to the propaganda value involved in face of American opinion, a balance of credit to our side.

3. I do not think that Cripps was too upset at being put into quarantine for the night at Karachi, but I feel that I am entitled to grumble that the position had not been explained to him before he left, and that I should have been put in the awkward position of having to break him the necessity for precautions which no doubt at first seem to be just an annoying piece of red-tape. It was all the more awkward as Cripps himself decided, half way through his journey, that he would like to push on to Jodhpur on the night of the 22nd instead of staying at Karachi: an arrangement which, since my experts told me that there was no mosquito control at Jodhpur air-port, I could not allow consistently with the very strict attitude we have had to adopt in the past. As things turned out, I have no doubt that Cripps found quarantine a convenient excuse for escaping from visitors at Karachi.

[Para. 4 on the Hurs in Sind, para. 5 on refugees from Burma, para. 6 on co-ordination between Government and Army in Eastern India, and para. 7 on the wheat situation, omitted.]

8. I have sent you the Commander-in-Chief’s and my own reactions to your telegram No. 4764 of 14th March, asking for a preliminary opinion about the arrangements for the military command in India over the coming months, and its relation to His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India. The plan of 1929, made to meet the requirements at the time of a campaign against Russia, seems to Wavell and myself to be hardly applicable to contemporary conditions. I have given you in my telegram the broad grounds upon which our opinion is founded, and I must confess that they seem to me to be conclusive. I am sure my present Council would break up at once if told they were to have nothing to do with the general conduct of a campaign for the defence of India. A more “political” Government would not tolerate such a position for a moment. We shall of course be ready to provide you with a more formal statement of our views if that is required later on.

9. We have a house full of Governors at the moment. Glancy is leaving tonight and at the moment Lumley, Herbert, Hallett, and Cunningham are here.
Cripps’ visit has therefore been the occasion for a conference of Governors which, I know, some of them would like to be of more frequent occurrence, but which in these days is not an easy matter to arrange.

Warming up here now.

Nos. 353 and 361.  No. 325.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&F/10/4: f 12

MY INTERVIEW WITH THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

23 and 24 March 1942

I explained to the Executive Council why no details of the scheme could be disclosed at this stage. They made no response while I was there; it appears that they called back the Viceroy to say that they wished to have the scheme disclosed to them before discussions with the Indian Leaders began.

I saw the Viceroy about this and agreed to disclose the details on Tuesday on the understanding that they would be regarded as being of the utmost secrecy.¹

I met the Executive Council again on Tuesday for this purpose.

¹ See No. 367, para. 5.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

24 March 1942

No. 766–G. Following is summary of press account of speech by Jinnah at “Pakistan Day” public meeting in Delhi, on March 23rd:

Begins. It is true that Cripps is friend of Congress but we should not be afraid on that score, as he has not come in personal capacity. If His Majesty’s Government’s scheme is detrimental to Muslim interest we will never accept it. I warn Government against attempt to suppress League or create disruption therein. We know our cause is righteous; we are asking for justice; we have no designs upon our sister communities; we want to live in this land as free and independent nation. We are not minority, but nation. If we have adopted attitude of non-embarrassment towards British Government, we know that
if British Government are broken we are also in danger. We are not going to co-operate as camp-followers of Government. League stands more firmly for freedom and independence of this country than any other community. It is a libel to say we want to support British Imperialism. I have never accepted idea that we should be under any foreign domination in this country. Let us treat Cripps as representative of British Government and reserve judgment. We are prepared to face all consequences if any scheme detrimental to interests of Muslims is forced upon us. We shall resist it to utmost; if we have to die in attempt we shall die fighting. We have two opponents—Hindu leadership and British leadership. It is futile to attempt to create differences and disruption among Muslims and Muslim League. League is only authoritative organisation of Muslims. We cannot tolerate Muslims in camp of enemy. Non-League Muslims are traitors in enemy camp. Ends.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 24 March 1942

So Cripps has duly arrived and made his first bow to the Press. His opening interview certainly seems to have gone off very well. What I shall be more anxious to know, if you have time to write, is how his opening talks have gone with you, with Wavell, with your Executive, and with Provincial Governors. A great deal to my mind turns on the extent to which the first two days will have given him your background and that of the administration before he talks to the politicians. As regards the latter, the atmosphere certainly seems to be as favourable as one could have hoped. It remains to be seen whether in face of the external danger any of the Congress leaders can be persuaded to realise that the half loaf, which is all that either we or the rest of India can give them, is better than no bread. Jinnah, I should have thought, will be content to realise that he has now got Pakistan in essence, whether as something substantive or as a bargaining point, though no doubt the purely provincial delimitation will want a good deal of adjustment so as to secure what he calls "zones". In that connection, by the way, I notice that the use I made of the words "area or region" in my simplified version of the proposed declaration—when it was still going to be a declaration—was intended in the broader sense of zones, and not, as I gather you took it, in the sense of some divisions even smaller than Provinces.
2. I was amused by your account of your talk with Coupland³ and I am sure that it will be a good thing for him to stay on for these talks⁴ before he goes home to write up his constitutional plan for the future. As regards that plan, the more I think of it the more probable it seems to me that in some form or other the Viceroy will have to remain, not merely as constitutional Governor-General, but as representative of broader imperial aspects of government, for a long good time to come, and to be equipped with the instruments of power required to carry out his functions. After all, supposing that Pakistan come off, there will be possibly two Muslim areas, the whole of the States, Hindu British India (if that does not divide itself up!) and finally at least one important primitive hill tribe area such as that which Reid has very interestingly outlined in the memorandum⁵ which reached me by the last mail. It is obviously absurd to think that each of these is going to have its own air force and navy or even its own mechanised ground forces on any scale that is going to be of use for the defence of India. There will therefore have to be someone, in the absence of a central self-governing federal scheme, to take control of these matters, and that someone will have to have at any rate a certain number of cantonments, aerodromes and ports with probably a central reserve area of his own. He may not have a real Legislature, but only delegations from the different Legislatures, in other words, he may find himself presiding over the kind of inchoate system which, as President Roosevelt has reminded Winston,⁶ prevailed in America between 1783 and the framing of the present American Constitution. So whatever else you do or agree to, you had better keep in mind the desirability of retaining Delhi and a considerable area around it as the ultimate federal territory of an eventually united India, and not let it pass into the hands of any one of the “Dominions” that may temporarily emerge out of the first experiment in constitution framing. However, it is really rather absurd speculating about the constitutional future when there are so much more pressing immediate military problems before us.

3. I entirely agree with you⁷ that the kind of division of command contemplated by the Imperial Defence Committee in 1929 cannot apply in the India of today and that the defence of India must in effect be conducted by the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the Government of India, ultimate difficulties being resolved at the highest level between Wavell and yourself on one side and the Cabinet and myself on the other. I do not see what other solution is workable, whether with your present Executive or with a possibly more political one resulting from Cripps’ negotiations. In paragraph 12⁸ of

¹ See No. 279, in which the words used were ‘region or regions’. Mr Amery’s other ‘simplified version’ (Enclosure to No. 292) does not appear to have been communicated to Lord Linlithgow.
² See No. 288, para. 2. ³ See No. 30, para. 15. ⁴ Cf. No. 300, para. 3.
⁵ Not printed. ⁶ See No. 311. ⁷ See No. 361. ⁸ Not printed.
your letter of February 2nd you expressed your anxiety that your work in connection with amphibious warfare was not receiving such support as it might from this end. I have taken the liberty of sending that paragraph to Lord Louis Mountbatten, who is dealing with the whole question of combined operations here, and hope to have a talk with him in the next few days. I don’t know him well, but from what I have seen of him I have a feeling that there is more life and initiative in him than in most of our senior officers and I only hope that Winston will soon give him even wider scope.

4. In that connection Lytton was telling me the other evening of his visits to the Sundarbans and expressed the view that they ought to form an area in which we could develop amphibious guerilla warfare on a considerable scale, if the Japanese were not before us in doing the same thing there. The same view was expressed to me by Edward Thompson who was strong on making the fullest use of all the bad characters in that part of the world on our side rather than letting them be recruited by the Japs. He mentioned in that connection that no one was so influential in that region as Narayan, who, I gather, is still in jail. I leave you to judge of that situation, but no doubt, when we are really up against it, we may have to revise a good deal our notions of who is a scoundrel to be suppressed or a scoundrel to be utilised or even made much of. In that connection I wonder whether you have at all revised your opinion of Roy? Do you still think him a mere light weight, or is it possible, especially if the politicians fail to play up, that in case of invasion he might become a really useful factor?

5. To turn back to another matter more concerned with the future, I have been reading with much interest the various memoranda on the problem of Indian students in this country. Lall has also been concerned with the problem at this end and produced a memorandum, which I have not seen yet, but which I understand is very much on the lines of those which you have had in India. When I see it I must look further into the matter to see whether it may be possible to organise some improvement in existing arrangements. It has occurred to me as just possible that the Rhodes Trustees (we now include Hailey among our number) might possibly do something to help, which might be better appreciated than anything purely official.

*   *   *

9. I have been heckled a certain amount lately in the House of Commons by people who consider that India is not taking the war seriously enough and in particular by Milner and Lyons (a very tiresome questioner), who have attacked your own expenditure, for instance in taking your Bodyguard about at what they allege to be considerable expense. I promised Milner last Thursday that I would make enquiries from you on the latter point and was going to do this by mail, but I am glad to see today a telegram from you which gives me the
answer. I am sending a line to Milner pointing out that it is necessary to keep up an essential minimum of state in India (I presume Bodyguard is part of such a minimum), as is done even here by the Palace, and that £30 is not a very large sum to move a Bodyguard a thousand miles. I hope this may have the effect of silencing him for the moment. Of course, there is only a handful of members who worry about this kind of thing, but naturally their remarks secure a good deal of publicity. On the other hand, it is, of course, the same sort of point that my Advisers have made to me more than once recently and I am sure it is essential that we should have good answers to give, even on such petty matters.

10. My wife showed me your little note recounting your prowess as a Nimrod. You certainly must be in pretty good physical trim even to pick up all the birds you shoot. Do you, I wonder, pursue that particular form of physical training which consists in throwing a pack of cards into the air when you get out of bed and picking them up individually so as to supple your waist and spine? Anyhow, do go on keeping fit. Fitness, plus a good seasoning of philosophy, is the best recipe for seeing through work like ours in these times.

10 Not printed.

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Sir H. Twynan (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

CAMP, 24 March 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Your Excellency’s letter dated the 20th March asking for my reactions and those of the Central Provinces and Berar to the Prime Minister’s announcement.

I feel at some disadvantage in commenting because, with the arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps and the initiation of discussions, any information which I can convey will at best be “secondary evidence”.

There is no doubt whatsoever that India is keyed up to a high pitch of expectancy and that the first reaction to the announcement was favourable. There are under-currents of scepticism, insistence upon bargaining and, I regret to say, malevolence but, generally speaking, my own personal reaction and that of the Province is undoubtably favourable.

1 Lord Linlithgow’s letter to Sir H. Twynam of 28 March (also in MSS. EUR. F. 125/63) mentions that he is showing this letter to Sir S. Cripps.

2 Not printed.
That reaction is of course now of secondary importance because it is the reaction to the actual terms of the “just and final” solution with which we shall soon be faced. It is inconceivable that the general scheme favoured by His Majesty’s Government will not be public property within a very short time in view of the number of persons whom Sir Stafford Cripps must see and the almost certainty that these latter will find it impossible to remain silent in face of their principal supporters. Of the proposals of His Majesty’s Government I of course know nothing and cannot therefore venture to suggest possible reactions of the public. My own personal reactions are twofold.

(a) A feeling that an attempt may be made to wriggle out of the war.
There is, I fear, little willingness for personal sacrifice to defeat the enemy and it is even reported by the C.I.O. that Gandhi regards the test of political power to be “freedom to negotiate with foreign powers, including enemy countries”.

I fear that one section of the Congress Working Committee will pitch its demands so high as to make it impossible to do business. Nehru’s attitude is said to be stiff and uncompromising and based on the absurd hypothesis that the British Government has already collapsed. Minds such as his, not uncommon in this country, jump readily to conclusions and the general feeling of uneasiness is evidenced by the almost universally current supposition that we are in for a period of lawlessness and Goonaidism against which Government will be powerless and, for coping with which, private organisations should be formed.

(b) My second reaction is a fear that in attempting to appease Congress and develop a satisfactory solution of the Indian problem, we should antagonise—not Jinnah, but the Muslim community. Jinnah will require very tactful handling, especially as, I feel little doubt, His Majesty’s Government’s decision must include a final rejection of Pakistan in the extreme sense suggested by Jinnah.

I imagine also that the two major political parties in this Province, as elsewhere, must be thinking on one or other of the two lines suggested above.

2. As your Excellency is aware, I am altogether in favour of the fullest measure of Self-Government for India after the war. I gather from Cripps’ first public statement that neither he, nor His Majesty’s Government, would for one moment contemplate any measures which aimed at non-belligerency for India during the course of the present war. Nevertheless, I am not at all sure that some such suggestions may not be made, perhaps hesitatingly: if they are made, I trust that they will be stamped on without hesitation.

It seems to me that Cripps’ best suit is the unanimity of His Majesty’s Government and the fact, obvious to us, that the British Parliament and the British people would be shocked at any suggestion that advantage should be taken of our present difficulties to obtain a position in which India could get out of the war.
The utmost that we can hope, I think, is for a split in Congress: this may be accompanied by a split in the Muslim League. Rajagopalachariar and Sikander Hyat Khan may—if the terms are as I envisage them to be—come in openly and fully on the side of Britain: I feel the gravest doubt about any support from Gandhi and his clique and some measure of doubt about Jinnah and his immediate followers. Not only that, but I cannot believe that the old Ministerial gang in this Province, Shukla, Misra & Co. will ever co-operate wholeheartedly in measures for the prosecution of the war; consequently, my earnest hope is that there will be a split in Congress which will eliminate the Gandhi clique and will permit of the formation of coalition Ministries representing Rajagopalachariar’s party in Congress and the Muslims. To permit of this even, the maximum of concessions will be necessary but I imagine that these are provided for.

3. As my fortnightly letter is due, I will round off this letter with a few other comments.

Reactions to Sir Stafford Cripps’ visit almost fill the bill of current events to the exclusion of everything else. The Chief Secretary’s report3 (copy enclosed) indicates the declining morale in face of our continued reverses. Personally I do not feel any uneasiness on this score. I am confident that law and order will be maintained in this Province and am surprised at the wishful thinking of the malevolent who imagine a breakdown of authority. Even if Cripps’ mission fails, I am sure that we can hold the fort both against the Congress and the Muslim League, provided always that we can maintain ourselves in India against the Japanese.

I am not very hopeful of results from the National War Front. There is no hope of arousing a national spirit in India such as exists in China: it simply is not there. The mass of the people regard government as belonging by right to any power which is strong enough to maintain itself and I have little doubt that the vast majority would acquiesce in Japanese rule without hesitation sooner than risk their lives or property. On the other hand, I do not think that we need worry about the Indian soldier who is loyal to his salt rather than to the geographical expression “India”. I am not confident however that we can expect a very high standard of discipline or self-sacrifice from our new armies. Again, the intelligentsia would certainly prefer Britain to conquer rather than Japan but they would be swept away if things got to a pass where the Japanese were in occupation.

On the whole, therefore, while I hope for a considerable measure of success for Cripps, I have little hope of him being 100 per cent. successful. At the same time, whatever the outcome, the clarification of the position can hardly fail to do good in the eyes of both India and the world but it will involve

3 Not printed.
clear differentiation between the sheep and the goats and we shall have to be prepared for the firmest measures against dissentients and those seeking to fish in troubled waters.

Yours sincerely,
H. J. TWYNAM

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Notes on Executive Council Meeting, at 6 pm on Tuesday, 24 March 1942

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

His Excellency expressed the appreciation of himself and his colleagues of the readiness and indeed the anxiety of Sir Stafford Cripps to give them the details of H.M.G.'s plan.

Sir Stafford, replying, said that he had no instructions to disclose the plan at this stage, but, since he knew of their anxiety, was very ready to comply with their desire. He then read the Declaration slowly. Mr. N. R. Sarker and Sir Firoz Khan Noon took notes rapidly of certain portions. Mr. N. R. Sarker particularly noted the clause about protection for minorities, and Sir F. K. Noon that about the right not to accede. Sir Stafford was asked (? by Sir Homi Mody) to read clause (e) again—relating to the arrangements during the war period.

Questions

Sir F. K. Noon at once enquired whether the Constituent Assembly would be set up by votes, in which those of non-Muslims would predominate. Referring to non-acceding provinces he asked, would they have their own constitution, and constitutions not inferior vis-à-vis the British Government? (At this Mr. Aney looked glum.) He further enquired whether non-acceding provinces could amalgamate, e.g., the N.-W.F.P., Sind, and the Punjab.

Sir Stafford said that this was possible, and stated that this could be done if they set up their own Constituent Assembly subsequently.

Sir F. K. Noon suggested that it would be well to elucidate this point clearly in presenting the declaration (Mr. Aney looked glum again).

Sir Homi Mody enquired how the choice of accession or non-accession would be determined, e.g., in the N.-W.F.P., where Congress was predominant.

Sir F. K. Noon gave the rejoinder that this would not be so after the next election.

Sir R. Mudaliar enquired whether the elections would be on the present franchise, to which Sir Stafford replied in the affirmative.

Sir H. P. Mody then asked whether the present Central Legislature would
come into the Constituent Assembly, to which Sir Stafford replied in the negative.

Sir R. Maxwell enquired whether provincial boundaries would be intact. Sir Stafford replied that the Constituent Assembly might decide to alter boundaries.

In reply to Sir R. Mudaliar, Sir Stafford said that they would not contemplate any alteration of provincial boundaries except by this method, i.e., by the Constituent Assembly.

Sir Homi Mody enquired how the defence problem would be handled if the States and some Provinces stood out. Sir Stafford replied that those remaining outside would continue to be British India unless their constitution were altered by a similar process.

Sir Homi Mody then asked how money would be allocated for defence. Sir Stafford replied that this would be according to the size of the area left outside the Union and its arrangement with the British Government.

In reply to Mr. N. R. Sarkar, Sir Stafford said that it was not contemplated that the non-acceding States should form a dominion.

Mr. Raghavendra Rao enquired what arrangements would be made about joint services such as railways, coin, and currency. Sir Stafford thought that this could only be done by agreement.

Mr. Raghavendra Rao observed that Central revenues would be reduced.

Sir Sultan Ahmed enquired whether there would be any Centre.

The Commander-in-Chief enquired about the future of the army. Sir Stafford replied that it would cease to exist as a British Army subject to the necessity of maintaining the existing army for a period of time.

The Commander-in-Chief then enquired whether during the intervening period the army would be supplied partly from the new union (Dominion) and partly from British India.

Sir F. K. Noon brought out the point that in Bengal and the Punjab, although the Muslim population was in the majority, the Muslim Members of the Assembly were less than 50 per cent. and could therefore be overruled by non-Muslims. Sir Stafford replied that the decision on accession would be that of the provincial government then existing. After a general election, that Government would have to decide whether they could accede having regard to their own internal minority problems.

Sir F. K. Noon observed that this was letting down the Muslims, as the present Government of Bengal had already shown that Muslims could be cheated, and that on a question of accession or non-accession all non-Muslim politicians would be solid against Muslims.

Sir R. Mudaliar enquired what kind of protection minorities would enjoy under treaty. Sir Stafford replied that it would probably be similar to the arrangement contemplated by the League of Nations, viz., the setting up of
some arbitral body. The Depressed Classes would certainly be a minority for this purpose.

In reply to further questions Sir Stafford Cripps explained that the Union Government itself would be bound by treaty to give effect to these minority provisions, and if not the ordinary sanctions would apply.

At this stage Sir Stafford was asked again to read the passage about the wartime arrangements.

Sir Homi Mody again raised the difficulty about customs and railways under any constitution that was not federal. Sir Stafford agreed that these difficulties were real, but said that it was not His Majesty's Government's intention to indicate the nature of their solution which must be left to Indians themselves.

His Excellency asked Sir Stafford Cripps to explain what precisely was in contemplation regarding the power to readjust provincial boundaries. Sir Stafford replied that the Constituent Assembly would have to consider the question of possible readjustment, and would have to bear in mind the effect of this on provinces acceding or not acceding.

Mr. N. R. Sarker asked who would decide on provincial boundaries. Sir Stafford replied that this would be for the Constituent Assembly (Mr. Sarker looked pleased). Sir Stafford emphasised, however, that it would be the old units (i.e., the existing provinces) which would exercise the option to come in or stay out.

Sir F. K. Noon enquired what would happen if Muslims in the Punjab refused to attend a Constituent Assembly. Sir Stafford replied that that would be unfortunate, because they would lose nothing by attending, and might get better conditions, by bargaining, for staying in. Sir F. K. Noon observed that it would be better for the Muslims to start a row after the war is over. He thought the Muslims should keep quiet now and fight afterwards.

Sir Homi Mody enquired whether the right to secede was in the Declaration. Sir Stafford replied in the affirmative (Mr. Sarker had spotted this on the first reading).

Sir Sultan Ahmed enquired what was going to be the position in the provinces until the end of the war. Sir Stafford replied that it would change only to such extent as His Excellency might decide.

Sir Sultan Ahmed then enquired how Bengal and the Punjab stood under the proposed arrangement. Sir Stafford replied that they might get a good price from the others as an inducement to come in. Sir Sultan Ahmed again drew attention to the fact that Muslim strength in the legislature in these two provinces was less than 50 per cent.

Sir F. K. Noon also reverted to this point, and simultaneously Mr. Sarker put the opposite point of view, expressing his fears that the Hindus might be forced to stay out by the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes.

At this stage Sir Stafford Cripps said that the Muslim point perhaps could only
be met by providing more than a bare majority to decide on accession, and undertook to look into it.

His Excellency enquired whether, if Bengal and the Punjab only went out, they would have a Central Government, to which Sir Stafford replied that what was contemplated was that they would form separate dominions.

Mr. Aney enquired whether they could accede later; and His Excellency observed that if they could some provision would be necessary for preventing every subsequent election in those provinces being fought on the issue of accession.

Sir F. K. Noon asked what immediate gain would result from this declaration. Sir Stafford replied that by settling these difficult questions they hoped to bring into the conduct of the war the whole of the energy of India at present dissipated by political controversy.

Sir F. K. Noon then enquired whether it was expected that Congress governments would come back in the provinces. Sir Stafford replied that he hoped so—on a suitable basis of agreement with the Muslim League.

Sir F. K. Noon observed that if Congress refused to agree to the setting up of proper coalition governments, then the Muslims had no intention of going back under Congress government after once experiencing it.

Mr. Aney enquired what was meant by “participation in the Councils of India”. Sir Stafford observed that the Declaration had said, “counsels” and not “councils”: the development of this participation was a matter for His Excellency.

Mr. Aney’s next remark clearly indicated that he was chiefly interested in immediate Hindu or Congress control of the existing Government. Sir Stafford observed that His Majesty’s Government must keep control of Defence, but apart from that participation of others would be welcome to any extent that His Excellency desired.

Sir Homi Mody observed that it would be impossible for the existing Executive Council to function if Provincial Governments were to be constituted as before, since under war conditions the Centre had to control Provincial affairs so much, and this would be impossible unless the Governments were all of the same complexion. His Excellency observed that he would have to take that into consideration.

Mr. Raghavendra Rao asked whether Hyderabad State could join the Muslim union if it wanted to; to which Sir Stafford replied: yes.

Mr. Aney observed that non-acceding Provinces, though Members of the Constituent Assembly, could subsequently back out nevertheless.

Mr. S. N. Roy asked for more precise information regarding sanctions to be applied in the event of a breach of the treaty in respect of the protection of minorities. Would the British Government step in? Sir Stafford replied that that would have to be decided in the then circumstances, as in the case of a breach of any other treaty.
Sir F. K. Noon remarked: "In the then circumstances?" (which I took to imply that having regard to the British Government’s record, e.g., at the League of Nations, this did not fill him with great confidence). On Sir Stafford remarking that they would have to decide how to enforce the treaty, Sir F. K. Noon remarked: "By going to war?".

Further discussion followed on the future of the Central Government in the event of Provinces remaining outside, and it was observed that it might be possible to have one Central Government in two halves with different responsibilities to the Union and to "Continuing British India". But it might be found necessary to have two Centres.

(His Excellency concluded the proceedings by observing that one Centre might be at Delhi and the other at Simla. He expressed the thanks of the Council to Sir S. Cripps.)

With reference to "A" on page 8 of the Diary; at this stage it seemed to me that His Excellency would be left to bear the complete brunt of demands for immediate participation in the Government, unsupported by His Majesty’s Government except as regards defence. It would be helpful if Sir Stafford Cripps would, in the course of his conversations, make it clear that His Majesty’s Government appreciated the practical difficulties and were [not ?] prepared to sell everything in advance except as regards the Defence portfolio.

L. G. PINNELL, 25.3.42

Approved. L. 25.3.42

1 This evidently refers to the passage side-lined A above.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

25 March 1942

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 773-S. I would be glad to have your latest reactions on the question of possible modification of those provisions of the Ninth Schedule1 which require three Members with service2 qualifications to be in my Executive Council.

2. I should perhaps add that anxious though I am to facilitate negotiations I should regard it as unwise that we should commit ourselves either on this matter or as to the form of my Government until we see what emerges from the reception of His Majesty’s Government’s proposals on their merits.

1 Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 36 (3).
2 ‘require three Members with service’ omitted in decipher.
I read the document slowly through asking for any interruptions upon points that did not seem too clear or satisfactory but I was not stopped until document was completed and the only points which seemed to interest him at all were those concerning the immediate steps in paragraph (e). He at once fixed upon the question of Defence and stated that, according to Congress view, it was necessary, in order to mobilise effectively the forces of the Indian people, to give the Indians the control of the defence of their country. I pointed out to him that strategically India had to be regarded as a part of a much greater theatre of war and that the decision on what troops, air forces and naval vessels were available for use in India and how best they could be used could only be made by the War Cabinet in London in the light of considerations affecting England itself, the Middle East, the Caspian front, Africa, Ceylon, Burma and other places in addition to India; that supplies could only be made available for India at the cost of other theatres and that therefore the British Government, if it was to carry the responsibility for the defence of India, must retain all control of Indian defence in its own hands; that the way in which India could participate in this was by the appointment of a representative to the British War Cabinet, where he would have the same position as the Australian representative who was now functioning. Upon this Azad reiterated his point of view as regards mobilising defensive power in India and the need for some great gesture such as the Indianisation of the Defence Ministry, though he was prepared to admit that in matters of strategy it would be wrong for any Indian Defence Minister to attempt to interfere with the Commander-in-Chief.

My general impression was that Congress wanted the appearance and name of an Indian Defence Minister while at the same time realising that he could not take any effective part in ordering the movement of troops or other military arrangements. Apart from this one point, I asked him whether he could suggest any other way in which we could have demonstrated more decisively our intention to give India full self-government at the earliest possible moment. He had no further suggestions to make. He promised to report to the Working Committee which would be coming to Delhi and to see me as soon as he had consulted them. I told him I would like to see Nehru and also that I had arranged to see Gandhi. He was extremely friendly throughout and left me in a very good humour.
Directly Mr. Jinnah arrived I broached the question of my past attitude towards the Muslim League and told him that the views I took two and a half years ago were sincerely taken and represented my judgement of the situation as it then was and that I had regarded the Pakistan propaganda as pure political pressure. He responded very amiably to this, recognising the sincerity of my views, which I told him the last two years had changed in view of the change in the communal feeling in India and the growth of the Pakistan movement, and explained to me the speech¹ he made the other day with reference to my visit, and this explanation started us off on a friendly basis.

I then gave him the document to read and, as I expected, he was substantially only concerned with the first part of the document, which I think rather surprised him in the distance it went to meet the Pakistan case. He stated of course that he was not prepared to give any views on it but we had a long discussion as to its effect, especially upon Bengal and the Punjab, and the main thing with which he was concerned was whether they would have the effective right to opt out of the constitution in the event of their so desiring. I told him that I had discovered a difficulty as regards these two Provinces and explained the position which would arise if it were left to the Legislative Assembly whether to accede or not, and suggested as an alternative method that all Provinces should formally accede to the New Constitution by vote of their Legislative Assemblies but that in cases where there was less than a three-fifths majority in favour of accession the two-fifths minority should have the right to demand a plebiscite of the total adult male population of the Province and that the plebiscite taken should then determine the question of accession or non-accession. He stated that he thought that the plebiscite was the only absolutely fair idea and he told me the only question was as to whether 40% was the right figure to apply to the minority.

I asked his opinion as to the operation of paragraph (e) and he did not seem to think that there would be any insuperable difficulty, provided the Viceroy would consult the Congress and himself on the composition of the Executive and would treat the Executive as a Cabinet rather than as the Executive according to the constitution.

He promised to lay the matter before his Working Committee in Delhi and to come back and see me immediately afterwards with his observations.²

² From the original text: "25 March 1942"

¹ From the original text: "the speech he made the other day with reference to my visit"
He was extremely cordial and when we parted expressed the view to me that the one thing that mattered was to be able to mobilise the whole of India behind her own defence and that he was personally most anxious to achieve this. On the whole I was hopefully impressed by his general attitude and his lack of pernickety criticism of phrases and words which I had rather expected. The only substantial suggestion he made as regards any alteration in the document before publication was that the phraseology of the second part of paragraph (c) (i) should be made clearer as regards the possibility of a second Dominion being set up. I promised to consider this before the document was actually published.

1 See No. 374.  
2 See No. 413.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: ff 119–20

MOST IMMEDIATE  
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

376. Superintendent Series. Your private and personal telegram 25th March 773–S.1 War Cabinet are uncommitted on this issue though it was clear from discussions that they would be prepared for positions on Executive Council to be offered to political leaders provided this would not embarrass the defence and good government of the war during the present critical time.

2. My own personal feeling has been that our aim should be on grounds of experience and continuity to keep three official members (but not necessarily in present charges) and incidentally avoid amendment of Act but that difficulties in way of Indian unofficial Finance Member are not insuperable and that we might consider possibility of Indian unofficial Defence Member in charge purely of administrative side. I would stick to European official Home Member in view of communal difficulties.

3. Above has been I repeat my own personal view. I cannot of course say that War Cabinet would not be prepared to reduce or abolish official members other of course than Commander-in-Chief if this were presented as essential part of agreement with political leaders but it goes without saying that they would pay particular attention to your and Commander-in-Chief’s views on effect this might have on Defence and good government of India which as you know they have throughout regarded as paramount consideration.

1 No. 378.
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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Commander-in-Chief and War Office)¹

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 122

MOST IMMEDIATE

25 March 1942, 4.45 pm

Received: 25 March, 2.20 pm

Unnumbered cipher 25/3. Following from Sir S. Cripps for Prime Minister secret and personal.

After consultation with Governors and Viceroy and others I have provisionally decided subject to your approval to publish the text of declaration on Sunday next² as it is almost certain to get out by that date in some form and to give a short explanatory broadcast from here the same evening dealing with those points of difficulty that have been raised in my interviews. I suggest simultaneous publication in England and if you think it wise broadcast of my talk by B.B.C. next day.

I will let you know finally 24 hours in advance of any publication.

¹ Circulated to the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee (Operations) by direction of the Prime Minister.
² 29 March.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 25 March 1942

My dear Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan,

You will have seen in the Press that the exchange of representatives between India and China at a high level has been accepted in principle by the Governments concerned. The intention of His Majesty’s Government and China is that, until such time as India attains Dominion Status, these Representatives should take the same position as that already accorded to the Indian Agent-General in America, and the American Commissioner in India, that is to say that Agent-General will be a part of His Majesty’s Embassy in Chungking with the personal rank of Minister. There is this possible difference on the psychological plane that there should be more scope for cultural ties and affinities between the two great countries of Asia than could be the case elsewhere in the world. And you will not fail to appreciate, too, how vastly important to the common war effort it is that during the coming critical month China should feel that in India she has an Ally who can give effective help in turning the tables against Japan, and how greatly her confidence will be affected by the manner in which and the personality by whom assurances can be given.
It is with thoughts such as these in mind that I have determined, in consultation with His Majesty's Government, to ask you if you will step forward to fulfil this important and difficult rôle at a critical juncture in the history of India, the Empire and Asia as a whole. That you have been for so long a member of my Government, and that you now sit on the Federal Court, are matters which will not escape Chinese notice, and, apart from other qualities, will incline them to assess rightly the importance which His Majesty's Government, and I myself, attach to the filling of the new post in a manner consistent with its dignity and importance. I could not of course expect you to renounce your Judgship in order to go to China, but I understand from the Chief Justice that having regard to the weighty considerations involved, he would be prepared to acquiesce in an arrangement whereby you would fill the post at Chungking, retaining your position as a Puisne Judge of the Federal Court, for a period of six months. The next six months will be the critical time, and the important thing is to inaugurate the new arrangements in a worthy manner. Thereafter you would be able to revert to your duties on the Federal Court.

In making this appeal to you I am very fully conscious of the sacrifice I am asking you to make. Chungking, as we know well, is a place of dangers and discomforts, and I understand that it would be inadvisable for the Agent-General to be accompanied by his family. In fact, as I see it, the post will be in the nature of an heroic one, and there are few men on whom I feel I could call with confidence to sustain it. If, as I greatly hope, you accept, I need not assure you how greatly my own anxieties will be eased by the thought that the post is held by a tried and valued colleague and Counsellor in whom, as our association has so often shewn, I am able to repose the completest confidence.

A word is necessary about the terms of appointment. The suggestion would be that you would retain your emoluments as a Puisne Judge of the Federal Court (Rs. 5,500 per mensem), free of Income-tax. Emoluments on this scale are a little higher than the aggregate of those drawn by His Majesty's Ambassador himself, but justification for that result can be sought in the proposal that you should proceed as a Judge, en mission and for six months only, to inaugurate the post. Owing to difficulties of accommodation in Chungking it will be necessary in any case to ask the Chinese Government to make a house available, and the Government of India will be prepared to meet the rent and reasonable expenditure on furnishing and so on, as has been done for Bajpai in America. Smaller details could be varied in the light of experience gained.

I shall naturally be ready to discuss these matters with you at any convenient time. But it is my hope that you will see your way to accept my proposals, and in that event that you will be able to make the journey at an early date.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW
Sir Stafford gave His Excellency the following particulars of his interviews:\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Maulana Kalam Azad} had been polite. Sir Stafford Cripps asked him whether he could suggest any way in which His Majesty’s Government could give better proof of their sincerity. Azad did not answer. Later he said that they must have an Indian in charge of defence, and must be made to feel that defence was their affair. Sir Stafford Cripps explained that at this stage they could not make it a purely Indian responsibility. There were British and Imperial, and American forces involved; with reinforcements from all parts of the world. It was essentially an Imperial and International affair. The Government of India were of course deep in the matter and would be more deeply associated still; but the Commander-in-Chief must remain as the Member in charge of Defence in the Executive Council. Azad then asked if it was not possible to give them something of the kind, so that they might appeal the more effectively to the people.

\textit{Jinnah}. Sir Stafford Cripps disarmed him by apologising in advance for his articles in the \textit{Tribune}, saying that they represented his impressions at the time, and if they were wrong he was sorry. He hoped Jinnah would realise that he had the fullest sympathy with the just cause of minorities. Jinnah said little but appeared pleased; picked up the Declaration, and said he would consult his colleagues.

With regard to the date of an announcement by Sir Stafford Cripps? (accompanied by publication of the Declaration\textsuperscript{3}), His Excellency and Sir Stafford agreed that the announcement should be released at the appropriate time on Sunday evening for simultaneous publication in India and London on Monday morning (the League and Congress will by then have consulted their working committees).

His Excellency then observed that he was glad that Sir Stafford was going to meet him every day, and thought it most important that each should know how the other’s mind was working without reserve. His Excellency drew his attention to the telegrams\textsuperscript{3} on the question of the Executive Council, both to the Secretary of State and to Cabinet, and observed that though he had nothing firm from His Majesty’s Government, his own position was clear enough. Sir Stafford Cripps recalled these telegrams, and agreed that His Excellency had made his own position perfectly clear. His Excellency, pursuing the matter, observed that he knew the people concerned better than Sir Stafford Cripps
did. He knew how little administrative experience they had, and how prejudiced they were both in their own minds and by statements made so often to their followers. He considered it vital to keep some steady horses in the coach during this critical period. But if Sir Stafford Cripps could do the big thing and get the assent of Parties to the declared policy of His Majesty's Government, His Excellency was prepared to take big risks because the situation would call for them. If, on the other hand, only one Party was prepared to come in, His Excellency would not be prepared to pay the big price by way of the Executive Council: it would not be worth it. Sir Stafford Cripps replied that he entirely agreed, and thought he had made this clear in his press release. 4 His Excellency, as a last word, remarked to Sir Stafford that he would forgive almost anything except stealing His Excellency's cheese to bait his own trap. Sir Stafford said that he agreed, and thought His Excellency's attitude reasonable.

His Excellency concluded by saying that if Sir Stafford could do the big thing he would not find His Excellency falling short: and His Excellency himself would be most concerned if, in the event of failure, Sir Stafford had the slightest feeling that failure was due to anything on His Excellency's part; but he (His Excellency) would not pay the big price for the sake of getting one party in: in that way lay disaster.

L.,—26.3

1 Unsigned, but presumably by Mr Pinnell, the initial at the foot denoting Lord Linlithgow's approval.
2 Cf. Nos. 379 and 380.
3 Lord Linlithgow may have been referring to Nos. 183, Points 5 and 6, 184, para. 11, 209, paras. 3–4, 274 and 275, para. 7.
4 This presumably refers to No. 400.

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Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/84

CAMP, 25/26 March 1942

REPORT NO. 6

8. Stafford Cripps' visit. In the course of other comment in your letter of the 16th March, 1 Your Excellency asks for my own reactions and the reactions of my Province to the Prime Minister's announcement and Cripps' visit. Here the Ministry in power is anti-Congress and predominantly pro-landlord. While Cripps' visit is welcomed, the general feeling on the Government side is that care must be taken to see that Congress does not get away with it, and that

1 Not printed.
in any changes that are made the landholder interest is protected. (I do not suggest that Godavaris Misra would subscribe to this part of the Government reaction since while now anti-Congress his position is still pro-tenant.) On the side of the orthodox Congress Orissa takes its lead from outside and there is nothing special in the provincial reaction. A view put to me a few days ago as a local Congress view was that they wished well to Cripps and would do nothing to hamper him, but that his work would be judged in terms of the freedom and independence which he obtained for India. Since we have no Hindu-Muslim complications in Orissa, the radical relation which that part of the problem bears to its solution is apt to be lost on local leaders.

9. My personal reaction I would express precisely in Your Excellency’s own words that the statement that there is now a definite plan on which His Majesty’s Government are united is all to the good. I have the clearest recollections of my talk with Cripps on his visit to India two years ago. So much depends on his success; may good fortune attend his efforts. But big difficulties lie in the way. It may be, however, that with danger now so close Cripps may have a better chance than has previously offered of getting round those difficulties and inducing all concerned to get together and work for the country as a whole.

*   *   *

18. Landholders. Since I wrote the above the Prime Minister\(^2\) has seen me this morning with a party of six or seven of his zemindar colleagues, representing the greater part of the large landholder interest in Orissa. I had declined to receive a formal deputation for the transmission of views to Stafford Cripps, who I told them was in charge of his own programme, but I agreed to receive them informally to hear anything they wished to tell me on the present situation. Paralakimedi acted throughout as their spokesman. He said they are concerned as regards their position in the future India; they have no wish to stand in the way of India’s progress and wish to take part both in making and running such new constitution as may emerge, but that since the present constitution was made they have consistently been the main target of Congress attack. They emphasised their loyalty to the British connection, and their help in the war effort. It was only the present safeguards which (by Your Excellency’s withholding of assent to Congress legislation) had saved them from expropriation. Safeguards for landholders in the future constitution were doubly necessary and should be secured to them. In particular they urged that the franchise was already too low and that if to so ignorant an electorate adult suffrage were given the result would be disaster. They said they were hurt that landholders as such had not been invited to see Cripps. It was all the same to them whether they were regarded as a special interest or as a minority, but their claims should not be overlooked.
19. I remained throughout a silent listener, took a few notes, made no comments, and gave no undertakings as regards such action as I might take. This is a brief account of what transpired. The claims of the landholders much in these terms have frequently been under Your Excellency’s notice.

2 The Maharaja of Parlakimedi.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 19

INTERVIEW WITH THE JAM SAHEB AND [THE] MAHARAJA OF BIKANER

26 March 1942

I saw these two Princes as representatives of the Chamber and gave them the document with an explanation.

The only two points which seemed particularly to interest them were, first, as to whether if they entered the constitution-making body they would have the right to withdraw if the constitution did not suit them, and secondly, as to whether, in such an event, the Treaties with the Crown would remain unaffected save in such matters as common services, i.e. railways, etc., and similar incidents which would require regulating with the new Indian Union. I assured them that this was the intention and was covered by the statement in the document, and also pointed out that the document allowed not only for an option as to coming into the constitution-making body but also an option as to going out if they did not agree with the constitution as formulated.

The Maharaja and [the] Jam Saheb spent a considerable time in explaining to me how advanced the administration of many of the Princes was, as to which I made no comments. They stated that they would submit the document to their Chamber and would probably come and see me again with any further questions that arose. They were extremely friendly and did not seem at all worried at the contents of the document.
After a short preliminary talk about labour conditions I showed him the document, which I read through to him slowly and subsequently went through again.

His general reaction to it was favourable, with the one exception of the Defence reservation in para. (e). He took much the same line as Maulana Azad on this, though not quite so strongly, and suggested that some sort of compromise might be made by having a nominal Defence Minister who would occupy himself with administrative matters, leaving a clear line of definition between him and the Commander-in-Chief. It seemed that he was really more concerned with the possibility of the Executive being able to make comment upon and tender advice as to Defence matters rather than exercise any control over them.

I asked him what his general impression was as regards the likelihood of acceptance by Congress and the Muslim League, and he said that he thought the Muslim League would accept and that certainly the Congress ought to but as to this he was not certain.

I asked him about his Trades Union Congress, but he said it was divided into roughly three sections, Communists, Congress and a section not attached to either of the political sections. He stated that on the basis of the document, if the Congress accepted it there would be a 100% vote in favour of it by the Trades Union Congress, otherwise there would be a two-third vote in favour, Congress members taking the same attitude as Congress.

He raised one or two other matters, such as the release of the political prisoners, but I told him that I could not go into any such thing until the major point was disposed of.

He expressed the view that there might be some difficulty for the Viceroy in agreeing to proportions between the communities for the allocation of seats in the Executive if that course was adopted, but agreed with me that once the final situation was clarified it would diminish the importance of the Executive proportionality in the existing circumstances.

1 See No. 379.
I showed him the document and he was, of course, only interested in the position of the Anglo-Indian Community, and I pointed out to him that, as a very small numerical minority, the best that they could hope for would be to get the Congress in the constituent assembly to give them as good terms as possible as a minority. He accepted this position but was anxious that H.M.G. should, if possible, render the community some assistance after the transfer of power as they would, he anticipated, find themselves in a very difficult position, especially in the matter of continued education, to which he attached importance. I told him that it was quite impossible to give any sort of promise as regards these matters but that if he put forward some reasonable demand it would, I was sure, have consideration in view of the special position of this community, but beyond that I could not say anything.

Mr. Sarker at once asked me what I thought would be the reactions to the Cripps Declaration.

I said that that was the question I was wanting to ask him. His general view is, so far as I can gather, that the Declaration would put the Congress in a difficult position as it gave them the essence of what they had asked for, namely, the right of Indians to settle the communal question between themselves. He doubted however whether they would accept it because they would not wish to take responsibility at this stage.
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War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 14
L/PO/6/106c: ff 98-108

Ultimate Control of Operations in India
memorandum by the Secretary of State for India

INDIA OFFICE, 26 March 1942

I circulate herewith, for consideration by the Committee, telegrams1 exchanged with the Viceroy on the above subject, together with a draft telegram in which I ask concurrence. This is a matter of special urgency in view of the impending publication of the Government's declaration on Indian Policy.

L.S.A.

Annex to No. 390

Draft Telegram2

From Secretary of State for India

To Governor-General

Your telegrams 20th March 724-S and 22nd March 751-S His Majesty's Government agree of course that conditions confronting Committee of Imperial Defence in 1929 were very different in many respects not only in methods and range of operations but also in allocation of governmental responsibilities in India from those in which threat of invasion by Japan has to be faced. But the two have this much in common that now as in case then discussed defence of India is being conducted from India but outside India by Commander directly responsible to His Majesty's Government and that there is possibility of these operations extending to Indian territory. The question to what extent the authority of the Government of India in India must be affected by force of circumstances arises now as then but His Majesty's Government agree that the answer is not to be found by forcing analogy with 1929 conclusions.

2. Your 724-S. His Majesty's Government agree that Commander-in-Chief India should as such be in control of operations for defence of India in Burma, Ceylon and in India itself and should be relieved of such of his normal functions as may be convenient by devolution to Deputy Commander-in-Chief. They are content to leave to him such reorganisation of General Headquarters as he may decide to be necessary to cope with situation as it develops.
3. Your 751–S. Since operations against Japanese even if they develop on Indian territory cannot be wholly dissociated from those against Axis Powers elsewhere it is fundamental that final decision in regard to control of them must lie with War Cabinet (in conjunction with U.S.A.). It follows that Commander-in-Chief India must be responsible in respect of control of operations in India as elsewhere to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom (compare paragraph (e) of draft declaration of policy in possession of Lord Privy Seal). But it is equally evident that if Governor-General’s Executive Council (particularly if materially reconstituted or expanded) is to take effective share in counsels for defence of India this responsibility to His Majesty’s Government must not be exercised to exclusion of Governor-General’s Council. Commander-in-Chief should therefore be at pains to inform Governor-General betimes of any proposals whether emanating from himself or from Chiefs of Staff or His Majesty’s Government (whether, for example, for broad disposition of forces available for defence of India or for supersession of civil authority by military in any part of India) which seem likely to involve questions of high policy or directions to Provinces by Central Government in exercise of emergency powers vested in it. It would remain as now responsibility of Governor-General to decide whether to lay any such proposal before his Council and if necessary to forward to Secretary of State for India any representations against it. Such representations would be given full and careful consideration by War Cabinet but it must be accepted by Governor-General in Council that final decision must lie with His Majesty’s Government in United Kingdom.

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1 Nos. 325, 353 and 361.
2 Mr Amery transmitted the text of this draft to Lord Linlithgow in telegram 5540 of 26 March. The words 'as he no doubt always is' were inserted after the word 'pains' in the third sentence from the end. L/WS/1/1271: ff 65–6.
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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)¹

Telegram, R/30/1/1: f 18

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 26 March 1942, 12.55 am

No. 788–S. Following from Lord Privy Seal.

Begins. After further discussion with Viceroy and owing to rumours of contents of document which are now circulating, I consider it essential that publication should be made here not later than Monday morning’s press with simultaneous publication in press in London on Monday morning,² but B.B.C. must not repeat not broadcast before it appears in Monday morning’s press. I will broadcast short explanation to India Monday evening. Please confirm your approval. Ends.³

¹ Circulated to the War Cabinet and the Committee on India. See also No. 382.
² 30 March.
³ On his copy of this telegram, Mr Churchill minuted to Sir E. Bridges as follows: ‘I see no objection, but India Cte shd see’.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)

Telegram, R/30/1/1: f 17

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 26 March 1942, 2.15 pm

No. 792–S. Following from Lord Privy Seal.

I saw Azad and Jinnah yesterday.¹ Initial reactions seemed favourable though both reserved judgment till they had consulted their Working Committees.

2. Jinnah pointed out that closing words of paragraph (c)(1) were too indefinite and I therefore propose to revise wording before publication as follows. Omit all words after ‘prepared’ and substitute ‘to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down’.

¹ See Nos. 379 and 380.
War Cabinet
Committee on India. T(42) 9th Meeting

L/PO/6/106c: ff 116–8

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 26 March 1942 at 6 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Viscount Simon, Sir John Anderson, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary). Mr C. J. Radcliffe attended for items 1–3, others for item 5 only.

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TEXT OF DRAFT DECLARATION

1. The Committee considered telegram No. 792–S\(^1\) from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, in which the Lord Privy Seal proposed the following amendment to the draft Declaration:

Omit all words after “prepared”, in the last line but one of the comment on paragraph (c) (i), and substitute the following:

“to agree upon a new Constitution, giving them the same full status as Indian union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down”.

The Committee:
Approved this alteration, and authorised the Secretary of State for India so to inform the Lord Privy Seal.

PUBLICATION OF TEXT OF DECLARATION

2. The Committee considered the proposal that the text of the Declaration should be published at the week-end (personal telegram of 25th March\(^2\) from the Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister, and telegrams 788–S\(^3\) and 792–S from the Viceroy).

\(^{1}\) No. 392. \(^{2}\) No. 382. \(^{3}\) No. 391.
The Committee:
Authorised the Secretary of State for India to despatch a telegram at once, saying that publication was agreed to, and that he assumed that both the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief concurred in this course.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLICATION

3. Sir Stafford Cripps contemplated simultaneous publication of the Declaration in the Indian Press and in the London Press on Monday morning. This course was approved. It was agreed that a Declaration of this kind should first be seen in print, rather than be given out on the broadcast.

It would, however, be necessary that Sir Stafford Cripps should give a lead to the Indian Press. This would have to be done at a Press Conference on Sunday afternoon, and, to avoid premature publication, steps would have to be taken to ensure that the news did not leave India, by taking appropriate measures to prevent leakage in telegrams from India on the night of Sunday/Monday.

Similar arrangements would have to be made in this country: i.e., the text of the Declaration would have to be given to the Press on Sunday afternoon, for issue on Monday morning, together with suitable guidance, and corresponding measures would have to be taken with regard to telegrams leaving this country on the night of Sunday/Monday.

Agreement was expressed with this plan, although it was realised that it would be impossible to make arrangements in Canada, Australia and the United States on the lines proposed in this country and in India for giving the news to the newspapers some hours before the time fixed for publication.

Great importance was also attached to the guidance given to the Press on Sunday afternoon being based on that given by Sir Stafford Cripps to the Indian newspapers.

The Committee:
(1) Gave general approval to the above arrangements.
(2) Instructed the Director-General of the Ministry of Information to concert the Press and publicity arrangements with the Press Officer of the India Office, on the above lines:
(3) Asked the Secretary of State for India to telegraph to the Lord Privy Seal urgently, requesting him to telegraph home the lines on which he proposed to give guidance to the Press Conference in India on Sunday afternoon.
CONTROL OF OPERATIONS IN INDIA

4. The Committee had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (I. (42) 14), and concurred in the terms of the draft telegram to the Governor-General appended thereto.

5. [Minute on U Saw. Not printed.]

4 No. 390.
5 Without alteration, except for the minor amendment noted in Annex to No. 390, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 97

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 26 March 1942, 7 pm

382. Your private & personal telegram 26th March 788–S. Agree to publication Monday morning. Assume you and Commander-in-Chief concur.

1 No. 391.

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Mr Bracken to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/I/1/751: ff 426–7

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

26 March 1942, 9.15 pm

5548. Following for Lord Privy Seal from Minister of Information. Begins. On basis simultaneous publication in press of India and United Kingdom on Monday morning, the following provisions are required:

1. No references to Declaration to appear in broadcasts in India or press messages from India before 03.00 B.S.T. We assume Censorship can be instructed accordingly.

2. Text of declaration will be made available to press in this country on Sunday afternoon but similar ban will be imposed on any broadcast or outgoing press messages.

3. B.B.C. will not mention until Monday morning Indian transmission at 08.00 hours.
4. It is essential that you send us as full as possible guidance on same lines as will be given to Indian press so that this may be made available to press in this country on Sunday afternoon and they may take same line as you are giving in India.

5. The B.B.C. will arrange to record or take live your Monday evening broadcast if 48 hours previous notice can be given. Ends.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: ff 23-5

INTERVIEW WITH A NUMBER OF SIKHS

27 March 1942

Baldev Singh; Ujjal Singh; Master Tara Singh; Sir Jogendra Singh. After reading through the document with some explanation, they naturally raised immediately the question of protection of the Sikh minority and the possibility of having some redistribution of provincial power between the eastern and west Punjab in order to carve out a province in which the Sikhs would have the decisive voice as a large balancing party between Hindu and Moslem. We then went again very carefully through the document and I pointed out to them the successive stages at which they might hope to be able to exert pressure which would enable them either to remain part of the single Indian Union or to get some provincial autonomy within the second Union if such was formed. These stages were as follows. First of all in the constituent assembly Congress would not have a clear majority or at least a very small one and would desire to get the smaller minorities such as the Sikhs on their side by making the most ample provision for their protection in the New Constitution. This would set a standard of minority protection which might well be satisfactory to the Sikh community and might even entail the subdivision of the Punjab into two provinces or the setting up within the Province of the Punjab of a semi-autonomous district for the Sikhs on the Soviet model. If this failed and the Constitution did not contain sufficient clauses to satisfy the Sikhs, then in the Treaty which would be negotiated contemporaneously with the framing of the Constitution we should be able to insist on the insertion of minority protection clauses in accordance with the definition set out in the document. The form of these would be a matter for negotiation. If, when the constitution was finally settled, the Moslems decided that they had not got sufficient concessions to enable them to remain within the Indian Union, then
The Viceroy and Lady Linlithgow walking with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek in the gardens of the Viceroy’s House, 9 February 1942.
Sir Stafford Cripps, Maulana Azad and Pandit Nehru, 1942; in the background is the Secretariat, New Delhi.
Mr. Jinnah departing from an interview with Sir Stafford Cripps, 1942.
Mr L. S. Amery with Sir Stafford Cripps on his return from India, 21 April 1942.
it would be necessary for them to obtain a vote of non-accession by plebiscite in the Punjab. Although they would have a narrow majority for this purpose they would no doubt be anxious to increase that majority as far as possible, both in order to make certain of a majority and also to have as favourable an atmosphere for setting up the new second Dominion as possible. The probability would be that they would try to get the Sikh vote to support their action and in order to do so would offer minority protection clauses going further than those already offered by the Indian Union and possibly going as far as agreeing to a division of the Province or the setting up of a semi-autonomous district. There would be the meeting of the second constitution-making body in which the Sikh minority would be able to exert its pressure for minority protection if it had not previously succeeded in getting what it wanted. If at all these points they had still failed to get protection, then in the negotiation of the Treaty with the second Dominion the British Government would, in carrying out the words of the document, insist upon adequate protection for the Sikh minority, and that protection would be guaranteed to the extent that if it were not given there would be a breach of the Treaty between the Dominion and the British Government and whatever action was appropriate could follow. I pointed out to them that once granted our decision to allow the Indian peoples complete freedom in determining their own constitution, there was nothing further that we could do to provide protection for the minorities as we could not intervene in the making of the constitution or in its carrying out after the Dominion had been set up beyond insisting upon the observation by the Dominion of its Treaty obligations as regards minorities.

Although they were obviously anxious, first of all to avoid the setting up of a second Dominion, and secondly, if it were set up, to cut themselves out an autonomous district, I think they appreciated that we had done our utmost in the circumstances to provide protection and they were very pleased when I emphasised to them that this matter of protection to the Sikhs had been particularly discussed in the War Cabinet because of our very great appreciation of the contribution that the Sikhs had made in the past and were making now to the defence of India.

The only other point which they raised was as regards the intervening period. I explained to them, on the lines which I had explained to the others, that the forming of the Government was a matter for the Governor-General, subject to the general consideration laid down in para. (e), and that I was sure that the Indians who would be asked to participate would be chosen in consultation with the various principal sections of Indian opinion, a point upon which they laid stress.

They raised the question also of Defence and pointed out that from the point of view of Indian public opinion it was very essential that in some way or another an Indian Minister should be associated with Defence, though they
fully appreciated that all major questions of strategy, etc. must remain within
the province and control of the Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy.
They were extremely friendly and, I think, were fully convinced that we
were doing our utmost for them, and they promised to take away the document
and consult their Committee and come back in a day or two with their final
observations.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps
L/P&J/10/4: ff 26–30

MY INTERVIEW WITH MAHATMA GANDHI

27 March 1942

I gave Mr. Gandhi the document to read after a few short introductory remarks,
and he impressed upon me that he had not, of course, anything to do with
Congress officially and that any views he expressed would not necessarily be
those of the Congress. In the first instance he expressed the very definite view
that Congress would not accept the document, basing this upon two main
points—firstly, the paragraph dealing with the Indian States, secondly, that
dealing with accession or non-accession of Provinces. Curiously enough, he
also, in rather a vague way, questioned the point as regards the retention of
Defence in the British hands.

So far as the Indian States point was concerned, he stated that Congress
took the view that they could not tolerate the continuance of those autocratic
States under the aegis of the British Government with the right to call upon
the British armed forces to enforce the arbitrary power of their rulers. He
elaborated a number of instances of the arbitrary action of the Rulers against
the States’ peoples and suggested that the document envisaged the continuance
in perpetuity of such a regime in the case of those States that did not actually
come in to the new Indian Union. I pointed out that this was not so, but that
the first basis for any reform in State administration was the setting up of an
independent British India which by its influence and its economic power would
inevitably set up a movement of democratisation in the States, immediately
in so far as they came into the new Indian Union and more gradually so far
as those that stayed out were concerned; that beyond this the question was an
administrative one and that I was certain once the new basis was laid down for
British India that it would be the object of the British administration to en-
courage the States in the direction of a greater amount of democratic govern-
ment in order that they might more easily associate themselves with British
India. I asked him what his solution was, whether he suggested that we should immediately force all the States into the Indian Union; and he replied that he was against any such idea, he would like to see them all converted immediately into independent States having no reliance upon the paramountcy of the British Government as he felt certain that this would accelerate a movement for power by the States’ peoples. He did not wish to see the States’ Rulers disappear immediately but he wished them to convert their States, in the case of the larger ones into constitutional democracies, while the smaller States would have to be absorbed into the larger ones or into the Indian Union. After a very lengthy argument on this subject, he seemed inclined rather to moderate his view as to the difficulties raised by the document in this relation, though he did not withdraw it.

As regards the second point, he started by asserting that the document was an invitation to the Moslems to create a Pakistan. He acknowledged the great influence of Jinnah and that the movement for Pakistan had grown tremendously in volume during the last two years, though he was inclined to agree, when I expressed a doubt as to whether, when it came to the question of practical application, there would be as much support for the Pakistan idea as there was at the present time. I went through the document with him, pointing out that it was primarily based upon the conception of a united India and that it was only in the case of Congress being unable to come to an agreement with the Moslems in the Constitution-making body that any question of non-accession would arise. I told him that I had always understood the attitude of Congress was that, once the British Government were out of the way, as they would be in the Constitution-making body, it would be possible for the Congress and Moslems to come to an agreement. I also stressed my belief that agreement was more likely if we did not force the Moslems in but gave them the option of not coming in if they so desired when negotiations had been tried over the constitution-making period. Again, after very lengthy discussion, he seemed to be rather less certain of the antagonism of Congress on this point.

I then asked him frankly as a friend and not as a member of the Congress Working Committee or as the direct adviser of Congress to tell me what he thought was the best method of proceeding. He said he thought it would have been better if I had not come to India with a cut and dried scheme to impose upon the Indians, but when I reminded him that the first time I had met him he had told me that once it was made absolutely clear that India would achieve self-government on some ascertained date, what happened in the intervening period was of comparatively small importance, he seemed inclined to accept the view that this document was merely a finalising of the date and of the method which might be adopted pending the agreement of the parties upon any other or better one. He accepted, I think, this approach to the document and then said that he thought it was extremely inadvisable to have the document
published in any way whatsoever unless first agreement had been obtained from both the major communities. I told him that the intention was that it should be published on Monday and he asked me many times to see that it was not so published. He asked me what Jinnah’s views were as to publication. I told him that he had suggested that, in view of the danger of leakage, it would be wise to publish it before too long; and he interpreted this as being an indication that Jinnah would accept the scheme. I rather formed the view myself that the desire he expressed that it should not be published was because he was afraid of the pressure of public opinion upon Congress to accept the scheme against, perhaps, their wishes, and as to some extent depriving them of an opportunity of bargaining for a better position.

I then asked him how, supposing Jinnah were to accept the scheme and Congress were not to, he would himself advise me to proceed. He said that in these circumstances the proper course would be for me to throw the responsibility upon Jinnah and tell him that he must now try to get Congress in either by negotiating direct with them or by meeting them in association with myself. He thought that if it was pointed out to Jinnah what a very great position this would give him in India if he succeeded, that he might take on the job and that he might succeed. Similarly, if Congress accepted and Jinnah refused, he thought the onus should be thrown upon Congress to get in Jinnah. I told him quite definitely that I should have to make up my mind as regards acceptance or not within the next few days and that, if this scheme was not accepted, there would be no question of any other scheme, anyway before the end of the war, and that those people who had taken the Congress point of view in the past, like myself, would not be in a position to exercise further influence in England as regards the solution of the Indian problem, as it would generally be thought that this offer was one which Congress should have accepted and that it was no good making any further offer until the Moslems and Hindus agreed. He expressed, I think quite sincerely, his hopes that I should succeed in spite of what he had said, but more, I think, as a personal matter than as an indication that he wanted the scheme to go through.

He stated that he would be remaining in Delhi until Sunday night¹ as the Working Committee was meeting tomorrow, and that he would be most willing to come and see me again at any time I liked if I thought it would be of any assistance. I thanked him and indicated that I would either come and see him or ask him to come and see me sometime on Sunday.

¹ 29 March.
Sir Henry Richardson; Mr Haddow; Mr Lawson; Mr Hodgson; Mr Parker. This Group was mainly interested in the question of the protection of all European interests both during the transition period and in the permanent set-up after self-government has been granted. I read them the document on which I gave them notes and explained to them that the whole spirit of the document was that we should give India complete self-government and freedom and give her complete liberty to frame her own constitution in whatever way she liked; that we are not going to interfere in the form of that constitution by insisting upon any special rights for British subjects. I also pointed out that after the new constitution had operated they would, unless they accepted Indian nationality, become foreigners in this country. I further said that we had decided as a matter of principle that we would not include in the Treaty, which we made a condition of the acceptance of the constitution, any provisions protecting their commercial interests. Such matters will have to be dealt with in a separate treaty which would not be a condition of the granting of the new constitution and would deal with trade matters generally. So far as we could influence the terms of that second treaty, we should try and get protection for British commercial interests. They then asked what the position would be of British subjects who as a result of the granting of self-government find themselves deprived of their livelihood. I added that in my opinion there was no reason why British subjects should not be allowed to continue to operate their businesses after the new constitution came into operation but that if as a direct result of the constitutional change, individual British subjects found themselves deprived of their livelihood, I felt certain His Majesty’s Government would give due consideration to any claims they put forward with a view to alleviating the situation of such persons. I also pointed out that the British Government were prepared so far as Government employees and soldiers etc., were concerned to accept the complete liability in the case of their employment being discontinued. So far as the interim period was concerned I said that the form of the Government under clause (e) was a matter for the Governor General but assented to their proposal that the Executive Council would be substantially Indianised, but explained to them that until the new constitution became operative, the Government would have to be carried on on the basis of the existing Act subject only to some possible minor alteration which might be
necessitated after a new Executive Council were constituted. They promised, consequent on my explanation, to put their observations in writing and said that if necessary they would come and see me again.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Bracken (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, L/1/1/751: f 425

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 27 March 1942, 4.50 pm
Received: 27 March, 3.15 pm

Your telegram No. 55481 dated March 26th. Following from Sir Stafford Cripps for Minister of Information. Agree to your proposals release of document subject to following consideration; (? Your) para. No. 1. Presume you mean actual terms of declaration. Press already sense imminence of the announcement.

Paragraph 2, I shall release text of document to special press Conference at 6 p.m. Indian standard time Sunday March 29th for publication not before Monday morning newspapers here imposing ban on broadcasts and out-going press messages. At Conference I shall explain form of document copy of which will be circulated with document to press. Cabling text of explanation.

3. All Indian Radio bulletins will carry explanation and document from 7.20 hours Indian standard time Monday March 30th.

No. 4. Please treat explanation as your guidance.

No. 5. Important you should make available both explanation and document to Hennessy and/or British Library of Information for release in U.S.A. This will (? enable) us assure U.S.A. correspondents here that explanation and document will be available in U.S.A. in time. Essential American publication and broadcasting should not repeat not precede publication in India. Most desirable Indian public receive first publication from Indian sources.

Indian Bureau of public information will cover China Australia and New Zealand. Presume you will arrange cover Russia.

I shall broadcast to Indian listeners starting 8.30 p.m. Indian standard time Monday March 30th for approximately 15 minutes. Cabling exact duration later. Text of broadcast will be released to press here simultaneously. Please arrange that Reuter’s cable text to Dominions and America with copy to Hennessy. Indian Bureau of Public Information will cover China Australia and New Zealand.

1 No. 395.
400

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Bracken (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 115

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 27 March 1942, 9.10 pm

No. 806–S. Following from Sir Stafford Cripps for Minister of Information.

Below follows explanation referred to in my reply1 to your cable No. 5548.2 I shall read this explanation and circulate copies with the proposals at the press conference at 6 p.m. Indian Standard Time March 29th.

Begins. Press statement to accompany publication of document.

In handing you a copy of the conclusions arrived at by the War Cabinet I want to explain and make clear to you the form in which the document is drafted.

It is in the form of a declaration by His Majesty’s Government as to the future of India and as to the immediate (?) problem of Indian Government and defence.

I am giving it to you for publication today as a proposal which has been submitted to the leaders of Indian opinion by the War Cabinet and its publication is not the publication of a declaration by His Majesty’s Government but only of a declaration they would be prepared to make if it met with a sufficiently general and favourable acceptance from the various sections of Indian opinion.

I rely upon you all to make (?) that position abundantly clear.

Secondly I am sure I can rely upon every paper in India and throughout the world to deal with this document with the deep seriousness and responsibility which it deserves.

You have a very great opportunity and a great responsibility in the way in which you deal with the matter.

It is difficult to imagine a more weighty issue than this one, upon which the future, the happiness and freedom of 350,000,000 people may well depend.

Whatever you say as to it, I know I can trust you to say it with a full sense of its importance and with a full realisation that you too may play a part in the solution of this difficult problem, by the way you treat the document and by the manner of your publicity.

I have waited to make the document public until I had had the opportunity of submitting it personally to the leaders of main interests in India and until they had been able to submit it to their colleagues.

1 No. 399. 2 No. 395.
Now it is to be given a wider publicity and I commit it to your hands in confidence that whatever your views may be you will seek to help to bring all Indian opinion together and not to divide or exacerbate differences.

I shall myself be broadcasting an explanation tomorrow night to the Indian peoples and in view of that fact I do not now propose to answer any questions except upon the meaning of the document itself, in case there are any passages which are not wholly clear to any of you.

I will read the document to you slowly—and thereafter I will answer your questions. Ends.

401

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 114

IMPORTANT

NEW DELHI, 27 March 1942, 12.10 pm
Received: 27 March, 11.30 am

801—S. Your telegram to Foreign Office No. 1,355\(^1\) repeated to me.

Following for Agent General Begins. Many thanks for interesting information about Chiang Kai Shek’s reactions. There is little immediately which can be done about this, and there is no solution of problem however liberal which will miraculously convert a whole people to war-mindedness overnight. I am hoping that it may be possible to acquaint Chiang Kai Shek with H.M.G.’s suggestions for a solution which Sir Stafford Cripps is discussing now with Indian Leaders, before any announcement is made, and to secure from him some public statement to the effect that he welcomes these suggestions as a token of H.M. Govt.’s sincerity towards India. But it may be difficult.

(2. Two notes\(^2\) have been sent to Hennessy on Subhas Bose’s career; and appreciation of the effect in India of Bose’s broadcasts which should have given a useful background. Bose’s broadcasts have excited more curiosity than interest in India and except in Bengal have not had much effect. There were suggestions that it was not really Bose’s voice, a symptom perhaps of a feeling of shame that a prominent Indian leader should be in (? league) with Germany. Culminative (sic) effect of Axis propaganda supporting Bose, and attacking Cripps Mission may however have some effect, though Bose is not really a popular leader outside Bengal. The idea that his supporters have majority in North West Frontier Province, Punjab and Maharashtra, is of course utter nonsense.

Repeated to Secretary of State.)

\(^1\) No. 280. \(^2\) Not printed.
402

Sir Kingsley Wood to Mr Amery

L/PO|6|106c: f 137

TREASURY CHAMBERS, WHITEHALL, S.W.1, 27 March 1942

My dear Secretary of State,

I am rather concerned at Cripps’ telegrams Nos. 194 and 195. You will remember that I gave you a memorandum on 13th March suggesting that we should ask Cripps by telegram to amend the draft Declaration so as to make it clear that the phrase “His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for Indian defence” does not imply complete financial responsibility. In your letter of 21st March you pointed out that the draft had not been made public, and was to be merely in Cripps’ pocket as a basis for discussion, which is “a very different thing from a published declaration, by each word of which the authors are bound”; and you thought it unlikely that the phrase would be discussed textually.

With some misgiving, I decided to accept the position, supposing that if anything were to be published Cripps would report home when he reached the drafting stage.

The two telegrams I have mentioned show that the draft declaration has not, as you expected, been kept in Cripps’ pocket but has been shown to and discussed textually with, the Indian leaders and that publication of its text is proposed next Monday. It is evident that the precise wording is being closely scrutinised by the Indian leaders and we must expect it to be equally closely scrutinised by their followers on publication.

I appreciate what you said to me on this matter the other day but I feel bound to ask you to consider my point, which is a very serious one, again, and to send a telegram to Cripps as I previously suggested asking him to insert the word “military” before the word “responsibility” in paragraph (e). Frankly I do not think we shall deserve well if we leave the matter to the chance that Indian opinion will not hold us to the full meaning which can be attached to the words; a document of such historical importance must be assumed to have been drafted with great care and it may not look well if we try later to take the line that we do not accept the full implications of the wording we ourselves chose.

Yours ever,

KINGSLEY WOOD

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1 Sir Kingsley Wood was referring to telegrams 788–S and 792–S (Nos. 391 and 392) by the number which appeared at the top right-hand corner of the decipher.
2 No. 327.
3 No. 360.
My dear Clem,
Please see the enclosed copy of a letter\(^1\) just received from Kingsley Wood. He is very afraid that the reference to “full responsibility for Indian defence” in the Declaration will be taken by Indians to mean that we shoulder the whole expense and India ceases to pay for her defence. He accordingly would like the word “military” inserted before “responsibility”.

While realizing that there may be some substance for his anxiety about the possibility of misinterpretation, I should have thought that it would be quite sufficient, if the question were raised, for us stoutly to deny that the phrase could bear the implication which he fears. To insert “military” would, I fear, have the effect of suggesting that we were not going to be responsible for anything except military operations, whereas we did in our discussions clearly understand that “defence” in effect covered “good government”.

My inclination would be to let the declaration stand as it is and run the risk. But I should be glad of your views.

I am sending copies of this simultaneously to the other members of the India Committee.\(^2\)

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

\(^1\) No. 402.

\(^2\) Mr Amery’s letters to Sir J. Anderson, Viscount Simon and Sir J. Grigg suggested that they might let him have their views by telephone.
404

Mr Attlee to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106c: f 129

DOMINIONS OFFICE, DOWNING STREET, S.W.1, 27 March 1942

My dear Leo,
If there is any real substance in the Chancellor’s point,¹ which I doubt, it will not be removed by inserting the word "military". The implication, if any, is in the word "full".

I, therefore, say "no change".

Yours ever,

C. R. ATTLEE

¹ See No. 403.

405

Record of a telephone message from Sir J. Anderson

L/PO/6/106c: f 130

Reply to Secretary of State’s letter of 27th March¹

1. Sir John Anderson.
Hoped it would not be necessary to make any addition to the text. Sir S. Cripps had a good knowledge of what was in his colleagues’ minds and what they meant by the words in the draft. Sir John suggests that Sir S. Cripps might be asked to make this meaning plain in exposition without finding it necessary to add any qualifying word to "responsibility".

2. If such qualifying word were found necessary by Sir Stafford (and he must have full discretion) then Sir John would prefer "executive" to "military".

¹ See No. 403, note 2. There is no record of replies from Viscount Simon and Sir J. Grigg in L/PO/6/106c.
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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 113

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 27 March 1942, 11.35 am

386. Your private and personal telegram 26th March, 792-S.\(^1\) Paragraph 2. Proposed amendment is approved.

\(^1\) No. 392.

407

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: ff 95–6

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 27 March 1942, 2.20 pm

387. Superintendent series. Following for Lord Privy Seal from myself. I am sure that it is most important that you should give press fullest possible explanation of real meaning and purpose of declaration before issuing it in order to secure intelligent comment and avoid stupid misconceptions. You will of course know best what to say but one or two points occur to me as probably worth stressing.

The equality of Dominion status is the status of this country, which we regard not as independence minus but as independence plus, as independence enhanced by the sense of moral responsibility and of moral support. It is in no sense a derogation from India’s status among the free nations of the world.

The right of provinces to stay out is the inevitable corollary of our determination that the need for agreement should not hold back freedom for those who do agree. We desire Indian unity and we hope and believe that Indians considering their interlocking interests will freely find a solution which will preserve India’s essential unity towards the outside world. But we would sooner see India free and divided, for a time at least and in the hope of subsequent coming together, than see freedom indefinitely postponed. As in the United States after 1783 an interim period may follow removal of British control before true United States of India can take shape.

Anyhow all good luck to your gallant effort. You have evidently begun well.
408

Mr Clauson to Mr Turnbull (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: ff 109–12

MOST IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 27 March 1942, 5 pm

390. Turnbull from Clauson. Superintendent series. Your telegram 803–S.1 Following is text of draft telegram to Viceroy. [There follows the text of the Annex to No. 277.]

1 This telegram has not been traced in India Office Records. It is therefore uncertain whether it asked for the text transmitted in telegram 390, or whether the text required was that transmitted, after a further request by Mr Turnbull, in telegram 5668 of 28 March (No. 424).

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 234

INDIA OFFICE, 28 March 1942, 12.5 am

5599. Following is repetition of Washington telegram to F.O. No. 1714 of March 24th.

We learn from a source other than the State Department that the United States Agent-General1 at New Delhi has reported that unless Sir Stafford Cripps’ solution gives India the complete freedom which she demands, together with effective guarantees for its fulfilment, the effect will be disastrous.

1 Mr. Thomas M. Wilson.
After giving them the document, they raised a number of questions as to what might happen in strange hypothetical situations, any of which were never likely to arise, in order to ascertain what their situation would be vis-à-vis the new Indian Union and His Majesty’s Government. I pointed out to them that there were two classes of treaties, one of which dealt with paramountcy, and the other of which dealt with trade, economic or financial considerations, and that the latter series of treaties would require adjustment if the new Indian Union came into being since their arrangements would then have to be between the independent Dominion and themselves and not between His Majesty’s Government as the rulers of British India and themselves. So far as the paramountcy treaties were concerned, these would remain unaltered unless any State desired to get rid of the paramountcy in order to be able to accommodate itself the better to the new conditions.

They asked whether the Governor-General and Viceroy would in the new circumstances be the same man and I stated that, as far as I could see, there would have to be two different individuals because the interests to be regarded by the two were quite definite, and in some cases antagonistic. As regards the location of the Viceroy, I suggested that some extra-territorial place in one of the States would possibly have to be arranged, and also explained that in our treaty with the Union we should have to make any necessary arrangements for the passage of troops, etc. which might be required for the carrying out of our treaties with the States. So far as the undertaking of our obligations of defence of the States was concerned, I said that this would depend of course upon the number and position of States that were left out of the Union, but there was no insuperable difficulty from the naval point of view so long as we held Ceylon, or from the Air point of view so long as we had the aerodromes that were necessary in one or other of the States, but that it was impossible to hypothesize conditions of which there would be an infinite variety of possibilities.

I said that, summing it all up, we should stand by our treaties with the

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1 The members of the delegation were the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar; the Maharaja of Bikaner; the Maharaja of Patiala; the Nawab of Bhopal; Sir V. T. Krishnamachari; Sir C. P Ramaswamy Aiyar; the Nawab of Chhatari; Sir M. N. Mehta; Mir Maqbool Mahmud.
States, unless they asked us to revoke them, so far as all matters of paramountcy were concerned. That as far as I could see, if they wished them to be revised and for us to give up paramountcy in any case we should be unlikely to take any objection.

4II

Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/104: f 33

MY INTERVIEW WITH SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU
AND DR M. R. JAYAKAR

28 March 1942

Both of these two took the Hindu line in a rather modified form, not protesting to any great extent against the right of non-accession but raising very strongly the question of the control of Defence by an Indian. I repeated to them the arguments that I had used with others showing the necessity of that control remaining in British hands, and I do not imagine that they would go so far as to oppose the totality of the scheme on this ground.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/104: ff 34-5

MY INTERVIEW WITH SRI C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

28 March 1942

I had an extremely interesting and very instructive talk. He had not actually seen the document, except for a moment before he came, nor was he prepared to deal with any part of it in detail as he was not authorised to present the Congress point of view. But in fact he pointed out to me the portions of the document which were likely to be picked upon by Congress. The first was the use of the word "Dominion", and he suggested that if we could use the words "Free Member State" instead of "Dominion" it would be an advantage. Secondly he dealt with the right of non-accession, though he did not stress this so strongly as the third point, which was the question of Defence. I pointed out to him that the document must be accepted or rejected as a whole so far as the fundamentals were concerned and that he must bear in mind what the
alternative to it was, that is to say, the continuance of the present state of affairs at least for the period of the war, and perhaps for an indefinite period afterwards, which would certainly militate seriously against the effectiveness of the defence of India. He stressed very strongly his own view that everything possible must be done to defend India and that it was essential that the Indian Leaders should be able to give some clarion call to the Indians which would stimulate them from their present defeatist attitude and it was as part of this argument that he put forward suggestions that something should be done as regards the redrafting of the last paragraph in order to make it clear that the Indian people were asked to defend their own country and that it was not merely the obligation of the British Government, and he associated with this the recommendation that something should be done about an Indian Defence Minister if we hoped to get the consent of Congress to the document. So far as the whole scheme was concerned, he said that he was in favour of its acceptance and that the crucial question would be whether Nehru could be got to take the same point of view; if he could, he had no doubt that they would carry the scheme through the Congress Working Committee. He begged of me to try and make some adjustment of the final paragraph in order to meet what he knew would be Nehru's reaction.

413

Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 36

MY INTERVIEW WITH MR JINNAH

28 March 1942

Mr. Jinnah who was most urbane and pleasant came professedly to ask a few further questions and elucidation. The questions did not amount to anything more than he had asked before. He asked me to specify what I regarded as essentials of the scheme which must be accepted and I specified all these other than the detailed arrangements and the form of the constituent assembly provided a form could be agreed by the Indian leaders. It was quite clear from his whole attitude that his Committee had already accepted the scheme in principle, and were prepared to proceed to settle the details especially those under clause (e). We talked in a rather vague and general way about this and I told him that if Congress and the League accepted the scheme I should ask the Viceroy to get into touch with them as regards the questions of formation of a Government under clause (e).
MY INTERVIEW WITH THE HYDERABAD DELEGATION

28 March 1942

This was merely a repetition for the satisfaction of the Diwan of Hyderabad\(^1\) and three of his advisers\(^2\) of the interview which had been held with the Delegation from the Chamber of Princes in the morning at which he had also been present and therefore requires no further record.

\(^1\) The Nawab of Chhatar.
\(^2\) Nawab Mahdi Yar Jung Bahadur; Nawab Ali Yavar Jung Bahadur; Mr Syed Abdul Aziz.

MY INTERVIEW WITH THE HINDU MAHASABHA

28 March 1942

This delegation was led by Savarkar,\(^1\) who spent most of his time lecturing me upon the principles of majority determination and of the fallacies within the document which I had submitted to him. On the few occasions when I was able to get a word in I tried to point out that the principle of the document was a single unitary India for which purpose a constituent assembly voted by majority would be set up and that it was only in the case of the failure of the Hindus and the Moslems to agree that any question of a second dominion would arise. I am afraid I made little or no impression on him and his colleagues who then asked me whether the document must be accepted as a whole since they were in favour of an immediate declaration in the terms of the first paragraph but were opposed to the right of non-accession. I told them that the document must be accepted as a whole or rejected so far as the fundamental parts were concerned and that we regarded the right of non-accession as fundamental. I gathered that they would on this basis reject the document. They then raised the question of the Defence Minister and said that as they did not trust the

\(^1\) The other members of the delegation were: Dr B. S. Moonje; Dr S. P. Mookherjee; Sir J. P. Srivastava; Mr Ganpat Rai.
Moslems and they imagined they did not trust the Hindus, they would want to have two Defence Advisers, one Hindu and one Moslem, whose advice the Viceroy would undertake to accept. I pointed out that it did not appear to me to be a very practical scheme, but the Viceroy would no doubt get his advice from the Executive Council and not from outside advisers, and it appeared that the advice tendered by the Moslem might not be the same as the Hindu.

416

Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: ff 39–40

MY INTERVIEW WITH THE CONGRESS PRESIDENT

28 March 1942

He came back with a view to raising with me further explanatory points prior to the meeting of the Congress Working Committee tomorrow afternoon. He was depressed at the apparent cheerfulness of the Muslim League and at first raised again the question of the right of non-accession but very quickly gave up the argument upon that, stating that it was not nearly so important as the other point which he had to raise which related to the Defence Minister. For over an hour and a half we argued upon this point exploring it from all angles and I constantly impressed upon him that the alternative to the acceptance of our scheme was not that they would have an Indian Minister, or any other advantages of the scheme, but that matters would remain precisely as they are to-day until after the war and possibly a good deal longer. Also, if this scheme was not accepted, they would find that those who had been their best friends in British political circles in the past were no longer able to do anything to assist them towards the aims which they had. After a very great deal of arguing he practically admitted that it was not possible to expect British units of any kind to be submitted to the political control of an Indian Minister. As I pointed out to him, such a conception was contrary to every kind of international practice in these matters, instancing that, when we sent naval units and air force units to Russia, no one ever suggested that they should be subjected to Russian political control; though operationally they might be under Russian officers, their movements could only be decided upon and controlled by the British Government. He then asked could there not be Indian control of the Indian Army. I pointed out that to have two staffs, two commanders-in-chief and two armies in India under separate control, one from the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, and the other from the Defence Minister, would make for maximum inefficiency in the defence of India even if it were otherwise practical.
I stressed that this was not a question of denying the Indians some element of freedom because we did not trust them but was a technical matter upon which we had decided for the sole purpose of making as effective as possible the defence of India by British and Indian units together. I do not think that he was convinced though he was considerably shaken when he left me. He stated that he had one or two further points to raise, but that he would raise them tomorrow.

1 Maulana Azad.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 41

MY INTERVIEW WITH SIR SIKANDER HAYAT KHAN

28 March 1942

Sir Sikander really came to give me the confidential information that the Working Committee of the Muslim League had accepted the scheme as a whole and were prepared to embark upon the working out of the details particularly as regards sub-clause (e). I asked him his views as regards the question of the Defence Minister and he stated that he thought it very possible that Congress would fix upon this as a reason for refusing the scheme since it would be almost impossible for them to refuse it on any other ground and that in his view it was most advisable, if possible, that we should make the maximum of concessions in the direction of giving some appearance of defence responsibility to an Indian member of the Executive, although he agreed that it was essential that the practical control of defence matters should remain in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy. He thought that the chances of getting Congress to accept would to a considerable extent depend upon whether we could make an offer in this respect appear sufficiently reasonable for them not to be able to face public opinion in turning down the whole scheme upon the excuse as regards defence.
Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/6/106c: f 131

28 March 1942

My dear Kingsley,

I have submitted to the India Committee your letter of March 27th suggesting the insertion of the word “military” before “responsibility” in paragraph (e) of the Declaration. I am afraid I agree with them in thinking that it is undesirable to change the Declaration and that the insertion would not really safeguard us against a deliberate misrepresentation to which the simple answer is that we obviously did not mean anything other than responsibility for the executive policy of defence and its concomitant consequences in respect of good government generally. The word “military” might very well, from that point of view, be taken to mean that we wash our hands of all responsibility for India except as regards military operations.

I am, however, telegraphing to Cripps to suggest that in his preliminary exposition to the Press he might find an opportunity for making your point. I attach a copy of the telegram.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

1 No. 402. 2 No. 419.

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 127

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

398. Superintendent Series. Following for Sir S. Cripps. Chancellor of Exchequer is anxious lest reference to full responsibility in paragraph (e) should be taken as implying that we relieve India of financial responsibility for her defence and would suggest insertion of “military” before “responsibility”. Have discussed with colleagues on India Committee who are against any change. You may however find it possible to forestall possible misconception in your preliminary exposition to Press. If in that case any qualifying word to “responsibility” were used “executive” would probably be better than “military”.

1 See No. 402. 2 See Nos. 403, 404 and 405. 3 See No. 405, para. 2.
420

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Bracken (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, L/I/1/751: f 419

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 28 March 1942, 3 pm
Received: 28 March, 1.15 pm

812–S. Following from Lord Privy Seal for Ministry of Information. Reference last night’s B.B.C. broadcast from London reporting interviews taking place here. The comic ignorance of a (sic) confusion between a Sheikh and a Sikh does not help to build up British prestige, but merely makes us a laughing stock.

421

Mr Turnbull to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 94

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 28 March 1942, 1.50 pm
Received: 28 March, 10.30 am

No. 815–S. Following from Turnbull. Will you please repeat immediately to Washington text of draft statement of policy so that State Department see it before public.

422

Mr Amery and Mr Bracken to Viscount Halifax (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 89

MOST IMMEDIATE

28 March 1942, 1.50 pm

No. 1998. Following from Secretary of State for India in consultation with Minister of Information.

Begins. India policy. With amendment telegraphed in my immediately succeeding telegram¹ you are now in possession of final text of His Majesty’s Government’s proposals. Text of proposals will be released for publication simultaneously in India and in this country at 3 a.m. (repeat 3 a.m.) British Summer Time on Monday, 30th March. Explanatory statement² which Sir

¹ Transmitting the amendment contained in No. 393, Minute 1. L/PO/6/106c: f 88.
² No. 400.
Stafford Cripps will make to a Press Conference in India tomorrow (Sunday) evening will also be published simultaneously in India and this country at 3 a.m. (repeat 3 a.m.) British Summer Time Monday. Text of explanatory statement is being telegraphed to Campbell by Ministry of Information.

2. In view of importance of adequate publicity for the proposals, and the explanation of them, in United States of America, we should be grateful if you would arrange for simultaneous release of both documents in America at 3 a.m. (repeat 3 a.m.) British Summer Time next Monday. It is imperative that no (repeat no) advance distribution should be made in order to ensure that India does not receive first intimation of proposals through American broadcasts or from Press messages from United States of America.

3. Please confirm immediately that you will arrange release in this way in order that American correspondents in India may be informed accordingly.

4. Cripps will broadcast to Indian listeners at 8.30 p.m. (repeat 8.30 p.m.) Indian standard time (approximately 4 p.m. British Summer Time) on Monday, 30th March, for approximately 15 minutes. British Broadcasting Corporation are making arrangements to link up either for live relay or recording and are contacting American network. Text of broadcast will be released to Press in India simultaneously and Reuter will transmit it fully to United States of America dropping copies on British Press Service and Indian Agent-General.

5. Please inform Campbell and Bajpai and communicate text of declaration to State Department in strictest confidence.

423

Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery and Mr Bracken (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 87

MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, 28 March 1942, 3.55 pm
Received: 28 March, 10.35 pm

Following for Secretary of State for India and Minister of Information.
Necessary arrangements are being made for release here, in accordance with your instructions.

1 No. 422.
424

Mr Clauson to Mr Turnbull (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 123

Most Immediate

India Office, 28 March 1942, 3 pm
5668. Turnbull from Clauson. Your telegram 28th March, 820-S.1 Begins.
[There follows the text of the Annex to No. 283.] Ends.

1 This telegram has not been traced in India Office Records. See Nos. 295, para. 2, 300; para. 1, and 408.

425

Mr Amery to Mr Radcliffe

L/PO/6/106c: ff 90–2

28 March 1942

Dear Mr Radcliffe,

I see from Sir Stafford Cripps’ telegram1 that his proposed statement to accompany publication of the Declaration is merely to lay stress on the fact that it only becomes a declaration of policy if implemented by Indian agreement, and that it is a serious document. There is none of the kind of explanation of its meaning and purpose which I confess I had hoped for. In view of this it might be as well that you should have available for guidance of the Press the enclosed note on the more salient points. They may also be useful to whoever at the B.B.C. does a digest of the Declaration, and I enclose a couple of spare copies for that purpose.

Yours sincerely,

L.S.A.

Endorse to No. 425

Note on Declaration of Policy

The Declaration deals mainly with the future constitutional policy. The reason for this is that until there is agreement upon the future, all discussions of present interim changes will inevitably be governed by the desire of the different parties to manœuvre for position with reference to the future, and that they will inevitably put forward extreme demands both against each other and against H.M.G. in the hope of prejudging the situation, or at any rate not giving it away from their point of view. Once there is agreement on the future, Indian

1 No. 400.
eaders will, it is hoped, consider the question of participation in the actual conduct of the war by the Government from a practical and realist point of view.

The preamble states the position of India as a full Dominion in terms taken from the famous Balfour Definition of 1926. The essential point emphasised is that the status is that, not merely of the other Dominions, but of the United Kingdom itself. We have never felt the moral obligations of the Commonwealth partnership as a derogation from our status. On the contrary we have regarded them as an enhancement of that status, quite apart from the fact that the obligations are at least balanced by the advantages of mutual support. These advantages will obviously be greater for all of us after the war.

The question of secession from the Empire is one not of constitutional right, but the practical one that the other members of the Commonwealth would not endeavour by force to restrain a fellow member which decided to wash its hands of the obligations, and forgo the advantages, of the partnership. If this country decided that it would no longer regard British subjects outside this country as such and that it had no intention of helping them or their countries in time of danger, it is not likely that the rest of the Commonwealth would coerce us. But our action would certainly be morally a wrong and not a right.

As regards the actual scheme, the essence of it lies in the fact that no element of such importance or essential character of its own as the Moslems—or for that matter the Indian States—can be coerced into submission to a central authority for India which they are not prepared to accept. On the other hand, our recognition of that fact has in the past laid us open to the charge, the untrue charge, that we were using internal differences in India in order to postpone self-government. To that the only, and indeed obvious answer, is not to let the reluctance of one part of India stand in the way of the rest going ahead. That is the meaning of the proposed right of provinces to stand out. In this respect the Government has only been following the precedent set in the case of every Dominion, where unity has first come about by the action of certain colonies, others coming in later and in some instances not at all, e.g. Newfoundland in the case of the Canadian Confederation, New Zealand in the case of the Australian Commonwealth, and Southern Rhodesia and the Protectorates in the case of the South African Union.

By this decision it is not implied that H.M.G. do not desire the maintenance of that unity in relation to the outside world which has been one of the greatest contributions Britain has given to India. But it believes that this union is more likely to come about, in some form or other, and if not at once then subsequently, if the different elements are free to decide for themselves and to weigh on their own responsibility, all the disadvantages from the point of view of economic development, defence, the interlocking of minorities, etc. of failure to achieve union.
Similarly, the particular body suggested for shaping the constitution is only failing prior Indian agreement on a preferable alternative. The essential point here again is our desire to make it clear that it is not we who are standing in the way of India’s constitutional advance, but that we are ready to give that initiative in promoting agreement which we already pledged ourselves to give in the Declaration of 1940.

2 See No. 195, note 2.

426

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL 28 March 1942

No. 825–S. I have had clear indications both from Dow in Sind and from Bengal of the growing reluctance of the Ministries to put their heart into the war effort or take responsibility for unpleasant decisions. In Sind the position seems to be that the Chief Minister, while doing lip-service to war effort or war propaganda, will do nothing to further these aims if he can avoid it. While in Bengal the Civil Defence Minister1 is achieving good results, some of the Ministry seem to have put about the ingenious theory that the Council of Ministers is distinct from the Government of Bengal—a theory which the Chief Minister puts into practice by agreeing departmentally to the issue of orders necessitated under direction from the Centre, and then coming back with a memorandum from the “Council of Ministers” protesting against the policy. In brief the idea appears to be to hang on to the sweets of office without accepting its responsibilities. I feel I ought to let you know of this tendency because I have the strong impression that the situation is deteriorating and that a situation might develop in which Herbert ought to force the issue even to the point of Fazlul Haq’s resignation, and should this be necessary it would be important that the issue should be presented squarely and tersely in a form that could be published without the necessity of long arguments on our side. I naturally hope that such a situation will not develop, but would be glad to know in advance what would be your reaction and that of Parliament if the matter were handled on these lines.

1 Mr Santosh Kumar Basu.
Viscount Halifax to Sir S. Cripps (via Viceroy)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

WASHINGTON, 28 March 1942

No. 6. Following for Sir S. Cripps. I have to make public speech on India in New York on 7th April about which time if not earlier I suppose you may make some statement before leaving India.

If this is likely to appear either just before or just after my speech I should be immensely grateful for a short telegram, to reach me by 5th April at latest, giving me for my confidential information the tenour of any statement you may be contemplating. I hate to bother you at such a time and I would not do so if I did not believe my speech can help His Majesty's Government by getting Indian realities better appreciated here, and I do not want to be out of step with what you may be saying or doing.

428

Note by Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

28th March

Suggestions for amendment of the broadcast were prepared by P.S.V. in consultation with the Reforms Commissioner, and an amendment on defence drafted having regard (a) to the recent telegrams on the subject of defence organisation, and (b) to the desirability of presenting a firm and sound propaganda case should Congress try to back out of their dilemma by using the Defence portfolio as an excuse. His Excellency adopted one or two of these suggestions and entered them in pencil on Sir Stafford Cripps' draft. His Excellency did not desire to suggest definitely to Sir Stafford Cripps the expansive amendment on defence as drafted, and decided merely to suggest the omission of certain words. Given, however, the possible desirability from the propaganda point of view of so framing the statement on defence as to prevent Congress from making the defence statement a good excuse to reject the declaration (which they might quite probably want to reject for other less publishable reasons), His Excellency agreed that the draft should be offered by Reforms Commissioner to Sir Stafford Cripps for his own consideration and with the remark that should he desire to make any alteration in his original draft the Commander-in-Chief should of course be consulted. It was to be added by the
Reforms Commissioner that in the event of Sir Stafford Cripps desiring to adopt a draft on these lines, he might also bring into the draft a further suggested passage designed to indicate that there were other things in the formation of a Government in addition to the defence portfolio and which were of serious importance, and that His Majesty’s Government did not imply that they had no interest in what happened to the rest of the Government so long as the defence portfolio remained unchanged during the war (vide his note attached). 5

Mr. Hodson duly put these points to Mr. Owen.

About lunch time, Mr. Turnbull came to see His Excellency and informed him that Mr. Rajagopalachariar had indicated good hope of Congress accept ance 6 provided that:

(a) the words “Dominion Status” were omitted from the Declaration; and

(b) the declaration on the subject of defence was so altered as in effect to result in the following:

(i) that full control of defence should pass to Indian hands:

(ii) that His Majesty’s Government’s responsibility should be stated as existing for historical reasons; and

(iii) that while, therefore, the control of defence lay in Indian hands, His Majesty’s Government should retain responsibility and be responsible for its success or failure. Sir Stafford Cripps was proposing to telegraph home to the War Cabinet on the subject of a modification of the Declaration so as to meet this point.

His Excellency informed Mr. Turnbull that he could not possibly accept such as a modification; and on His Excellency’s instructions P.S.V. subsequently asked for an initial typescript of the modification 7 in question, which His Excellency had found himself unable to accept. His Excellency had also conveyed to Mr. Turnbull that in the event of Sir Stafford Cripps desiring to telegraph home to the War Cabinet on the subject, His Excellency must himself have the opportunity of simultaneously sending his own views home. Having regard to this development, His Excellency was prepared, if subsequent information showed it to be desirable, to consider reopening with Sir Stafford the question of the terms of his broadcast on defence, with a view to producing a passage which would have the double effect (a) of minimising the propaganda value of the defence point for the Congress, and (b) showing quite clearly how far His Excellency was prepared to go.

Approved. L., 30.3.42.

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1 Namely No. 457, the broadcast which Sir S. Cripps was to make on 30 March at 8.30 pm.
4 Sir S. Cripps’ draft has not been traced in India Office Records.
5 Not printed.
6 Cf. No. 412.
7 Enclosure to No. 429.
Annex to No. 428

Draft by Mr. Pinnell and Mr. Hodson

Read over to Mr. Owen by Mr. Hodson, 28th March

We make one absolutely essential reservation in respect of defence. This reservation does not mean that the Governor-General and his Executive Council will or could be excluded from an effective share in counsels for the defence of India. In this war defence is indivisible; it permeates the activities of every department of Government and demands from every department the fullest co-operation. But if His Majesty’s Government are, as they feel bound to do, to take full responsibility for the naval, military and air defence of India, then the defence of India must be dealt with by His Majesty’s Government as part of the world war effort in which they are now engaged, and the direction of which must be decided by the War Cabinet and their highest Staff advisers. To reconcile this position with the requirement that the Government of India must have an effective share in defence counsels, we have decided that at this end the Commander-in-Chief, who in military operations is the responsible agent of His Majesty’s Government, must also be present in person both to hear and to speak at the Council table of the Governor-General and must there be invested with the full authority of a Member of the Executive Council. At the other end, the Indian peoples have been offered a place for India’s representation on the War Cabinet, and it is, through their representatives, instructed by the Governor-General in Council and sharing in the deliberations at the Centre of the Commonwealth’s war direction, that India will take her full share in the joint control of the Commonwealth’s war policy guarding and emphasising her own needs.8

I have said that defence is indivisible, and in the situation I have described the personal burden on the Viceroy and his Government must be heavy and unceasing.

The Viceroy, whose task it is to secure for India that government which will ensure the most effective prosecution of the war in all its phases, has done his utmost to assist me with my Mission, and I am certain that Indian leaders can rely upon him in consultation with them for the carrying out of the general principles that I have just explained to you.9

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429

Mr Turnbull to Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

28 March 1942

Mr. Pinnell,
This is a copy of the proposed amendment which I brought for His Excellency to see at 1.30 today.

F. F. TURNBULL

Enclosure to No. 429

Proposed revise of paragraph (e)¹

During the critical period which now faces India, the peoples of India must take upon themselves the defence of their own country and the task of organising this defence must fall upon the Government of India; yet His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for the successful prosecution of the war in India, both for historical reasons and by virtue of the world-wide nature of the war. They desire and invite...³

¹ See also Nos. 428 and 430.

430

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 29 March 1942, 1 am¹

PERSONAL AND VERY SECRET

No. 831–S. For Prime Minister. It looks at the moment pretty certain that the critical issue will arise tomorrow, Sunday, on the question of Defence responsibility. I have made it clear that under no circumstances can we give up any of the responsibility for the Defence of India. A very considerable number of persons and interests have on the other hand stressed the need to raise the keenness of the Indians to defend their country.

2. The Viceroy, Commander-in-Chief and myself have discussed this and want to do our utmost to deprive Congress of any excuse for refusal under this

¹ MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 gives the date as 28 March. The date and time given here are taken from L/1/1/751: f 409.
head. In order to get rid of the possible implication in the present draft that it is not for the Indians to defend India we unite in urging the immediate acceptance—which I must have by 3 p.m., Indian Standard Time, tomorrow, the 29th March, to be effective in the publication—of the following paragraph in lieu of the first portion of paragraph (e) down to "desire and invite".

Begins. (e) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for and retain the ultimate control and direction of the Defence of India as part of their world war effort,² but the task of organising to the full the military moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. His Majesty’s Government desire and invite. Ends.

3. If your agreement is received in time we will substitute this in agreed text for publication.

² The draft printed in MSS. EUR. F. 125/141 has 'the world war' for 'their world war effort'.

431

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 85

29 March 1942, 4 am

MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL AND SECRET

403. Superintendent Series. Following from Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal. Begins. Your 831-S.¹

1. There is no time to convene Cabinet, or even to consult colleagues, but since you assure me that Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief unite with you in urging proposed amendment of clause (e) I authorise you to act accordingly.

2. It would be better to omit the adjective “full” before the word “responsibility”, and the adjective “ultimate” before the word “control”. Cable most immediate final text.

3. I am very glad you have made it clear that your mission in no way extends to Ceylon. Ends.

¹ No. 430.
432

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 84

MOST IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 29 March, 3.45 am

404. Following for Lord Privy Seal. Begins. You may assure American correspondents that simultaneous publication of draft declaration is being arranged in U.S.A.¹

2. State Department will be shown text in strict confidence before issue.² Ends.

¹ See Nos. 422 and 423.
² See No. 421.

433

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)

Telegram, R/30/1/1: f 17

MOST IMMEDIATE

29 March 1942

833—S. Your telegram No. 403¹ March 29th. Following from Lord Privy Seal. Am inserting proposed amendment of paragraph (e) in final text with omission of 2 words requested in your paragraph No. 2.

Full text of amended paragraph follows.²

¹ No. 431.
² Telegram 834—S of 29 March (L/I/17/751: f 414) transmitted the text of para. (e) of the draft Declaration as published, No. 456.

434

Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&E/J/10/4: ff 42–5

MY INTERVIEW WITH CONGRESS MEMBERS

29 March 1942

Jawaharlal Nehru came to breakfast and I was glad to find that he met me in the same completely friendly atmosphere in which we had last parted, and after some general and family conversation we talked on some of the major points of the document, and he stated that he had had no conversations with his Congress colleagues yet because he had only just seen the document at
Allahabad and had then to go into strict isolation in bed for two days to try
and get over his fever and had seen no one.

I stressed to him the need of using this opportunity to arrive at a settlement
and my impression was that, in his present frame of mind, the only real dif-
ficulty that would emerge would be that relating to the immediate state of
affairs and the allocation of the Defence Ministry. We only had time to explore
this in a very cursory way, and I then went with him to Birla House, where
there was a great gathering of Congress people, and was met by Maulana Azad,
who took me and Nehru straight along to see Mahatma Gandhi. I did not
repeat or discuss any of the problems with Mr. Gandhi, we merely had a rather
general conversation and he said he had nothing more to add. He thanked me
for my letter¹ about publication and said he quite understood that it could not
now be put off but that he thought it was unfortunate in the circumstances.
He then suggested that I should take the opportunity of seeing Kher and Pant
as they were both there, and I went off into another room with them and we
had an hour and a half’s conversation.

First of all it turned upon the question of non-accession and it was entirely
Pant who put forward the arguments, though they both intimated that they
had no sort of authority to speak on behalf of the Working Committee. He
was quite persistent in trying to convince me that it was undesirable to en-
courage, as this document he thought would do, the non-acceding desires of
the Muslim League, but I pointed out to him that, whatever the ideal solution
might be, my task was to create a solution between the Muslim League and
Congress, and that this could not be done without doing something to meet
the Muslim League view. I told him, as I had told Nehru, that I understood
that the Congress leaders had stated they did not wish to rule out the Pakistan
idea, and that all our scheme was doing was to leave it as a possibility, and I
felt therefore it was difficult for them to object on that ground. I think that by
the end of the argument on this point, both Pant and Kher began to see that
as a compromise there was something to be said for the scheme as we put it
forward.

He also raised the question of the Indian States and the desirability for our
handing over paramountcy to the new Indian Union. I pointed out to him that
this could not be done, except by the consent of the States, without a breach
of our treaty obligations and we did not propose to commit such breaches; and
that I took the same view as had been expressed by Mr. Gandhi the other
day to me,² that it was impossible to force the States into the Union if they
did not wish to go, and that we must rely upon the pressure of the example of
self-government in the Indian Union to develop the democratisation of the
States and gradually bring them into the Union.

Kher then raised the question of the Defence Ministry and we had a long
three sided argument as to the practicability of this. I pointed out that it was
not a question of whether we trusted or did not trust the Indians to control their own defence but that it was a question of the technical efficiency of the defence of India and it was impossible at the last moment, when an attack might come any day, to enter upon the task of transferring the defence from its present control to Indian control. I stated that none of the British officers at present in command would be prepared to work under the new system because they would feel that they could not carry out effectively their duties, and also that a change-over would create such disorganisation that it would militate against the effectiveness of defence over the vital period of three or four months which was ensuing. By the end of the argument they both admitted that in practice the strategic and tactical disposition of all fighting units must remain under the effective control of the Commander-in-Chief, subject to the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet, but they still urged that there were many other Defence matters which could be handled by an Indian, and stated that they did not think they could rouse the country to its self-defence unless they could point out that the Indians themselves were responsible for their own defence. I stressed the fact that the ultimate control was in the War Cabinet and that we were asking the Indians to participate fully in this control through their representative on the War Cabinet; and that the Government of India would of course be fully able to advance its views and tender its advice and any such views or advice would be most seriously considered, but that upon the question of the ultimate controlling power there could be no question but that this must reside in the War Cabinet and nowhere else. They were not satisfied with these arguments but I think they realised the force of them and quite frankly were trying to face up to the difficulties of combining an actual British control of the Defence forces and a publicly acknowledged position in which an Indian Member could really lead the Indian people to their defence. I suggested to them that I might be rather altering the words of the last clause—"I was not yet certain—and that the alteration might put the situation in a manner which would help them in making their appeal to the Indian people.

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1 Mr Gandhi and Sir S. Cripps had discussed the question of publication during their meeting of 27 March (see No. 397, pp. 499-500). Evidently, Sir S. Cripps had written to Mr Gandhi to explain further his reasons for deciding to publish.

2 See No. 397, p. 499.  
3 See No. 430.
29 March 1942

I had about two hours with these two and started by giving them the new altered draft in its final form and then explained to Nehru the general picture which I had given to Maulana Azad the last time I saw him. The four points that were raised were, first, the use of the word "Dominion". I pointed out that this was not a question of substance but of phraseology and I gave the reasons why it had been put in, in order to stop objections by the House of Commons or the other Dominions. I think they attached psychological importance to this but it was in no sense a major point.

They then went on to the question of the Indian States and the representation by [for?] the States Peoples. I repeated the arguments I had used to Mr. Gandhi and to Maulana Azad on a former occasion and said that if they wanted these States to come in, as apparently they did, this was the only way of inducing them.

They then passed to the non-accession point. I explained the method of deciding this in those cases where there was a 40% or more minority of the accession vote in the legislatures, that it would be referred to a plebiscite of the total adult male population. This method they seemed to accept. On the major point we had a long argument as to what the effect of the grant of the act was likely to be, and I pointed out that Nehru and other Congress leaders had said they were prepared to envisage the possibility of Pakistan and that was all the scheme was doing. They then said that they thought a scheme by which the Moslem provinces could secede after five to ten years was one that might be acceptable, and I replied that this would be a far more disruptive method of deciding the matter than doing it in the making of the constitution, and finally the argument was reduced to which was the better method of allowing for some form of non-accession or secession, which I pointed out was essential in order to get the Moslems to agree.

We then went to the final point as regards Defence. The altered text seemed somewhat to improve the position but we went through all the same arguments again and I think I convinced them of the non-practicability of an Indian Defence Minister in the usual sense of the word.

The general attitude of Nehru, who was tired and not well, was mild and conciliatory and he left me in complete doubt as to whether Congress was more or less decided not to accept it and that it was not worth arguing or pressing
for any alteration or whether he was not inclined to press his particular objections in view of the general character of the scheme and its grant of free self-government in India.

1 See No. 456. 2 See No. 416. 3 See No. 397, pp. 498–9.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 48

MY INTERVIEW WITH MR FAZLUL HUQ

29 March 1942

This largely consisted in the recounting of conditions in Bengal. He also made it quite clear that he had no intention of opposing Jinnah in any way either now or in the future and that if it came to a showdown he would follow his leadership even though he disagreed with him. He said that he would do anything he possibly could to help the scheme to get through, although he did not apparently like the provisions as they related to Bengal. He was really more concerned with the immediate situation and what was going to happen in Bengal, and the more effective use of the Indian control of Government to mobilise the Indian people.

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Formula given by Mir Maqbool Mahmud to Mr Turnbull

L/P&J/10/9: f 53

There is no specific provision at present for a separate Union of States only. If, however, a large number of States desire to have a separate Union and to deal collectively with the other Union, there is nothing to prevent it.
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Mr Turnbull to Mir Maqbool Mahmud
L/P&J/10/9: f 52

29 March 1942
Dear Maqbool Mahmud,
I have shown the formula\(^1\) which you gave me to Sir Stafford Cripps. He states that he did not intend to convey that States which decided not to accede to the new Indian Union could form a Union of their own with the same status as the Indian Union. What he did say was that, if any of the States should decide not to accede to the Union, there would be no objection to their forming some combination among themselves, but the States included in any such combination would not obtain any change of status by virtue of the present document, which is not intended to deal with such a situation.

Yours sincerely,
F. F. TURNBULL

\(^1\) No. 437.

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Mir Maqbool Mahmud to Mr Turnbull
L/P&J/10/9: ff 43-51

SECRET

19 CANNING LANE, NEW DELHI, 29 March 1942
Dear Turnbull,
In continuation of our talk this morning, I enclose herewith a copy of the unofficial summary of consultations which the Indian States’ delegation had with Sir Stafford Cripps on the 28th March 1942. Sub-para (iii) of para 3 will be amended in the light of your letter of today.

Yours sincerely,
MAQBOOL MAHMUD

Enclosure to No. 439

OFFICE OF H.H. THE CHANCELLOR, CHAMBER OF PRINCES
(NARENDRA MANDAL)
The Memorandum attached is not the official record of the conversation. It has been prepared by the Secretary to the Chancellor and approved by the Ministers who were present at the meeting with the Lord Privy Seal.
Forwarded with the compliments of His Highness the Chancellor, Chamber of Princes.

SECRET
Summary of proceedings of the Consultations of the Indian States delegation with the Lord Privy Seal in Delhi, on the 28th March, 1942.¹

Introductory
His Highness the Chancellor made it clear that this meeting was intended to elucidate the position in respect of certain matters arising out of the proposed Declaration and, that it was not intended to commit the States to anything or to be treated as an indication of their views. Sir Stafford stated that he fully appreciated this position.

2. Sir Stafford indicated that, in order to eliminate certain doubts which had been expressed by certain quarters, it was proposed to amend the second part of clause c(i) as follows:

"With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution giving them the same full status as to the Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down."²

3. Sir Stafford elucidated the position as follows in respect of the questions put to him—

(A) Regarding c(i)
   (i) The non-adhering States will retain their present constitutional position;
   (ii) Whether it will be possible or not for States that do not adhere in the beginning to do so later, will depend on the decision of the Constitution-making body;
   (iii) There is no specific provision at present for a separate Union of States only. If, however, a large number of States desire to have a separate Union and to deal collectively with the other Union there is nothing to prevent it.

(B) Regarding c(ii)

4. Query I(a)³
It is contemplated that ultimately the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands will include Defence. The Treaty arrangements between the Crown and the non-adhering States are intended, however, to remain as hithertofore.

¹ Cf. No. 410. ² See No. 393, Minute 1.
³ No text of this or the subsequent queries has been traced in India Office Records.
5. *Query I (b)*

(i) If it be necessary for the fulfilment of Crown’s obligations to the States, to provide for the retention of Crown troops or for the passage of Troops across the territories of the Union, it is contemplated to make suitable provision for it in the proposed Treaty between the Crown and the Union.

(ii) The question of protection of the States would continue to be a matter between the Crown and the States, unless some or all of the adhering States told the Crown that they desired their right to protection to be transferred to the Union.

(iii) It is the intention of the Crown to retain the means to implement its obligations to the States even after the new Constitution has come in.

(iv) No Crown Troops are intended to be located within the territories of the Union, without its agreement, after the new Constitution is set up; but possibly some arrangement may have to be made to locate the Crown Troops in a place outside the territories of the Union (such as in Ceylon or in the territories of some State). If Crown troops are retained outside the territories of the Union, corridor for the free passage of such Troops will have to be arranged across the territories of the Union to the States concerned.

(v) The question of protection may also form one of the subjects of negotiation between the adhering States and the Union, and it may be a part of their agreement that the relations of a State with the Crown may be transferred to the Union. But this could not be done without the consent of the State concerned.

(vi) In the initial stages the movement is likely to be towards separate Dominions. In theory at least there may be separate Armies also. His Majesty’s Government must retain sufficient power to implement their obligations to States, with due regard to all such forces.

(vii) It is left to the States to decide whether to adhere or not to adhere to the new Constitution, and in doing so, they will satisfy themselves whether the Treaty obligations are safely provided for.

6. *Regarding query 2*

(i) It is contemplated that the revision of the Treaty arrangements to be negotiated by the States would cover matters of common concern to British India and the States, whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution. In the case of adhering States, the contemplated revision may also cover other matters including those relating to the right of protection and in certain cases the exercise of Paramountcy. It is impossible, however, to anticipate the exact position until it is known what the Constitution will be.
(ii) The relationship of the Crown and the States is not proposed to be referred to in the Treaty between the Crown and the Union.

7. Regarding query 3
The proposed negotiations for the revision of Treaty arrangements could be undertaken, both by the adhering and the non-adhering States, after the Constitution of the Union has been framed by the Constitution-making body. These negotiations will be conducted by the States with the Crown. It may, however, be necessary for the adhering States to make supplementary arrangements in respect of certain matters with the Union.

8. Regarding query 4
The clause "so far as this may be required in the new situation" in this para. obviously means as may be necessary to meet the circumstances created by the new Constitution.

9. Regarding query 5
(i) It is not contemplated that the States which adhere to the Constitution may later secede from it unless the Constitution-making body agrees to provide in the new Constitution for such right of secession and under such conditions as may be agreed to.
(ii) Even if the new Union should decide to have a republican form of Government, it will not be open to an adhering State to secede from it, unless there is a specific provision to that effect in the new Constitution.

10. Regarding query 6
Compliance with the Treaties contemplated under this clause and the implementing of the Crown’s obligations to the States, would be enforced under the New Constitution with the usual sanctions such as diplomatic persuasion, economic pressure and in the last resort the use of force.

11. Paramountcy
Regarding query 7
(i) It is contemplated that Paramountcy will continue as at present with the Crown, and legally it cannot be transferred to any other authority without the concurrence of the States. This will be so even in respect of the adhering States, unless any of them desires that in consequence of its adherence its relations with the Crown may also be transferred to the Union. The new Union will exercise no paramountcy over the States, nor is there any question of handing over the rights of paramountcy to the new Union.
(ii) It is contemplated that, both in the case of the adhering and the non-adhering States, paramountcy will disappear in due course by the establishment of suitable conventions.
(iii) Under the new Constitution, the Viceroy will have to be a separate person from the Governor-General. This matter has not yet been decided upon by the War Cabinet, but Sir Stafford had come to the definite conclusion that the separation of the offices of the Viceroy and Governor-General will be inevitable under the new Constitution. There may be some difficulty regarding the place of residence of the Viceroy, but it should be possible to secure an extra-territorial area in a State where the Viceroy could reside.

(iv) In the obviously extreme case where, for instance the Union unwarrantedly invades a State, the Viceroy may have to use force against the Union. Moreover, the British Navy in the Far East, at any rate for a considerable period, would be strong enough in the last resort to implement the Crown’s obligations to the States.

12. Regarding query 8
(i) The decisions in the Constitution-making body will be taken by majority.
(ii) Thereafter, the contemplated procedure is as follows: The new constitution will be put to the formal vote of the Lower House of each Provincial legislature. If it is approved by a majority of not less than 60%, the Provinces concerned would adhere to the proposed constitution; otherwise the matter shall be referred to a plebiscite of the total adult population of the Province which will decide by simple majority whether to adhere or not to adhere to the new constitution. The whole procedure will have to be repeated in the case of non-adhering Provinces to evolve their Constitution.

13. Regarding para (e)
It was made clear that this para is in the nature of instructions of the Imperial War Cabinet to H.E. the Viceroy. He will proceed to implement them as soon as there is indication of general agreement with the proposed Declaration. The Governor-General’s Executive Council will be confined in the interim period to British India and there is no question of any Prince or representative of States as such being included in it.

14. General
It is not proposed to keep any official record of these conversations.
Proceedings of a Press Conference held by Sir S. Cripps on 29 March 1942

L/P&F/10/3: ff 45-51

Q: May I ask—in the statement¹ which you have just read, you have mentioned the word "principal sections of the Indian people", but in your introductory statement² you have used the word "Indian peoples". You have also used the same word "peoples" in the first declaration.³ Formerly the Viceroy has always said, "I speak on behalf of the Princes and people of India". Would you kindly tell us whether there is any particular significance?

A: We use both in the declaration. As I understand English the peoples of India and the Indian peoples are exactly the same. There is absolutely no particular significance. We recognise that the Indian sub-continent is peopled by more than one race. I believe the last sentence of paragraph 1 is almost a paraphrase of the Balfour Declaration.

Q: Does the Statute of Westminster⁴ come into the picture as far as the determination of the Balfour Declaration is concerned?

A: I will elucidate. The Statute of Westminster lays down a number of different constitutions for different Dominions in accordance with the desires which those dominions expressed.⁵ There is no such thing as a Statute of Westminster definition of a dominion. The only question which arose as regards the Balfour Declaration as originally made in 1926 was a constitutional question which was argued by lawyers as to whether a dominion had the legal right to secede from the Commonwealth. Long after that it was universally accepted as a fact, whatever the legal arguments may be, that the dominions could secede. In this document, in order that there should be no possibility of doubt on that point, we have inserted in the last sentence of para (c) (ii) the statement "but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in future its relationship to other Member States of the British Commonwealth." It can decide to remain with them or part from them. The Dominion will be completely free either to remain within or to go without the Commonwealth of Nations.

Q: May I ask what will be the earliest possible time to realise the achievement of the new Indian Union?

¹ Namely, the draft Declaration.
² No. 400.
³ Apparently a reference to No. 369.
⁴ Of 1931.
⁵ Sir S. Cripps transmitted some extracts from this Press Conference to Mr Bracken (via Viceroy and India Office) in telegram 846-S of 30 March, in which this sentence was corrected to read as follows: 'The Statute of Westminster establishes the constitutional position of the different Dominions in accordance with the desires which those Dominions expressed.' L/P&F/10/3: f 9.
A: Immediately after the termination of hostilities, not the end of the war. The Provincial elections will be held and as soon as their results are known, the constitution-making body will be set up. We don’t impose anything on India, not even a time limit.

Q: What about the Chief Commissioners’ Provinces?
A: All the totality of the area which comes within British India will be represented in the constitution-making body consisting of Indians.

Q: In Delhi there is no legislature. What will happen to them? They won’t be able to send their representatives?
A: If I may say so, it is perhaps a matter of detail which will be obviously decided later on.

Q: Will you please explain the idea of the Indian Union?
A: The idea of an Indian Union is to give a name to the new India which will have a constitution made by Indians, the form of which, we have a suspicion, will be some sort of a federal structure. It has no significance beyond a name for the new India.

Q: You call this a draft declaration. Are you likely to change the draft?
A: I have already, as I have said, made some changes in the draft. As far as I can see, the answer is no. I do not bind myself either to making changes or not making any changes. This is the changed draft.

We wish to create a new India with a wholly Indian constitution framed by Indians and we have got to give it a name. The name we have given is Indian Union. In the political sense it is the constitution of a new India.

Q: Are you aware that the history of Britain is a history of broken pledges? Can you guarantee that these proposals will be implemented after war? Should not somebody like President Roosevelt guarantee them?
A: If you do not trust me there is no guarantee of anything—even that this thing is implemented. I am afraid you won’t get President Roosevelt to guarantee it.

As soon as the constitution is settled everything will be transferred to India. If some provinces decide not to accede then so far as they are concerned they will not be parties to the constitution.

Q: What happens to the Indian Army?
A: So far as new India is concerned they can have the whole of the army and everything else.

Q: In para (a) you refer to “an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India” and in (b) about the Indian States you only refer
to participation. Does this mean that the people of the Indian States cannot be represented in the constitution-making body?

A: If there is in an Indian State a method of election, it may be used. If there is not, it will be by nomination.

All the provinces will take part in the constitution-making body.

Q: You have contemplated "such non-acceding Provinces". You contemplate more than a province not agreeing to accede?

A: The plural was intended to cover the singular.

Q: Do you also contemplate, for example, a province in the north not acceding and another province in the south also not acceding trying to club together and to form a separate union?

A: That would be impracticable. Two contiguous provinces may form a separate union.

Q: Are we agreed that till today the provincial boundaries in India have been arbitrarily fixed ever since the administration of the East India Company days?

A: Arbitrarily, the answer is yes. Why should not this new union be allowed to fix the natural boundaries of these provinces? Because you have got to take some existing undisputed area. If you have to settle the areas which can secede afterwards, the various communities will try to create areas in which their communities are in a majority and you will get no nearer a decision. The object of this scheme is to make a decision that self-government will no longer be held up by the British Government which in the past has been blamed for indecision as regards the method it has adopted.

Q: Will there be any chance of a plebiscite?

A: In any case where the result is not absolutely clear the suggestion has been made that it should be done by a plebiscite of the adult population. I have not accepted it. I proposed it. Democratically, the plebiscite is to ascertain the will of the population in a given area, if there is doubt whether the legislature reflects the opinion of the population.

Q: Am I to understand that the plebiscite will be allowed to decide the fate of the whole country?

A: No. It will be decided, in the case of a narrow difference of opinion, by plebiscite. Where quite obviously the legislative assembly has decided by a majority of 80 per cent to accede it won't be necessary to have a plebiscite. If 60 per cent of the legislature do not vote in favour of accession then the minorities shall have the right to challenge a plebiscite. Non-acceding provinces shall be given the same status as the new Indian union.

Q: I referred to a particular area. In that area it happens that the northern portion is inhabited by a particular minority and the other area is inhabited
by a separate community which is in a minority. Both the areas are predominantly one minority or the other. Will the plebiscite be for the whole population?

A: The answer to a case of that kind would be, if there is the smallest amount of commonsense amongst the Indians, there would be a rearrangement of boundaries as between the two Unions, and exchange of populations to get the larger majority in each.

Q: Will it be obligatory upon a province to decide either to accede or not to accede before the province is permitted to send its representatives to the constituent assembly?

A: The process is completely different. All provinces have got to send representatives to the constituent assembly. There will be discussions in that constituent assembly with everybody present and at the end of a period (say, during the course of a year) a constitution will be framed. When it is finally, definitely framed all provinces will be able to say "in spite of all our efforts to get what we wanted, fair treatment, in the constituent assembly we have failed. We do not, therefore, wish to accede." The legislature will then vote upon it. If there is a majority of less than 60 per cent the minority will demand that a plebiscite should decide.

If for a year in the constitution-making body the Indian communities meet together in order to forge a united constitution for India they will probably succeed. If they do not, we can do nothing more to help them to succeed. If after having done that, some of them want to separate, nobody in the world can stop them.

Q: Why should there be provision for non-acceding provinces?

A: I can assure you there are many other people in India who regard it an absolute necessity before they can agree.

Q: Supposing there are two or three non-acceding provinces, what is the procedure? Do you offer to them a new dominion?

A: Provided it is physically possible.

Q: Do you propose to make each of those non-acceding provinces into separate dominions or a joint dominion?

A: We do not propose to do either. We propose to respond to the request of those provinces which may be that they want separate dominions or may be that they want one.

We want a positive vote for accession. As a matter of formal procedure in all constitutions there is always a positive vote afterwards of the Union in order to confirm the decision which has been made by their representatives in the constitution-making body.
Q: Why should you handicap those who are in favour?
A: It does not handicap anybody at all.
It is a legitimate argument in the case of a large minority that the legislature
does not truly reflect the actual forces of the different communities in the
country. In order that there may be no possibility of doubt, or of anybody
suggesting that anything unfair has been done, we want to fix something like
a 2/5 or 3/5 majority. The plebiscite will be decided by a bare majority.

Q: How are you going to find out whether the Indian States are going to
accede?
A: By asking them whether they wish to accede.

Q: Will the people in the Indian States have any voice?
A: That will be decided by the existing Governments whatever they are.
I imagine in a sense if a State accedes to the new Indian Union there will be
provision in the constitution of the Indian Union—which will make it a con-
stituent of it—for a form of Government in which the people have a voice.
We have got to deal with facts as they are. We cannot create Governments
that are not there. The Indian States are governed by treaties. The treaties, so
far as I know, with Britain, will continue to exist unless somebody wants to
alter them.

The Indian States, if they do not join in this Union, will remain in exactly
the same situation as they are today.
There will be no maintenance of Imperial troops in this country unless it
is at the request of and by agreement with one of the new Indian Unions.

The Frontier is for the Indians to defend.
If the Frontier Province of the Union or the Union to which it belongs asks
us for some assistance we shall be prepared under agreement, as with any other
country, to give that assistance. You cannot have freedom and also dependence
upon an Imperial Power.

We offer it as a method by which there can be a United India governed by
the Indians and we are not going any longer to take up the attitude that it is
the British Government which is preventing this happening because they are
relying upon differences between the Indians. We are no longer going to rely
upon differences between Indians; we are, therefore, giving them a method
by which they can solve their differences themselves.

Q: Are not Indians themselves competent to evolve a scheme on the basis
of which they can unite?
A: Unfortunately our experience in the past ten years has been that Indians
have not yet solved the problem or put forward a joint scheme for the giving
of self-government to India.
Q: Exactly at what stage of this declaration does the Government propose to leave this country?
A: At the stage when the constitution-making body have decided upon the constitution.

As soon as the constitution-making body has framed a new constitution to take the place of the old one, the Government undertake to accept and implement the new one and the moment the new constitution comes into operation the changeover takes place. We ask the Indians to do it.

Q: Supposing there are non-acceding provinces which are not financially self-supporting, will H.M.G. finance or help them?
A: The British Government will not undertake financing of the new dominion. They will have to decide before they decide not to accede whether, when they have not acceded, they can support themselves financially.

Q: Will the Indian Union have the right to take expropriation measures? Will there be no conditional reservation of British rights at all? It will have the same power as every other sovereign State?
A: We are not going to make any condition in the treaty as regards guaranteeing the vested rights of British interests in India.

Q: Don’t you think there will be necessity for arbitration?
A: There may be reason for arbitration.

Q: Can we take it that the protection of racial minorities does not include the British vested interests?
A: It does not.

The treaty to be entered into will be between the constitution-making body and the British Government. It will be implemented and carried out by the self-governing dominion of India.

Q: If India goes back on its obligations what will His Majesty’s Government do?
A: The same action will be open to H.M.G. as is open to any government, if there is a breach of treaty.

There are roughly two divisions of treaties with Indian States. One of them concerns paramountcy one of them concerns economic matters. Whether the Indian States adhere or not, those economic matters will clearly have to be adjusted with the Indian Union and not with the British Government. So far as paramountcy is concerned, the paramountcy clause will not be interfered with unless at the request of any particular Indian State.

Q: If a Province or a State does not want to join will there be any procedure for settlement?
A: They will treat with another State in exactly the same way as they treat with all other powers, Japan, Siam, China, Burma, or any other country.

Q: What will be the procedure for non-acceding provinces?
A: Exactly the same procedure will be gone through.

Q: Can the new Union secede from Britain? What is the meaning of the last sentence of (c) (ii)?
A: It means that the Indian Union will be absolutely free to decide its future relationship with other member States of the British Commonwealth one of which is Great Britain.

Q: Don’t you think that the provision regarding non-acceding provinces encourages separatism?
A: Do you appreciate that I am trying to get an agreement between the different communities in India and that in order to do so I cannot accept wholly the views of any one community.

Q: What will be the power reserved by the British?
A: There will be no power reserved at all, but there will be a treaty by which the Government of the Indian Union will undertake to carry on the protection which has been promised to those communities and if it fails it will be a breach of the treaty with the British Government.

Q: What will be the consequences of such a breach?
A: I am not going to say. It would be ridiculous and stupid for me to suppose what action might be taken in a particular instance.

Q: Do you at least contemplate what steps shall be taken to enforce the treaty?
A: The British Government will stick to its treaty and, if the other party does not, they will take such steps as they consider suitable in the circumstances.

Q: Is there any minimum number for Indian States to join the Union?
A: No.

Q: May I enquire whether in case Indian States do not join in the Indian Union and they remain allies to the Paramount Power, would the Paramount Power discharge its obligations to the Indian States, maintain Imperial troops under their treaty and if so would they maintain them on Indian soil or somewhere else?
A: They might maintain them by agreement in one of the States. They will not maintain them in the Indian Union. The treaty will cover all necessary matters—technical questions like the transfer of power in two or three months and the machinery of transfer.
The safeguards of services will be taken over by the British Government and there will be no safeguards for British vested interests.

Q: What is the minimum number of provinces that will have to form the Union?
A: That will solve itself. The decisions of the constitution-making assembly will of course have to be passed by a majority. The Provinces who support the majority would be the theoretical minimum which could form the Union.

Q: Supposing some Provinces do not join the body making the constitution?
A: They have got to. Every Province goes in. That is the last act of British India.

Q: Will the Members of the Union have power to secede?
A: That is a matter for the constitution which they frame.

If they frame a constitution which permits the members of the Constitution to secede, they will have the power; if they don’t, they don’t.

Q: May I know why it is not possible for the British Government to impose on the Indian States the obligation that they should also join the constitution-making body?
A: Because we have treaty rights with the Indian States and we could not do that without breach of our treaty rights. It is the desire of the British Government that all or as many of the States as possible should join.

Q: The question is whether it is not possible to lay down that at least the question of acceding or seceding...
A: It is not possible to do that without agreement with the Indian States. We have not got the control over the Indian States we have over British India. Many suggestions will be made to the States.

Q: As a Socialist are you satisfied with the form of representation provided for the Indian States in the constitution-making body? (At this stage there was some local interruption on the propriety of the question.)

(I am accustomed to being heckled at meetings. I do not mind being heckled.)

I have been asked whether as a Socialist I am satisfied with this scheme, particularly the part relating to the Indian States. My answer is that I am satisfied, from all the views that I have got, that this is the best possible solution of the Indian problem in order to give the maximum chance for the creation of a United India.

Indian States will be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of representatives from British India as a whole and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

It does not contemplate any forced change in the constitution of any Indian
State. It contemplates that each Indian State will use the best method it has available of appointing people’s representatives; if there is no other, it will be nomination by the ruler.

Q: What do you mean by the ruler of an Indian State?
A: I mean whatever recognised form of Government at present exists in that State. I am dealing with facts, not with wishes or hypotheses.

We set up in India an elected body and we say that you can add to that for the purpose of getting representation of the Indian States non-elected people.

Q: What will happen in the centrally administered areas?
A: We shall have to make some arrangement as regards their representation. But that is, if I may say so, not one of the broad questions which we can go into here. The smaller States will obviously have to come together into groups.

Q: What do you mean by principal communities in (d)?
A: It means to say that you are going to reproduce in the constitution-making body exactly the same proportion of all the parties as we have in the first houses of the Legislative Assembly—all the parties, not all the communities.

Q: What will be the constitution of the electoral college?
A: The electoral college consists of all the Members of the Lower Houses of all the Provinces, about 1,381. They are the Provincial Assemblies which are elected under the existing constitution.

Q: What do you mean by “immediately upon the results being known of provincial elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities”?
A: It will be as soon as it can be organised after the cessation of hostilities.

Q: Can the Indian States change their Constitution?
A: Let me make an assumption that there is to be a new federal unit of India consisting of unit States. A Province will become a State. Some of the States may become States. The constitution will lay down the form of Government both for the States and for the Federation. Whether these States of the new Federal Unit be former Provinces or former States, everybody will decide upon the constitution for the whole. They will all share together in the whole constitution.

Q: Why this solicitude of the British Government to get the Indian States into the Union?
A: That is the practical method of doing it under the existing facts. It is the only practical way.

Q: Can you define the words “Principal communities”?
A: I cannot accurately define. Obviously, I may say, the principal communities are the Hindus and the Muslims.
If they do not reach an agreement and they come to H.M.G. saying "We have a better alternative" in which event we shall say: "We are delighted". We shall have to arrive at a decision as to whether they represent, broadly speaking, the majority of the Indian people or not.

Q: The States come into the constitution-making body. The constitution is made. What will happen if some of the States do not accede?
A: The position will be they will revert to exactly the same position as they are in now. They may have to agree to economic adjustments. The Railways, Posts and Telegraphs will have to be with the new Indian Union.

Q: Your scheme contemplates provincial legislatures only. It does not bring in the Central legislature. What is the position?
A: The people who are elected by proportional representation by the Provincial Legislatures need not necessarily be members of the Central Legislature but they must be people capable of being members.

Q: Can any revision be made of the provisions in the Treaty after it has been concluded?
A: I imagine it would probably be a treaty for a term of years in the usual form to be continued for a further period unless either party wants to revise it. One party to a treaty cannot alter it without the consent of the other. If the other party does not agree, you have to go on with the existing treaty or go without any treaty at all.

Last para of the Proposals:
Q: What exactly is meant by world war effort? Do I take it that what you imply thereby is that even during the interim arrangement the responsibility for the defence of India so far as it is Indian defence within the borders of India will be that of the Government of India, and that to the extent to which it is a part and parcel of the war in the world as a whole it will be the responsibility of the British Government?
A: I am afraid you can't divide the defence of any part of the front from any other part like that. It is all one. What this is intended to express is precisely the words that are here used. They are so self-explanatory that any elaboration of them is liable to mislead the people and not give any information. What it means to say is that on the question of defence, the British Government must be responsible and exercise control, but when it comes to the question of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India to take part in that defence, that must be the responsibility of the Government of India.

I cannot make the distinction clearer than that between these two functions. You would not be right in saying that it is a British-Indian responsibility.

The intention of this paragraph is to indicate to the Governor [-General?]
who is responsible for the formation of a Government in India, the broad lines upon which, in accordance with the scheme, that Government might be formed. All the details of the formation are for the Governor-General and we have not attempted and should not attempt to take that responsibility out of his hands in any way. The particular part which is the guiding principle for the interim Government is paragraph (c), and the word "immediate" means starting as from the day after the acceptance of this scheme by the principal persons concerned and after my decision that there has been a sufficient generality of acceptance to enable H.M.G. to put the scheme into operation. "Effective" means not nominal but "real".

The Counsels of the Nation means primarily the Council of the Governor-General, the Counsels of the Commonwealth means primarily the War Cabinet and Counsels of the United Nations means primarily the Pacific War Council.

The Provinces certainly come into the picture. The effective participation of the Provinces must depend upon the attitude which is taken up by the majority parties in the Provinces... 6 There may be, on the other hand, some sharing of control in the Provinces or some new division of power for the purpose of the more effective carrying on of the Provincial Governments.

Q: I take it that it is your desire to stay on till arrangements themselves are worked out.
A: I shall if acceptance is given. I shall wait here until I can say definitely this is a settled scheme.

Q: Will it be proper to assume that His Excellency the Governor-General, can, so to speak, Indianise the non-Indianised Departments at the centre with the exception of Defence?
A: It is not obligatory on the part of the Governor-General. All we do is to give him a general direction. The object of the scheme is to give the fullest measure of government to the Indian people at the present time consistent with the possibilities of a constitution which cannot be changed until the end of the war.

Q: What will be the position of the Central Legislature?
A: You cannot change the constitution. All you can do is to change the conventions of the constitution. You can turn the Executive Council into a Cabinet.

Q: What about the Service men?
A: I am not going to say anything specific. That is the job of the Governor-General and not of myself. All I can say is the general direction which has been laid down by the War Cabinet in this scheme.

The principle of the formation of the Government of India is in the rest of

6 The dots indicating an omission are in the original.
the paragraph. The leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people are to be invited to play their full and effective part which means to say that the intention of this document is as far as possible subject to the reservation of defence to put power into the hands of Indian leaders. The scheme goes through as a whole or is rejected as a whole. If it is rejected, I see no opportunity of any formulation of any further scheme for India before the end of the war. (e) is a part of the scheme and depends upon the scheme going through.

Q: Who will be responsible for recruitment and training?
A: I am afraid I cannot answer that. I cannot answer details of this kind. It is for me to decide whether, after interviewing the Indian leaders, there is that general measure of acceptance which I consider necessary in order to promulgate the scheme.

It means that so far as one can, within the conventions of the existing constitution, which you cannot alter, we shall attempt or the Governor-General will attempt to form in his Executive Council a body of Indian leaders who can give leadership to the country and who can help, as is said here, to direct the counsels of the country, and in London direct the counsels of the War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council.

Q: Why should not the provisions regarding the non-acceding provinces be left to the constitution-making body?
A: I wish I can very easily and with just as much comfort to myself get over the matter without putting [in?] anything about non-acceding. My object is to get people with different points of view to come to a common agreement. We have considered it necessary to put it in.

Q: If it is the desire of major sections of Indian opinion that defence should be in Indian hands, would you be prepared to alter the clause?
A: If it is the desire of all the sections, I should be absolutely convinced it would be the worst thing for the defence of India. To disorganise the complete defensive arrangements of India at this moment would be fatal.

Q: Your are inviting the co-operation of the major political parties to send their representatives to the Viceroy’s Council?
A: It means exactly what it says. It means this: if the scheme is generally accepted, the Viceroy will call into consultation some of the leaders as to the best way to form a new Government which will give what is here stated as effective participation of the leaders of Indian opinion. If we remove from the defence of India the British Navy, the British Air Force and the British Army, how can we expect to defend British India? You appoint an Indian Defence Member. He won’t have control of the British Navy, the British Air Force or the British Army. It is because of the history of what has gone before it is now impossible to change control at a critical moment.
Q: Would you consider joint responsibility for defence?
A: So far as this document is concerned, it contemplates joint responsibility. We are not bargaining. It is not a question of bargain. We have been blamed in the past for leaving it to the Indian leaders who could not agree to settle the future of India. We have accepted that challenge and if the Indian people wish to accept it it is open to their acceptance.

Both parts must go together. The first with the second and the second with the first. One covers the period after the hostilities and the other covers the period until the end of the hostilities.

Q: What will amount to an adequate measure of agreement?
A: I am not going to say anything about it. It is a matter entirely for myself to judge upon the whole of the discussions I have as regards an adequate measure of acceptance.

Q: Am I to understand that there will be no Indian as Defence Member even for internal defence of India?
A: You are not to understand that. You are to understand what is exactly catalogued in the first part and that which is catalogued in the second part. The first part is the responsibility of H.M.G.

Q: What would be the position as regards the internal defence of India, whether at any time it can go to an Indian Defence Minister? What would be the position of the Commander-in-Chief?
A: The fallacy, if I may say so with respect, in your question is to speak of the internal control of the defence of India. There isn’t such a thing. It just doesn’t exist. Civil Defence is a completely different proposition altogether. Internal security is another matter altogether. It is not a question that generally comes under defence. It may be in the normal state of affairs when there is not a war raging not only all over the world but on your frontiers.

Let me take a purely hypothetical case.

Let me assume that the movement of troops is required from Madras to Calcutta. That you would say is a purely internal matter. The question as to whether those troops are to be moved will depend on a very large number of external matters. The Japanese are likely to attack Ceylon; the position in Burma, the placing of the fleet, both the American and the British, in the Pacific waters and a multitude of other questions. Whether there are other troops available to be moved from other points like the Middle East, England, South Africa, etc. to put [in place of ?] the troops that are required to be in Calcutta. When there is a state of war you cannot dissociate the internal movement of troops from the general strategy and tactics of the war. If you could, it would be a perfectly simple thing to let the Indians manage the internal defence of India. If in the existing circumstances we were to placate Indian opinion we
should be false to our duty. We should be merely destroying the effective
defence of India. So long as a large portion of the effective air force, navy and
army have to be from British or other Dominion sources or America or wherever
it may be, it is essential that the control of the movement of all those forces
should be under a centralised body. They are today, through the Commander-
in-Chief, under the control of the Chiefs of Staff who get their directions from
the War Cabinet. Now, in order to overcome that difficulty, and to make it
clear that we want Indians to participate in every way in their defence, we are
asking them to appoint a member to the War Cabinet, just as Australia has
a member on the War Cabinet, where all these questions are discussed and
decided as regards strategy in the Pacific, or in the Pacific War Council. So
we ask the Indians to play their part by full membership in the War Cabinet
in deciding those questions. They are questions which could, in no circum-
stances, be decided by an Indian Defence Minister, when there is a state of war.

As regards other matters, the matters which are dealt with in organising to
the full the military, moral and material resources of India, that is a different
proposition. That we say we do want the Government of India to do. We want
the Government of India to be fully Indianised.

(Somebody cited the case of Australia.)

Q: Who is going to give the Commander-in-Chief his orders?
A: The War Cabinet. It would be dishonest to say that the Indian Defence
Minister was responsible for defence.

(As regards the British units in this country they would remain under British
control. It would be the Indian units which would be under Indian control.)
(The position in Australia today is that the whole are under American control.)

There are two different kinds of control of forces. There is the technical
military control. And there is the ultimate political control. What we are
really debating upon is political control. Supposing we send forces to Russia,
let me say to take a foreign country, those forces will not be under the political
control of Russia; they may come under the operational control of Russia.
In the same way, politically the British forces in India must in any event con-
tinue to be controlled by the War Cabinet in London.

If you had had in India a system going on for a longer period of time (as
there is in Australia) under which there was such a dyarchy, it is possible to
meet the conditions of war. One thing is quite certain. If you create those
conditions in a moment of crisis you will only create confusion and inefficiency
and lack of defence.

Finance and Communications are matters which will be under the Govern-
ment of India.

Q: Is there going to be any variation in the financial side? (regarding army).
A: It does not mean an alteration of the present system under which we
bear a large measure of the responsibility and India bears a measure of responsibility also. For the British units given to India we bear the responsibility for them and you bear certain responsibilities for certain Indian units. That division of financial responsibility will not be varied under this system.

**Q:** Would following the scorched earth policy be the concern of the Government of India?

**A:** I cannot decide here and now upon particular items. It is not a broad question. If you know, it includes a thousand and one things. It includes the question of movement of factories, movement of population, burning of farms and a thousand and one different items, which would all probably fall under different Ministers.

India will be represented at the Peace Conference.

The British War Cabinet are not going to appoint anybody to the War Cabinet. They are going to ask the new Indian Government to appoint someone they consider suitable.

**Q:** Now that this declaration has been made is there any difficulty in the way of India participating in the Atlantic Charter?

**A:** None at all.

**Q:** By what date do you expect to leave India?

**A:** I expect to leave on the date on which I said I would leave.

I have tried as far as I can to give you explanations of the points that you have raised. I know some of you may have views opposite to the views which I have expressed and I am not in the least asking you in any way naturally to suppress those views. But I hope, if you are going to express those views, you will also find it possible to express some of the views which I have given as well so that you do not present an entirely one-sided case, whether it is my case or whether it is your case. We want the Indian people who have got to judge to have a fair basis on which to form their judgment.

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**Note by Mr Pinnell**

*MSS. EUR. F. 125/141*

Diary. 29th March.

At his evening interview, Sir Stafford said that he realised that Gandhi was against him, but hoped that the difficulty of rejecting the offer might lead to its acceptance. Nehru was surprisingly weak in his arguments against it, whether due to illness or due to knowledge that Congress had made up its mind one way or the other?
Sir Stafford realised that the Mahasabha was against it. Jinnah was going away on Thursday (2nd April). Sir Stafford intended to force a decision on Wednesday and then clear out, probably by next Monday (6th April).

The question of arrangements in the provinces was discussed, in the event of the declaration being accepted. It was agreed that it would be unwise to force the communal issue to any undue strain by insisting on an early move to resume parliamentary government before things had settled down; and that there was nothing wrong with a good Centre and Section 93 in the Provinces. Given these circumstances the introduction of non-official (Indian) Advisers was the best way.

L. G. PINNELL,—30.3

Approved. L., 31.3.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/104: ff 51–2

INTERVIEW WITH DR AMBEDKAR AND MR RAJAH, REPRESENTING THE DEPRESSED CLASSES

30 March 1942

After telling me about the conditions of the Depressed Classes, particularly in Madras and Bombay, they then went on to point out that under the system of election they would have a very small representation only in the constituent assembly, as most of their so-called representatives would be Congressmen, and that their position would therefore be very weak. They summed up the demands that they would make to the constituent assembly and then asked me whether we considered that they came within the racial and religious minorities, to which I answered yes, and what sort of provisions were likely to be made in the Treaty for their protection. I stated that these would probably be along the lines of the League of Nations minority treaties, and if already there were special provisions in the constitution these would probably be repeated in the Treaty, and there would be some obligation to refer the matter to some outside authority in cases of dispute, the government of the Indian Union undertaking to abide by the decision so given, and that if they did not do so it would constitute a breach of Treaty, whereupon the British Government could take such steps as it considered wise in the particular circumstances. I stated that though this form of protection might no doubt seem to them inadequate, once granted the idea of self-government and self-determination
for India, there was no other possible way by which we could intervene to protect any minority in India.

So far as the interim period was concerned, I pointed out that the probabilities were that some representative of the Depressed Classes would be asked to serve on the Executive Council at the Centre, and that one of the first tasks of that Council would no doubt be to make some temporary arrangements as regards the carrying on of the Provincial Governments.

Mr. Ambedkar expressed the view that they would demand to be treated as one of the major elements and to be taken into consultation by the Viceroy in the formation of the new Executive. I stated that this was not a matter for me; the Viceroy would exercise his own judgement as to whom he should consult in this matter.

Naturally they were not very happy about the whole situation, but I did not gather that they would oppose the scheme, since there was no other alternative under which they could get any greater measure of protection.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&EJ/10/4: f 49

MY INTERVIEW WITH MR FAZLUL HUQ

30 March 1942

Mr Fazlul Huq came to see me for a short time only in order to speak about Bengal conditions and also to tell me how he thought matters were progressing. I gather that he is in contact with some of the Congress people, and he thought that on the whole the situation was not at the moment too bad though it might at any moment alter. Otherwise he did not add much to what he had told me before.¹

¹ See No. 436.
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Note by Sir S. Cripps
L/P&J/10/4: f 53

MY INTERVIEW WITH PANDIT SHUKLA

30 March 1942
I discussed with the Pandit the Congress objections and explained to him to the best of my ability the situation as regards Defence and also as regards non-accession, and did not get anything particular from him beyond the arguments which I had already had from others.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps
L/P&J/10/4: f 50

MY INTERVIEW WITH INDIAN CHRISTIANS

30 March 1942
Sir Maharaj Singh; Dr De'Souza; Mr Rallia Ram.
After giving me a general sketch of their situation and numbers, we went through the document and they pointed out, as others, that they would be represented by a very small minority on the constituent assembly, and asked whether they would be considered as a religious minority, to which I gave an answer in the affirmative. I gave them the same explanation as regards Treaty rights as I had given to the Depressed Classes representatives.

They asked whether they would be considered as one of the major Indian communities for purposes of consultation by the Viceroy. While saying that that was of course not a matter for me to consider, I told them that, quite frankly, in my view it was very unlikely they would be so consulted.

They also took up the question of the Defence Minister. I tried to explain the point to them.

Their general attitude was that although there might be points in the scheme which they did not easily agree with, they would not take any objection to them.
Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 55

INTERVIEW WITH JUSTICE PARTY, MADRAS

30 March 1942

They pointed out that they represented a large proportion of the Provincial population but that owing to lack of education and of wealth and opportunity, they were unable in any election to stand up against the more wealthy and powerful Brahmin population which, though only a small percentage in numbers, have a great deal of power. They took the view that it would be in the interests of the population of Madras to secede from the main Union in order to have a Union of their own, in which they might then hope that the non-Brahmin Hindu would get power. But they realised that there was no possible way of achieving this non-accession either by a vote of the legislative assembly or by a plebiscite since in both cases the more powerful elements would be able to persuade the majority of the population to vote with them. The only method they could suggest was to set up immediately separate electorates on such a scale as to give them automatically the majority in the Province. I pointed out that this was a wholly impracticable suggestion and that it would raise the whole question of communal electorates as well, and that until such time as they could persuade the people of Madras to vote in their favour it was not possible within any democratic method at all to give them that majority which they desired. They appreciated this situation but were nevertheless insistent that something should be done to assist them. I pointed out, as sympathetically as possible, that in existing circumstances there was nothing we could do.

They also dealt with various reforms which they desired to see in Madras but I told them that at the present moment I was concentrating on the solution of the main problem and that they must deal with the Governor or the Governor-General so far as these matters were concerned.

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1 This delegation consisted of Mr Periar E. V. Ramaswami; Sir Muthiah Chettiar; Mr N. R. Samiappa Mudaliar; and Mr W. P. A. Soundrapandia Nadar.
I had a long talk with Dr Mukherjee, who was very concerned as regards the situation in Bengal and also as to the non-accession provisions of the scheme. He expressed himself as very anxious to arrive at some agreed solution of the problem and pointed out that the ex-Government in Bengal had been able to bring about a considerable assuagement of inter-communal feeling and he was anxious that nothing should be done to upset this state of affairs. I pointed out to him that any agreement must be based upon a compromise between the various communities and it was impossible for me to accept the views either of a particular community or of a particular Province without jeopardising the acceptance by other communities and other Provinces. It was the diversity of interests and problems that made it difficult to come to a common agreement. I pointed out to him, as I had done to others, what the alternatives were to the acceptance of the scheme and he fully realised the gravity and the seriousness of the situation, and was, I think, convinced that it was necessary for those who did not wholly agree with the scheme to accept it in order to get a mixed representative Indian Government at the Centre and so at least start upon the solution of some of the problems.

He was very anxious about the mobilisation of Bengal for its own defence and was critical of the government of the Central Administration, especially on the question of raising a militia and the arming of the Indians.
Committee to the scheme. These were the same four that had been often mentioned before, use of the word “Dominion”, the position of the Indian States, and non-accession of the Provinces and the Defence Ministry. I repeated to him all my arguments as regards these four points and stressed very strongly the dangers of the alternatives which would arise if the scheme were not accepted. He was fully conscious to these and was, I am certain, prepared to do his utmost to get the acceptance of the scheme by the Working Committee.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: ff 57–8

MY INTERVIEW WITH JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

30 March 1942

Nehru came and had dinner with me and afterwards we talked for over two hours. I have never known him more serious and more worried about the Indian situation, and he was very fully conscious of the acute dangers that would arise if the Indian leaders were not to participate at the present time in the rallying of India to her own defence, but he stressed the very dangerous state of opinion arising from a multitude of causes all of which had exacerbated Indian opinion against the British. The principal of these were, one, the treatment of Indian refugees coming from the eastern seaboard to the central districts in comparison to the treatment of the European refugees. Secondly, the growing unemployment in certain industries such as the weavers at Benares, where there was no alternative occupation either to maintain the population or to keep it quiet and orderly. Thirdly, the difficulties as to food distribution and shortage of wheat associated with rumours that we had sent Indian wheat to Persia. Fourthly, the growing disbelief in the capacity of Great Britain to make any defence effective in the light of the happenings in Malaya and Singapore, with the consequent lack of respect for police and others in India whose power had in the past depended largely upon the uniform that they wore. Fifthly, the tendency for a reversion to sympathy for Japan which had been demonstrated widely during the Russo-Japanese war on the ground of fellow Asiatic nations, though this was moderated by the pro-Chinese feeling in India. He was afraid that these various factors would make for a general breakdown of administration and internal trouble on too large a scale to be held by British forces at the same time as they were holding the Japanese back.

He then told me of the difficulties in the Congress Working Committee and conveyed to me the impression that they would not accept the proposals,
largely, I think, though he did not say so precisely, due to the influence of Gandhi. I gathered that he was doing his utmost to gain support for acceptance but felt that he was fighting a losing battle. We discussed shortly again the various points of difficulty but my general impression was that it was not so much the actual point of difficulty as the non-violence outlook of Gandhi and his supporters on that line, which obviously is opposed to the idea of mobilising effectively the armed defence of India; and I feel fairly certain it is this aspect pointing to the undesirability of Congress leaders associating themselves in any way with the war effort which will be the decisive factor in the situation rather than any particular provision of the scheme itself. I naturally stressed to him again the hopelessness of the situation if nothing was now done and that the Congress and other nationalistic movements would lose all the support of sympathisers in other countries, anyway for the immediate present.

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Mr Turnbull to Mir Maqbool Mahmud

L/P&J/10/9: s 42

30 March 1942

Dear Maqbool Mahmud,

This is in reply to your letter of the 29th March\(^1\) enclosing a copy of the unofficial summary of the consultation which the Indian States Delegation had with Sir Stafford Cripps on the 28th March. Apart from the point dealt with in my letter to you of the 29th March\(^2\) regarding the position of Indian States which decided not to accede to the Union, as regards which I note that you say that the record requires correction, Sir Stafford Cripps considered that the summary does not accurately represent the course of the discussion, particularly on the following point. It is assumed in the summary in a number of places that an Indian State which decides to adhere to the Indian Union will continue to receive special protection from the Crown. The intention is that if a State decides to adhere, it will become part of the Union and subject to the constitution of the Union, and in such circumstances it will not be possible for any special relation to continue between the adhering State and the Crown.

Sir Stafford does not feel that it is possible for him to agree a complete written record of all that passed in the conversations which he had with the Chamber Delegation and there are other points in the summary which he would be unable to accept as accurate, at any rate in their present form. He would like, however, to make the position quite clear on the point which is dealt with in the preceding paragraph.
As there appears to have been some misunderstanding Sir Stafford will be ready to discuss these points further if the Chamber Delegation wish to meet him again, but he does not think that it will be possible for him to manage more than one further interview with the Chamber Delegation owing to the short time which is at his disposal.

Yours sincerely,

F. F. TURNBULL

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1 No. 439.  
2 No. 438.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

30 March 1942

No. 835-S. Personal to Prime Minister from Lord Privy Seal. The position here as regards A.R.P. and fire-fighting is very serious. I have discussed it with Viceroy and gather urgent requests for help have been made to India Office without result. From the general atmosphere here I gather that the India Office requires urgent shaking up and should be told that an immediate war threatens India and all peace-time tempo must disappear.

2. In brief the position is that—

(i) Regular fire brigades and fire-fighting appliances exist only in a very few large towns and are completely lacking in other large towns containing as many as 250,000 people. The small permanent staff of the existing fire brigades in such places as Calcutta are having great difficulty in coping with the training of new recruits.

(ii) Rudimentary A.R.P. measures exist in 102 towns forming part of the "threatened area", total population of these towns being about 13 million. A.R.P. preparations are now beginning in a further 152 towns in British India, each of not less than 20,000 inhabitants, and also in a number of towns in Indian States.

3. The following are the most urgent requirements which should be dealt with immediately:

(a) Fire-fighting personnel—

(i) 10 to 20 officers capable of taking over small fire brigades. These should come out by air.

(ii) At least 200 fully trained firemen for stiffening the more important fire brigades in the few towns where they exist.
(b) Trailer pumps and hose. The following are on order:

(i) From the U.S.A., 2,140 trailer pumps, deliveries being promised at the rate of 200 to 300 a month, the first shipment being due to arrive by the end of April.

(ii) From England, 700 trailer pumps, shipments being promised at the rate of about 190 in December 1941 and 75 weekly thereafter. None of these has so far arrived.

(iii) From England, one million feet of hose, on order.

(c) Instructors for A.R.P. schools. 10 are required urgently to provide a reserve for and to permit of expansion in the existing two schools and to staff the third school which must soon be started. Instruction is given in English.

4. In regard to equipment (item (b) of para. 3 above) anything you can do to expedite delivery will be greatly appreciated here. As regards fire-fighting personnel and instructors for A.R.P. schools (items (a) and (c) of para. 3 above) no formal request has been sent by the Government of India in view of the failure of their repeated attempts to get even one fire-fighting expert from England to act as Fire Adviser. I am sure however that formal requests on the lines indicated above would be immediately forthcoming if there were some assurance of their being met.¹

¹ Mr Amery referred to this telegram in his telegram 416 of 1 April to Lord Linlithgow. This emphasised the difficulty of meeting the Government of India's demands while attacks on cities in Britain were still intense and trained men at a premium. Mr Amery added inter alia that at no time had he had the slightest indication that the Government of India's requirements of personnel were on the scale now stated by Sir S. Cripps; and that since the previous autumn he had had no indication other than the request for an adviser on fire-fighting that the Government of India's resources were insufficient. L/PO/10/17: f 53. See also No. 476, para. 5.

452

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/6/106c: f 125

30 March 1942

My dear Kingsley,

If you will look at the final version of paragraph (c)¹ of the Declaration, which separates H.M.G.'s responsibility for the Defence of India as part of their world war effort from the responsibility of the Government of India to organise to the full the military, moral and material resources of India, I think you will see that your anxieties² have been substantially met. I don't think anyone could read into the Declaration as it now stands any suggestion that we are thereby
relieving India of the economic responsibility for providing her own defence. What we do insist upon is a responsibility for "control and direction."

Yours ever,

L.S.A.

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1 See No. 430, para. 2.  
2 See No. 402.

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453

Sir G. S. Bajpai to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 181

MOST SECRET  
WASHINGTON, 30 March 1942, 2.5 pm
Addressed to Foreign New Delhi telegram No. 70 of March 29th repeated to India Office.

Following from Agent General. At fortnightly meeting on March 27th at the Embassy of Heads of Empire Indo-European service missions Nash, New Zealand Minister, stated that South West Pacific War Council, on which Australia and her Dominions [other Dominions?] would be represented, was to be set up soon in Washington. A meeting of this Council has now been called by the President for Wednesday.1 For political reasons, Ambassador and I hope that India may not be omitted from a body (on whose London prototype she has already been given representation) in spite of the fact that India is not within the Pacific area for which the United States of America are assuming responsibility. I am reporting this in case the Government of India wish to take any action.

1 1 April. India was not represented.

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454

Note by Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Diary. 30th March.
During the morning Sir Stafford Cripps, accompanied by Mr. Turnbull, came to show His Excellency the draft of a letter (marked P)1 which Sir Stafford was considering sending the President of the Congress, as he had been told that the question of the Defence portfolio was all-important with the Congress. His

1 Annex 1.
Excellency informed him that he could not accept the draft in this form and was bound to be careful even as regards a modified form in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief who had left Delhi.

In discussion His Excellency pointed out that a promise of particular responsibility for defence to one member could not be made in advance without knowing who the Members of the Cabinet were going to be, and that such a statement could not wisely be made to one party.

Sir Stafford modified the draft as at "Q" referring to the Commander-in-Chief as "a Member of the Executive Council". His Excellency accepted this with the addition of the words "in charge of Defence", and, before issue, a final important amendment was made so that the passage read "as the Member of the Executive Council in charge of Defence".

The letter is understood to have issued in this form, with a copy to the Muslim League and the Mahasabha.3

Conflicting reports regarding Congress attitude were received during the day, one being to the effect that Gandhi was dead against it and had described the Declaration as a "blank cheque on a crashing bank", and another being to the effect that Rajagopalachariar might not be able to make his full weight felt with Congress unless he secured the modification desired by him as regards Defence.

Further reports received were that Savarkar and some of the non-party people had been offended by being told by Sir Stafford that the Muslim League and the Congress were the people that really counted, and that the effect of this remark might be to drive them into the arms of the Congress.

A letter was received from Mr. Ogilvie in which he reported a conversation between himself and Master Tara Singh. Tara Singh had expressed the view that publication of the Declaration would cause great communal bitterness, and that the Sikhs would accept nothing short of a separate partition of the Punjab for themselves. A copy of the letter is appended.4

In the afternoon the "final draft" of Sir Stafford Cripps' broadcast5 was received and, with His Excellency's permission, an alteration was suggested in it to avoid the inference that if the Declaration failed people could still expect a change of Government in any case.

In the resultant broadcast the passage in question was left out altogether instead of being modified.

L. G. PINNELL,—30.3
Annex 1 to No. 454

P

30 March 1942

My dear Maulana Azad,
I had a short talk with the Viceroy last night when he discussed with me his views as to the carrying out of clause (e) of the scheme.

(He is prepared to place an Indian Member in charge of that portion of the Defence activities which are laid down in the final form of the draft declaration as being the functions of the Government of India.) He hesitates to give this minister the name of Defence Minister since he does not wish to have any misunderstanding hereafter; but if it were to be clearly understood that the final definition of the division of responsibilities was as stated in paragraph (e) he would be prepared to consult with the Indian leaders on this basis, that is as to the creation of such a Ministry of Defence or of Defence Co-ordination.

I give you this information as you put the question to me when I saw you last.

( ) But the C.-in-C. is in charge of this as a member of the G. of I.

L.

Annex 2 to No. 454

Q

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 30 March 1942

My dear Maulana Saheb,
I had the opportunity of a short talk with H.E. the Viceroy last night during which he discussed with me his views as to the implementation of clause(e) of the draft Declaration.

It must be clearly understood that the final definition of the division of responsibilities between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India is as stated in paragraph (e) of the document. I propose to make the position as to this as clear as I can in my broadcast tonight.

The Viceroy would be prepared to consult with Indian leaders on this basis to see whether it were possible to designate an Indian to some office connected with the Government of India’s Defence responsibilities without in any way impinging upon the functions and duties of the Commander-in-Chief either in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the armed forces in India or *(as the Member of the Executive Council) in charge of Defence.

2 Annex 2.
3 The letter in this form is included in Cmd. 6350, with a note that a similar letter was sent to Mr Jinnah. There is no mention of a similar letter or a copy having been sent to the Mahasabha.
4 No. 455.
5 See No. 457.
I give you this information as you put the question to me when last I had the pleasure of seeing you.

Yours v. sincerely,
STAFFORD CRIPPS.

(*) As originally drafted by Sir S.—‘as a Member of the Executive Council’.

Approved. L.

455

Mr Ogilvie to Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

SECRET GOVT. OF INDIA, DEFENCE DEPT., NEW DELHI, 30 March 1942
D.O. NO. 194-S.

My dear Pinnell,

Yesterday night Master Tara Singh came to see me. He was extremely upset at the scheme propounded by Sir Stafford Cripps and gave it as his opinion that, so far as the Sikhs were concerned, it was more likely to cause a complete cessation of the war effort than to encourage them to do more.

He said that he considered that it was a great mistake to publish the announcement; that it would cause communal trouble all over India, and that the ultimate result might be a combination between the Congress, Hindu Mahasabha and Sikhs to oppose the war effort. He said that the only thing that would satisfy the Sikhs, if this scheme were to be implemented, was that the Punjab should be divided and that the whole area South of the Sutlej plus the districts of Lahore (less Lahore City), Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur and Kangra should be made into a separate province. He was, of course, convinced that the Punjab would never come in to a general union and he was equally convinced that the Sikhs would never tolerate Muhammadan rule, open or disguised. He expressed grave doubts as to the practical value of any treaty and said that the whole question of the treatment of minorities was much too vague and would not satisfy the Sikhs.

I believe that he was speaking for the others and that this view does probably represent what representative Sikhs are either already feeling or can readily be made to feel.

Yours sincerely,

C. MACL G. OGILVIE.
Draft Declaration for Discussion with Indian Leaders (as published)

Cmd. 6350

30 March 1942

The conclusions of the British War Cabinet as set out below are those which Sir Stafford Cripps has taken with him for discussion with the Indian Leaders and the question as to whether they will be implemented will depend upon the outcome of these discussions which are now taking place.

His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty's Government therefore make the following declaration:

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to:

(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides.

With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution, giving them the same full status as Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.

(ii) the signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This Treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other Member States of the British Commonwealth.
Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(d) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:

Immediately upon the result being known of the provincial elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. His Majesty’s Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

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Broadcast by Sir S. Cripps

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

30 March 1942

I want tonight to give you a short explanation of the document which was published in the Press this morning, and which gives the proposals of the British War Cabinet for the future of India, a document unanimously agreed upon by every member of that Cabinet.

First of all you will want to know what object we had in view. Well, we wanted to make it quite clear and beyond any possibility of doubt or question that the British Government and the British people desire the Indian peoples to have full self-government, with a constitution as free in every respect as our own in Great Britain or as of any of the great Dominion members of the
British Commonwealth of Nations. In the words of the draft Declaration, India would be, “associated with the United Kingdom and other dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs”.

There is however an existing constitution which regulates the central and provincial Governments of India and everyone agrees that in these troubled times we cannot here and now set about forging a new Constitution. It is far too important a matter for the future of India to be improvised in a hurried way.

The principle on which these proposals are based is that the new Constitution should be framed by the elected representatives of the Indian peoples themselves, so we propose that immediately hostilities are ended a Constitution-making body should be set up consisting of elected representatives from British India, and if the Indian States wish, as we hope they will, to become part of the new Indian Union, they too will be invited to send their representatives to this Constitution-making body, though, if they do, that will not, of itself, bind them to become members of the Union. That is the broad outline of the future.

Now what is to happen in the meantime?

The British people are determined to do their utmost for the Defence of India and we are confident that in that great task the Indian peoples of all races and religions are eager to play their full part.

Let me read to you what the statement says on this point—

“(c) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed, His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. His Majesty’s Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India”.

So ends the document.

The Governor-General, whose task it is to form the Central Government of India, has done his utmost to assist me with my mission, and I am certain that the Indian leaders can rely upon him to find the best way in consultation with them for carrying out the general principle laid down in the Clause that I have just read to you.

1 This text, although entitled ‘Draft Broadcast’ in MSS. EUR. F. 125/141, corresponds to the text of the broadcast as it appeared in the Press on the following day. The text available in the India Office Records (see e.g. L/1/2751: ff 396-400) is no different in substance, but contains—presumably as a result of corruption in transmission—a number of minor errors.
So much for the general framework of the proposals. But, as we all know, the most vital and difficult question is that which concerns the interests of the various communities amongst the Indian peoples.

I will not attempt to go into any of the historical origins of these difficulties, let us instead look at them as a present fact. In the great sub-continent of India there is more than one people, there are many peoples and races as there are in the great sub-continent of Russia. Our object is to give to the Indian peoples full self-government with complete freedom as to how they will devise and organise their own Constitution.

There are those who claim that India should form a single united country, there are others who say it should be divided up into two, three or more separated countries. There are those who claim that Provincial Autonomy should be very wide with but few centrally controlled federal services; others stress the need for centralisation in view of the growing complexity of economic development.

These and many other and various ideas are worthy to be explored and debated, but it is for the Indian peoples, and not for any outside authority, to decide under which of these forms India will in the future govern herself.

If the Indian peoples ask our help it will of course be gladly given but it is for you, the Indian peoples, to discuss and decide upon your future Constitution. We shall look on with deep interest and hope that your wisdom will guide you truly in this great adventure.

We ask you therefore to come together—all religions and races—in a Constitution-making body as soon as hostilities are over to frame your own Constitution.

We have specified the form which that body will take, unless, and this is an important point, the leaders of the principal sections of Indian opinion agree between themselves before the end of hostilities upon some other and better form.

That Constitution-making body will have as its object the framing of a single Constitution for the whole of India—that is, of British-India together with such of the Indian States as may decide to join in.

But we realise this very simple fact. If you want to persuade a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go in there is no way out—they are to be forever locked in together.

It is much wiser to tell them they can go in and if they find they can’t come to a common decision, then there is nothing to prevent those who wish, from leaving again by another door. They are much more likely all to go in if they have knowledge that they can by their free will go out again if they cannot agree.

Well, that is what we say to the Provinces of India. Come together to frame
a common Constitution—if you find after all your discussion and all the give and take of a Constitution-making assembly that you cannot overcome your differences and that some Provinces are still not satisfied with the Constitution, then such Provinces can go out and remain out if they wish and just the same degree of self-government and freedom will be available for them as for the Union itself, that is to say complete self-government.

We hope and expect to see an Indian Union strong and united because it is founded upon the free consent of all its peoples; but it is not for us Britishers to dictate to you, the Indian peoples, you will work out and decide that problem for yourselves.

So we provide the means and the road by which you can attain that form of the absolute and united self-government that you desire at the earliest possible moment. In the past we have waited for the different Indian communities to come to a common decision as to how a new Constitution for a self-governing India should be framed and because there has been no agreement amongst the Indian leaders, the British Government has been accused by some of using this fact to delay the granting of freedom to India. We are now giving the lead that has been asked for and it is in the hands of Indians and Indians only whether they will accept that lead and so attain their own freedom. If they fail to accept this opportunity the responsibility for that failure must rest with them.

We ask you to accept this fulfilment of our pledges in the past and it is that request that I have put before your leaders in the document which you have now seen.

As regards the position of minority communities within the new Indian Union, I am confident that the Constitution-making body will make just provision for their protection. But in view of the undertakings given to these minorities by His Majesty’s Government in the past we propose that in the Treaty which, under the draft Declaration, will be concluded between His Majesty’s Government and the Constitution-making body, the new Indian Union should undertake to protect the rights of these minorities. If there should be any non-acceding Provinces a similar Treaty provision would be made in respect of minority communities within their borders.

I have already indicated to you the position as to the immediate future.

I know that His Excellency the Viceroy has the greatest hope that the acceptance in principle of this document by the leaders of Indian opinion will make it possible for him to start forthwith upon the consultations which will enable him to implement the principle laid down in the last paragraph of the document which I have already read over to you.

It contains one essential reservation—that in respect of the responsibility for Defence. This reservation does not mean that the Governor-General and his Executive Council will or indeed could be excluded from taking an effective
share in the counsels for the defence of India. In this wide-flung war, defence cannot be localised in a single country and its preparation must permeate the activities of every department of Government and must demand from every department the fullest co-operation. If His Majesty's Government are to take full responsibility for the conduct of the naval, military and air defence of India, as it is their duty to do, then the defence of India must be dealt with by them as part of the world war effort in which they are now engaged, and the direction of that defence must rest in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief under the War Cabinet and their highest staff officers. But, as I have already pointed out, the Government of India must also have an effective share in the Defence counsels and so we have decided that the Commander-in-Chief must retain his position as a Member of the Executive Council.

In order, however, that India may have her full voice in this central control of strategy, defensive and offensive, not only in India itself but in all the interrelated theatres of war, we have invited the appointment of a representative Indian to the War Cabinet and to the Pacific Council of the United Nations—that is one of the ways in which India will have her full say in the counsels of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations as an equal partner. And when it comes to the making of the peace, India will appoint her own representatives to the Peace Conference side by side with those of the other free Nations and so make her contribution to the building of a new world order.

I am confident that nothing further or more complete could be done towards the immediate realisation of the just claims and demands of the Indian peoples. Our proposals are definite and precise. If they were to be rejected by the leaders of Indian opinion, there would be neither the time nor the opportunity to reconsider this matter till after the war and it would be a bitter blow to the friends of India all over the world.

I consider it a high honour that it has fallen to my lot to be the messenger of the War Cabinet in a matter of such vital and far-reaching importance to the future world order. I personally am convinced of the soundness and completeness of these proposals, and I have asked your leaders to give to them an ungrudging acceptance.

There will still be difficulties perhaps—the result of the distrust which has grown up between us in past years, but I ask you to turn your back upon that past, to accept my hand, our hand of friendship and trust and to allow us to join with you for the time being in working to establish and complete your freedom and your self-government. This as you may know has long been a cause dear to my heart and it is with the greatest hopes that I look to the events of the next few days which may if wisely handled seal for ever your freedom and our friendship.

Your country today is in peril from a cruel aggressor, an aggressor whose hand has soaked in blood and suffering great areas of China with its friendly
and democratic peoples, an aggressor allied to those nations who have deluged with tragedy the once peaceful plains of Russia. Against those aggressors we and the Allied Nations will fight to victory.

The outlook is overcast for the moment, but believe me I have no doubt as to the final result. Russia, the United States, China and Great Britain have resources which the Axis and its allies can never defeat.

We stand by our duty, growing out of our past historical associations, to give you every protection that we can, but with your willing help and co-operation [this ?] can be made more effective and more powerful.

Let us enter upon this primary task of the Defence of India in the now sure knowledge that when we emerge from the fire and travail of war it will be to build a free India upon foundations wrought by the Indian peoples themselves, and to forge a long-lasting and free friendship between our two peoples. Regrets and recriminations as to the past can have no place beside the confident and sure hopes of the future, when a free India will take her rightful place as a co-worker with the other free nations in that world reconstruction which alone can make the toil and suffering of the war worth while. Let the dead past bury its dead! and let us march together side by side through the night of high endeavour and courage to the already waking dawn of a new world of liberty for all the peoples.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: f 608

NEW DELHI, 30 March 1942, 11.55 pm

Received: 31 March, 4 pm

845–S. Following from Lord Privy Seal.

I have now had interviews with representatives of all leading parties and interests and Chamber of Princes. My broad impression is that Moslem League are ready to accept but are waiting to see what Congress will do. Gandhi is, if reports as before myself and Viceroy are correct, wholly opposed, while Rajagopalachari and his followers are in favour of acceptance. Nehru’s attitude will probably be decisive and should be known shortly. Crucial question at present appears to be the immediate situation regarding defence and I am doubtful whether revised version of paragraph (e) will be sufficient to meet Congress. This will I think be the deciding question but I can see no way of easing position without making real concession which would weaken defence position.
2. Long-term proposals have had in general favourable reception except from Sikhs, depressed classes and Gandhi himself who I understand greatly resents local option provisions. Hindu Mahasabha also object strongly to right (of) (?) Provinces) to opt out.

3. I will telegraph as soon as any indication of final attitude of Congress and Moslem League becomes available.

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Note by Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Diary. 31st March 1942.

Interview between Sir Stafford Cripps and H.E. this morning.

Sir Stafford realised that he was finished, and had no feeling that there had been any lack of helpfulness so far as the Viceroy was concerned. He was still adamant on the question of defence. H.E. mentioned the question of transmitting information to Chungking, and said that he might be writing to Madame Chiang, and enquired whether he should express regrets that the Declaration had not been accepted, but add that all realise the difficulties of Indian leaders. Sir Stafford replied bluntly that he thought Indian leaders had missed an excellent offer, and if anything had to be said on the subject that should be made plain. He added that Nehru had been fighting hard for the scheme, but that Gandhi had made up his mind to prevent the organisation of India for war, and was prepared to use any means to thwart it. The Congress would not split. He intended to force the issue tonight.

Sir Stafford said that he would state in a press conference on Thursday that he was not going to discuss the reactions of parties or allocate the blame; but the general response was so poor that he would not be justified in recommending implementing H.M.G.'s plan, and that he was going back. H.E. suggested that Jinnah might pretend that this course was a little hard on him. Sir Stafford replied that Jinnah had not accepted the scheme and probably would not if the Congress did not. He had no intention of elevating him above his present position.

Sir Stafford then observed that if he went back with failure, the House of Commons would be certain to enquire whether he had asked Indian leaders what they would take. H.E. replied that if Sir Stafford wanted his personal views he would give them to him; but this looked like going outside the
Cabinet brief. Sir Stafford said that he was thinking of getting some of the constructive leaders together among the Muslims, Congress, Mahasabha and Sikhs, and saying to them: "This is the end for me; as regards India I am finished for the future. But before leaving you I am going to ask you whether there is any scheme on which you could all get together to fight the Japanese menace". H.E. observed that it was most unlikely that they would produce any scheme, but that if Sir Stafford considered this course necessary to meet the criticism that he had failed to invite Indians to supply a constructive alternative he must of course follow it. He advised Sir Stafford that it would be futile, in his selection, to leave out the titular heads of the main organisations. If he tried to go behind their back to some more constructive Members, the former would condemn his results. On that basis it was evident whom he must see.

Sir Stafford mentioned that in conversation with Nehru, Nehru had made bitter complaints about the differentiation in comfort and facilities for European evacuees to Calcutta as compared with Indians\(^1\). H.E. suggested that all these stories might not be gospel.

During the afternoon H.E. sent Sir Stafford a letter giving his considered views on the proposal at 'A' above—copy filed herewith (marked D).

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**Annex to No. 459**

**D**

31 March 1942

You have sought my views upon your proposal that in the event of your not being able to announce the acceptance of His Majesty's Government's proposals, you should invite a gathering of leaders of the principal parties to offer a constructive alternative upon which parties could agree and which they would be prepared to work.

I understand the importance of giving the party [parties?] an opportunity, if they so desire, to put forward their suggestions for an agreed and workable plan. But I would, I confess, have thought that the notes of your interviews with the various party representatives provide ample proof of your readiness to hear and consider difficulties and alternative proposals. Nor am I able to feel that any meeting of leaders is likely to provide you with as good a picture of their minds as you have gathered from your interviews, while it might possibly lead to much bickering and argument of a kind that might tend to increase bad feeling, particularly as regards communal matters.

If, however, you take the view that a talk to a meeting of that kind is worth while and ought to be undertaken, my advice would be that you should ask

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\(^1\) See No. 449.
the recognised leaders of such parties or groups as you may desire to summon. I think that to select for invitation as representatives, persons other than those commonly regarded as the principal leaders of parties or groups, in the hope that those so chosen might prove more constructive than their "betters", would upset the rejected panjandrums, and tend to make these hostile to any ideas or suggestions that might come out of the meeting.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW.

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Proceedings of a Press Conference held by Sir S. Cripps on 31 March 1942 (Extract)

L/P&J/10/3: ff 3-4

Q: If the proposals are accepted by the various leaders, am I to understand that at the end of the war you would use in the relevant section of the Westminster Statute the expression "India" ... (Question incomplete).

A: That would not be necessary; because it will be rather a waste of time till we know whether the new Indian Union is going to be completely independent or is going to remain a dominion. That will be a question for the new Indian Union to decide. It won't be possible to bring one word "India" into the Westminster Statute. The Statute of Westminster contains broad regulations regarding Canada and Australia. When the Statute of Westminster was made, it was a recasting of the relationship of all the dominions, each one with its special reservations or regulations, and that was the result of an Imperial conference when we recast the picture and put it all into one single book. That was a constitutional development. Anything that happens since then need not go into the Statute of Westminster. It is a sequel to what then happened. It does not require to be put actually into that. The way in which the new Indian Union would come into being would be by an Act of Parliament in England repealing the whole of the existing legislation as regards India and re-enacting in a single section the new constitution.

Q: What would be the exact constitutional implications of those expressions which you made at the last press conference and in the broadcast talk? Don't you think that they should all be put in the form of an annexure to the document?

A: That is what I should propose to do. If there were an acceptance of it, I should then take the various points, about which I have made statements, amplifying the document, and I shall then submit the document to various leaders and say: "This is my understanding of the various points and I will make it an extra addition to the document."
Q: Can you say whether the new dominions will be based on any contiguity of boundaries? Will financial stability be a pre-requisite?
A: There is no pre-requisite at all.

In reply to a question, Sir Stafford said: "There is no contemplation of any dominion being set up which consists solely of Indian States."

Q: Last night in your speech you mentioned "peoples of India", "British people", and the "Indian peoples". Any significance?
A: You are really a little bit too meticulous. I was drawing a contrast between the two unions (Britain and India). I meant it territorially. I did not mean to omit the Welsh from England or any of the peoples of India.

Q: There is a reference to India being represented in the Allied Council. We have one representative already. His designation is Agent General. Does that imply a status slightly inferior to that of a Dominion representative?
A: At the moment, of course, he cannot represent a Dominion unit, as India is not a dominion. As I envisage the situation, the representative of India will be on the same footing. I cannot bind Washington accepting it. That must be a matter for the American Government. I personally, should certainly suggest that they could give the same status to the representative of India as they would to the representative of Canada or other Dominions.

Q: What about the commercial safeguards?
A: So far as the commercial safeguards of Great Britain are concerned, they will not be a condition of any constitution at all. So far as the Indian people, Indian commercial people, are concerned, that is a matter for themselves.

Q: The other day you mentioned that the safeguards of British Members of the services would be taken over by the British Government—British members only or Indian members also?
A: It applies to anybody who has been in the service of the Crown and who is displaced as a result of the new arrangement, both in the army and in the services.

Q: Will it hold good in the case of covenanted service only or all, irrespective of whether they are officers or clerks, etc.?
A: I have not a so complete knowledge of the exact conditions of service, but the broad intention is that no individual will suffer who has been in the service of the Crown, if as a result of the compulsory changeover he loses his position.

Q: In clause (e) of the document it is said that the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility

1 No. 457.  2 Sir G. S. Bajpai, Agent to the Governor-General in the U.S.A.
of the Government of India. Can the Indian members of the Council have the power to arm the population?

A: It will be for the Government of India as to how the activities of the Indian population are ordered. That is to say, they can decide whether there should be conscription, whether they should work in the factories, in the land, in the army. That is a function which every Government of every country is to perform as regards its own population. It has the right to decide how you are going to use the population for the defence of India.

Q: In the case of the non-acceding provinces, will they continue to be governed by the Government of India Act of 1935?

A: Whichever they elect to do. In the first instance, on the first day after the new Union comes into being, if they do not accede they will naturally maintain the situation in which they now are.

Q: The other day while you were explaining the term “Indian peoples” you thought that India was inhabited by several races. Will you kindly give us at least the names of three or four races?

A: This is not a simple knowledge examination (Loud laughter).

Q: It is a very fundamental question. I suppose you are not confusing religion with race.

A: You know quite well the reason for my not answering such a question. If I should, I may omit a race, and I will be getting a thousand and one telegrams tomorrow. I do not confuse religion with race.

Q: If you are lucky enough to get this scheme accepted...

A: It is not a question of luck, it is a question of commonsense.

Q: Would you kindly consider staying on in India for three or four months to settle details?

A: I will certainly consider it. I am afraid the consideration is only likely to arrive at one conclusion and that is that I have promised to get back to England and to some extent my services are required there.

Q: Can you tell us clearly that you are going to give us “freedom”, freedom as understood by the people of the country, by the man-in-the-street whose war effort is immediately required for the purposes you all have in view? What is the use of giving us a dominion status constitution of the Westminster variety which compels me to read Berriedale Keith. What is required is one simple word “freedom”, a simpler word which will infuse people with enthusiasm.

A: We used what we thought simple, the most conclusive phrase which was “full self-government”. That seems to us to be the most expressive phrase that we can use. I am afraid it is not Berriedale Keith. If you ask him he will
have considerable constitutional discussions with you as regards this. What we have said is full self-government. Now we have had to give that a definition which is understood not only in India but in the British House of Commons and in all the other dominions and other places in the world. We followed full self-government by a definition which we believed would convey the right meaning to all those other quarters. There is no conceivable doubt about the situation that this allows complete and absolute self-determination and self-government for India, and I cannot imagine anything more which can be put into the two words.

Q: Why don't you use the word "Swaraj"?
A: I know the use of the word pretty well. I don't know the language, but I have heard it many times over the last few years. I should say there is no difference between the two expressions. Ours is longer, yours is shorter, but they are the same.

Q: Can the Union join any contiguous foreign countries?
A: There is nothing to prevent [it]. Canada [can] join the United States of America, if it wants, tomorrow.

Q: Can it?
A: Of course it can.

Q: In your broadcast yesterday you said that in case the scheme is not accepted, the responsibility shall be of the Indian leaders. What was the justification for that? The responsibility should be of Britain also. You have brought some proposals. The leaders were not consulted when the proposals were drafted.
A: We have been asked time and again by the Indian leaders to put forward some precise and clear scheme, method, by which self-government could be attained. We have been accused in the past of leaving it to the Indian leaders to decide, and, as a result, delaying the matter over years and years. We have now responded to the requests which we had received and we have made a precise and clear offer. The responsibility for acceptance or rejection of that offer does not rest with us but with the Indian leaders.

Q: In order to enable the Viceroy to call in the leaders to participate in the Government do you envisage or is there any possibility for the present Indian members of the Executive Council to go out?
A: If a new government is formed, it starts with the resignation of the existing executive as all cabinet re-constructions. You cannot reconstruct a cabinet until you have got the resignation of the old cabinet.

Q: Except the Commander-in-Chief?
A: Yes.
Q: Your address at the last press conference was so conclusive, so exhaustive and so helpful. Could we have an authorised version of the proceedings of that Conference?
A: I think it would be a bad precedent to set. I think it is wiser to leave the matter to the press representatives themselves to take what notes they consider important.

Q: Then, are you satisfied with the reports that have so far appeared in the newspapers?
A: If I may say so, I am not only extremely satisfied but I am extremely grateful for the way in which the Press handled that long press conference. I realise that it was a strain to everybody who was there, but I think the high degree of accuracy of such reports as I had the opportunity to read is a great credit to the Press of India and I doubt whether any other press conference in any other country would have got so loyal and accurate a report.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps
L/P&J/10/9: ff 38-9

INTERVIEW WITH DR PATTABHI SITARAMAYYA

31 March 1942

He dealt with the question of the States peoples and emphasised his horror and disgust at the omission of any consideration of the States peoples in the document. He recounted to me their present position and suggested that the British Government ought to insist upon the States democratizing their constitutions at the same time the promise of freedom was given to British India. I pointed out that it was impossible to do otherwise than deal with the States as they existed today whatever the historical reasons might be, and that the process of democratization would only be accelerated when the fact of a free India became a compelling force with the rulers of the States, in which circumstances the British Administration, so long as it remained in India, would be able to exercise all the influence it had upon the States rulers in the same direction. I also pointed out that Mr. Gandhi had told me that he did not think it was possible for the States to be forced into an Indian Union, and that we took the same view, and that it must be left to the advance of democratic ideas permeating the States and their rulers from the contiguous democracies of the Indian Union. This naturally did not satisfy him as he wished some immediate steps to be taken
to free the Indian States people from the autocracy of their rulers though he was prepared for the rulers to remain as constitutional monarchs.

He also raised the question of the small States which had no Treaty rights and asked what was proposed to be done as regards them. I stated that it was obvious that they would have to be grouped or federated in order to form large enough units either to come into the Indian Union or to associate themselves with other States that were outside. In this matter too he was in favour of immediate action to force the smaller States into British India as a prelude to the formation of the new constitution.

He was extremely critical of my own position in the matter, saying that he had been bitterly disappointed with my views as to put forward a document so reactionary so far as the States peoples were concerned.

1 See No. 397.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 59

INTERVIEW WITH K. B. ALLAH BAKHSH

31 March 1942

He was very concerned about the prospect of a breakdown by a non-acceptance by Congress which obviously he thought was practically settled now, and made various suggestions as to what might have been done, but, as I pointed out, I had to have regard to other people’s wishes as well as to any individual Indian’s on a settlement, and it was not possible now to start negotiations which might last for months and months. I impressed upon him the seriousness of the situation if there were no agreement and this he fully realised. I also explained to him the situation as regards Defence, with which he fully agreed. He was anxious, I think, to do anything he could to assist in a settlement but had no very constructive suggestions as regards the matter.
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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&E/J/10/4: f 70

INTERVIEW WITH SARDAR DASAUNDHA SINGH AND
CAPT. SARDAR NAUNIHAL SINGH MAN

31 March 1942

These two representatives of the Khalsa League\(^1\) stated very much the same particular case as regards the Sikh minority in the Punjab as had the others,\(^2\) but they raised the further question of the divergence of interests between the different classes of Sikhs themselves and this seemed to add to a complication which was completely insoluble. I pointed out to them the various opportunities which they would have of getting safeguards and that in the last resort we should be prepared to insist on their inclusion in the Treaty with the second Dominion, if there ever were one. Naturally they were not thoroughly satisfied with this but they at least appreciated what the situation was. They were anxious to have carved out a special Sikh area where there could be a plebiscite to decide as to whether they should join the first or the second union in the event of there being two unions. It was only in the event of a second union materialising that they felt there was a danger to their interests.

\(^1\) The Khalsa Defence of India League was formed early in 1941 with the Maharaja of Patiala at its head. Its object was to encourage Sikh recruitment to the Army.

\(^2\) See No. 396.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&E/J/10/4: f 61

INTERVIEWS WITH SIR V. T. KRISHNAMACHARI; SIR C. P.
RAMASWAMY AIYAR; SIR GOPALASWAMY AIYAR

31 March 1942

These three Diwans came to have a short chat before their departure and were anxious that the scheme should go through and expressed the view that if it did the majority of the States would come into the first Union and that they did not think that there would be a second Union since the Pakistan idea was not a practical one, and they felt that the Muslims and Hindus would be able to arrive at a working arrangement.
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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 63

INTERVIEW WITH SIR MUHAMMAD SA'ADULLA

31 March 1942

He was mainly of course concerned with the problem of Assam and pointed out that if Bengal were to form a separate Dominion, the position of Assam would be a difficult one and that it was a Province which had particular problems and in which tea planting occupied a very important position. He was not very much concerned with any of the general lines of the scheme and, when putting forward the specialised considerations as regards Assam, made no material comments upon it.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 60

INTERVIEW WITH THE SIKH DELEGATION

31 March 1942

The Akali Sikhs1 came back2 in order to give me their view upon the scheme and stated that they did not approve of it since it did not give them sufficient protection. They also expressed the view that they would like a special area in which the vote could be taken to decide whether they should join the first or second Union. I promised to bear this matter in mind and to mention it at some stage to Mr. Jinnah. They raised no other points of importance, and I again assured them of the gratitude of H.M.G. for all they had done in the past and for their present attitude of helpfulness in the war.

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1 The Akali movement grew up among the Sikh community after the First World War and aimed to take over their gurdwaras from the Hindu priests who controlled many of them. It abandoned the policy of co-operation with the British pursued by the more conservative Sikh leadership. After 1925 the movement split into three groups: the Congress Sikhs, the Central Akali Dal, and the Akalis led by Master Tara Singh, who became the official Akali party.

2 See No. 396.
Dear Sir Stafford Cripps,

May we begin by stating that after giving careful consideration to the proposals which have now been published from the point of view of (1) India’s integrity and (2) the Sikh position, we find them unacceptable because; (1) instead of maintaining and strengthening the integrity of India specific provision has been made for separation of Provinces and constitution of Pakistan and (2) the cause of the Sikh community has been lamentably betrayed.

Ever since the British advent our community has fought for England in every battlefield of the Empire and this is our reward, that our position in the Punjab, which England promised to hold in trust and in which we occupied a predominant position, has been finally liquidated.

Why should a Province that fails to secure a three-fifths’ majority of its Legislature, in which a religious community enjoys statutory majority, be allowed to hold a plebiscite and be given the benefit of a bare majority? In fairness this right should have been conceded to communities who are in permanent minority in the Legislature.

Further, why should not the population of any area opposed to separation be given the right to record its verdict and to form an autonomous unit?

We are sure you know that Punjab proper extended up to the banks of the Jhelum excluding Jhang and Multan Districts, and that the Trans-Jhelum area was added by the conquest of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and retained by the British for administrative convenience. It would be altogether unjust to allow the extraneous Trans-Jhelum population, which only accidentally came into the Province, to dominate the the future of the Punjab proper.

We give below the figures which abundantly prove our contention. From the boundary of Delhi to the banks of the Ravi river the population is divided as follows: Muslims forty-five lakhs five thousand, Sikhs and other non-Muslims seventy-six lakhs forty-six thousand.

From the Delhi boundary to the banks of the Jhelum river excluding Multan and Jhang districts: Muslims eighty-two lakhs eighty-eight thousand, Sikhs and other non-Muslims ninety-three lakhs forty-eight thousand.

To this may be added the population of the Sikh States of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot, which is about twenty-six lakhs. Of this the Muslims constitute barely twenty per cent. and this reduces the ratio of Muslim population still further.

We do not wish to labour the point any more. We have lost all hope of
receiving any consideration. We shall resist however by all possible means separation of the Punjab from All-India Union. We shall never permit our Motherland to be at the mercy of those who disown it.

Yours sincerely,

BALDEV SINGH, President, Sikh All Parties Committee.

TARA SINGH

JOGENDRA SINGH

UJJAL SINGH

MOHAN SINGH (ex-Adviser to the Secretary of State for India).

We append herewith a note which gives some particulars of the position of our Community in the Punjab.

Enclosure to No. 467

On behalf of the Sikhs we wish to place the claims of the Sikh community in the proposed scheme of His Majesty’s Government for the governance of India. We begin by giving a historical background of our case.

The Sikhs are an important and distinct community mainly concentrated in the Punjab of which they were the Rulers until 1849. Sikhism recognises no caste and strictly enjoins upon those who profess it to treat all human beings as equal.

Sikhs play an important role in the economic and civic life of the country and a leading part in its defence. In the British Punjab with their 3\frac{1}{2} million population (13.5 per cent. of the whole) the Sikhs pay 25 per cent. of the land revenue and 40 per cent. of the land revenue and water rates combined, the main source of the Provincial Exchequer. They maintain at their own expense over 400 schools and 4 colleges open to all communities and classes without distinction. The percentage of literacy among the Sikhs is higher than in any other community in the Punjab. They have got a large number of Sikh shrines with big landed estates attached to them which are the centres of Sikh culture and tradition.

The authors of the Montford Report recognised the importance of the Sikhs and “the difficulty of denying to the Sikhs in the Punjab a concession which is granted to Mohammedans”. 1

The Simon Commission states: “Sikhism remained a pacific cult until the political tyranny of the Mussalmans and the social tyranny of the Hindus converted it into a military creed. It is a striking circumstance that this small community contributed no less than 80,000 men” (actually 89,000 combatant recruits in addition to 32,500 already serving when the war broke out) “to serve in the Great War, a larger portion than any other community in India”. 2

1 The text of this letter and its enclosure were transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery in telegram 209-S.C. of 18 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.


With a population of over 6,000,000 in India the share of Sikhs in the defence forces of the country has always been out of all proportion to their population. The Sikhs are perhaps the only community which is making an organised war effort by the establishment of the "Khalsa Defence of India League" to maintain its glorious traditions in the Army. We do realise that with our past traditions and the excellent fighting material that can be found in the Sikh districts, we should have done still better in mobilising our manpower, but we are constrained to remark that nothing has been done by Government to rouse the enthusiasm of the Sikh community in the way of recognition of its status in the sphere of the Central Government or of providing effective safeguards for it in the Punjab, to which it was entitled on account of its unrivalled position, historical, political and economic.

The Sikhs were deeply disappointed at the differential treatment meted out to them under the so-called "communal award" of 1932. In spite of their unique position in the Punjab they were not given the same weightage in the Legislature as the Moslem minorities were given in other Provinces. By way of illustration it may be stated that Muslims with 14.8 per cent. population in the United Provinces were given 30 per cent. seats in the Provincial Assembly as against 18.8 per cent. seats to the Sikhs in the Punjab with their 13.5 per cent. population. Their influence in the administration and political life of the Punjab was further weakened in the formation of the Provincial Cabinet. Whereas in the days of dyarchy⁴ out of three Punjabees appointed as Ministers and Members of the Governor's Council there was one Sikh from 1921 to 1926 and one Sikh out of four Punjabees from 1926 to 1937, since the advent of the Provincial autonomy there has been only one Sikh out of a total of six Ministers. It will thus be observed that in the sphere of the supreme Executive of the Province, the representation of the Sikhs was reduced from 33 per cent. in 1921 to 25 per cent. in 1926 and to 16 per cent. in 1937.

This progressive deterioration of the share of Sikhs in the Punjab Cabinet is strongly resented by the community as it has led to encroachment of their religious and cultural rights and the waning of their influence on the political and economic life of the country.

We submit that under the existing constitution the strength of the Sikhs in the Punjab Cabinet should be maintained normally at 33 per cent. and in no case below 25 per cent. so that there may always be at least two Sikh Ministers in the Cabinet. We also feel that so long as communal electorates continue to be the method of representation in the Legislature, Cabinet should be formed on a coalition basis in the true sense of the word. We may here point out that when ministries were functioning in all Provinces, in the United Provinces where the percentage of the Muslim population is nearly the same as that of Sikhs in the Punjab, there were two Moslem Ministers in a Cabinet of six.
In the sphere of the Central Government, the Sikh Community in spite of its important stake in the country, its sacred shrines scattered all over India and the valuable services that the Sikh soldiers and technicians are rendering, has been unjustly treated. The Sikhs have suffered a great disillusionment by the deliberate neglect of their claims and omission of any reference to the Sikh minority by British statesmen and the Viceroy of India in their statements made from time to time during the last ten years on the Indian question. It seems as if in their opinion, Muslims alone or the depressed classes sometimes, constitute the important minorities of India.

Although for seventeen years a Punjabee has been appointed on the Viceroy’s Council, no Sikh has ever been considered for such an appointment. Even at the time of the last expansion of the Executive Council, the claims of the Sikhs were entirely ignored.

In this connection we should like to invite attention to the decisions of the Allahabad Unity Conference which were arrived at between Hindus Muslims and Sikhs in November, 1932. Resolution number 4 regarding Cabinets read as follows: 1. “In the formation of the cabinet of the Central Government, so far as possible, members belonging to the Muslim, Sikh and other minority communities of considerable numbers forming the Indian Nation shall be included by convention.” 2. “Further during the first ten years in the formation of the Central Government, a seat shall be offered to a member of the Sikh community.”

Resolution No. 7 reads as under: II. “It is agreed that in the Central Legislature out of the total elected seats allotted to British India 33 per cent. shall be reserved for Muslims, 42 per cent. or 14 seats out of 300, for Sikhs.”

It will thus be observed that leading Indians of different communities recognised the importance of the Sikh minority and agreed to accommodate it in the Central Cabinet, and also to give it nearly 5 per cent. representation in the Central Legislature.

We favour immediate transfer of power to Indian hands, entrusting all portfolios including defence to Indians with experience of public life.

We feel that in this way alone, the moral and material resources of India can be tapped to the fullest extent and Indians can participate in the war with full vigour and enthusiasm.

The Sikhs stand for national unity and the integrity of India. They would like the provinces to enjoy as wide a measure of autonomy as may be compatible with good government in the country as a whole but they also feel that any weakness at the centre will expose India to internal and external dangers.

They are strongly opposed to the vivisection of India into two or three rival dominions or sovereign states as is contemplated in the British proposals.

4 Under the Government of India Act 1919. 5 In July 1941.
They feel that such a step would lead to a state of perpetual strife and civil war in the country.

If the object is to give self-determination to the provinces in the matter of accession to the "Union of India," the right to stand out and break the unity of India should not be exercised by a bare majority but by at least 65 per cent. of Indian members present at the meeting of the provincial assembly when the resolution is considered. A plebiscite on the issue of secession is certain to lead to intercommunal riots of a most serious character and magnitude and should in no case be resorted to.

We are constrained to remark that the proposed scheme does not make any provisions for safeguarding the interests of the Sikh minority. The decisions of the constitution-making body are to be by a bare majority and no provision is made for recourse to arbitration by the aggrieved party as was even assured by Mahatma Gandhi in his statement on the Congress scheme of Constituent Assembly.

The Treaty which is proposed to be negotiated between the constitution-making body and His Majesty’s Government for protecting the religious and racial minorities in accordance with undertakings given by the British Government, will have no sanction behind it. Besides, we are not sure how political rights which relate mainly to a share in the Legislature and the administration of the country will be incorporated in the Treaty. The Treaty might cover the cultural religious and linguistic rights of minorities as such Treaties in European countries after the last Great War did. But the undertakings given to the Sikhs by His Majesty’s Government from time to time relate to the position and status of the Sikhs in the governance of the country and not merely regarding the exercise of their religious or cultural rights.

The Sikhs therefore feel that they cannot attain their rightful position or effectively protect their interests unless the Punjab is re-distributed into two Provinces with the river Ravi roughly forming the boundary between them.

We might invite attention to the All-India Moslem League Resolution of the Lahore session held in March, 1940, which is popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, "that no Constitution would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

A careful reading of the Resolution discloses the fact that the Muslim League itself visualised the re-adjustments of areas and the inclusion in their separate state of only those areas in which the Muslims were in a majority.

The population of the Punjab is so distributed that the two western divisions
of Rawalpindi and Multan are predominantly Muslims and the two eastern divisions of Ambala and Jullundur area [are?] predominantly non-Muslims. The three central districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore have a balanced population. The separate figures of population for each district of the Punjab are attached\(^6\) as appendix to this statement. If a new Province of a contiguous area of the two divisions of Ambala and Jullundur plus the three districts of Lahore, Gurdaspur and Amritsar is carved out, it will have a total population of 12,151,000 (according to 1931 census) with non-Muslims forming 63 per cent. and Muslims 37 of the population. The other Province to the west of the river Ravi comprising the Multan and Rawalpindi divisions plus the three districts Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Gujranwala will have a total population of 11,429,000, with Muslims forming 77.3 per cent. and non-Muslims 22.7 per cent. of the population.

The Sikhs do not want to dominate but they would certainly not submit to the domination of a community which is bent upon breaking the unity of India and imposing their personal laws and culture on the other sections of the population.

We submit that in any interim arrangement or in the permanent scheme the following safeguards should be provided either in the Treaty which might be enforceable or in the Constitution itself:

No. 1. By delimiting the present Provincial boundaries of the Punjab, a new Province comprising of Ambala and Jullundur divisions with the three districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore be constituted.

No. 2. The Sikh minority in the Provinces be given the same weightage and measure of protection as the Muslim minority.

No. 3. So long as communal electorates exist, Provincial Cabinets should be formed on a coalition basis.

No. 4. The Sikhs should be given 5 per cent. representation in the Central Legislature.

No. 5. A Sikh should always be given a seat in the Cabinet of the Central Government.

No. 6. A Defence Advisory Committee should be set up for advising the Indian Defence Minister and a Sikh should be given a seat on that Committee.

No. 7. The position of the Sikhs in the Defence Forces of India should be maintained in keeping with their past traditions and strength in those forces.

No. 8. The share of the Sikhs should be fixed in Provincial and All-India Services on the lines it has already been provided or may be provided for the Muslims.

No. 9. Religious laws of Sikhs enacted may only be amended by the votes of majority of the Sikh members in the Legislature.

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\(^6\) Not printed.
No. 10. No restrictions should be imposed by the State in the exercise of the religious rights of the Sikhs in the matter of eatables and religious performances.

No. 11. The State should provide for the teaching of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script where a certain fixed number of scholars is forthcoming.

BALDEV SINGH, President.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/PEJ/10/4: f 62

INTERVIEW WITH THE EUROPEAN DELEGATION1

31 March 1942

The Delegation brought a long list of questions to which I gave them the answers and promised further answers in writing. They were naturally mainly concerned with the protection of their own community and the position in which they would be if they were of Indian citizenship or of Indian nationality. I explained all these matters and made it clear to them that in the first treaty upon which the granting of the Constitution would be conditional, there would be no clause protecting British vested interests in India. They quite accepted this situation. They also took the view that it would be advisable to give the Indians control of their own defence so far as was consistent with the maintaining of the position and authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

1 The composition of the delegation was the same as before: see No. 398.
Sir Kingsley Wood to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/106c: f 124

31 March 1942

My dear Leo,
Thank you for your letters of the 28th and 30th March,¹ about the wording of paragraph (c) of the Indian Declaration. While I am sorry that the India Committee regarded it as undesirable to change the wording to meet my suggestion, I agree that the final form of this part of the Declaration, as altered at the last minute, does seem to be better from my point of view. All we can now do is to sit back and hope for the best.

Yours ever,
KINGSLEY WOOD

¹ Nos. 418 and 452.

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 607

NEW DELHI, 31 March 1942, 2.35 am
Received: 31 March, 6 am

844-S. Following from Lord Privy Seal.

Soon after my arrival it was pointed out to me that the question of the method by which a Province should decide to opt out of proposed union raised a controversial point because owing to the (?escapage) [weightage ?] given to minorities in Legislative Assemblies Moslems in Bengal and Punjab have no clear majority without assistance of minority votes. It was obvious that some method must be found of ensuring that (?Moslem) majority of the population in these Provinces could make its wishes felt if it were in favour of standing out. I have resolved this difficulty by proposition that a Province should reach its decision whether or not to stand out of union by a vote in Legislative Assembly on a resolution to stand in. If majority for accession to the union is less than 60 per cent the minority will have the right to demand a plebiscite of adult male population.

2. I considered possible alternative that voting power of different communities in Legislature should be increased to make them properly representative of their proportionate strength in the population but I decided that this though more practicable would undoubtedly be regarded as a wangle.
3. In my conversations I have put this proposition to the representatives of all parties and no dissent has been expressed to it. I recognise practical difficulties of a plebiscite but these will have to be faced if necessary. Unless some method of this kind had been found Moslem acceptance of declaration as a whole would have been out of the question.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Churchill (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 176

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 31 March 1942, 2.14 am
Received: 31 March, 9.40 am

No. 1847. Following for Prime Minister.

As you will see from my immediately following telegram,¹ the President has announced the establishment of Pacific War Council here—with first meeting on Wednesday.²

2. I understand, though this is still largely conjecture, that President’s idea is that Council should stand in same relation to him on political side as Chiefs of Staff on military, each reporting separately to him.

3. I think Australia and New Zealand will wish to press for something more than this, and have the notion of Council consulting with the President, and fortifying themselves with combined staff advice.

4. It will not work out I expect like that, and I have told Evatt and Nash that they will have to be careful about trying to trespass upon President’s final responsibility.

5. Indian representative has not yet been invited—on the ground I suppose that India is not in Pacific area. But for political reasons at this moment I should have thought it unwise to leave India out, as she is represented on your council in London, and I propose to suggest to the President her inclusion.³ I hope you will not disagree.

¹ No. 472. ² 1 April. ³ Cf. No. 453.
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Viscount Halifax to Mr Churchill (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 177

IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, 31 March 1942, 2.14 am
Received: 31 March, 8.40 am

No. 1848. My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Early, President’s press secretary, to-day announced the creation of a Pacific War Council with Headquarters in Washington.

Early added that first Meeting of the Council was to be held on April 1st, that the President would represent the United States and that in addition to myself, Dr. Evatt for Australia, Mr. Nash for New Zealand, Dr. Soong for China, Mr. Loudon for the Netherlands and Canadian Chargé d’Affaires (in the absence of Minister) had been invited to be present.

2. As on behalf of the President in making announcement, Early said: “it is important that all of the United Nations now actually engaged in Pacific conflict consider together matters of policy relating to their joint war effort. An effective war can only be prosecuted with the complete co-operation and understanding of all the nations concerned. New Council will be in intimate contact with a similar body in London (grp. undec.).

¹ No. 471.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 175

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 31 March 1942, 1.5 pm
Received: 31 March, 10.15 am

2530. Addressed to Ambassador Washington, repeated to Secy. of State for India.

Following from Viceroy for Lord Halifax.

Bajpai’s telegram No. 70¹ of March 29th.

We are not clear as to exact relation of South-West Pacific War Council to other Controls [councils ?], and shortness of time makes it impossible to handle the matter through London. But if, as we hope, India is entitled to seat we suggest Bajpai should represent India as ad interim emergency arrangements.

¹ No. 453; the date should be 30 March.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 31 MARCH 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Dictating today, Tuesday, 31st March, it is too early to feel entirely confident about the course of Cripps' negotiations and the response of the various groups to His Majesty's Government's scheme. Nor would it help you if I were to attempt at this moment any detailed appraise of the position. But if the signs are not at this moment favourable (and that, unhappily, is the position), this is certainly no fault of Cripps', for he has handled a difficult and wearing job with outstanding skill, courage, and imagination. I have watched his technique with interest and admiration, and hope I may have learned a little in the process. The general picture, and such information as is beginning to dribble in, suggest that my appreciations of the position are likely to be proved approximately accurate. I send you a note on Master Tara Singh's reactions which is in tune with my most gloomy forebodings! Cripps, whom I saw this morning, appears to think that the scheme will be rejected. I have asked him, and he has agreed, to discuss with me the position that must arise in the event of his having to declare the failure of his mission. He, of course, recognizes, as clearly as I do, that the effect of such failure must be at least for a time to make things a good deal more difficult, and to aggravate communal feeling, which is already running high. I shall, I apprehend, very soon be in telegraphic communication with you about this and kindred matters. I think that here in India we shall have to hold things together with a very firm hand. May I venture to suggest that in England there may be need for a similar policy. Krishna Menon and his organisation have constantly misrepresented the Indian problem before the Press and public at home, and have consistently intrigued to create in Parliament and in the constituencies prejudice against our Indian policy. . . .

I do hope you will seriously consider the expediency of seizing some favourable occasion to get him put out of the U.K. . . .

2. The loss of the Andamans and the renewal of fighting in Burma have had remarkably little effect on public morale in India which seems if anything to be better than a few weeks ago. It may simply mean that people have got something nearer home to think about than the approach of the war, whether it is the outcome of Cripps' discussions, the possibility of a scorched earth policy or the shortage of wheat. There is so much misunderstanding about "scorched earth", that I shall have to seek an early opportunity of some public explanation of what our policy of "denial" is likely to mean, if the need for
it should arise in any part of India, and for this purpose I am thinking of agreeing to a request from the Indian Chambers of Commerce that I should receive a deputation.

3. After a good deal of thought I decided to ask Zafrullah Khan to be India’s first representative in Chungking.\(^5\) His term would only be for six months, but I did not conceal from him the dangers and discomforts which he would have to face, nor my view that the post would be in the nature of an heroic one. I am glad to say that Zafrullah accepted without hesitation, as you will have heard by now. Gwyer made no difficulty about sparing him from the Federal Court, since four months of the time that he will be away will be covered by the Court’s vacation. Zafrullah has diplomatic gifts of a high order and I believe that he will be very successful at starting us off on the right foot with the Chinese.

The question of emoluments was a little difficult to decide but Zafrullah would obviously have to retain those which he is drawing as the Puisne Judge of the Federal Court, although this would give him a little more than the aggregate of those drawn by Seymour himself. The justification is that he would be proceeding as a Judge *en mission* for six months only to inaugurate the post.

[Para. 4, on the offer of Rothney Castle in Simla to Chiang Kai-Shek, and para. 5, on the China Relations Officer in Calcutta, omitted.]

6. Cripps has sent a strongly-worded telegram\(^6\) to the Prime Minister about our fire-fighting equipment and I hope it may produce some results. It is almost as important that we should be prepared in this respect to deal with the worst that may happen in our cities, as that we and Burma should have more aircraft, on which point, as I dictate, I have just seen the Prime Minister’s not very encouraging reply\(^7\) to Wavell’s urgent plea,\(^8\) backed by Cripps.

7. If there should be a row, whether at home or out here, about India’s Military unpreparedness, of which you mention the likelihood in your letter of the 10th March,\(^9\) you will find that my case is ready and fully documented.

All luck!

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1 Presumably No. 455. 2 See No. 459. 3, 4 Personal references omitted. 5 See No. 383. 6 No. 451. 7 Not printed. 8 Not printed. 9 No. 304, para. 2.
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Note by Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Interview between Sir Stafford Cripps and H.E. on the night of March 31st.

Sir Stafford observed that it was the defence issue that was really worrying Congress. H.E. expressed the view that what was hardest for them was not really the defence issue, but the right of secession, and Sir Stafford was half inclined to agree.

Sir Stafford said that he would be leaving on Sunday.¹ He then expressed the wish that an occasion might be made for him on which to make a speech to the Army in India. It should be towards the end of this week, and it would be more effective if a reasonable number of troops were on parade and could go past him. He suggested that the Viceroy might be with him and take the salute. H.E. promised to consider this matter further.

¹ 5 April.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

I have just been reading Cripps’ broadcast,¹ which struck me as very good, and also his answers to the Press questions. I note that he has announced definitely that we mean to make no treaty reservations as regards British vested interests.² I presume that he has only done that after consultation with you and presume also that it only means that the question of these interests is not included in the pre-constitution treaty. There is no reason why we should not make treaty arrangements afterwards with the Indian Government or Governments, as we do in the case of any Dominion or foreign country. I wonder, too, whether he discussed with you his rather elaborate figures on which he based the arrangements by which a Province can stand out,³ or his apparent assurance that in States where there are elected bodies they would be the basis

INDIA OFFICE, 31 March 1942

You may safely presume that Sir S. C. consulted me about nothing at any time.

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of representation on the constituent body. However, all these are details as compared with the main question whether the scheme is accepted or not.

2. From today’s papers it looks to me as if Congress, without turning it down directly on the issue of the constitutional future, will say that it will only play if the Executive is completely Indianised and Defence handed over to them. If they do that and the other parties agree, and especially if some fraction at any rate of Congress break away from the main body, I suppose you and Cripps will consider that there is enough agreement on which to go forward. What you will do if only Jinnah agrees and the Hindu parties all disagree is a more difficult question. My own feeling is that Gandhi will dislike the idea of being left out in the cold by agreement and will also be afraid, if Congress agrees, that the Mahasabha will gain too much ground at Congress’ expense, and will therefore veto agreement.

3. If there is no agreement, then I presume you go back to very much what you were meditating as regards your own Executive, but that there will be no further talk of altering the Executive during the war. On the other hand, I assume that, agreement or no agreement, our post-war policy stands, though it may be open to us to drop it if the whole post-war situation turns out to be completely different.

4. I am glad to say that the tiresome business of rates of pay for officers attached to the Indian Army has been satisfactorily disposed of by John Anderson, whom the Cabinet instructed to arbitrate between Grigg and myself. On the main issue he decided without qualification for the Indian Army case, and I can only regret that so many months have been wasted over a pure bit of tiresome pedantry on the part of the War Office. There are still some loose ends to fix up as regards the position of Staff Officers, but I don’t think Grigg means to make any difficulty about them. My one hope is that you may now get a really good contingent of keen young men from the Middle East.

5. I must say I was rather surprised when I saw Cripps’ telegram to Winston accusing the India Office of slackness and incompetence in securing firefighting apparatus and personnel for India. I have been looking over the record and it seems to me that we did our very best to secure for you everything that you asked, but that during the blitz of last year neither personnel nor equipment could be extracted from the Home Office, while since then shipping has been the

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1 No. 457.  
2 No. 440, p. 542.  
3 Ibid. pp. 539–41. See also No. 470.  
5 No. 451.
main obstacle. But I won’t go into that as I am sending you a telegram today. Besides, in any case, I will of course do my best to get you all I possibly can and it may be much easier now to secure personnel.

[Para. 6, on customs arrangements in Cutch, omitted.]

6 See No. 451, note 1.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 64

INTERVIEW WITH MR M. N. ROY AND MR JAMNADAS MEHTA

1 April 1942

I saw Mr. Roy and Mr. Mehta, representatives of the Indian Federation of Labour, who elaborated the proposals which they had submitted in a memorandum.1 They were both somewhat bitter against the Congress and the Muslim League and other political parties as being unrepresentative of the mass of the Indian population, and suggested that the right way to proceed irrespective of the future solution of the problem of self-government was by picking the Government from the best Indians, including of course Mr. Roy, irrespective of what parties or sections they belonged to. I noted their views and said that it had been decided to proceed upon the basis of dealing with the particular communal parties, and that therefore we could not accept the alternative suggestion if the scheme we had submitted was accepted by principal political parties. At this Mr. Roy seemed to get very vexed and expressed the desire to see me again in order to make a further attempt to convince me.

1 Not printed.
Note by Sir S. Cripps

1 April 1942

The Maharajah came to see me about the situation in Orissa and was chiefly concerned with the protection of the landlord interests and also the extending of the boundaries of Orissa so as to include the whole of the Oriya population which he said were being badly treated by the neighbouring provinces of Madras and C.P. I pointed out to him that it was impossible to change the boundaries of Provinces at this stage—it could only be done by a constitution-making authority—and that so far as the landlords were concerned, we did not regard them as a minority any more than any particular kind of trader and that they must make their protection with the other interests in the constitution-making Assembly. I pointed out to him that however much he would like to maintain the old systems and customs in India, it was impossible to arrest the advance of a civilization which would no doubt get a fresh impetus forward if self-government came to India.

Note by Sir S. Cripps

1 April 1942

He came to see me this morning with a view to making suggestions of some compromise upon the Defence situation, and it was as a result of the talk with him that I drafted the letter\(^1\) to Maulana Azad proposing the meeting with the Commander-in-Chief. He then gave me a further statement of the lines upon which some recommendation [accommodation?] might be arrived at on the Defence Ministry.

\(^{1}\) No. 480.
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Sir S. Cripps to Maulana Azad

Cmd. 6350

1 April 1942

I understand from the Press that difficulties are still in the mind of Congress as to the question of the responsibility for the defence of India. I have done what I could to clarify this point but as I think it would be a tragedy if negotiations were to break down upon any misunderstanding of the position I should like to suggest that I should ask the Commander-in-Chief to meet yourself and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru with myself in order that he may explain fully to you the technical difficulties of the situation and in order that you may make to him any suggestions you wish as to the division of responsibilities in this sphere of Government. Unfortunately he is at the moment away in Calcutta but he is expected back on Saturday next at the latest (and possibly earlier). If you consider this a helpful suggestion—as I hope you will—I will ask him the moment he returns whether he will be prepared to attend such a meeting and I do not anticipate that there will be any difficulty about it. I am sure you will realise that I do not want to be met with an impasse if there is any reasonable way out.

1 Sir S. Cripps transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office) in telegram 860-S of 1 April where the word 'Hindu' appears before 'Press' in the first sentence. The omission of this word from the White Paper was in accordance with Sir S. Cripps' wishes. L/PO/6/166c: f 73. See Nos. 653, 659, 661 and 663.

2 4 April.

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(Note by Sir S. Cripps)

L/P&J/10/4: ff 65-6

Interview with Mr. J. C. Gupta

1 April 1942

I had two long talks with Mr. Gupta who had been in conversation with the Maulana and other persons and he told me that the situation in Congress was that, although they objected to a number of things in the scheme, they would not turn it down if they could be satisfied upon the question of Defence; that they felt it was necessary if they were going to take part of the responsibility for rousing India to its own defence that they should be in a position to show the people that they, the people, would exercise some measure of control over
Defence. He stated that the Mahatma had remained in Delhi at the request of the Maulana and although he was opposed to the scheme he would not prevent Congress acceptance if the majority were satisfied on the Defence question; that if there was acceptance, the Non-Violence Group would retire from any active participation in the Working Committee and leave it to those who had accepted the scheme and who were anxious to do all they could to make the defence of India effective. He further stated that he was sure that the Maulana was anxious to arrive at a settlement and that the step that I had taken to write was a wise one, and between the two interviews which we had he went again to see the Maulana and asked him to send a favourable answer\(^1\) to my letter, which subsequently arrived. He was quite helpful as to the outcome of further negotiations on the Defence point. He gave me a good deal of information about the relationship of Fazlul Huq and the other Moslem Premiers to the Muslim League as he has been working very closely with Fazlul Huq over the reorganisation of the Bengal Government. He was not at all complimentary about the capacity of the Government of Bengal to rise to any serious war effort. He also stressed the influence which Subhas Bose still had in Bengal and the necessity for mobilising all elements which might be able to counteract this, including some of those extremist elements who were now in detention, but who, owing to their communist sympathies, were anxious to take a full part in the Defence of India at the present time. I think he is a valuable go-between and he has offered to stay in Delhi to do anything he can to help.

\(^{1}\) No. 485.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 69

INTERVIEW WITH SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU

1 April 1942

Sir Tej brought along some suggestions on the compromise formula with regard to the Ministry of Defence and told me that he had seen the Mahatma and tried to persuade him not to turn down the scheme pending further negotiations as to the Defence Ministry. He was not unhopeful that something might be arranged along the lines of his draft\(^1\) and offered his services in any way that might be useful.

\(^{1}\) Not printed.
This group of students, who are very keen to organise the younger people for the war effort in every way that they can, brought with them a list of points upon which they were most concerned and explained them to me and discussed them, leaving a list with me. Their attitude was one of strong desire to be allowed to partake in the Defence of India very much activated by the fact that Great Britain and Soviet Russia were now in alliance and they were most anxious to secure the freedom of those students who had been detained during the period when, owing to the then attitude of the Soviet Government, they as a body had taken a hostile attitude to the war. They stated that all other members who had then been imprisoned were now anxious to come out and take their place in the fighting line. I promised to discuss some of the points with the rest and the general approach of them to His Excellency the Viceroy.  

1 MSS. EUR. F. 125/141.  
2 The precise meaning of this sentence is not clear.

No. 859–S. Following from Sir Stafford Cripps for Prime Minister:

1. From all appearances it seems certain that Congress will turn down the proposals. There are a multitude of currents and cross-currents but they are selecting the question of Defence as their main platform for opposition.

2. The Muslim League who are prepared to accept will no doubt if Congress refuse also find some reason for refusal as will all other sections of opinion.

3. There has been almost unanimous protest from representatives including the European community as to the complete retention of the existing control of Defence by His Majesty’s Government. (I should however add that Viceroy doubts whether this is representative of attitude of Europeans in Bengal.) This
protest arises partly from a misunderstanding of the position which I have tried to clarify in successive stages and partly because people feel that the maximum of appeal must be made to the Indian people by their leaders if they are to be galvanised to their Defence, and that unless those leaders can claim some control over their Defence of India they cannot make their appeal effective to the Indian people.

4. Except in the Punjab and North-West Frontier present situation as to morale amongst the Indian and in many cases the European population is deplorable. The anti-British feeling is running very strong and our prestige is lower than it has ever been owing to events in Burma and more particularly in Singapore. The stories circulating on all sides as to Malaya and Singapore convey an impression of incompetence which is indeed alarming.

5. Unrest is growing amongst the population, and unemployment is developing in certain centres. The food situation is causing disquiet and the refugee problem in view of the complaints of discrimination against the Indians, of which the administration is accused, and which I have asked the Viceroy to look into, is a source of serious intensification of anti-British feeling.

6. The outlook so far as the internal situation goes is exceedingly bad and if we cannot persuade the Indian leaders to come in now and help us we shall have to resort to suppression which may develop to such a scale that it may well get out of hand even though we use for this purpose a part of our available military resources.

7. I give you this picture so that you may judge as to the importance from a Defence point of view of getting the Indian leaders into the job of controlling, encouraging and leading the Indian people. This cannot be done under existing circumstances by any Britisher.

8. The present situation as to the Defence Minister is that the new words which were drafted by the Viceroy were put into paragraph (e) with the full consent of the Commander-in-Chief who consulted with the Viceroy upon this point without my being present.

9. An explanatory letter was sent to the main communities containing the following material paragraph: "It must be clearly understood that the final definition of the division of responsibilities between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India is as stated in paragraph (e) of the document. The Viceroy would be prepared to consult with Indian leaders on this basis to see whether it were possible to designate an Indian to some office connected

1 Deciphered as ‘frail’. 2 Deciphered as ‘appeaser’. 3 Annex 2 to No. 454. 4 Deciphered as ‘community’.
with the Government of India's defence responsibilities without in any way impinging upon the functions and duties of the Commander-in-Chief either in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the armed forces in India or as the Member of the Executive Council in charge of Defence”.

10. I have consequently addressed a letter (text in my next following telegram), suggesting interview of Congress leaders with Commander-in-Chief.

11. If some adjustment can be so arrived at will you give me full authority subject to agreement of Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy.

5 See No. 480, note 1.

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Maulana Azad to Sir S. Cripps

Cmd. 6350

1 April 1942

I have your letter\(^1\) of to-day's date for which I thank you. If you so desire it I shall gladly meet the Commander-in-Chief and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will I hope be able to accompany me. My Committee have already arrived at a decision in regard to the proposals communicated by you to us. It was my intention to send this to you this evening or possibly to take it over in person in case you wished to discuss any point contained in it. This decision naturally covers other points also apart from defence. I hope to send it to you some time to-day. If you wish to meet me again in regard to this I shall gladly meet you.\(^2\)

\(^1\) No. 480. \(^2\) Cf. No. 663, para. 2.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

1 April 1942

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

No. 866-S. My telegram No. 860-S.\(^1\) Following from Sir Stafford Cripps for Prime Minister. As Congress have accepted offer of discussion with Commander-in-Chief and myself I shall stay on here till Sunday week.\(^2\)

\(^1\) See No. 480, note 1. \(^2\) 12 April.
Dr Ambedkar and Mr Rajah to Sir S. Cripps

Cmd. 6350

1 April 1942

We told you when we met you on the 30th March that the proposals of His Majesty’s Government relating to Constitutional development of India will not be acceptable to the Depressed Classes for the reasons which we placed before you at the interview. Since then we have had consultations with many of the Depressed Classes’ representatives in the various Provincial and Central Legislatures and all of them have unanimously endorsed the view we placed before you regarding the proposals.

We are all of us absolutely convinced that the proposals are calculated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed Classes and are sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule. Any such result which takes us back to the black days of the ancient past will never be tolerated by us, and we are all determined to resist any such catastrophe befalling our people with all the means at our command.

We request you to convey to His Majesty’s Government our deepest anxiety regarding the future of the Depressed Classes and to impress upon them that we must look upon it as breach of faith if His Majesty’s Government should decide to force upon the Depressed Classes a Constitution to which they have not given their free and voluntary consent and which does not contain within itself all the provisions that are necessary for safeguarding their interests.

In the end we want to thank you for assuring us that you called us in our representative capacity and that His Majesty’s Government did not regard the Depressed Classes as a minor party—points upon which some doubt had arisen in our mind and about which we asked you for a correct definition of our position.

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1 The text of this letter was transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery in telegram 207-S.C. of 18 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

2 No. 442.
Viscount Halifax to Mr Churchill (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/560: f 178

IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, 1 April 1942, 2.54 am
Received: 1 April, 9.10 am

My telegram No. 1847.¹
Following for Prime Minister.
President is not (repeat not) inviting India to be represented at Pacific Council to-morrow, but is seeing (grp. undec.? officials of?) (grp. undec.? Indian Government) separately.
Repeated to Viceroy with reference to his telegram to the Secretary of State No. 2530.²

¹ No. 471.
² No. 473.

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 53

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 1 April 1942

415. Your telegram 412–S,¹ dated 21st February. I do not see why suspension of I.C.S. recruitment should prevent resumption after the war, but whole matter may require further consideration in the light of constitutional developments and at the moment I do not feel that I can say anything except that unless anything emerges from Cripps' visit which would clearly justify such action I should see great difficulty in suspending Indian recruitment immediately. Public announcement of 1943 Delhi examination has already been made and decision to recruit two Indians by selection here this year has been communicated to numerous enquirers. Position regarding European recruitment is different as although intention to secure a few recruits by selection if opportunity occurs has been communicated to certain University authorities it is very doubtful whether further suitable candidates will be forthcoming and abandonment of intention would probably make no practical difference.

I am not clear whether you contemplated cessation of recruitment for Indian Police also. Position regarding European recruitment for this Service is that enquirers here have been informed of proposal agreed to in Home Department telegram 72/5, dated 19th October, to endeavour to select up to 14 recruits
this year. As regards Indian recruitment usual public announcements have presumably already issued in respect of 1942 examination.

We should in the ordinary course be circularising Universities very shortly with a view to obtaining candidates for selection here and shall have to make up our minds before long, but before taking any further action I will await your further comments which please telegraph as soon as possible.

1 No. 161.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/7/5173: f 9

INDIA OFFICE, 1 April 1942, 5.30 am
Received: 2 April

No. 5842. Question in Parliament for 15th April:

Begins. How many race meetings were held in Calcutta during January, February and March, respectively; and what steps he is taking to impress on the Government of India the necessity for the European community in India to set an example and to put themselves on a war basis as regards limited amusements, restricted food, petrol, luxuries and living¹ in general without further delay. Ends.

Can you assist me with material for reply? Question doubtless inspired by press allegations that luxuries and amusements of European civilians are unaffected by the war. I am of course aware of petrol restrictions and your telegram of 25th March No. 787–S² is relevant. But it would be helpful here if some early opportunity could be found by you and Governors to enjoin greater austerity of living on wealthier classes Indian and European as definite contribution to war effort. Press hint that classes criticised would respond to lead if given “from on high”.

¹ MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has ‘manner’. ² MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
NEW DELHI, 1 April 1942, 11.55 pm
Received: 2 April, 5.45 am

59–D. Dated 1st April 1942 (following is summary of statement) on Cripps proposals. Published in press of April 1st by Central Executive Committee of M. N. Roy’s Radical Democratic Party. This is first formal utterance on proposals by political body. Begins: We welcome declaration of British Government because it once again admits India’s right of self-determination this time without reservation. It is premature to raise (question of) post-war procedure now, because possibility of framing constitution of free India is conditional upon outcome of war. To defend India against imminent Japanese invasion and also possible invasion from the west is supreme task of the moment; and India can be defended only as sector of world anti-Fascist front. If Japanese invaders overrun India not only will country lose chance of becoming free but outcome of whole war may be decisively influenced thereby. Therefore, defence of India is not isolated Nationalist concern, and cannot be subordinate to any Nationalist conditions. Cripps in press statement¹ said declaration required sufficiently general and favourable acceptance from various sections of Indian opinion implying that in the absence of such acceptance offer will be withdrawn. Radical Democratic Party emphatically consider even then scheme can be put into force with the help of very large volume of truly representative popular opinion and it would be great injustice to India and injury done to cause of progress and freedom if offer was withdrawn. Continuation of status quo will be most prejudicial for mobilising India as active force on world anti-Fascist front. Ends.

¹ No. 400.
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Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 77

MOST IMMEDIATE TO DOWNING STREET, 2 April 1942, 1.30 am PERSONAL AND SECRET

5937. Superintendent Series. Prime Minister to Sir Stafford Cripps. Your 859–S\(^1\) and 860–S\(^2\) of 1 April. I cannot give you any authority to compromise on defence without submitting issue both to Cabinet and Ministers above the Line\(^3\). I will bring your telegram before Cabinet tomorrow. Everyone admires the manner in which you have discharged your difficult mission and the effect of our proposals has been most beneficial in the United States and in large circles here.

\(^1\) No. 484. \(^2\) See No. 480, note 1. \(^3\) Namely all Ministers except the Minister of Pensions, the four Law Officers, and Under Secretaries.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 73

MY INTERVIEW WITH MR MAHOMAD UZAFAR

2 April 1942

He told me that he had just been released from gaol together with some other Communists and that he was not conversant with the political situation as a result but that he particularly wished to speak to me about the other communists who were still under detention, including those at Chittagong; and he handed me two statements expressing their attitude towards the carrying on of the war and impressed upon me that whatever happened as a result of the present negotiations for an arrangement the Communists wished to support the war against Japan wholeheartedly and were anxious that their members should be released for this purpose, and also would like some measure of freedom for the Communist Party to organise and act in this direction, at least that the arrest of Communists should cease, especially in the Punjab where some had been made very recently within the last few days. He asked me whether I would like to see some of those who were more able to speak with a knowledge of the recent political situation of the communists and gave me the name of someone
so qualified, but asked me to obtain a safe conduct for him in the event of his coming to see me as otherwise he might be arrested.

I said I would consider this matter and would bear in mind what he had said about the Communist Party.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 74

INTERVIEW WITH MAHARAJA SIR VIJAYA OF VIZIANAGRAM

2 April 1942

He was chiefly concerned with the question of the Andhras and their position in the new constitution. I explained the situation to him and also explained to him that it was impossible to make any new provinces before the new constitution came into operation since, if it was done in one case, there would be demands in many cases in order to advantage one or other community or race; that all such matters must now be left over to be decided by the Indians themselves at the time of the making of the new constitution. Apart from this point he seemed otherwise satisfied.

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Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/4: f 75

INTERVIEW WITH SIR BIJOY PRASAD SINGH ROY AND SIR CHIMANLAL SETALVAD

2 April 1942

These two had a number of questions, being particularly concerned about the situation in Bengal. They were opposed to the right of non-accession, though they realised that it was part of a principle of self-determination, and they suggested various methods by which the actual majority in the non-acceding provinces should not be allowed to exercise its full voting power. But I pointed out to them that we did not intend to countenance any device which would misinterpret the wishes of the population, and that was why we had said that, in the last resort, there must be a plebiscite to decide the matter.

They also urged strongly the question of the Indian Defence Minister. They
suggested there should be an understanding that he did not in fact have any control over military matters. I pointed out to them that, if we were to take up such a position, immediately a settlement was arrived at we should be quite rightly accused of a dishonest trick directly it was discovered, especially by those who were opposed to the scheme, that we had attempted to mislead the Indian people on the realities of the situation. I told them that the matter was still under discussion with Congress and that we hoped that it might be possible to arrive at some accommodation, and that this must be by honest and straightforward means.

496

Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&EJ/10/4: f 76

INTERVIEW WITH MAULANA AZAD AND JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

2 April 1942

They brought the reply of Congress with them and gave it to me to read. I asked them whether this meant that they decisively turned the draft document down, and they said it was the considered opinion of the Congress Working Committee but that if any change were made they would naturally reconsider their attitude to the new document.

We went through the three first points. Upon the first argument they stated that it was difficult for them to accept a document which did not speak clearly of independence in view of their long propaganda on this point.

As regards the Indian States, Nehru particularly stressed the fact that Congress had always insisted as a fundamental matter that regard must be had to the peoples of the States and not to the rulers, and that again it was very difficult for them to accept a document which went against this principle completely.

So far as the non-accession point was concerned, they admitted, as their document does, that the principle of self-determination must be allowed to the Moslems in some way, but said that the very definite statement in the draft document had prejudiced any more favourable solution of the problem and had made it difficult for any agreement between them and the Muslim League upon this matter; that they feared the partition of India and definitely thought that this encouraged it, and that the principle of a united India was one for which they were prepared to go to almost any length.

So far as the Defence question was concerned I did not discuss this further but we arranged that they would come and see the Commander-in-Chief as soon as an appointment could be made.

1 See No. 507.
497

Sir S. Cripps to Maulana Azad

Cmd. 6350

2 April 1942

Mr. Jinnah has asked me to give him a clear picture of the method by which I have proposed that a Province should decide whether it will or will not join an Indian Union set up in accordance with the procedure laid down in His Majesty’s Government’s draft declaration. I have told him in reply that the proposition which I have put orally to him and to the other leaders is that a Province should reach its decision by a vote in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution that the Province should join the Indian Union and that, if the majority for accession is less than 60%, the minority would have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. I explained this to you at our first meeting but as I have written to Mr. Jinnah in this sense I thought it desirable to give you a similar letter.

498

Note by Sir S. Cripps

L/P&EJ/10/9: ff 35-6

INTERVIEW WITH CHAMBER OF PRINCES DELEGATION

2 April 1942

They brought with them a final questionnaire, to which I gave them the answers, and they said they would let me have a copy of the questionnaire with the answers1 so that I could correct it and let them have it.

It was only a clarification of what I had already told them2 as regards the position in which they would be in the various events which might arise as the result of the decisions of the constitution-making body, and they were quite satisfied upon all points but asked me to submit to the Government the question of whether they could themselves form a free and independent union if they chose, that is to say, whether we would give up paramountcy if they formed such a union. I told them that there had been no decision on this and that I should have to submit [it?] to the Government; that I would do so on my return if the scheme went through, but that in the present scheme there was no such suggestion. I gathered that they thought that this might be a good pressure point for them in dealing with the constituent-making assembly.
They also asked me whether, in view of the need for them to make arrangements with the major parties in the constituent assembly, they would be allowed freely to consult with those parties from now onwards, as this would be a great help to them and would be able to diminish the amount of misunderstanding which at present existed. I told them that this was a matter for the Viceroy but that, as far as I understood his mind on it, he would certainly desire to do everything to help them to get a satisfactory arrangement with the parties who would be in the majority in the constituent-making body, and I asked them to raise this matter with the Viceroy when next they saw him.

They also spoke of the question of federating of States preparatory to the constitution-making assembly as they thought that it would give them a better position for coming into that body if the smaller States especially were grouped prior to the time of its coming into being. I told them that this also was a matter for them to discuss with the Viceroy.

I put to them that my understanding was that the scheme, so far as it had any effect upon their States, was satisfactory and they replied that that was so.

1 Two copies of 'a summary of the points asked and the elucidations given' at this meeting were enclosed in a letter of 3 April from Mr Maqbool Mahmud to Mr Turnbull. The letter asked Mr Turnbull to return one copy 'with such amendments as may be desired by Sir Stafford'. L/P8J/10/9: ff 29-34.
2 See No. 410.

499

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/106c: f 76

INDIA OFFICE, 2 April 1942

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 20/42

Prime Minister

I hope you will be able to agree to Sir S. Cripps' suggestion1 that he should be free to settle the defence point subject to agreement of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. So long as the latter retains, under the War Cabinet, the full operational control over all forces in India I cannot see that the risks already inherent in the Indianised Executive are substantially increased by having an Indian Member of Council in charge of the administrative side of the Indian Forces. Indeed, such a Member of Council, working closely with Wavell, might prove an effective supporter for Wavell in dealing with his colleagues.

L. S. AMERY

1 See No. 484, para. 11.
500

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 40th Conclusions, Minute 2

L/PO/6/106c: f 69

2 April 1942

INDIA

The War Cabinet had before them two personal telegrams from the Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister (W.P. (42) 138).¹

In these telegrams the Lord Privy Seal said that the complete retention of the existing control of defence by H.M.G. had met with a very unfavourable reception and that there was perhaps some misunderstanding of the position. It was also thought that unless the Indian leaders could claim some control over the defence of India, their appeal to the Indian people would not be effective. He had accordingly sent a letter suggesting that he and the C.-in-C. should have an interview with Congress leaders, in order to explain to them the technical difficulties of the situation and to tell them that they might make any suggestions which they might wish as to the division of responsibilities in this sphere of government.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that the acceptance or rejection of the proposals set out in the Declaration was not likely to turn on responsibility for defence. There could, of course, be no question of our accepting a nominee of Congress to some office connected with the defence responsibilities of the Government of India. But there was no reason why some suitable Indian, selected by the Viceroy himself, should not be appointed in such a capacity. This could be done without altering the terms of the Declaration, and without impairing the C-in-C’s responsibility for the control and direction of the Defence of India.

It was also felt that the Congress leaders, by concentrating attention on responsibility for defence, were attempting to distract attention from the essential features of the scheme set out in the Declaration.

The War Cabinet:

Agreed that a telegram should be sent to the Lord Privy Seal embodying the following points:

(a) His action was approved in inviting Congress leaders to a discussion with himself and the C.-in-C., at which the former would formulate their suggestions on the defence question. But the War Cabinet must know what these proposals were, before any commitment was entered into.

(b) The War Cabinet was unwilling to contemplate any departure from the published text of the Declaration.

(c) If, contrary to what appeared to be the case, it became clear that Indian association with Defence was the point on which acceptance of the whole
scheme turned, a new situation would have arisen, and it would be worth while to consider some arrangement to meet this outstanding point; subject of course to the C.-in-C.'s responsibility for the control and direction of the Defence of India being unimpaired.

The Prime Minister undertook to prepare a draft telegram on these lines, which he would circulate to the members of the India Committee in the course of the afternoon.

1 Nos. 480, 484, and 492 were circulated to the War Cabinet under this reference, dated 1 April.

501

War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 10th Meeting

L/PO/6/106c: f 68

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee's Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 2 April 1942 at 5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir John Anderson, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

In accordance with the Conclusions reached at the Meeting of the War Cabinet that morning, (W.M. (42) 40, Conclusion 2), the Committee considered a draft telegram, prepared by the Prime Minister, in reply to telegrams Nos. 859-S and 860-S from the Lord Privy Seal.

The draft telegram as amended by the Committee was circulated to the War Cabinet as W.P. (42) 141.4

1 No. 500. 2 No. 484. 3 See No. 480, note 1. 4 No. 502.

502

Draft telegram from Prime Minister to Sir Stafford Cripps1

L/PO/6/106c: f 67

PERSONAL AND SECRET

1. War Cabinet and India Committee this morning considered your telegrams 859,2 8603 and 866-S.4 We entirely approve your inviting Azad and Nehru to talk Defence question over with you and Commander-in-Chief and asking them to state their proposals. We feel, however, that we must know what these

1 Circulated to the War Cabinet under reference W.P. (42) 141, dated 2 April. 2 No. 484. 3 See No. 480, note 1. 4 No. 486.
proposals are before you are in any way committed to their acceptance. I must, as I told you, consult not only the Cabinet but the Ministers above the line.

2. Cabinet showed itself disinclined to depart from the published text of the Declaration or to go beyond it in any way. It has made our position plain to the world and has won general approval. We all reached an agreement on it before you started and it represents our final position.

The restatement of paragraph (e) together with your explanation in paragraph 9 of 859–S has made it plain that, as long as the Commander-in-Chief retains his position on the Viceroy’s Council and his existing control and direction of the defence of India, there is no objection in principle to the appointment of a new Indian member on the Council to co-operate in the sphere of military organisation.

3. If Congress leaders have some better way of providing for Indian association with defence, as safeguarded by you in your 859–S, and if they assure you that subject to this they are prepared to accept the whole scheme, then some more precise interpretation to meet this outstanding point would be worthy of consideration. But are you satisfied that this is the actual position? Up to the present Congress spokesmen appear to have avoided anything which could be construed as even a conditional acceptance of the post-war proposal.\(^5\)

\(^5\) See No. 506.

\[\text{503}\]

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

2 April 1942

Most immediate

Most secret

No. 872–S. It is evident that Defence issue is being strongly pressed by Congress and Hindu parties as the principal difficulty in acceptance of His Majesty’s Government’s declaration. I personally suspect that non-accession is the more serious stumbling block and that Defence is chosen as having better propaganda value. However this may be, there is growing pressure to alter the sense of the declaration in the direction of giving to an Indian non-official Member of Executive Council some measure of control over Defence.

2. I am not in this present telegram arguing on merits, but merely wish to emphasize on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief and myself that if any proposals of this kind are under consideration, the Cabinet ought to have our views in our own words. I do not wish you to think that any difficulties have arisen
between Cripps and ourselves: on the contrary relations and mutual understanding could not be better. Our strong feeling is that it is not possible for us to convey to you and Prime Minister our views and advice by suggesting amendments or additions in telegrams drafted by anyone else, and having regard to our responsibilities I consider it essential that His Majesty’s Government should be in possession of our views in our own words before taking any decision as to modification of the declaration either in terms or by interpretation. I would of course show to Cripps any telegrams relating to declaration sent to you by myself with Commander-in-Chief. May I have your reaction very early. I would like Prime Minister to see this telegram.

504

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 62

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA Office, 2 April 1942, 8.10 pm
Received: 3 April

424. Superintendent Series. Cabinet discussed your 859–S and reply from Prime Minister to Cripps will be sent later in the day. Understand general line will be that if accommodation on defence is the only obstacle to agreement Cabinet willing to consider such compromise solution as you Wavell and Cripps may agree upon but not to give blank cheque in advance. Meanwhile I should very much like to know if your personal estimate of present situation or of result of breakdown of present negotiations is as pessimistic as that given by Cripps.

1 No. 484.

505

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 61

MOST IMMEDIATE
MOST SECRET

INDIA Office, 2 April 1942, 7.40 pm
Received: 3 April

6000. Superintendent Series. Your telegram 2nd April 872–S. I have shown to Prime Minister who says by all means let you and Commander-in-Chief send your views direct and in your own words.

1 No. 503.
506

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 41st Conclusions

L/PO/6/106c: f 60

2 April 1942

INDIA

The War Cabinet had before them telegram No. 872–S¹ from the Viceroy, and were informed that, by the Prime Minister’s direction, a reply² had already been sent asking the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief to send their own views in their own words on the proposals under consideration.

The War Cabinet also had before them a draft telegram to the Lord Privy Seal, submitted by the India Committee after consideration of a draft prepared by the Prime Minister (W.P. (42) 141).³

The War Cabinet:

Approved the despatch of this telegram, subject to the final sentence of paragraph 2 being amended to read as follows:

""The restatement of paragraph (e) together with your explanation in paragraph 9 of 859–S⁴ has made it plain that, as long as the Commander-in-Chief retains his position on the Viceroy’s Council and as long as his existing control and direction of the defence of India are not in any way weakened, there is no objection in principle to the appointment by the Crown of a new Indian member on the Council to co-operate in the sphere of military organisation.”⁵

¹ No. 503. ² No. 505. ³ No. 502. ⁴ No. 484. ⁵ Mr Churchill despatched this telegram to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy) as 426 of 3 April 1942, 12.30 am. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

507

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL AND SECRET

NEW DELHI, 2 April 1942, 11.25 pm
Received: 3 April, 1.30 am

No. 875–S. Following from Sir Stafford Cripps for Prime Minister:

1. Azad and Nehru called on me this afternoon and handed me resolution¹ of Working Committee. This resolution was framed before I had offered to ask Commander-in-Chief to meet them.
2. Resolution is lengthy document. Opening part may be summarised as follows:

(1) Government's proposals have been made at the very last hour because of the compulsion of events and have to be considered not only in relation to India's demand for independence but more especially in present crisis with view to meeting effectively perils and dangers that confront India and the world.

(2) Congress has repeatedly stated that people of India would line themselves with progressive forces in the war if essential condition of freedom of India was realised.

(3) War Cabinet proposals relate principally to the future after cessation of hostilities. Committee while recognising that self-determination for the people of India is accepted in principle in that uncertain future regret that this is fettered and circumscribed and certain provisions have been introduced gravely imperilling development of free and united nation and establishment of democratic state. People's right to self-determination is vitiated by introduction of non-representative elements in constitution-making body. Committee recognise that future independence may be implicit in the proposals but accompanying restrictions are such that freedom may well become an illusion. Complete ignoring of 90 millions of people of Indian States and treatment as commodities at disposal their rulers is negation of democracy and self-determination. While States are represented in constitution-making body on population basis people of States have no voice in choosing representatives and are not to be consulted on decisions vitally affecting them. States may become barriers to growth of Indian freedom where foreign authority still prevails and where possibility of maintaining foreign armed forces has been stated to be a likely contingency and a perpetual menace to freedom of people of States and rest of India.

(4) The prior acceptance of principle of non-accession for Provinces is severe blow to conception of Indian unity and likely to generate growing trouble in the Provinces which may well lead to difficulties in the way of Indian States joining Indian Union. Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break in that unity would be injurious and painful to contemplate. Committee cannot however think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will but Committee feel that every effort should be made to create conditions which would help different units to develop a common and co-operative national life. Each territorial unit should have fullest possible autonomy within the Union consistently with a strong national state. War Cabinet proposal encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at the very inception of a Union and create friction just when utmost co-operation

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1 For the full text see No. 605.  
2 Deciphered as 'maintained'.  
3 'affecting them' deciphered as 'affected'.  
4 Deciphered as 'acceptable'.

and goodwill are needed. Proposal has presumably been made to meet communal demand but will have other consequences also and lead politically reactionary groups among different communities to create trouble and divert attention from vital issues before country.

3. Resolution concludes with following paragraph regarding Defence which is verbatim: Begins. Any proposal concerning the future of India must demand attention and scrutiny but in today’s grave crisis it is the present that counts and even proposals for the future are important in so far as they affect the present. The Committee have necessarily attached the greatest importance to this aspect of the question and on this ultimately depends what advice they should give to those who look to them for guidance. For this present the British War Cabinet’s proposals are vague and altogether incomplete and it would appear that no vital changes in the present structure are contemplated. It has been made clear that the defence of India will in any event remain under British control. At any time defence is a vital subject; during the war time it is all important and covers almost every sphere of life and administration. To take away defence from the sphere of responsibility at this stage is to reduce that responsibility to a farce and a nullity and to make it perfectly clear that India is not going to be free in any way and her Government is not going to function as a free and independent Government during the pendency of the war. The Committee would repeat that an essential and fundamental pre-requisite for the assumption of responsibility by the Indian people in the present is their realisation as a fact that they are free and are in charge of maintaining and defending their freedom. What is most wanted is the enthusiastic response of the people which cannot be evoked without the fullest trust in them and the devolution of responsibility on them in the matter of defence. It is only thus that even at this grave eleventh hour it may be possible to galvanise the people of India to rise to the height of the occasion. It is manifest that the present Government of India as well as its provincial agencies are lacking in competence and are incapable of shouldering the burden of India’s defence. It is only the people of India through their popular representatives who may shoulder this burden worthily. But that can only be done by present freedom and full responsibility being cast upon them. The Committee therefore is unable to accept the proposals put forward on behalf of the British War Cabinet. Ends.

4. Resolution is strictly confidential at present and Azad has undertaken not to publish at present. I will telegraph my comments after further meeting with Congress leaders which Commander-in-Chief will attend I hope tomorrow.

5 No. 519.
Sir G. S. Bajpai to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, 2 April 1942

MOST SECRET

No. 7. Following from Bajpai for (Foreign Office ?). President called me to see him this afternoon. Main object was to explain why India has not been included in the Pacific Council which is to sit in Washington. America has assumed full military responsibility for area east of Singapore and as far south as New Zealand. Countries represented on Washington Council are directly interested in developments in this region. China is included because her normal coastline is on the Pacific. Area west of Singapore as far as eastern Mediterranean is British responsibility. India is included in this area and should look for representation on appropriate British body (as India has been promised seat in British War Cabinet, this presumably is not the case). Should deliberation of Washington Council directly or indirectly affect India’s interests at any time, President promised to call me. He added Pacific Council in London would continue to function and to deal with political problems. India has already been promised seat on this Council and according to the President there is no question of changing this decision. My impression is that effort now to make him change his mind regarding Washington Council is not likely to succeed.

2. I sought to get the President’s reaction to Sir Stafford Cripps’ proposals. Mr. Roosevelt seems to think plan regarding immediate federation does not go far enough. His idea (following American evolution parallel) seems to be that complete autonomy, including power to raise armies, should be given to provinces. I tried to explain dangers in time of war of such change—the need is for greater unity rather than disintegration of effort—but the President is not a good listener. He has asked me to see him again after reactions of all parties in India have crystallised.

3. Soong has been out of Washington and I have been unable to ascertain his views. (Johman ?) who is close to him said on Monday that proposals were generous. Today he was repeating favourite Chinese thesis that in these fateful times risks have to be taken and that transfer of political power to Congress in India involves least risk.

1 L/P&J/8/560: f 174 has ‘His Excellency the Viceroy’. 2 See No. 117.
3 L/P&J/8/560: f 174 has ‘meets’ instead of ‘is not’. 4 See No. 117.
5 Not identified.
My dear Kingsley,

In the _aide-mémoire_¹ that you handed me on March 14th the proposal for a revision of the financial arrangements with India in respect of defence expenditure is put forward primarily as a remedy for a situation in which it is suggested India may experience some difficulty in utilising the proceeds of payments to her save in ways inconvenient to the United Kingdom. I feel bound to say that any such ground for reducing the payments does not commend itself to me. Nor do I see much force in the view that, in so far as payments are in fairness due to India, any objection to her receiving them blocked might be removed if instead she did not receive them at all.

2. Let me first make clear that by no means all of the sterling accretions are freely disposable. The war expenditure in India on behalf of His Majesty’s Government contributes to the increase of the note issue, and a substantial proportion (perhaps an increasing proportion as the note issue rises higher) of such increase has to be held in the shape of increased sterling assets in the Reserve Bank’s Issue Department. In the past twelve months the increase in the note issue has been about £100 million. Again, of the potential 1942–43 accretions some £70 million is earmarked for the reduction of the 3½ per cent. Sterling Stock and £12 million for the purchase of railways.

3. I feel that we must look for some principle other than the apprehension that a transformation of India’s debtor position may in some respects prove subsequently embarrassing to the United Kingdom. It does not seem to me that such a principle can be found in a pooling of resources on the basis of India paying finally for everything that calls for payment in rupees. For, first, the principle of share-and-share-alike, if applicable at all, ought not to be applied partially and selectively, and it cannot be assumed that India either is or is going to be an equal co-partner with this country in power, wealth, and prospects. Secondly, even if that were not the case, there is no very obvious equity in an arrangement which allocates the burden of the war, not according to capacity to pay, or power exercised, or benefits expected, but with relation to the more or less arbitrary and accidental circumstances of the location of the forces employed or the sources of the materials expended. Nor, I think, can a guiding principle be found in a comparison of the debts or the budgets of India and the United Kingdom. The circumstances of the two countries are far too dissimilar to provide any fair basis of comparison.
4. The existing principle may be challenged, but it is clear and well understood. Under it India bears the full cost of all measures undertaken by her in pursuance of her responsibility for her own local defence. The comparison in the aide-mémoire between what are called the "British contribution" and the "Indian contribution" seems to imply that the former is a contribution to the defence of India as such, and that the cost of that defence is, under the defence expenditure plan, in some way divided between India and this country on a basis which is now proving increasingly inequitable. This is not the position at all. Indeed, the figures given are not comparable, and the change in their relative size has not the implication suggested. The "Indian" figures represent the cost to India of the defence of India, which is also the total pecuniary contribution of India to defence generally. The "British" figures do not represent a contribution towards relieving India of part of the cost of the defence of India, nor, of course, are they the total cost to the United Kingdom of defence generally; they merely represent such part of the cost of the general war effort (in the main supplying all the Imperial and Allied forces in Egypt, Middle East, Iraq and Malaya) as happens to be incurred in India on behalf of His Majesty's Government. The defence expenditure plan did not alter this layout. The plan was designed to leave India to bear the full cost of such defence as described above, while cutting out complicated accounting. This intention has, I believe, been faithfully carried into effect, and explains the substantial increase in India's effective defence expenditure from Rs. 36 crores in 1939-40 to Rs. 125 crores for 1942-43.

5. It must in fairness be added that in addition to serving as a producing and supply depot, India has raised large bodies of additional troops, of which 250,000 are serving overseas, a figure which I should think compares favourably with the total overseas forces of the rest of the Empire. It is these services, rather than the cost involved, that represent India's contribution to the general war effort. Incidentally, I am given to understand that some part of the cost of supplies by India is recovered by His Majesty's Government from Dominion and Allied Governments.

6. The scene is changing. Approach of war to India's frontier may well increase substantially the sums to be borne by India under the existing plan, since troops being raised in India, which had been intended to go overseas during 1942-43, and the cost of which would have fallen on His Majesty's Government as from the date of their embarkation, may have to be retained in India for India's own local defence, and therefore paid for by India. Similarly, in the matter of supplies. Moreover, the maintenance charges of any British troops that may be sent for the defence of India in excess of the pre-war strengths

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1 No. 328.
would, under the existing arrangements, also fall on India. But the War Office may be forced, nevertheless, to insist on India furnishing its troops and supplies for overseas as planned, and further expansions in India may be necessary for this end; in which case, although the costs to India would be heavily increased, there would not necessarily be any commensurate reduction in the sterling sums due to India. Furthermore invasion might not only increase the financial burden on India, but at the same time—by disorganising or crippling industry, transport, and administration—make her less able to bear even the existing burden.

7. Another point to which I must refer is that there undoubtedly exists in India a feeling (not entirely dissimilar to some of the criticisms that have arisen in Australia) that in spite of the immense sums that have been and are being spent by India on defence, the country, now faced by imminent invasion, feels itself so ill-provided with first-line troops and modern armaments as to be relatively defenceless.

8. In the circumstances I do suggest to you that the moment is inopportune for raising the idea of asking India to pay substantially more than in the past towards the cost of the war as a whole, as distinct from the defence of her own country. Another reason why the time is inopportune is to be found in Cripps' mission. It may be that his efforts will bring about a considerable political easement, which might partially find a vent in acceptance by India of heavier financial war burdens; but it would seem unwise to attempt to secure such acceptance while the political consultations in India are still going on.

9. I thought I had better send you this interim reply, to let you know how I view that matter in present circumstances. But it can be an interim reply only, since in any case, as I have indicated above, the situation must be profoundly affected (a) by the success or failure of Cripps' mission, and (b) by whether India is seriously invaded, in which case the existing arrangement might be beyond India's capacity and might have to be revised in the opposite sense.

Yours ever,

L.S.A.
Note by Mr Pinnell

Diary. 2nd April 1942.

As desired by His Excellency, Private Secretary to the Viceroy saw General Hartley in the morning and informed him that he was likely to be asked for by Sir Stafford Cripps, as there was a strong pressure on the defence issue. General Hartley would no doubt stand most firmly on the absolute necessity of the Commander-in-Chief maintaining effective control and responsibility. Sir Stafford wanted to see General Wavell as soon as he returned. General Hartley should therefore report to the Commander-in-Chief at once on his return anything that may have passed. Private Secretary to the Viceroy also suggested that General Hartley should keep in the closest touch with His Excellency and informed General Hartley that His Excellency had committed himself to no weakening, or sharing, or diminution of the powers and responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief, and no modification of the constitutional position. Private Secretary to the Viceroy also showed General Hartley, as an indication of the kind of line that might be taken, a note (below) drafted by Mr. Shiva Rao and handed to His Excellency the previous night by Sir Stafford Cripps. He also informed General Hartley that Sir Stafford Cripps was aware of a previous mention in telegrams by His Excellency of the portfolio of Defence Co-ordination. Private Secretary to the Viceroy expressed his own views, which did not commit His Excellency, regarding the dangers, no less than the potentialities, of such a portfolio and of the impossibility of promising in advance that one Member of the Council would co-ordinate the others, without knowing who the others would be, since, when it came to the point, the others might violently object to being co-ordinated. General Hartley came in later in the morning after seeing Sir Stafford and pursued this subject further with Private Secretary to the Viceroy and His Excellency. Mr. Gerald Palmer saw Private Secretary to the Viceroy in the afternoon to discuss the question of contact with the Students' Federation. Private Secretary to the Viceroy undertook to have a person selected as soon as possible and put him in touch with Mr. Palmer.

Approved. L., 3.4.

L. G. PINNELL, —3.4.42.
Enclosure to No. 510

Note by Mr Shiva Rao

1 April 1942

It is conceded that the organisation of the material, moral and man-power resources of India will be the responsibility of the Government of India in cooperation with the people of India. It is conceded, further, that the Viceroy’s Executive Council will be in close touch with the Commander-in-Chief in the prosecution of the war.

A division in functions and in the sphere of authority seems to be contemplated between the Government of India and the Commander-in-Chief so as to leave no doubt that in carrying out the directions of the British War Cabinet in regard to Imperial strategy, the Commander-in-Chief’s responsibility is to the British War Cabinet.

It follows from the above that the creation of a department of the Government of India is essential for the organisation of all the resources of the country. This being a total war, the problem is to evolve an arrangement which would satisfy on the one hand the people of India that it implies no lack of trust in them or in their leaders but is inevitable at the present critical stage of the war; and, on the other, leaves no room for conflict or misunderstanding on the part of the Commander-in-Chief that his discretion in his own sphere is in any way being fettered.

General Wavell told India two weeks ago that the defence of the country rests on three factors: (1) planes, (2) guns and tanks, and (3) civilian morale. Of these, he regarded the last as the most important.

It need hardly be said that civilian morale can be maintained only by the leaders of the people. That responsibility will be discharged effectively only if such leaders are in a position to say to the people: (a) we have the substance of freedom already bestowed on us, and only the constitutional form remains to be completed after the war; (b) there is complete mutual trust and co-operation between us and the British authorities, the division of functions in the defence sphere being only for the prosecution of the war; and (c) a trusted Indian is in the British War Cabinet which shapes world strategy, and a trusted Indian is in charge of all India’s resources. Both will satisfy themselves that India’s defences receive adequate attention.

Nothing less than this assurance will do at the present moment.

If so much is conceded, the two points for settlement are: (1) what is to be the designation of the new Department of the Government of India and of the member in charge; and (2) what are to be the functions of the Commander-in-Chief and his relations with the member in charge of (1).

If (1) were to be called Defence Department and Defence Member respectively, it would go a long way towards meeting a great and just now a compelling
psychological necessity. (2) should be discussed with the Commander-in-Chief; but a tentative suggestion is that he may be called War Member (in addition to being Commander-in-Chief) for the duration of the war and continue to be a Member of the Executive Council. The Commander-in-Chief will consult the Defence Member in all possible matters though emergencies may arise when such consultations are, for temporary periods, not practicable. He will make it a point to consult the Defence Member particularly in regard to the decisions of the British War Cabinet which directly touch the defence of India.

The scheme will work if there is a spirit of accommodation and friendly understanding between the two. No Indian Defence Member will imperil the safety of India or the successful carrying out of any operation merely because he has not been consulted beforehand in any matter affecting either. The limitation of the functions and authority of the Defence Member will be accepted as inevitable by the Executive Council as a whole—not through any reluctance of the British Government to part with power and responsibility but because of past policy which cannot be set right in a day during a critical phase of the war. But such a limitation will not be felt as one by the people of India if certain points are made clear in a declaration: (1) that henceforth there will be no discrimination based on racial considerations in any of the defence forces, or any organisation connected with defence; (2) that the Defence Member and the Commander-in-Chief will, while working together on a short-range basis for the successful prosecution of the war, wholeheartedly pursue a policy designed to make India self-sufficient in the matter of defence from every point of view.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: ff 57–8

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 3 April 1942, 4.20 pm
Received: 4 April

427. Superintendent Series. You will have seen Prime Minister’s reply\(^1\) to Cripps’ 859–S.\(^2\) Personally, as you know, I have never seen much difficulty about a second, joint or additional, Defence Member, whatever you call him, charged with such administrative matters as barracks, aerodromes, ports, equipment and victualling to which might now be added coordination with civil defence in provinces and States, organisation of Home Guards, etc. The right man should be of real help to Wavell in Council and Legislature and I should

\(^1\) See No. 506, note 5.
\(^2\) No. 484.
hope that there should be room for him as well as for Hartley. The difficulty is the man. Even if you concede the principle at instance of Congress you are in no way bound to select a Congress nominee. On the contrary the obvious kind of choice would be Sikander if he can be spared from Punjab. If you have a Moslem for this I imagine you might have to give finance or Cabinet representation here to a Congressman. All this is on the assumption that the defence question is the real obstacle for Congress and not merely tactical ground selected for break. Even if this should be the case we shall have proved our good faith by showing readiness to meet them as long as we stick to what every one including, I believe, American opinion will recognise as reasonable namely our unfettered control through Wavell over the whole operational field in which the defence of India, Burma, Ceylon and the Indian Ocean is an indivisible problem and in which British and Indian forces are inextricably intermingled. Have just seen Congress resolution which is certainly not helpful or encouraging.

3 'for Congress' omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE 3 April 1942

No. 19–U. If I have to answer the last sentence of your No. 424, dated 2nd April, I shall have to say that my personal estimate is not as pessimistic as that of Cripps, and that I am more concerned at the prospect of negotiations dragging on than at the prospects of a breakdown on a clear issue involving other matters besides defence. I am having an answer prepared but do not feel that I can send it unless I have the Prime Minister’s direct and personal instructions to do so. I should find it very difficult to convey my own appreciation of the situation to you in any telegram which, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, I should feel it my duty to show to the Lord Privy Seal. I was about to send you a private and personal telegram to the above effect but have since seen your No. 426 from the Prime Minister for Sir Stafford Cripps, and think it better to await his reactions to No. 426 before deciding whether I must pursue the point.

1 No. 504. 2 See No. 484. 3 See No. 506, note 5.
513

Sir S. Cripps to Maulana Azad

Cmd. 6350

3 April 1942

I have now been able to see His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and he will be very glad to meet you and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to discuss the position regarding defence. Subject to your convenience 6 o’clock to-morrow evening would suit General Wavell, and if you can manage this I suggest that you should come here at 10 minutes to 6 p.m. and I will go up with you to the Commander-in-Chief’s office. If there are any specific points of detail about organisation which you wish to raise I should be very much obliged if you could let me have a note of them to-night or first thing to-morrow morning, so that the Commander-in-Chief can consider them before the meeting.

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Resolution of the Hindu Mahasabha, ratified by the Working Committee of the Mahasabha on 3rd April, 1942

Cmd. 6350

There are several points in the Declaration which are more or less satisfactory but according to the statement unfortunately made by Sir Stafford Cripps, the scheme of His Majesty’s Government is to be accepted or rejected in toto. As some essential features of the scheme are wholly or partially unacceptable to us, the Hindu Mahasabha has no other alternative but to reject the scheme.

1. One of the cardinal points in the scheme which Sir Stafford Cripps has put forward on behalf of the War Cabinet is the right which has been conferred on the provinces of British India to keep out of the Indian Union or Federation. The basic principle of the Hindu Mahasabha is that India is one and indivisible. In the religious and cultural aspect there has been recognised the fundamental unity of India by the Hindus throughout the ages, and even unity in the political sphere was an accomplished fact in many periods of this country’s history. Even during some two centuries of British rule, the political unity of India has been recognised and fostered and this has always been claimed by Britain herself as her finest achievement. Besides, India has been treated as one political and constitutional unit under the Constitution Act of 1935. The right to step out of the Indian Federation will stimulate communal and sectional animosities. The other option given to the non-acceding provinces to set up a rival Pakistan
Federation constitutes, in view of such Moslem movements as Pakistan and Pathanistan involving threats of joining hands with Afghanistan and other Moslem nations, serious menace to India's security and unity, and this may lead to civil war in the country. The Mahasabha cannot be true to itself and to the best interests of Hindusthan (India) if it is a party to any proposal which involves the political partition of India in any shape or form. The Hindu Mahasabha therefore has fundamental objections to the proposal.

The right of non-accession of any province to the "Indian Union" cannot be justified on the principle of self-determination and no such right can be imposed by any outside authority. India has already been one unitary State, and the existing provinces are constituted as administrative units. The analogy of sovereign States entering into a Federation and surrendering a portion of their sovereignty for certain common purposes cannot apply to Indian Provinces.

2. According to the scheme of Sir Stafford Cripps, a treaty will be signed between His Majesty's Government and the Constituent Assembly, and such a treaty will implement the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government for the protection of racial and religious minorities. In the framing of this treaty all parties and sections will have an effective say. Such a treaty ought to completely satisfy the minorities.

If, however, any minority is not satisfied with the safeguards in the proposed constitution, then the question of such safeguards can be referred to a tribunal or [of ?] arbitration to be appointed by the Constituent Assembly in consultation with disputing parties. We want to take our stand on justice and fair play, and we do not ask for any rights or privileges which we are not prepared to extend to any community.

3. The Hindu Mahasabha is not so much concerned with a declaration as to the future, but the real question is whether England is willing to transfer immediately real political power to India and, if so, to what extent. It notes with regret that the scheme which Sir Stafford Cripps has announced is nebulous, vague and unsatisfactory with regard to the interim arrangements. The Government of India Act of 1935 still maintains the bureaucracy in power with the Governor-General and the Governors as their powerful protagonists. But for successful prosecution of the war it is essential to transfer real power to Indian hands and to set up conventions whereby Indian ministers can formulate and execute a policy of national defence, including the formation of national militia and the arming of the Indian people for the defence of the country.

4. It has been the demand of the Hindu Mahasabha that India should be immediately declared an independent nation with free and equal status in the Indo-British Commonwealth. The Declaration promises full national sovereignty in the future, but the constitutional position and status of India during the interim period have not been made at all clear.
5. Particularly in regard to defence, the scheme of His Majesty's Government is unacceptable to us.

It is urgent and imperative that if India is to be an effective partner in the struggle for freedom, her defence policy must be determined and her defence arrangements must be made on the responsibility of her own Defence Minister enjoying the confidence of all sections of the people. The tragic experiences of Malaya and Burma have demonstrated that, apart from the deplorable failure of military strategy, the apathy and hostility of the people who were deliberately kept unarmed, contributed to the British reverses. The psychology necessary for full and willing co-operation in the present war amongst the Indian people cannot be created unless, and until, the defence of India is put in Indian hands.

6. We note with satisfaction that this scheme provides for a constitution-making body for framing the future constitution of India, and that the Constituent Assembly may begin its work with the declaration of India's independence. But the principle on which it will be constituted is vicious. The constitution-making body will be elected on the basis of the communal award1 which is not only anti-national but runs counter to the essential principles of democracy.

7. Unless, and until, the scheme of His Majesty's Government is radically altered and readjusted on the vital issues mentioned above, the Hindu Mahasabha cannot be a party to the acceptance in as much as the scheme is to be accepted or rejected in toto.

1 See Annex to No. 30, note 16.

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The Nawab of Chhatari to Sir S. Cripps

L/PEJ/10/9: f 12

CAMP: NIZAM'S GUEST HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 3 April 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Sir Stafford Cripps,

With reference to the talk which the Hyderabad Delegation1 had with you on the 28th March 1942, I am writing to say that His Exalted Highness has since examined the proposals of His Majesty's Government relating to the future Indian Constitution, and, in the light of the elucidation offered by you to the Delegation, desires to express his satisfaction at the assurance that it is not

1 No. 414.
intended to transfer his treaty or other relations with the Crown in the United Kingdom to any other authority without His Exalted Highness’ consent or affect in any way his status as a Sovereign or his position as Faithful Ally. Since, as you explained, the proposals are intended to leave His Exalted Highness free to adhere or not adhere to any one of the Unions that may be set up, or, in the event of not adhering, to maintain or cease to maintain the relations at present subsisting with the Crown in the United Kingdom, His Exalted Highness, as at present advised, considers the proposals to be very fair. Further, while His Exalted Highness’ consent is implicit in any negotiation for such revision of treaty-arrangements as may be required in “the new situation”, it may be made clear that, to the extent that His Exalted Highness may wish to retain a particular treaty right, such right will be provided for and arrangements made, in case of dispute or difference arising from it, for recourse to arbitration by a body mutually agreed upon. Moreover, as Berar, the Northern Circars and the Ceded Districts are linked with the question of defence of His Exalted Highness and his Dominions, His Exalted Highness will have the right to reopen the question of the future of those territories in the light of the new situation.

Yours sincerely,

AHMAD SAID

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2 By an agreement of 1766, the Nizam of Hyderabad ceded to the East India Company territories known as the ‘Northern Circars’; and the East India Company undertook to furnish when required a ‘subsidiary force’ for the Nizam’s assistance. In 1800, the Nizam ceded territories in the Deccan, thereafter known as the ‘Ceded Districts’, in return for an augmented ‘subsidiary force’.

In 1800, the Nizam also agreed to furnish in war a contingent of troops. In 1853, he agreed instead to assign certain districts including Berar on perpetual lease to the East India Company for the maintenance of a ‘Hyderabad contingent’, the troops for which were henceforward to be supplied by the East India Company. The contingent was to be available to deal with rebellion or disturbance in the Nizam’s dominions. By agreements made in 1902 and 1936, the sovereignty of the Nizam over Berar was reaffirmed. Although the ‘Hyderabad contingent’ ceased to remain as a separate force, the British obligation to protect the Nizam’s dominions was maintained.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/16c: ff 54–6

INDIA OFFICE, 3 April 1942

Secretary of State’s Minute: Serial No. 21/42

Prime Minister
I think it may be important that Halifax should be seized of the present position of Cripps’ negotiations and able to give confidential guidance to the President or other responsible persons in view of the possible rejection of our proposals. I attach draft of a telegram which I will send him through Foreign Office if you approve.

L.S.A.

Enclosure to No. 516

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON

Following note may be useful as giving background of present stage in Indian negotiations. Indian public opinion has concentrated on our retention of control of defence. So far as this affects operations and movements it is obvious that defence of India cannot be separated from that of Burma, Ceylon or of Indian Ocean Waters or control of Indian Army from that of British forces in same area, and must remain, subject to War Cabinet, under Wavell’s undivided control. Whether there is room on the administrative side for developing the reference in (e) of the draft declaration to organising India’s military and civil effort in the direction of giving some specific function in connexion with defence to an Indian Member of Council is a point on which Cripps is inviting Congress suggestions to be discussed with him and Wavell on Saturday with a view to some workable compromise which if concurred in by Wavell and Viceroy as not weakening Wavell’s position will be submitted to Cabinet.

Hope of anything coming of Saturday’s discussion is slender in view of Resolution1 of Congress Working Committee handed to Cripps on 2nd but at present still strictly confidential. This rejects our proposals on all counts. It objects to constitution-making body because it is to include non-representative elements from the States. It strongly deprecates without actually flatly rejecting possibility of Provinces standing out. But its main objection is that the whole government of India including above all full responsibility for defence is not immediately handed over to the “Indian people” whose elected leaders alone

1 See No. 507.
can "galvanise them to the height of the occasion" by taking over from the present incompetent government. Congress leaders must know that all this is sheer bunk and it looks as if they are determined to decline responsibility for agreeing to anything but are concentrating for tactical reasons on what they know to be an impossible demand over defence.²

² Mr Amery subsequently adopted two amendments suggested by Mr Churchill, namely:
(a) that in the second sentence 'Indian public opinion has concentrated' should be replaced by 'Congress objections to the general scheme have been focussed'.
(b) that in the final sentence 'pretence' should replace 'bunk'.

Mr Amery also replaced the words from 'on which Cripps' to 'submitted to Cabinet' at the end of the first para. by 'at present under discussion by Cabinet'. He despatched the telegram to Lord Halifax (via Foreign Office) as 2274 of 7 April, 2.35 pm. L/PO/6106c: f 35.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

I have just seen Stafford Cripps' summary of the Congress Working Committee's Resolution. It is certainly difficult to imagine a more purely negative document and I am afraid it looks as if Gandhi had once again persuaded them that wrecking is the best policy. I am not sure that these people really want responsibility, and if we offered them the moon they would probably reject it because of the wrinkles on its surface. Even they must know quite well that if they reject the future policy, and there is no agreement upon that, there obviously can be no agreement now as to the allocation of power between the various elements of the "Indian people". They must know equally well that they are quite incapable of taking on the whole defence problem or of "galvanizing the people of India to rise to the height of the occasion". All this is bunk for external consumption, material for proving us in the wrong if we refuse to hand the whole show over to them.

2. All the same, I am glad that Cripps has not broken off at once, but is prepared to discuss the defence question with their representatives and Wavell. On merits I have, as you know, always had a leaning towards the division of defence between the administrative and the operational side and giving the former to an Indian. That is the current division of functions in all the continental armies, and indeed very largely here today, with Winston as Defence
Minister and the immediate head of the three Chiefs of Staff. Anyhow, something of that sort is a compromise worth accepting, if it means a real agreement and whole-hearted support, and worth being willing to accept, if only to show ourselves as reasonable compared with Congress intransigence.

3. I must say that the more I look at the Resolution the more doubtful I am whether people of that type would ever run straight, even if they could be brought for the moment to agree. They would be quite capable, not only of making endless difficulties for Wavell, but even of trying to negotiate a separate peace with Japan.

They could never run straight.
One will have to plough through the old gang down to better and younger stuff.

4. The Cabinet has never yet considered what precisely we are to do if negotiations with Congress break down. Is it possible for you to carry out some further expansion of your Executive on the non-official side with the support of the Muslim League and some other minor parties? This time you won’t have even the Mahasabha, who were prepared to play in 1940, or, apparently, Ambedkar. However, his criticism\(^2\) of the scheme may only be meant to register a claim and may not preclude his coming in to help.

5. As for the post-war side of the scheme, I suppose we stand by it in any case. Public opinion may get more used to it and realise that it is up to Indians themselves to prevent Pakistan by mutual concessions, while such a problem as that of the Sikhs may have to be dealt with by boundary readjustment or by autonomy within autonomy.

I am myself now quite sure that self-government is incompatible with unity.

6. Meanwhile, my inclination would be to sum up to the situation by saying that we are likely to have improved our position in the outside world, but, for the time being at any rate, made it worse in India than if we had done nothing and stood pat, as you and I were prepared to do at the end of last year. As against that must be set the fact that there is really no other solution consistent with the principles of self-government, and that the sooner Indians begin to face up to that the better.

\(^1\) No. 507.
\(^2\) No. 487, the substance of which appeared in *The Times* of 4 April. Mr Amery may have seen a Reuter message reporting it.
7. What I didn’t like about Cripps’ telegram on the defence question was the picture he drew of the gravity of the present position and of the terrible results of a breakdown in the negotiations. I have telegraphed asking you for your personal view and hope it may confirm my own, which is that, though the situation has many elements of weakness, we are not on the verge of a breakdown of government, and that the failure of the negotiations may leave a great many people relieved at heart. I cannot see Congress going into direct antagonism or even joining the Japanese because they have once more rejected a good offer.

8. I am not sure that it is not a case of the Sibylline Books, and that if Congress fails this time it may be the end, for many long years, of any constitutional progress in India. The tide in the world outside is all against democracy and self-government and while we are rightly fighting and hope to win the battle against the excesses of the world revolution, just as we fought and won the battle against the excesses of the French Revolution, yet many of the underlying ideas of the reaction against Parliamentary Democracy may well dominate the coming generation. If so, and with an India left exhausted and demoralised after the war, the whole trend of opinion here and in India may move away from the democratic forms we have envisaged in the past, even if there may be increasing concessions to Indian independence of control from here.

9. I must say I have been rather annoyed by Cripps’ telegram about our failure to help in the matter of fire-fighting. I won’t go into details, as I have explained the situation in my telegrams. Where I have much sympathy with you is in your appeal on the subject of your airborne troops. It has been a hopeless job trying to get any sort of decision one way or the other as between Air Ministry and War Office, but we are now trying again and only hope that somehow Winston can be induced to intervene. [The remainder of this para. deals with Mr Amery’s views on inter-Service co-ordination].

11. When some one asked Napoleon what the world would say when he died, he said “Ouf!” I expect you will be saying “Ouf!” when the present hectic affair is over, and you get—I hope—a breathing space.

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3 No. 484.  
4 No. 504.  
5 No. 451.
2. Political Reactions. Sir Stafford Cripps' mission, and the publication of the War Cabinet's declaration, have entirely monopolised public attention. Before Sir Stafford Cripps arrived, Congress here were reported to be very optimistic, while the Muslims were obviously suspicious. When the terms of the offer were made public, most communities obviously endeavoured to mark time to see what their leaders would say: but I have little doubt that the completeness and the generosity of the terms made a marked impression, and that the private view of a great many people, especially Hindus, was that they could not see how such terms could be rejected. Consequently, when it became apparent that Congress were likely to reject the proposals, there was marked depression. It has been relieved, for the moment, by the news that Sir Stafford Cripps has postponed his departure and that the discussions will continue. What the effect will be if the discussions finally break down, is difficult to foresee. I still, however, believe that the making of the offer, even if it is rejected, will have been all to the good. Congress, no doubt, will have sufficient hold over the nationalist Press to confuse the issue and persuade great masses of unthinking followers that it is the British Government again, which is responsible for the failure of this proposal: but the very deep impression which was made when the proposals were first published, and the important reactions in the American Press, must have their effect, and I think there must be a strong undercurrent which believes that Congress will have missed a great opportunity.

The Muslims have remained so quiet, up to now, that there is practically no evidence, in Bombay, of the effect of the proposals on them, but I assume that reports in the Press are correct, and that Muslim leadership is fairly well satisfied with them. If that is so, it will be a solid advantage, whatever the ultimate reactions may be. I might mention here, in view of the controversy which has arisen in the House of Commons about the Momins,\(^1\) that a meeting of some 6,000 Muslims, at which a large number of Momins were present, was recently held in Bombay, which condemned unanimously the action of certain Momins in sending telegrams to the Secretary of State suggesting that Momins were supporters of Congress and affirmed unanimously that they were solidly behind the Muslim League.

One reaction amongst Parsees is worth reporting. Sir Cowasji Jehangir tells

\(^1\) See No. 269, note 6; also *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 378, 12 March 1942, cols. 1186–7; 19 March, col. 1675; and 26 March, col. 2134.
me that amongst middle-class Parsees there is a feeling that it would be better to be ruled by the Japanese than to have India dominated by the Congress. Amongst Parsees, bitterness about the Congress régime still prevails. The same is, I should say, true of Dr. Ambedkar’s followers.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

4 April 1942

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL AND VERY SECRET
No. 890–S. Superintendent Series. Following from Sir Stafford Cripps for Prime Minister.

1. The time has now arrived when a final decision must be arrived at as to how far we are prepared to go on the chance of getting a settlement. My best estimate of the situation is as follows:

2. The Muslim League are satisfied and prepared to accept the scheme as it stands.

3. Congress reaction you know from my telegram No. 875–S of 2nd April. According to the best information I can get as to the internal stresses there are at least three sections of opinion. The Gandhi wing of non-violence who are against the scheme altogether. They are indifferent as to what happens in the war and regard Great Britain as defeated and unimportant so far as the future of India is concerned. They are definitely a minority. The remainder are all in favour of fighting the Japanese and would participate in the war given conditions which in their view could make their participation effective.

4. This remainder falls into two main groups—those who consider the defects (non-accession and Indian States representation) as fatal quite apart from the defence question and those who would unwillingly swallow the rest of the scheme if they were satisfied on defence.

5. It is impossible to estimate the relative strength of the two groups, but the latter might if satisfied be able to swing the Working Committee particularly if the offer on defence were sufficiently favourable to make any refusal on that ground look ridiculous.

6. Nothing can be done to meet Congress on the points other than defence. The first point upon “independence” is not a vital one. The second as to the Indian States cannot be met without upsetting seriously the States Rulers
which I could not recommend at this stage. The third on non-accession is vital to get the Muslim League in and any change in that now would only result in losing their support and we should be no better off.

7. The only point therefore for negotiation is the content of clause (e) which as you know was purposely left vague apart from the general principle of the retention of defence.

8. I must make it clear that so far as this point is concerned, the demand for transfer of responsibility has come from all sides except the Muslim League and the Sikhs. Many Muslims have demanded it individually, e.g., Prime Minister, Bengal. The general trend of the Press is that it is a universal demand and if Congress refuse on this point whatever their actual views may be all other communities including the Muslim League will probably point to it as a reason for refusal.

9. I must point out that if Congress do not accept no one will dare to state that they will accept the scheme. I should expect it to be turned down by all sections including Muslim League although they have in fact passed a unanimous resolution accepting it in their Working Committee.

10. In the event of acceptance by Congress I am informed from a good source that the non-violent group will probably retire from all participation in the Working Committee during the war and will leave the other leaders (Maulana Azad, Nehru and Rajagopalachari) to carry on.

11. So far as these three are concerned and the Working Committee under their control, I am satisfied that if once they come in they will go all out to maximise Indian resistance to Japan and will fight with courage and determination to galvanise the Indian people to action. They have told me that there would be no question whatever of any separate peace and I am certain this can be relied upon.

12. Estimates will differ as to how far their coming in will or can help in the actual prosecution of the war.

The two main factors in my view are—first that they will be able to assist greatly in preventing panic and maintaining morale amongst the great masses of the civilian population and organising them in civil defence of all kinds, and second the Muslims also will come in and throw their weight into the war.

13. In addition I think the general psychological effect on the allied cause will be good especially in all eastern theatres of war including the near and Middle East.

1 No. 507.
14. There will of course be risks of differences between His Majesty’s Government and the Indian Government, but these seem to me to be unimportant in view of the major considerations stated in paragraphs 12 and 13.

15. If they do not accept, then the situation will in my view become very difficult as we shall be attempting to carry on the war in at best a neutral atmosphere and at worst a hostile one. A great deal of suppression will be necessary and this will again exacerbate nationalist feeling and no section of the people will be prepared to come out in open support of His Majesty’s Government.

16. It is in these circumstances that we must decide how far we can go with safety in giving to an Indian Minister control of defence.

17. So far as the functions of the Commander-in-Chief as such are concerned, there can be no question whatever as to taking any existing power away from the Commander-in-Chief.

18. It is only in his capacity as Defence Minister that any question can arise. Under the new arrangement whereby the Executive Council will approximate to a Cabinet presumably any question coming within the competence of the Government of India as defined in the amended clause (e) will be for decision by the Government of India as a whole and not by any particular Minister.

19. This will relate to all questions of policy as distinct from administration.

20. There seem to be three possible courses open:
(a) To stand upon the present position that nothing further can be done by way of compromise.
(b) To take the risks entailed and to hand over the Defence Ministry to an Indian, subject to a convention in writing that the Defence Minister will not in any matter affecting the prosecution of the war act contrary to the policy laid down by His Majesty’s Government and communicated through the Commander-in-Chief.
(c) To create some new office for an Indian Minister connected with Defence and to hand over to him any functions of the Defence Ministry which the Commander-in-Chief considers can be so handed over safely and practically.

21. As to (a) above, I consider this would be a fatal policy for two reasons. First it makes failure inevitable, and second it leaves His Majesty’s Government open to the criticism that we were merely stubborn when some small concession might have made all the difference.

22. I should personally prefer to offer (b) as this would I think have the best chance of acceptance. But in view of the immediate dangers and the Commander-in-Chief’s view of the confusion that might be caused I cannot press it as strongly as otherwise I would.
23. As to (c), I doubt very much that there is any chance of acceptance. But nevertheless, if you decide that you cannot act in accordance with paragraph 22, then I think this should be tried on the off chance of acceptance and in any event so as to show we have done our utmost to reach an accommodation.

24. In this regard after discussion I think the best that could be done to give effect to paragraph 20 (c) would be to (a) make the Commander-in-Chief War Member instead of Defence Member and turn the Defence Department into the War Department; (b) set up a Defence Co-ordination Department to take on the duties of the present Defence Co-ordination Section and certain things now done by the Defence Department, e.g., Public Relations and any other functions agreed to by the Commander-in-Chief.

25. If you approve principle of (c) I can work out details of actual wording of offer with Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy.

26. There is a small chance of acceptance as regards paragraph 20 (c) and a better chance as regards paragraph 20 (b). If there is acceptance by Congress, I anticipate the Muslim League will come in and this will be a large enough measure of acceptance to proceed with the scheme. Other bodies too will probably come in so as not to lose the chance of seats in the new Government.

27. In the event of acceptance, there will of course be difficulties as to apportionment of seats when the Viceroy comes to form his new Government and I would propose in that event to stay till the new Government is formed.

28. It is a matter of urgency to decide as to how we propose to proceed and I ask you to consider the question most urgently as I am convinced we must make some offer to meet the situation.

29. I am asking the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief to telegraph their own comments separately and urgently.

30. When you come to a decision please telegraph most immediate the words “your paragraph 20 (b) approved” or “your paragraph 20 (c) approved” as case may be and send any comments by separate immediately following telegram.

31. I have provisionally promised Congress my final answer after consulting you by Tuesday morning.²

² 7 April.
520

Maulana Azad to Sir S. Cripps
Cmd. 6350

4 April 1942

Thanks for your letter of to-day’s date. From our talk yesterday I had gathered the impression that we were likely to meet the Commander-in-Chief some time to-day and we had arranged our programme accordingly, but as this is not convenient to him we shall meet him to-morrow at 6 p.m. as suggested and reach your house at 5.30 p.m. I do not think it is necessary for me to send a note about organisational details. We are interested as you know in the political aspect of the problem, the full popular control of defence as well as all other departments of administration. We consider such control essential before responsibility can be undertaken. Our views on this subject and others are embodied in the resolution I gave you yesterday and it is with that background that we should like to consider the subject of defence. Problems of higher strategy may well be controlled by inter-Allied Cabinets or Councils, but the effectual control of the defence of India should rest with the Indian National Government.

1 Cf. Nos. 659, para. 2 (c) and 661, para. 1 (c).
2 No. 513 is evidently the letter referred to.
3 From Nos. 513 and 524 it appears that the meeting with the Commander-in-Chief took place on 4 April.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow
Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 52

MOST IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 4 April 1942
Received: 5 April

No. 18-U. I showed your 19-U1 to Prime Minister and immediately succeeding telegram2 is his reaction.

1 No. 512. 2 No. 522.
522

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 52

MOST IMMEDIATE

4 April 1942
Received: 5 April

19–U. Following personal to you from Prime Minister: of course telegraph personal to me or Secretary of State exactly what you think. It is my responsibility to decide to whom it is to be shown after I have read it.

523

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 51

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 5 April 1942, 6.30 pm

MOST SECRET
Received: 6 April

No. 6226. Following from High Commissioner, South Africa, to Dominions Office. No. 607. Following for Prime Minister from General Smuts:

Begins. India. I do not wish to put spanner into the works and sincerely wish Cripps Mission all success; at same time India is now key to our whole Empire defence and putting that key in unskilled Indian hands may have fatal results for this war. Please insist that final responsibility for defence measures will rest with our High Command whatever ancillary defence powers are devolved on India. Divided military control may spell ruin both to Indian and Empire defences. Ends.

524

Sir S. Cripps to Viscount Halifax (via Viceroy)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

IMMEDIATE

5 April 1942

No. 898–S. Following from Sir Stafford Cripps:

Begins. Your telegram No. 61 of March 28th. So far as I can see I shall not be making public speech here before 7th April but on that day or a few days later I shall probably speak in public preparatory to my departure. Sense of this

1 No. 427.
speech will depend on outcome of conversations and, although rejection of scheme by Congress seems probable, I have not entirely abandoned hope.

2. If rejection occurs it will do so mainly on our failure to transfer Defence to Indian hands. The important thing will then be to demonstrate reasonableness of our refusal. Commander-in-Chief met Azad and Nehru yesterday and himself explained obstacles to transfer and extent to which an Indian Member who would not hold Defence portfolio could have control in matters not strictly within purview of Defence Department. I am sure you are in a position from your own knowledge to assure American public of impossibility of separating Indian and British armies at this juncture.

Rejection will probably also be on grounds that right of Province to opt out is contrary to conception of Indian unity and unnecessary; that scheme does not provide for representation of peoples of Indian States in constitution-making body, and by maintaining treaty relations of non-adhering States assures their continued existence with the support of British armies. Opting out provision is of course essential to secure Muslim agreement and this might well be pointed out. As regards States, we cannot but adhere to our treaty obligations and if constitution is made in form to which States will not adhere, continuation of present obligations is inevitable. Facts being what they are there is no other means of securing association of States with constitution-making body than to accept nominees of existing Governments. I have publicly expressed here hope of His Majesty’s Government that States which have any form of existing electoral machinery would employ it for selection of their representatives.

I have emphasised throughout that offer stands or falls as a whole and that without acceptance of long-term policy we are not (repeat not) committed to immediate reconstitution of Government of India. *Ends.*

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*The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery*

*Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22*

5 April 1942

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 904-S. Superintendent Series. Following for your own and Prime Minister’s information. Cripps handed to Commander-in-Chief and myself yesterday a draft memorandum on defence for our views and the Commander-in-Chief had discussion with Azad and Nehru, from which it appeared that even if satisfied on points of defence they would not concede other points. We are preparing our final views on defence in the light of Cripps’ telegram
No. 890, and though I do not accept as a balanced picture his diagnosis of present morale in India nor his gloomiest forebodings of the consequences of rejection, I agree that given the movements of world opinion resulting from his visit we must do all that we safely can to meet him on the lines of paragraph 24 of his telegram No. 890. We would welcome an early success if it should prove possible, but, at the same time, I should say that I am more concerned at the dangers arising from prolonged negotiations with the Congress, when all minorities and Princes have already been seriously upset, than at the possible propaganda difficulties arising in the event of failure from inability to deprive Congress of a presentable excuse on the defence point. I also apprehend that line taken in paragraph 18 of his telegram will preclude possibility of Muslim League co-operation unless they are assured of either—

(a) a majority in such a Cabinet, or
(b) substantial proportion of members reinforced by clear maintenance of Governor-General and Secretary of State’s control during the interim period.

2. With reference to paragraph 27 of his telegram, I of course realize that if the immediate offer as finally modified to suit Congress should entail repudiation by League at the stage of formation of a government, it would be essential from the point of view of the future position of the Governor-General that the eventual breakdown should happen while Cripps was still present. On the other hand, if his continued presence here should amount to assuming or appearing to assume for the time being the functions of the Governor-General, I can conceive that circumstances might well arise in which it would be difficult for the same Governor-General to re-assume them.

1 No. 519.

526

Memorandum by Sir T. B. Sapru and Mr M. R. Jayakar

Cmd. 6530

5 April 1942

We observe from the Draft Declaration that excepting clause (e) there is very little in the Declaration about the changes to be introduced in the constitution of the Government of India during the period of the war. It may be that instructions have been or may be issued to His Excellency the Viceroy to bring about the necessary changes in the composition and the constitution of the executive government.

1 The text of this memorandum was transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery in telegram 214-S.C. of 18 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
If any such instructions have been issued we are not aware of them but we must point out that Indian opinion attaches the greatest importance to the transfer of real power in the Central Government at the present moment and it is for this reason that we emphasize the necessity of the complete non-officialization of Government without the reservation of any portfolio during the interim period.

We have considered the terms of clause (e) as originally given to us and as subsequently amended by Sir Stafford Cripps. In the amended clause we find it stated that while His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the defence of India as a part of their world war effort the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. We have carefully considered the terms of this amended clause particularly in the light of the speech of Sir Stafford Cripps at the press conference, a summary of which appeared in the press on March 30th, 1942. It is stated therein that Sir Stafford Cripps was emphatic that handing over political control and direction of defence in the midst of the war to the Indian Government would be fatal, and, further, that if Indian leaders insisted on absolute control over defence before accepting the scheme then the scheme would fall through.²

We realize that the transfer of absolute control over defence at the present juncture, when it is necessary that there should be unity of direction and control of military policy, would not be in the best interests of England and India. But we fail to see how this end will fail to be achieved by the appointment of an Indian Defence Member who, we presume, will be a man possessed of a due sense of responsibility and would be only too willing to accept expert advice and to work in the closest co-operation with the War Cabinet.

While we appreciate the necessity of unity of policy and control in matters of Defence we think, in common with most of our countrymen, that the appointment of an Indian member in charge of Defence working in close association and co-operation with the War Cabinet and willing to accept expert advice will be taken at this stage as an unmistakable token of the reality of the transfer of such power and as a symbol of the confidence of His Majesty’s Government in the people of this country. We have no doubt that the object of His Majesty’s Government is that the people of this country should feel that this is their own war, but we feel that the requisite sense of responsibility for the defence of the country can best be stimulated by an appeal to their sense of pride and self-esteem, and by the two countries, England and India, completely identifying themselves with each other in the common cause of defending this country. We strongly hold that it would be a mistake to ignore the strength of the sentiment of the people on this subject.

We desire to state unequivocally that we are strongly in favour of the Indian
people rendering every possible help in the successful prosecution of the war. At the same time we feel equally clearly that, in order to achieve that end, it is necessary that during the period of the war there should be an Indian Defence Member of the Council of the Governor-General. We are fully aware of the arguments to the contrary, and we do not wish to overlook or minimise them, but we feel that the arguments in favour of the adoption of this step are overwhelming.

The adoption of an Indian Defence Member will have a great effect on Indian psychology. It will inspire the people with confidence and materially help in altering the present mentality of the people, which in our opinion is not adequately zealous in the successful prosecution of the war. We do not in the slightest degree desire that there should be any conflict between his powers and those of the Commander-in-Chief in technical matters or in decisions about the movements or disposition of the troops or similar other matters. We think that the presence of such a Member will, far from weakening the military position in India, strengthen it, and the political effects of this step will be very wholesome.

Besides, there are in our opinion large and inexhaustible resources of manpower remaining untapped in the youth of the country, which can be mobilized by methods which a Defence Member drawn from the people can alone effectively employ.

His approach to this storehouse of strength will be by methods vitally different from those which the British official mind has hitherto employed with such little effect. The successful way in which the people of China, Russia, and even the small Philippine Islands, have resisted the overwhelming forces of Japanese aggression contrasted with the debacle in Malaya, Singapore and Rangoon, graphically illustrates the difference between a struggle carried on by people of a country under the direction of their own leaders and another pursued with the aid of a professional army guided and directed by officers who are drawn from a different race. We venture to suggest that at this critical time, when the danger is daily approaching, the old world ideas of keeping Indians in the perpetual position of unarmed helplessness, and also the feelings of distrust and suspicion which have led to this policy, should be forthwith abandoned and a new era of hope and confidence inaugurated, leading to a joint effort by England and India on terms of mutual reliance, association and truthfulness. It is only such an association that would be productive of the maximum effort of this country, resulting eventually in a victory based on the self-esteem, honour and willing sacrifice of a proud people.

On all these grounds we desire strongly to press the inclusion of an Indian Defence Member in the Executive Council, as otherwise the Declaration,

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whatever its other merits may be, will fail to achieve the object it is intended
to serve. It should not in our opinion be difficult to define the spheres of activity
of the Defence Member and of the Commander-in-Chief so as to avoid con-

flict, nor should it be difficult to secure close co-operation and co-ordination
between the two.

The second point to which we desire to advert relates to clause (c) of the
proposed Declaration. While we recognise the justice of allowing any Province
of British India the liberty of remaining out of the new constitution and of
retaining its present constitutional position, we are not free from considerable
doubt and anxiety about the wisdom of the further provision which makes it
possible for another Federal Union being established. Such a Federal Union
may in certain conceivable circumstances be a rival or hostile union. But apart
from this we cannot favour any step which may have the effect of breaking
up the integrity of the country fostered by a long succession of Hindu and
Muslim Emperors and a galaxy of British administrators. We are convinced
that the creation of more than one union, howsoever consistent in theory with
the principle of self-determination, will be disastrous to the lasting interests
of the country and to its integrity and security.

In the Draft Declaration which has been handed over to us we do not find
any indication of the precise majority of votes which will be required in a
Provincial Legislature to carry a resolution as to whether the Province will or
will not adhere to the Union. We are however of the opinion that in a matter
of this momentous character the method of bare majority cannot be adopted,
and that the majority required for any decision on this question should not
be less than 65 per cent. of the Indian Members of the Lower House at which
the resolution is passed. We do not think that a decision in which the Indian
population is primarily interested should be allowed to be influenced by the
votes of European Members, to whom the question of remaining in one
Federation or another cannot be of the same importance as it is to the Indian
Members.

We are also strongly of the opinion that once this principle of a prescribed
majority of votes in a Legislature is accepted, it would not only be superfluous
but might easily lead to grave social disorder if resort were to be had to the
further device of a plebiscite of the adult population of the Province. We feel
that in the existing circumstances of the country such a plebiscite, howsoever
democratic in theory, is bound to lead to serious consequences gravely dis-

turbing peace and tranquillity, not only in the Province concerned but in other
areas to which the contagion may easily spread, leading to violent communal
or religious conflicts. For these reasons we cannot conceal our grave concern
as to the wisdom and expediency of provisions making it possible for some
Provinces to combine into a separate Union.

We attach importance to the possibility of the leaders of Indian opinion
in the principal communities coming to some mutual agreement before the cessation of hostilities, an agreement which may secure and safeguard the interests of all minorities by providing for (a) their representation in the Legislature, (b) in the Government to be established, and (c) reservation to them of the fullest liberty in matters of conscience, religion and culture. If the contending parties begin to work together in a common cause during the interim period they will, we hope, learn to appreciate one another’s point of view, and a spirit of tolerance and confidence may be generated conducive to a final settlement which will secure the position of the minorities in the fullest measure without causing a disruption of the well-established integrity of the country.

If however all attempts during the intervening period to secure one Federal Union unhappily fail and the overwhelming wishes of the Provinces to have a separate Union are indicated through their Legislatures and the evils pointed out above of having a separate Union are prevented or mitigated, we have no objection to the experiment suggested in the Draft Declaration being made, subject of course to what we have stated above.

Lastly we desire to call attention to the necessity of the restoration in the Provinces of a popular form of Government. There is no reference to this question in the Draft Declaration probably because it is intended to leave it for decision by the new Government which is to be established at the Centre. We consider however that the rule which at present prevails in so many Provinces under Section 93 of the Government of India Act should be brought to an immediate end and their administration restored once more to popular control. If for the successful working of the Provincial Governments it should be necessary to establish coalition Governments we would indeed welcome such an arrangement.

On all other points arising out of the Draft Declaration of Sir Stafford Cripps we do not wish to say anything more than that we are in general agreement with the line adopted by His Majesty’s Government.
Mr Turnbull to Mir Maqbool Mahmood

L/P&J/10/9: ff 22–8

5 April 1942

Dear Maqbool Mahmood,

In reply to your letter of the 3rd April, Sir Stafford Cripps has asked me to send you the enclosed revise of the summary of proceedings of the consultations of the Indian States’ Delegation with him on the 2nd April. This revise contains certain corrections which Sir Stafford considers necessary to make it an accurate summary of the conversations.

Yours very truly,

F. F. Turnbull

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Enclosure to No. 527


SECRET

His Highness the Chancellor asked that the States should be assured that in the event of a number of States, in spite of their desire to see a united India, not finding it feasible to adhere, the non-adhering States or groups of States so desiring, would have the right to form, and to negotiate for, a Union of their own with full sovereign status in accordance with a suitable and agreed procedure specially devised for the purpose. Sir Stafford replied that such a situation had not been considered in connection with the present Document nor was it contemplated under the present scheme, he had therefore no occasion to consult his colleagues in the matter. At the same time, personally he did not see any fundamental impossibility. He would, if the scheme went through, raise the point when he returned home.

2. His Highness the Chancellor enquired:

Question 1. In case of adherence, will the Sovereignty of a State be adversely affected and its people become subjects of the Union?

Answer. Sir Stafford stated that this would depend on the constitution devised by the constitution-making body and the agreement reached between the Union and the adhering States.

Question 2. Is it intended that the new Union will exercise no paramountcy over any of the States, or is there any question of transferring to it the paramountcy of the Crown?
**Answer.** There is no question of the Crown transferring any paramountcy to the Union. The scheme contemplates that the Union will have no paramountcy over the adhering States.

**Question 3.** In the case of adhering States will their adherence automatically dissolve the Crown’s special obligation to protect them? In such a case if there is to be no paramountcy in respect of the adhering States, what would be the procedure regarding questions appertaining to the personal and dynastic affairs of the Rulers such as Succession, Commissions of Enquiry into allegations of gross misrule, etc.?

**Answer.** The adherence of a State would automatically dissolve the Crown’s special obligations to it. A State that adheres to the Union does so on whatever terms it makes with the Union. It becomes a part of the Union, and the Crown cannot have paramountcy over a portion of the new Union.

**Question 4.** Will it be possible for a State to adhere to the new Union reserving the dynastic and personal affairs of the Ruler to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Crown?

**Answer.** The present scheme does not contemplate the reservation of dynastic and personal affairs of a Ruler to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Crown in the case of an adhering State. It would however be open to an adhering State to negotiate, and make suitable arrangements on these matters with the new Union.

**Question 5.** Is it intended that the Crown will retain the means to implement its obligations to the non-adhering States even after the new constitution has come into being, and that the Crown’s obligations to these States would be enforced with the usual sanctions such as diplomatic persuasion, economic pressure and in the last resort the use of force?

**Answer.** Yes. We will provide for everything necessary to implement our treaty obligations to the non-adhering States. For this purpose, the necessary sanctions would be available to the Crown, including the use of force in the last resort. However, I am not going to commit myself as to the conditions under which such sanctions could or would be operated under the new scheme.

**Question 6.** May it be assumed that the constitution-making body will not have any authority to discuss matters relating to the internal affairs or the constitutional machinery of the States?

**Answer.** The constitution-making body will have the right to discuss matters relating to the internal affairs or the constitutional machinery of the States just as the States delegates will be free to discuss the internal affairs of British India. If the States do not like the constitution which emerges from the constitution-making body they can refuse adherence to it.

**Question 7.** Is it desired that in view of the impending developments the Indian Princes should make contacts with the major political parties in British India?

**Answer.** Certainly. But this is not a matter for me, it is for the Viceroy. I should have thought that Your Highnesses would be well advised to make such
contacts. I have discussed this matter quite informally with His Excellency the Viceroy and he was sympathetic to that view. This is a matter, however, which you should yourselves discuss with His Excellency when you meet him.

3. His Highness of Bikaner enquired:

Question 8. In the case of States adhering to the Union will there be any Residents or Political Officers in view of the fact that it is proposed that Paramountcy will cease to operate in regard to such States?

Answer. No. In the case of adhering States, Residents or Political Officers, etc. will disappear.

Question 9.

(i) We do not quite understand why it is proposed that, whether a State accedes or not, its entire Treaty must be revised.

(ii) Many States who value their Treaties are naturally strongly averse to the revision of their Treaties in such circumstances.

(iii) If it was a question of only fiscal and other matters of all-India concern which would require to be dealt with in the changed conditions, then a supplementary Treaty covering all such matters would appear to be called for.

We understood on the first day of our talk that such revision of Treaties was only to be in regard to matters of such common concern as Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, Water etc.

Answer. The proposed declaration does not contemplate that the entire Treaty arrangements of a non-acceding State must be revised. The revision contemplated is only "so far as this may be required in the new situation". This provision is primarily intended to deal with economic matters of common concern to British India and the States. The whole idea is that the transfer of power to British India will automatically require a variation of some of the provisions of the Treaties relating to matters which are of common concern to British India and the States.

Questions of paramountcy and protection of the non-adhering States will not be revised except with their consent.

The term "revision" used by His Majesty's Government in the proposed declaration is not intended to mean a wholesale revision of the Treaty relationship of the Crown with the non-adhering States.

I would make this point clear in a letter\(^2\) to the Chancellor that as regards the non-adhering States there is no intention of revising their Treaties in so far as their relationship with the Crown is concerned except with their consent. The non-adhering States would, however, appreciate that the new situation must involve some variation of their Treaties, or incorporation of some new clauses therein, relating to economic and fiscal matters of common concern to them and the new Union.
The non-adhering States need have no alarm that their Treaties will be revised without their consent.

The Crown will implement its obligations to the non-adhering States.

**Question 10.** One of the statements which you are supposed to have made at a recent press conference suggests that if there be more than one Union in India, any of these Unions will be free to join foreign countries outside India. What exactly did you intend to convey on this point?

**Answer.** This question was asked of me at a recent Press Conference and what I stated was that the Unions, being free in their foreign affairs, would have the right to make treaties with foreign powers. Obviously they cannot coalesce with a foreign power unless they first secede from the Commonwealth.

**Question 11.** Is it necessary that the proposed Union must be limited to geographically contiguous Units or States?

**Answer.** I have stated at a recent Press Conference that ordinarily it should be so, unless some practical arrangement is made with the intervening Union or Unit, by the Units not geographically contiguous. If they can come to some feasible arrangement in the matter they are free to do so. The British Government, however, cannot be expected to coerce any party into such arrangements. If any of the Unions should have a serious quarrel, the good offices of the British Government would be available to arbitrate or to resolve the difference; it would not however compel one Union to submit to the other.

**Question 12.** If one of the major parties does not accept it, is it contemplated that the whole scheme will be abandoned?

**Answer.** I think that the scheme is likely either to be accepted by almost all the major parties or to be rejected by them all. I do not expect its wholesale acceptance by one major party and rejection by the others.

4. The Nawab Sahib of Chhatari enquired:

**Question 13.**

(a) whether the intention is to give full freedom to all provincial Units and the States to come into the new Union and to leave it to them to come to any arrangements they may desire; and

(b) if individual States, whether adhering or non-adhering, desired that the paramountcy should discontinue, is it contemplated that it should be discontinued?

**Answer.** (a) Yes, that is the intention. We do not desire to stay in India unless the Indian peoples want us in their interests to stay, and except to the extent that it may be unavoidable for us for the fulfilment of our treaty obligations to the non-adhering States. We feel that for all concerned free relations with India will be better than forced relations. If the present scheme goes by the board in not being accepted by the main elements in the national life of India,

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2 This letter has not been traced in India Office Records.
I presume that nothing will be done till after the war when the whole matter will be subject to reconsideration in the light of the new conditions.

(b) In the case of a non-adhering State it is not contemplated that paramountcy should be discontinued. An acceding State, as already explained, would cease to be under paramountcy.

5. Sir Stafford emphasised that if the Indian peoples are sufficiently reasonable and broadminded it should be possible for them all to come into a single Union. Otherwise they could have separate Unions and suffer the inconvenience involved.

He suggested that the first step for the smaller States should be to get into groups or into federal relations amongst themselves and, for this purpose, the spirit of the scheme for co-operative grouping should be extended to wider units, particularly in matters of common industrial and economic interests, so that the States are not left behind British India and may pull their full weight in the development of India as a whole. This is a matter which the Princes would be well advised to discuss with His Excellency the Viceroy.

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Sir S. Cripps to the Nawab of Chhatari

L/P&J/10/9: f 11

5 April 1942

Dear Nawab Sahib,

I have received your letter of the 3rd April in which you are kind enough to convey to me the views of His Exalted Highness in regard to the proposals which I have been discussing with the leaders of Indian opinion. I fear, however, that there are some points on which there appears to have been some misunderstanding at our interview. It is the case that His Exalted Highness will be free to decide whether Hyderabad should adhere or not adhere to any Indian Union which might be set up under these proposals if they are given effect. If, however, His Exalted Highness decided that Hyderabad should not adhere, the relations at present subsisting between the Crown and His Exalted Highness would remain unchanged and His Exalted Highness would not be free, as suggested in your letter, to cease to maintain them. Any revision of the existing Treaty arrangements which might be required as a result of the creation of a new Indian Union would be by negotiation between the Paramount Power and His Exalted Highness and clearly might involve modification of particular Treaty rights in the light of the new situation. The question whether any particular point which might be difficult to resolve by negotiation should
be submitted to arbitration would be for the Paramount Power to decide and I can give no assurances at this stage in regard to it.

As regards Berar, the Northern Circars and the Ceded Districts, I note the views of His Exalted Highness.

Yours sincerely,

STAFFORD CRIPPS

1 No. 515.

529

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 48

MOST IMMEDIATE 10 DOWNING STREET, 5 April 1942, 6.30 pm
SECRET Received: 6 April 6225. Prime Minister to Sir Stafford Cripps. Superintendent Series. Your 890-S.1

1. India Committee and War Cabinet will consider your proposals Monday evening.2 I hope by then we shall have heard from Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. It would be a great help if we knew exactly what functions it would be proposed to hand over as matter cannot be decided purely on principle.

2. Ceylon news seems good and it is lucky we did not withdraw fighter forces.

3. Your wife is with us and sends following message:

Begins. All my love and undaunted confidence. All friends send deepest support in your courage and handling. Greetings to you all. Ends.

1 No. 519. 2 6 April.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery and Mr Churchill

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 912-S. (For your own and Prime Minister’s information.) On further consideration of paragraphs 20(c) and 24 of Cripps’ telegram No. 890,1 and given the present state of world opinion on the subject, Commander-in-Chief

1 No. 519.
and I feel that no very serious risks are involved in setting up and handing over to an Indian Member of Council a portfolio Defence Co-ordination including duties of present Defence Co-ordination section along with such other non-essential functions of present Defence Department as Wavell thinks he can safely include in new portfolio.

2. But we are both satisfied that in existing circumstances it is not (repeat not) possible to take away from Commander-in-Chief the substance of the Defence portfolio as now held by him in order to entrust it to a representative Indian.

3. We see no reason why Commander-in-Chief while continuing to perform all his essential functions as at present should not be styled War Minister if it is felt that this would make the offer more attractive to Congress.

4. There can however be no question of majority decisions of the Council being effective against the requirements of His Majesty’s Government, and it must be for the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General to decide whether in a particular instance the directions of His Majesty’s Government are to be enforced without further argument, or whether circumstances permit and render it desirable to discuss the matter further with His Majesty’s Government before His Majesty’s Government’s decision is enforced.

5. To preserve the relationships stipulated in the preceding paragraph it is essential that the position of the Executive Council should not be glozed over in any clarification of the offer. This is the more necessary because of popular references to an Indian Cabinet or National Government.

The vital test of Cabinet Government, namely, responsibility to an Indian legislature, does not and cannot exist in the interim period. The constitutional responsibility of the Governor-General in Council must remain to Parliament; the Governor-General must retain his powers of overriding the Executive Council, and the Secretary of State his powers of direction and control over the Governor-General in Council. On the other hand non-official Members of the Executive Council appointed for their political influence will always possess in their hands the weapon of resignation. On a particular issue, whether of procedure or of substance, the question to be decided would be whether the Governor-General and His Majesty’s Government attached so much importance to their own views that they would be prepared to face the resignation of the non-official Members.

6. Such a test would immediately arise were a majority of the non-official Members to oppose for example the destruction of industrial property as a military measure. It could arise in its most acute form if they were to demand the cessation of hostilities in India against the wishes of His Majesty’s Government.
7. There should be no doubt that the Commander-in-Chief will be in effective control of all functions of the Defence Department remaining in his hands. Moreover the Commander-in-Chief (through the overriding powers of the Governor-General if necessary) must also have as much control as is necessary and practicable, in areas outside the field of active military operations, over the functioning of other Departments in matters affecting the fighting value of and facilities for the army. On the other hand the views of all Members of Council at Council level on any matter (including matters falling within the Defence Department portfolio) would of course have all the influence that would inevitably flow from the danger of their resignation.

8. Given a real desire to fight the war, this position should satisfy Indian demands for a real and substantial degree of control and responsibility over the whole field of Defence.

531

General Wavell to Mr Churchill (via War Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 46

MOST IMMEDIATE 6 April 1942, 5 am
MOST SECRET Received: 6 April, 2.15 am
8230/C cipher 5/4. Private for Prime Minister from General Wavell.
I am sure you realise that I am doing my utmost in close consultation with Viceroy and Lord Privy Seal to go to furthest limit possible on question of defence in order to secure acceptance of scheme put forward by H.M.G. I am convinced after careful consideration that it would not be possible to separate my dual functions as civil [Commander-in-Chief?] and defence member without causing complete dislocation of machine but I am working out proposal to give effect to para. 20 (c) of Lord Privy Seal’s telegram No. 8901 on the lines suggested in his para. 24. I have left it to Viceroy to safeguard position of civil [Commander-in-Chief?] so that he cannot be overridden by majority decision in council on essential matters on defence.

1 No. 519.
532

War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 15

L/PO/6/106c: ff 43–5

Responsibility for Defence
memorandum by the Secretary of State for India

India Office, 6 April 1942

The attached memorandum is circulated for consideration by the Committee.
L.S.A.

Annex to No. 532

Sir S. Cripps’ telegram 890–S¹ raises two main issues. Firstly the specific problem of defence discussed in paragraphs 20–25. Secondly the general issue of the powers and composition of the interim Government of India raised indirectly by paragraph 18.

2. As regards defence it seems to me that the distinction drawn by Sir S. Cripps in paragraph 20 between courses b and c is a somewhat unreal one and blurs the real issue which is: What powers connected with defence can be safely handed over to an Indian Minister without weakening the Commander-in-Chief’s unfettered control over war policy and operations?

In Continental armies, there is normally a complete separation between the War Ministry, which raises, equips and maintains the Army, and the General Staff which is responsible for training, war policy and operations. Here we have in the present war for the first time followed the Continental example to the extent that the Chiefs of the Staff, and through them the staff side of the Defence Services, work directly under the Minister of Defence. On the other hand the Chiefs of the Staff remain members of the Board of Admiralty and of the Army and Air Councils, thus maintaining a close liaison with the administrative side of their services.

3. Purely on military merits there should be no insuperable difficulty in a reorganization in India on similar lines. The Commander-in-Chief would retain absolute control over the General Staff and Military Secretary’s Department as well as unfettered executive authority over all forces of every category. A Defence Member would be responsible to the Viceroy for the present Adjutant-General’s, Quarter Master General’s and Master General of the Ordnance’s Departments. Liaison with the Commander-in-Chief’s Office could
be maintained by a Council of the above heads of Departments on which the Commander-in-Chief would be represented by his Chief of Staff (or by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief).

4. Such a reorganisation, under which an Indian Member might take over the Defence Department as such, minus the new War Department retained by the Commander-in-Chief, would, no doubt, be much more attractive to Indian sentiment than anything that looked like a makeshift second Defence Department created merely as a sop to Congress. It would give the greater part of Sir S. Cripps’ course b without what seems to me the confusion of functions implied in it.

5. As for the proposed “written convention” which is to accompany (b) surely that is a condition precedent which should be insisted upon as regards every member of the Executive. The Commander-in-Chief is dependent for the fulfilment of his duties upon the co-operation of the Supply Department, the Communications Department, the Civil Defence and Home Departments, in fact upon the whole machinery of the Government of India. That the Defence Member should promise to be a good boy in a sense not required of the rest seems to me a quite indefensible proposition.

6. This brings me to paragraph 18. It was, I think, clearly understood by the India Committee and by the Cabinet that paragraph (e) of the Declaration did not envisage any fundamental change in the relations between the Viceroy and his Executive, or between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India during the War. Nor was it understood that the special reference to His Majesty’s Government’s control of Defence was to involve a clean sweep of the whole of the existing Executive and their replacement by Indian political leaders. That would at once raise Hindu–Moslem rivalry in its acutest form. Unless the three European Members are retained as a balancing factor—not necessarily in their present offices, though probably in the Home Department—it is certain that Jinnah will insist on half the places going to his men, a solution which Congress is bound to reject. I may be reading too much into paragraph 18 of Sir S. Cripps’ telegram, taken in conjunction with what seems to be almost universally assumed by the Press, but I think it is very desirable that this point should be cleared up without delay.

L. S. A.
533

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 42

Most Immediate

Secret

10 Downing Street, 6 April 1942, 3 am

6229. Superintendent Series. Following from Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal. Your 890-S,\(^1\) paragraph 18. We have not heard anything here about the words beginning "under the new" down to end of paragraph. What does this mean?
Repeat to Viceroy.

\(^1\) No. 519.

534

War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 11th Meeting

L/PO/6/106c: ff 40–1

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 6 April 1942 at 12.15 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir John Anderson, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

The Committee had before them the following papers:

(1) W.P. (42) 147\(^1\) covering the following telegrams:
   (i) 890–S from the Lord Privy Seal to the Prime Minister.
   (ii) No. 607 from Field-Marshal Smuts to the Prime Minister.
   (iii) No. 904–S from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India.
(2) Telegram 8230/C\(^2\) from the Commander-in-Chief to the Prime Minister.
(3) Telegram No. 912–S\(^3\) from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State.

The first point discussed was whether the Lord Privy Seal contemplated any constitutional change at the present time. Certain paragraphs of telegram No. 890–S could be read in this sense (e.g. 18 and 27). Again, part 2\(^4\) of the Viceroy’s telegram No. 912–S showed that the Viceroy was anxious that the constitutional position of the Executive Council should not be glossed over in any way.

The Committee was informed that the Prime Minister had sent a telegram (No. 6229)\(^5\) to the Lord Privy Seal asking for a clarification of paragraph 18 of telegram No. 890–S which referred to “...the new arrangement whereby the Executive Council will approximate to the Cabinet.”
The Committee agreed that it was important that it should be made clear that the position of the Viceroy's Council, however its personnel might be changed or enlarged, could not be altered in the present circumstances. The position was, of course, and must remain, that the Viceroy in Council acts as a collective body responsible to the Secretary of State, subject to the Viceroy's special powers and duties under Section 9.6

The Committee then discussed the three alternatives set out in paragraph 20 of telegram 890–S as to defence arrangements. The Committee agreed that alternatives (a) and (b) could not be adopted, but that an arrangement on the lines of (c) could be accepted, subject to the overriding powers of the Viceroy and to preserving the essential authority of the Commander-in-Chief. As long as these essential conditions were understood and applied the detailed arrangements might be left to be worked out by the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief and the Lord Privy Seal.

In this connection, it was pointed out that all members of the Viceroy's Council shared in the responsibility for defence and that too much emphasis must not be laid on the responsibility for defence of the proposed new Indian Minister.

It was also pointed out that the Lord Privy Seal had not made any direct reply to the passage in the telegram7 despatched by the Prime Minister after the meeting of the Cabinet on the previous Thursday, in which it had been stated that we would agree to some more precise interpretation of paragraph (c) of the Declaration, if the Congress Leaders gave an assurance that, subject to this, they were prepared to accept the whole scheme. It did not look as though this was the case. Judging by telegram 890–S, it looked as if the Lord Privy Seal favoured a modification in the defence arrangements in order to ensure that if there was a breakdown, it took place on a point on which we should receive a general measure of support. It was therefore suggested that the telegram to the Lord Privy Seal should include a sentence to the effect that we could only infer from the exchange of telegrams that the prospect of agreement on the whole scheme by reaching an arrangement on the defence issue was far from hopeful, and that this must influence the way in which the defence issue should be handled.

The Secretary of State for India undertook to prepare a draft telegram to the Lord Privy Seal, in the light of the discussion, for consideration at a further meeting to be held at 5.30 that afternoon.

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1 Nos. 519, 523 and 525 were circulated to the War Cabinet under this reference, dated 5 April, by direction of the Prime Minister.
2 No. 531.
3 No. 530.
4 See No. 530, para. 5.
5 No. 533.
6 The Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935 was intended; see Annex A to No. 536.
7 Nos. 502 and 506, note 5.
535

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

6 April 1942

No. 917-S. Following from Lord Privy Seal for Prime Minister. Your No. 6229, dated 6th April. I am in agreement with position as stated in Viceroy's No. 912-S. which will make clear what is intended in passage to which you refer.

1 No. 533. 2 No. 530.

536

War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 12th Meeting

L/PO/6/106c: ff 32-4

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee's Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 6 April 1942 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir John Anderson, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

The Committee had before them a draft telegram prepared by the Secretary of State for India.

The Committee went through the draft and made certain amendments.

Copies of the draft, as circulated by the Secretary of State (Annex A) and as submitted to the War Cabinet (Annex B), are appended to these Minutes.

Annex A to No. 536

DRAFT TELEGRAM CIRCULATED TO THE INDIA COMMITTEE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

1. Your paragraph 18 of 890-S raised a doubt since dispelled by your 917-S whether it was clearly understood that the constitutional position of the Viceroy's Council, however its personnel may be changed or enlarged in pursuance of the invitation contained in (e) of the draft declaration, cannot be altered in present circumstances. The position is and must remain that the Viceroy in Council acts as a collective body responsible to the Secretary of State and subject to the Viceroy's special powers and duties under Sections 40 and 41 of Ninth Schedule of Act. There should be no misunderstanding between you and Indian political leaders on this point.
2. As regards defence, War Cabinet agree with you in regarding your 20 (a) as impossible but are not prepared to accept 20 (b). The actual application of 20 (c) depends on the decision as to what sections of the present Defence Department can be transferred to an Indian member, together with such additional duties as those of co-ordination with Civil Defence, without interfering with the unimpaired authority of the Commander-in-Chief. So long as this essential condition is understood and applied the War Cabinet is quite willing that the detailed arrangements should be such as commend themselves to Viceroy, Commander-in-Chief and yourself. There is no objection to the change of nomenclature suggested in your paragraph 24.

3. Your paragraph 27 gives no indication of your views or of those of the Viceroy as to the composition, in the event of agreement, of the reconstituted Executive. Is it contemplated that the existing European official members should not be retained, even if not in their present posts? If not, how is it proposed to meet Jinnah’s demand for at least equal representation on the Council with all Hindu parties combined? To which community is it suggested that the additional Defence portfolio is to be assigned? Is it proposed to transfer the Finance Portfolio or even the Home Portfolio? (Further do you really think it desirable, once the general principles of the reconstitution are agreed as between the Viceroy and yourself, that you should stay on to conduct what is essentially the Viceroy’s own business of making up his Executive.)

4. You have not so far directly replied to the question contained in paragraph 3 of the Prime Minister’s 426. But we cannot but infer from 890-S that the prospects of agreement, so far as Congress are concerned, are in your opinion very slight. It is hardly necessary to remind you of the danger of antagonising other elements in your efforts to secure adhesion of Congress in respect of the immediate position.

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1 This corresponds to the telegram despatched (No. 538), except that in paragraph 4 of the latter 'War Cabinet assumes' replaced 'I assume'.
2 No. 519. 3 No. 535. 4 Namely, Government of India Act 1935.
5 See Nos. 502 and 506, note 5.
The War Cabinet had before them—

(i) W.P. (42) 147,\(^2\) covering the following telegrams:

(ii) No. 607 from Field-Marshal Smuts to the Prime Minister.

(iii) No. 904–S from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India.

(2) Telegram No. 8230/o\(^3\) from the Commander-in-Chief in India to the Prime Minister.

(3) Telegram No. 912–S\(^4\) from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State.

(4) A draft reply\(^5\) to the Lord Privy Seal prepared by the India Committee. After a short discussion the War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the despatch of the telegram drafted by the India Committee.

(2) Asked the Secretary of State for India to prepare a short statement on the present position of the negotiations, which could be issued as guidance to the Press; and invited the Minister of Information to arrange for the Secretary of State for India to see the Principal Editors on the following day.

(3) Invited the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to send a short telegram to the Dominions informing them of the present position of the negotiations, on the basis of the statement to be prepared by the Secretary of State for India.

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\(^1\) No. 506. \(^2\) See No. 534, note 1. \(^3\) This should read '8230/C', i.e. No. 531. \(^4\) No. 530. \(^5\) See No. 536, note 1.
Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 38

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL. MOST SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, 6 April 1942, 8.40 pm
Received: 7 April

441. Superintendent Series. Following for Lord Privy Seal. War Cabinet to-day decided on following answer. Begins. Your paragraph 18 of 890-S¹ raised a doubt since dispelled by your 917-S² whether it was clearly understood that the constitutional position of the Viceroy’s Council, however its personnel may be changed or enlarged in pursuance of the invitation contained in (e) of the draft declaration, cannot be altered in present circumstances. The position is and must remain that the Viceroy in Council acts as a collective body responsible to the Secretary of State and subject to the Viceroy’s special powers and duties under Sections 40 and 41 of Ninth Schedule of Act.³ There should be no misunderstanding between you and Indian political leaders on this point.

2. As regards defence, War Cabinet agree with you in regarding your 20 (a) as impossible and fully share your misgivings as to 20 (b). In view of Wavell’s opinion, we must definitely rule this out. This leaves 20 (c).

3. The actual application of 20 (c) depends on the decision as to what sections of the present Defence Department can be transferred to an Indian member, together with such additional duties as those of co-ordination with Civil Defence, without impairing the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. So long as this essential condition is understood and applied the War Cabinet is quite willing that the detailed arrangements should be such as commend themselves to Viceroy, Commander-in-Chief and yourself. There is no objection to the change of nomenclature suggested in your paragraph 24.

4. You have not so far directly replied to the question contained in paragraph 3 of 426.⁴ War Cabinet assumes that you wish to secure agreement under 20 (c) in the hope that thereby you will improve the chances of the scheme as a whole. It is unnecessary to remind you of the danger of antagonising other elements in your efforts to secure adhesion of Congress in respect of the immediate position. Ends.

¹ No. 519.
² No. 535.
³ Government of India Act 1935.
⁴ See Nos. 502 and 506, note 5.
Telegrams received from Secretary of State showed that the Prime Minister had seized hold of the references to Cabinet government in Sir Stafford Cripps’ telegrams (possibly owing to attention having been drawn to them by H.E.’s telegram No. 904?) and was asking Sir Stafford Cripps what was implied by paragraph 18 of his No. 890 as Cabinet at home had heard nothing of this before. Sir Stafford Cripps suggested to Mr. Turnbull that H.E. should reply. P.S.V. told Mr. Turnbull that this would be rather difficult as we could not reply on this point, and it would be for Sir Stafford Cripps to reply in the light of instructions he had received from H.M.G. At an interview in the morning, H.E. showed Sir Stafford Cripps a brief in the form of a draft telegram, drawing pointed attention to the fact that H.E. had all along objected to offering portfolios as a bait for acceptance of a declaration, was uneasy about the loose employment of terms such as “Indian Cabinet” and had been apprehensive of the course of negotiations, but was not aware of what H.M.G.’s instructions were. Sir Stafford Cripps suggested that he should reply to the Cabinet that his interpretation of “Cabinet” government in India was precisely that adopted by H.E. in his telegram No. 912 of the previous evening sent in consultation with the C.-in-C. and supplementing the telegram sent by the C.-in-C. H.E. agreed to Sir Stafford sending the telegram but reserved the right to send a further telegram covering the wider range and sent a letter to Sir Stafford Cripps to this effect. A telegram covering the wider range was accordingly drafted (copy attached). At Sir Stafford Cripps’ interview with H.E. in the afternoon this telegram was shown to him and H.E. suggested that to avoid misunderstanding, Sir Stafford Cripps should revise his draft memo to Azad so as to make it a document which would not make unnecessary concessions on the points in question. Sir Stafford Cripps agreed to revision on this line but showed some reluctance on the point of not conceding the abolition of the service members. H.E. then observed that if those were H.M.G.’s instructions, he would record his regrets. Sir Stafford Cripps then said that he would put this matter right in the draft and that the Cabinet’s instructions were not that all service members must be eliminated but that Government would be prepared to go as far as eliminating them entirely (except the C.-in-C.) if it were necessary. The draft memorandum was revised in consultation with H.E. and the C.-in-C. and the draft telegram kept on record. H.E. did not undertake not to send it.

P.S.V. conveyed to Mr. Cook, for Sir Stafford Cripps, the suggestion re-
ceived from Sir R. Maxwell that in view of the strong feeling on the part of members of the Executive Council, Sir Stafford Cripps should consider imparting to the Executive Council as a body any proposed statement as to the reception of his scheme before he made it.

L. G. PINNELL,—6.4
L.

540

Mr Pinnell to Mr Turnbull

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

THE VICE ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 6 April 1942

Dear Turnbull,
The enclosed is first hand but the recipient has no permission to show it to anyone but His Excellency. Will you therefore please ensure its secrecy and if possible return it?

Yours sincerely,

L. G. PINNELL

Enclosure to No. 540

MOST SECRET

Extract from a record of an interview on 6th April, between Mr O. K. Caroe, C.S.I., C.I.E., and Colonel Johnson, President Roosevelt’s Personal Representative in India.

2. After explaining that Nehru had sought the interview, Colonel Johnson said that he half suspected that Nehru believed that he, Colonel Johnson, had brought a letter from the President, but there was no question of any such letter. Colonel Johnson asked me to pass on to His Excellency the main lines of his conversation with Nehru which were broadly as follows:

3. He gathered that Congress had decided not to break on the non-accession issue, partly he understood because they believed that economic factors would make non-accession impossible (Nehru may have been thinking of the 60 per cent. formula which has in effect barred non-accession by the Punjab and Bengal and of the Central subsidy to the N.-W.F.P., which will of course be a strong influence against non-accession by that Province). Nehru had then gone on to speak of hitching India’s wagon to America’s Star and not Britain’s.

1 The dots here and at the end are in MSS. EUR. F.125/141.
2 See No. 497.
Colonel Johnson then told him that it was the President’s determination and the determination of the American people to support Great Britain to the end of the war, to the utmost and to preserve the integrity of the British Empire and that there must be no doubt in anybody’s mind in India that America would see the war through. If America was convinced that Congress was solidly supporting the war effort, the sympathy she had previously had for Congress would continue: if, on the other hand, it appeared that Congress was saving face, or hedging or taking action to slow down the conclusion of the war, it was not too much to say that America would hate Congress. Colonel Johnson added, in response to an interjection of Nehru’s that America would have the leading place at the peace table, that her attitude towards India at that table would be determined by the wholeheartedness or otherwise of the Indian war effort. If he himself were associated with the Peace Conference he would do his best to see that an India which had wholeheartedly backed the war effort obtained America’s fullest support in attaining her ambitions. But the matter would be far otherwise, if at that time the American people felt that American blood had been spilt unnecessarily and the war prolonged by shilly-shallying. Nehru then spoke of his belief that India, particularly rural India, would not create a refugee problem, the villages were rooted where they stood and would not move. He also enlarged on his belief that Indians, particularly villagers, would make fine guerillas (at this point I interjected doubts regarding the capacity of the Bengal villager for guerilla warfare and Colonel Johnson said even Nehru himself was anxious whether Bengal would stand fast against an invader).

4. Nehru had then gone on to speak of the issue regarding control of Defence, and he said that although Congress would not break on the non-accession issue, they must break if they were not satisfied on this. Colonel Johnson added that Nehru and other Congress leaders, he gathered, did not like the present Commander-in-Chief, though they expressed admiration for his predecessor. They were determined, he thought, to get a Defence Minister, but Nehru, when asked, had said that this would in no way involve interference with control of operations or in the field. The supply issue was not touched on.

5. Colonel Johnson said that he really believed he had created some impression on Nehru and that he (Nehru) would work to assist the war effort even if the “Cripps proposals” did not go through. As an instance of this he gave a move, which is apparently now being made, by Nehru, to get certain strikes settled. The account of the interview with Nehru terminated with a citation of that politician’s view to the effect he (Nehru) would lose his followers, if he compromised with the British on the Defence issue. Colonel Johnson like others who have met him was much impressed by Nehru’s charm of manner, grasp of history and logic and wide intellectual gifts...
541

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 6 April 1942, 6.10 pm
Received: 6 April, 7.15 pm

No. 919-S. Reference paragraphs 20(c) and 24 of telegram No. 890 from Sir Stafford Cripps to Prime Minister. Following are Commander-in-Chief’s proposals agreed to by Lord Privy Seal and myself:

Begins. 1. I agree to the suggested change of title.

2. As regards handing over to a Defence Co-ordination Department certain activities now undertaken by the Defence Department, I make the following suggestion:

(a) Public Relations.

(b) Demobilization and post-war reconstruction.

(c) Petroleum officer, whose functions are to calculate the requirements of, and make provision for, all petroleum products required for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and for the civil departments, including storage and distribution.

(d) Indian representation on the Eastern Group Supply Council.

(e) Amenities for, and welfare of, troops and their dependants, including Indian Soldiers Boards.

(f) All canteen organisations.

(g) Certain non-technical educational institutions, e.g. Lawrence Schools, K.G.R.I.M. Schools and The Prince of Wales’ Royal Indian Military College.

(h) Stationery, printing and forms for the Army.

(i) Reception, accommodation and social arrangements for all foreign missions, representatives and offices.

3. In addition to the above, the Defence Co-ordination Department has immense potentialities if properly developed.

It could take over many major questions which bear directly on defence, which concern many other Departments but which are difficult to locate in any particular one. Good examples are—

“Denial” policy.
Policy of evacuation from threatened areas.
Signals co-ordination.
Economic warfare. Ends.

1 Circulated to the War Cabinet under reference W.P. (42) 149 dated 7 April.
2 No. 519.
3 Deciphered as ‘welcome’.
Ministry of Information Press Conference

L/II/1/751: ff. 339-52

The Rt. Hon. Brendan Bracken, M.P. (Minister of Information)
(in the Chair)

STATEMENT BY THE RT. HON. L. C. M. S. AMERY, M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

7 April 1942

Note taken by Treasury Reporter.

MINISTER OF INFORMATION: Gentlemen, the Secretary of State for India has very kindly come here today to give you some background on the present position of the negotiations in India. After he has made his statement he tells me he will be very glad to answer questions.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: Gentlemen, I thought it was a happy idea of Mr. Bracken’s that we should meet at this very critical moment in the development of the Indian negotiations, not from the point of view of giving you any news because that can only come from India and I can only hope it may be good news, but to give you the general background of the Government’s point of view and the genesis of our whole policy and, in the light of that background the motives and currents which will either lead to agreement or, as I am rather afraid, may lead to disagreement. As you will remember it is now something like twenty months ago that the Government issued what is known as the August 1940 Declaration, a very far-reaching Declaration as a matter of fact, which promised India full Dominion status, full and equal partnership with ourselves, as soon after the war as a constitution-making body agreed upon by Indians could meet and frame their own Constitution, subject only to two main conditions:

Provision for the due fulfilment of such obligations of ours as have arisen from our long connection with India, and subject also to the fact that the new Constitution must be by agreement and not by coercion of any important element of India’s national life.

I do not think the fullness of that Declaration was ever realised and indeed it may have suffered by a certain lack of precision which laid it open at once to the extremely suspicious Indian mind. The feeling was that we had not given sufficient precision as to what was meant by “equal partnership with ourselves”; that we had not indicated what we meant by obligations and that we had at the back of our minds the idea of using those obligations as a lever for in effect depriving them of full Dominion status, and yet again, and this was perhaps the strongest suspicion of all though entirely unwarranted, that our insistence
upon agreement was simply an excuse for postponing any sort of decision; that we did it with our tongue in our cheek knowing that Indians would not agree and indeed in the course of some eighteen months no attempt at arriving at agreement was made. We felt it was essential from the point of view of the outside world and of India that we should set those suspicions or misunderstandings at rest and the main and primary object of the proposed Declaration was to remove all possible vestige of those suspicions. It made clear in the Preamble that there was no kind of qualification or limitation upon Dominion status; that in every respect India as soon as she had framed her own Constitution was to be put on an equality with ourselves. It even made it clear in a later paragraph that nothing in any treaty between the constitution-making body and ourselves for the fulfilment of past obligations or for military assistance, for instance, if India asked for it, should be so framed as to preclude India from leaving the British Commonwealth. The thing could not be more far-reaching or more precise than that. In the same way the fulfilment of obligations, the clearing up of all matters incidental to the complete transfer of responsibility, was made not as a unilateral Declaration by the British Government, but to conserve and emphasise equality of status in treaty form in a treaty to be agreed with the constitution-making body, and no doubt negotiated concurrently with the framing of the Constitution, so that there could be no question of our holding up India’s freedom by long bargaining about points of that sort.

Then as to the question of delay, we had already made it clear that as soon as might be after the war, if Indians agreed, they should set up their constitution-making body, but again to show that we meant business we have indicated the constitution-making body which, in default of prior agreement among Indians themselves, we propose to set up at once after the cessation of hostilities; not after the technical end of the war, which might be considerably later, but after the cessation of hostilities, but only, and this is the answer to any criticism of that particular constitution-making body, this is our suggestion of what we will do if they cannot agree upon a better one. We are not compelling India to adopt this particular form of constitution-making body, but basing it as we do on the elected representatives, the Lower Houses of the Provincial Assemblies, we do at any rate indicate that we want a democratic body insofar as British India is concerned. Insofar as the States come into it, they are, subject to certain limitations, entirely self-governing and independent. They are vitally affected by what happens in India, but it would be contrary to all principles of the relations between States and communities if we were from the outside to insist that their representation was to be in any other form than the existing Governments of those States choose. They may not be democratic States, but, on the principle of the Atlantic Charter, we do not propose to enforce a Constitution upon other countries, nor could we enforce upon the Indian States any other
form of internal Constitution or of representation of their Constitution than they themselves decide upon.

Lastly, and this is perhaps the most important point, we wish to make clear that our insistence upon agreement does not mean delay by the provision which allows for the non-adhesion of Provinces which dissent from the Constitution framed by ourselves [sic]. That is really in one sense an inversion of the true position, which is that we say to the majority in India, "If you want to go ahead we are not going to hold you up indefinitely because certain parts of India do not like your Constitution; you are entitled to go ahead and frame your Union as, for instance, in the case of every Dominion a similar Federation or Union took place in the first instance of those who were willing to join. If I may remind you, the Federation of Canada began with Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

**Question:** But they were separate Colonies, were they not?

**Secretary of State for India:** They were separate Colonies.

**Question:** Is that comparable at all?

**Secretary of State for India:** Yes, it is, because when you remove the bureaucratic element, you have to have some basis upon which people come together when you have elements as different as those.

**Question:** I am humbly suggesting that they are altogether different cases. It is not a question of bringing people together, it is a question of an existing State, British India, and not of separate Colonies.

**Secretary of State for India:** They are separate over a very wide field of government. The question is whether the common element of government which is to be transferred from His Majesty’s Government to a new body is to be based on agreement or not.

**Question:** I am only humbly suggesting that it is not comparable with Australia, Canada, or South Africa, where there was no common element of government at all except the British Crown.

**Secretary of State for India:** I do not admit that at all. On the contrary, if you look back to the condition of the Canadian Colonies in the years immediately before Federation, practically all those matters which today are governed in India by the Central Government were still under the control of the Imperial Government. The Canadian Colonies enjoyed self-government, but foreign policy and defence were still in the main under the control of His Majesty’s Government. If you are to get any free Constitution in India it must be on the basis of the coming together of the main elements that make up India, and in default of devising new elements, which is rather what Mr. Jinnah suggested, the Province, which has a considerable national life of its own, is the only basis. I wonder if you read a very interesting speech made not many months ago by Sir S... Prime Minister of the Punjab, in which he laid down various points of view as to what an Indian Constitution might be
and ended by saying quite clearly "Whatever it is, it is a question of hands off the Punjab". From our point of view, the essential for progress, as in the Dominions, and I repeat this, lay in those parts of India that wished to go ahead and form a Constitution for themselves not to be held up indefinitely by the objections of others. That does not mean that in any sense we are anxious to break up that unity of India which we for the first time in history brought about and without which there will be many economic and principal [political?] difficulties facing the India of the future, but if India is to be freely governed it must be governed by consent and if we were to agree to a majority Constitution for India from which certain important Provinces at once dissented and declared themselves hostile the whole scheme would break down from the beginning, and therefore we believe that the first approach to unity in India is going to lie in Indians settling this question for themselves on the basis of being free to join or not to join. The whole difficulty of the position hitherto has been that instead of approaching it objectively, each section, and more particularly Congress, has always hoped that by using its pull here, in Parliament, in America and elsewhere, it would get us to set up a Constitution which favoured its point of view and then see that Constitution through with the help of British bayonets. From now onwards, whether these present negotiations succeed or fail, as regards immediate cooperation, it is perfectly clear to Congress and to other elements in India that they can only achieve their end and come together by dealing with each other and that it is no use trying to override other sections in India by appealing to us or putting pressure upon us. Anyhow, from our point of view, after very much consideration, we felt that this permission to stand out was the only way in which progress could be made with an Indian Constitution framed by Indians for themselves without involving the majority coercion of elements which are no more susceptible of being treated as minorities than the different nations or elements in Europe are. How fairly we have struck the balance in this matter is perhaps shown by the fact that Mr. Jinnah is very far from satisfied that this is going to give him his Pakistan. He is already frightened that the minority influence in the predominantly Moslem Provinces will be so effective and influential as to prevent the Provinces voting themselves out. I think that alone indicates how near we have come to striking a reasonable and fair balance in this matter. We believe that our proposals are as generous, as fair between the different elements, and as practicable as any proposals that could be devised. Anyhow, what we hoped was that in the light of those proposals, in the better atmosphere created, Indian political leaders would both support the British Government war effort and would be less concerned than they have been with manoeuvring for position against each other. From that point of view our invitation to them has been to participate immediately and effectively in the counsels of their country,

1 Sir Sikander Hyat Khan.
of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. By that was meant that they should be invited to occupy posts on the Viceroy’s Executive which is, of course, a corporate body and takes its decisions, as the Cabinet does, collectively, though it is subject to the overriding authority of Parliament here and of the Viceroy in such matters affecting the vital interests of India as he may decide upon. We hoped that, if they cooperated, we would give them representation on the War Cabinet here on the same footing as the representative of Australia, or on such a body as the Pacific War Council, and at the Peace Conference. In other words, that subject to the existing Constitution of India, they would be given the very widest opportunity of effectively cooperating and participating in the decisions of the Government of India. What was never contemplated and could not be carried out would be an immediate change in the fundamental Constitution of India at this moment with the enemy at the gates. After all a Government must be responsible to some organised scheme of Government. At present the ultimate responsibility for the Government of India lies in Parliament, full discussion in Parliament, and the responsibility of Ministers and the Secretary of State to Parliament and of the Government of India on ultimate issues, major issues, to the Secretary of State. Similarly, as soon as an Indian Constitution has been agreed, the Government of India of that day will be responsible to their Constitution, to its Legislature, within the terms of the Constitution. When people talk of setting up at this moment a National Government consisting entirely of Indian influential political leaders, they never face the question of whom that Government is to be responsible to, nor do they face the question that until there is agreement on the main principles of the future Government, and the criticism of our scheme shows how far we still are from agreement, you will not get agreement on the composition of any new Government. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru proposed this kind of Government responsible to itself, composed of Indian leaders, but they have never produced any indication even of the composition of that Government or of the possibilities of agreement with regard to it. Mr. Jinnah has condemned the Sapru scheme outright and declared the revolt of the Moslem League against it, and we know that the least he asks for himself under any Government of that sort is equal representation with Congress and all the Hindu elements together. There is not the slightest chance of Congress looking at that, so that from the Constitutional point of view it is not possible to set up at this moment a Government based on any new Constitutional principle, and there is also a practical point of view which more particularly centres on the issue of defence. It is not possible in practice at this moment to divest His Majesty’s Government and the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy of the responsibility for the defence of India and all that goes with defence—communications, supplies, Local Government, and so on. It is not merely that the defence of India is part of our general war against the Axis. It is that the defence of India is inextricably
and immediately bound up with the defence of Ceylon, which may become very vital in the immediate future; with the defence of Burma; with the control of the Indian Ocean. In those matters Sir Archibald Wavell is the single Commander-in-Chief over all. He must be absolutely free to move his Forces, his air and land Forces, where they are needed from the strategical point of view, and the same applies to the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Indian Ocean. Again, the Forces we have there and in the perimeter of India include, besides the Indian Army, British troops, British air forces, and, as I have said before, the Navy. Finally, the Indian Army is an historic Army voluntarily recruited, with a great tradition, but it is a tradition of loyalty to the King Emperor, and to the Commander-in-Chief, and it is by no means certain that the entrusting of defence to an Indian member of the Executive would not create the most serious difficulties within the Indian Army itself and from that point of view it would be very prejudicial and dangerous to the whole defence of India.

Therefore, the idea that you can hand over the general control of the Government of India today and, above all, control of defence to an Indian member of the Executive is really out of the question. What has been offered and what is a function of no small importance in connection with defence—of course I am talking entirely off the record now, we shall know in 48 hours or so whether that offer is acceptable or not—is a function which an Indian politician can most effectively and fittingly exercise, that of coordinating the whole business of defence with civil defence, with local government, with the work of the provinces, with the other departments of the centre, and with a good many of the functions of the Defence Department at present which do not directly affect the Commander-in-Chief’s control over the whole military machine. So far as we can possibly go in that direction we are going and we believe the offer we have made in that respect is an eminently fair one and one which, from the point of view of anyone who both wants the success of the war and in general terms accepts our pledges for the future of India, should be an acceptable offer. If it is rejected, it will not be because the post is not of real importance, but because Congress leaders will have made up their minds on general grounds to reject our scheme anyhow. It will not be because Sir Stafford Cripps and the Viceroy have been sticky and have refused to make some tolerable concession in order to bring about a big result and bring the whole mass of India right behind the Government’s war effort. It will not be that. It will be because the Congress leaders did not want agreement except on their own terms, their own terms as against the Government here, their own terms as against the Moslems, their own terms as against the rights of the Princes to decide on their own representation on any constitution-making body. The Working Committee of Congress passed a Resolution a few days ago which has not yet been published, I see that Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
said it would probably be published today or it may be tomorrow, but I think its general character has been pretty freely indicated in the Indian Press and has been telegraphed here. I think it will confirm that, if there is a breakdown, it will not be in fact on the particular issue of such defence powers as are or are not given to an Indian member of the Executive, but on Congress’s rejection of the scheme as a whole as not fitting in with its conception of its in fact rightful authority to govern India.

**Question:** Is it not the fact that the existing frontiers of some of the provinces are to a certain extent arbitrary and is it essential to your scheme that the constituents of the Constituent Assembly should be based upon existing Provinces? For example, it appears to be one of the difficulties of the Sikhs that they are inside the Punjab. Is it necessary, if you take that example, that the Punjab as a whole should be treated as a Province?

**Secretary of State for India:** It is perfectly true that the existing frontiers arose under bureaucratic conditions and did not entirely coincide with communal or racial boundaries. That is in one sense an argument encouraging the hope that the outcome of the decision will be unity and not division, but there was the further question that if you were to set up a body as quickly as possible after the war you must start with some existing method of representation and turning over the whole field we came to the conclusion that the Lower Houses of Provinces did in fact offer the most natural basis. The only criticism from India of the suggested constitution-making body, and it is only a suggestion, has come from those who have said that the whole of the Province should not form a single electorate, but that each Province should select its own delegation. The provincial spirit, however the Provinces have grown up, is a very strong thing. As I indicated just now, it is a very strong thing in the Punjab and in Bengal and in Orissa, which was definitely carved out to meet the Oriya-speaking population’s demand for a separate representation. It is I think the nearest we can get, but we have never excluded the idea that when they come down to business it may be part of the terms of compromise that there should be readjustments of boundaries. It may very well be that the Sikhs will either so effectively throw their weight in the Punjab against non-adhesion as to justify Mr. Jinnah’s fears, or that the Moslems will offer them an internal autonomy within the Punjab or a special position. They do in fact enjoy very considerable powers in the Punjab already politically, but the whole of our idea is to set up something that will bring the process of discussion and argument and practical getting together in being. I have always held the view that if you once begin on customs tariffs, telegrams, aviation, railways, with the interlocking of elements, the arguments for union are so strong that even Pakistan will recede into the background, but if you deny the Moslems the right to stand out then they harden their heart and will refuse to discuss anything. In fact I think it could not be put better than Sir Stafford Cripps put it in one of
his Press talks\textsuperscript{2} when he said "If you say to people ‘you come into the room and the door is locked behind you and the thing is settled by a majority’, then they will not come in to the room." Indeed, if we had not got the non-adhesion principle I should think it very probable certain Provinces would refuse to join the party from the start. As Sir Stafford Cripps says, "come into the room and discuss the plan in partnership and if you do not like it you can always go out by the other door" then there is no reason for not coming in.

**Question:** May I enquire if Congress accepts the plan, is it proposed to transfer from the India Office to the Dominions Office Indian affairs, or would that await the framing of the Constitution to bring it into force?

**Secretary of State for India:** I do not think there will be a question of transferring Indian affairs. In the first place, the India Office has to do a tremendous amount of work on behalf of India. I should say the bulk of the work done by the India Office at this moment concerns not the internal government of India but the multifarious demands of the Indian Army upon the Treasury and War Office and the Air Ministry for equipment of all sorts and concerns a great deal of work that is being done in India for Departments here and paid for by Departments here, all of which has to come through the same channel and requires a very considerable staff to deal with it. You could not hand over the India Office plus the Burma Office, which is also of some little importance, to a Department like the Dominions Office which has very little administrative work to do and occupies comparatively few rooms in what was the old Colonial Office building. What will be the position after the new Indian Constitution is formed I do not know. Then it would be a matter of convenience. If there was so little work then being done as not to justify a separate Department, then it might be handed over to an enlarged Dominions Office. I cannot say. At any rate, there could be no question at present of overloading the Dominions Office with the enormous burden of the work of an office which by the necessities of the case is a much bigger office both on the military and the civilian side than the Dominions Office, but of one thing I can assure you, that there is no such thing as "the dead hand of the India Office weighing on the whole administration of India". The administration of India is far too big a thing to be settled day by day in the India Office.

**Question:** Has it been possible to deduce from the Working Committee’s Resolution and from such other information as may be available whether, if arrangements acceptable to Congress as to a Defence Member can be made, they will then accept the main scheme of post-war settlement?

**Secretary of State for India:** I think you have always to distinguish a little bit between what you might call public denunciation of a thing and practical agreement. If in their heart of hearts, having passed Resolutions denouncing the scheme from various points of view, they still think it is not

\textsuperscript{2} In his broadcast; see No. 457.
so bad and they come to an agreement about the Defence Portfolio or the Portfolio that is suggested to them, then they come in and whether they publish their criticism or not it will stand on record, but it does not mean that they would come in and co-operate. As I say, what I am afraid of is that they do intend to reject the proposals as a whole and will look upon the defence question more as a tactical issue for breaking off the negotiations than as the real reason.

**QUESTION:** Do they envisage an Indian Defence Minister as a Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council as at present constituted, or as part of a new National Government during the interim period?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** I do not know. After all, there have been a great many discussions and a certain amount has been said in public. This morning’s paper attributed to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru the statement that the real question was who was boss, the Indians or the Commander-in-Chief, and implying that he thought the Indians should be boss. That is of course a fundamental issue.

**QUESTION:** On the question of the Provinces, what elasticity have you in your scheme in the case, say, of Bengal where there is a Moslem majority in Eastern Bengal? Do you contemplate that they could separate and become a separate unit?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** Bengal has numerically from the point of view of population a small Moslem majority, I think it is 54 per cent Moslem and 46 per cent Hindu. If Bengal wished to stand out, it has a population of 50 million, two and half times as much as the whole of the Dominions added together, but of course Mr. Jinnah’s fear is that the Hindu element which owns most of the industries in Bengal and therefore most of the money will be able to secure that Bengal at any rate will stand out. If it does stand out, well then it stands out for the time being. I would if I may come back to the question of Pakistan for the moment. Supposing that the worst happens, in one sense, and that the North-Western Provinces stood out, that Bengal stood out, and as is certainly probable, that a good many of the major States stood out, Allahabad [Hyderabad?] and so on, those separations running across the whole problem of India’s economic unity—railway unity and so on—will force the separate Governments to meet in some sort of standing Conference during the period. I imagine if that happens, as in the case of Burma, you will provide at any rate for three years or so that a common tariff would remain, but those Governments would have to meet to consult together and would almost certainly in the outcome frame some sort of modus vivendi constitution for their common defence and in working together. I have in mind, if those things happen, the kind of constitution that existed in the United States in the case of the seceding American Colonies between their independence and the date when they found that such a loose Confederation was so unworkable that they finally framed the present American Constitution.
It might well be that the first Constitutional scheme emerging after the liberation of India from British control would be a difficult and unworkable one because of the various elements and would lead up to closer and more effective union once the various elements felt their feet, but the beginning of the process of feeling their feet is in the Provinces, the right of saying “Will we come in or not?” That is the beginning of true independence and the true Dominion spirit.

**QUESTION**: But you do rather feel, as you express it yourself, that the proposed scheme would be difficult and unworkable?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**: Not unworkable in the sense that it would not get along somehow, but that it might lead those concerned to frame a closer scheme, again I do not call that a new scheme. The whole essence of our policy is to make Indians face the responsibility of framing a scheme for India themselves. If they can agree about a scheme then they will work it. Nobody is going to work a Constitution which has been imposed upon them against their will. We work our Constitution because we have agreed to it for centuries. There is no Constitution that cannot be made entirely unworkable if there is a considerable element that dislikes it. The British Constitution was pretty nearly wrecked by the Irish. If we had to force a majority Constitution upon India I have no doubt the Moslems would probably wreck it in the Parliamentary sense, if they did not wreck it in the military sense long before.

**QUESTION**: You say it is a thing for Indians themselves to do, but the secession clause, the right of the States to stand out, is to be dictated from here. That is not a thing for Indians to decide as to whether they will have it or will not have it.

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**: It is only another way of saying, as I put it, that we are not prepared to see any substantial part of India coerced into a majority Constitution, but on the other hand we are prepared to allow those parts of India that want to go ahead to go ahead without being held up by the others.

**QUESTION**: On the other hand, take Bengal, you say Bengal must not be coerced, if Bengal votes by 54 per cent to 46 per cent for standing out, what about the 46 per cent? Are you prepared to see them coerced into staying in Bengal? Can you get away from the coercion of minorities?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**: In all those matters, the question of self-determination is always a question of area. There was no case, by a majority vote perhaps, for the Irish Free State ever being set up. They were in an infinitesimal minority in the United Kingdom, but they felt very strongly, and they included a certain minority who would sooner not have gone out. Ulster was separated, but Ulster again included a considerable minority that would sooner have been in Eire. All you can do is to minimise the element of coercion and injustice as much as possible. What one hopes is that so large a minority in
Bengal will see to it that they persuade the majority of the advantages of unity, but we come back to the point that it is by agreement they have to go forward. I do want to make it quite clear that it is not that we are forcing this question of secession on India. What we have insisted upon is that there shall not be coercion of major elements, and in order to enable India to go ahead consistently with that pledge of ours we have said that those Provinces that wish to get ahead without certain others can go ahead. The form in which it is put in the Declaration, which is a Constitutional document, leaves the right of non-adhesion because we wanted, and Mr. Jinnah has criticised this, we wanted to correct the bias towards unity by suggesting an All-India Constitution-making Body; we might quite possibly have said that the constitution-making body should consist of such provinces as wished to come together. That would have been in a sense following the Dominion analogy even more closely, but I quite agree you must not press that analogy too far. Therefore, we have begun with a constitution-making body on which all Parties are represented, but in which the ultimate right of standing out remains with any Province that feels that this Constitution imposes an injustice upon it. What one always hopes is that in the course of the discussion during the convention the arguments of those Provinces will be met in one way or another.

**Question:** But the right of coercing the minority is not to be denied, it is to be vested in Provincial Governments?

**Secretary of State for India:** It has been reduced to a small area, that is quite true. After all, there is a limit to which you can split it up. You may have to readjust your boundaries. You may have even to create an autonomy within a Province, but at any rate in order to get a beginning you have the existing organisations. After all, in international affairs we have always taken that point of view. We have never admitted, I hope not at any rate, the German contention that Czechoslovakia had no right to its existence because there was a Sudeten minority.

**Question:** You spoke of Congress exercising pressure upon us through America. Are you referring to something that has happened recently?

**Secretary of State for India:** No. I am afraid American public opinion has been predominantly influenced by lecturers and speakers from the Congress point of view and in fact America generally has accepted the view that Congress speaks for the whole of India and that it is a simple matter to “give India what she wants”, although there is in fact no such “she” in existence or ascertainable, although we should like to see an India that could be described as “she”.

**Question:** What do you propose to do if Congress does reject the scheme, apart from putting the blame on Congress?

**Secretary of State for India:** Go ahead with the existing Government of India as it is, carry on the ordinary administration, carry on the law.
QUESTION: What about the Declaration of 1940, would that still stand?
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: Yes, and I imagine our general pledge as to the future still stands; we do not withdraw it; it remains open for acceptance later.
QUESTION: The whole scheme?
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: Yes.
QUESTION: The clarification of the 1940 Declaration?
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: The whole scheme so far as we are concerned stands because it is the best scheme we can think of, but of course it does not come into the picture any more for the moment. Cooperation during the war, if that has been rejected then we go ahead without cooperation, but our general offer for the future stands on record.
QUESTION: What I want to get at is this. If this offer is rejected, when we have to comment about it shall we be able to say that nevertheless the declarations with regard to Dominion status and so on still stand?
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: Oh, yes. We do not say, “This is our conception of how things should happen, but if you do not accept immediate cooperation the whole thing is washed out.”
QUESTION: That was rather implied in the original statement.
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: It referred to the whole thing including the important Section (e) which deals with the present. Oh, no. After all, this is only unfolding and giving precision to what we have already pledged ourselves to in 1940. If I might put it this way, if Indians had had the kind of mentality the Dominion people had, to make use of whatever is offered in order to get more, they would have said at the time of the Declaration of 1940, “Will you please give us a closer definition, does it mean, as the Balfour Declaration made it clear in regard to the Dominions, equal in every respect”, and we should have had to say “Yes”, and if they had said “From the point of view of status, these obligations you refer to, do you mean to enforce them upon us or would you be agreeable to doing it in a more favourable way?”, I think we should also have said “Very well, we are willing to consider that”, and if they had said “Our conception of a constitution-making body is one based on a Provincial Legislature”, we should have accepted that and if they had said “Can a majority of Provinces go ahead even if some Provinces do not want to cooperate?” we should have said “Yes”. There is nothing that we declare now in what we think the best way of doing it that the Indians could not have asked for for themselves as implicit or possible in the Declaration of August 1940. It is only giving it full effect and full precision to what underlay the general broad offer and the generous offer we made then. It is not so-to-speak that there has been a death-bed repentance as to the British future in India. The whole policy was there in germ, in essence, before, but it had met with suspicion and depreciation, and we thought the time had come to clear
up all those suspicions in order to secure more effective cooperation now that
the war is at India’s gate.

**QUESTION:** You said we should know within 48 hours the results of the
negotiations. Does that mean there is a time limit?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** No. What I mean is this. I believe
Sir Stafford Cripps has been meeting the Congress people today and they will
presumably either say “Yes” or “No”, or they will go back to the Working
Committee if they are inclined to continue the negotiations, and I imagine
that in a matter of something like 48 hours we shall hear. Perhaps it may be
longer, it may be 96 hours possibly, but I should think the probabilities are
we shall know in the next couple of days and that is why I thought it desirable,
when Mr. Bracken suggested it, that we should meet here to give you the whole
background and the meaning and purpose behind the British Government
policy.

**QUESTION:** We might know whether they wished to negotiate further,
but we should not necessarily know whether they had accepted the scheme
or not.

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** I think it has come to a somewhat
narrower point than that. They have passed a general resolution criticising,
not condemning but criticising, but they have also at any rate been willing to
meet Sir Archibald Wavell and Sir Stafford Cripps again to discuss this question
of whether an Indian member should be given control of some Ministry con-
ected with defence. I should think it would be pretty certain after that meeting,
whether they thought it good enough from their point of view or did not
think it good enough, although they might go through the form of consulting
their Working Committee again, I should have thought a decision one way
or another would be known pretty soon.

**QUESTION:** Is it the case that acceptance or breakdown depends upon the
single issue of the appointment of an Indian Defence Minister and not on the
question of minorities?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** I hoped I had made that clear. That
may be to some people the last straw, but if it breaks down on that point it
certainly will not be because of that; it will be because of their unwillingness
to accept the scheme as a whole.

**QUESTION:** Do the new instructions sent to Sir Stafford Cripps cover any
modifications beyond that question of a Defence Minister?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** He has had, in the details of the in-
terpretation of the clauses of the Declaration, a fairly free hand within certain
limits. I do not think I can go too closely into his instructions, but, as I have
said before, the essential responsibility of the Government of India to Parlia-
ment here and the complete control of the Viceroy and the Commander-in-
Chief over defence in all its aspects is set out quite clearly in Section (e).
QUESTION: What are you proposing to call the new Member, Member for Defence?

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: I think the question of nomenclature is one of the points that is being discussed at this moment.

QUESTION: Would you feel any great objection to calling him Defence Minister?

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: I do not know about "Defence Minister"; Minister for Defence Co-ordination perhaps, but I think you must trust Sir Stafford Cripps, as we trust him. He is a very experienced negotiator and he has staked his career, most courageously, on going out to conduct these negotiations and he is deeply anxious they should succeed, not from a personal point of view, but far more from the point of view that he is an intense believer in Indian self-government, and I think you can trust him as certainly we trust him not to omit any little device that would make things easier.

QUESTION: I was not distrusting him. I was only asking whether there was any objection over here to using the word Defence Minister. You rather suggested there was because he would only be dealing with part of defence, but we have a Secretary of State for War who only deals with part of the war, but it does not matter. It is nothing to do with not trusting Sir Stafford Cripps, but sentiment is extraordinarily important in these things.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: What I meant was that we had largely left it to him and you can be sure that if there was anything in a change of names, as long as it did not create real misunderstanding, he would adopt it.

QUESTION: He has a free hand to do that?

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: Yes.

QUESTION: Is the question of the Indian Defence Minister the only major question so far remitted by Sir Stafford Cripps for consideration by the War Cabinet?

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA: There may well be questions of other portfolios and so on, but they have not arisen yet. If there were agreement in general principle I have no doubt Sir Stafford might have to remain out there a little bit longer to discuss other possible posts in the Government, although once the general principle is settled of course it is for the Viceroy to reconstitute his own Executive Council and you cannot have somebody else forming your Government for you. What Sir Stafford Cripps has gone out to do is to settle the broad principles of agreement and in connection with that he has discussed one particular detailed point arising out of the question of Defence. If there is agreement on that then no doubt the other matters will be either discussed in general terms by him or settled by the Viceroy. I admit there are probably rather intricate questions of, for instance, if this new portfolio in connection with defence is occupied by a Hindu what will the Moslems get to balance it, or if a Moslem gets that portfolio what will the Hindus get
to balance it and all those sort of things will come into the picture if there is agreement.

**QUESTION:** Are the Americans mediating?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** Oh no. I think the last thing President Roosevelt would wish to do would be to mediate. We all know the general point of view of the Americans and their general sympathies and that America would heartily wish for an agreement, but I think "mediation" would not be the appropriate word.

**QUESTION:** There has been a good deal of speculation about that mysterious letter the President is supposed to have sent to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** I know nothing about that.

**QUESTION:** Are we to understand that what you have said is to be used only when a decision has been announced?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** Yes. I have been talking very frankly and off the record in order to give you our outlook and a background. I do not think anything I have said is suitable for quotation, but it is suitable for guidance. I have prepared something for guidance, for the use of your leader writers and others in judging of the situation when it emerges, whether successfully or unsuccessfully (hand-out circulated). If it emerges successfully and there are further developments coming along subsequently, if it should be your wish I would meet you again and have another talk.

**QUESTION:** But meanwhile nothing you have said is to be used?

**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA:** No, it is not to be used except as background for guidance.

**QUESTION:** The point arises that you have given us something that might be definite news, or might easily look like definite news, but that is not to be touched as news?

**MINISTER OF INFORMATION:** Not until Sir Stafford Cripps makes his announcement from India. The news must come from India.

We are all very much obliged to the Secretary of State for India for coming here to-day.

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3 Not printed.
543

Sir S. Cripps to Maulana Azad¹

Cmd. 6350

7 April 1942

I have as I promised when I last saw you consulted His Majesty's Government as to what further step could be taken in order to meet the criticism of your Working Committee, that under clause (e) of the draft declaration the defence of India would not fall to be administered by a representative Indian. Although, as the Working Committee have fully understood, it is impossible to make any change in the existing constitution during the period of hostilities, His Majesty's Government are anxious to give representative Indians the maximum possible participation in the Government during that period.² In accordance with the principle laid down in clause (e) of the draft declaration I have explained to you the technical difficulties with regard to the position of the Commander-in-Chief and will not here reiterate them. I have also pointed out that all those main aspects of the defence of India which at present fall under the care of other members of the Executive (e.g., civil defence, supply, home affairs, communications, etc., etc.) will, if the scheme is accepted, be administered by representative members in the new National Government. His Majesty's Government are however anxious to do their utmost to meet the wishes of the Indian people and to demonstrate their complete trust in the co-operative effort of the two peoples, British and Indian, which they hope may reinforce the defence of India. They also appreciate the force of the arguments that have been put forward as to the necessities of an effective appeal to the Indian peoples for their own defence.

I am therefore authorised to propose to you as a way out of the present difficulties that (a) the Commander-in-Chief should retain a seat on the Viceroy's Executive Council as War³ Member and should retain his full control over all the war activities of the armed forces in India subject to the control of His Majesty's Government and the War Cabinet, upon which body a representative Indian should sit with equal powers in all matters relating to the defence of India. Membership of the Pacific Council would likewise be offered to a representative Indian. (b) An Indian representative member would be added to the Viceroy's Executive who would take over those sections of the Department of Defence which can organisationally be separated immediately from the Commander-in-Chief's War Department and which are specified

¹ Sir S. Cripps transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery (via Viceroy) in telegram 930-S of 7 April, observing that he expected to receive a reply the same evening. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
² MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has no full stop here and continues up to and including the word 'declaration'.
³ 'War' omitted in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
under head (I) of the annexure. In addition this member would take over the
Defence Co-ordination Department which is at present directly under the
Viceroy and certain other important functions of the Government of India
which are directly related to defence and which do not fall under any of the
other existing departments, and which are specified under head (II) of the
annexure.

His Majesty's Government very much hope, as I personally hope, that this
arrangement will enable the Congress to come into the scheme, so that if
other important bodies of Indian opinion are also willing it will be possible
for His Excellency the Viceroy to embark forthwith upon the task of forming
the new National Government in consultation with the leaders of Indian
opinion.4

Annex I to No. 543

Matters now dealt with in the Defence Department which would be transferred
to a Defence Co-ordination Department:

(a) Public relations.
(b) Demobilisation and post war reconstruction.
(c) Petroleum officer whose functions are to calculate the requirements of
and make provision for all petroleum products required for the Army, Navy
and Air Force, and for the civil departments, including storage and distribution.
(d) Indian representation on the Eastern Group Supply Council.
(e) Amenities for and welfare of troops and their dependants including
Indian soldiers' boards.
(f) All canteen organisations.
(g) Certain non-technical educational institutions, e.g., Lawrence schools,
K.G.R.I.M. schools, and the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College.
(h) Stationery, printing, and forms for the Army.
(i) Reception, accommodation, and social arrangements for all foreign
missions, representatives, and offices.

Annex II to No. 543

In addition the Defence Co-ordination Department would take over many
major questions bearing directly on defence but difficult to locate in any par-
ticular existing departments; examples are denial policy, evacuation from
threatened areas, signals co-ordination, economic warfare.

4 [Note in Cmd. 6350] (A similar letter was sent to Mr Jinnah.)
544
Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 28

IMMEDIATE 7 April 1942, 4 pm
444. Following from Prime Minister for Sir S. Cripps. Viceroy’s telegram 919-S has crossed War Cabinet conclusion embodied in the Secretary of State’s telegram 441.2 Commander-in-Chief’s proposals are entirely within terms of paragraph 3 of that conclusion. Wish you success.

1 No. 541. 2 No. 538.

545
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

NEW DELHI, 7 April 1942, 6.30 pm
Received: 8 April, 1.30 am

No. 932–G. Following is summary of Press account of open session of All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on April 5th and 6th:

Begins. Various resolutions regarding Cripps’ proposals placed before Subjects Committee were withdrawn on Jinnah’s appeal that it was not expedient to commit League to particular course of action in view of liquid state of negotiations between Cripps and political parties.

2. Resolution was adopted with one dissentient vote authorising Jinnah till next session to take all action he might consider necessary in furtherance of objects of Muslim League and consistent with principles, policy and goal of League.

3. Session unanimously adopted resolution that committee be appointed by Jinnah to take forthwith all necessary and effective steps for protection of life, honour and property of Mussalmans in consultation with Provincial Leagues and to submit weekly report to Jinnah of steps taken.

4. Resolutions were also adopted unanimously praising Jinnah’s expulsion of Fazlul Haq from League; expressing sympathy with evacuees from Java, Burma and Malaya, and condemning those responsible for “shameful discrimination against Indian nationals”; and urging Government of India to remove all restrictions on Allama Mashriqi, lift ban on Khaksar movement, and release unconditionally all Khaksar prisoners.1 (Last resolution was moved by Jinnah.) Ends.

1 See No. 170, note 3.
Sir F. Puckle to Mr Joyce

Telegram, L/I/1/751; # ff 369–70

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

NEW DELHI, 7 April 1942, 10.30 pm

Received: 11 April, 11 pm

No. 2756. Joyce from Puckle. Your telegram 61881 April 4th. The note below deals with probable effect on war effort particularly recruiting and industrial output in event of (a) acceptance or (b) rejection of the proposals and lines which may be taken with press correspondents. Kindly inform Hennessy.

It may perhaps be assumed if Congress accept British Government’s scheme, the Muslim League in order not to be left out in the cold will also accept. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikhs are not likely to accept any scheme which permits creation of some sort of Pakistan. Advantages of this degree of settlement would be (a) cessation of constant nagging against Government which Nationalist press indulges in. This should result in steadying of, if not definite improvement in, morale in towns and of educated classes, who by and large are Nationalists. Psychological gain would be considerable. (b) Some improvement in recruiting Hindu young men particularly those qualified by status and education to be officers. (c) Greater readiness to subscribe to war loans and accept additional taxation.

The disadvantages would be: (a) probable deterioration of communal relations since Hindu Mahasabha and Sikhs would almost certainly start a raging agitation against Pakistan.

(b) Nervousness amongst Europeans and Government servants and classes which are already fully supporting war effort e.g. the Punjab. The war record of leading Congressmen does not inspire any confidence that they are not infested with “Pétainism” and many people, Indian as well as British, doubt whether a National Government in which Congress had large influence would be 100 per cent prepared to see the war through.

2. If as today seems more likely to happen the scheme is rejected the position may be something as follows: We may assume that though official attitude of League may not change the Moslem Community in general is satisfied that the scheme attempted to protect them: we can probably rely on increased cooperation from Moslems in general, as distinct from their political organisations. Hindu Mahasabha and Sikhs will be relieved that the scheme is dead for the present and there is unlikely to be any material change in their attitude towards the war effort. The Congress will be in a difficult position; the scheme gives a great deal of what they have been demanding and they will have an uneasy conscience and will have to justify their action to Congressmen, to
India and to the world. Even if we take at its face value a recent statement that Congress will maintain its policy of not embarrassing us in the conduct of the war, a policy which has sometimes been rather curiously interpreted in conduct, we can expect increased nagging and criticism of the Government.

This will inevitably still further weaken the morale in the towns and of the educated classes and may absolutely destroy it. Position as regards labour seems unlikely to be affected, and the output of munitions etc. should not fall off. In the army, at any rate so far as the old martial classes are concerned, there may be a feeling of relief at disappearance of the prospect of Congress control of the forces of the Crown, though young officers may share the depression of their civilian friends. In general, recruitment from classes which are at present offering themselves, is not likely to be affected. Extension of recruitment to other classes and recruitment for commissioned ranks may suffer. To sum up, failure of Sir Stafford Cripps’s mission will not seriously, if at all, directly affect the material side of the war effort; it will weaken the morale and encourage defeatism and to that extent indirectly affect the war effort.

3. This presupposes that rejection of the scheme will not be followed by acute communal trouble and Congress will not indulge in other than passive anti-war agitation.

I do not think communal trouble is likely. The danger is that Congress may intensify anti-war agitation to such an extent that the Government will not be able to ignore it and will be driven to “repressive” measures, amounting, may be, in places, to martial law. In circumstances such as these we must expect labour trouble, sabotage and fifth column activities—in fact a very grave menace to India’s chances of defending herself successfully. Any such deterioration is likely to coincide with air raids on Indian towns or a Japanese landing. If it ever does come to this, it will be by the deliberate wish and action of Congress.

4. Our scheme of publicity should be as follows, in case of failure:

(i) The future. We have offered everything which the nationalists have asked for: the right of secession from Empire; self-determination; constitution to be framed by Indians in a freely elected democratic body; no special protection for British business or British civil servants.

The right of non-accession may be a stumbling block in the U.S.A. It is one thing to coerce a political minority, quite another when the minority is religious. It rests with the constitution-making body i.e. with Indians to devise terms which will keep the minorities within the Union. If they cannot do this is it suggested that British bayonets should compel the minorities to stay in? The biggest, Muslims, are one third of the population of British India.

1 Enquiring what line Sir F. Puckle proposed to take with responsible correspondents if they asked for probable reactions of the Indian Army in the event of acceptance or rejection of H.M.G.’s proposals. L/1/1/751: f 376.
The States may be another stumbling block. Again it rests with the constitution-making body i.e. Indians to devise terms which will bring the States into the Union. If not, is it again suggested that Britain should break her treaties or compel the States to come in by force?

(ii) The present—what we can say here depends a good deal on what Cripps has offered but the arguments against handing over the complete control of the war effort to the interim Indian Government seem to be realised in the U.S.A.

547

Note by Mr Pinnell1 (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Diary. 7th April 1942.

At 2.45 p.m. was received a copy of a letter2 issued by Sir Stafford Cripps to the Congress President earlier in the morning. This letter, while safeguarding the position of H.M.G. with regard to the Executive Council, promises in terms the transfer of all portfolios except Defence to the representative members in the National Government. In conversation with Mr. Turnbull at 3.20 I gathered that the use of this phrase was quite deliberate although, in fact, the letter had been handed over to the Maulana Saheb before H.E.’s letter3 arrived this morning.

In the afternoon news was brought to H.E. by the C.-in-C. that Colonel Johnson, the U.S. President’s representative, had made a suggestion that if the defence formula were put in a modified form, Nehru, though not sure of success, would have a try at getting the working committee to accept it. The formula was to the following effect:

Instead of making a new “Defence” Department and giving it the Defence Co-ordination section and certain functions from the present Defence Department, let a representative Indian take over the existing Defence Department but transfer to the War Department (of which the C.-in-C. will be the Member in charge) any powers (functions?) that H.M.G. desire the C.-in-C. as War Member to retain.

The snag in this formula appeared to be that anything which we did not now specify in the list as transferred to the C.-in-C. as War Member might never be got hold of later. The formula clearly required departmental examination, and this was undertaken by Mr. Hodson in consultation with Mr. Ogilvie and Sir George Spence. Meantime Sir Stafford Cripps sent a further formula which was also examined and found not to be satisfactory, although it appeared to get over the difficulty referred to above. As a result of further examinations
and discussions, Mr. Ogilvie, Mr. Hodson and P.S.V., after obtaining H.E.'s general directions, saw Sir Stafford Cripps and his staff late at night, and after a full appreciation of the difficulties on both sides a formula was evolved which was accepted by H.E., and ran as follows:

(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in charge of a representative Indian Member, with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Executive Council.

(b) A War Department will be constituted which will take over such functions of the Defence Department as are not retained by the Defence Member. A list of all the retained functions has been agreed, to which will be added further important responsibilities including the matters now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department and other vital matters related to the Defence of India.

This was to be delivered by Sir Stafford Cripps' staff to Colonel Louis Johnson in the early morning of Wednesday, 8th, and was to be handed by Colonel Johnson to Nehru as his suggestion. The result would be that—

(a) if the Congress decided to come in on this formula it would come as a suggestion from them for our approval; and

(b) if the Congress were not coming in even on this formula the formula sent to them in Sir Stafford Cripps' letter to Abul Kalam Azad would remain as the only offer made by H.M.G.

1 Presumably by Mr Pinnell, though this portion of the Diary is unsigned.
2 No. 543. A footnote in the Diary states: 'A copy of this letter was also sent by Sir S. C. to Mr. Jinnah.'
3 Not printed.

548

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

INDIA OFFICE, 7 April 1942

Received: 8 April

No. 20-U. If the negotiations over defence result in agreement the question of reconstituting your Council will immediately arise. You have no doubt discussed with Cripps and I fully appreciate that throughout this difficult business you and he have been in closest co-operation. But of course responsibility rests with you, subject to my concurrence, and it is important that there should be no obscuring of the constitutional position. The Prime Minister shares my view on this and does not intend that Cripps should stay as suggested in paragraph 27 of No. 890-S.1

1 No. 519.
2. In the event of agreement I should be glad of earliest indication of what changes you have in contemplation for example as to retention of European or other members of your existing executive in present or other posts, more particularly whether you have considered giving Finance as well as new Defence Co-ordination portfolios to Indian political leaders, or what proportions you have in mind as between communities. Equally in event of failure I should be glad to know whether new situation has in any way modified your previous plans as to executive.

549

Viscount Halifax to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

WASHINGTON, 7 April 1942

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL

No. 2019. If Cripps’ discussions fail, it has been suggested to me by friends here that it would be of great value for United States of America public opinion if he could return this way and explain situation with authority that only he could command. Perhaps this may be impossible but I entirely concur in estimate of value and hope it may be considered.

Addressed to Foreign Office.

550

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICE ROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 7 April 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

As I write we are still in the throes of Cripps’ endeavours to persuade Nehru and the Working Committee to accept the offer. The moves and counter-moves which fill our days will be stale news to you by the time you receive this letter, and I will therefore forbear for the moment from any attempt to describe these in detail. The Lord Privy Seal keeps his temper and keeps his heart up in very praiseworthy fashion, and if he fails in the end no one will be able with any truth to suggest the responsibility will be in any way his.
2. Colonel Louis Johnson, Roosevelt's personal representative who arrived last week, stayed with us for three days before moving into his own house. He is a very pleasant fellow and evidently of good calibre. I am glad to tell you that he tells me that he is very favourably impressed by our war effort and much delighted by the way in which the whole position has been prepared in advance for him and the rest of the American Technical Mission. The credit for this must go largely to Jenkins whose clear head and high capacity are fortified by large experience in getting together materials for previous Missions. Johnson has, ever since his arrival, been dabbling in the constitutional affair and has, I think, succeeded in very considerably increasing the pressure upon the Working Committee in favour of accepting the offer. He has told them in very plain language that, unless they play up now and go on playing up about this war, they will lose every friend they have in the United States for two generations. But however helpful he may be, and may yet be, I do not altogether like the principle of anybody in his position concerning himself too closely with detailed negotiations between His Majesty's Government and Indian politicians, and I shall be relieved if we get through this business without some misunderstanding or confusion arising on account of Johnson's activities and perhaps on the part of the President himself.

[Para. 3, on the Pir of Pagaro, omitted.]

4. Our news at the moment is bad and the sea position thoroughly unsatisfactory. As far as I can see there is only one method of successfully countering the enemy's command of these waters, and that is the provision in India of a sufficient number of heavy bombers to make his ships uncomfortable in the Bay of Bengal and the immediate waters to the west of this sub-continent. I confess, I do, find it very difficult to believe that the concentration of virtually the whole of our heavy bombing force for use on the Continent and in raids which involve us in casualties of the order of 5 per cent. of the bombers flown in any one night's operations is a wise policy, having regard to our commitments elsewhere in the world and the immense strain upon our naval resources. I cannot but feel, having watched them for a good many years, that the "brass hats" of the Air Ministry are a little inclined to work in a closed compartment and fail to take due account of the general strategic position in disposing of their available forces.

5. This is no more than a brief line dictated at a time of very heavy pressure. I only hope that by next Tuesday we may know where we stand one way or the other, for the uncertainty as to the outcome of Cripps' Mission is beginning seriously to disturb the nerves of the various minorities, and I fear unfortunate consequences if things are not brought to a conclusion pretty soon.

   All luck.
551

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

8 April 1942

No. 943–G. Following is summary of speech made by Jawaharlal Nehru at mass meeting in Delhi on April 7th, as reported in Hindustan Times without Press advice:

Begins. It would be premature to say anything about Cripps mission till Congress Working Committee resolution was published. India’s problem had suddenly become world problem. Head of Chinese State expressed himself in unmistakable terms on question of India’s freedom; 1 United States envoy in New Delhi was also taking interest in matter. There was no representative of Soviet Russia in New Delhi though Russia was Britain’s Ally and alone had done actual real fighting in this war. Government of India did not seem to have realised yet that a war was going on. They did not allow any Russian in India. Government of India were incapable of defending this country and were not allowing Indians to defend it. Germany and Japan were also deeply interested in India’s question as evinced by daily broadcasts in Hindustani; they had been warning Indians against settlement with Britain.

2. Solution of India’s problem would affect whole world. Old slogans would not do. Their attitude should be determined solely by consideration of what was based on interest of India’s freedom; they wanted freedom for world, but that would be meaningless unless it meant freedom for India also. Congress had never hidden sympathy with democracies and had raised voice against Hitlerite Germany since it embarked on policy of conquest. They were equally opposed to system that enslaved India. They could not help democracies until freed from shackles of foreign domination. British Imperialism, despite its ramifications, was considerably weakened; it was no longer a first class power and could never survive the war. Declarations regarding constitutional status of India had very little value for uncertain future. Value was only for the present.

3. Their sympathy with Russia and China was genuine. Fall of Russia would be major calamity for world. It would be utterly foolish to desire Russian defeat simply because Britain was on Russia’s side. Russia, China and America would play leading part in construction of post-war world. Bombing of Indian coastal cities should not frighten them. They could not reconcile themselves to foreign domination, or be mere spectators of game of Japanese troops fighting British, Chinese and American troops on their sacred soil. Some people said he (Nehru) was foolishly and unnecessarily antagonising Japanese and
Germans and should keep silent if he could not speak well of Japanese; he rejected such advice, which was based on fear, with contempt. He had no enmity with Japan or Japanese who had done many good things for their country. He had sympathy with them till they made unprovoked attack on China. Japanese were not coming to India at his invitation; he thought it his duty to fight them, and was not prepared to be a mere spectator. Past history of India discredited slogan that Japanese were coming to India to liberate them. Whether Indians came to settlement with British Government or not, they would fight any invading army; it was more dignified and honourable for India to go down fighting with soul intact and hope of rising again. Even if Cripps’ talks failed it did not mean they would not come to settlement later. It would be great misfortune if India fell victim to any aggressor without a fight. “Mighty empires have fallen in recent months. It will not be strange if India shares same fate, but we will have satisfaction of fighting for cherished ideal and will have firmly laid foundation of India’s freedom.” Ends.

1 No. 173.

552

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 27

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

452. Superintendent Series. Following for Lord Privy Seal. Your telegram of 7 April 930–S.¹ In your talk to Press on Thursday² would you find it possible to correct bad publicity effect which is to be apprehended from arrangement of contents of Annex. Functions of Defence Co-ordination give real power and wide responsibility but as result of being placed in Part II are over-shadowed by details in Part I some of which are important but some look de minimis and derisory. Similar effect results from words in body of letter “In addition” introducing mention of Defence Co-ordination.

¹ See No. 543, note 1. ² 9 April.
Note by the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Note of a conversation between H.E. and Sir Stafford Cripps on 8th April 1942.

I saw Cripps at 10 p.m., having asked Colonel Louis Johnson to come to Viceroy's House at 10.15 p.m.

I told Cripps I had not had time to examine the formula1 brought me from him by Mr. Hodson. Nor had my advisers had time fully to examine it. I must therefore be regarded as speaking informally. I thought I should have difficulty in accepting paragraph (d) which secures to H.M.G. the decision as to the allocation of disputed subjects as between the Defence and War Departments. I thought this a serious invasion of the Governor-General's powers in allocating functions to Departments. I would have to see what my people thought about this. Cripps replied that he understood my position and that I would require time to examine the formula. As to (d) he himself took the view that since the bargain was one between H.M.G. and parties in India, it was better that H.M.G. should decide disputes, if only because Congress would suspect the Viceroy of being biased in favour of the Commander-in-Chief.

I said that I was myself nervous about the list of functions to go to the War Department unless the opposite list (that of the functions to be left with the Defence Member) was also to find a place in the formula. But there were probably other matters in which I might find difficulty which would emerge on fuller examination of the language. Sir Stafford then said that he thought Congress would come in on this formula and Johnson had gathered that from them. I asked how Congress had come to know about this formula. Cripps replied that Johnson had shown it to them, but that they had not got it. I at once protested against Congress having been shown the draft, and said that the fact that Johnson had shown it to them made the position all the worse, given the U.S.A. position in the business. If I were now to differ from the draft, my position might well be rendered intolerable, as I ran the risk of being held up to the U.S.A. as the obstacle to a settlement.

Cripps then said that matters had reached a climax in which something had to be done about it and generally glossed over the incident.

Johnson then came in.

I put a point to Sir Stafford and Colonel Johnson as follows. Suppose for the sake of argument that Congress felt the need of a supreme effort to recover their propaganda position in the U.S.A., what would they do? Surely, they would try to interest Colonel Johnson and if possible so to work things as to emphasize...
the difference between what Johnson thought good and reasonable but what
the British thought unsound—stressing the point that the U.S.A. who were
going to send supplies and arms and their own sons to India to fight for India
were just as much interested in the soundness of the picture in India as any
Britisher. So it would be claimed the fault must lie on the British side. I was
not, I said, prejudiced in favour of this theory, but it was a possibility that they
ought to watch closely. The evidence for it is—

(a) Nehru calls on Colonel Johnson uninvited,
(b) a cartoon appears in Hindustan Times depicting President Roosevelt
stepping in to help Sir Stafford in his task of solving the deadlock,
(c) a headline appears “Will America intervene in time?”
(d) a promoted telegram goes to U.S.A. from the United Press to say that
agreement has been reached and that Sir Stafford and Colonel Johnson have
approved. Colonel Johnson had tried to stop the telegram but someone had
arranged to the contrary.

The indications were not enough to constitute even a probability, but it
was worth watching closely.

Sir Stafford said that he had spotted this possibility the previous evening and
was terrified of Congress coming back on the annexure to last night’s formula²
(i.e., the formula based on the list of powers to be held by the Defence
Minister) and offering to agree if “recruiting” were added to the list of subjects
to be given to the new Defence Minister. If so both the Viceroy and he himself
in the House of Commons would have found it most difficult to justify a
refusal on our part to give way on that one point, since its significance would
not be understood either at home or in the U.S.A.

Colonel Johnson then said that the Congress was going to settle, and on this
formula.

I enquired when they were going to consider the new formula. Colonel
Johnson replied “tonight—they are on it now—the formula on which I agreed
with Sir Stafford Cripps this evening”.

Colonel Johnson then left with Sir Stafford. I called Sir Stafford back alone.
I made a further and direct complaint about the manner in which I and the
Commander-in-Chief had been passed over. We had neither of us had any
opportunity of examining the formula before it had been shown to Colonel
Johnson and to the Congress Working Committee. Cripps said that the situ-
ation was getting hot and he had had to do something. Hodson had seen the
formula (Mr. Hodson has since said that the document was only in his hands for a
few minutes and that he certainly did not commit anyone to it). I remarked
that Mr. Hodson was not the Governor-General and that the Commander-in-
Chief had not seen it.

Sir Stafford replied that the list of subjects for the War Department was my

¹ See Nos. 557, para. 1 (b) and 559.
² See Nos. 547, 557, para. 1 (a) and 558.
own list (referring to a list included in a different formula\(^3\) drafted by Messrs. Hodson and Ogilvie).

I pointed out that this did not justify presenting it to Congress in changed trappings.

Concluding the conversation I observed that I did not base myself on any matter of dignity but would found myself on the merits of the formula as it had been shown to Congress, and on the best opinion I could form about it after consulting my advisers.

\(^3\) Not printed.

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**554**

*Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery (via Viceroy)*

**Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22**

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

**NEW DELHI, 8 April 1942, 9.35 pm**

**Received: 8 April, 7.15 pm**

No. 948-S. Following from Sir S. Cripps, United Press message sent today reporting agreement between Colonel Johnson and Nehru on defence issue is untrue. Please take urgent steps to prevent publicity in conjunction with M.O.I.

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**555**

*(Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow)*

**Extract**

**MSS. EUR. F. 125/42**

**GOVT. HOUSE, CALCUTTA, 8 April 1942**

6. *Political.* The decision of Stafford Cripps to prolong his stay in India has revived expectancy: prior to that the general tone of the press indicated a belief that his mission had failed. The attitude of the Forward Bloc newspapers in Bengal, the *Amrita Bazar* and *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, has been most objectionable, since it has been deliberately designed to emphasise the futility of the proposals, and to suggest that the country must look rather to the Bose brothers for its freedom. The Hindu Mahasabha appears to have definitely rejected the proposals, and thus emphasised that Party’s attitude that it will be content with nothing but Hindu rule. Information recently received indicates that the Mahasabha would be prepared to go to the length of invoking any outside power to attain their object, and suggests that this Party may prove to be the
most strongly pro-Japanese. It considers—so this information states—that if Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru were to be placed in charge of the defence of India, that would be regarded as tantamount to a surrender to the British proposals, and that the Mahasabha would have to fight Congress over that issue. There is no pleasing some people.

556

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via War Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 24

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

953—S. For Prime Minister from Sir Stafford Cripps.

Largely owing to very efficient and wholehearted help of Col. Johnson, President Roosevelt’s personal representative, I have hopes scheme may now succeed.

I should like you to thank the President for Col. Johnson’s help on behalf of H.M.G., and also personally on my own behalf.

557

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

9 April 1942

No. 956—S. Constitutional position. Latest developments are as follows:

(a) After discussion with Cripps and Wavell on evening of 7th April,¹ formula given in my immediately following telegram² was agreed as one to be taken by Colonel Johnson as his suggestion to Nehru today and to be re-submitted as Congress suggestion if they agreed. This was consequent on representation made by Johnson to Wavell that if Defence formula could be produced in a modified form, there was some chance of its acceptance by Nehru.

(b) I tonight (8th April) at 10.00 p.m. saw first Cripps and thereafter Cripps and Johnson together.³ I made the point that the latest Congress manoeuvres might well be designed to drive wedge between His Majesty’s Government and U.S.A. Johnson replied that he had reason to believe Congress were prepared to accept latest formula, as agreed between Cripps and himself, and were

¹ See No. 547.  
² No. 558.  
³ See No. 553.
actually now examining it. Text of formula which had been sent to me and to
the Commander-in-Chief at 7.15 p.m. tonight as being one which Cripps
thought a satisfactory redraft of one propounded to Johnson by Nehru but of
course without any indication that it was to be taken back to the Congress
until Wavell and I had considered it, is contained in my telegram No. 958-S.4
As you will see it differs in vital particulars from text referred in (a) above.
Cripps (after Johnson had left) admitted that he had let this formula go to
Congress on the ground that situation had got hot and something had to be
done and endeavoured to gloze it over. After Johnson had left I said I would
not conceal my own strong feeling of grievance, though that could not be
paramount in any way, but I must reserve judgment until I had seen the Chief,
which I will do on the morning of the 9th April.

2. I refrain at this stage from comment on the formula save to say that its
restrictive character will be evident. Paragraph (d), drafted by Cripps, cuts
across of course position of the Governor-General.

3. On tactics, public interest must be paramount, and no feeling of personal
grievance can be allowed to count. Nor do I raise issue of its consistency with
instructions of War Cabinet. If Wavell is content to accept this formula, I will
work it with all the strength I can, and do my best with it. That is equally true
of any modified version (I need not trouble you with drafting amendments
which might improve matters) which Wavell proposes and we can secure (if
Wavell is unable to accept, I will of course back him), for we cannot run the
risk of the Governor-General, the Chief and His Majesty’s Government being
shown as unwilling to honour a formula agreed between His Majesty’s Govern-
ment’s emissary and Roosevelt’s personal representative, if that formula secures
the support not only of Congress but of the Muslim League (who have not
yet been brought into this latest development, and whose attitude I cannot speak
for), I assume that that will be the wish of the Cabinet and would welcome
earliest possible instructions.

4 No. 559.
558

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 9 April 1942, 3.47 am
Received: 9 April, 2.45 am

No. 957–S. Following is formula referred to in paragraph 1 (a) of my most immediate telegram No. 956–S¹ of April 9th:

Begins. In amplification of the Clause (e) of the draft declaration His Majesty’s Government make the following proposition upon the subject matter of the Defence of India.

(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in charge of a representative Indian Member, with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Executive Council.

(b) A War Department will be constituted which will take over such functions of the Defence Department as are not retained by the Defence Member. A list of all the retained functions has been agreed, to which will be added further important responsibilities including the matters now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department and other vital matters related to the Defence of India. Ends.

List referred to in (b) was substantially identical with that given in my most immediate telegram No. 919–S² of 6th April.

¹ No. 557. ² No. 541.

559

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 9 April 1942, 3.45 am
Received: 9 April, 2.45 am

No. 958–S. Following is text of Cripps-Johnson formula referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of my most immediate telegram No. 956–S¹ of 9th April:

Begins. (a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member, but certain functions relating to the conduct of the war will be exercised, until the new constitution comes into operation, by

¹ No. 557.
the Commander-in-Chief, who will be in control of the war activities of the armed forces in India, and who will be a member of the Executive Council for that purpose.

(b) A War Department will be constituted under the Commander-in-Chief. This Department will take over such functions as are to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief. A list of such functions has been prepared and is attached.

(c) The Defence Member shall be in charge of all other matters relating to Defence in the Defence Department and those now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department in addition to other important matters closely related to Defence.

(d) In the event of any new functions falling to be discharged in relation to Defence or any dispute arising as to the allocation of any old functions it shall be decided by His Majesty’s Government. 

Following is list referred to in (b) above:

Begins. The War Department, for which the Commander-in-Chief will be Member, will be responsible for the governmental relations of G.H.Q., N.H.Q., and A.H.Q. which include—

(1) Examining and sanctioning all proposals emanating from G.H.Q., N.H.Q. and A.H.Q.

(2) Representing the policy of Government on all questions connected with the war which originate in or concern G.H.Q., N.H.Q. or A.H.Q.

(3) Acting as the channel of communication between the Government of India and His Majesty’s Government on all such questions.

(4) Acting as liaison between these Headquarters and the other Departments of Government, and Provincial Governments. 

2 Deciphered as ‘re-established’. 3 Decipher has ‘at Simla’ after ‘Department’.

560

Minute by Sir D. Monteath

L/PO/6/106c: f 26

S[ecretary of] S[tate]

Points which seem to require elucidation are:

(1) The Viceroy (956–S2–para. 2) describes the formula in 958–S as “restrictive”. In form it is, since it specifies the functions allotted to the C. in C. and leaves everything else, falling within the scope of “Defence”, to the Indian Defence Member. In fact, the formulae in items 1 to 3, at any rate, are so
comprehensive in relation to “all questions connected with the war” that there seems to be very little that is certainly excluded from the C. in C. and so given to the Def[ence] Member.

(2) The phrase “governmental relations” is obscure. If it means functions other than those given effect within the Army, Navy or Air Force by executive order by the competent authority i.e. functions bearing upon those falling to be discharged by Dep[artmen]ts of the G[overnment of] I[ndia], the functions of the 3 Headquarters are to originate (as well as execute so far as the Service machine is competent) all matters affecting the 3 Services except administration of cantonments, ecclesiastical affairs and Indian Soldiers’ (welfare) Board.

Para. 2 therefore leaves it to the C. in C. to represent the “policy of Government” on practically everything affecting the three services provided that they are connected with the war. In relation to financial provision it would seem that it will rest with the C. in C. to represent part of the requirements to the Legislature and with the Def[ence] Member to represent a part.

It is the function (under para. 1) of the C. in C.’s War Dep[artmen]t to sanction all proposals which do in fact emanate from one or other H.Q. Is there anything to prevent the Indian Member’s Def[ence] Dep[artmen]t from originating rival proposals—e.g. the recruitment of men for “Home Guard” as distinct from the Regular Forces? or is this barred by the C. in C.’s “control of the war activities of the armed forces in India”?

(3) The first three lines of para. (d) seem to entail an amendment of S[ection]s 40 and 41 of the Ninth Schedule of the Act\(^3\) since they dispossess the G[overnor] G[eneral] of his function of allocating business and resolving disputes in Council. Incidentally the bringing in of H.M.G. direct for the solution of a dispute violates S. 313 of the Act which provides that the executive authority in India is vested in the Governor-General in Council. This appears to be a fundamental constitutional change.

D. T. M.

\(^1\) Namely in No. 559. \(^2\) No. 557. \(^3\) Government of India Act 1935.
561

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 9 April 1942, 2.15 am

No. 20–U. My telegram No. 956–S¹ gives you the latest developments. You can imagine my own feelings, but they are neither here nor there, and if Wavell is able to accept this or some modified form and the Cabinet approve, they can look for my wholehearted support while I remain here in working the formula whatever my view may be as to its wisdom or practicability. But Cabinet will recognise that while I will do my utmost, and fully recognise the paramount importance of the war² situation and our relations with United States, which must be decisive, responsibility for any working difficulties does not rest with me.

¹ No. 557.
² The text in MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 ends at this point; the remainder is taken from the India Office decipher in R/30/1/1: ff 11–2.

562

Note by Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

9th April 1942

The Commander-in-Chief having considered the formula¹ presented by Sir Stafford Cripps on the evening of the 8th, and a note² of a conversation between His Excellency, Sir Stafford Cripps and Colonel Johnson, came to see His Excellency at 11 a.m. Certain modifications which he regarded as essential were made in the formula. It was specifically mentioned to the Commander-in-Chief that upon the formula as it originally stood there would be considerable doubt whether internal security functions remained with the Commander-in-Chief or passed to the Defence Member. It was also pointed out that unless the formula was amended specifically to deal with the point, the new Government could claim that the raising of a Militia and arming it with any arms that they can get under their control, e.g., civil arms, would be a matter for departments other than the War Department. It was added however that even with the formula as now revised there would be nothing to prevent the new Government in the Home or Defence Department from raising forces which would in fact be identical with the Militia and claiming any available arms for their use. The Commander-in-Chief was ready to accept the formula as amended.
His Excellency saw Sir Stafford Cripps at 12.15 p.m. Sir Stafford Cripps told His Excellency that Colonel Johnson said that the Congress were going to accept on last night's formula. His Excellency gave Sir Stafford Cripps a copy of the amendments suggested and asked him kindly to get these changes made for the Commander-in-Chief himself. Sir Stafford Cripps observed that in that case he must pretend they were mere drafting amendments. His Excellency stated that he could not say whether the Commander-in-Chief would consent to any variation of the formula now handed to Sir Stafford Cripps until the Commander-in-Chief had seen it, and His Excellency personally, as he had not seen Sir S. Cripps' draft of last night before it was handed to Congress, could accept no responsibility. Sir S. Cripps agreed that this was the position.

L. G. PINNELL,—9.4.42.

1 No. 559. 2 No. 553.

563

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 22

MOST IMMEDIATE

IO DOWNING STREET, 9 April 1942, 11.10 am

PERSONAL AND SECRET

455. Superintendent Series. Following from Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal. Please repeat to Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.

Begins. Cabinet will study your latest formula¹ immediately. Meanwhile you must not commit us in any way, as at first sight it seems most difficult to understand. Before coming to any decision we must of course have the independent and unprejudiced opinions of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. Ends.

¹ See No. 559.
564

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via War Office and Commander-in-Chief, India)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 43

MOST IMMEDIATE. CLEAR THE LINE 9 April 1942, 1.20 pm

PERSONAL

184. Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal. Please repeat to Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. Your 953-S.1 Colonel Johnson is not President Roosevelt’s personal representative in any matter outside the specific mission dealing with Indian munitions and kindred topics on which he was sent. I feel sure President would be vexed if he, the President, were to seem to be drawn into the Indian constitutional issue. His message2 to me, just received from Mr. Hopkins, who is with me as I write, was entirely opposed to anything like U.S. intervention or mediation.

1 No. 556. 2 This message has not been traced in the Prime Minister’s Office.

565

War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 13th Meeting

L/PO/6/106c: f 21

Those present at this meeting held in Mr Attlee’s Room, 11 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on 9 April 1942 at 11 am were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir John Anderson, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Major-General Lockhart, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

The Committee met to give preliminary examination to telegrams Nos. 956–S,1 957–S2 and 958–S,3 from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, in preparation for the meeting of the War Cabinet to be held at 12 Noon.

The points which emerged from this examination were raised at the Meeting of the War Cabinet and are recorded in the Minutes of that body (W.M. (42) 45th Conclusions).4 No separate record of the Committee’s discussion is therefore necessary.

1 No. 557. 2 No. 558. 3 No. 559. 4 No. 566.
The War Cabinet had before them the following telegrams: 956-S, 957-S and 958-S from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India.

The second of these telegrams set out a revised formula in regard to defence, which, after discussion between the Viceroy, the Lord Privy Seal and the Commander-in-Chief, had been taken by Colonel Johnson, as his own suggestion, to Pandit Nehru. The third telegram contained a further revised formula, which had also been sent to Congress, but before the Viceroy or the Commander-in-Chief had had an opportunity of seeing it.

The following points were made in regard to these formulae:

(i) Both formulae gave a changed emphasis to the division of duties between the Commander-in-Chief and the proposed new Defence Minister, since both took the form of assigning to the Defence Minister all defence functions other than those specifically assigned to the War Department to be set up under the Commander-in-Chief.

(ii) It was explained that the General Headquarters, Naval Headquarters and Air Headquarters in India (which were within the sphere of the proposed War Department) included all the work which was done by the Military Branches of the three Service Departments in this country, but excluded the Secretariat and Finance Department.

(iii) It thus seemed that, so far as concerned the actual functions to be assigned to the War Department under the Commander-in-Chief, there was no very substantial difference between the two formulae, but there were a number of doubtful points.

(iv) For example, it was not clear whether, under the latest formula, the Commander-in-Chief would have authority to give final sanction to proposals within the general financial provision made for the Services, or whether the Defence Minister would have power to veto any proposal on financial grounds.

(v) Exception was also taken to the phrase in (a) of telegram 958-S, that the Commander-in-Chief would be in control of the war activities of the armed forces in India, and would be a member of the Executive

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1 No. 537.  2 No. 557.  3 No. 558.  4 No. 559.
Council for that purpose. It was important to make clear that, like other members, he remained a member of the Council for all purposes.

(vi) Objection was seen to the suggestion in paragraph (d) of this telegram that, in the event of any new functions falling to be discharged in relation to defence, or any dispute as to allocation of old functions, the decision should rest with His Majesty’s Government.

(vii) The language used in regard to the division of functions between the War Department and the Defence Department was felt to be somewhat derogatory to the Commander-in-Chief and open to misconstruction. It was undesirable to agree to a formula which, when published, would lead to questions to elucidate the real position. Would it not be more satisfactory to say that the present Defence Department was to be divided between a War Department and a Defence Department, and to state what functions were to be assigned to each.

(viii) No decision could be reached in regard to these questions of defence until the Commander-in-Chief’s views were known. But the War Cabinet should, in the meantime, despatch a telegram in order to clear up the above points.

On the more general issues, the intervention of Colonel Johnson, the President’s personal representative, was regarded as unfortunate.

The Prime Minister read to the War Cabinet the text of two Personal telegrams which he had sent to the Lord Privy Seal (T. 550/2 and 551/2). In these telegrams he had explained that Colonel Johnson was not the President’s personal representative in any matter relating to Indian Constitutional issues, but had been sent out to deal with questions relating to military matters and supplies. He had also asked that the Lord Privy Seal should not commit us in any way to the latest formula until the War Cabinet had studied the matter and had communicated with him.

Generally, it was felt that we were in danger of being drawn away from the clear position which had been explicitly stated in the terms of the Declaration. It was not easy to envisage as a whole the stages by which the present position had been reached, and the War Cabinet felt that it would be desirable to call a halt and to obtain a clear statement of the developments proposed under heading (e) of the Declaration, which dealt with steps to be taken to ensure the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country.

In particular, certain phrases had been used—as, for example, in the letter from the Lord Privy Seal to Azad (telegram 930–S)—which seemed to contemplate handing over a number of important portfolios in the Viceroy’s Council to representative Indians. If it was contemplated that all the members of the Viceroy’s Council would be Indians, this would put the Viceroy into an impossible position. In theory he would have the power to override his
Council; but what would his position be if all the members of the Council were opposed to him? Furthermore, how could he carry on the Government unless there were some member or members who could act as his spokesman in the Legislature? The proposal that a representative Indian should be put in charge of the Home Department also raised difficult questions in regard to the Secret Service. Again, if the whole of the Viceroy’s Council was to be composed of Indians, this would almost certainly result in the Moslem League refusing to participate unless they were given half the seats.

Finally, it was important to bring the matter back to the plan approved by the War Cabinet, and to obtain an assurance that, if agreement was reached on defence, the scheme in other respects was acceptable.

The War Cabinet:

Agreed to the text of two telegrams embodying the above points, and authorised the Secretary of State for India to arrange for their despatch. (Note: These were later despatched as Telegrams No. 456 and 457 from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy.)

5 Nos. 563 and 564. The numbers quoted are those of the Prime Minister’s Office.
6 See No. 543, note 1.
7 Namely the Intelligence Bureau, Home Department, Government of India.
8 No. 567. 9 No. 568.

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War Cabinet to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 16

MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET. PERSONAL

456. Superintendent Series. Following for Lord Privy Seal from War Cabinet:

War Cabinet deeply sympathises with difficulties of your task, but it is greatly concerned to find that latest formula was propounded to Nehru and to Working Committee without previous knowledge and approval of Viceroy and Wavell. There is also grave danger that Johnson’s public intervention may be misunderstood as representing action on behalf of U.S. Government, which of course is not the case.

2. It is essential to bring the whole matter back to Cabinet’s plan which you went out to urge, with only such amplifications as are agreed to be put forward.

3. The most practical course would be to have from you in clear and continuous1 form, the developments in or under (e) which the Viceroy, the

1 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has ‘vivid’.
Commander-in-Chief and yourself are propounding, so that the Cabinet can see the position as a whole.

4. It is also necessary to know what is meant by allusions to a National Government as though the members of it would all be Indians.

5. We have not received any assurance that if agreement was reached on defence, the scheme in all other respects is acceptable.

6. Following telegram raises some questions on 958-S\(^2\) on which we have as yet no clear information.

\(^2\) No. 559.

568

War Cabinet to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: ff 14–5

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL, MOST SECRET

457. Superintendent Series. Following for Lord Privy Seal from War Cabinet: Viceroy’s telegram No. 958–S.\(^1\) Following points need to be definitely cleared up—

(1) Last line of (a) “for that purpose”. We presume Commander-in-Chief remains member of Council for all purposes like all other members, and that the phrase above only refers to his special *raison d’être*. This must be quite clear.

(2) First sentence of (d) appears completely to side-track position of Viceroy and Government of India and if so is clearly unacceptable. The decision should be by Viceroy.

(3) Does “sanctioning” under (d) (t) cover authority to give final sanction to proposals within general financial provision made for services or does it give to the finance branch under the Defence Minister power to veto any and every proposal on financial grounds.

(4) Generally speaking the whole document is obscure and couched in terms derogatory to the Commander-in-Chief’s position. If the scheme is acceptable to Commander-in-Chief in substance, would it not be much better to say clearly that the present Defence Department is to be divided between a War Department and a Defence Department and explicitly define the functions\(^2\) assigned to each.

\(^1\) No. 559. \(^2\) MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has ‘defined functions’.
569

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 13

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

459. Superintendent Series. Paragraph 2 of your telegram 956-S. Following points have occurred to me since Cabinet discussion this morning: (1) In description of War Department’s functions words “war activities of armed forces” and “questions connected with the war” might be read as excluding raising and employment of troops for such purposes as internal security in Provinces and States and thus enabling Defence Department to raise and control separate Forces?

(2) You no doubt appreciate that (d) in No. 958-S would entail amendment of Sections 40 and 41 of Schedule 9 as well as violating Section 313.5

(3) Is it contemplated that Governor-General’s power to certify budget for War Member will be preserved?

1 No. 557.
2 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 places ‘might be read’ here instead of before ‘as excluding’.
3 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has ‘which could be’ instead of ‘questions’.
4 No. 559.
5 Of the Government of India Act 1935.

570

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir S. Cripps

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

9 April 1942

My dear Stafford,

Before your interview with Congress leaders this afternoon I think I should draw your attention to paragraph 1 of the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 441 of the 6th April, stipulating that the constitutional position of the Viceroy’s Council cannot be altered, and the emphasis laid by the War Cabinet on the necessity of avoiding misunderstanding between yourself and Indian political leaders on this point. In view of the desirability of avoiding any possible recrimination between the Governor-General and the future Executive Council on the matter I trust you will be able to make the position clear.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

1 No. 538.
Note by Mr Pinnell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

This is a note of conversation between His Excellency [the Viceroy] and Sir Stafford Cripps on the evening of 9th April 1942.

Sir Stafford Cripps asked H.E. if he had seen his telegram to H.M.G. containing the present formula. He produced a copy of a telegram\(^1\) and a copy of the Johnson-Cripps formula showing the omissions and amendments suggested by H.E. after consulting the Commander-in-Chief on 9th April morning. He said he had got these omissions and amendments accepted by saying that they were purely legal points of drafting. He had, however, omitted the phrase in the original Cripps-Johnson formula\(^2\) which specified that the War Department arrangements should remain in force until the new constitution came into operation, as Congress feared that this would keep the Commander-in-Chief here for ever.

He had left (\(d\)) (i.e., provision for H.M.G. to decide disputes) intact for reasons previously mentioned.\(^3\) H.E. said that as Sir Stafford knew he had so far had no chance to examine the formula, so had only been able to come forward with improvements as a hasty contribution, but this did not enable him to take responsibility. He proposed now to examine it formally. He did not wish to be critical but the permanent staff had their job of pointing out all possible implications and he had his responsibility as Governor-General and to any future Governor-General. Sir Stafford Cripps did not repeat his remark in the previous conversation that he would take all the responsibility. H.E. enquired what the hurry was. Sir Stafford said that he would like the Cabinet to get it as soon as possible and asked whether H.E. had seen all his telegrams. H.E. replied that he did know what telegrams Sir Stafford Cripps had sent; and then enquired whether Congress would take this formula. Sir Stafford Cripps said that they had made no further complaints and had asked a lot of questions and had talked round the point interminably. H.E. again asked whether they had accepted it. Sir Stafford Cripps said that they had not yet accepted it because they were not yet prepared to say that they would come in, but they had no further objections to raise. H.E. asked whether Congress agreed to the other terms of the declaration. Sir Stafford said “No”, but they were willing to come in on the basis that they refused to agree to the long-range scheme, and that was good enough for him. H.E. enquired what about the protection of the Governor-General’s statutory position referred to in his letter\(^4\) of that afternoon, and home telegram No. 441.\(^5\) Was this protected? Sir Stafford said they started putting all sorts of hypothetical cases on the point
but he had replied that he refused to argue or define any of these matters. He had talked of national government and had avoided any mention of cabinet government. He had told them that he could not say how the Viceroy would arrange matters, but the Viceroy would doubtless do all he could by means of appropriate conventions. H.E. said that he could not see how it was possible to reconcile a convention of that kind with the written constitution and with the precise instructions of H.M.G. to preserve the position. He would have a bad time in preserving the position. While he would heave a sigh of relief if a settlement were arrived at, he did not want to get into the position afterwards where he would be held up as the bad boy responsible for wrecking at the stage of practice the wonderful settlement arrived at by Sir Stafford Cripps. Therefore, he did not like the general position.

Correct. L., 10.4.

1 Evidently No. 574. 2 See No. 559. 3 See No. 553. 4 No. 570. 5 No. 538.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L|PO|6/106c: f 12

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 9 April 1942

Received: 10 April

21-U. I hope War Cabinet's telegrams 1 just sent to Cripps will help you. We have never yet heard what offices have been offered to representative Indians or whether official members remain. The offer of Home Affairs referred to in Cripps' letter 2 to Azad disquiets me and I imagine will disquiet whatever community fails to get it. All my sympathy to you over way in which you have been treated. You have been most generous and helpful throughout.

1 Nos. 567 and 568. 2 No. 543.
Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the
Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR’S REPORT NO. 7,
DATED THE 9TH APRIL 1942

Though everyone seems still to be in a state of suspended judgement until Congress and the Muslim League have declared themselves on the announcement made by Sir Stafford Cripps, it may be useful to record what seems to be the attitude of the average educated man hitherto. In the first place, I think it is certain that most people hope that the British Government’s proposals will be accepted. The comment that is generally made to me by sensible people is that a declaration of some such nature as this was certainly required, and that His Majesty’s Government have made their position perfectly clear. Muslims are obviously pleased at the thought that Pakistan is now recognised as practical politics by His Majesty’s Government. The local Congressman, too, seems gratified that self-determination has been conceded; a Muslim Congress member of the Provincial Assembly said to me that India had now got all that she could want.

2. The lengthening of the negotiations between Sir Stafford Cripps and the political leaders has aroused mixed feelings. One common comment is that all this talk is merely hampering the conduct of the war. Most people, however, realise that it at least means that a satisfactory settlement is still a possibility. From the day that the first announcement was made it was common talk here that the Congress High Command would make demands for immediate concessions in the sphere of administration which His Majesty’s Government might be unable to meet. Government’s readiness to negotiate has, I think, therefore, been appreciated. On the particular question of defence, it is clear that a good many people of moderate views think that Government might be well-advised to appoint a non-official Indian of the right stamp as Defence Member, as they take it for granted that he would be guided in every case by the Commander-in-Chief. Even here, however, the communal virus has crept in, and some Muslims have said that a Hindu Defence Minister might easily lay himself out to increase Hindu recruitment for the Army at the expense of the Muhammadans.
Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

No. 971—S. Superintendent Series. Following from Lord Privy Seal to Prime Minister. Your telegram No. 455. Following is text of formula on basis of which I am now negotiating. It incorporates alterations desired by Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief and I understand that it substantially meets their views. It is the outcome of long series discussions in which Johnson has been invaluable as an intermediary and I urge most strongly that this formula should be agreed to. Without it there is no prospect of success but on this basis there is now considerable chance.

2. Formula begins. (a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian member, but certain functions relating to the conduct of the war will be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, who will be in control of the armed forces in India, and who will be the member of the Executive Council in charge of the War Department. (b) This Department will take over such governmental functions as are to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member. A list of such functions has been prepared and is attached. (c) The Defence Member shall be in charge of all other matters relating to Defence in the Defence Department and those now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department in addition to other important matters closely related to Defence. (d) In the event of any new functions falling to be discharged in relation to Defence or any dispute arising as to the allocation of any old functions it shall be decided by His Majesty’s Government. Formula ends.

List of functions of War Member begins. The War Department, for which the Commander-in-Chief will be member, will be responsible for the governmental relations of General Headquarters, Naval Headquarters and Air Headquarters which include: (1) Examining and sanctioning all proposals emanating

1 No. 563.
2 The text of the formula and of the list of functions of the War Member, as given in this telegram but with the variations noted below, is included as No. (8) in Cmd. 6350, with the following prefatory note:

‘After further consideration of the formula contained in the second paragraph of letter No. (7) [No. 543], a new formula was evolved and submitted to the Congress leaders.’

The variations are as follows:

The formula is headed 'Draft Alternative Formula on Defence'. In (a) 'control' replaces 'be in control of' and 'a Member' replaces 'the member'; in (b) 'governmental' is omitted.

The list is headed 'The following is the list referred to in (b) above'. In the preamble 'for which the Commander-in-Chief will be member' and in (4) 'the' are omitted.

See also Nos. 623, 624 and 627.
from General Headquarters, Naval Headquarters and Air Headquarters. (2) Representing the policy of Government on all questions connected with the war which originate in or concern General Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, or Air Headquarters. (3) Acting as the channel of communication between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government on all such questions. (4) Acting as liaison between these headquarters and the other Departments of Government, and Provincial Governments. *List ends.*

3. Transfer in form of Defence Department is essential feature of this formula and gives much better chance than creation of Defence Co-ordination Department. In fact however effect is the same in content as proposal put in my letter to Azad, see my telegram No. 930-S, dated 7th April. List of functions of War Member was drafted by Government of India experts and I am satisfied that it will retain for Commander-in-Chief all necessary functions. I understand Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief agree that it meets their requirements but am asking them to telegraph their views separately as desired.

4. With reference to point raised in paragraph 1 of telegram No. 441, dated 6th April, I have throughout emphasised that existing legal and constitutional position must remain unchanged.

5. As I expect to receive views of Congress on proposed formula tomorrow it is essential that I should have War Cabinet's authority to proceed on this basis not later than tomorrow evening. If on basis of this formula they are ready to enter reconstructed Executive Council I shall make it clear that this can only happen on basis of issue of declaration as a whole by His Majesty's Government. We cannot expect that any party will endorse declaration as a whole as each will take exception to different points. If Congress agree to come into a National Government I feel confident that Muslim League will do so also. Hindu Mahasabha have already agreed subject to reservations on long-term policy and I have no doubt that Sikhs and Depressed Classes would also come in.

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3 See No. 543, note 1. 4 No. 538.
575
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL
10 April 1942

No. 972–S. Cripps’ telegram No. 971–S¹ of today. My comments follow, but you must not (repeat not) assume that Chief and I welcome or are content with his formula, and I will telegraph further about this tomorrow.

2. I have not yet given Cripps copy of my No. 956–S.² If he asks for it in view of reference in No. 958–S³ he shall have it (a) omitting words in paragraph 1 (b) “and endeavoured to gloze it over”, in interests of good relations; and (b) omitting paragraph 3 lest it be used to suggest that I welcome his revised formula. I shall not tell him of either omission and rely on you to protect my position.

3. I gather from Cripps that Congress are still by no means committed and do not propose to let myself be rushed.

¹ No. 574. ² No. 557. ³ No. 559.

576

Mr Clauson to Mr Christie

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 11

MOST IMMEDIATE
10 April 1942, 2.20 pm

463. Clauson to Christie. Has further telegram promised in telegram No. 972–S¹ been despatched? Not yet received and Cabinet clamouring.

¹ No. 575.

577

Sir S. Cripps to War Cabinet (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL
10 April 1942

No. 973–S. Superintendent Series. For War Cabinet from Lord Privy Seal. Your telegrams Nos. 456¹ and 457² apparently refer to some sent from here which I have not seen, and therefore I find difficulty in understanding them.

¹ No. 567. ² No. 568.
2. As regards first paragraph of your No. 456 facts are as follows. It was suggested that offer in my letter\(^3\) to Azad would be more acceptable if Defence Department were promised to an Indian Member and all necessary functions transferred from it to the Commander-in-Chief as War Member. Two formulas were in the field at this stage, one by myself listing functions to be “retained” by Defence Department in exactly same way as in letter to Azad, and transferring all others to Commander-in-Chief as War Member; the other by the Viceroy, defining functions of both War Member and Defence Coordination Member. Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief accepted my draft and it was put to Congress. Subsequently it became clear that offer would be more acceptable if it were made in form which defined War Member’s functions to be transferred from Defence Department. I then drafted a formula based on Viceroy’s original draft, and, since there was no substantial difference, and annexed list of functions of War Member was identical in terms with that in Viceroy’s own draft, I suggested to Congress tentatively that I would consider such a formula if they were prepared to accept it. Subsequently I showed it to Viceroy who suggested some drafting changes to which I have since secured agreement. Resulting text is that telegraphed in my last telegram\(^4\) and is in form agreed, as I understand it, by Viceroy, except that words “until new constitution comes into operation” have been omitted after “exercised” in (a). Congress would not accept this though I included it in text which I discussed with them.

3. Point 2 of your No. 457. The reason for making the decision that of His Majesty’s Government and not the Viceroy was because the Viceroy would be one party to the dispute if it arose and the dispute would concern the document agreed by His Majesty’s Government and would not concern the constitution. Congress would not accept the Viceroy’s decision on this point, I am certain, nor could I put it forward as a reasonable or just arrangement.

4. I do not understand your paragraph 2 of No. 456. There has never been any departure from the document. We have since been seeking to define more particularly what is included in “Defence”.

5. I have sent you a telegram\(^5\) a few hours ago giving text of document, and understand Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief are also communicating with you at my request.

6. I do not know to what you refer in paragraph 4 of your No. 456 unless it is to letter to Azad which was agreed with Viceroy. “National Government” is phrase suggested to me by latter. It denotes a Government mainly composed of representative Indians together with Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.
7. I cannot give you any assurance as to paragraph 5, or I should not still be negotiating. I am awaiting Congress’ answer. See my telegram above referred to.

8. Your telegram No. 457, Point 1. This, with other phrases, has now been altered. Changes were readily agreed to by Congress as mere drafting amendments (which in fact they are) and were made to meet the Viceroy’s criticism to me.

9. Point 2 of your No. 457 is dealt with in paragraph 3 above.

10. Point 3. This clause was drafted by Military Financial Adviser⁶ and Defence Secretary⁷ and submitted to me by Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy as completely watertight and satisfactory. I therefore accept it as such.

11. I do not understand point 4 and cannot accept either criticism.

12. It would be quite easy to draft the document in many different ways, covering the same points, but it is necessary to adopt the one which makes success most likely. The whole question is whether Congress, in which there is a division, can persuade their own public to accept it, and I am anxious to do my best to help them.

13. I am sorry that my colleagues appear to distrust me over this matter, and I am quite prepared to hand the matter over if they would rather someone else carried on the negotiations.

14. I have throughout told you that I would not agree anything that was not satisfactory to Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy on the Defence question, but this you seem to doubt. Unless I am trusted I cannot carry on with the task.

³ No. 543. ⁴ ⁵ No. 574. ⁶ Mr E. T. Coates, I.C.S. ⁷ Mr C. MacL.Ogilvie, I.C.S.

578

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE 10 April 1942

No. 978-S. I asked Cripps last night¹ for an assurance that the position of the Governor-General had not been compromised during negotiations in regard

¹ See No. 571.
to his powers and duties under Section 41 of the Ninth Schedule. Cripps replied that Nehru and Azad had pressed him in a series of hypothetical questions to define the intention of the Governor-General in the matter if a National Government is formed. Cripps told them that he declined to agree the point; that there was to be no change in the constitution; but that he assumed the Governor-General would proceed to meet the point by means of a convention.

2. This is a matter on which I must know with precision what are the instructions of His Majesty’s Government to which I am to work. It is really no use trying to shuffle round this difficulty. Either the Governor-General must continue to have the right to differ from his colleagues (under Section 41 of the Ninth Schedule) or he must promise that in no circumstances will he refuse to act upon their advice. The point is of particular importance in relation to the protection of the Commander-in-Chief, especially if there is to be a separate Defence Department under a non-official Member of Council. I need not emphasize the difficulty of operating a system of conventions when we are dealing with a written constitution and the position is entirely different from the fluid position at home.

3. I am sure that if Congress comes in there will be a great fuss over this point. I shall have to be perfectly open and direct about it or I shall lay up for myself and successor endless trouble. Nor will the point be an easy one to hold if all else is settled and the whole world is waiting for a new Government.

2 Of Government of India Act 1935.

579

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&E/J/10/2: f 153

IMMEDIATE PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

466. Superintendent Series.

Except for an incidental and somewhat startling reference to the transfer of Home Affairs in letter to Azad we are still completely in the dark as to what has been either offered or contemplated as between you and Cripps as regards reconstitution of Executive Council. Are present official Members, or any European Members, or any of the existing Indian Members to be retained? What is contemplated as regards allocation of posts between different com-
munities and parties? Has that been discussed at all with party leaders? Matter is clearly within your sphere but obviously a certain amount of discussion must have taken place.

1 No. 543.

580

War Cabinet
Committee on India. I(42) 14th Meeting

L/PO/6/106c: ff 9–10

Those present at this meeting held on 10 April 1942 at 3.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair for second part of Meeting), Mr Attlee (in the Chair for first part of Meeting), Sir John Anderson, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Edward Bridges (Secretary)

The Committee had before them telegrams 971-S¹ and 973-S² from the Lord Privy Seal. Consideration was given to the revised formula in regard to Defence set out in paragraph 2 of telegram 971-S.

As regards (a) of the formula, it was noted that the words "for that purpose" had been omitted, whereby meeting the point made by the Committee (see (i) of telegram 457³ from the Secretary of State for India).

The Committee's view was that, subject to any comment which the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief might make, (a), (b) and (c) of the formula were not open to objection.

The Committee, however, still felt strong objection to (d), which provided for a decision to be taken by His Majesty's Government in the event of any new functions falling to be discharged in relation to defence or any dispute as to allocation of old functions.

A telegram in this sense was drafted.

(The Committee then adjourned to No. 10 Downing Street,⁴ and the Prime Minister took the Chair.)

At this stage in the Meeting, telegram 978-S⁵ from the Viceroy was received. This telegram dealt with the question whether the Governor-General's position in regard to his powers and duties under Section 41 of the 9th Schedule had been compromised during the negotiations. It appeared that the Congress leaders had been informed by the Lord Privy Seal that while there was to be

¹ No. 574. ² No. 577. ³ No. 568. ⁴ The minutes do not show where the first part of the meeting was held. ⁵ No. 578.
no change in the Constitution, he (the Lord Privy Seal) assumed that the Governor-General would meet the point by means of a Convention.

It was pointed out to the Committee that this was contrary to the position as stated by the Viceroy in telegram 912-S,6 in which the Lord Privy Seal had concurred (Telegram 917-S).7 Moreover, no such proposal had ever been made or, indeed, contemplated, in the discussions before the Lord Privy Seal had left this country.

After further discussion, the Committee agreed to the despatch of the two following telegrams:

(a) Telegram No. 4698 Private and Personal from the Prime Minister to the Lord Privy Seal (a copy being sent to the Viceroy).

(b) Telegram No. 4689 from the War Cabinet to the Viceroy (a copy being sent to the Lord Privy Seal).

6 No. 530. 7 No. 535. 8 No. 582. 9 No. 581.

581

War Cabinet to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: f 8

10 April 1942, 10 pm

MOSF IMMEDIATE PERSONAL

468. Superintendent Series. Following from War Cabinet to Viceroy. Please repeat to Lord Privy Seal.

Begins. Your 978-S.1 There can be no question of any convention limiting in any way your powers under the existing constitution. If non-official Indians are invited to join your Executive it must be on the basis of the present position as set out in your telegram 912-S2 and agreed to by Lord Privy Seal, and no departure from this can be contemplated during the war. If Congress leaders have gathered impression that such a new convention is now possible this impression should be definitely removed.

2. We must have your clear and explicit view as to composition of new Executive which you are prepared to approve of.

3. As to defence question, we have not yet received Commander-in-Chief's views but if you and he are in complete agreement that the latest formula3 really effectively protects the military situation we can no doubt accept, but only subject to satisfactory alteration or preferably complete omission of (d) which deals with a point already fully covered by the existing constitution.
4. We are puzzled as to what Lord Privy Seal means by the Viceroy being "one party to the dispute". The allocation of business between portfolios is a normal function of the Viceroy, and if a difficulty as to allocation arises it will presumably be raised in Council and subject to the existing provision for protest to Secretary of State by any two Members who object to his decision. It surely is not contemplated that if some new question arises as to allocation of duties after the proposed arrangement has come into force, Congress, or any other Indian party, should be in a position to question it or appeal to His Majesty's Government, except through the constitutional procedure of protest within Council and possibly eventual resignation of Members concerned? The Viceroy cannot be considered, apart either from the Government of India or from His Majesty's Government, merely as a party in a dispute with Congress. 

Ends.

1 No. 578. 2 No. 530. 3 No. 574, para. 2. 4 See No. 577, para. 3. 5 Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 41 (3).

582

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: ff 6-7

10 Downing Street, Whitehall, 10 April 1942, 9 pm

Most immediate

personal and secret

469. Superintendent Series. From Prime Minister to Lord Privy Seal, repeat to Viceroy. Begins. Paras 13 and 14 of your 937-S.1 There can be no question of want of confidence and we sympathize with you in your difficulties, but we have our responsibilities as well as you. We feel that in your natural desire to reach a settlement with Congress you may be drawn into positions far different from any the Cabinet and Ministers of Cabinet rank approved before you set forth.

2. The Viceroy has cabled2 us that while willing to help you in every way (Quote) responsibility for any working difficulties does not rest with him (Unquote). We have not heard a word from General Wavell. We do not know for instance whether the Viceroy and you propose that there should be no European on the Council except the Commander-in-Chief. We have been told nothing about the character and composition of the new Council or

1 This should read 973-S, i.e. No. 577. 2 No. 561. 3 'working' was received corrupt.
National Government you think should be formed. We do not know whether
the Home Department or Finance are to be placed in the hands of Congress
nominees. We have not heard what personalities the Viceroy has in mind for
submission to the King-Emperor. We have received no assurance that there is
any acceptance by India as a whole or by any of the principal Parties of the
declaration which we drew up together.

3. We are concerned about the Viceroy's position. You agreed\(^4\) with his
definition of his powers in 912-S\(^5\) (including retention of powers of overriding
the Executive Council) and we must definitely reject suggestion of a convention
which would restrict them.

4. In your para. 13 you speak of carrying on negotiations. It was certainly
agreed between us all that there were not to be negotiations but that you were
to try to gain acceptance\(^6\) with possibly minor variations or elaborations of our
great offer which has made so powerful an impression here and throughout
the United States. As a fair-minded man you will I am sure try to realise how
difficult it is for us to see where our duty\(^7\) lies amid all these novel proposals
and in the absence of clear and simple explanations. \textit{Ends}.

\(^4\) See No. 535. \(^5\) No. 530. \(^6\) MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has 'risk' after 'acceptance'.
\(^7\) MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has 'goal'.

\section{583}

\textit{Notes by Mr Pinnell and Sir G. Laithwaite}

\textit{MSS. EUR. F. 125/141}

Diary. 10 April 1942, 2.15 pm

Mr. Aney said he would like to see H.E. for five minutes to give him this
message: There had been a hitch in the negotiations. Could H.E. send for
Nehru or possibly Nehru and Cripps together to come and see H.E. and see
if he could clarify the matter. The suggestion had been made by a friend but
if H.E. found difficulty in this, then Mr. Aney would quite understand.

\textit{L. G. P.}—10.4.42.

10 April 1942, 2.20 pm

Mr. N. R. Sarker told me that he had been informed just before lunch that
there was likely to be a breakdown. Vallabhbhai Patel had thought that the
"Cabinet" was going to get absolute authority except in the sphere of defence;
namely, that the Viceroy would be bound to act on the advice of the majority except in that sphere, and that this would be done by convention. They were now drafting a letter to Sir Stafford Cripps and considering it at 2.30 p.m. today. In Mr. Sarker’s view, the whole negotiations might have been on a different footing if instead of being done between Cripps and Nehru they had been done by Rajagopalachariar and Cripps in H.E.’s presence, as Rajagopalachariar was constructive, but neither he nor Nehru nor Cripps understood anything about internal affairs.

H.E. has seen.

J. G. L.,—10.4.42.

H.E., after reading the notes by Mr. Pinnell about his talks with Messrs. Sarker and Aney, was clear that he could not take action on the lines suggested by Mr. Aney. He proposed to see Sir Stafford Cripps this evening and then to let him have the telegraphic correspondence that had passed with Secretary of State and that had not so far been seen by Sir Stafford Cripps, with the exception of No 904-S\(^1\) which was in reply to a direct enquiry from the Prime Minister in the course of which the Prime Minister had said that he would use his own discretion as regards circulating the reply in question.

J. G. L.,—10.4.

\(^1\) No. 525.

584

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

10 April 1942

No. 979–S. I comment as follows on Cripps’ No. 973–S.\(^1\)

Paragraph 1. Correspondence referred to is clearly my Nos. 956–S\(^2\) and 958–S\(^3\) I have now sent copies of both to Cripps. It goes without saying of course that while I have in fact taken Cripps into fullest confidence as to my communications with you and Cabinet the Governor-General must remain free to express his own view on these matters for Cabinet’s guidance.

Paragraph 2 of Cripps’ No. 973–S. You have had text of rival formulas. Circumstances in which the “Cripps-Johnson” formula was communicated to Congress without prior reference to me and Commander-in-Chief are known to you. As regards what I may describe as the “Viceroy” formula referred to

\(^1\) No. 577. \(^2\) No. 557. \(^3\) No. 559.
by Cripps, vital point is that it contained an exhaustive definition of the functions of the Defence Department as well as of the War Department prepared by my expert advisers plus a hard-and-fast provision for the determination of any dispute by the Governor-General. The whole setting of the formula was clearly altered the moment definition of the functions of the Defence Department was excluded and the power of decision on matters in dispute transferred as in (d) of the Cripps-Johnson formula to His Majesty’s Government.

Paragraph 6. I read this as meaning that Cripps regards himself as quite uncommitted as to possibility of our retaining, e.g., a non-official European such as Benthall and conceivably a Service Member or Members. Latter point is of less importance than former.

Paragraph 10 of No. 973–S. I am arranging to check this point and make sure that position is as I assume water-tight.

585
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery
Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

10 April 1942
No. 980–S. Cripps has shown me his No. 971–S of 10th April. I have also given him copies of Nos. 956–S and 958–S.

2. Formula referred to by Cripps in No. 971–S is the Cripps-Johnson formula, the genesis of which is described in my No. 956–S, with drafting amendments subsequently inserted at the request of the Chief and myself. As you know the formula is not one that either Wavell or I like, but, in the circumstances and for the reasons described in No. 956–S, we told Cripps that we would be prepared to accept it as amended on assumption (a) that Congress would accept it; (b) that it was the price of a general settlement under which Congress would leave their other claims in abeyance for the period of the war. Cabinet must not, however, think that we regard it as more than a pis aller or that we would have put it up ourselves; and my immediately following telegram gives text of a telegram which I would have despatched last night had Cripps been able to report that Congress were prepared to play.

3. When however I saw Cripps last night he told me that though he had secured the drafting amendments we desired and had in addition been forced to concede the amendment referred to in paragraph 2 of his No. 973–S (I comment separately on this) he was unable to assure me that the formula was even yet finally accepted as part of a settlement by Congress, or that Congress
had finally withdrawn their other objections and agreed to matters in question remaining in abeyance during war. So long as this is the case, the assumptions on which Wavell and I were prepared to accept revised formula are not satisfied. I am commenting separately\(^6\) on Cripps’ telegram of 10th April, No. 973–S, of which he has sent me a copy.

4. Exclusion at the request of Congress of words “until the new constitution comes into operation” (paragraph 2 of Cripps’ No. 973–S) raises a point of great importance. The words are significant to Congress and more so to minorities. Their omission at Congress instance admits of the implication that after the war a “National” Government in which Muslims and minorities would be in a minority would have political control of Army during the period of constitution-making and the subsequent plebiscites. Clearly what the amendment would imply is that governmental functions of Chief would cease when war was no longer to be continued and that Defence Department would then assume all powers in the defence field, the Commander-in-Chief remaining subordinate, by implication, to Defence Department between the end of the war and introduction of new constitution. My own judgment in these circumstances is that retention of these words is of very great importance, and that I should make this clear to Cripps. I was not of course consulted, as his telegram will have made clear to you, as to their omission.

\(^1\) No. 574. \(^2\) No. 557. \(^3\) No. 559. \(^4\) No. 586. \(^5\) No. 577. \(^6\) No. 584.

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586

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

10 April 1942

No. 981–S. Following is draft telegram referred to in paragraph 2 of my immediately preceding telegram:\(^1\)

Begins. My immediately succeeding telegram contains the text of formula on Defence to which Cripps assures me that Congress will agree, keeping in abeyance for the war their other objections to the declaration. This represents the best we can do with the Cripps-Johnson formula reported in my telegram No. 958–S\(^2\) under the circumstances reported in my telegram No. 956–S.\(^3\) Whether or not it will lead to difficulties in Government (and possibly to deadlocks for which Congress will take good care to prepare American opinion) entirely depends on how far those who come in really mean to be helpful and

\(^1\) No. 585. \(^2\) No. 559. \(^3\) No. 557.
can resist pressure from their own caucuses to cause trouble later. Given all the circumstances and the importance of American opinion, Commander-in-Chief and I feel that we have no choice but to acquiesce in this and take the chance of subsequent trouble rather than the immediate certainty of very unfavourable propaganda position in America. Ends.

587
Maulana Azad to Sir S. Cripps¹
Cmd. 6350
10 April 1942
On April 2nd I sent you the resolution of the Working Committee² of the Congress containing their views of the tentative proposals put forward by you on behalf of the British Government. In this resolution we expressed our dissent from several important and far-reaching proposals for the future. Further consideration of these proposals has only strengthened us in our conviction in regard to them and we should like to repeat that we cannot accept them as suggested. The Working Committee’s resolution gives expression to our conclusions relating to them, which we reached after the most earnest consideration.

That resolution however emphasized the gravity of the present situation and stated that the ultimate decision that we might take would be governed by the changes made in the present. The over-riding problem before all of us, and more especially before all Indians, is the defence of the country from aggression and invasion. The future, important as it is, will depend on what happens in the next few months and years. We were therefore prepared to do without any assurances for this uncertain future, hoping that through our sacrifices in the defence of our country we would lay the solid and enduring foundations for a free and independent India. We concentrated therefore on the present.

Your original proposals in regard to the present, as contained in Clause (e) of the proposed Declaration, were vague and incomplete, except insofar as it was made clear that His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for the defence of India. These proposals in effect asked for participation in the tasks of to-day with a view to ensure the future freedom of India. Freedom was for an uncertain future, not for the present; and no indication was given in Clause (e) of what arrangements or governmental and other changes would be made in the present. When this vagueness was pointed out, you said that this was deliberate so as to give you freedom to determine these changes in consultation with others. In our talks you gave us to understand that you envisaged a National Government which would deal with all matters except Defence.
Defence at any time, and more particularly in war time, is of essential importance; and without it a National Government functions in a very limited field. Apart from this consideration, it was obvious that the whole purpose of your proposals and our talks centred round the urgency of the problems created by the threat of the invasion of India. The chief functions of a National Government must necessarily be to organize defence, both intensively and on the widest popular basis, and to create mass psychology of resistance to an invader. Only a National Government could do that, and only a Government on whom this responsibility was laid. Popular resistance must have a national background and both the soldier and the civilian must feel that they are fighting for their country’s freedom under National leadership.

We pointed this out to you. The question became one not of just satisfying our national aspirations, but of effective prosecution of the war and fighting to the last any invader who set foot on the soil of India. On general principles a National Government would control defence through a Defence Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief would control the armed forces and would have full latitude in the carrying out of operations connected with the war. An Indian National Government should have normally functioned in this way. We made it clear that the Commander-in-Chief in India would have control of the armed forces and the conduct of operations and other matters connected therewith. With a view to arriving at a settlement, we were prepared to accept certain limitations on the normal powers of the Defence Minister. We had no desire to upset in the middle of the war the present military organization or arrangements. We accepted also that the higher strategy of the war should be controlled by the War Cabinet in London, which would have an Indian Member. The immediate object before us was to make the defence of India more effective, to strengthen it, to broadbase it on the popular will and to reduce all red tape delay and inefficiency from it. There was no question of our interfering with the technical and operational sides. One thing of course was of paramount importance to us, India’s safety and defence. Subject to this primary consideration there was no reason why there should be any difficulty in finding a way out of the present impasse in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Indian people, for in this matter there are no differences amongst us.

The emphasis on defence led you to reconsider the matter and you wrote to me on April 7th suggesting a formula for defence.

In this letter you said “as the Working Committee have fully understood, it is impossible to make any change in the existing constitution during the period of hostilities.” The Working Committee’s attitude in the matter has been

1 The text of this letter was transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery in telegram 1068-S of 16 April. L/1/751: ff 297-9.
2 No. 605.
3 No. 543.
completely misunderstood and I should like to clear this up. Although we are not immediately concerned with it, the Committee do not think that there is any inherent difficulty in the way of constitutional changes during the war. Everything that helps in the war not only can be but must be done with speed. That is the only way to carry on and win a war. No complicated enactments are necessary. A recognition of India's freedom and right to self-determination could easily be made if it was so wished together with certain other consequential but important changes. The rest can be left to future arrangements and adjustments. I might remind you that the British Prime Minister actually proposed a Union of France and England on the eve of the fall of France. No greater or more fundamental change could be imagined and this was suggested at a period of grave crisis and peril. War accelerates change. It does not fit in with static conceptions.

The formula for Defence that you sent us was considered by us together with its annexure which gave a list of subjects or departments which were to be transferred to the Defence Department. This list was a revealing one as it proved that the Defence Minister would deal with relatively unimportant matters. We were unable to accept this and we informed you accordingly.

Subsequently a new formula for Defence was suggested to us but without any list of subjects. This formula seemed to us to be based on a more healthy approach and we suggested certain changes pointing out that our ultimate decision would necessarily depend on the allocation of subjects. A revised formula was then sent back to us together with an indication of the functions of the War Department. This was so widely and comprehensively framed that it was difficult for us to know what the actual allocation of subjects and departments as between the Defence Department and the War Department would be. A request was made on our behalf that illustrative lists of these subjects might be supplied to enable us to consider the matter. No such lists were supplied to us.

In the interview we had with you yesterday we discussed the new formula and expressed our viewpoint in regard to it. I need not repeat what I said then. The wording of the formula is after all a minor matter and we would not allow that to come in our way unless some important principle is at stake. But behind that wording lay certain ideas and we were surprised to find that during the past few days we had been proceeding on wrong assumptions.

When we asked you for illustrative lists of subjects for the two Departments you referred us to the old list for the Defence Department which you had previously sent us and which we had been unable to accept. You added that certain residuary subjects might be added to this but in effect there was not likely to be any such subject as the allocation was complete. Thus you said that substantially there was no change between the old list and any new one that might be prepared. If this was so and we were to go back ultimately to the place
we started from then what was the purpose of our searching for new formulae, a new set of words meaning the same thing made no difference.

In the course of our talks many other matters were also cleared up. Unfortunately to our disadvantage you had referred both privately and in the course of public statements to a National Government and a Cabinet consisting of Ministers. These words have a certain significance and we had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as a Cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head; but the new picture that you placed before us was really not very different from the old, the difference being one of degree and not of kind. The new government could neither be called, except vaguely and inaccurately, nor could it function as a National Government. It would just be the Viceroy and his Executive Council with the Viceroy having all his old powers. We did not ask for any legal changes but we did ask for definite assurances and conventions which would indicate that the new government would function as a free government, the members of which act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional government.

In regard to the conduct of the war and connected activities the Commander-in-Chief would have freedom and he would also act as War Minister. We were informed that nothing could be said at this stage even vaguely and generally about the conventions that should govern the new government and the Viceroy. This was a matter in the Viceroy’s sole discretion and at a later stage it could be discussed directly with the Viceroy. Ultimately there was always the possibility of the Members of the Executive Council resigning or threatening to resign if they disagreed with the Viceroy. That sanction or remedy is of course always open but it is curious that we should base our approach to a new government on the probability of conflict and resignation at the very outset.

The picture therefore placed before us is not essentially different from the old one. The whole object which we and I believe you have in view, that is to create a new psychological approach to the people to make them feel that their own National Government had come, that they were defending their newly won freedom, would be completely frustrated when they saw this old picture again with even the old label on. The continuation of the India Office which has been a symbol of evil to us would confirm this picture. It has almost been taken for granted for some time past that the India Office would soon disappear, as it was an anachronism, but now we are told that even this undesirable relic of a past age is going to continue.

The picture of the Government which was so like the old in all essential features is such that we cannot fit into it. Normally we would have had little difficulty in disposing of this matter for it is so far removed from all that we have striven for, but in the circumstances of to-day we were prepared to give full consideration to every proposal which might lead to an effective organization

4 See No. 574, note 2.
of the defence of India. The peril that faces India affects us more than it can possibly affect any foreigner and we are anxious and eager to do our utmost to face it and overcome it. But we cannot undertake responsibilities when we are not given the freedom and power to shoulder them effectively and when an old environment continues which hampers the national effort.

While we cannot accept the proposals you have made, we want to inform you that we are yet prepared to assume responsibility provided a truly National Government is formed. We are prepared to put aside for the present all questions about the future, though as we have indicated we hold definite views about it. But in the present the National Government must be a Cabinet Government with full power, and must not merely be a continuation of the Viceroy's Executive Council. In regard to Defence we have already stated what in our opinion the position should be. At present we feel that such an arrangement is the very minimum that is essential for the functioning of a National Government and for making the popular appeal which is urgently needed.

We would point out to you that the suggestions we have put forward are not ours only but may be considered to be the unanimous demand of the Indian people. On these matters there is no difference of opinion among various groups and parties and the difference is as between the Indian people as a whole and the British Government. Such differences as exist in India relate to constitutional changes in the future. We are agreeable to the postponement of this issue so that the largest possible measure of unity might be achieved in the present crisis for the defence of India. It would be a tragedy that even when there is this unanimity of opinion in India the British Government should prevent a free National Government from functioning, and from serving the cause of India as well as the larger causes for which millions are suffering and dying to-day.

588

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

10 April 1942

No. 984—S. Superintendent Series. Following for Prime Minister from Lord Privy Seal. I have tonight received long letter from Congress President stating that Congress is unable to accept proposals. Rejection on widest grounds and not solely on Defence issue although it indicates that while Congress would agree that Commander-in-Chief should have freedom to control conduct of war and connected activities as Commander-in-Chief and War Member pro-
posed formula left functions of Defence Member unduly restricted. Main
ground of rejection is however that in view of Congress there should be im-
mediately a National Government and that without constitutional changes there
should be "definite assurances in\(^2\) conventions which would indicate that the
new Government would function as a free Government and the members of
which would act as members of a cabinet in a constitutional government".
Letter also states that picture of proposed immediate arrangements is not
essentially different from the old ones "the whole object which we have in
view that is to create a new psychological approach to the people to make them
feel that their own national freedom had come, that they were defending their
newly-won freedom, would be completely frustrated when they saw this old
picture again which is such that Congress cannot fit into it".\(^3\)

2. There is clearly no hope of agreement and I shall start home on Sunday.\(^4\)

\(^1\) No. 587. \(^2\) No. 587 has 'and'.
\(^3\) This quotation differs in some respects from the fourth paragraph from the end of No. 587.
\(^4\) 12 April.

589

Note by Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Diary. 10 April 1942

Mr. Turnbull came to see H.E. at 7.30 p.m., on Sir Stafford Cripps’ instructions,
bringing with him in original Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s reply\(^1\) to the
British Declaration.

After dinner Mr. Turnbull rang me up to ascertain whether I could give him
the text of the Poona Resolution;\(^2\) and Sir Stafford Cripps, when he came to
see H.E. at 10.55 p.m. told me that Mr. Jinnah had said to him that Congress
reaction was simply the Poona Resolution over again, and that he had no inten-
tion of subscribing to it. Sir Stafford had been anxious to refer to the Poona
Resolution and the objections to it of the minorities, in his reply to Abul Kalam
Azad; but such investigations as was [were?] possible at short notice showed
that there was no sufficient positive declaration of hostility easily traceable by
Mr. Jinnah, to admit of a convenient reference, and that that was equally the
case as regards the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes; while the Mahasabha were
very unlikely to have come out against it. Sir Stafford, in those circumstances,
decided to omit any reference to this point from his draft reply. Having shown
the draft reply to H.E. and discussed the situation generally, he left at about
11.50.

\(^1\) No. 587. \(^2\) See Nos. 7, note 4 and 16, note 1.
I was extremely sorry to receive from you your letter of April 10th expressing the rejection by the Congress Working Committee of His Majesty’s Government’s draft declaration.

I will not deal with those points which are covered by the original resolution of your committee which you sent me, as they were clearly not the reason for your decision.

Nor need I go into the question of the division of duties between the Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief as War Member with which you deal at length. This division allotted to the Defence Minister all functions outside those actually connected with the General Headquarters, Navy Headquarters and Air Headquarters which are under the Commander-in-Chief as head of the fighting forces in India.

In addition to these functions in the narrow field of “defence” it was suggested that all other portfolios relating to that subject such as:

- Home department: internal order, police, refugees, etc.,
- Communications department: railways, roads, transport, etc.,
- Finance department: all war finance in India,
- Supply department: supplies for all forces and munitions,
- Information and broadcasting department: propaganda, publicity, etc.,
- Civil defence department: air raid precautions, and all forms of civilian defence,
- Legislative department: regulations and orders,
- Labour department: man power,
- Defence department: administration of Indian personnel, etc.,

should be put in the hands of representative Indians as members of the Executive Council.

Nothing further could have been done by way of giving responsibility for defence services to representative Indian members without jeopardising the immediate defence of India under the Commander-in-Chief. This defence is as you know a paramount duty and responsibility of His Majesty’s Government, while unity of command is essential in the interest of the allied help to India.

The real substance of your refusal to take part in a National Government is that the form of Government suggested is not such as would enable you to rally the Indian people as you desire.

You make two suggestions. First that the constitution might now be changed. In this respect I would point out that you made this suggestion for the first
time last night, nearly three weeks after you had received the proposals, and I would further remark that every other representative with whom I have discussed this view has accepted the practical impossibility of any such legislative change in the middle of a war and at such a moment as the present.

Second, you suggest "a truly National Government" be formed which must be "Cabinet Government with full power".

Without constitutional changes of a most complicated character and on a very large scale this would not be possible as you realise.

Were such a system to be introduced by convention under the existing circumstances the nominated cabinet (nominated presumably by the major political organisations), responsible to no one but itself, could not be removed and would in fact constitute an absolute dictatorship of the majority.

This suggestion would be rejected by all minorities in India, since it would subject all of them to a permanent and autocratic majority in the cabinet. Nor would it be consistent with the pledges already given by His Majesty’s Government to protect the rights of those minorities.

In a country such as India where communal divisions are still so deep an irresponsible majority Government of this kind is not possible.

Apart from this, however, until such time as the Indian peoples frame their new Constitution His Majesty’s Government must continue to carry out its duties to those large sections of the Indian people to whom it has given its pledges.

The proposals of His Majesty’s Government went as far as possible, short of a complete change in the Constitution which is generally acknowledged as impracticable in the circumstances of to-day.

While therefore both I and His Majesty’s Government recognise the keen desire of your Working Committee to carry on the war against the enemy by every means in their power, they regret that your Working Committee has not seen its way to join in the war effort upon the conditions sincerely offered, the only conditions which could have brought together all the different communities and sections of the Indian people.

1 Sir S. Cripps transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery and Mr Bracken (via Viceroy) in telegram 990-S of 11 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
2 No. 587.
3 No. 605.
591

Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar to Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/9: ff 3-4

CONFIDENTIAL  COUNCIL HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 10 April 1942

My dear Sir Stafford,

The Indian States’ Delegation unanimously adopted the following resolution in respect of the proposals of His Majesty’s Government which you discussed with them:

“The attitude of the Indian States in general on the mission of the Lord Privy Seal is summed up in the resolution on the subject which was adopted unanimously at the recent session of the Chamber of Princes. The Indian States will be glad as always, in the interest of their Motherland, to make their contribution, in every reasonable manner compatible with the sovereignty and integrity of the States, towards the framing of a new Constitution for India.

The States should be assured, however, that in the event of a number of States not finding it feasible to adhere, the non-adhering States or groups of States, so desiring, would have the right to form a Union of their own with full sovereign status in accordance with a suitable and agreed procedure devised for the purpose.”

Yours sincerely,

DIGVIJAYSINHJI

Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar,
Chancellor, Chamber of Princes.

Enclosure to No. 591

RESOLUTION

“(a) that this Chamber welcomes the Announcement made in the House of Commons on the 11th March, 1942, by the Prime Minister and the forthcoming visit to India of the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, and expresses the hope that it may help to unite India to intensify further her war effort and to strengthen measures for the defence of the Motherland.

(b) that this Chamber has repeatedly made it clear that any scheme to be acceptable to the States must effectively protect their rights arising from Treaties, Engagements and Sanads or otherwise and ensure the future existence, sovereignty and autonomy of the States thereunder guaranteed, and
leave them complete freedom duly to discharge their obligations to the
Crown and to their subjects; it therefore notes with particular satisfaction
the reference in the Announcement of the Prime Minister to the fulfilment
of the Treaty obligations to the Indian States.
(c) that this Chamber authorises its representatives to carry on discussions and
negotiations for the constitutional advance of India with due regard to the
successful prosecution of war and the interests of States, and subject to final
confirmation by the Chamber and without prejudice to the right of individual
States to be consulted in respect of any proposals affecting their Treaty or
other inherent rights."

1 The text of this letter and its enclosure were transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery in
telegram 210-S.C. of 18 April (MSS. EUR. F. 125/22) and are included on pp. 15-6 of Cmd. 6350,
with some variations, namely: In the covering letter. Second para.: 'their Motherland' reads 'the
Motherland'. Third para.: 'groups of States' reads 'group of States'. In the Resolution. Para. (b):
'existence, sovereignty' reads 'existence of Sovereignty' and 'obligations' reads 'obligation'.
2 See Nos. 308 and 309.

592

The Nawab of Chhatari to Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/10/9: ff 8-9

CAMP: H.E.H. THE NIZAM’S GUEST HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 10 April 1942
My dear Sir Stafford Cripps,
Herewith I send you a cutting for ready reference. I assume that the reply you
gave to Dr. Syed Abdul Latiff is subject to the reply1 that you gave to the
Hyderabad Delegation and the Princes' Delegation. I also submit a copy of
your reply2 that you gave to the Princes' Delegation for ready reference, which
was sent to you after the interview and was also approved by you.

Yours sincerely,

AHMAD SAID

1 Nos. 528 and 527.  2 Presumably the Enclosure to No. 527, para. 1.
Enclosure to No. 592

The Hindustan Times of 10 April 1942

Hyderabad Query
states' status in Indian dominion

Hyderabad, April 9

Replying to Dr. Syed Abdul Latiff's query to Sir Stafford Cripps whether, "if one dominion for the whole of India is not agreed to by all parties and the need for more than one dominion arises ultimately, could Hyderabad, if she so desires, stand under any possible arrangement by herself as a dominion member of the British Commonwealth, enjoying equal status with other dominions in India," Sir Stafford Cripps's secretary says: "Sir Stafford Cripps desires me to inform you that he made clear in his conversations with representatives of the Chamber of Princes and Hyderabad that His Majesty's Government do not contemplate that Indian States which decide not to adhere to the new Indian Union should be in a position to form an Indian union by themselves which [would ?] have the same status as the main union. If any province in British India should desire not to adhere to the main Indian Union, it would be open to Indian States to join a new union with that province by agreement provided this were geographically feasible."—A.P.I.

593

Mir Maqbool Mahmood to Mr Turnbull

L/P&J/10/9: f 6

Council House, New Delhi, 10 April 1942

Dear Turnbull,
I am desired to invite attention to the following telegram published in the Statesman of today, reported to have been sent by Sir Stafford Cripps' Secretary to Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad:

"Sir Stafford Cripps desires me to inform you that he made clear in his conversations with representatives of the Chamber of Princes and Hyderabad that His Majesty's Government do not contemplate that Indian States which decide not to adhere to the new Indian Union should be in a position to form an Indian Union by themselves which would have the same status as the main Union. If any province in British India should desire not to adhere to the main Indian Union it would be open to Indian States to join a new union with that province by agreement provided this were geographically feasible."
His Highness the Chancellor takes it as understood that this brief telegram, if correctly reported, does not affect the position, on the points mentioned in it, as elucidated by Sir Stafford to the States Delegation on the 2nd April, 1942.¹

Yours sincerely,

MAQBOOL MAHMOOD

¹ Nos. 498 and 527.

594

Sir S. Cripps to the Nawab of Chhatari

L/P&J/10/9: f 7

3 QUEEN VICTORIA ROAD, NEW DELHI, 10 April 1942

Dear Nawab Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of the 10th April.¹ The letter which my Secretary wrote to Dr. Syed Abdul Latif was written on the 1st April and its terms are in conformity with the letter which he wrote on my instructions to the Secretary to the Chamber of Princes on the 29th March,² a copy of which I enclose. The position stated in those letters is the present position of His Majesty’s Government. When I saw the Chamber Delegation for the second time on the 2nd of April³ I told them that the formation of a Union consisting of States only had not been considered in connection with the Government’s proposed declaration and was not contemplated under the present scheme. I did, however, add that I did not personally think the idea impossibly and that I would consult my colleagues on the subject when I got back to England.

I do not think there is any inconsistency between the letter and the report of the proceedings which you have sent me, and I shall certainly see that the desire of the States to be able to form a Union of their own is given consideration both by His Excellency the Viceroy and by the British Government.

Yours sincerely,

R.S.C.

¹ No. 592. ² No. 438. ³ See Nos. 498 and 527.
595
Mr Turnbull to Mir Maqbool Mahmood
L/P&J/10/9: f 5
11 April 1942

Dear Maqbool Mahmood,
In reply to your letter of the 10th April,¹ I think I cannot do better than send a copy of the letter² which Sir Stafford Cripps wrote to the Nawab of Chhatari, which deals with the same point which you raise in your letter of the 10th April.

Yours sincerely,
F. F. TURNBULL

¹ No. 593.  ² No. 594.

596
Sir S. Cripps to Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar
L/P&J/10/9: f 2
3 QUEEN VICTORIA ROAD, NEW DELHI, 11 April 1942

My dear Jam Saheb,
I write to acknowledge your letter of the 10th April¹ in which you have communicated to me a resolution passed by the Chamber of Princes in regard to the proposals of His Majesty’s Government, which I discussed with representatives of the Chamber and leaders of Indian opinion. I have taken note of the views expressed in the resolution and will communicate them to His Majesty’s Government on my return to England.

As the Congress and Muslim League have both passed resolutions unfavourable to the proposals which I brought to India and as unfavourable opinions have also been expressed by the representatives of other organizations, I have reached the conclusion that a sufficient body of agreement cannot be obtained to enable the declaration to be promulgated and I propose to advise His Majesty’s Government accordingly.

Yours sincerely,
S.C.

¹ No. 591.
597

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via India Office and Viceroy)

Telegram, L/PO/6/106c: ff 4-5

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, 11 April 1942, 3.15 am

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET


Your 984-S.1 You have done everything in human power and your tenacity, perseverance and resourcefulness have proved how great was the British desire to reach a settlement. You must not feel unduly discouraged or disappointed by the result. The effect throughout Britain and in the United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defence is a great advantage. I am very glad you are coming home at once, where a most cordial welcome awaits you. Even though your hopes have not been fulfilled, you have rendered a very important service to the common cause and the foundations have been laid for the future progress of the peoples of India.

1 No. 588.

598

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 11 April 1942, 12 noon

Received: 11 April, 10.45 am

No. 987-S. Your No. 20-U of April 7th. I have many possibilities in mind, but it has not seemed wise to try to build in advance combinations to match every possible contingency.

2. Generally my tactics would be, if all parties come in, to see leaders Congress and Muslim League, and after getting their agreement to come in subject to satisfactory arrangements being made, to tell them that we have left the old world and its quarrels behind us for ever; that I wish to consult them about general plans for reconstruction. I would see whether they were disposed to agree between themselves about numbers of seats for principal parties in Council; stress importance of a broad basis for the new Council; point out

1 No. 548.
weight and difficulty of existing administrative work particularly in financial field, and ask them to consider with me whether on one basis or another we could not continue to use Raisman’s and Maxwell’s experience at least for a time. I am inclined, if they jib at having officials in office, to suggest to them that these might serve on for a period as advisers to the new members rather than to myself. I would, I think, see whether Nehru and Jinnah, if they will come in, would consider taking office without administrative portfolios, so that they might remain free to tour the country to bolster up morale (though, as you know, I don’t hope for much out of pep talks to terrified coolies). I would try to persuade them to regard inclusion of Benthall or another, as representing ultimately an advantage to themselves, particularly in view of negotiating European business affairs in Treaty. I don’t doubt we shall have high jinks before we get all settled, or that once in they will keep me busy for a while, but I dare say they will soon steady down. My anxiety would be much more on account of lack of administrative experience and surfeit of ambitious plans for immediate reform than of any persistent wrong-headedness. Thereafter, I should call² Mahasabha, Non-Brahmins, Sikhs and Depressed Classes.

3. These are general ideas rather than plans. When situation is firm I shall follow my instinct and such indications of public opinion and views of party leaders as may be available and do the best I can, consulting Governors as necessary. I will keep you informed, but subject to that I hope you will feel able to give me a free hand, for speed and elasticity will be needed to make the best of the tide while it runs.

² Deciphered as ‘(? start on)’.

599

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via Viceroy and India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 988-S. Following for Prime Minister from Lord Privy Seal:

You will have heard of the refusal of Congress upon what is almost a new point. But the difficulties cannot be explained by telegram.

We have done our best under the circumstances that exist here and I do not think you need worry about my visit having worsened the situation from the point of view of morale or public feeling. In the last few days the temper has I think been better.

My own view is that despite failure the atmosphere has improved quite definitely.
Nehru has come out in a fine statement for total war against the Japs; Jinnah has pledged me the unwavering support of the Muslims, and the Sikhs and other minorities will be on the whole relieved and I hope to some extent reassured. The real difficulty has been the internal stresses in Congress itself hence their long discussions and the veering of the indications of their decisions.

There is a chance if we handle the situation wisely and without recrimination the All-India Congress Committee on April 21st may give an indication of a changing spirit as it is much more representative than the Working Committee.

We are not depressed though sad at the result. Now we must get on with the job of defending India. I will tell you as to this on my return.

All good wishes. Cheerio! Stafford.

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600

Sir S. Cripps to Mr Bracken and Mr Amery (via Viceroy)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 989-S. Following from Lord Privy Seal for Minister of Information and yourself. Please both give it your personal attention:

Begins. Most important that Press should take a serious but not hopeless tone over refusal of Congress.

It should not be regarded as final and doubt should be suggested vaguely as to views of All-India Congress Committee which meets on April 21st.¹

There must be no recriminations against any one here and no lecturing of the Indians.

Halifax’s speech² has done the greatest harm at a most critical moment and that sort of approach must be avoided.

There should be no assumption that Congress leaders are not prepared to help and Nehru’s fighting statements and speeches should be played up.

The line of my letter³ to Congress which is being telegraphed separately should be followed upon the main issue upon which there has been a breakdown and the Viceroy must be protected from criticism. The sole responsibility here on this matter is my own.

Otherwise concentrate on Defence of India here and now. My broadcast tonight will give general line in more detail. Ends.

¹ The A.I.C.C. was to meet on 29 April.
² At New York Town Hall, 7 April. See The Times, 8 April, p. 3.
³ No. 590.
601

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 11 April 1942, 2 pm
Received: 11 April, 1.30 pm

No. 993–S. You will have had from Cripps gist of Congress reply\(^1\) and of his answer\(^2\) to it, and full text will reach you through Reuter today. I need not emphasize to you vital importance of publicity for our point of view at home and in America or desirability of making play with what is in effect reassertion of extreme Congress claim. Their demands as regards conventions, responsibility, &c., are of course quite inconsistent with statement in declaration that no major constitutional change could take place during the war and would in effect jump the claim, to the prejudice of other interests whose position has got to be considered in India, as well as of the special obligations which we have ourselves to safeguard. If there is any point on which we can help from here with material you have only to let me know.

\(^1\) No. 587. \(^2\) No. 590.

602

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

11 April 1942

No. 994–S. Paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 972–S.\(^1\) On further consideration I decided to include paragraph 3 of my No. 956–S\(^2\) in copy of that telegram which I communicated to Cripps.

\(^1\) No. 575. \(^2\) No. 557.
603

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/6/105e: f 85

11 April 1942

21-U. Your telegram 21-U.\textsuperscript{1} Warmest thanks for all your help and support. Matters have now of course been taken out of our hands by intransigent attitude of Congress. I am (saying that—sic—?) glad to say that relations with Cripps remain good and friendly despite these various difficulties.

\textsuperscript{1} No. 372.

604

Maulana Azad to Sir S. Cripps\textsuperscript{1}

Cmd. 6350

11 April 1942

I have just received your letter of April 10th\textsuperscript{2} and I must confess that my colleagues and I were considerably surprised to read it. I am sending you this reply immediately and can only deal briefly here with some of the points you have raised.

The points covered by our original resolution\textsuperscript{3} are important and represent my Committee's well-considered views on the British proposals as a whole; but we pointed out to you that so far as the proposals relate to the future they might be set aside, as we were anxious to assume responsibility for India's Government and defence in this hour of danger. This responsibility could only be undertaken, however, if it was real responsibility and power.

As regards the division of functions between the Defence Minister and the War Minister, you did not give an illustrative list as requested by us, and referred us to the previous list of the Defence Minister's functions which as you know we had been wholly unable to accept. In your letter under reply you mention certain subjects directly or indirectly related to the war which will be administered by other departments. So far as the Defence Minister is concerned it is clear that his functions will be limited by the first list that you sent.

No one has suggested any restrictions on the normal powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Indeed we went beyond this and were prepared to agree to

\textsuperscript{1} The text of this letter was transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery in telegram 1069-S of 16 April. L/I/1/51: f 299.
\textsuperscript{2} No. 590.
\textsuperscript{3} No. 605.
further powers being given to him as War Minister. But it is clear that the British Government’s conception and ours in regard to Defence differs greatly. For us it means giving it a National character and calling upon every man and woman in India to participate in it. It means trusting our own people and seeking their full co-operation in this great effort. The British Government’s view seems to be based on an utter lack of confidence in the Indian people and in withholding real power from them.

You refer to the paramount duty and responsibility of His Majesty’s Government in regard to defence. That duty and responsibility cannot be discharged effectively unless the Indian people are made to have and feel their responsibility, and the recent past stands witness to this. The Government of India do not seem to realise that the war can only be fought on a popular basis.

Your statement that we have for the first time after three weeks suggested a change in the constitution is hardly correct. In the course of our talks reference was made to it, but it is true that we did not lay stress on it as we did not want to introduce new issues; but when you stated explicitly in your letter that we had agreed that no constitutional changes could be made during the war we had to deny this and correct your impression.

It is the last part of your letter that has especially surprised and pained us. It seems that there has been a progressive deterioration in the British Government’s attitude as our negotiations proceeded. What we were told in our very first talk with you is now denied or explained away. You told me then that there would be a National Government which would function as a Cabinet and that the position of the Viceroy would be analogous to that of The King in England vis-à-vis his Cabinet. In regard to the India Office you told me that you were surprised that no one had so far mentioned this important matter, and that the practical course was to have this attached or incorporated with the Dominions Office.

The whole of this picture which you sketched before us has now been completely shattered by what you told us during our last interview.

You have put forward an argument in your letter which at no time during our talks was mentioned by you. You refer to the “absolute dictatorship of the majority”. It is astonishing that such a statement should be made in this connection and at this stage. This difficulty is inherent in any scheme of a mixed Cabinet formed to meet an emergency, but there are many ways in which it can be provided for. Had you raised this question we would have discussed it and found a satisfactory solution.

The whole approach to this question has been that a mixed Cabinet should be formed and should co-operate together. We accepted this. We are not interested in the Congress as such gaining power, but we are interested in the Indian people as a whole having freedom and power. How the Cabinet should be formed and should function was a question which might have been con-
sidered after the main question was decided: that is the extent of power which 
the British Government would give to the Indian people. Because of this we 
ever discussed it with you or even referred to it.

Nevertheless you have raised this matter for the first time in what is pre-
sumably your last letter to us and tried most unjustifiably to side-track the 
real issue between us.

You will remember that in my very first talk with you I pointed out that 
the communal or like questions did not arise at this stage. As soon as the British 
Government made up its mind to transfer real power and responsibility, the 
other questions could be tackled successfully by those concerned. You gave me 
the impression that you agreed with this approach.

We are convinced that if the British Government did not pursue a policy of 
encouraging disruption, all of us to whatever party or group we belonged would 
be able to come together and find a common line of action; but unhappily 
even in this grave hour of peril the British Government is unable to give up 
its wrecking policy. We are driven to the conclusion that it attaches more 
importance to holding on to its rule in India as long as it can and promoting 
discord and disruption here with that end in view, than to an effective defence 
of India against the aggression and invasion that overhang it. To us and to all 
Indians the dominant consideration is the defence and safety of India and it 
is by that test that we judge.

You mention that you propose to publish your letter to me. I presume that 
you have no objection now to our publishing our original resolution, your letters 
to us, and our letters to you.

605

Resolution of the Congress Working Committee

Cmd. 6350

Issued 11 April 1942

The Working Committee have given full and earnest consideration to the 
proposals made by the British War Cabinet with regard to India and the 
elucidation of them by Sir Stafford Cripps.

These proposals, which have been made at the very last hour because of 
the compulsion of events, have to be considered not only in relation to India's 
demand for independence but more especially in the present grave war crisis, 
with a view to meeting effectively the perils and dangers that confront India 
and envelop the world.

Congress has repeatedly stated, ever since the commencement of the war 
in September 1939, that the people of India would line themselves with the

1 This text was based on that telegraphed to London by Reuter.
progressive forces of the world and assume full responsibility to face the new problems and shoulder the new burdens that had arisen, and it asked for the necessary conditions to enable them to do so to be created. The essential condition was the freedom of India, for only the realisation of present freedom could light the flame which would illuminate millions of hearts and move them to action.

At the last meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, after the commencement of the war in the Pacific, it was stated that: "Only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis and be able to help in the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the form of war." ²

The British War Cabinet’s new proposals relate principally to the future, upon the cessation of hostilities. The Committee, while recognising that self-determination for the people of India is accepted in principle in that uncertain future, regret that this is fettered and circumscribed and that certain provisions have been introduced which gravely imperil the development of a free and united national government and the establishment of a democratic state. Even the constitution-making body is so constituted that the people’s right of self-determination is vitiated by the introduction of non-representative elements.

The people of India have, as a whole, clearly demanded full independence, and Congress has repeatedly declared that no other status except that of independence for the whole of India could be agreed to or could meet the essential requirements of the present situation.

The Committee recognise that future independence may be implicit in the proposals, but the accompanying provisions and restrictions are such that real freedom may well become an illusion.

The complete ignoring of ninety millions of people in the Indian States, and their treatment as commodities at the disposal of their Rulers, is a negation both of democracy and self-determination. While the representation of an Indian State in the constitution-making body is fixed on a population basis, the people of the State have no voice in choosing those representatives, nor are they to be consulted at any stage while decisions vitally affecting them are being taken. Such States may in many ways become barriers to the growth of Indian freedom, enclaves where foreign authority still prevails, and where the possibility of maintaining foreign-armed forces has been stated to be a likely contingency and a perpetual menace to the freedom of the people of the States as well as of the rest of India.

The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a Province is also a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the Provinces, and which may well lead to further difficulties in the way of the Indian States merging themselves into an Indian Union. Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and
unity and any break of that unity especially in the modern world when peoples’ minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federations would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will. While recognising this principle, the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create conditions which would help the different units in developing a common and co-operative national life. Acceptance of this principle inevitably involves that no changes should be made which would result in fresh problems being created and compulsion being exercised on other substantial groups within that area. Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible autonomy within the Union consistently with a strong National State.

The proposal now made on the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at the very inception of the Union and thus create great friction just when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are most needed. This proposal has been presumably made to meet the communal demand, but it will have other consequences also and lead politically reactionary and obscurantist groups among the different communities to create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country.

Any proposal concerning the future of India must demand attention and scrutiny, but in to-day’s grave crisis it is the present that counts and even the proposals for the future\(^2\) in so far as they affect the present. The Committee necessarily attached the greatest importance to this aspect of the question and on this ultimately depends what advice they should give to those who look to them for guidance. For this the present British War Cabinet’s proposals are vague and altogether incomplete, and there would appear to be no vital changes in the present structure contemplated. It has been made clear that the defence of India will in any event remain under British control. At any time Defence is a vital subject; during war-time it is all-important and covers almost every sphere of life and administration. To take away Defence from the sphere of responsibility at this stage is to reduce that responsibility to a farce and nullity, and to make it perfectly clear that India is not going to be free in any way and her Government is not going to function as a free and independent Government during the pendency of the war.

The Committee would repeat that the essential fundamental prerequisite for the assumption of responsibility by the Indian people in the present is their realisation as a fact that they are free and are in charge of maintaining and defending their freedom. What is most wanted is the enthusiastic response of

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2. The resolution referred to confirmed the resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee at Bardoli, 30 December 1941. "form of war" should read "form of war". See Appendix III.

3. The words ‘are important’ have been omitted here. Compare the text of this and the following para. with No. 507, para. 3.
the people, which cannot be evoked without the fullest trust in them and the
devolution of responsibility on them in the matter of Defence. It is only thus
that even in this grave eleventh hour it may be possible to galvanise the people
of India to rise to the height of the occasion. It is manifest that the present
Government of India, as well as its Provincial agencies, are lacking in com-
petence and are incapable of shouldering the burden of India’s defence. It is
only the people of India, through their popular representatives, who may
shoulder this burden worthily. But that can only be done by present freedom
and full responsibility being cast upon them. The Committee are, therefore,
able to accept the proposals put forward on behalf of the British War
Cabinet.

606

Resolution of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee

Cmd. 6550

Issued 11 April 1942

The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League have given their
most earnest and careful consideration to the announcement made by Mr.
Churchill, the British Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on March 11th
1942 and the Draft Declaration of the War Cabinet of His Majesty’s Govern-
ment regarding the future of India, and also the interim proposals during the
critical period which now faces India for the immediate participation of the
Leaders of the principal sections of the Indian People in the counsels of their
country.

The Committee appreciate that the British Prime Minister in his pronunc-
ment made it clear that the draft Declaration embodied only the proposals of
His Majesty’s Government and not their decision, and that they are subject
to agreement between the main elements in India; thus maintaining the validity
of the Declaration of August 8th 1940, which had promised to the Moslems
that neither the machinery for the framing of the Constitution should be set
up, nor the Constitution itself should be enforced, without the approval and
consent of Moslem India.

The Committee, while expressing their gratification that the possibility of
Pakistan is recognised by implication by providing for the establishment of
two or more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His
Majesty’s Government embodying the fundamentals are not open to any
modification and therefore no alternative proposals are invited. In view of
the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty’s Government with regard to the
fundamentals not being open to any modification, the Committee have no
alternative but to say that the proposals in their present form are unacceptable to them for the following reasons:

(1) The Mussalmans, after 25 years of genuine efforts for the reconciliation of the two major communities and the bitter experience of the failure of such efforts, are convinced that it is neither just nor possible, in the interests of peace and the happiness of the two peoples, to compel to constitute one Indian Union composed of the two principal nations—Hindus and Moslems: but this appears to be the main object of His Majesty’s Government as adumbrated in the preamble of the draft Declaration, the creation of more than one Union being relegated only to the realm of remote possibility, and is purely illusory.

(2) In the draft Declaration a constitution-making body has been proposed with the primary object of creating one Indian Union. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, it has finally decided that the only solution of India’s constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones: and it will therefore be unfair to the Moslems to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union. With conditions as they are it will be not only futile but on the contrary may exacerbate bitterness and animosity amongst the various elements in the country.

The machinery which has been proposed for the creation of the constitution-making body, namely that it will consist of members elected by the newly elected Lower Houses of the eleven Provinces upon the cessation of hostilities as a single electoral College by the system of proportional representation, is a fundamental departure from the right of the Mussalmans hitherto enjoyed by them to elect their representatives by means of separate electorates, which is the only sure way in which true representatives of the Mussalmans can be chosen.

The constitution-making body will take decisions by a bare majority on all questions of the most vital and paramount character involved in the framing of the Constitution, which is a departure from the fundamental principles of justice and contrary to constitutional practice so far followed in the various countries and Dominions; and the Mussalmans by agreeing to this will, instead of exercising their right and judgement as a constituent factor, be at the entire mercy of the constitution-making body in which they will be a minority of about 25 per cent.

(3) The right of non-accession to the Union as contemplated in the draft Declaration has been conceded presumably in response to the insistent demands

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1 The text of this resolution was transmitted by Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery in telegram 1070–S of 16 April. L/l/l/751: ff 300–1.
2 See Nos. 308 and 309.
3 Appendix I.
by the Mussalmans for the partition of India: but the method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed object; for in the draft proposals the right of non-accession has been given to the existing Provinces which have been formed from time to time for administrative convenience and on no logical basis.

The Mussalmans cannot be satisfied by such a Declaration on a vital question affecting their future destiny, and demand a clear and precise pronouncement on the subject. Any attempt to solve the future problem of India by the process of evading the real issue is to court disaster.

In the draft proposals no procedure has been laid down as to how the verdict of the Province is to be obtained in favour of or against accession to the one Union, but in the letter dated April 2nd4 from the Secretary of Sir Stafford Cripps addressed to the President of the All-India Muslim League it is stated that “a Province should reach the decision whether or not to stand out of the Union by a vote in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution to stand in”.

If the majority for accession to the Union is less that 60 per cent. the minority will have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. In this connection it must be emphasised that in the Provinces where the Mussalmans are in a majority, as in the case of the major Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, they are in a minority in the Legislative Assemblies, and in the Assemblies of Sind and the North-West Frontier Province the total number (namely 60 and 50 respectively) is so small and the weightage given to the non-Moslems so heavy that it can be easily manipulated, and a decision under such conditions cannot be the true criterion of ascertaining the real opinion of the Mussalmans of those Provinces.

As regards the suggested plebiscite in the Provinces in which the Mussalmans are in a majority, in the event of the requisite majority not being available in the Legislative Assemblies, the procedure laid down is that reference shall be made to the whole adult population of the Provinces and not to the Mussalmans alone; which is to deny them the inherent right to self-determination.

(4) With regard to the Indian States, it is the considered opinion of the Committee that it is a matter for them to decide whether to join or not to join or form a Union.

(5) With regard to the Treaties to be negotiated between the Crown and the Indian Union or Unions, the proposals do not indicate as to what would happen in case of disagreement on the terms between the contracting parties; nor is there any provision made as to what would be the procedure when there is a difference of opinion in negotiating a revision of treaty arrangements with the Indian States in the new situation.

(6) With regard to the interim arrangement there is no definite proposal
except the bare statement that His Majesty's Government desire and invite the effective and immediate participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations. The Committee are therefore unable to express their opinion until a complete picture is available. Another reason why the Committee are unable to express their opinion on the interim arrangements for participation in the counsels of the country is that Sir Stafford Cripps has made it clear that the scheme goes through as a whole or is rejected as a whole, and that it would not be possible to retain only the part relating to the immediate arrangements at the centre and discard the rest of the draft scheme; and as the Committee has come to the conclusion that the proposals for the future are unacceptable, it will serve no useful purpose to deal further with the question of the immediate arrangements.

See No. 497.

607

Note by Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/141

Diary. 11 April 1942

Sir Stafford Cripps attended a meeting of the Executive Council at which he personally explained the circumstances in which his enquiries had proved abortive, but expressed his confidence and hope that the fact that they had taken place would be not without its advantages from the point of view of future relations between India and H.M.G.

Sir R. Mudaliar on behalf of "some of my colleagues" expressed with some vigour his feeling that the position of the Executive Council had been extremely difficult during these last few days, and was supported in this by Sir Homi Mody. The clear implication was that the Council might reasonably claim that it had not been treated with sufficient consideration or courtesy, or in a manner due to the Government of the country; and that whatever may have been the fate of Sir Stafford's mission, the fact that it had taken place; that certain proposals had been put forward by a representative of H.M.G.; and that negotiations had been conducted at great length with the major political parties, made a difference to the situation—had produced indeed a new situation, the extent of which could not be overlooked or its importance minimised. Sir R. Mudaliar hinted that certain representations from his friends and himself might be anticipated, and that he was anxious that Sir Stafford Cripps should let H.M.G. know that this was the case and that some degree of feeling existed inside the Council.
Sir Stafford said that these were matters essentially for the Governor-General, and that it might always be assumed that what the Governor-General saw fit to forward to His Majesty's Government would receive the consideration it deserved.

Sir Stafford Cripps addressed a press conference at 12 noon.

J. G. L.,—11.4.42.

608

Sir S. Cripps to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 11 April 1942

My dear Viceroy,

May I make a parting request to the Government of India through you? I would dearly appreciate it if they could see their way to liberate all the students now detained as a gesture of their goodwill to the young people of India. I am certain that the great majority of them will be most valuable helpers in the Defence of India and the risk of releasing any who will do any harm is small enough to make it worth while.

The gesture will do a great deal to reinforce the efforts of those students outside who are trying to concert their whole body to an intensive war effort.

I shall be most grateful if this can be done.

Yours very sincerely,

STAFFORD CRIPPS.

609

Broadcast by Sir S. Cripps (Extract)

L/P&J/8/510: ff 559-60

NEW DELHI, 11 April 1942

You will have heard that the Draft Declaration which I brought to India on behalf of the War Cabinet and which I explained to you the last time I spoke over the wireless\(^1\) has been rejected by your leaders. I am sad that this great opportunity of rallying India for her defence and her freedom has been missed. No one could have been more fully conscious than I of the great difficulties which history placed in the way of a settlement of relations between the British and Indian peoples and even more between the different communities in India.

The War Cabinet in sending me on this mission realised to the full that
Indian opinion—though united in a desire for full self-government—was widely disunited as to the methods by which it should be attained. It was with these wide differences of view we had to deal and it would have been no use if we had closed our eyes to the hard realities of the situation.

In the past British Governments have been accused of using vague terms to cloak a lack of purpose; and when they stated that it must be left to the Indian communities to agree among themselves it has been said that this was only a device by which Great Britain might indefinitely retain its control over India. But Congress since the outbreak of war has repeatedly demanded two essentials as a basis for its support of the Allied effort in the war—first a declaration of Indian independence and, second, a Constituent Assembly to frame a new and free constitution for India.

Both of these demands find their place in the Draft Declaration. It was in the light of the demands and criticism of India’s leaders that the War Cabinet drafted their Declaration with the object of convincing the Indian peoples and world public opinion of the sincerity of their desire to offer freedom to India at the earliest practicable moment.

To avoid complaints that had been made in the past they put out a clear and precise plan which would avoid all possibility of Indian self-government being held up by the views of some large section or community. But they left it open for Indian leaders to agree upon an alternative method if they wished.

Of course every individual and organisation would have liked the Draft Declaration to express his or their point of view, forgetting that if it did it would inevitably have been rejected by others.

The War Cabinet were thus in a position rather like an arbitrator who tries to arrange a fair compromise between conflicting points of view. They could not, however, without denying the very freedom which they were offering, impose a form of government upon the Indian peoples which they did not themselves freely choose.

Criticism has been showered on the scheme from all sides; parties and individuals vied with one another in a competition to discover the greatest number of defects. But in all this spate of criticism those vital parts of the document with which all agree have never been mentioned. Full and free self-government for India—that is its central feature.

This critical and unconstructive attitude, natural enough in the law courts or in the market place, is not the best way of arriving at a compromise, but compromise there must be if a strong and free India is to come into being.

Some day, somehow, the great communities and parties in India will have to agree upon a method of framing their new constitution.

I regret profoundly for the sake of India, for whom I have a deep and admiring friendship, that the opportunity now offered has not been accepted.

1 No. 457.
But all this concerns the future. The immediate difficulties have been as regards the present. First, there was difficulty as to defence. Upon that, the attitude of the British Government was very simple. For many decades the defence of India has been in charge of His Majesty’s Government. That charge has been carried out for over 20 years by the Commander-in-Chief, who is also Defence Member in the Viceroy’s Executive Council.

This led to an organisation which places control of the armed forces under a Defence Secretariat headed by the Commander-in-Chief. The Army in India—containing British and Indian units—the Navy and Air Force all come under this supreme command.

The demand has been made that the defence of India should be placed in Indian hands. No one suggests that the Commander-in-Chief, as head of the armed forces, should be under the Indian Government but they say his functions as Defence Member should be transferred to an Indian.

This may sound simple—it would mean a long and difficult reorganisation of the whole Defence Secretariat—an unscrambling of eggs scrambled many years ago—which would cause delay and confusion at the very moment when the enemy is at the gates and the maximum speed and efficiency are essential in defence. The duty of the British Government to defend India and our duty to our American allies, who are giving such valuable help, makes such a course impossible.

To show our complete sincerity and desire to give representative Indian Members on the Executive Council maximum power we offered to create a new War Department which would take over the governmental relations of the Commander-in-Chief’s general headquarters and the Naval and Air headquarters and which would be in his charge as War Member, leaving the rest of defence—a Department with a number of most important functions added—to an Indian Defence Member.

This arrangement satisfied some of the parties but not Congress, who demanded a degree of control for the Indian Defence Member which might have greatly jeopardized the Allied war effort in India.

In the wider area of defence, which touches almost every Department of the Raj, administration would have been wholly under the control of representative Indians.

But none of these things were the real cause of the breakdown in the negotiations.

In their final letter addressed to me the Congress Working Committee stated that the temporary form of government envisaged during the war was not such as to enable them to join the Government. They have two suggestions to remedy the situation: first, an immediate change of constitution—a point raised at the last moment and one that everyone else admitted to be wholly impracticable while the war is proceeding; and, second, that they are prepared
to enter a true National Government with a Cabinet of Indian leaders untrammelled by any control by the Viceroy or the British Cabinet.

Realise what this means. Government for an indefinite period by a set of persons nominated by Indian parties responsible to no Legislature or electorate, incapable of being changed and the majority of whom would be in a position to dominate large minorities.

It is easy to understand that the great minorities in India would never accept such a system. Nor could His Majesty's Government, who have given pledges to those minorities, consent to their being placed unprotected, while the existing constitution lasts, under simple and possibly inimical majority rule.

It would be a breach of all the pledges that we have given. Such a solution may sound simple and attractive to those who have no knowledge of the deep communal divisions in India, but it is in fact wholly impracticable and would never be accepted by very large sections of the Indian peoples. Congress suggested that without these changes they cannot give a lead to the Indian people.

The essential need of India today is for all the leaders of all the main parties and communities to come together in a single National Government. A scheme that attracts some and repels others, such as Congress has suggested, is of little value. Nor does the precise form matter so greatly. Inspiration and leadership are not to be found in form or conventions, they will be demonstrated by combined purpose and unity of action.

No constitution and no convention will work unless those who lead the people will come together with a common determination to make it work. Had the Congress leaders felt themselves able to join with other leaders who were willing, then indeed great work ought to have been accomplished.

One thing I must make clear. I alone in India carry responsibility for what has been done. Neither the Viceroy nor the Commander-in-Chief carries any responsibility for these negotiations. They have throughout done their utmost to help me and I express to them and many other willing helpers of all nationalities my sincerest thanks for that help.

We have tried by the offer that I brought to help India along her road to victory and freedom. But for the moment past distrust has proved too strong to allow a present agreement. But in that failure to achieve immediate results there is no bitterness. Our effort has been genuine. No responsible Indian has questioned the sincerity of our main purpose—complete freedom for India.

Such an effort, inspired by goodwill and sincerity, will leave its mark upon the history of our relations and will cast its beneficent light forward into the future—it will prove to have been the first step along the path of freedom for India and of friendship between our two countries.

[The remainder of the broadcast consisted of an appeal to the Indian people to support the war effort of the Allied Nations.]
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

What a time you have had of it! And what a relief now that it is over! It is clear from the telegrams that bearings between you and Cripps must have been getting pretty heated during the last few days, and indeed they were getting pretty heated between him and the Cabinet. It does seem to me that the longer he stayed out there, the more his keenness on a settlement drew him away from the original plan on which we had all agreed, and in the direction of something to which we were all opposed. Our whole conception was to put an end to all doubts about our complete sincerity as to the future and to hope that in the light of that Indians would co-operate within the present constitutional scheme. What we were quite clearly opposed to was anything in the nature of a Sapru National Government responsible to no one. Yet at the last moment, when it came to suggesting that the new “National Government” should work under some sort of convention, Cripps was getting very near giving the whole case away, and you will have seen how strongly we reacted to that in the telegram which I drafted in the course of yesterday afternoon’s Cabinet meeting. What puzzles me a little is that Cripps should have been prepared to go that far with Congress without realising that this was the very thing against which Jinnah said the Muslims would rise in revolt.²

2. What I must say we have felt here rather strongly is that neither Cripps nor yourself has given us any clear indication of how far you were either prepared to go between you, or how far Cripps went in his talks with Indian leaders, in the direction of reconstituting your Executive. It was only through a casual reference in Cripps’ letter to Azad³ that we realised that the Home Affairs Department—surely the most dangerous in many ways as well as the most contentious between the communities—had been offered. (2) We have no idea whether Finance was offered as well, or whether the European official members were to have been kept in their original or in other posts. That, too,

INDIA OFFICE, 11 April 1942

Some day when I have handed over charge, I will give L. S. A. my views. Till then—least said soonest mended!

L.

How could I help when I was consulted by Cripps about nothing?

L.

1.² Done without consultation and protested against by me the moment C. told me he had done it.
2. Chucked away despite my strong protest.

L.
undoubtedly frightened Winston and the Cabinet, for our idea when Cripps left was certain[ly?] not that of a completely clean sweep of the existing Executive, except for the Commander-in-Chief, but only of a substantial reconstitution which might possibly include Finance as well as part of Defence, but still leave you with some of your old Advisers, as well as with a balancing element, neither Hindu nor Muslim, which would get over Jinnah's otherwise not unreasonable demand for half the seats.

Cripps told me that Cabinet had given him permission to go the length of 100 per cent Indianization, if necessary.5

3. Well, all that is now back history, though it will still be interesting to know how far you yourself have been prepared to go and what was actually offered. I don't suppose Jinnah will want to seem less nationalist than Congress and therefore to come in under the existing constitution. If he does, I suppose you could give him certain seats, balancing his men with Ambedkar and possibly a new Hindu or two, but still retaining the majority of your existing Executive? Or you may simply decide to drop all idea of bringing in political leaders from either of the two main parties and fill up on the lines you were contemplating before all this emerged?

I think S. or S. knows J.'s terms.

4. So far as the effect outside India is concerned it seems to me likely to be all to the good. For the first time America will have learnt something about the complexities of Indian affairs and of the intransigence of Congress politicians and their underlying refusal to face responsibility. Here at home we ought to have a public opinion united in the main, though I imagine that a certain element of the extreme Left will begin before another six months are out clamouring for us to do something new and not preserve the die-hard attitude shown by Cripps! When it comes to India, I confess I find it very difficult to form any sort of idea of what will be the outcome. You have escaped being saddled with a probably quite unworkable team. Will your present team have been so badly shaken by the uncertainties of the last three weeks as to be weaker, or will they now feel themselves firmly in the saddle and prepared to take responsibilities which may become very grave before long? From the point of

1 No. 581. 2 See No. 170, para. 3. 3 No. 543. 4 This marginal note evidently refers to the second sentence of para. 2. 5 See No. 539.
view of Indian politics generally I should have thought that it was a substantial
gain to have brought home to all parties, and to Congress above all,
that a united India can only be preserved by agreement and compromise and
not by agitating against the British Government. On the other hand, there is,
of course, the danger that instead of facing the need for compromise, the dif-
ferent factions, Hindu and Muslim, Muslim and Sikh, may be even more
antagonistic to each other and organise against each other, possibly to the
serious detriment of recruiting. Then there is the actual attitude of the parties
towards the war. Will Congress drift into a position of definite antagonism,
with a fifth columnist outer wing, in which case we shall have to be absolutely
firm in locking them all up, or will they
be at heart a little ashamed of themselves
and give a certain measure of co-opera-
tion? The Muslim League, I suppose,
will still be officially non-co-operative,
but probably more co-operative than
hitherto in practice in view of the
definite concession to the possibility
of Pakistan that we have made?

My fear is that Nehru and Raja-
gopalacharia will shout “forward”
while the back rows do the 5th
column stuff!

5. To turn to the really bigger issues, I am very much afraid that the naval
inactivity of the Americans has allowed the Japanese to bring a formidable
battle fleet into the Indian Ocean and push our fleet away, not without sad
loss, but happily without annihilation. In these conditions the invasion of
Ceylon may become a very serious problem and if Ceylon went as well as
Burma you would be indeed largely not only open to attack from more than
one side, but also seriously blockaded. However, it is no use being pessimistic.
Ceylon is well garrisoned, especially on the air side, and Burma has been
gaining time very gallantly in spite of woeful deficiency in the air. I need not
tell you how keenly I sympathise with Wavell in his desire for more air force;
but, the organisation being what it is, it seems impossible to send him what he
wants at any rate in the near future.

[Para. 6, on the inadequacy of the Chiefs of Staff organisation, and para. 7,
on Chiang Kai-shek’s G.C.B. insignia, omitted.]

8. I do hope that, after this last hectic three weeks, you will be able to get
a little bit of rest and that you will not be too much exhausted by your heroic
decision to stay on in Delhi through the hot weather.

All good luck for the next chapter.

P.S. We have seen your son John
once or twice lately. He seems in very
good form.

He reports how kind Mrs. A. and
you have been to him and I am
most grateful.
President Roosevelt to Mr Hopkins

Telegram, R/30/1/1: ff 5–8

12 April 1942

Kindly give the following message immediately to the former Naval Person: every effort must be made by us to prevent a break-down.

(Quote) I hope most earnestly that you may be able to postpone the departure from India of Cripps until one more effort has finally been made to prevent break-down of the negotiations.

I regret to say that I am unable to agree with the point of view contained in your message1 to me, that public opinion in the United States believes that negotiations have broken down on general broad issues. Here the general impression is quite the contrary. The feeling is held almost universally that the deadlock has been due to the British Government’s unwillingness to concede the right of self-government to the Indians notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust to the competent British authorities technical military and naval defence control. It is impossible for American public opinion to understand why, if there is willingness on the part of the British Government to permit the component parts of India to secede after the war from the British Empire, it is unwilling to permit them to enjoy during the war what is tantamount to self-government.

I feel that I am compelled to place before you this issue very frankly, and I know you will understand my reasons for doing this. Should the current negotiations be allowed to collapse because of the issues as presented to the people of America and should India subsequently be invaded successfully by Japan with attendant serious defeats of a military or naval character for our side, it would be hard to over-estimate the prejudicial reaction on American public opinion. Would it not be possible, therefore, for you to have Cripps’ departure postponed on the ground that you personally transmitted instructions to him to make a final effort to find a common ground of understanding? According to my reading, an agreement appeared very near last Thursday night.2 If you could authorize him to say that he was personally empowered by you to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that both sides would make minor concessions, it appears to me that an agreement might be yet found.

As I expressed to you in an earlier message,3 I still feel that if the component groups in India could be given now the opportunity to set up a Nationalist Government in essence similar to our own form of government under the

1 See No. 597, the text of which, with that of No. 588, was transmitted by Mr Churchill to President Roosevelt on 11 April. R/30/1/1: ff 9–10.
2 9 April.
3 No. 311.
Articles of Confederation with the understanding that following the termination of a period of trial and error they would be enabled then to determine upon their own form of constitution and to determine, as you have promised them already, their future relationship with the British Empire, probably a solution could be found. If you were to make such an effort and if Cripps were still unable then to find an agreement, at least you would on that issue have public opinion in the United States be satisfied that the British Government had made a fair and real offer to the Indian people and that the responsibility for such failure must be placed clearly, not upon the British Government, but upon the Indian people. (Ends)

612

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, 12 April 1942, 2.5 pm

Received: 12 April, 1.30 pm

No. 1004-S. Your private and personal telegram of 10th April, No. 466.\(^1\) Matter is largely disposed of by failure of Cripps’ negotiations. Position is briefly as follows:

(a) I am entirely uncommitted as regards elimination of Service element and have never conceded this. I suspect however that Cripps has gone a considerable distance in formal\(^2\) conversation to compromise possibility of its retention in the event of His Majesty’s Government’s scheme going through.

(b) At no point has he, so far as I understand, got down to detail with the parties as regards nature of reconstitution of Executive Council which (rightly) he regarded as being a matter for me to settle.

(c) Nor have I got down to it, for there has been no necessity to do so from the point of view of the progress of Cripps’ negotiations up to the date of their collapse.

2. I shall of course now have to consider what line to take. I gave you in my telegram of 11th April, No. 987-S,\(^3\) my ideas as to tactics if Cripps’ negotiations succeeded. Now that we are driven back on retention of existing Council, problem is a very much more restricted one, I will let you have my recommendations in due course.

\(^1\) No. 579. \(^2\) ‘in informal’ was probably intended. Cf. No. 634, para. 1. \(^3\) No. 598.
613

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

12 April 1942

No. 1006-S. Paragraph 4 of Cripps' reply¹ to Azad suggests that we were committed to transfer certainly of Home and possibly of Finance to 'representative Indians'. I have throughout made it clear to Cripps that we must regard ourselves as entirely uncommitted on the question of the retention of Service element in Council, and so in the immediate present of Home and Finance (compare in this connection 3rd paragraph of my telegram No. 979-S² of 10th April). Only importance of point in present connection is that if and when constitutional discussion is resumed suggestion will no doubt now be made that we start on the basis that Service membership must disappear. We clearly however shall have to make the best of that. But perhaps you will find it possible to save the point in the debate. It is worth doing if you can because of the scarcity of bargaining counters in our hand.

¹ No. 590. ² No. 584.

614

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 12 April 1942, 10.40 pm

Received: 12 April, 10.30 pm

No. 1012-S. Cripps told me yesterday that he thought that Jinnah and possibly the Mahasabha would be willing to come into an Expanded Council now, and I have been at pains to take informal soundings of Jinnah and try to ascertain whether there was serious foundation for this. I gathered from Firoz that Jinnah's tactics were likely to be to pose as willing to co-operate, but that in practice he would not be willing to come in since he would be afraid to do so without Congress and apprehensive that, in the event of sanctions having to be applied to Hindus without Congress in the Central Government, a violent counter-attack would be launched on him.

2. I have now had a further report of soundings taken by Firoz. Jinnah, he says, would be delighted to come in even in absence of Congress, on following terms: Council of 15—eight from Muslim League, probably two from Mahasabha to be put in by Viceroy; in addition depressed class and Sikh representatives
to be approved by Jinnah. This would in effect give Jinnah a minimum of two-thirds of the Council. It is quite clear that there is nothing doing on this basis and I suspect that Jinnah has deliberately pitched his terms high so as to be able to claim that he is prepared to co-operate without, in fact, having to take the responsibility of doing so. I daresay all parties will now tend to lie back till Parliamentary reaction is seen.

3. I am confirmed in my view that we shall do well now to go quiet for the next few days and let the dust settle. It does not look as if there is any prospect of getting the Muslim League, even after an interval, and I shall be much surprised if Cripps’ anticipations\(^1\) that the All-India Congress Committee will be more reasonable than the Working Committee, are realised, though by the time it meets (28th–29th April) a desire to save face so far as possible and avoid carrying responsibility for this breakdown will no doubt be apparent.

\(^1\) See No. 599.

615

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

12 April 1942

No. 1013-S. Herbert who has just been here has begged that following message should be communicated to you with request that if you see no objection it should be communicated to Prime Minister. He has given a copy to Cripps, who, he tells me, agrees with views expressed in the message and will mention it when he gets home:

Begins. I have on previous occasions expressed my views on the political considerations affecting the defence of India. The present situation calls for reiteration and elaboration of these views.

2. British prestige—still the important factor in the stability of government—has obviously been weakened by the loss of Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon and much of Burma. These losses have followed upon publications which gave rise to confidence in our preparedness, and have inevitably resulted in a genuine feeling of insecurity. That feeling has been voiced in Gandhi’s criticism that Britain’s post-war constitutional proposals for India amount to a post-dated cheque on a bank of doubtful solvency. The fact must be faced that this feeling exists, and will become intensified with the continuance of Japanese successes. As the belief grows of our inability to hold the enemy and consequently to hold India, the threat to internal security, and the danger of communal strife,
and even of uprisings, is accentuated. Intelligence reports already show a strong inclination to hedge against Japanese victory. Donors to War Funds prefer to remain anonymous to avoid victimisation by the invader while subversive groups are attempting amalgamation in the hope that they will be recognised by Japan as the predominant party.

3. The abandonment of the Calcutta area would not only deprive India of more than half of her war production but would be such a severe blow to prestige that any belief in our ability to resist the enemy would disappear. The loss of Calcutta would prove tantamount to the loss of India and it might well be followed by a state of widespread chaos completely interrupting lines of communication and all prospect of any retirement to a western strategic line. The moral effect will probably also undermine China’s will for further resistance.

4. These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the defence of East India is a matter of paramount importance affecting the whole war issue. It would be a fatal and irretrievable mistake to undertake the defence of Calcutta and then fail. If the decision of the War Cabinet is to defend East India and Calcutta, the defences must be sufficient beyond all possible doubt, and this decision implies that the War Cabinet is prepared to provide by land, sea and particularly in the air, such forces as are considered fully adequate.

5. I cannot guarantee to obtain the wholehearted support of my Ministry if there is any suspicion that it is not the intention of the War Cabinet to send all the forces required for the defence of East India. If there were any genuine doubt not only of our ability, but of our intention to hold East India and Calcutta, the danger of collapse of public morale would become imminent.

6. Although it is not for me to assess the adequacy of military preparations, I feel bound to mention the result on public morale and hence on internal security in East India of any apparent weakness in our defences. Ends.

I am as you know fully alive to the vital importance of this whole matter and have both directly and indirectly pressed as hard as I could for adequate reinforcements for this area. As a special case and in view of his discussions with Cripps, I am prepared to send Herbert’s message which, as I say, he is most keen you should let Winston see.
616
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery
Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
No. 1014–S. My telegram No. 1013–S. Herbert has been a great nuisance about this, but without breaking his heart I do not think I can turn it down flat and it is for that reason, even at the risk of over-clogging the market, that I have passed this on to you.

1 No. 615.

617
Mr Churchill to President Roosevelt (Extract)
Telegram, R/30/1/1: ff 2–4

CLEAR THE LINE
PERSONAL AND SECRET
Former Naval Person to President. No. 68

[Paras. 1 and 2 deal with war strategy.]

3. About 3 a.m. this morning, the twelfth, when contrary to your instructions1 Harry and I were still talking, the text of your message2 to me about India came through from London. I could not decide such a matter without convening the Cabinet, which was not physically possible till Monday. Meanwhile Cripps had already left and all the explanations have been published by both sides. In these circumstances Harry undertook to telephone to you explaining the position but owing to atmospherics he could not get through. He is going to telephone you this afternoon and also cable you a report.

4. You know the weight which I attach to everything you say to me, but I did not feel I could take responsibility for the defence of India if everything has again to be thrown into the melting-pot at this critical juncture. That I am sure would be the view of Cabinet and of Parliament. As your telegram was addressed to Former Naval Person I am treating it as purely private, and I do not propose to bring it before the Cabinet officially unless you tell me you wish this done. Anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart and would surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of this terrible struggle.

1 About Mr Hopkins’ health. 2 No. 611.
618
The Marquess of Linlithgow to MR Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

NEW DELHI, 13 April 1942, 11.50 pm
Received: 14 April, 1.30 am

No. 1035-S. Reference my telegram No. 997-S, dated April 11th. Question reveals fundamental misconceptions and ignores differences, between United Kingdom and India, of climate, transport facilities and conditions of social life; there are many places where hardly any amenities worth the name exist. Need for relaxation greater in tropics more especially under the heavy pressure at which Europeans in India have been working without leave for some years. Petrol rationing more burdensome in conditions of greater distance and inadequate public transport facilities. Owing necessity of catering for varying diets of Indians and Europeans meals in restaurants, hotels or at private dinners bound to appear extravagant according English standards. Racing supported predominantly by indigenous population though controlled largely by Europeans or Australians is substantial source of revenue to Provinces and makes valuable contribution to War Funds. Moreover difficult understand why racing here regarded reprehensible when professional football and greyhound racing tolerated United Kingdom. In spite rigours of climate pressure of work and other hardships European community has drastically curtailed relaxation amenities and luxuries. Social functions almost entirely discarded. Late hours in hotels and restaurants are prohibited. Use of cars greatly limited, consumption of liquors very substantially reduced and the only relaxations which Europeans generally permit themselves are occasional visits to early dances or cinema performances. The problem now is not further curtailment of amusement, &c., but finding means avoid, for lack reasonable relaxation, depression and demoralization setting in.

Foregoing would show European community in India already on War basis and criticism implied in questions misconceived. Europeans here keenly resent attempts malign their War effort and would suggest sharp answer to discourage them in future.

1 Stating that material was being collected for reply to Parliamentary Question referred to in No. 490. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.
619

Mr Turnbull to Sir D. Monteath (via Viceroy)

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f150

NEW DELHI, 13 April 1942, 9.30 pm
Received: 14 April, 1.30 am

1036-S. Personal from Turnbull for Monteath.
Congress President asked for and was given permission to publish closing
letters exchanged with Sir Stafford and other correspondence. In Sunday's
morning's press here they published not only correspondence but formulae
on defence the last of which was described as Cripps-Johnson formula. This
formula was (as explained in one of Sir Stafford Cripps' last telegrams) subsequently modified at last interview with Nehru and Azad.

As there is possibility that formula may become important document if at
any time Executive Council is constituted in future, I suggest that it should
be made plain when Sir Stafford Cripps speaks in the House that Congress
subsequently had accepted orally some modifications and that after his return
final version be published. I have no papers with me but modifications were I
feel sure telegraphed after final interview.

1 Nos. 590 and 604. 2 12 April. 3 No. 577, para. 2.

620

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

SECRET

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

No. U.P.-132

13 April 1942

My dear Lord Linlithgow,
Now that the Cripps mission has ended, I feel it desirable to put before you
some of my ideas on the position. I have had a talk with Sir J. P. Srivastava
who was up in Delhi lately attending the National Defence Council and he of
course is full of stories and rumours. But it is clear that what he and a good
many others who have been actively supporting war effort feel is that the whole
discussions were conducted with Congress, that Congress was given the pre-
dominant position and that other associations were treated with contempt.
I need not repeat the stories he told me, but I gather that the Hindu Mahasabha
and the Sikhs were very annoyed. But it is satisfactory that the Sabha have made
a definite offer of further co-operation. What Sir J. P. and others also are, I think, apprehensive about is that yet another attempt may be made to conciliate Congress, as has been done in the past.

2. Many of the comments in the papers appear to be based on the assumption that war effort cannot be increased or intensified without Congress or cannot be increased to the extent desirable. I have myself always been very sceptical as to whether Congress could render any real help; there would be some influence by Gandhi’s non-violent theories; others would be obsessed by hatred of Great Britain; others would merely think of saving their own skins or property, e.g., the critics of the scorched earth policy; others would be influenced by the Left Wing and the Forward Bloc, for my experience shows how the Ministry in this Province was becoming more and more obedient to the Left Wing; others would be quite incompetent as administrators. For these reasons it seems to me not merely useless but dangerous to make any further attempt to conciliate the irreconcilable, especially if that means still further alienating those who support us. Of course there is much speculation as to the inner history of the discussions and as to the reasons why they finally broke down. If we assume that Congress were really out to help in the war—and Nehru’s recent statements are obviously designed to create this impression and to impress American opinion—then there was not much likelihood of a fundamental difference between the Viceroy and his Cabinet or Council. The matter might have been settled in much the same way as the question of Governor’s special powers was settled in 1937 and indeed the Hindustan Times of April 12th makes this suggestion. But it looks to me that there must have been more serious apprehensions than this and I see M. N. Roy in today’s Statesman writes as follows: “The British offer also visualised transfer of real power to wage war for the defence of the country. Only the power to make peace with invader instead of resisting him was withheld. Congress leaders for one reason or another have indeed talked of the possibility of making peace with the invader on honourable terms.” The National Herald of Sunday, April 12th, does not of course go so far as to make any suggestion that they wanted the power to make peace, but it takes a very different line from the Hindustan Times. It says: “The people of the country have two plain alternatives before them—fighting with honour for freedom and not fighting at all. Repeatedly they have tried the first alternative, at times even bearing with patience stupid and calculated insults. Once again they have been insulted after prolonged parleys and after pretence of friendly settlement in the offing. They now fall back on the second alternative which in fact has been their position from the beginning of the war.” Possibly it is not very profitable to make these quotations or to base any inference on them. But apart from the desire to make peace with Japan because of hatred of Great Britain, a desire intensified perhaps by all the pernicious Tokyo
propaganda, there is the desire to make peace with the winning side, and no doubt many in this country think Japan will win. Recent naval losses and the loss of the American armies in the Bataan peninsula coming just at the time when the negotiations were drawing to an end may have influenced the Congress leaders.

3. I have written at undue length about Congress. We must [I?] feel now definitely regard them as irreconcilable and must cease to consider whether any action we take will further alienate Congress.

4. But the main important point is to rally our friends who, as I have said, are disheartened by the back seat allocated to them in the recent negotiations. It is not really for me to make suggestions as to what Your Excellency should do at the Centre and of course, as I fully recognise, much depends on Jinnah and the League. But if the League would come in as well as the Mahasabha and the Sikhs into an enlarged Executive Council, it would undoubtedly improve our position. At present the rejection by Congress of His Majesty's Government's offer conveys to the world the impression that we have no friends in this country and that is very dangerous.

5. But as regards the provinces, Your Excellency mentioned to me the question of non-official Advisers or the alternative of a sort of Governor-in-Council Government. The latter as I said at the time seems out of the question; it would involve altering the Act as far as I can see and would involve also making use of the legislature which in this Province at least would be quite impossible. The possibility of coalition Ministries being ruled out, we must stick to Section 93. As regards non-official Advisers there is an alternative to having all the Advisers non-officials that I wish to put tentatively before Your Excellency, though of course once again a good deal depends on the League attitude. But I feel that any non-official Adviser would feel great difficulty in holding the Law and Order portfolio, involving as it would decisions or advice as to the action to be taken against Congress, even against the Left Wing. Any member of the Hindu Mahasabha who supported such action would jeopardise his chance of success in any election to be held after the war; any member of the Muslim League even if he took reasonable action would be confronted with grave opposition and communal tension would increase. It seems to me possible that members of these parties might prefer to leave the dirty work of dealing with Congress and other agitators to the officials. But it would I think definitely help war effort in the Province if I could bring in, say, 3 or 4 non-official Advisers to deal with war questions. One portfolio could be war production (I already have a special Secretary in charge of that and many important problems such as the transfer of factories and offices to the United Provinces arise); another could of course [be?] propaganda; a third could be civil defence and
A.R.P. A fourth portfolio might deal with price control. I should also of course consult these new Advisers if I found it desirable on other matters. This alternative might of course give rise to criticism, especially if other provinces had all non-official Advisers.

6. I am trying to find out about the League attitude, but I feel that this suggestion, though I admit it is tentative at present merits consideration and may help us to rally our supporters.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. HALLETT

P.S.V.— This is interesting as bringing Sir M. H. (never an enthusiast for non-official advisers) into line with my own immediate views. L.,—15.4.42.

621

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE VICE ROY’S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, 14 April 1942, 12.30 am

Received: 14 April, 1 am

No. 177–S.C. Following from Bajpai, dated 11th April:

Begins. Following for His Excellency the Viceroy. Now that negotiations in Delhi have unfortunately broken down I venture to suggest full inside story should be communicated to President as it is important that responsibility should be clearly placed where it lies. Otherwise there is risk that Congress sympathisers may twist stories to suit their own ends. President has extended to me privilege of direct access to him whenever I want but I should not in the least mind if task of apprising him of course of discussions were entrusted to someone else. Ends.

I appreciate importance of getting position across to President. But story, as you know, is a complicated one, and we must bear in mind not only fact that we shall not know what Colonel Johnson has reported, and embarrassment which would result from a conflict of testimony, but need to protect position of His Majesty’s Government and the Ambassador. I am inclined to let correspondence published speak for itself, and to ask Halifax through the Foreign

1 Mr Amery’s Private Secretary sent a copy of this telegram to Mr Churchill’s Private Secretary on 15 April under cover of a letter enquiring what action, if any, Mr Amery ought to take on it. Mr Churchill’s Private Secretary replied on 17 April that the Prime Minister had minuted on the telegram: ‘Better let it lie’. L/PJK/8/510: ff. 555–6.

2 Deciphered as ‘repeated’.

3 ‘Conflict of’ deciphered as ‘conflicting’.
Office while deploring breakdown, and fact that it is clearly attributable to profound internal suspicions and cleavages which have stood in the way in the past, to take the line that His Majesty’s Government though discouraged are not without hope for the future, that they remain as anxious as ever for a solution, and that they are in any event well satisfied as to the wisdom of having sent out Cripps, and as to the significance and value of their own declaration even if at this stage and for conflicting reasons, general support for it has not been forthcoming.

622

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&EJ/10/2: ff 136–7

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 14 April 1942, 9.45 pm

Received: 15 April

6722. White Paper is to be laid regarding Cripps’ Mission. I propose to include
(1) Prime Minister’s statement on March 11.1 (2) Draft Declaration as published.2
(3) Congress Resolution rejecting proposals.3 (4) Azad’s covering letter.4
(5) Cripps’ reply.5 (6) Azad’s further reply.6 (7) Muslim League Resolution
rejecting proposals.7 I have (1), (2) and (5) on official record. I think (3)
has been telegraphed by Reuters in full but please confirm. Please telegraph full
texts of (4), (6) and (7).

2. I understand Congress have also published in India texts of various Defence
formulae which were discussed. Please telegraph exactly which have been
published and with what explanatory matter so that I can include them with
appropriate explanation in White Paper.

1 No. 398 and 399. 2 No. 456. 3 No. 605. 4 No. 587. 5 No. 590.
6 No. 604. 7 No. 606.

623

Mr Churchill to Sir S. Cripps (via Foreign Office and H.M. Ambassador, Cairo)

Telegram, L/P&EJ/10/2: f 135

MOST IMMEDIATE

14 April 1942, 8.45 pm

No. 1112. Following from Prime Minister for Sir Stafford Cripps.
Parliament has asked for White Paper which we propose to lay containing:
(1) my statement of March 11th; (2) draft Declaration as published; (3) Con-
gress resolution rejecting proposals with Azad’s covering letter; (4) your reply in form of letter to Azad; (5) Azad’s further reply; (6) Moslem League resolution rejecting proposals. Only texts we have on official record are (1), (2) and (4). We are telegraphing to India for remainder.

2. We understand from India that in Sunday’s morning’s press Congress published not only correspondence but also formulae on defence, last of which was described as Cripps-Johnson formula, but not modifications in that formula suggested by Viceroy to which Congress agreed orally. We propose to include in White Paper various formulae followed by this note: ’Certain amendments in the last formula were suggested to the Congress leaders on April 10th and accepted orally by them. The final formula as amended was as follows’. Then would follow final formula as contained in your telegram 971–S of 10th April. Please telegraph whether you concur.

1 See notes to No. 622. 2 12 April. 3 No. 574.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&E/J10/2: f 138

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 14 April 1942, 11.20 pm

Received: 15 April

6739. My telegram No. 6722.1 I understand final formula contained in Cripps’ telegram 971–S2 was not published by Congress. Prime Minister has telegraphed3 to Cripps informing him of proposed White Paper and suggesting that this formula should also be included with following note preceding it:

Begins. Certain amendments in the last formula were suggested to Congress leaders on April 10th and accepted orally by them. The final formula as amended was as follows. Ends.

1 No. 622. 2 No. 574. 3 No. 623.
Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

CONFIDENTIAL

D.-o. No. 390

GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, 14 April 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am not troubling Your Excellency with a general report just at present, as we have discussed the Punjab and all-India affairs so recently at Delhi. But there is one point arising out of Sir Stafford’s mission which I should like to emphasize especially, as it appears to me to be of the greatest importance if the general war effort is not to be impaired.

One of the main reasons which led to the breakdown of the negotiations was no doubt the fact that party leaders were for the most part only interested to a minor extent in co-operating with Sir Stafford in his endeavour to find a practical solution of the constitutional problem: their main interest appeared to lie in using the opportunity to manœuvre their own particular parties, and in some cases themselves individually, into as prominent and unassailable a position as possible. As to the rank and file, now that no positive result has been secured, there are certainly a great many people of various persuasions who are unaffectedly disappointed. But this feeling is of course by no means universal and it would be futile to deny that there are considerable sections of the population who are unforgivably relieved at the thought that a settlement on the lines proposed has at least been deferred. Those who subscribe most strongly and most genuinely to this latter point of view pertain largely to minority communities the interests of which appeared to be adversely affected by the solution in prospect; perhaps the most prominent of all were the Sikhs. From the outset the Sikh community were very seriously perturbed by the potentially fissiparous nature of the War Cabinet’s proposals. The Sikhs were outspokenly apprehensive lest the Punjab should decline to accede to the all-India confederacy and should carry off the whole Province into the outer darkness of Pakistan. They regarded themselves as being in danger of everlasting subjection to an unsympathetic and tyrannical Muhammadan Raj. Unrest increased very markedly among the community and the danger to internal security became definitely more pronounced. We are doing what we can to deal with the situation. It is possible that, as things have turned out, those who have been making for trouble amongst the Sikhs will be less active or at least less successful in their attempts to represent the community as being threatened with extinction. But, if there is to be a real chance of things settling down in the Province while we get on with the war, surely it is essential to avoid giving any impression
that the ultimate solution of India’s problem will necessarily follow the same lines as those laid down in the recent formula. I see that the London Times\(^2\) is quoted in Reuter’s Government summary of yesterday as having said that the “permanent plan for India once set forth in this authoritative form remains the foundation of British policy”. If you agree with the views that I have expressed, may I suggest that a warning of the consequences involved by this kind of statement should be given without delay where it is due and that all possible steps should be taken forthwith to avoid including in any official or semi-official or inspired pronouncements, either in India or at home, words which can be taken to imply that the terms of the offer, now they have been rejected, will inevitably be renewed? It seems well that there should be a breathing space while those who genuinely desire to think things out can be given an opportunity of doing so, and while attention can be concentrated to the maximum extent possible on the war.

Yours sincerely,

B. J. GLANCY.

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\(^1\) A copy of this letter was sent to Mr Amery on 16 April. In addition Lord Linlithgow transmitted the concluding passage from ‘if there is to be a real chance’ in the fourth sentence from the end in telegram 263-S.C. of 23 April, observing that ‘I think it only right that you should be in possession of Glancy’s view’. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

\(^2\) Of 13 April.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

VICEROY’S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, 14 APRIL 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

By the last bag I received no fewer than five letters from you simultaneously, dated 28th February,\(^1\) 2nd March,\(^2\) 19th March,\(^3\) and two of the 24th March,\(^4\) the second\(^5\) about jurisdiction over American forces in the United Kingdom and in India. Many of the points arising out of those letters have inevitably been disposed of in the interval, and in particular Cripps’ discussions have reached their conclusion. But I will try later in my present letter to clear up any outstanding points that there may be.

\(^1\) Not printed. \(^2\) No. 218. \(^3\) No. 349. \(^4\) No. 375. \(^5\) Not printed.
2. The first and principal item for comment is, of course, the failure of the Cripps’ discussions. Here, too, we have been in the very closest touch by telegram throughout, and I should like to thank you again for all your help and sympathy. I will not conceal from you that I went through one or two somewhat difficult moments, and that in particular the fact that the “Cripps-Johnson” formula should have been put to the Congress without prior consultation with the Commander-in-Chief and myself had in it the elements of serious danger. However, I have no desire to conduct postmortems. I must say, writing for your own eye, that I was left with the strong impression that Cripps in his extreme anxiety to meet Congress claims and to secure the support from them which might have resulted in securing the support of other parties, may have taken chances in discussion which were dangerous, and I am confirmed in that view by statements such as those positively made by Kalam Azad in his letter of 11th April 6 to Cripps and not contradicted by the latter, that Cripps had talked very freely of a “National Government” presided over by the Viceroy who would stand in much the same relation to it as the King does at home. I pass no comment on that if it is correct; for of course any such arrangement would have gone far beyond the instructions of the Cabinet. But it is just conceivable that the Congress may genuinely have thought that we were in fact prepared to go very much farther in that direction than was the case; and one has seen too often the ease with which Europeans and Indians attach different meanings to the same words or phrases, and find themselves at cross purposes in consequence, with complete honesty on both sides, to feel much surprise if that should be correct.

3. As I told you by telegram, 7 Cripps, after the breakdown, felt that he had reason to think that if one made an immediate move to Jinnah and the Mahasabha one might be able to get them in. My own instinct, based on one’s own very considerable experience of this political problem, was that that was most unlikely to be the case so far as Jinnah was concerned, at any rate on any acceptable terms, and that in general the course of wisdom would be to let the dust settle a little and see reactions here to the failure of the negotiations, and reactions here also to the comment expressed on that failure at home and in the United States. However, I was at pains without delay, and before Cripps left, to sound Jinnah through Firoz Khan Noon, who has been a most useful intermediary, with the result which I have already reported to you by telegram. 8 It is quite clear that we could not contemplate tying ourselves to Jinnah to the extent that he would like us to, and I myself suspect that the true explanation of this excessive demand is either a desire to see how far we are on the run, or a desire to make demands so extensive that he knows that we could not possibly accept them and that he could therefore hope to be in a position to say that he was willing to co-operate if given real power, and that any responsibility for
non-co-operation rests with us in that his request for “real power” has not
been accepted. I only wish I had had Jinnah’s final figures before Cripps’ actual
departure, for their lesson is obvious.

4. I am not so much bothered by the Mahasabha. I dare say that one could
get another member of that body into my Council at any stage without any
difficulty—they would hate to be left out and they are passionately anxious,
despite the excessive claims they make from time to time, to have a finger in
the pie. However, having cleared the air as regards Jinnah, and in the light of
discussion with those best able to advise, I decided that I should be wise to
leave the pot to boil by itself for a few days; and I have moved out to Dehra
Dun where I hope to spend a week or so during which the air can clear and
whence I can get back to Delhi in 3 or 4 hours if either war or constitutional
developments make that necessary.

5. I shall look forward, I need not say, with the very greatest interest to
Cabinet reactions to Cripps’ report on his Mission, and I must with the
minimum of delay get down to formulating proposals for the expansion of my
Executive Council and the filling of the vacancies in it. I think, however, that
I should be wise to wait until the All-India Congress Committee and the
Working Committee have had their meetings on the 28th to 30th April. I doubt
very much (though Cripps is more optimistic) if anything that will help
materially will come out of those meetings, but it would be foolish to have
committed ourselves in advance of them to any course of action which would
provide Congress with a fresh target; and I shall be interested, in any event,
to see to what extent the meetings reflect a feeling of anxiety on the part of
Congress not to be saddled with responsibility for the rejection of the Cripps’
proposals. If my expansion is to be on a limited basis then what I have in mind
is something of the order of Usman (non-Muslim League), Jogendra Singh
(Sikh), Ambedkar (Depressed Classes), and Benthall (probably for the new
transport portfolio); while I might conceivably pick up somebody who is, or
has been, in touch with the States, and fill another portfolio or so by liberal
elements if I can find the right type of man. I shall have, as I calculate the
position, possibly almost half a dozen seats to fill, though it is not of course
necessary to fill them all at once. For there are vacancies in “Information”
and in “Communications”; the sub-division of the Communications portfolio
provides a third vacancy; a Member of Council would be the appropriate
choice for the War Cabinet; and if we were to have a High Commissioner in
Canada and to find someone of Council standing for that, that would give a
fifth seat; while there remains the question of the Pacific Council.

6. I ought to let you know (the point will no doubt be mentioned by Cripps,
but we may well hear more of it) that when he was good enough to inform my Council, before seeing the press, of the breakdown of the negotiations (his statement was balanced and admirable), something in the nature of a formal protest was made by Mudiali, on his own behalf and that of certain of his colleagues, at the manner in which the Executive Council had been treated over this matter. I enclose, for your entirely confidential record (as I am not placing it on record with the Council proceedings) a note by the Secretary of what passed—a note, I may say, which in some respects hardly represents the vigour with which this criticism was advanced. I had previously had the strongest protests from Indian members of the Council, who complained bitterly that they had not had the consideration to which they were entitled from Cripps or from the Cabinet: and that, though they were the Government of India, Cripps had come out with a concealed scheme, had negotiated freely with parties to the exclusion of Council, and had sorely humiliated that body before the public. I believe that feeling to be deep and real, and it may be a source of trouble to us. I have never known a stronger feeling of criticism and grievance among my colleagues than over this issue, and the handling of the discussions. I must of course wait and see what if any representations I get from Mudiali, Sultan Ahmed, and Mody, who are the three principally concerned, and I shall inform you by telegram of their nature once I receive them. But the point is one of some substance: these people feel that, having made very considerable sacrifices and taken considerable political risks by coming into the Government, they have been left on one side in the course of these negotiations; and you will see a reflection of that view in the leader in the Pioneer of 12th April, which I send you by this bag, and which is of some interest as setting out the general reaction of a certain type of moderate opinion (Srivastava is, I think, the controller of the paper) to what has happened. But I shall not be surprised if we hear a little more on these lines. It is clearly never easy, when one has a regularly constituted government predominantly political in character, to harmonise its existence with the necessity for dealing direct with political parties over issues of major policy.

7. Let me only add in that connection that the effect on the Princes appears to have been equally unhappy, and that there is a strong feeling that their loyalty and their contribution to the war have received little consideration.

8. I send you also by this bag Arthur Moore’s leader in the Statesman of 13th April. It has come in for a good deal of criticism, and it is about as good an example as one could wish for of the perverseness of Arthur Moore’s approach to these matters. When I first read it I felt that I should have no option but to ask you to raise the issue with Catto, for we are at a moment when one is entitled to expect a very considerable restraint on the part of the Press, and when even at home, as the recent Daily Mirror incident showed, hints have had
to be given, of a character that would not normally be considered, as to the risks involved in the Press taking certain lines. The effect of articles such as this article of Moore's on public opinion and confidence (I say nothing of the position in relation to opinion out here of the Secretary of State and the Cabinet) may well be very serious; and his references to the activities of the India Office and officials in the Government of India are, as no one knows better than yourself and myself, wholly and completely off the mark. However, Moore followed up this article the next day, and before I could communicate with you, with a further article (which I also send you) suggesting that we might very well contemplate a change of Viceroy now and put in Maurice Gwyer as the constitutional King of this country! I express no opinion on that proposition so far as I personally am concerned, though I should like to hear what Gwyer's doctor had to say about it! But it is clearly impossible for me, without some risk of misunderstanding, in face of it to press for the removal of Moore with the same vigour as I should otherwise have done! But I wish you would tackle Catto about it for all that, on the basis of this first article of Moore's. I am certain that we shall have to face up to this issue before long. I know Catto's difficulties, and he has done his best to help us... Do not think that I doubt Moore's patriotism: I believe him to be enormously and genuinely concerned to secure the result which he believes to be the right one, and I believe him to be in his own way zealously anxious for the effective prosecution of the war, and to be a patriot of unimpeachable sincerity. That is not the basis of my criticism, which is that he is off the mark, and that the means which he advocates so strenuously not only are not the means best calculated to achieve the object in view, but are indeed by no means unlikely to produce exactly the opposite effect. If things go bad in the Eastern Indian area, we may have no choice but to muzzle him if he remains here and in his present post, and that I should be most anxious to avoid.

9. I must apologise for sending you a long telegram covering a message from Herbert, who has just been up here again; but, as I said in the private telegram which accompanied it, Herbert is so obsessed with this matter of war organisation that I could not have declined to do something for him without completely upsetting him. I would have preferred myself to have said nothing at this stage, for, as you know, I am most concerned that we should get the fullest possible equipment for Calcutta, and, either through the Chief or otherwise, have done all I can to try to keep His Majesty's Government up to the mark regarding it. But possibly Herbert's additional contribution will do no harm.

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9 Not printed in MSS. EUR. F, 125/11: but it may have been the note at No. 607.
11 Personal reference omitted.
12 No. 615.
13 No. 616.
18. I most heartily agree with what you say in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter of the 19th March about the Japanese threat. It is vital to try to hold Ceylon and so far as possible maintain our position in this country. But as I write, it will not surprise me at any moment to hear of a Japanese landing somewhere in South India, with a view to a pincer operation on the Ceylon position. I do feel most strongly that we ought to have more support from home in terms of the air, and I keep on asking myself whether these excursions over the Ruhr (usually pretty expensive in terms of losses) are really of such vital significance and desirability in present conditions, and whether we should not do better to push out here (or to Libya—but Auchinleck can fight his own battle with His Majesty's Government over Libya) some of the material that is at present held up at home. I put this point very strongly to Cripps, who I hope will be able to help us over it when he gets back, and Wavell has made his attitude on it clear in his telegram No. 8891-C.14 of 12th April to the Chief of Staff. I had thought of moving Peirse, my new A.O.C. (who is not only a man of first-class quality, but has been Chief of the Bomber Command) to fly home to discuss the issue, now that he is able to do so with first hand knowledge of our difficulties in Burma and in India, if that would help but Wavell told me on the 12th April that he did not feel it possible to spare him. The responsibility and the burden that falls on me, and equally the difficulties that will confront the government at home if we collapse here as the result of any mis-application of available resources or of any failure by His Majesty's Government to respond to our insistent demands for help, will be one that I should not care to contemplate, and you may use my name in support of the strongest possible representation on these lines to those concerned at home.

19. I am much attracted by the idea of a High Commissionership in Canada, discussed in paragraphs 7 to 9 of your letter of the 19th March, and I will follow this up now that the Cripps Mission is over.

* * *

21. I appreciate the help you have given me over these tiresome questions in the House of Commons about expenditure out here (paragraph 9 of your letter of 24th March). . . .15 The whole harm is done once the question has been asked and has received publicity. No explanation ever catches up on that. . . .16

22. I am so grateful for your help about amphibious warfare (paragraph 3 of your letter of the 24th March). I quite agree with what Lytton says about the Sundarbans, and it has been very much present to me. In all of what I might call the more specialised and novel sides of war development—amphibious warfare, tanks, gliders, &c., we should welcome any help we can get, and my only regret is that despite your own valiant efforts, it has all been such a slow business, and the results to date so much less satisfactory than I could wish.
23. Coupland has, I gather, accompanied Cripps home, and you will probably have had a chance of making contact with him before this letter reaches you. How much help he was able to give Cripps I cannot say. I am still, for your own entirely private ear, disposed to think that his approach to this question is less profound than one might imagine, and that he is inclined to underestimate the difficulties both in the Indian and in the international sphere. But I gather that he has been greatly impressed by Cripps, and assume that the educational process of association with him must have been considerable.

24. We will give Turnbull all possible help. I am sure that he has been most useful to Cripps, and I welcome the chance of putting any one from the India Office in touch with people and places out here. Dorman-Smith has warmly welcomed the suggestion of a visit to Burma. I think that, apart from that, Turnbull, though he might decide to visit Bombay, will probably content himself with a few days in Bengal. I should, I need not say, have been delighted to give him more extensive facilities for touring, but I dare say he is right in wanting to get back before too long. I did not much like Cripps's first suggestion about him, for it looked to me too much like a roving commission with an uncertain remit, and I think it might very well have placed Turnbull himself in an extremely embarrassing position as well as producing suggestions or enquiries which could not appropriately have been handled save by somebody working under me, or in a report sent home for discussion or consideration save through the ordinary governmental channel. But the present arrangement, which is on a completely different basis, is I think a very good one.

14 Not printed. 15. 16 Personal references omitted.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Churchill (via H.M. Ambassador, Cairo, and Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P/E/F/10/2: f 133

MOST IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL AND SECRET

1093. Your telegram No. 1112.¹

For Prime Minister from Sir S. Cripps.

In addition to documents (1) to (6) mentioned by you, my (?) final letter to Azad of April 7th² is important as it states quite clearly that there can be no change in the constitution and is referred to in his letter.³ Text follows in my next telegram.⁴

¹ No. 623. ² No. 543. ³ Of 10 April (No. 587). ⁴ Not printed.
2. I should prefer to publish the whole correspondence between myself and Congress with a note added that similar letters were in each case sent simultaneously to the Moslem League. Texts follow.

3. Your second paragraph. Only two defence formulae are of any importance, the first one that was sent to Congress and the Moslem League on which the interviews with Wavell took place i.e. those including the list of functions of Defence Minister to which you agreed, and second the final one as to which we were corresponding when the negotiations broke down. The intermediate one was too tentative to matter and was never discussed by me directly with Congress.

4. Only other question is whether we ought not to publish the replies of some of the other sections of opinion e.g. Hindu Mahasabha and Sikhs. If they are not published these people will think that we pay no attention to what they said, on the other hand they are not really material (as they) were not decisive in any way. I think therefore that some sort of note should be added explaining that though they were fully considered and taken into account it is not possible from the point of view of paper economy to print them all in full. I have not telegraphed these for the same reason.

Full list of above ( grp. undec.) organisations plus Indian Christians, States, depressed Classes, European Community, Justice Party and others who need not be mentioned specifically.

I had thought that it might be well to append a list of those persons I saw officially so as to show the full range of opinion covered. As however some of these were seen semi-officially it would perhaps be better to omit the list. Perhaps you will consider this from the point of view of the British and American reactions as to which I am so far ignorant.

6. (sic) I hope to leave Lagos Saturday if all goes well and you can perhaps provide plane for me to fly direct with my staff to London on our arrival in Ireland.

5 See No. 543.  6 No. 574.  7 18 April.
**628**

*The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery*

*Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22*

**IMMEDIATE**

**DEHRA DUN, 15 April 1942, 2.10 pm**

**PERSONAL**

Received: 15 April, 3.30 pm

No. 187–S.C. My personal telegram of 25th February, No. 448–S. In view of our failure to secure acceptance of proposals of Cripps’ Mission, question of extension of Section 93 proclamation now becomes one of urgency, and you may find it simplest to cover case for such extension in any general debate on results of Cripps’ journey. Are there any outstanding points or is there any supplementary material or expression of views that you want from me as to line to be taken?

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1 Pointing out that the current extensions of Sec. 93 proclamations expired at the end of April; and suggesting that it might be necessary to amend the section in order to remove the words which limited to three years the period during which a proclamation remained in force. MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.

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**629**

*Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow*

*Telegram, L/PG/J/8/557: f 51*

**IMPORTANT**

**INDIA OFFICE, 15 April 1942, 8.10 pm**

Received: 16 April

6790. Reference paras. 6 and 7 of my telegram of the 14th March, No. 4764. While awaiting the comments promised in para. 6 of your telegram of the 22nd March, No. 751–S2 I have seen Defence Co-ordination Dept. circular letter of 20th February No. 767–OR/413 regarding “martial law” and Home Dept. circular letter of 28th February, containing instructions for the guidance of civil officers in the event of invasion. As regards the latter in particular I should be glad to learn the outcome of any discussions you may have had with Sir Stafford Cripps in the matter.

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1 No. 325.  
2 No. 361.  
3 Not printed.  
4 Not printed.
630

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir G. Cunningham
(North-West Frontier Province) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

Confidential

Viceroy’s Camp, Dehra Dun, 15 April 1942

Very many thanks for your d.-o. No. G.H.-120 of 9th April and for your Report No. 71 enclosed in it. I read with much interest your appreciation of local reactions to the Cripps Mission, and I shall welcome it if you care to let me know in your next letter how feelings stand in regard to the collapse of the proposals which were presented. I am inclined to suspend judgment for the moment, for I think we shall have to let the dust settle, and I doubt if that is likely to happen before the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee towards the end of the month. I had been at some pains, for your own information, to take soundings of Jinnah immediately after Cripps left, but I found little in his response that encouraged me to think that there was any likelihood of his being willing to accept responsibilities of co-operation, save on terms which it would be out of the question for us to consider.2 But I shall not be surprised if, as time goes on, a tendency to think again displays itself among the various political parties, and I shall of course expect Congress to be at pains to try to evade the reproach that it is their intransigence that is responsible for the breakdown of the scheme.

1 No. 573. 2 See No. 614.

631

Sir H. Twynham (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

No. R.-90-G.C.P. Gamp, 15 April 1942

I postponed my usual fortnightly letter until I was in a position to comment on the first reactions to the breakdown of the Lord Privy Seal’s negotiations. I take this opportunity of acknowledging receipt of Your Excellency’s letter, dated the 28th March1 in reply to my letter, dated the 24th of March,2 regarding the first reactions to the news of Sir Stafford Cripps’ arrival.

2. It may sound paradoxical but I believe that the general attitude to the breakdown is one of relief. Locally, I understand there is little real disappointment and, personally, I have no hesitation in saying that on receipt of the
first optimistic Press message to the effect that Congress were prepared to form a National Government without any delay, I felt only dismay at the prospect of a resumption of office by Ministers in whom I could not feel any confidence that their hearts were in the war or that they had overnight abandoned their Anglophobia. I expect that the Intelligence Bureau’s weekly report will enlighten us from within as to the psychological factors and therefore my own surmises may be wide of the mark. For what they are worth, however, my own impressions are that the Congress Leaders felt (a) no enthusiasm for assuming responsibility for the war effort in this present critical period; (b) doubt as to their ability to show how much more efficient they are than the present “incompetent” Government—the description which is becoming increasingly popular with the Nationalist Press; and (c) appreciated the difficulties involved in converting overnight a sedulously fostered anti-British movement into one of whole-hearted co-operation with Britain in furthering the war effort; (d) they were also not uninfluenced by the circumstance that many of the lesser fry among Provincial and District leaders would not be at all averse to negotiating with the Japanese.

Had the war situation been favourable the result of the negotiations might have been different.

As regards this last point, there is confirmation from several sources. There is a reference in the current Bombay Chief Secretary’s fortnightly to the existence of this feeling; I have seen a letter of Acharjya Kripalani indicating that Gandhi and his non-violent followers wish to remain neutral in the struggle, whatever proposals His Majesty’s Government might formulate; there is the resolution of the Working Committee which defines its attitude as based upon “Self-sufficiency and self-protection” with the suggestion of isolationism carried by the word “self-sufficiency”; lastly, there is my own personal opinion confirmed by the views of my two Indian Divisional Commissioners. Yesterday, I held a Commissioners’ Conference to discuss what we should do in the light of the present war situation. Banerjee (Bengali) and Rau (Madras), Commissioners of the Chhattisgarh and Nagpur Divisions respectively, both agreed that in the event of successful Japanese invasion, they would expect local Congress leaders to be the first to felicitate the Japanese and to offer co-operation. The tone of the speeches delivered by people of this kind over a period of years, and especially since the war situation developed unfavourably, has been so vile that I would not place the slightest trust in the speakers. It would have been difficult for the Working Committee—specially without Gandhi’s support—to “galvanize” even their own immediate followers, especially local leaders of the above kind, into enthusiastic support for the war and these latter, even if they had been “galvanized”, would not have been able to produce any real effect on the apathetic mass of the population. In short, there are influential

1 Not printed. 2 No. 376.
elements which are opposed to antagonizing Japan, although obviously they cannot say so publicly. With these elements, Nehru is said to be not over-
popular in view of his recent call to action against the Japanese, coupled though it may be with denunciation of all things British.

M. N. Roy in Independent India of 15th March, 1942, faces the situation with outspoken comment. In an article headed “Doubts and Misgivings” will be found the following passages:

“Secondly, whatever may [be?] the immediate cause of the change the establishment of a National Government, controlled by parties, cannot be expected to improve the situation. The Military position cannot be substantially improved overnight simply by a change of the Government.”

He refers to “the prevailing desire of short-sighted Nationalism to come to terms with Japan” and says:

“The obvious inference...is that, under a National Government, the Defence of India Act would no longer be in operation, if not formally repealed. There would be no check on anti-war propaganda and Fifth Column activities.”

I am not in a position to endorse all the above impressions but I have no doubt that there is substance in the views expressed in the article. In any event, Congress now stands to gain “Heads I win, tails you lose.” The Muslims also take the view that Pakistan has been conceded in principle.

As regards the Muslim attitude, I cannot help feeling some sympathy with the memorandum3 presented to Sir Stafford Cripps by Sapru and Jayakar. It contains a very significant admission with a very significant qualification. The memorandum states: “While we recognise the justice of allowing any Province of British India liberty of remaining out of the new constitutional4 position, we are not free from considerable doubt and anxiety about the wisdom of the further provision which makes possible another Federal Union being established”. While I recognise that the Draft Declaration was logical in referring to the possibility of another Federal Union, I cannot help thinking that that logical outcome need not have been set forth quite as clearly as it was because a prolonged period must elapse before such an issue can become a live one, so that a declaration on this point might have been postponed, on the ground that it was unnecessary to look so far ahead. It is significant of the triumph of the extreme elements that no attention has been paid by the Nationalist Press to the Sapru-Jayakar recognition of “the justice” of allowing any Province liberty to remain out of the new constitution.

3 No. 526.
4 This quotation omits the words ‘constitution and of retaining its present’ between ‘new’ and ‘constitutional’.
Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

15 April 1942

3. As I indicated in my last report, the Cripps proposals were awaited with expectancy. Their full implications were not at first appreciated—perhaps because of their conciseness—and provincial opinion was voiced with an ear to the pronouncements of the party leaders. I doubt whether the man in the street ever saw the complete picture as it was filled in by Cripps’ broadcast and his Press talks. My own first impression was that the proposals would be summarily rejected. I was the more surprised to find our National Front Leader, full of optimism and quoting the odds as three to one on acceptance. He regarded Gandhi as the only person likely to hold out against an accommodation. The non-accession clause seemed at first to be the most likely rock on which the ship of negotiation would split but in Bihar, as elsewhere, Defence became the major issue and when at the end of the first week it appeared that the British War Cabinet was prepared to bargain it was immediately promoted to be the vital issue. Throughout last week the political barometer was overworked. If one day it recorded “Set Fair” the next day a serious depression had generally set in. But I am convinced that even when things looked darkest most people thought that some sort of settlement would be achieved and it has come as a shock to many that the end has been failure. Now we come to the post mortem. Local Congress opinion is silent. Can it be that they, as well as Cripps and all of us, are dumbfounded by the last minute and utterly insincere interpretation sought to be put on the term National Government. Was there ever a greater dishonesty? Non-Congress opinion, smarting under the assumed insult that the Landlord Party had been ignored by Sir Stafford, hands out the blame for the breakdown with commendable impartiality. The demand of Congress for an irresponsible oligarchy was unjustified; but the intransigence of the British War Cabinet and Cripps in regard to Defence is adjudged an equal crime. No one appears to understand why, at the eleventh hour when hopes of a settlement were running high, a breakdown should have occurred. Two alternatives suggest themselves. Either that Congress at the last minute shirked the responsibility or that from the beginning they had no intention of placing themselves in a position which would prejudice them vis-à-vis the Japanese should an attack on India prove successful. This latter is a frame of mind which has already revealed itself in the loud criticisms of a scorched earth policy for

1 Not printed.
2 Sir T. Stewart’s letter to Lord Linlithgow of 24 March mentions that Chandreshvar Prashad Narayan Sinha had agreed to take over direction of the National War Front in Bihar.
India. It is true that Nehru's latest statement conflicts with this opinion but even if that statement is evidence of his real views, it only proves that these views are illogical and nonsensical. I trust that the U.S.A. and China will make a proper appreciation of this episode. I do not attempt to assess the long term results of the failure to reach agreement. For the present it means the loss of a powerful force which might have been harnessed to restore national courage and morale and to stimulate recruitment though it might have done little to assist a greater production of war supplies. On the other hand, in this Province where we are in constant touch with the Army and where important and immediate decisions have constantly to be taken a Congress, or even a Coalition, Ministry would have tended to slow down business.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

VICEROY'S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, 16 April 1942, 2.10 pm

Received: 16 April, 5.50 pm

No. 195-S.C. My telegram No. 197-S.C.1 of today, and your No. 67392 of 14th April. I think it essential that White Paper should bring out: (a) that a particular defence formula (Viceroy-Wavell) was offered; (b) that amendments proposed by Chief and myself in "Cripps-Johnson" formula were put by Cripps to Congress and accepted by them; and (c) that Congress also proposed an amendment in that formula (excision of words "until the new constitution comes into operation"), which was reported by Cripps but never formally accepted.

2. I am telegraphing separately3 exactly what has been published and with what explanatory matter.

1 No. 635. 2 No. 624. 3 No. 646.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 196-S.C. I have replied officially to your telegrams Nos. 6722\(^1\) and 6739.\(^2\) As correspondence with Azad brings out, Congress seem to have been under the impression, after their talks with Cripps, that there was possibility of a National Government with Viceroy in same relation to his Council as King to the Cabinet. Correspondence suggests at various points also that the retention of service element or even of any non-Indians may have been subject of somewhat loose discussion.\(^3\) I think it most important since we shall have so little to negotiate with when the time comes that we should sacrifice nothing which we can possibly save whatever may have been the line taken in informal and exploratory talk between Cripps and the Congress, and that we should make it clear in the debate that what we stand on is the Declaration and that on matters such as conventions, responsibility of the Governor-General to Parliament, Membership of the Executive Council, &c., we were wholly uncommitted at any time save to the extent implied in the Declaration. It is also, as I am sure you will agree, very important to catch up point of Congress amendment\(^4\) of Cripps-Johnson formula.

2. Are there any other points of tactics in this matter on which you would like my help? I realise that the position may be one of some little delicacy given the fact that Cripps is himself a Member of Cabinet, and that he was responsible for conduct of these discussions. But I am sure you will agree with what I have said above, and feel myself that you are entitled to expect a full explanation of any disparities.

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\(^1\) No. 622.  \(^2\) No. 624.  \(^3\) 'discussion' omitted in decipher.  
\(^4\) See No. 633, para. 1 (c); also No. 585.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery
Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

DEHRA DUN, 16 April 1942
Received: 16 April, 2.30 pm

No. 197–S. Your telegrams of 14th April, Nos. 6722¹ and 6739.² White Paper.
(a) I agree as to desirability of inclusion of items set out in paragraph 1 of your telegram. I am confirming as regards text of 3, and will telegraph full texts of 4, 6, and 7.

(b) In addition I think it of great importance that White Paper should contain resolutions rejecting proposal by Sikhs,³ Mahasabha,⁴ Scheduled Castes,⁵ and hope you will arrange this. Texts will be telegraphed to you if not already sent home by Reuter.

(c) Resolution of Chamber of Princes⁶ was confidential, but here again there is much to be said in my judgement for publication. I am ascertaining from Jam Saheb whether he would see any objection to inclusion if desired and will telegraph further.

(d) Question arises whether we ought to include resolutions or statements by Liberals (Sapru and Jayakar),⁷ Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians. There may be some little feeling on the part particularly of the Liberals if they are left out. What would your judgement be? Material can be telegraphed if necessary.

2. I deal in my telegram No. 195–S.C.⁸ with point raised in paragraph 2 of your No. 6722.

¹ No. 622. ² No. 624. ³ No. 467. ⁴ No. 514. ⁵ No. 487. ⁶ No. 591.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery
Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

16 April 1942

No. 1067–S. Your telegram No. 6722,¹ paragraph 1. I confirm that Reuters telegraphed text of Congress resolution in full.

2. I am repeating in immediately succeeding telegrams² following:
(a) Azad’s covering letter.
(b) Azad's further reply.
(c) Muslim League resolution.

3. These are of course only Press versions but purport to be full facts. Cripps has originals and it would be best to check with them before publication.

1 No. 622.  
2 See Nos. 587, 604 and 606.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: f 566

NEW DELHI, 16 April 1942, 7.15 pm
Received: 17 April, 12.15 am

1057-G. Following is summary of press statement issued by Nehru at Allahabad on April 15th. Begins. Among many astonishing things said by Cripps on the eve of departure was "Congress wanted everything or nothing and now they have nothing". Only last part of sentence is true. We want to live our lives in our own way without interference from any outsider, and to get rid of this world of non-official Excellencies and Highnesses and pomp and pageantry and waste, extravagance and incompetence of our British Rulers. Our appetite for freedom is insatiable. It was not what we wanted that we told Cripps but something we considered essential and irreducible if we were to shoulder effectively today's burden and defend this dear country to the uttermost. Without this we remain ineffective camp followers of those in control today who have exhibited so often their utter incapacity. It surprises me how far we went in our desire for settlement. Yet we did so deliberately for we almost forgot everything for the moment except the peril to India and our immediate duty to defend the Motherland. But we could only defend her shoulder to shoulder with our own people and not from mountain-tops or Viceroyal Residences. The War is upon us. Already we have had foretaste in Malaya and Burma. Our time in India itself is coming and therefore we went to uttermost limits of concession in talks with Cripps for we were anxious to face this peril with the organised power of the State and our masses functioning together. That is not to be now and we function separately. From our side there are going to be no approaches to British Government for we know now that whoever comes from them speaks in the same accent as of old and treats us in same way. Blood and tears are going to be our lot whether we like them

1 A Reuter message dated 13 April, published in The Times of 14 April, reported that Sir S. Cripps had said at a Press conference the day before: 'Congress wanted all or nothing—they could not have all so they got nothing'. He later denied that he had said this; see No. 605, p. 816.
or not. Whether we remain up or go down we shall do it bravely and with dignity thinking ever of honour of that great and beloved land that has given us birth and sustenance. Our blood and tears will flow; maybe the parched soil of India needs them so that the fine flower of freedom may grow again. 

Ends.

2. Following is summary of Press statement by Rajagopalachari at Bezwada on April 15th. Begins. I was very glad when Cripps’ visit to India was announced and hoped that he would be able to set up National Government and put the Defence of the country on rational and efficient basis. I do not doubt his sincerity of purpose, which is proved by his bitter disappointment. A good effort never goes in vain. United Nations cannot leave India in this condition. A people and a Government with no mutual confidence and unrelated to one another cannot face invasion. Leaders of United Nations must sweep cobwebs away and make truly total effort in India possible. Suspicion, caution and tradition sit like an incubus on the Government of India and unless the Government of India confidently advise, Churchill cannot move. What could Cripps do against this dead-weight of resistance? Buried talent of India remains buried. Politics of the minorities were good counter-offensives in old days against nationalism, but today nationalism is one great munition which India requires to be put into motion. There is only one way of meeting the Jap infiltration danger. Organise and arm the coastal people as swiftly as possible. Give them poorest weapons and enough service men to give short training. Sustain this force by full backing of intelligentsia organised on basis of patriotism and not on the broken reed of mere payment. Hence corollary of the National Government and its inspiring call. This can be secured in half a dozen ways without wasting precious time if only the spirit is willing. Otherwise the consequences are obvious enough—apathetic people uninspired for facing immediate trouble and danger and feeling no responsibility for public safety. 

Ends.

3. Following is summary of press statement by Rajendra Prasad at Patna on April 14th. Begins. War Cabinet’s draft declaration only said what it proposed not to give to Indian representatives viz. Defence, and it was assumed by all naturally enough, but as has become clear now quite wrongly, that departments other than Defence would be completely transferred. Cripps’ statements at Press conferences encouraged this interpretation e.g. that the working of the New Council under proposed interim scheme would have to be within the present Constitution but a good deal could be done by changing conventions; he (? particularly) mentioned that Executive Council could become the Cabinet. In discussions with Congress representatives it was found that Sir Stafford left the whole matter of Cabinet responsibility to be decided by Viceroy. This meant that position of Member of Council would be that of heads of departments as at present. Stage of distribution of offices among various
groups was never reached, negotiations breaking down on question of power to be transferred from British to Indians. It is entirely wrong and disingenuous of Cripps to proclaim to the World that he could not agree to minorities being placed at the (?) mercy of the majority. There is no group in India prepared to accept offer of August 1940 in April 1942 though it (?) may be) dressed in different way. Apart from very doubtful future constitution to be framed by body of which about one-third were nominees of Indian Princes and which flung open the door for disintegration of India, interim arrangement contemplated nothing more than the August offer. No wonder British proposals have not been accepted by anyone in this country. Congress rejection is supported by all groups (?) that have) spoken, though Moslem League reasons for rejection are different. Ends.

4. Jinnah’s press statement on League rejection of scheme has been telegraphed by Information Bureau.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

SECRET

Viceroy’s Camp, Dehra Dun, 16 April 1942

My dear——,

Will you please refer to the Home Department’s official Express letter No. 71/42-Poll.—(I). dated 14th April 1942, regarding the possible release of members of the Communist Group of the All-India Students’ Federation. While he was in Delhi Cripps was approached by the Executive of this Group who assured him that they were genuinely anxious to help and proposed to hold a Conference in Delhi next month for the purpose of stimulating resistance to Japanese aggression and anti-Fascist activities in general. It was explained to him that certain members of the Federation who had genuine anti-Fascist views would be precluded from attending this Conference because they were either detained in custody or subjected to various restrictions under the Defence of India Rules. Cripps was particularly anxious that every possible step should be taken to mobilise anti-Fascist support, especially amongst the younger generation, and I undertook to help in every possible way. In addition the Working Committee of this Group of the Students’ Federation has undertaken to vouch for the anti-Fascist convictions of those whom they would like to see released. The official Home Department letter necessarily leaves it open to the Provincial

1 Not printed. 2 No. 483.
Government to object to releases in any particular cases; but I am writing to you personally to explain that I gave a definite undertaking to Cripps, with a full appreciation of the risks involved, that every possible young man would be released, whatever his views about the British might be, provided that there was sufficient reason to believe that he would for the present work actively against the enemy. May I ask you, therefore, to explain the position to your Chief Secretary and see that every possible step is taken to honour my undertaking. If there had been time I should have written to you beforehand, but it was literally a last minute request from Cripps and one that I felt that I ought to go as far as possible to meet.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW.

3 See No. 608.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f 130

MOST IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 17 APRIL 1942, 1.50 PM

6909. Your telegram 16th April 197–S.C. (b) and (c). I agree. Please telegraph texts of these resolutions whether telegraphed by Reuter or not. (d) If Liberals, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians have passed resolutions or issued formal official statements I think they should be included. Please telegraph texts if available.

2. Your telegram No. 195–S.C. Cripps suggests we should include only first formula (viz., his letter to Azad of April 7th) and final formula. I am doing this and will meet your points (b) and (c) by a note in substitution for that suggested in my telegram No. 6739. I will telegraph text later.

3. I must have all material by Sunday afternoon at the latest.

1 No. 635.  2 No. 633.  3 No. 543.  4 No. 624.  5 19 April.
ATTITUDE OF INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, 17 APRIL 1942

The following passage from a recent letter from Nehru to Rajagopalachari, forwarded by the Viceroy in a letter of February 18th, throws an interesting light on the attitude of Congress leaders. After expressing his distress at some of Rajagopalachari’s speeches suggesting a willingness to cooperate, the letter continues:

“I should like to make it clear that I am not challenging your right to say what you have said. But a continuous approach to the British Government, even though this might be subject to the conditions laid down by the Congress, makes people think that behind all our resolutions there is a more definite invitation to the British Government and that something in the nature of a compromise is being worked out. This approach again leads people to the conclusion that some arrangement will be arrived at. They do not therefore worry themselves about the organisational or the constructive programme of the Congress nor do they think much about developing their own strength to lead the crisis ahead. A feeling of doubt and uncertainty fills the minds of people making them incapable of effective action.

“You told me that whatever your wishes were in the matter, you saw no chance whatever of any compromise between the British Government and Indian nationalism. If that is so, and I agree with you entirely that it is so, then there is no point in emphasising the desirability of such compromise which can only lead people’s minds astray. For my part, I think it is much too late for any real compromise to take place, for the very minimum conditions on our part are far beyond what the British Government might do. I think there can be nothing more dangerous than our being saddled with responsibility without complete power. Complete power is inconceivable in the present and partial power will make our position worse.

“You references to the Muslim League more or less on same terms as the Congress also seem to me to be unhappy. This gives a fillip to the dwindling fortunes of the League and irritates large number of Congressmen and others.

“I have ventured to write to you frankly because I know you will appreciate frankness on my part. I have also of course only hinted at what I had in my mind but you will understand.”

1 See No. 97.
The reference to "leading the crisis ahead" and to "only hinting at what I had in my mind" are obscure, but would seem to suggest some sort of action independent of, if not directed against, the Government.

L.S.A.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

IMPORTANT

17 April 1942

No. 203–S.C. Failure of Cripps Mission makes it urgent now to complete organisation of National War Front and to infuse real life into it. Those who were hanging back pending political talks should now be ready to come into the open and those who are disappointed may welcome opportunity of constructive non-political work for national safety. In selecting leaders and sub-leaders effort should be made to bring in active and keen workers representing all strata genuinely inclined to support declared objects of the Front, regardless of their previous affiliations. Labour organisations should certainly not be neglected and if members of major political parties will come in on non-political non-party basis so much the better. Non-official character of Front should be emphasised and fact that membership does not involve renouncing any personal views or allegiance provided they are not inconsistent with its objects. You will no doubt keep in touch with members of National Defence Council and make full use of their services. In Provinces where there are distinct linguistic divisions regional leaders might be useful. I am sending by letter some names of likely workers who have been suggested to me. You might consider them among others but I must leave final selections to you.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&E/J/10/2: f 129

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 17 April 1942, 8 pm

Received: 18 April

6959. My telegram of 17th April 6909.¹ I propose subject to Cripps' agreement to insert following note between Azad's letters of April 7th² and April 10th³ which will be items (7) and (9):
Begins. After further consideration of the formula contained in the second paragraph of letter No. (7) a new formula was evolved and revised in discussion with the Congress leaders. It was further discussed in the appended form. It was then agreed that the words underlined should be added and the words in square brackets omitted, and the Congress leaders suggested that the words in italics should be omitted. The discussion was not concluded when letter No. (9) was received by Sir Stafford Cripps. Ends.

1 No. 639.  2 This letter was from Sir S. Cripps to Maulana Azad (No. 543).
3 No. 587.  4 MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has 'agreed'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE  18 April 1942

No. 208–S.C. Following is text of letter and draft resolution from Hindu Mahasabha, dated 1st April, to Cripps. President of Mahasabha reported to Cripps on 3rd April that resolution had on that day been ratified unanimously by Working Committee of Mahasabha:

Begins. Dear Sir, I am forwarding to you under this cover a draft of the resolution as regards your scheme, which was prepared in consultation with and consent of almost all members of the Working Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha who are present in Delhi, and which draft will be placed before the Working Committee on the 3rd of April for formal ratification.

As I read in the press that you are anxious to hear the final decision from those organisations which are consulted by you, as early as possible, I thought it better to acquaint you fully with the attitude the Hindu Mahasabha would take as regards your proposals. Yours sincerely, signed V. D. Savarkar, President, Hindu Mahasabha. Ends. [There follows the text of No. 514.]
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

Viceroy's Camp, Dehra Dun, 18 April 1942, 3.45 pm

MOST IMMEDIATE

Received: 18 April, 5.30 pm

No. 211-S.C. Your telegram No. 6959\(^1\) of 17th April. It is important that there should be no misunderstanding. Please

(a) telegraph numbered list of items;
(b) confirm that item (7) will be Cripps' letter to Azad of 7th April;\(^2\)
(c) confirm (i) that "new formula" referred to is the Viceroy-Wavell formula as reported in my telegram No. 957-S\(^3\) of 9th April; (ii) that the "appended form" of that formula is the Cripps-Johnson formula as reported in my telegram No. 958-S\(^4\) of 9th April; (iii) that the "words underlined" and the "words in square []" brackets omitted" are the drafting amendments accepted by Wavell and myself (compare my No. 980-S\(^5\) of 10th April); and (iv) that the "words in italics" are the words "until the new constitution comes into operation".

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\(^1\) No. 642. \(^2\) No. 543. \(^3\) No. 558. \(^4\) No. 559. \(^5\) No. 585.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

MOST IMMEDIATE

18 April 1942

No. 212-S.C. Your telegram of 17th April, No. 6909.\(^1\)

(a) I am telegraphing En clair text of Sikh,\(^2\) Mahasabha\(^3\) and Scheduled Caste\(^4\) resolutions.
(b) Also text of Sapru-Jayakar resolution.\(^5\)
(c) While there has been correspondence with Christians and Anglo-Indians I have been unable to find any resolutions which could usefully be included. Europeans gave Cripps a memorandum but indicated that as it was interim they did not propose to publish. I think we can omit them and also Christians and Anglo-Indians. Cripps could, if necessary, touch on their views in debate.
(d) I am telegraphing text of Princes' resolution\(^6\) (in cypher R.) but have not yet had Jam Sahib's concurrence in its publication. I will hurry him up.
(e) Your paragraph 2—I note position.

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\(^1\) No. 639. \(^2\) No. 467. \(^3\) No. 514. \(^4\) No. 487. \(^5\) No. 526. \(^6\) No. 591.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

18 April 1942
No. 215–S.C. For your record, following defence formulae have been published by Congress:

(a) Cripps’ letter of 30th March to Azad. [There follows the text of Annex 2 to No. 454.]

(b) Cripps’ letter of 7th April to Azad (text given in my telegram No. 930–S\(^1\) of 7th April).

(c) Formula put with my agreement and Wavell’s to Congress by Johnson (text in my telegram No. 957–S\(^2\) of 9th April).

(d) Formula agreed between Cripps and Johnson (text in my telegram No. 958–S\(^3\) of 9th April).

2. As regards explanatory matter for the other documents about the Defence issue, Cripps’ two letters with the annexure to his letter of 7th April\(^4\) speak for themselves.

\(^1\) See No. 543, note 1.  \(^2\) No. 558.  \(^3\) No. 559.  \(^4\) No. 543.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

DEHRA DUN, 18 April 1942, 9.20 pm

Received: 19 April, 12.5 am

No. 216–S.C. I hope you will let me know as early as possible date of debate on Cripps mission. It seems to me important that we should not be apologetic, and I am sure the combative line taken in Cripps reply\(^1\) to Azad is the right one. It is desirable at the same time so far as possible to avoid recrimination consistently with making it clear that we do not regard ourselves as at fault but rather the reverse, and I have no doubt that that will be present to you and to other government spokesmen. I am not too hopeful as to prospect of the parties being willing to come together here, but I do not want to give them any excuse for their not doing so based on proceedings in the House of Commons.

\(^1\) No. 590.
2. In my considered opinion, prospect of smoothing down Sikhs, and some other minorities, will be improved to the extent that position is maintained in debate that the "offer" is withdrawn, and that the "offer" is not an irrevocable declaration of policy. I fully realise, of course, the other side of the picture, and that the next move will inevitably begin where the last one left off, and I have no doubt that His Majesty's Government will in practice ride a middle course. But I think the minority aspect just mentioned very important, and that you should be aware of it.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

18 April 1942

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL
No. 217-S.C. We are in correspondence separately about the possibility of a personal communication to Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek about breakdown of Cripps negotiations. I have sent you certain material which will I hope be of use with Press in getting our point of view across, and have emphasised importance I attach to this and to our fixing responsibility where it lies. I have also, however, seen Cripps' telegram to you and Ministry of Information, urging importance of avoiding recrimination (as to that I agree) or of singling out Congress for attack. I have to consider finally the desirability of keeping atmosphere as sweet as possible here at a time when events of such critical importance in the war sphere may be developing.

2. On the other hand, from my point of view as well as that of His Majesty's Government it is important that responsibility should be fixed where it belongs. Subject to Cabinet discussion after Cripps' return and to the outcome of the debate, I think that it should be possible to prepare an entirely objective and concise, but definitely damaging statement of case which would bring out Congress intransigence. I should much welcome your view. Joyce could no doubt ensure that we get this across effectively both at home and in America, and it is the more important that he should since I anticipate that Congress tactics will be to try as usual to cloud the issue and to suggest that the fault is not theirs. I could, if you wished, get Hodson to prepare a short statement on these lines which we could telegraph to you.

3. Grateful for very early reply.

1 L/P&J/8/510: f 553 gives the date as 19 April.  2 See Nos. 621 and 650.
3 No. 600.  4 Deciphered as "(?breakdown)".
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

DEHRA DUN, 18 April 1942, 11.40 pm

Received: 19 April, 3.45 am

No. 218-S.C. I have telegraphed separately asking if you want any further material for debate on extension of Section 93 proclamations. I would anticipate that you may find yourself under pressure as to what we are doing or could do, in event of extension of proclamations, to liberalise administration of provinces affected and to associate non-official elements more closely with it. Had Cripps' negotiations been successful we might of course have looked for a reflection in the provinces of agreement between parties to work together in Centre for prosecution of war. But that is not the case. Arguments for and against non-official advisers have been fully canvassed in personal correspondence which will be on record with you, and I need not summarise them here; and those arguments on either side retain much if not all of their force.

2. While, however, I do not wish to make a specific recommendation to you yet my own instinct is that, now that the war is so close to India and the situation confronting us may be so difficult, we shall almost certainly have to face risks in the Indian political sphere involved in some appointment of non-official advisers. I shall have to consult further with Governors about this and I do not wish to be taken as expressing any final view: but I am attracted by a suggestion which has been put to me by Hallett, viz., that we might compromise by adding a certain number of non-official advisers, to be particularly concerned with war problems, production, &c., to official advisers in provinces. He recognises, as do I, that we are most unlikely to get any non-official advisers from Congress or, save on terms which we could not accept, from the Muslim League. And you and I are well aware of absence of value politically of advisers who do not represent the major parties and of risk of our irritating major parties by giving any share in power to persons drawn from minorities who have been unable to secure control in the legislatures. Moreover I must be at the utmost pains to avoid anything that can aggravate the communal position. For all that we may have to face it. But the Hallett suggestion may have the germs of a solution in it, and it would enable highly controversial portfolios, such as law and order, to remain in official hands and so avoid difficulties that would certainly arise if a Muslim adviser were associated with strong action against Congress or the like.

1 No. 628. 2 See No. 620, para. 5.
650

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

18 April 1942

IMPORTANT

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 219-S.C. My private and personal telegram No. 177-S.C.² of 14th April. If anything is to be done with Roosevelt the sooner the better. I should be grateful therefore for very early reply. I am rather inclined, too, to let Chiang Kai-shek have a short personal message from myself in very cautious terms through Seymour, playing a little on the personal note, if it is decided to send anything to Roosevelt. Have you any view?

¹ L/P&J/8/510: f 554 gives the date as 19 April.
² No. 621.

651

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

SECRET

GUINDY, 18 April 1942

REPORT NO. 3 OF 1942

Since we last met in Delhi much has happened here in the Madras Presidency.

2. First of all, the sinking of many ships off the coast and the landing of the survivors at all sorts of out of the way places gave rise to a lot of alarm. The various districts in which they landed seem to have made all possible emergency arrangements and the men were well cared for.

3. Immediately following on that came the air raids of Vizagapatam and Cocanada with the casualties you know. There is deep resentment at Vizagapatam at the absence of anti-aircraft guns or aeroplanes, especially as both arrived there and were immediately taken away. Of course, I know of the shortage, but naturally the local people feel that their port is the important one and ought to be defended properly.

4. These raids completely emptied both towns and food &c., was a great difficulty. However, this has now been surmounted and in Cocanada people are coming back, and life is normal, but not in Vizagapatam.

5. The effect of all this was shown in Madras City, where the exodus was very heavy, especially after an air-raid alarm, when the Jap planes were encountered by one of our very ancient reconnaissance planes on April 7th.
6. The final and most important event occurred on April 10th. Southern Command informed us that they had been told that a large Japanese force was on its way to South India and that the spearhead might be expected to arrive any day after the 15th. They were most emphatic that the news was correct and, as you know, made many troop movements at once. I had always told the public that if there was real danger, I would warn them, which I did, and of course this immediately led to a very rapid exodus.

7. I was then faced with the immediate problem of Government offices, High Court, &c. The Military were very anxious to get everybody away before a landing took place, instead of a mad rush afterwards, and, in particular, wanted to clear the Fort, where the Secretariat works. Although I knew that moving the Government offices would add to the panic, I could not run the risk of having the whole Government, High Court, &c., captured if there was a successful landing. Madras is right in the front line and to have the whole administration involved in possible street fighting was unthinkable. I accordingly moved all the offices inland, keeping myself, the Advisers and the Secretaries with a skeleton staff here in Madras. I had to remember that I had to govern the whole Presidency and not only Madras City, and that would have been impossible if we had been cut off or captured.

8. All offices have removed to various places and the Secretariat is half in Ootacamund and half in Chittoor District. I know this was a grave decision to take, but the Military were insistent and I felt that it had to be done. The result was, as I anticipated, that the exodus greatly increased, but has now slackened and, in fact, among workers people are returning.

9. The immediate danger seems to have now receded, but with Japan in complete control of the Bay of Bengal it may return at any moment, and I do not propose to reverse any orders. Labour has stuck it well and war work has not been interfered with to any extent. Of course, as the invasion did not take place, everyone now says that it was all unnecessary but, as I have said, it might occur at any moment again, and I cannot allow the whole administration to run the risk of capture.

I am sorry to say that some of the Europeans, even in the hills, gave way to sheer terror and were demanding to be evacuated from Ootacamund of all places. Altogether a most unpleasant fortnight, but I feel quite certain that we acted correctly in the circumstances, as, if we had not warned the people and trouble had taken place, we would have very rightly been blamed.

10. These events have completely overshadowed the political situation, but the general reactions to the failure of the Cripps' proposals are: (1) In Congress circles deep disappointment and annoyance with the Working Committee, and (2) in all other circles, i.e., Justice, Scheduled Classes, &c., a deep sense of relief.
11. I have seen Rajagopalachari, Srinivasan and Subbarayan, and they all are very upset, and say that Congress have made a fatal mistake. Rajagopalachari was most reasonable on the whole, although blaming Cripps for the breakdown, most unfairly I think. However, he (Rajagopalachari) was all for acceptance, and he is going to have another attempt at the Working Committee this month. He also told me that if he fails, he is going to break away from the Central Committee and run an independent show down here. This I very much doubt, but he is certainly very changed in his outlook and is being quite helpful over the War. He asked to see me and I thought in view of the general situation that it was best to do so.

April 21st

12. Since writing the above, I have just seen Goenka, the owner of the Indian Express, who, despite the rather extreme views of his paper, is not a bad man. He tells me that the Madras Congress Working Committee met yesterday for nine hours and decided to put before the Congress Members of the Legislative Assembly and Members of the Legislative Council who are meeting tomorrow, a resolution to the effect that a Coalition Government should be set up in Madras, and that the All-India Congress Committee should be asked for permission to set it up. If permission is refused, then the Working Committee intend to put a further resolution to the Members of the Legislative Assembly suggesting a breakaway from the All-India Congress Committee and forming a government here, despite the “official” disapproval. Goenka repeated what Rajagopalachari said, that it would be definitely a Coalition Government, with Justice Party, Muslim League (if allowed by Jinnah), Christians, Scheduled Classes and even one European. These proposals are being backed up by most of the Congress Press and I think are genuine, but a breakaway is a tall order and I will believe it when I see it. Incidentally, Rajagopalachari told me that if he came back at the head of a Coalition Government, it would be a War Government and controversial legislation would not be introduced.

*   *   *

14. I am afraid that this letter is behind times, but these last weeks have been so hectic that it has been very difficult to find time to write.
652

Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

GOVT. HOUSE, CALCUTTA, 19 April 1942

Dear Linlithgow,

This is in acknowledgment of your secret letter of the 16th April, regarding the wish expressed by Cripps that members of the communist group of the All-India Student's Federation, who are in custody or restricted under the Defence of India Rules, should have their cases reviewed, and be released unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary.

I think I can promise you every assistance in implementing the undertaking which you gave to Cripps. As soon as we receive a list of the names of persons detained in this Province, we shall proceed at once to review the cases of those whose movements have been restricted at the orders of Government, and in the case of those who have been detained or restricted at the orders of District Magistrates, we shall ask the District Magistrates concerned to cancel their orders, except in those cases in which they consider that release would be prejudicial to internal security. In such cases they will be asked to give their reasons for opposing release, and these will be considered by Government.

Yours sincerely,

J. A. HERBERT. 2

1 No. 618.

2 Lord Linlithgow received replies from the other Governors later in April or during May, reporting either that cases of Communist students were being reviewed and releases effected, or that there were no such cases in the Province.

653

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f 107

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 20 April 1942, 1.20 pm

Received: 21 April

7086. Your telegram 211-S, April 18th.

1. Your (a). Following is complete list of items to be included in White Paper which will be issued on Thursday or Friday. I will telegraph which. Debate will probably be on Tuesday, April 28th.

1 No. 644.  
2 23 and 24 April.
First Prime Minister’s statement on March 11th.3
Second Draft Declaration as published.4
Third Cripps–Azad correspondence comprising:
(1) Cripps’ letter of 30th March5 (text as in your 215–SC).6
(2) Cripps’ letter of 1st April7 omitting word “Hindu” in “Hindu Press”
in first line.
(3) Azad letter of 1st April.8
(4) Cripps’ letter of 2nd April.9
(5) Cripps’ letter of 3rd April.10
(6) Azad letter of 4th April.11
(7) Cripps’ letter of 7th April with annexure.12
(9) Cripps’ reply of 10th April (990–S).14
(10) Azad’s letter of 11th April (1069–S).15
Fourth Letter from Chancellor of Chamber of Princes dated 10th April, and
text of Resolution of Chamber of Princes referred to therein (your 210–SC)16
subject to Chancellor’s concurrence, news of which I await.
Fifth Congress resolution as telegraphed by Reuter.17
Sixth Moslem League resolution.18
Seventh Hindu Mahasabha resolution19 contained in your 208–SC20 without
repeat without covering letter from Savarkar.
Eighth Letter from Ambedkar and Raja (your 207–SC).21
Ninth Letter and memorandum from Sikh All Parties Committee (your
209–SC).22
Tenth Sapru–Jayakar Memorandum (your 214–SC).23
2. Your (b). I confirm.
3. Your (c). I confirm all points.

3 Nos. 308 and 309.  4 No. 456.
5 Annex 2 to No. 454.  6 No. 646.  7 No. 480.  8 No. 485.  9 No. 497.
10 No. 515.  11 No. 520.  12 No. 543.  13 No. 587, note 1.  14 No. 590, note 1.
15 No. 604, note 1.  16 No. 591, note 1.  17 No. 605.  18 No. 606.
19 No. 514.  20 No. 643.  21 No. 487, note 1.  22 No. 467.
23 No. 526, note 1.
654

War Cabinet
Committee on India. Paper I(42) 16
L/PO/6/106c: f 2

Lord Privy Seal's Mission
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India
India Office, 20 April 1942

I circulate for the information of my colleagues a White Paper in proof form,¹ which I propose to show to the Lord Privy Seal immediately on his return and, subject to his concurrence, to lay this week.

2. It contains nothing which has not been published, either here or in India, except for the Resolution² of the Chamber of Princes Standing Committee and the brief note³ in item (8) of the correspondence with Maulana Azad.

L. S. A.

¹ Not printed. ² No. 591. ³ See No. 642.

655

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 551

Immediate

Personal

India Office, 20 April 1942, 9 pm

Received: 21 April

507. Your telegram 19th April 217–S.C.¹ As regards Roosevelt Prime Minister tells me he has communicated with him and no further action is required. As regards Chiang Kai-shek I will discuss with Cripps and if necessary other colleagues. It would be great help to me to have from you a rough outline of statement such as you suggest in last sentence of paragraph 2.

¹ No. 648; the date should be 18 April.
656

Mr Clauzon to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: f 552

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 20 April 1942, 8.30 pm
Received: 21 April

508. Clauzon to Laithwaite. Secretary of State’s telegram 507.1 Determined efforts supported by number ten have failed to extract from Prime Minister what he has said to President.

1 No. 655.

657

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: f 565

NEW DELHI, 20 April 1942, 6.50 pm
Received: 21 April, 2.15 am

1091–G. Following is summary of article by Gandhi in Harian dated April 19th. Begins. It is thousand pities that the British Govt. should have sent proposal for dissolving the political deadlock which on the face of it was too ridiculous to find acceptance anywhere. And it was misfortune that the bearer should have been Cripps, acclaimed as the radical among radicals and friend of India. I have no doubt about his goodwill. He believed no one could have brought anything better for India but he should have known that at least Congress would not look at Dominion Status even though it carried the right of immediate secession. He knew too that the proposal contemplated the splitting up of India into three parts each having different ideas of governance. It contemplated Pakistan, yet not the Pakistan of the Moslem League’s conception. And it gave no real control over defence to responsible ministers. Cripps having become part of the imperial machinery unconsciously partook of its quality. It is almost invariable experience in India that Indians drawn into it lose originality and become like their companions in service and often outdo the latter in loyalty to the Moloch of imperialism. Had Sir Stafford remained detached he would have conferred with his radical friends in India and secured their approbation before undertaking the mission. If it be said he could not very well do so, that is what I mean when I say that having become part of the machinery he was bound to fall under its spell.
2. It is no use brooding over past of British mistakes. It is more profitable to look within. Our mistakes or rather defects are many. Attainment of independence is impossibility till we have solved communal tangle. We will never tackle this problem so long as either or both parties think that independence will or can come without any solution of the tangle. There are two ways of solving what has almost become insoluble, royal way of non-violence or violence. By second way parties fight with each other till one is for time being worsted. All interested in freedom must make the choice. I suppose the choice has already been made by the chief actors. But rank and file do not know their own minds. They must think independently and take to non-violent action in terms of unity.

3. Whether those who believe in two-nation theory and the partition of India can live as friends I do not know. If vast majority of Moslems regard themselves as separate nation no power on earth can compel them to think otherwise. If they want to partition India they must unless Hindus want to fight against such division. So far such preparation is silently going on on behalf of both parties. That way lies suicide. Each party (will probably) want British or foreign aid. In that case goodbye to independence. I dare not contemplate such fight and should not like to be its living witness. I would love to see joint right for independence. In very process of securing independence it is highly likely that we shall have forgotten our quarrels. But if we have not, then only will it be time to quarrel if we must. Ends.

658

Sir Kingsley Wood to Mr Amery

L/F/7/2861: f 231

TREASURY CHAMBERS, WHITEHALL, S.W., 20 April 1942

My dear Secretary of State,
Many thanks for your letter of the 2nd April.¹ I quite agree that before taking any further steps about the financial arrangements between the United Kingdom and India, we must await the return of Cripps, and also see a little clearer the possible outcome of military events in the East.

Meanwhile, however, I should like to make it clear that my view—that a revision of the existing financial arrangements is necessary—was not based primarily on the grounds suggested in the first paragraph of your letter. If, for the sake of argument, at the end of the War India’s holding of sterling had

¹ No. 509.
reached a large sum, of which only a comparatively small part had to be held in the Reserve Bank Issue Department, it would manifestly be an understate-
ment of the matter to say that India might experience some difficulty in using this. If, for instance, she wished to convert this sterling balance into gold or dollars, this would be impossible as we should not have the gold or dollars available. In these circumstances our critics in India might say that this country was in effect defaulting on its obligations to India, and this would not be con-
ducive to political amity. And it would not help very much to argue that to pay India in blocked sterling is at any rate better than not paying at all.

I do not have in mind any proposals that would be unfair or unreasonable, or outside India’s financial capacity. But at the earliest practical time there should be consideration and discussion of United Kingdom and Indian financial relations with a view to regularisation for the maximum war effort, and in the interests alike of India and this country looking to the future. There is, I fear, rather a tendency to relegate financial questions to the background. This can only result eventually in a situation whereby the difficulties and complications are vastly increased. It is for this reason that I would wish your officers and mine to consult together, so that a situation might not arise in the future which could have been avoided by more foresight.

In conclusion, I may say that, having raised the danger signal, I am for the present content to leave its consideration for a short interval until we can all see a little clearer the possible outcome of recent political events in India and the general war situation in that part of the world.

Yours ever,

KINGSLEY WOOD.

659

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE VICE ROY’S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, 21 April 1942

Received: 21 April, 2 pm

No. 231-S.C. Your telegram No. 70861 of April 20th. All is now clear and I have following comments only.

2. Under head “third”—

(a) Item 2, would it not be better to retain the words “the Hindu”, as Azad’s reply of April 1st2 (your item 3) refers to them, and Cripps’ answer of same date (your item 4) both of which you are publishing explains what he meant.
(b) Item 4. Date of Cripps' letter is April 1st if I am right in thinking that it is the letter beginning "thank you very much" and ends "amongst other papers". 

(c) Item 6. Date of Azad's letter is April 3rd if I am right in thinking it is the letter beginning "thanks for your letter" and ending "should rest with the Indian National Government".

3. Your head "fourth". I have not yet heard from Jam Sahib but am doing my best to hurry him and will if possible telegraph\(^5\) result to you today.

\(^1\) No. 653. \(^2\) No. 485. 
\(^3\) This letter has not been traced in India Office Records, but its final paragraph is reproduced in No. 663, para. 2. 
\(^4\) No. 520. \(^5\) No. 660.

660

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

NEW DELHI, 21 April 1942, 10.40 pm 
Received: 21 April, 8.45 pm

No. 1101-S. Your telegram dated 20th April No. 7086.\(^1\) Chancellor, Chamber of Princes, concurs inclusion his letter of April 10th\(^2\) and text of resolution.

\(^1\) No. 653. \(^2\) No. 591.

661

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&E/J/10/2: f 100

INDIA OFFICE, 22 April 1942, 12.15 am 
7186. Your telegram 21st April, 231-SC.\(^1\) Paragraph 2. (a) Azad's letter\(^2\) (my item (3)) begins "I have your letter" and ends "I shall gladly meet you". Neither it nor Cripps' answer (see below) refers to words "the Hindu Press" and we are therefore omitting "Hindu", which is in accordance with Cripps' own wishes. (b) Item (4) is not letter you mention, but begins "Mr. Jinnah has asked me" and ends "give you a similar letter".\(^3\) (c) You have got hold of right letter\(^4\) but I have confirmed from Cripps that date is April 4th.

\(^1\) No. 659. \(^2\) No. 485. \(^3\) No. 497. \(^4\) No. 520.
2. Cripps cannot agree to publication of note and formula as contained in my telegram 6959\(^5\) and (c) of your telegram 211–S,\(^6\) since he says it is historically inaccurate. We have agreed therefore that the note should read Begins. After further consideration of the formula contained in the second paragraph of letter No. (7) a new\(^7\) formula was evolved and submitted to the Congress leaders. Ends. Draft formula then reads precisely as in telegram of 10th April, 971–S.\(^8\) This of course meets (b) in your telegram 195–SC\(^9\) except that Cripps states formula was not in fact “accepted” by Congress. As regards (c) of your 195–SC, he is clear that formula discussed with Congress never included words “until the new constitution comes into operation” at all and point was only discussed in conversation. Whatever may be decided on general policy I must clearly accept facts about his discussions as stated by Cripps and publication in form indicated above seems to expose minimum of surface.

3. In my telegram 7086\(^10\) under “Third” please renumber (8), (9) and (10) as (9), (10) and (11). (8) consists of Note and formula as in paragraph 2 above.

\(^5\)No. 642. \(^6\)No. 644. \(^7\)MSS. EUR. F. 125/22 has ‘as my new’ instead of ‘a new’.
\(^8\)No. 574. \(^9\)No. 633. \(^10\)No. 653.

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**Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow**

*Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f 66*

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

**PRIVATE AND PERSONAL**

**INDIA OFFICE, 22 April 1942, 2.5 pm**

513. My telegram 21st April 7186.\(^1\) Line taken by Cripps seems rather inconsistent with your telegram of 18th April 215–SC\(^2\) if I am right in inferring from (d) of that telegram that last formula published by Congress actually included words “until new constitution comes into operation”. But it is perhaps all to the good that words should appear in their version and other variations in texts if they attract attention will help to show that there has been no agreement on any particular form of words and to this extent leaving us free hand for future. I shall endeavour here to concentrate on broad issues as in Cripps’ letter of 10th April\(^3\) to Azad in which I note from your telegram of 18th April 216–SC\(^4\) that you concur.

\(^1\)No. 661. \(^2\)No. 646. \(^3\)No. 590. \(^4\)No. 647.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f 64

MOST IMMEDIATE

DEHRA DUN, 22 April 1942, 8.10 pm
Received: 22 April, 9.30 pm

247-S.C. 1. Your 71861 of April 21st.

2. Your (a). Letter as already published here from Azad contains following last paragraphs Begins. “In your letter you refer to the Hindu press. I do not know what exactly you mean by this”. Last paragraph of Cripps’ reply,2 also already published here, runs “I apologise for the reference to the Hindu press. I was referring to the Hindustan Times amongst other papers”. But I leave decision to you.

3. Your (b). Noted. I have now traced letter.

4. Your (c). Copy of letter handed to me by Cripps is dated April 3rd, but point is immaterial.

5. Your paragraph No. 2. I note that Cripps says formula was not “accepted” by Congress. As regards words “Until new constitution comes into operation”, omission of which would, as pointed out in paragraph No. 4 of my telegram April 10th 980-S3 raise an important issue, they appeared in text communicated to me by Cripps of Cripps-Johnson formula as put to Congress, and paragraph No. 2 of his telegram 973-S4 to Prime Minister states that he was unable to persuade Congress to accept then, though he included the phrase in text which he discussed with them. But I agree that Cripps’ statement to you as to what was actually put by him to Congress must be accepted.

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1 No. 661.  
2 Cf. No. 659, para. 2(b).  
3 No. 585; see also No. 634.  
4 No. 577.
The proof of the White Paper circulated with my Memorandum of 20th April, No. I(42) 16,¹ was shown to the Lord Privy Seal on his return. He was not satisfied with item (8) on page 8 in its present form and the Note and clauses (a) and (b) of the draft formula have accordingly been altered to read as follows (I have informed the Viceroy):

After further consideration of the formula contained in the second paragraph of letter No. (7), a new formula was evolved and submitted to the Congress leaders.

Draft Alternative Formula on Defence

(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian Member, but certain functions relating to the conduct of the war will be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, who will control the armed forces in India, and who will be a Member of the Executive Council in charge of the War Department.

(b) This Department will take over such functions as are to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member. A list of such functions has been prepared and is attached.

2. The formula as now to be issued in the White Paper will differ from any of those issued in India by Congress and will not include the words “until the new constitution comes into operation” to which the Viceroy attached considerable importance. The Lord Privy Seal is, I understand, clear that they did not in fact form part of the formula submitted to Congress. It appears, however, from one of the Viceroy’s telegrams (215-SC,² circulated separately) that one of the formulae issued by Congress does include these words. The point, however, is not worth pursuing and it is all to the good that the words, if they appear, should appear in a formula put out by Congress themselves.

3. I do not think we need concern ourselves overmuch with the detailed wording of these various formulae at the present stage. We should clearly
concentrate on the broad issues, on the lines of the Lord Privy Seal's letter to Maulana Azad dated 10th April,1 which appears as item (10) on page 12 of the White Paper.

L.S.A.

1 No. 654.  2 No. 646.  3 No. 590.

665

Ministry of Information Press Conference

L/P&J/10/2: ff 14-25

Mr Brendan Bracken, M.P., Minister of Information, in the Chair

STATEMENT BY SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS

Note taken by Treasury Reporter 22 April 1942

MINISTER OF INFORMATION: Sir Stafford Cripps.

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very glad to have this opportunity of meeting the Press in London. I had many meetings with the Press in Delhi when I was there and I must pay them a great compliment for having been extremely fair-minded and just in their dealings with me, though I think on the whole the Indian is a better cross-examiner than the British pressman and that is saying a great deal.

Today I am going to make just a few observations as regards my Indian effort and then I will answer your questions upon it for a limited period of time, as I have to leave here by four o'clock.

You have all heard the statements I made in India since the breakdown of the negotiations which I was conducting there. I think perhaps the most useful thing I can do is to give you a short picture of what I think the net results of my mission have been. The first thing that is of importance is that the War Cabinet have got out a precise and definite plan by which they hoped, in consultation with the leaders of Indian opinion, to be able to lay the basis for an eventual solution of the whole problem of our relationships with India and in the meantime to enable the leaders of Indian opinion to help in the very difficult task of organising the defence of India. The second point is that a new method of dealing with the negotiations was adopted on this occasion. Instead of trying to bring representative Indians to London a member of the War Cabinet was sent to India in order to discuss with those representatives on the spot the plan which the War Cabinet hoped would be suitable and to see if within the four corners of that plan a sufficient accommodation could be arrived at to enable it to be generally acceptable. It was fully realised that with a plan
of that kind it would probably either be generally accepted or generally turned down because in the state of internal opinion in India it was not likely that any large body of opinion would accept a plan if the rest were going to reject it. There is always the danger that anyone who accepts it might be held out as being unduly subservient to British imperialist interests if the majority of the people rejected it and, therefore, we expected to have a general acceptance or a general rejection. Thirdly, I think the contacts that were established in India itself have served to clarify the situation very considerably, to clarify it not only so far as India is concerned by making clear beyond all possibility of doubt the attitude which Great Britain now adopts as regards the ultimate future of India after the war, but also to clarify it so far as this country, America, and other countries are concerned as giving them a better view of what some of the real difficulties of the situation are. Finally, I think the result of the discussions there has been to impress the Indian people and others with the sincerity of outlook of the British people and the British Government. There will no doubt be a period during which a certain amount of recriminations may be voiced in India as regards the breakdown. Naturally, everybody who has taken part in those negotiations will wish to justify the situation which they took up and will not want the blame for the breakdown to be placed on them. Personally, I do not place the blame for the breakdown upon anybody. I said in India that if anybody had to accept the responsibility for it I preferred to do that myself. The historical considerations and past difficulties I think are largely responsible for the difficulty in the present in settling this problem. In some ways it was not a very auspicious moment for such a settlement. The difficulties crowding upon India at the present moment from the point of view of her own defence are not such as to encourage people to come into a government which may be met by very urgent and very pressing necessities. It is not easier to solve the Indian problem as one approaches its actual solution. Fears and difficulties which may have been in the past somewhat vague tend very much to crystallise as the immediate solution approaches. It is not easy either suddenly to change an atmosphere which has been to a considerable extent distrustful into an atmosphere of complete trust such as is required if one is going to have co-operation between different nations or different peoples in a very difficult situation. All that is a legacy of the past, but unfortunately the past always throws its shadow on the present and the future and, therefore, if one can to some extent claim that that shadow has been dispelled without actually bringing about a present solution, I think one can be happy that at least some good has come out of the War Cabinet’s action. I am very anxious, and this is a matter which will rest very largely in the hands of the Press in this country and America and in the world generally, I am very anxious that there should be, anyway so far as we are concerned, no atmosphere of recrimination at all. I perfectly understand the difficulties which the leaders of the different sections
of Indian opinion have had. I perfectly understand all the things that stood in
the way of an out and out settlement both as regards the future and as regards
the present. I regret, of course, profoundly that those difficulties could not be
overcome and I think that many of the leaders of Indian opinion have done their
utmost and did their utmost while I was there in order to overcome those
difficulties. We seemed at one time to get extremely close, but we did not get
quite close enough in order to accomplish what we wanted to.

The problem now becomes not a political one, but the problem of the
defence of India, and in that I have had the assurance personally from many of
the leaders that they are going to co-operate to their utmost to make that
defence as effective as possible. You have seen the statements that have been
made, for instance, by Jawaharlal Nehru as regards the necessity for maximising
the effort of every Indian in order to protect their country from the Japanese
invasion if it comes, and similar sentiments have been expressed by the leaders
of the Moslems and the Sikhs and the Maharrattas and all the other peoples. I be-

lieve, therefore, that the result of these talks, when it comes to the question of
actual defence, will be a good result and that, although those leaders are not
prepared at the present moment to partake of the responsibility of sharing in
the government of India in the transition stage, yet they will extend themselves
in order to do anything they can to assist in an unofficial capacity in maxi-
mising the defence of India. The picture, therefore, is not a gloomy picture
so far as I am concerned; it is an encouraging picture, although not as en-
couraging as it might have been, but much more encouraging than it would
have been if nothing had been done.

That gives you I think just a short picture of my reactions to the situation
and now if you would like to ask me any questions about any of the details, so
far as I can I will answer them.

QUESTION: You have spoken of the precision of the Government’s offer; does
that word apply to the last clause which affects the immediate situation?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: No. That was specially left in what I may call a vague
condition, in order that it might allow the greatest area for negotiation. It was
only considered desirable as regards paragraph (e) to make the one reservation
as regards defence. The whole of the rest was left open so that the most effective
means might be devised and discussed by which the objective of the fullest and
most effective participation by the leaders of Indian opinion could take place.

QUESTION: You have just said that you came very near a settlement; can
you indicate exactly at what point the breakdown came?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: That is very difficult because it really means an analysis
of somebody else’s mind. I can only tell you that my impression and the im-
pression of many of the Indian supporters of the Congress view was, about two
days before the actual finish came, that there was going to be a settlement. Then
in the final talks which I had with the Congress leaders, I took the view that
there was not going to be a settlement and that was followed by the ultimate letter of rejection from the Congress President.

QUESTION: Did you detect any signs of urgency on your arrival in India?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Amongst the Indian leaders I detected great signs of urgency. I think the fact that we concluded all the conversations as quickly as we did demonstrates that fact.

QUESTION: There was a report a few days ago that you had invited Nehru and Jinnah to come to London.
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: No, and I am quite sure neither of them would leave India in the existing circumstances if they were invited.

QUESTION: Do you regard the political question of India as being now insoluble during the process of this war?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: I do not regard it as insoluble. It may be that under the stress of war other suggestions may arise in India itself for some form of Government which will bring in representative Indians.

QUESTION: From India or from here do you mean?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: It will have to come from India I think. I discussed with the Indian leaders, naturally, the possibility, if these negotiations did break down, of their putting forward some alternative suggestion as to how the immediate situation might be dealt with.

QUESTION: What was the difficulty over the defence system?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: The difficulty over defence is an extremely complicated one and I do not think I could elaborate it in reply to a question. I am going to deal with it in the House of Commons on Tuesday and I think it is really better to leave it to be dealt with in a rather careful statement than in reply to a question.

QUESTION: You said at Karachi that Congress wanted everything or nothing.
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: I did not say that at Karachi, someone apparently thought I had said it at Karachi. I think that was the shorthand report of a very long conversation I had, with the Press at Karachi.

QUESTION: But was that the gist of it, was that correct?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: No, it was not correct. What would be correct would be to say that they wanted complete power immediately for representative Indians and if they could not get that complete power for representative Indians then they were not prepared to participate in the Government of India at the present time.

QUESTION: In other words, were they prepared to form a National Government, a National Cabinet responsible to the people?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: The difficulty about using those phrases like "National Government" and "National Cabinet" is that everybody understands them in a different sense. One of the difficulties is that you cannot have a Government without a change of the Constitution that is responsible to the Indian people.
That was a difficulty which all of us faced at the very beginning and I was under the impression that everybody accepted that situation because the Executive Council is not responsible to the Indian Legislature to start with and therefore you would have to have an entirely new Constitution if you were going to do that and everybody agreed that we could not start upon working out a new Constitution now and that anyway if we did it would be so long in being worked out that we would never get the Government going until after the war was over.

**QUESTION:** Sir, I do not presume to cross-examine you, nor do I want to monopolise the whole time of this Conference, but according to the published correspondence it seems that Congress was prepared to come to an agreement on the basis of conventions without immediately changing the Constitution.

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** In their final letter\(^2\) they take up two points. First of all they say they do not see why there should not be a change in the Constitution, and I think that is impossible as I pointed out to them, that is the first point, and secondly they suggest that they do not see why there could not be conventions by which the Viceroy stepped out of the picture more or less. I pointed out to them that the question of exactly what conventions could be applied and should be applied would have to be discussed with the Viceroy when it came to the question of the formation of the Government and that he was quite prepared to discuss those questions with the leaders, probably with Nehru and Jinnah perhaps, or whoever he asked to come along for the formation of the new Government, but I could not bind the Viceroy as to exactly what conventions there would be. That would have to be a thing that would have to be worked out by the people who were going to be in the Government themselves; but if they were prepared to say broadly "All right, we will come in under this scheme", then the next stage would have been the discussion of those questions with the Viceroy and I promised to stay in India until those discussions were concluded so that if I could render any assistance in the course of them I would have done so, but then they were not prepared to start upon the discussions with the Viceroy.

**QUESTION:** At what point did authority pass from the War Cabinet to the Viceroy?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** Authority did not pass from the War Cabinet to the Viceroy at all, but the person who had got to run the Government must form the Government. I could not remain in India as the Prime Minister of the Government of India. The person who had to form a Government was in fact the Viceroy and therefore it was necessary for him to discuss the question of the actual conventions and so on that would be applied in the running of that Government.

**QUESTION:** Was the attitude of the Moslems more helpful than that of Congress?

1 No. 587.  \(^2\) No. 587.
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: That is a difficult question. I did not get the answer of the Moslem League until after Congress had given theirs. I was not so worried about the attitude of the Moslems as I was about the attitude of Congress.

QUESTION: The Congress President complains in his last letter that at the last moment you raised objections to the dictatorship of the majority, the absolute dictatorship of the majority, which apparently you said they were claiming. Is that correct?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Absolutely.

QUESTION: And that this point was only raised at the last moment, but was there any logic in that objection seeing that the present situation represents the dictatorship of a minority?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: It is absolutely correct what the Congress President said that I only raised it at the last moment, I only raised it at the last moment because Congress only raised it at the last moment. The first time they put forward the claim was in their final letter to me after the negotiations had broken down and I replied in the letter which criticised them. The question of the minority and the majority you speak of is rather different in the two associations in which you have mentioned it. You are talking about the present dictatorship of the minority as meaning the British dictatorship. The question of the majority and the minority, of course, and the minority relating to the Congress claim was as between the Moslems and the Sikhs and others and the Hindus; it was the internal question and not the external question.

QUESTION: Can you elaborate in any way your statement that you would under some circumstances return to India?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: No. That was merely a remark that I hoped one day I would go back to India.

QUESTION: Can you tell us if in your view you think the Government proposal to India was a very good one and that they should have accepted it?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: I never think anybody should accept anything unless they are themselves satisfied with it. All I can say is that I thought, from the point of view of the British Government, it was a very good and satisfactory proposal and I thought that it substantially did everything that could be done towards offering India immediate self-government.

QUESTION: Well, Sir, in view of the fact that they did not accept it, this proposal was not good enough for the Indians.

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Obviously they so thought, but you must allow us to hold different opinions if we have different convictions.

QUESTION: Would you please say something about your meetings with Gandhi?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: I do not know that I can tell you anything about them except that they were very interesting. I had a long discussion of about two and
a half hours with him very shortly after I arrived and then I went back and returned his call where he was staying and had a further discussion with him, but we did not get to any arrangement and, of course, Mr. Gandhi not being a member of the Working Committee of Congress was not pretending in any sense to represent Congress views. We were merely discussing the thing, largely as between two individuals.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that actually Gandhi has great influence upon Indian political opinion?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** Certainly.

**QUESTION:** Sir, could you give the American Press a more precise estimate of Colonel Johnson’s influence or lack of influence in the negotiations?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** Yes, I can tell you precisely what the position was as regards Colonel Johnson. When Colonel Johnson arrived there he went to stay with the Viceroy as his guest and while he was staying with the Viceroy some of the Congress people asked to see him and Colonel Johnson asked the Viceroy whether he thought it was a good thing for him to do that and the Viceroy said “Certainly” and he therefore saw the Congress people. He then saw me. I saw him as a matter of fact before because I paid a courtesy call on him directly he arrived. He then came to see me again and explained to me what he thought was the outlook of Congress and what were the points that were troubling them and so on and, at my request, he acted as an intermediary, a personal intermediary, at some stages of the discussions. He was of the greatest assistance so far as I was concerned and I am sure Congress equally appreciated what he did. He did not in any sense act in an official capacity at any time at all. He was merely acting as a personal friend who happened to come along at an opportune moment when he thought he could help, and I am sure everything he did did was of great assistance.

**QUESTION:** In the new atmosphere which you think has been created in India, do you think it is possible for any combination of parallel action to take place between the Indians and the Army Chiefs in India? Do you think such a combination of parallel action is possible?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** It is going on to a very considerable extent at the present time. For instance, Congress have organised in many areas a very good A.R.P. service. Services of that kind, and a Home Guard service and so on have been organised, and as far as I have been able to ascertain there has been no clash of any sort or kind between the Government authorities who are doing the same thing and Congress and I do not myself see any reason at the moment why those things should not go along side by side, though obviously it would be much better if they could all be concentrated under a single direction.

**QUESTION:** Would they be permitted to have an armed Home Guard?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** That depends, amongst other things, on whether there

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3 No. 604.  4 No. 590.
are any arms. I cannot give you any information about the arms situation in India.

**QUESTION:** That would be the main consideration, would it?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** It would be one of the main considerations.

**QUESTION:** I have three questions to ask, the first is—would you regard the breakdown as an epilogue or as a prologue, in which case would the endorsement by the United Nations be regarded as equivalent to giving Gandhi what he calls a post-dated cheque?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** You must not ask me about Gandhi's post-dated cheques; I cannot answer about those. I presume that in history every prologue is an epilogue, is it not?

**QUESTION:** My second question is, how would Mr. Gandhi's non-violence have effect in the defence of India in the event of Japanese invasion?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** That I think is really a question you must ask Mr. Gandhi. As I understand Mr. Gandhi's attitude it is this, that he would not use any force in any event against anybody and therefore presumably he would not use it against the Japanese, but would apply some method of passive resistance against the Japanese, hunger strike or whatever it may be, in order to prevent their advance. How effective that would be depends upon the view you take as regards the pacifist outlook.

**QUESTION:** My third question is, what in your view is the effect of the Generalissimo's visit to India?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** I have no doubt the Generalissimo's visit had a very good effect. I think it tended to bring the two Nations, the Indians and the Chinese, closer together, and I think it also gave the Generalissimo and the Chinese a better understanding of the problems of India.

**QUESTION:** But is it customary for the agent of a Foreign Government to interfere in the domestic affairs of another Government?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** I do not know what you are referring to.

**QUESTION:** General Chiang Kai-Shek.

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** He paid his visit at the request of the British Government and he certainly did not interfere with the relations of the British Government with anybody.

**QUESTION:** I understood, it was publicly reported, that he tendered advice as to the political conduct of India in relation to one particular section in that country.

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** No, no, I do not think that. I think that is misleading, what was reported there.

**QUESTION:** What were your impressions from the Middle East?

**SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS:** I was not there long enough to get any.

**QUESTION:** Do you think there is any possibility of some questions being settled previous to the settlement of the political or constitutional problem?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: I took the view before I went out there, a view which I hold still, that any discussions for a temporary settlement must be on a long term view as to what was to happen afterwards and I still think that you could not get an immediate communal settlement divorced from the question of what was to happen afterwards.

QUESTION: If I may revert to this question of the dictatorship of the majority, would you care to explain why in your opinion you think the dictatorship of the majority is a bad thing from the internal point of view in India whereas in Britain where we have a dictatorship of the majority it is not a bad thing?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: First of all, it is a bad thing because there is no democratic system in India in the same sense at all; that is to say what would be the Cabinet or the Viceroy's Executive is not responsible to the Legislature as it is here and, secondly, the question of the majority and the minority in India is not a question of a fluctuating majority and minority, one of which may be converted into the other, but it is a question of a communal minority and a communal majority neither of which can ever be converted, neither the majority into the minority nor the minority into the majority and therefore, if you are going to get an agreement in India, you must satisfy the minority to a certain extent or else impose upon them the majority.

QUESTION: Is it not the fact that a very considerable proportion of the Moslems are adherents of Congress and not of the Moslem League and is that not quite a big field of agreement?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: I do not think it is a big field once you raise the communal issue in an acute form. I think on that subject there is a big field there but once you raise the Banner of Islam I think then you would find the Moslem League would get the substantial support of the Moslem population in India.

QUESTION: The Congress President explained in his letter that they had offered to discuss quite freely with you and the British authorities the detailed questions as to how for the time being an Indian Government should be run consonant with due regard being paid to the minority interests, and yet the refusal stood on the British side.

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: There was no refusal on the British side at all, none at all.

QUESTION: But the negotiations broke down on the point of your objection to what you called the dictatorship of the majority.

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: No. As I told you a moment ago, I did not raise that point because it was not raised to me until after I had received their refusal, I did not raise it, but I dealt with it in my letter of reply. The breakdown came because they were not prepared to embark upon discussions with the Viceroy as to how the Government should be formed because they said there was too much reservation of power for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief and therefore they were not prepared to enter the Government at all. We never
got to the stage of discussing how many Moslems, how many Hindus, how many Sikhs and all the rest of it. That was all open for discussion, but we never reached the stage of that discussion at all.

**Question**: The point of breakdown was then on the question of whether the Indian Government should be responsible to the Viceroy and to Westminster so to speak rather than to the Indian people.

**Sir Stafford Cripps**: Rather than to no-one because, not being responsible to the Legislature, there was no-one else for them to be responsible to. That was the trouble. They would have been an elected body, a nominated body of persons and, if they were not responsible to the Viceroy, then they were responsible to no-body except in a loose way to their own organisations. You might have said that the Congress people on the Executive would have been responsible to Congress in some sense, or the Moslems to the Moslem League and the Sikhs to the Sikh organisation, but there was no electoral responsibility.

**Question**: Does it not boil down to a question of confidence?

**Sir Stafford Cripps**: I think very largely it does.

**Question**: You refused the Indians confidence, although they were personally not responsible...

**Sir Stafford Cripps**: No, I do not think there was any question of confidence in that way. I think the real question of confidence, if it arose at all, was the question of whether they were confident that the Viceroy would handle this new Government in a way which would give them sufficient control for the purposes for which they required it.

**Question**: They did not trust the Viceroy and you did not trust them.

**Sir Stafford Cripps**: I trusted them completely. I do not think that question really arose, but what I did not think was a suitable or possible form of Government was to have an Executive Council which was not responsible to anybody at all except itself.

**Question**: What about the Central Legislature?

**Sir Stafford Cripps**: They are not responsible to the Central Legislature, unless you are going to change the whole constitution, which of course is a possibility if you are prepared to enter upon constitutional discussions now, but unless you do that they cannot be responsible to the Legislative Assembly.

**Question**: But it is possible.

**Sir Stafford Cripps**: If you change the constitution, yes.

**Question**: Is it so vast a change as all that?

**Sir Stafford Cripps**: Yes. If you look into it, you will find that once you start on it it requires a complete change throughout.

**Question**: If it were decided that this Government should be constituted and instead of being left completely irresponsible it should be made responsible to the Indian Legislature, then would it not be necessary as a first step to
reconstitute the Indian Legislature in order to make it into a body with which that responsibility could suitably lie?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Of course that is one of the constitutional changes you would have had to make. You would have had to reconstitute the Central Legislature so as to make it a truly representative body in your sense of the word.

QUESTION: Why, under the pressure of war, and under the promise of the War Cabinet that Dominion status is a right and that independence is their objective, why is this change in legislature and in constitution so impossible? Is it not possible that you may still have to face that change, or the alternative may be the loss of that confidence which you think you have built up in India?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: That is quite a possibility, but I am still afraid, and this is a view that was shared by every single Indian with whom I discussed it, that it is impossible to have a new constitution now. If we started upon the discussion of a new constitution with the body of people with whom I was discussing this problem in India, I am perfectly certain we would not come to any conclusion under six months or a year. Of course, there are a great many very difficult questions involved. For instance, there is the whole question of the communal award, which, as you know as well I do, at once throws the fat right into the fire, if I may put it in that way. You have then got to get all these Depressed Classes, and the Christians and the Sikhs and so on to agree upon some new basis. That might be possible over a period of months or years, to get that agreement, but that would not deal with the question of how you are to get an Indian Government which is going to do its best for the defence of India. Therefore it was necessary to start upon the basis that we could not enter upon any constitutional changes now, but we have to improvise as well as we can in existing circumstances until we can get the Indians themselves to work out their new constitution. That improvisation can only go a certain distance and the limit of that distance, in my view and in the view of the War Cabinet, was that you cannot create an irresponsible Executive which is responsible to no-one and, of course, the minorities, if that were to have been the position, would never have consented.

QUESTION: Is it possible to have a universal electoral system?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Everything is possible, but it is difficult because you have so many non-literate people there. There are devices by which that difficulty can be overcome, but that in itself would be a thing that would take months or years to introduce.

QUESTION: Do you mean to say that Nehru and Jinnah both agreed that it was impossible to embark upon constitutional changes?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: That was my impression, certainly that applies as regards Mr. Jinnah, and it was my impression that it applied also as regards to the representatives of the Working Committee whom I saw, and it certainly applied as regards all the other people I saw.
QUESTION: What exactly is the objection to the present composition of the Central Legislature as a body to whom an Indian Government could have been made responsible?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: It depends from which point of view you look at it. From the point of view of the people who have got the majority in it, there is no objection at all no doubt, but from the point of view of the people who have not got the majority there are all sorts of questions raised, the communal award question and so on.

QUESTION: But that objection applies to our own Government.

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: It applies here you mean?

QUESTION: Yes.

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Unfortunately, I was not debating the question whether the British Government was on the right basis or not.

QUESTION: But that you will be compelled to debate in relation to India. You, Sir, keep saying that the Government they wanted would be a dictatorship, but might I put it to you as an Englishman...

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: I do not think I have used the phrase that it would be a dictatorship.

QUESTION: Then let us put whatever softness you like on it. May I put this question to you. What is the Government that India has now?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: The Government which India has now is a Government which is run by this country with the assistance of the members of the Viceroy’s Executive.

QUESTION: Not responsible to the people or to the Legislature?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: Not responsible to the people or the Legislature.

QUESTION: In other words a dictatorship?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: If you like, if that is your definition of a dictatorship that suits it.

QUESTION: The question of Pakistan has not been mentioned, would it be right to say that it has not played such a great part as sometimes appears in the negotiations?

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: It has played a very large part indeed. The Moslem League have now, as you know, adopted the Pakistan claim as fundamental to any solution they would agree to as regards the future of India, but my own view is that they would have been satisfied with the reservation of the point in the way it was reserved in the War Cabinet suggestion and the reservation which in fact the Congress leaders have said they are prepared to adopt and therefore, as it was dealt with in that way, to that extent it did not come very largely into the negotiations, but that does not mean to say it is not a very real problem.

QUESTION: Supposing for the moment the Indians had accepted a National Government, could you give us an idea of what would have happened?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: What would have happened, as I see the picture, is that the Viceroy would next morning have asked—and I am simply taking names as examples—Mr. Nehru and Mr. Jinnah to come and consult with him as to the composition of it for communities, as to the personalities and as to the conventions that should be applied to run it in running the Viceroy’s Executive and then I presume that either Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Nehru would have been satisfied, in which case they would have gone forward with it, or else they would have been dissatisfied and said “We do not agree to this, we cannot come to an accommodation” and the reason I stated I was prepared to stay in India was that if such a situation arose I would then have tried to iron it out if I had been able to. If I had not been able to then they would have said “We are sorry, we were prepared to come in, but the conditions A, B, C and D which have been worked out with the Viceroy are not such as enable us to come in and therefore we cannot come in”.

QUESTION: And they would have been responsible to the Viceroy?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: They would have been responsible to the Viceroy.

QUESTION: And their first task would have been the question of National defence?
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: It would have been for them to decide what their first task was.

QUESTION: Yes. That I take it would have been National defence and then the political question.
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS: There would have been a great many questions that they had to decide, obviously.

MINISTER OF INFORMATION: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure we are all very greatly obliged to Sir Stafford Cripps for his speech and for answering your questions today. (Loud and sustained applause.)

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL

DEHRA DUN, 22 April 1942, 11.55 pm
Received: 23 April, 1.30 am

No. 243–S.C. It is clear to me from information I am receiving that a substantial section of my Indian colleagues in Council are exceedingly sore about their treatment over the recent declaration. That was brought out at the farewell meeting1 of Council with Cripps and I am a little uneasy about the strength

1 See No. 607.
of the feeling which is manifesting itself. General line of criticism is that they have been ignored by His Majesty’s Government, very cavalierly treated by Cripps, kept out of the discussions, and that they have perilled their future careers by taking office in my Council and so were entitled to more considerate treatment, and that in general impression has been given that they are merely a Council of caretakers to whose views His Majesty’s Government attach no importance and of whose status His Majesty’s Government have no opinion.

2. A good deal of this is, of course, just pique, but it would be a great mistake to underrate its importance. If Winston himself is speaking in the debate, it would be of very great value if some sort of tribute to the Members of Council and to the importance which His Majesty’s Government attaches to it and to its representative character could be paid. I feel sure that a little butter from the higher sources would be worth while. If Winston is not speaking perhaps you could yourself help, and I am certain that it would be a good thing if Cripps could touch on the point. I need not elaborate the nature of the problem or the difficulty to you.

667

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

VICE ROY’S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, 22 April 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have no letter from you to answer since I wrote to you at considerable length last week,1 and there have been no very important developments to comment on. But I send you a line which I hope to get off, if possible, by Turnbull. Talking of which, I am greatly worried about these delays in the transit of our bags to and fro and am trying to devise some means of dealing with them. It occurs to me that a possible answer may be to use the planes which take the airgraph service and which, I am told, are now getting through from 17 to 18 days. That would be an immense improvement on the 50 to 60 days which certain air mails home have recently taken, and of course if this correspondence between us is really to serve its purpose, it is essential that it should get home with as short an interval as possible. Equally at a time when we want to spare the telegraph lines as much as we can and also to reduce labour in deciphering and enciphering at each end, it is of real importance that we should be able expeditiously to transmit to one another confidential documents by mail which would otherwise have to be telegraphed.
2. I am glad that you agree that the White Paper should include statements by the Sikhs, Depressed Classes, Mahasabha, Princes, &c., as well as the correspondence with the major parties. I am sure this is all to the good and it may help to bring out, for the purposes of debate, the various incompatibilities between the demands of clients with whom we have to deal, and the acute difficulty of the problem—a problem which, I suspect, Cripps himself realises a great deal more fully now than he did before he undertook his Mission.

3. I look forward with the greatest possible interest to the debate. Nothing that I have seen by way of intercepted correspondence or the like leads me to believe that we can look for any change of heart on the part of Congress, and Gandhi has endeavoured to deal a final blow to the Cripps Mission by his article in last Saturday's Harijan, the gist of which has been telegraphed\(^2\) to you and the text of which goes to you by today's bag. The line settled by him has been vigorously followed up in today's Hindustan Times. But I detect in the utterances of the Hindustan Times increasing signs of that anxiety, which I anticipated on the part of Congress, to avoid carrying themselves the responsibility for the breakdown and, as you will see from the leader, they are very ready to give Jinnah even more credit than he may on this occasion have deserved for his assistance in it.

4. I am sending you a telegram\(^3\) about my Council and begging you to try to secure that some flattering references to their work, eminence, the importance we attach to them, &c., are made in the debate. They are not of one mind amongst themselves, but the majority of the Indian members seem, so far as I can judge, to be exceedingly sore over Cripps' handling of them—and also their handling by His Majesty's Government, and the information which I have confidentially\(^4\) received as to their attitude makes me very anxious to try to soothe them if possible. I am not going to have an easy time with them in these next few months. They are on their dignity as a result of the breakdown of the Mission and full of suspicion as to the bona fides of His Majesty's Government. I shall have to nurse them with even more care than before. But it is so important to me to try to keep them working as a reasonably contented team, and I have, in fact, so high an opinion of their general quality, and so full a recognition of the risks which they took from the point of view of public life in accepting my invitation to serve in my Council, that I do feel under an obligation to do what I can to protect them. I have no doubt that I shall be able, thanks to my friendly personal relations with all of them individually, to do a good deal in that direction, but it would greatly assist me if I had some help

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1. No. 626.
2. No. 657.
3. No. 666.
4. This apparently refers to papers which Lord Linlithgow had received from Sir Firoz Khan Noon; see MSS. EUR. F. 125/127.
such as I have suggested. It is pretty clear to me, too, that Council, in their present mood, will be very disposed to take the line that if we were prepared to offer so much to people who were not prepared to look at our offer, we ought to be prepared to implement that offer, so far as the present Council is concerned, and it is there, of course, that I am going to find difficulty over the various suggestions which emerged from the Cripps’ discussions, e.g., the establishment of conventions binding the Governor-General, &c., for which there was, in fact, no foundation, but which Indian public opinion widely believes to have been offered, and to have been the subject of discussion. I must, of course, hold my own, but I may have a certain amount of difficulty from time to time.

*     *     *

6. Thank you very much for your telegram\(^5\) about Bajpai’s suggestion that we might let Roosevelt know what really happened over the Cripps Mission. Winston’s message (whatever it may have been!) covers the ground so far as Roosevelt is concerned. I have a quite open mind as to the arguments for and against sending anything to Chiang Kai-shek, but I think there might be advantage in a purely personal message, and I am telegraphing a draft for your consideration.

\(^5\) No. 655.

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668

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 254-S.C. Your telegram No. 415\(^1\) of 2nd April.

Competitive examination this year for I.C.S. is already over and there is no objection to the selection of a few Indians in London next August. No recommendation was made to stop recruitment for Indian Police because it was understood from paragraph 14 of your private letter of the 5th January\(^2\) that European recruits would be available and the same reason for stopping Indian recruitment did not exist. But for the reasons given in my telegram No. 412-S\(^3\) of the 21st February I am strongly of opinion that if Europeans are not available, recruitment for both services should be discontinued for the duration of the war. The 1943 Delhi Examination would have to be cancelled, and announcement of our intention would have to be made at once. To secure political advantage mentioned in my No. 412-S it is not necessary for it to cover more
than the war period, more especially as, if recruitment is resumed after the war, numbers of ex-Army officers will then be available to fill vacancies. I would welcome early decision.

1 No. 489; the date should be 1 April.  

669

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/591: f 112

IMMEDIATE 23 April 1942, 11.30 am

7276. Your telegram 18th April 218–S.C.,1 many thanks. I have in mind no other requirements of material at the moment except that I shall be glad to know if anything has developed in regard to your “National Defence Front”.

2. Arrangements for Debate next Tuesday, 28th April, are that Cripps will make statement on motion for the Adjournment. I shall wind up and motion will be withdrawn and I shall then move Section 93 Resolutions followed by Governor’s Allowances Order.

1 No. 649.

670

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f 44

MOST IMMEDIATE 23 April 1942

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

256–S.C. Your private and personal telegram 5131 of April 22nd. I have already replied2 to your 71863 of April 21st and have accepted your view that we must accept Cripps’ statement of what he actually put to Congress. As my reply makes clear, his present statement is inconsistent with what I was given to understand at the time: while Congress as you say in your telegram under reply have published as part of the formula communicated to them by Cripps the words which he denies having included in it. (Text as given in Hindustan Times of April 12th contains those words “until the new Constitution comes into operation” under heading “Sir Stafford Cripps’ formula”). I cannot take the matter further, but feel these discrepancies, which will be seized on immediately once text of White Paper is available here, may prove most difficult.

1 No. 662.  

2 No. 663.  

3 No. 661.
to explain. My own strong disposition would still be to avoid their (omission) by getting Cripps to agree to publication of texts as published by Congress. You alone can judge practicability of that, but I feel in any case Cabinet ought to be made aware of existence of these discrepancies and importance (as brought out in paragraph 4 of my telegram of April 10th No. 980–S4) of issue raised by Congress anxious to omit words “until new constitution comes into operation”.

2. I telegraphed yesterday about feeling among Indian members of my Council. There is every prospect that I shall be strongly pressed to agree to “conventions”, surrender of control of defence, etc. on line assumed to have been emphasised by Cripps with Congress with full approval of Cabinet. I cannot disclose that there was no Cabinet approval for certain of these matters and that I could not have stood for them myself save under direct instructions of Cabinet. But this makes it all the more important that so far as possible we should keep our hands free both as regards the “offer” and as regards any matter largely specifically and in terms covered by it which Cripps may have discussed with party leaders. I shall be telegraphing separately comment (two corrupt groups) received from Glancy.

3. Last sentence of your telegram. Emphasis in my telegram 216–SC6 is on combative nature of Cripps’ reply of April 10th7 (omitted) Azad, not (corrupt group) terms, for which I am not responsible.

4 No. 585. 5 See No. 625, note 1. 6 No. 647. 7 No. 590.

671

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE DEHRA DUN, 23 April 1942, 1.15 pm
PERSONAL Received: 23 April, 1.30 pm
No. 257–S.C. Your personal telegram of 20th April, No. 507. Many thanks. I will inform Bajpai privately that matter is disposed of so far as United States are concerned.

2. As regards Chiang Kai-shek, I would be disposed if you and Cabinet agreed to send something on the lines of my immediately following telegram through Ambassador, Chungking.

1 No. 655. 2 No. 672.
672

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

DEHLA DUN, 23 April 1942, 1.20 pm
Received: 23 April, 4.30 pm

No. 258—S.C. Following is draft telegram referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. From Viceroy to Ambassador, Chungking. As you know Cripps' endeavours to reach a settlement here on behalf of His Majesty's Government have unfortunately been unsuccessful. I do not want to bring the Generalissimo into our internal politics more than can be helped, but given our personal contact and interest which I know he has taken in this matter I should be most grateful if you would give him the following entirely personal message from me:

Begins. Failure of Sir Stafford Cripps' endeavours to reach a friendly agreement here on the constitutional issue has been a very real disappointment to me. Remembering our personal contacts when I had the pleasure of entertaining Your Excellency in India I would like, however, to assure you that, deeply as I deplore the breakdown of these conversations, the anxiety of my Government and the people of India to see the triumph of right over repression remains as strong and as real as ever. I am quite sure, too, that even if Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission has not had the success for which we hoped it has been of the utmost value that it should have taken place and that he should have visited India on behalf of His Majesty's Government with the proposals which he carried with him. Meanwhile I shall not fail to use every opportunity to enhance India's readiness for war. Ends.

1 No. 671.

673

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

Confidential

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 8,
DATED 23RD APRIL 1942

The majority of people in this Province who took any interest in Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission are without doubt disappointed at its failure. There are few educated people here who do not desire a continuance of close association with
Great Britain, and most of them felt that there was now a great opportunity for doing something which would satisfy their izzat without sacrificing the British connection. Their feeling of depression at the failure of the mission is genuine. At the same time, they are more concerned with the war situation than with constitutional advance, and some say that it was too late in any case to hope for complete co-operation in the war. The Khans on the whole are pleased chiefly at the thought that Congress has not come into power again; they—and, I think, our Provincial Services—are only too ready to see Section 93 arrangements continue. Ex-army men are still completely loyal, and their belief in ultimate victory is as ever. They are not interested in politics. The same thing applies to the tribes generally. I have seen an unusually large number of big jirgas during the last two or three weeks, and their attitude has been very satisfactory. Hatred of the Japanese unites a good proportion of the people both in districts and in tribal territory.

2. Few people have, I think, been misled by Congress propaganda that the British Government were to blame for the breakdown of negotiations, though the various communities, as was to be expected, differ as to the basic reason for it. Rai Bahadur Mehrchand Khanna (who belongs to the Hindu Mahasabha and was in touch with events in Delhi) says that he and his friends believe that the fundamental objection felt by Congress to Sir Stafford Cripps’ proposals was the Pakistan element in them. Congress could not, however, bring this objection too much to the forefront without stultifying a good deal that they had preached in the past about rights of self-determination. So they manoeuvred for a breakdown on other issues. The more general view, however, is simply that Congress were afraid of assuming responsibility at the present moment. There is, in fact, widespread doubt whether the dispute over Defence was really the issue on which Congress decided to break off negotiations.

3. I attribute very little importance to the rather foolish statement made by Dr. Khan Sahib. He was obviously the mouthpiece of others, probably of Gandhi. Since he returned to Peshawar he has been saying that the mass of Congress would never have agreed to anything short of complete independence, and that Nehru would have rejected Cripps’ proposals at the outset, but for the fear of exposing Congress to the criticism of intransigence. In reality, however, Dr. Khan Sahib probably regrets the failure of the negotiations because in his heart of hearts he is undoubtedly anxious to lead a Ministry again. He was foolish to refuse Sir Stafford’s invitation to see him, and I have told him so through Mrs. Khan Sahib; I believe the real reason was that he was terrified of having to answer awkward questions, as he is conscious of his weakness in debate. The only other Congress leader who has said much is Ali Gul Khan, President of the Provincial Committee, who even now is clearly anxious for a settlement, and has stated his belief that something may still materialise. The
rank and file of the Congress have barely understood the implications of the War Cabinet's Draft Declaration, and seem to think that intensive civil disobedience will soon start. I have had a warning conveyed to Dr. Khan Sahib about this.

4. From the Muslim League side, the belief is that Jinnah genuinely regretted the breakdown of negotiations, that he assured Sir Stafford that in this war Muslim interests are identical with those of the British, and that there is still some idea of Government coming to separate agreement with Muslim League. This last possibility is also being hinted at, with apprehension, by Hindus. They have stated that, if Muslim Leaguers are openly given preference and taken on the Viceroy's Council, Government will have the active opposition of the Mahasabha, the Sikhs and Congress. The Hindus have, of course, been thoroughly alarmed by the conditional offer of Pakistan, and I have heard more talk than usual lately of the necessity for Hindus to establish themselves on strong footing in the Army. Indeed, Hindu and Sikh officers have been heard talking in terms of complete independence and Hindu raj in India.

674

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

CONFIDENTIAL Viceroy's Camp, Dehra Dun, 23 April 1942

My dear Glancy,

Very many thanks for your confidential d.-o. No. 330\(^1\) of the 14th April, about reactions to the Cripps Mission. I agree with you as to the importance of the point you raise, and, in addition to sending Amery a copy of your letter by the fast air mail, I have telegraphed the latter portion of it, so that he and His Majesty's Government will have it before them when they are considering tactics in the debate. What line they will decide to take I cannot, of course, say; but you can at any rate rest assured that your view has not been overlooked and has been brought prominently to their notice.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

\(^1\) This should read '390', i.e. No. 625.
675

Minutes by Mr Patrick and Sir D. Monteath

L/P&J/10/2: f33

24 April 1942

Sir D. Monteath
Secretary of State

Sir B. J. Glancy’s views,¹ though weighty in representing the Punjab outlook, can hardly sway the policy of H.M.G. in this matter, with its repercussions in U.S.A.

I assume that in the Debate it will be an axiom that the “offer” if “withdrawn” is open when Indians want to grasp it; that the Viceroy is ready to meet the party leaders (preferably not singly but jointly); and that this fuller explanation of the 1940 Declaration remains authoritative² as an exposition of one way in which that Declaration might be fulfilled.

But something can be said about eventual adjustment of Provincial boundaries and the provisions in Section 290³ to enable this to proceed. There seems to be no way of putting back the clock in the Punjab. But we could, with the Governor’s help, perhaps find means even in the present time of stress of easing the transition.

Possibly you will wish to send to Sir Stafford Cripps and the P.M. a copy of the Viceroy’s telegram⁴ and your reply,⁵ for which I suggest a tentative draft.

P. J. P.

S[ecretary of] S[tate] wishes this sent and a copy of the tel[e gram]ms in and out to be supplied to P[reme] M[inister] and L[ord] P[ivy] S[ecretary].

D. T. M.

¹ No. 625.
² The remainder of this sentence is by Sir D. Monteath.
³ Of the Government of India Act 1935.
⁴ See No. 625, note 1.
⁵ No. 676.
676

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: ff 34–5

IMMEDIATE

INDIA OFFICE, 24 April 1942, 7.30 pm
Received: 25 April

7393. Your telegram of 23rd April, 263–SC.¹ I have let Cabinet know Glancy’s view. I shall be most interested to see his appreciation and do not underrate his anxiety. But I am sure you agree that it would be impossible for us now to treat the draft declaration, though withdrawn formally in view of its non-acceptance, as non-avenu and dead. Rather in my view the line must be that the Viceroy remains ready to consider practical suggestions put forward by responsible leaders, most of all if put forward jointly, for realising its aims. The next move lies with them; their talents and ours may well be devoted to finding practical means of bridging the difficulties which have arisen as exemplified in the Party Resolutions, and among these adjustments the means prescribed by Section 290 of varying the present composition of certain Provinces may require consideration.

¹ See No. 625, note 1.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 24 April 1942
Received: 25 April

No. 520. Superintendent series. Your private letter of 31st March¹ last sentence. I am so glad. We are of course agreed that protection of your position is of first importance and in whatever else we may fail I trust and believe we shall succeed in this.

¹ No. 474.
Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: ff 37-9

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

522. Your private and personal telegram of 23rd April, 256-S. Cabinet of course had your telegram of April 10th 980-S and I informed them of the alteration (with special reference to the words in question and your views on them) in the formula to be published in the White Paper. Obvious reply to any remarks on discrepancies in various texts is that discussions and consequently precise wording of formula were still in completely fluid state when breakdown occurred and I cannot see any difficulty in sticking to this line.

2. I appreciate the difficulty of the situation indicated in your paragraph 2. So far as concerns the position vis-à-vis leaders of Congress, Moslem League and other parties, it seems to me, and I hope it will be possible to bring it out in debate, that since all for one reason or another rejected draft declaration (which Cripps said to Press on 11th April was "withdrawn") we are in strict theory (but not of course in practice—see my reply to your 263-SC6) back at status quo ante (compare concluding words of preface to communicé publishing draft declaration7 viz., "the question whether they i.e. H.M.G.’s conclusions will be implemented will depend on the outcome of those discussions which are now taking place"). But in relation to your Council it may well, as I readily understand, be difficult to refuse some further measure of Indian control of departmental functions which is indicated in Cripps’ letter of 10th April8 as having in effect been offered as concomitant of acceptance of draft declaration. I think we had better keep an open mind as to course to be pursued till we see how this quasi-commitment is handled in debate; but I think we should recognise that while constitutional position is unchanged (this ruling out any convention such as adumbrated in your telegram 10th April 978-SC9 derogating from Viceroy’s control of Council proceedings) it may be necessary to contemplate Indian Member of Defence Co-ordination at any rate, whether or not you find it possible to contemplate further transfers.

3. With reference also to your personal telegram 23rd April 243-SC10 (which I have circulated to Cabinet) you may rely on me to make such opportunity as I can to pay tribute to and soothe the feelings of Members of your Council.

1 No. 670. 2 No. 585. 3 No. 664. 4 The Times Delhi correspondent reported on 12 April: "When Sir Stafford Cripps announced that the draft declaration had been withdrawn he said: "We revert to the position as it was before I came out here", but he significantly added, "though not quite perhaps to that position."" 5 No. 676. 6 See No. 625, note 1. 7 No. 456. 8 No. 590. 9 No. 578. 10 No. 666.
679

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&EJ/8/509: f 546

IMMEDIATE

PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 24 April 1942, 7.45 pm
Received: 25 April

524. Your personal telegram, 23rd April 257–S.C.¹ I have consulted Foreign Secretary and Lord Privy Seal and agree to your sending message to Generalissimo on lines proposed. I am informing Prime Minister.

¹ No. 671.

680

Sir H. Seymour to Sir S. Cripps (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 230

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CHUNGKING, 24 April 1942, 2.10 pm
Received 24 April, 7.5 pm

No. 560. Please pass to Cripps.

Great disappointment is being shown here at the failure of the constitutional talks in India. Several newspapers urge their renewal under Chinese-American mediation and the suggestion is also made that an allied High Command should be set up in India under General Wavell to replace the present purely British High Command. There is some criticism of Gandhi’s attitude.

2. It is evident that the Chiang Kai-sheks consider present deadlock to some extent a personal failure for themselves. According to Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Kai-shek had hoped that their visit to India would go a long way towards galvanising both the Indian people and British officials into a sense of imminent danger but they had apparently failed. She remains apparently impervious to explanations, maintaining that Congress is the only really representative body in India and that our failure to grant India independence now, with control over her own defences, means that we shall lose India. She stated in confidence that she knew for a fact that Congress was ready to break with Gandhi and his doctrine of passive resistance, had independence been granted at once.

3. It is obvious that the Chiang Kai-sheks are unwilling or unable to understand the true position in India and are highly nervous of the effect on China of a
successful invasion of India. Their confidence in our ability to defend it has by no means been strengthened by their recent visit to Burma.

4. Full press summaries were telegraphed to London and India on April 16th and April 18th.

681

Note by Mr Amery

L/P&J/10/2: ff 28–32

NOTES ON THE INDIAN SITUATION

The sending of the Cripps Mission was in no sense a sudden deathbed repentance involving a complete change of policy. Full Dominion Status, as defined by the Statute of Westminster, had already been promised as the goal by the Viceroy at the beginning of 1940. The August 1940 Declaration not only confirmed this, but declared the willingness of H.M.G. that it should come into being at the earliest possible moment after the war that Indians had agreed upon a constitution, subject however to such agreement and to the due fulfilment of the obligations arising from our historical connection with India. The real new development was on this occasion, when the two principles of an Indian-devised constitution and of agreement were laid down. All that has happened since was implicit in that declaration.

The declaration itself was, however, open to the charge of vagueness on several points. One was that the due fulfilment of obligations would mean an over-riding of the new constitution by H.M.G. so as to make it in effect not really a Dominion constitution or one framed by Indians for themselves. The other main charge was that agreement was simply a device on our part to postpone self-government, knowing that Indians would not agree.

The main object of the draft declaration was to set these suspicions at rest. First of all the full meaning of Dominion Status was set out in the language of the Balfour Declaration and even the possibility of secession was explicitly reserved in connection with the provision for a treaty, as Sir S. Cripps made clear in talking to the Press. The treaty provision was also put in in order to emphasise equality of status. Incidentally, Cripps declared that we should not attempt in the treaty to secure any terms for British trade interests. We did declare that we would use the treaty for the protection of minorities, though, as both Ambedkar and the Sikhs have pointed out, this may not mean very much.

In order to deal with the charge of deliberate delay, two new features were
introduced. One was that we put down our own idea of what might be a suitable constitution-making body and our intention to give effect to it immediately after the cessation of hostilities if Indians could not by then have agreed on a better alternative. The other was that the need for agreement should not hold back those parts of India which wished to get ahead. This was put the other way round in the form of non-accession of provinces who feared oppression from the constitution agreed by the majority. In this respect individual provinces were simply put in the same position as the States have always been. Incidentally, it may be worth noting that the declaration implicitly waived the 1935 stipulation that federation should only come into effect if a minimum number of States joined. It was not even stipulated that a majority of provinces was required to set up the new Dominion, though presumably if a constitution is framed by the majority of the kind of convention suggested, a majority of provinces would probably adhere to it. This does not, however, necessarily follow. The provincial legislatures, not subject to the convention atmosphere, might quite well react against a constitution and their reaction be endorsed by a plebiscite. Indeed, it is conceivable in Indian conditions that the convention might agree upon a constitution and a majority of provinces disagree with it.

In any case it is worth noting—for no one in India seems to have noted it—that the provision for non-accession by provinces is really consequential upon the particular form of convention suggested. If, for instance, Indian political leaders prefer a convention summoned by parties and communities, they might quite well, in default of agreement, eventually settle upon some form of Pakistan, cutting across existing provincial boundaries, i.e. more on the lines of the "zones" demanded by Jinnah. There is no reason, as a matter of fact, why, if it became obvious that the Moslems could not be persuaded to come into a constitution, there should not be arrangements for the redistribution of provincial boundaries even before the proposed plebiscite.

In any case, the object of the provision was not to break up India; but (a) to get rid of the charge that progress was held up by insistence on agreement; (b) to compel Congress to face the necessity of finding a constitutional solution which would persuade the Moslems to come in, instead of trying to coerce the British Government to frame a constitution to coerce the Moslems. The responsibility for a decision between patience and compromise securing a united India, and greater haste in achieving an independent but divided India, was fairly put upon Indians themselves.

1 Mr Amery appears to have written this note in preparation for his speech during the debate on the Cripps Mission. Parl. Deb., 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April, cols. 905–17.
2 See No. 43, note 1. 3 See No. 195. 4 See No. 440, p. 537. 5 See No. 440, p. 542.
6 Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 5.
7 Note by Mr Patrick: "The Provinces under the 1935 Act became bodies at least as "sovereign" as States. Hence option became a necessity whatever Convention was adopted?"
8 Note by Mr Patrick: "contemplated in the 1935 Act".
It was never intended by the Cabinet that section (e) of the Draft Declaration should imply a fundamental change in the present constitution of the Government of India. This was partly for purely practical reasons. The present defence of India is inextricably bound up with the fighting in Burma, the defence of Ceylon, and of the Indian Ocean, not to speak of the more contingent danger in the Middle East. To separate out India’s military responsibility and leave the last word in such matters as communications, supply, law and order, to a Government disagreeing with British strategy and Wavell’s operations was out of the question. Australia really affords no parallel. A further objection was the constitutional one that the kind of government demanded by Sapru & Co. and by Congress since, would be in the air, responsible to no ordered scheme of constitution, in fact an arbitrary dictatorship of a handful of party leaders. But the most serious and fundamental objection is the fact that any such government would have prejudged the future. That is precisely why the Hindu moderates and Congress have insisted on it, and why Jinnah has again and again, both before and after the Cripps Mission, declared his opposition, even to the point of revolt.

The most significant thing, perhaps, about the whole of the Cripps negotiations is that from start to finish the Indian political leaders did not meet Cripps together, but separately, and do not seem even to have met each other in private. The whole situation would have been different if Congress and the League had presented Cripps with an agreed demand for an all-Indian Government, including a Minister of Defence, the proportion of posts as between the different communities settled between them. The effect this would have had is so obvious that it is clear that the only reason why it was not done was that it could not be done. What Congress hoped was that if the principle were conceded they could then go, in a position of power, to demand the proportion of seats they thought reasonable and, if that were not agreed, fasten the whole blame on the other parties, or even more upon the Viceroy.

It was on that main and immediate issue that the negotiations broke down. On the issue of the future the various objections largely cancelled each other. But it is typical of Indian mentality that each element, instead of seeing in the proposals an opportunity for getting their desires by persuasion or effective organisation, simply assumed that the proposals did not give them outright all that they wanted and were therefore worthless. Jinnah condemns provincial non-accession as virtually killing any reasonable prospect of Pakistan, while the Sikhs treat it as betraying them and handing them over for good and all to Moslem rule. The real trouble, one might almost say, is that, while they all demand independence, none of them has that spirit of self-government which makes up its own mind what it wants to get and is prepared to take whatever is offered it as a stepping-stone towards achieving more.

Any intelligent Indian of real good will could have seen that the whole object
of our proposals was to secure a free discussion as the outcome of which the unity of India might be attained by common consent under some constitutional system giving greater guarantees to the Moslems and the Princes than the Act of 1935 or indeed than any constitution based on the British system of an Executive dependent on a parliamentary majority, i.e. in fact on a party caucus.

It may be asked how far the Draft Declaration has been withdrawn. Obviously certain parts of it stand. We are not going to go back, for instance, on the general definition of the goal or on our desire to attain it as soon as possible after the war under a constitution framed by Indians for themselves and based on agreement. Nor are we likely to go back on the method of treaty for settling outstanding matters, e.g. military assistance, the claims of the Services, our responsibility for the Princes, etc. Nor is it likely that we can go back altogether on something in the nature of a general right of non-accession for Moslem areas. On the other hand, the particular scheme for the constitution-making convention on a provincial basis and its consequentials may well be reconsidered if a better scheme can be devised by us or by Indians for themselves.

As regards the immediate future, I imagine the offer under (e) remains open; but the initiative must now come from Indians. We can hardly be expected, after this rejection, to go chasing them again, or to send out yet another emissary.

One point of major importance is to answer the delusion that the creation of a National Government in India would bring millions of armed men to India’s defence. As a matter of fact, under present conditions, the kind of National Government Congress wanted would have very seriously prejudiced recruiting and the spirit of defence in those parts of India which supply the armed forces. But even a generally supported National Government cannot provide arms, which are the bottleneck, or create a fighting spirit in populations which have never had it. To talk of the parallel of Russia, China, or the Philippines, is nonsense. The Russians have always been good fighters, under the worst of Governments, and have had conscription with all the arms that accompany it. China had a generation of civil war between different warlords and was flooded with all the cast-off armoury of the last war, before Japanese aggression consolidated its various contending elements in the common defence. There is no evidence that the Filipinos have put up any resistance to the Japanese as a population. The American-trained Filipino army has done well, but in no way better than the British-trained Indian Army.

9 Note by Mr Patrick: ‘But how? What States ask for is automatic protection without interference—only obtainable from a non-Indian Paramount Power.’
10 Note by Mr Patrick: ‘But the Princes will demand sanctions?’
11 Note by Mr Patrick: ‘As stated by Sir S. Cripps’ (see No. 665, p. 816).
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 536

NEW DELHI, 24 April 1942, 5 pm

1122–G. Following is the summary of two resolutions passed by Madras Legislature Congress Party, at meeting presided over by Rajagopalachari at Madras on April 23rd. According to press account 46 members participated in the discussions which lasted six hours. Proceedings were not open to the press. Begins. Madras Legislature Congress Party regrets that attempts to establish National Government for India have failed and in consequence nationalist (? India) has been placed in dilemma. It is impossible for the people to think in terms of neutrality or passivity during invasion by enemy power. Neither is it practicable to organise any effective defence independently and uncoordinated with defence measures of Government. It is absolutely and urgently necessary in interests of country to do all that Congress can possibly do to remove every obstacle in way to establishment of national administration to facilitate present situation; therefore, inasmuch as Moslem League has insisted on recognition of right of separation of certain areas from United India upon ascertainment of wishes of the people of such areas as condition precedent for united nation[al?] action at this moment of grave national danger, this party recommends to all-India Congress Party that to sacrifice chances of formation of National Government for doubtful advantage of maintaining controversy over unity of India is most unwise policy, and that it has become necessary to choose lesser evil and acknowledge Moslem League’s claim for separation, should same be persisted in when time comes for framing constitution for India, and thereby remove all doubts and fears in this regard, and to invite Moslem League for consultation for the purpose of arriving at agreement and securing (? installation) of national Government to meet present emergency.

2. Second Resolution. Whereas Province of Madras is seriously threatened with enemy invasion and life is subjected to growing dislocation; it is suicidal for the present and disastrous for future for the peoples’ elected representatives to remain passive and let the people suffer under these conditions all incidents of present autocratic administration, and also submit to aggression without (? participation) (? in) defence of the motherland, and whereas participation in defence is (? practicable) only if the people are armed and organised to (? some) extent and inspired for sacrifice: Madras Legislature Congress Party voices general feeling in this part of the country that there should be at this critical (? moment) popular Government in this Province doing the utmost to
secure requisite conditions for people to play their part. To facilitate united and effective action Moslem League should be (?) invited) to participate in popular Government. Party therefore requests All-India Congress to permit this party to take steps in this end, notwithstanding general All-India Congress policy.  

Ends.

3. First resolution is reported to have been passed by 37 votes against 6, 3 remaining neutral; second resolution is reported to have been passed by 39 votes against 2, 5 remaining neutral.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 24 April 1942

Cripps arrived on Wednesday,1 looking very fit and quite reasonably happy about the outcome of his mission. We are to have the debate on Tuesday, the 28th. Cripps will open and I shall field the byes and sum up. I have seen his speech, at any rate in its first draft, and think it will meet the case very well. I got him to tone down a reference to his and the Government’s desire to see “democracy” developed in the States and only refer to the development of “suitable representative institutions”. On the other hand, there is one point which seems to me very doubtful on which he has committed himself in writing2 to the Princes and insists on keeping in his speech, and that is that Princes, on entering the proposed Union, cease to be in any sense under Paramountcy. His argument is that it is impossible in practice for us either to give the necessary protection or carry out its corollary of interference in case of misgovernment in what would in effect be an independent State, even if it does not actually sever itself from the Empire. I confess I am not convinced. In South Africa we carry on the administration of the Protectorates in the middle of the territory of the Union, with such police as is necessary for internal order, and frankly without facing the theoretical possibility of having to defend these territories against a hostile Union. Again, to take the more theoretical point, in Australia the States, in so far as they have not definitely transferred powers to the Commonwealth, are still in direct relation with His Majesty’s Government and the Crown here. Their Governors are appointed from here and matters of all kinds are from time to time referred to the Dominions Office. Personally, I should have thought, though Cripps thinks otherwise, that very

1 22 April. Sir S. Cripps arrived on Tuesday, 21 April.  
2 See No. 527.
few of the Princes would look at a Union in which their domestic affairs would be subject to control by an Indian Government. Much as some of them resent the intervention of the Political Department, they would, I should have thought, prefer that to the intervention of a Union Ministry instigated by local agitators in their States.

2. I note that the States have put forward, no doubt as a bargaining point, the idea that they too might form a Federation or Dominion of their own. I think that is all to the good, at any rate from the point of view of teaching Congress what it may have to face if it is not prepared to work for a constitution acceptable to Muslims and Princes, or is going to insist on separation from the Empire. I don't know how far the Political Department still keeps up the old tradition of discouraging Princes from dealings with each other on questions of this sort. That, I should think, really belongs to an earlier phase and that nowadays it is to our interest and the general interest of India to encourage the Princes to work together as much as possible and to consider seriously such a possibility as a federation of the main Rajputana block, and other similar blocks, apart from the bigger question of a federation of all the Princes. I am talking of course of the major States and of those minor ones that can conveniently be fitted in with them. There are no doubt plenty of the quite small ones for whom the only appropriate fate is absorption in the adjoining Province.

3. Cripps seems a little distressed at the idea that your Executive should have thought he had treated them with scant consideration. He says they were the first people he talked to and gave an idea of the scheme, which then promptly leaked out. What I don't think he realises sufficiently is that the mere fact of his coming out and offering all the places on the Executive to the Politicians has naturally in itself been a mortifying blow to those who so recently accepted service on the Executive from patriotic motives. However, that was the fault of the Government as a whole and in a sense implicit in the scheme. But I have told Cripps that he ought to say a word about the present Executive and I shall certainly say more than a word on the subject. I do fully appreciate their feelings and I know you will do all you can to help them recover their sense of collective authority and to make them feel that individually they are not going merely to be scrapped. On the point which you have just raised in a telegram,3 that they may ask for some "convention" to govern their future position, I should have thought that the very fact that the negotiations with Cripps broke down on this point and that he left the matter entirely in your hands, was sufficient answer. After all, conventions, if they are to be of any good, grow in the working and are not things laid down in advance. You have throughout endeavoured to keep in line with your Council and to make them feel that they are playing a real part in the Government of India and I should have thought the only thing was to continue on that course.
4. There is, of course, the question of the Defence Department. Would you and Wavell perhaps consider it worth while carrying through the division on the lines of the formula discussed with Congress, with a view to appointing a good Indian, e.g., Sikander or Firoz, or even a Prince, to carry the Defence Co-ordination work? That might give you somebody who really could give some inspiration to the general public on that side of things.

5. I hope I may soon receive a further report of the progress made in considering suggestions for propaganda measures designed to present to American opinion a fuller picture of the Indian States. You referred to the matter briefly in paragraph 17 of your letter of the 24th November, and I have since seen the report sent home by your Political Secretary of a discussion of the subject on the 26th November. Interest in the matter must have been stimulated in America by the attention paid by Congress to the position of Rulers and States’ peoples in the framing of the new constitution, and I should say that the field is ripe for some judicious propaganda, calculated to show that the States and their Governments are not the sinks of iniquity which they are represented to be by Congress and form an essential part of the Indian polity.

6. I note that I shall be hearing from you again on the point referred to in paragraph 18 of your letter of 23rd January about the discretion to be allowed a Provincial Government in the matter of absorbing State territory. I shall be interested to see the views of your constitutional experts. Provisionally I should have thought that the provisions of Section 290 of the Government of India Act secure a considerable say in regard to any such proposal to the Provincial legislature. Nimrana is evidently not a paying proposition and the Provincial authorities could not perhaps be expected to welcome the prospect of its administration falling on their budget. On the other hand it may well be that we shall eventually have to revise Provincial boundaries, in order to meet both Muslim and Sikh objections, as a preliminary to actually giving effect to the non-accession principle.

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3 No. 670. 4 No. 30.
5 A chiefship with an area of 29 square miles, a population of 9,000 and a revenue of Rs. 40,000, forming an enclave within Alwar State. The Ruler was a feudatory of the Maharaja of Alwar, to whom he was bound to pay tribute. As his resources were regarded as insufficient to enable him to discharge this obligation as well as providing an administration for his subjects, the question of absorbing Nimrana into a larger unit had come under discussion. The Punjab Government had declined the offer on account of the financial liability involved.
1. Reactions to the result of Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission. As is always the case here, it is not easy to assess precisely the public reactions to the breakdown of the negotiations conducted by Sir Stafford Cripps. I am glad to say, however, that I do not notice any deterioration or any bitterness, with the exception which I shall mention later. In fact, I am inclined to think that, as I hoped would be the case, the proposals, though they have failed, have produced a nett gain, particularly in those quarters which were formerly our most persistent opponents. From an informant whom I have usually found reliable, I learn that a very much better feeling exists amongst those who professed to have doubts about our ultimate intentions. The Draft Declaration has satisfied a great many of them on that point. I also hear that local informed Congress opinion was quite prepared to accept the provision of non-accession, and considered it to be the only method so far put forward, with any prospects of success, for obtaining Muslim agreement to discussions about a future constitution. This view is said to find a good deal of support amongst local Congress people, although it has not been declared openly, and all nationalist newspapers condemn the proposals mainly on the ground that they would vivisect India.

There have been no public declarations by Muslims here, but most Muslim newspapers appear to be well satisfied with the result of the negotiations on the ground, first, that they have not been let down, as they feared, and secondly, that the negotiations cannot have failed to have opened the eyes of the British Government to the fact that it is Congress intransigence which is the real obstacle. Parsees, I am told, are generally relieved that, for a time at any rate, Congress will not regain power.

The exception to which I have referred is Ambedkar. He came to see me to discuss the establishment of the National War Front, and although he has, with no enthusiasm, agreed to give it some support, he took the opportunity to let off to me some very bitter steam about the Draft Declaration. He said that he had been as good as told that Congress and the Muslim League were the only bodies which counted, and that if they agreed to the proposals, it would not matter what he or the Depressed Classes thought about them. He professed to be bitterly disillusioned and to feel humiliated. He declared that the proposals went back on the August Declaration, and that, with the example of the Irish Treaty before him, the suggestion that minorities could be safe-
guarded by means of a treaty was a very poor joke. How, he asked, could he and his friends be expected to continue their support of Government if they were to be let down in this way? He had thought of resigning from the National Defence Council but had decided to carry on for the time being, but he could not be expected to show any enthusiasm in support of Government. I reasoned with him as best I could, but I fear made little impression upon him. This mood of disgruntlement has been noticeable in Ambedkar for a long time—certainly since he was not taken in to the expansion of your Executive Council, as he had hoped. He will, I expect, succeed in obtaining some support for his views amongst his followers in this Province, for he is the only individual amongst them who is capable of thinking for them. Nevertheless, I feel pretty sure that this disgruntlement is largely a personal matter. As you know, his own financial position has been worrying him for some time. I have reason to believe that he owes money to certain people who have helped him in the past, and that he is unable to pay any of it back, and is even rather rude if they mention the subject. As you know, too, he has been, for some time, anxious to obtain a position in the High Court or elsewhere, in which he could have a chance of providing for his own future. He has given me, for some time, the impression of a man who is no longer really interested in the work he is doing for his own followers, and is anxious to reach a different sphere. He is inclined, unfortunately, to attribute the difficulties of his own position to influences at work against him because he is a member of the Depressed Classes, and from that it is an easy step to the belief that we do not concern ourselves about him unduly because we do not think it worth while to secure the support of the Depressed Classes. I would very much like to see something done for him, and I hope that, if a further expansion of your Council is now possible, he will be included,—not on personal grounds alone, but so that we may retain the interest of the Depressed Classes. He has been unhelpful about recruitment of Mahars, and does not put his weight behind it overmuch, in spite of the fact that he has long clamoured for Mahars being taken into combatant units. Nevertheless, the recruitment of Mahars continues, but not as well as it would do if he were really keen to help.

Apart from the bitterness displayed by Ambedkar, I think that the failure of Cripps' negotiations has left us in no worse position, and the nett result is probably some gain.
IMMEDIATE

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

DEHRA DUN, 25 April 1942, 1.25 am

Received: 25 April, 3 am

No. 272–S.C. I understand that B.B.C. broadcast on April 22nd summarising or quoting Cripps’ press conference included the following sentence, which was repeated in all the Indian broadcasts but which has apparently been cut out of Reuters and Press:

_Begins_. Right up to the last two days I thought that a settlement was possible when it seemed clear to me that Congress leaders would not negotiate with Viceroy. _Ends_.

I am at a loss to know what this means, and would be very grateful for explanation.

686

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

DEHRA DUN, 25 April 1942, 1 am

Received: 25 April, 12.45 am

No. 278–S.C. My personal telegram of 25th April, No. 272–S.C. Alleged statement by Cripps. This is now receiving much prominence here, and _Hindustan Times_ leader of today says: “Whatever the real explanation we hope it will soon be forthcoming. Though Reuter makes no mention of it the B.B.C. broadcasting in its overseas service on Wednesday attributed to Sir Stafford Cripps the statement that the Congress was not willing to negotiate regarding present arrangements with the Viceroy whose business it was under the present constitution”. Quite apart from the embarrassing nature of the situation which this sort of statement, for which there is no shadow of foundation, may create for me personally, it is of utmost necessity, in the interest of the situation here that there should be an immediate _démentir_ by Cripps of use of these words which I cannot believe he ever uttered. I feel entitled to ask you to ensure that this is done without delay.

1 No. 685. 2 22 April.
687

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

DEHRA DUN, 25 April 1942, 3.35 pm
Received: 25 April, 3.50 pm

No. 281–S. C. Your telegram of 24th April, No. 7393. I of course quite agree that we cannot treat declaration as though it had never come into being and proceed as though we had never made any offer. But I am anxious to keep as much elbow room as possible, and particularly on this difficult question of minorities, and you and other government speakers in the debate can ease matters for the Chief and for me if they will bear in mind anxiety of Sikhs and avoid increasing it. That I am pretty sure you can do by saying comforting things about minorities. Sikh morale is a “first priority” in the army and for recruiting. I quite agree that we can continue on the lines that the Viceroy is ready to consider practical suggestions put forward by responsible leaders, but while I remain anxious, as you know, to reassure my Council, I think at the same time that it would be well to say “responsible party leaders”. I shall certainly be getting suggestions in the immediate future from my Council designed to pick up certain of the concessions which would have been made had Cripps’ negotiations gone through, and I do not think that His Majesty’s Government will be any more anxious than I am to find ourselves in any degree committed in that matter, for important as the Council in its present form may be, its support is a very different thing from the support of leaders of major political parties. If all the plums are eaten now the cupboard will be awkwardly bare when the critical moment comes for a settlement. Finally you should know that I am firmly of opinion that Congress will not under any circumstances assume responsibility for the conduct of the war until after a substantial British victory over the Japanese.

1 No. 676.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

25 April 1942

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL
No. 22–U. I think it is important that some opportunity should be taken in the debate not only, as I have separately suggested, of making a cordial reference to my Executive Council, but of reaffirming confidence of His Majesty’s Government in myself as Governor-General. It is clear from Press comments that Cripps Mission is regarded in many quarters here as having been a reflection on the Governor-General as well as on the Council, and, while that is not the case, it is of real importance that there should be no doubt in any quarters here that I have the complete support of His Majesty’s Government as well as their full confidence. I am going to have an extremely difficult time in these next few weeks, what with the war and with holding together of Council, which is clearly in a state of acute sensitiveness and irritation as a result of the Cripps Mission, and the more that can be done to strengthen my hand the better. Clearly if Winston is speaking in the debate he would be the right man to say anything that was to be said, and indeed if he were speaking it would cause comment were the expression of confidence such as I have suggested to come only from some other Member of Government, even from yourself.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

25 April 1942

24–U. My personal telegram No. 278–SC1 of today. You will realise fully difficulty of situation created by suggestion such as that attributed to Cripps, which of course directly places responsibility on the Viceroy, and necessity of immediate withdrawal or démenti. Statement is of course wholly without foundation and most damaging and embarrassing from my point of view in endeavouring to hold extremely difficult situation here. Further telegram follows.

1 No. 686.
25-U. Your letters of 3 April\(^1\) and 11 April\(^2\) just received. I think you should know that while Cripps kept me in general touch, there was little, if any, consultation, and I am still unaware of much that he may have said to Congress in his conversations. I made formal protests to Cripps either on merits or because I had not been consulted, on various occasions, but when I told him that I could not take responsibility for certain decisions or courses of action, his reply was invariably that the responsibility was entirely his, and that he would take it. He has not contradicted Azad’s allegation (letter of 11 April)\(^3\) that he held out hopes of Cabinet government with the Viceroy in the position of the King; there may well have been loose talk about conventions binding\(^4\) the Viceroy, and I have little doubt that there was; on Indianisation I repeatedly warned Cripps of my view as regards portfolios, service membership, etc, but he told me that he had Cabinet authority to offer 100% Indianisation if necessary.\(^5\) Whatever he offered as regards either Home or Finance was entirely against my views and protests. I was not consulted on points mentioned in para. 1 of your letter of 31 March.\(^6\) The history of the Cripps–Johnson\(^7\) formula you know; you will draw your own conclusions from the correspondence (my telegram dated 22nd April No. 247–SC,\(^8\) etc) about the inclusion in it of the words “until the new constitution comes into operation”; and incident discussed\(^9\) in my telegram 278–SC\(^10\) of today is only the latest stage. Best general comment on the way things were going is the Cabinet telegrams\(^11\) to Cripps, and the replies, or absence of replies, to the specific points raised in them.

2. As I was never informed of Cripps’s instructions, and he was here as a member of the War Cabinet and leader of the House of Commons, and pleading that he had full responsibility, it was impossible for me to exercise any check on him, and while the remedy of a break was available (and very present) to me, I felt, and still feel, that since much more than my personal position, viz: the possible solution of the Indian issue, and the integrity of the Government at home, was at stake, I had no option in duty but to accept this handling.

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\(^{1}\) No. 517.
\(^{2}\) No. 610.
\(^{3}\) No. 604.
\(^{4}\) ‘binding’, deciphered as ‘in communication with’.
\(^{5}\) See No. 539.
\(^{6}\) No. 476.
\(^{7}\) ‘Johnson’ omitted in decipher.
\(^{8}\) No. 663.
\(^{9}\) ‘incident discussed’ deciphered as ‘its discussion’.
\(^{10}\) No. 686.
\(^{11}\) Nos. 567 and 568.
of the matter. But I accept no responsibility for anything done or said by Cripps outside the actual words of the declaration, and my personal feeling you can imagine.

3. Use your own discretion about letting Winston see this for his own information only. I realise how difficult the position is.

12 'outside' omitted in decipher.

691

Sir H. Seymour to Mr Eden
Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 229

IMMEDIATE

CHUNGKING, 25 April 1942, 12.30 pm
Received: 25 April, 5.40 pm

No. 563. My telegram No. 560.1 Chiang Kai-shek has now told me that he is not unduly disappointed at the turn of affairs in India as he feels that a satisfactory settlement will be reached sooner or later. He said also that one should not be too pessimistic about war prospects in India as he regards Nehru's recent declarations in favour of assistance as important and encouraging.

Repeated to Government of India No. 259.

1 No. 680.

692

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery
Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 535

NEW DELHI, 25 April 1942, 2.55 pm
Received: 25 April, 7.30 pm

1132-G. Following is summary of Press statement issued by Executive Committee of all [India?] Council of Indian Christians. Proposals in War Cabinet draft declaration are appreciable advance on any pronouncement hitherto made by British Government but scheme is open to certain grave objections. Right of secession is likely to lead to conflict; present provincial boundaries are artificial and several minorities within them may ask for similar right of self-determination for themselves. Peoples of Indian States have no
say in constitution-making Assembly. There are no adequate provisions for representation of point of view of smaller minorities in Constituent Assembly. We are disappointed at reservation of defence; we cannot believe that any responsible Indian Defence Minister will interfere in legitimate discharge of Commander-in-Chief's duties; without concession on this point, it will not be possible to secure full co-operation of Indians in war effort. We re-affirm unanimous demand of Indian Christian Community, which next to Moslems is the largest religious minority in India, for due representation in any new Indian Cabinet.

693

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f 12

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, 25 April 1942, 3.35 pm

527. Your telegram 25th April 272-S.C. Sentence you quote seems to be compressed from more than one passage in report of Cripps press conference. My immediately succeeding telegram gives relevant passages.

1 No. 685.

2 Telegram 528 of 25 April transmitted the following extracts from No. 665 (pp. 815-7, 824-5): from 'question: You have just said that you came very near' to 'rejection from the Congress President'; from 'question: Were they prepared to form a National Government' to 'discussions with the Viceroy'; and from 'question: Supposing for the moment' to 'sir Stafford Cripps: They would have been responsible to the Viceroy'. L/P&J/10/2: f 13.

694

Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/98

D.-O. No. 154/F.R. GOVT. HOUSE, KARACHI, 25 April 1942

5. There is genuine disappointment that the Cripps Mission was unsuccessful. Allah Bakhsh, who had an interview with Sir Stafford, stated to me quite categorically that it was then made quite clear to him that in everything except Defence, the enlarged Council would be a real Cabinet, able to take majority decisions over which the Viceroy would have no veto. He asserts that near the
end of the discussions, Sir Stafford went back on this; from which he deduces that this was on instructions from Whitehall. This is a view which seems to be spreading in the Press, and if there is no foundation for it in fact it seems to me that it would be worth while to contradict it. But possibly the forthcoming debate in the House will clear up this question.

695

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

25 April 1942

No. U.P.—135

4. But though there may be doubts about war developments, it is more in regard to the political situation that doubts are felt. Have we heard the last of the Cripps Mission and will His Majesty’s Government make another attempt to placate Congress, as a result of the influence of America and because Congress leaders such as Nehru show in their speeches their hostility to Japan? Again there is of course great uncertainty as to the attitude of Congress and the meeting in a few days time at Allahabad will be interesting. One group is reported to be anxious to get back Gandhi and to support his policy of non-violence. In Madras I see that the Congress Committee has gone so far as to approve, or at least to acquiesce in, Pakistan and to suggest a National Government with the League.¹ I do not think the Congress here in the United Provinces would ever accept that! Nehru’s vague allusions to what he means by war effort do not tend to clarify the situation.

5. The Muslims are obviously even more apprehensive than before of the Hindus. I recently had an interview with Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman and later with a deputation of the Muslim League Civil Defence Committee consisting of Nawab Muhammad Ismail, Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-Zaman and another representative from the North-West Frontier Province, Muhammad Isa, who came to see me about their defence programme. Unfortunately Nazim-ud-Din from Bengal who is a member of this deputation had to go back to Calcutta. The object of the deputation which I gather is going to see all Governors was to explain that they were aiming at protection and defence, not aggression; they were not out to start an opposite Government but would keep in touch with Government and Government officers; they would try to assist in A.R.P. organisation but felt that to join civic guards would make both their position and ours difficult. They are clearly in my view more afraid of the Hindus than the Japs and they are somewhat apprehensive about the safety of Muslims in isolated villages, when they might have to remove to safer areas; they expressed
some anxiety about the attitude of Nepal and referred to rumours that the
Hindu Mahasabha were getting in touch with the Nepal Government (I am
trying to find out if there is any truth in this and possibly the D.I.B. might
help me). The Chaudhri in his private interview referring to the need for
protection referred as an example to East Bengal where Muslims are 74 per
cent of the population; there they apprehended that the Hindus would be
armed by the Japs and would help the enemy as some at least of the Burmans
have done and attack the Muslims.

6. Referring to the present political situation, he too raised the question
whether we shall make another attempt to placate Congress and he said that
it was desirable that Your Excellency should go on with the attempt to form
a National Government irrespective of Congress and he implied that Jinnah
would come in, if it did not compromise the Muslim position in a future
constitution and if we kept to the draft declaration in so far as it implied
Pakistan. He seemed to me to be definitely pleased with the declaration which
he interpreted as implying Pakistan, though Cripps had definitely said it did
not. Getting more on to detail, he did not of course like the question of
accession to be decided by the legislatures as at present constituted; for example,
in Bengal the European group might come in and their fate might be decided
by Arthur Moore or European businessmen who merely thought of themselves.
He emphasised the necessity for Muslims to maintain the British connection
and for an alliance between Great Britain and the Islamic powers whose religion
was not unlike Christianity. He seemed to hope that we should help to develop
industries in the Pakistan areas. Referring to the provinces, he held the view that
this would depend on what happened at the Centre. I hope Your Excellency
may find this interesting. We must keep on friendly terms with the Muslims
and I feel sure we shall be able to do so, provided we stick to the draft declara-
tion and interpret it as accepting the principle of Pakistan. The defence organisa-
tion will not I think be troublesome, if they keep in touch with Government.
They may also in some cases co-operate with non-Muslims.

7. Another point which causes doubts in many minds is regarding the posi-
tion of Colonel Louis Johnson. Some days ago he was reported to have com-
pared our treatment of India with America’s treatment of Cuba and the
Philippines and then he had asked people to come over and see him at Cochin
House if they had any suggestions to make about the future of India. It is,
as one of my officers has represented to me, just as if Lord Halifax had asked
the Negro population of America to put their grievances before him. But this
is only a comparatively minor point. His speeches and general attitude convey
the impression that America will compel us to hand over to Congress. Writing

1 See No. 682.
on his recent broadcast, the *National Herald* published an article which was to the effect that "Churchill must go". These are some quotations from it: "Whatever be our internal differences, we are convinced, and the world too is convinced, that Britain is never sincere, never honest in her dealings with India—she will never, never discharge her so-called promises to the people of India". "The last-minute breakdown caused by the intervention of the reactionaries in India". "The time has come for Mr. Roosevelt to act and we suggest that he should act decisively. He should tell the British people to be done with Churchill and Amery as the worst enemies of a vigorous common allied effort and as the worst opponents of a common allied victory." The *Hindustan Times* on the same date (April 24th) puts really the same ideas in less objectionable language. "We suggest to Colonel Johnson that without the hearty and enthusiastic co-operation of the people of the country, it will be impossible to defend the country against the menace which threatens it. If he agrees, then we feel that it is his duty to tell the British Government in language which they can understand that they must first secure the co-operation of the people of India before thinking of the defence of India."

8. I hope I do not appear to be paying too much attention to these newspaper articles, but they do have a wide circulation and they do seem to me to represent what some elements in Congress think, that America is going to help them to get rid of British Imperialism. It is no doubt a misinterpretation of Colonel Johnson's utterances which were designed primarily to show that America would help and was helping India in the war, by troops, planes and lend and lease. But it is extremely dangerous that the idea should get abroad that Roosevelt disapproves of His Majesty's Government's policy in regard to India and is even prepared to interfere in that policy. Such an idea is bound to be popular with all those persons who for years have attacked British Imperialism and who do not hesitate to charge us all, from Your Excellency and General Wavell downwards, with inefficiency and insincerity. I can only hope that the debate in the House of Commons will clarify the position. The publicity given to Nehru's speeches and tours is, I suppose, inevitable, but the Muslims I know feel that apart from the fact that they have no press to support them and only a few representatives of their view in England or America, even the press agencies, which should be impartial, are too Congress-minded.
696

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT  26 April 1942
No. 299-S.C. Your telegram No. 7276 1 of 23rd April, paragraph 1. The name of the National Defence Front has been changed to National War Front, in order to suggest a more positive attitude to winning the war, but, pending the outcome of the Cripps visit, Provincial leaders could not be appointed in most Provinces because persons sympathetic towards the objects of the Front were reluctant to come forward. For this reason, preliminary work only has so far been done. I have telegraphed 2 to Governors to give now a fresh impetus to the Front and expect its real development to begin soon. I will let you have further details in due course and have every expectation that we shall be able to mobilise plenty of support in the right quarters.

1 No. 669.  2 No. 641.

697

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/10/2: f 9

IMMEDIATE  INDIA OFFICE, 26 April 1942, 1.45 pm
PERSONAL

7489. Your personal telegram 25th April, 278-S.C. 1 I hope my telegrams Nos. 527 2 and 528 3 will enable you to deal with this. I am giving copies of all these telegrams to Cripps for consideration in connection with the debate.

1 No. 686.  2 No. 693.  3 See No. 693, note 2.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 534

NEW DELHI, 26 April 1942, 4.30 pm
Received: 26 April, 8.45 pm

1445-H. Following is summary of the press account of statement by Nehru at press conference in Calcutta on April 25th.

*Begins.* We are going to make no approach to British Government and shall face problems and perils with such wisdom and endurance as we may have. We prefer to perish rather than submit to arrogant imperialism or new invader. Gulf is greater today than before Cripps’ visit. We will have nothing to do with question of co-operating with the British efforts in India. To talk co-operation is misnomer; what is meant is subservience. Cripps’ charge that we shirk responsibility is curious when responsibility we sought was denied us. It surprises me that the British Government should still talk in old pre-war patronising language and try to pose to world as kind of arbitrators in India. Nehru expressed great surprise at content of Madras Congress Legislature Party resolution¹ and fact that it was sponsored by Rajagopalachari a member of the Working Committee. Such action, undesirable at any time, was extraordinary on eve of A.I.C.C. meeting. He entirely disagreed with the approach made in resolution. *Ends.*

2. Following is summary of press statement issued by Maulana Azad at Calcutta on April 25th on Madras resolution.

*Begins.* It greatly astonished and pained me that Rajagopalachari despite being member of the Working Committee should have adopted this attitude. Personal relationship however dear cannot deter me from discharging my duty as President of the Congress. In Congress organisation provincial committee is the only competent body to represent provincial views not Legislative party. Party itself was not fully represented; out of 91 members only 52 attended and only 36 voted. It would be wrong to attribute decision to majority congress of province. *Ends.*

3. Rajendra Prasad is reported to have described first Madras resolution as premature if not perverse. As regards second resolution there was no question of Congress taking office or joining any coalition in any province; he saw no chance of Congress reversing their policy.

¹ No. 682.
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

DEHRA DUN, 27 April 1942, 2 am

PERSONAL

Received: 27 April, 3 am

No. 302–S.C. Your personal telegram of 25th April, No. 527.¹ I am much obliged. It seems clear that Cripps did not make the statement attributed to him. In view of prominence it has achieved, a démenti still seems desirable.

2. But I am gravely concerned by what he seems to have said to the Press about conventions. My view on that is in my telegram No. 978–S² of the 10th April (copy given to Cripps at the time) and His Majesty’s Government (as I understand from the Prime Minister’s telegram No. 469³ of 10th April to Cripps) accepted it. Conventions are not practical politics with a written constitution. I regard it as vital that there should be no commitment on this matter in debate. If any Government Speaker (whether Cripps or anyone else) in the debate commits us, or admits that the Cabinet were prepared (which as I understand was not the case) to consider conventions binding the Governor-General, we shall be in a most difficult position vis-à-vis of my Council as well as of political parties. I must therefore urge most earnestly that this position be completely protected, and that view of Cabinet as expressed to me (with which I of course entirely agree) as to impracticability of conventions in the circumstances we are dealing with be reaffirmed. Point is of first-class importance.

¹ No. 693. ² No. 578. ³ No. 582.

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMPORTANT

DEHRA DUN, 27 April 1942, 4.50 pm

Received: 27 April, 4.45 pm

No. 311–S.C. Your telegram of 20th April, No. 507.¹ Following rough draft desired:

Begins. No. 312–S.C. The draft declaration would have granted all the fundamental Congress demands for the future of India after the war. It gave them a constituent assembly based on popular vote. It promised India complete

¹ No. 655.
self-government with the right to secede from the British Commonwealth. It removed from the constitution to be framed by Indians themselves, and transferred to a treaty to be negotiated on equal terms between Britain and popular Indian representatives, all matters which must be settled between the two countries in order to discharge British responsibilities and enable full power to be handed over. The draft declaration certainly contained features unpalatable to the Congress like provincial option or the inclusion on the constitution-making body of States’ representatives not necessarily elected by the States’ people. Such features, however, were essential in order to make the whole scheme tolerable to other parties and interests in India or to fulfil solemn pledges of His Majesty’s Government. These other parties and interests were not satisfied that the proposals went nearly far enough in this direction. For example, the Scheduled Castes leaders representing the poorest and most downtrodden social strata protested that the proposals meant handing their people over to Hindu Raj.

2. The Congress claim that the breakdown occurred not over such necessary compromises on long-term policy but over clause (e). Whatever legitimate misunderstandings there may have been over the use of language like “National Cabinet”, it was made absolutely clear from the start that the negotiations must be conducted within the terms of clause (e) as of other clauses in the draft declaration. This clause laid down that “until the new constitution can be framed His Majesty’s Government must inevitably bear responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the defence of India”. Cripps publicly emphasized that “no real major fundamental changes could be made in the War Cabinet’s conclusions” (his Press Conference of March 23rd), and that “the object was to give the fullest measure of self-government to the Indian people at the present time consistent with the possibilities of the present constitution, which could not be changed till the end of the war” (his Press Conference of March 29th). On the defence issue he explicitly denied that there could be any change in the draft proposals on this subject even if there was a united demand from the political parties in India (his Press Conference of March 31st). The Congress therefore deliberately negotiated on the basis of these unalterable terms. Had they genuinely been unwilling to accept them on principle, they could have said so at once. Their President, Azad, said before Cripps arrived that if he was satisfied that the British Government’s decision fell short of the Congress demands or would serve no useful purpose, then he would reject it and no meeting of the Working Committee would be summoned (interview with the Press on March 18th). The fact that the Working Committee was summoned and negotiations proceeded for three weeks is proof that the Congress did not dare reject such favourable terms out of hand even though they knew from the start that in fundamentals they were unalterable.
3. Instead, it is now clear that they set themselves to undermine the principles of the declaration by a series of subterfuges designed to secure for themselves immediate control of the defence and indeed the whole Government of India. Thus they tried—

(a) to whittle down the responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief;
(b) to eject him from the Executive Council and leave him only as a soldier under political orders without any assured liaison with the War Cabinet;
(c) to get full control of the Army, if not during the war, at least between the end of the war and the setting up of the new constitution, when its control might be an absolutely decisive factor in the communal and party struggle which would inevitably precede the framing of a new constitution and the voting of the provinces on it, and

(d) to turn the Governor-General in Council (to which the Commander-in-Chief is responsible) into an irresponsible executive or a Cabinet responsible to a Hindu-dominated legislature, and to break its essential link with His Majesty's Government.

4. On point (a), His Majesty's Government went to the limit to meet the Congress case. Thus, among other important Defence functions they proposed to entrust to an Indian Defence Minister the control of the "denial" policy, a subject in which the Congress had evinced special interest and on which it held views open to strong criticism from the British and Allied point of view. Moreover, it was repeatedly brought out in the negotiations that Defence is intimately bound up with all branches of Government in modern war. This has a double implication. On the one hand it means that Indianisation of the Executive Council as a whole means Indianisation of defence as a whole, whatever the particular responsibility of one member of Council, the Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, it means that His Majesty's Government's ultimate responsibility for control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort must involve ultimate responsibility for the whole Government of India in so far as this is identical with Defence.

5. On point (c) retention of ultimate British control of the armed forces in India between the end of the war and the framing of a new constitution is a vital protection for minorities. Feelings are likely to run extremely high and unless an impartial outside authority is present in strength, the inevitable result must be civil war, cf. the Saar Plebiscite.  

2 See No. 440, p. 547.  
3 'civil' omitted in decipher.  
4 The Treaty of Versailles 1919 stipulated that the Saar region on the Franco-German frontier should be ceded by Germany for fifteen years so that France might enjoy the ownership of the coal mines. The region would be governed by an international commission responsible to the League of Nations during this period, at the end of which the inhabitants would decide by plebiscite whether they wished to form part of Germany or France. The plebiscite was duly held in January 1935 under the auspices of the League, resulting in a 90% majority in favour of return to Germany.
6. Point (d) in the Congress campaign of sabotage against the draft declaration is fundamental. Beside it, point (b) is secondary. It is of comparatively little value to have the Commander-in-Chief in Council if he has nothing to fall back on but his one vote among many, backed theoretically by his right to resign if he is overruled. The fundamental constitutional position, of which the Congress leaders were fully aware, and which they were plainly told from the start could not be altered during the war, is that the Government of India is in the last resort responsible to Parliament. No alternative is at present possible, since responsibility either to a series of party caucuses or to the Indian legislature is violently repudiated by large and powerful elements in India. Assuming that the Government of India and the British Parliament are at one in seeking the vigorous prosecution of the war to complete victory, there is no need for this ultimate responsibility to be a drag on Indian self-government. It could be a drag only if India was half-hearted or defeatist. Nevertheless it must remain in reserve both to re-assure minorities and to enable His Majesty’s Government to discharge its particular responsibility for the defence of India. It must needs involve a channel of communication and action in the form of overriding powers of the Governor-General and the Secretary of State. These overriding powers although kept in reserve are thus fundamental both to the retention of the existing constitution in its vital particulars and to the discharge of His Majesty’s Government’s responsibilities to the Allied Nations.

7. All this was perfectly well-known to Congress leaders. They were equally aware that the minorities objected violently to the idea of a National Cabinet in the sense of one divorced from ultimate British control and responsible either to the Indian Legislature or to party caucuses. Proof of this was the decision of the Muslim League to oppose in the Legislative Assembly a motion by N. M. Joshi demanding the formation of a National Government responsible to the legislature, which was on the Order Paper for 12th February last and was withdrawn in view of its likelihood of defeat. It is grossly dishonest of Congress to allege that their demand for a Cabinet Government with full power must be considered to be the unanimous demand of the Indian people, cf. Jinnah’s statement of April 15th that if the proposals of the Congress were accepted on this point “it would be a fascist Grand Council and Mussalmans and the other minorities would be at the mercy of the Congress Raj”.

8. This indictment shows that the Congress negotiators were all along directing their efforts to two objects—

(1) to destroy the essential basis of the document on which they were ostensibly negotiating, and to gather final control of defence into hands which have been vividly shown by Congress utterances to be not only inexperienced but also irresolute in the defence of India against aggression, and
(2) to gain by this means a position of dominance over minorities from which they could not be dislodged and which would grossly prejudice the Indian people's right to work out untrammelled their own constitutional future. *Ends.*

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701

Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Clauson

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 314—S.C. Laithwaite to Clauson. His Excellency's telegram No. 22—U of April 25th. Grateful if Joyce could ensure that any reference to Governor-General on lines suggested are sent in full by Reuters (unless you prefer to wire them direct). Publicity here is important and we want to make the best arrangements possible.

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702

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: f 495

NEW DELHI, 27 April 1942, 4.45 pm
Received: 27 April, 7.45 pm

1148—G. Following is summary of portion of press statement made by Pandit Pant on April 25th, commenting on Cripps' recent statement at press conference.¹ *Begins:* Cripps volunteered to take entire blame for breakdown upon himself. But when one looks at rest of his statement one is struck by rank hypocrisy of sly pose. Every time Cripps has spoken since breakdown, he has repeated this nauseating cant but simultaneously has laboured hard to foist myth that responsibility for breakdown rested entirely on Indian leaders, that it was inevitable result of their irreconcilable differences and mutual distrust. This is mischievous lie. Negotiations failed at last moment just when success seemed very near, solely because Cripps went back on assurances he had given

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¹ See No. 665, p. 814.
in unequivocal terms at outset and almost throughout negotiations. In anxiety to organise defence of country, Congress Working Committee went to extreme limit of self-suppression, but found that once again Britain was not prepared to part with any real power. In certain quarters there was feeling then that Cripps had been perhaps duped by diehards, but people have been disillusioned. Cripps has been sedulously propagating lies faithfully following in steps of Amery and others, only his methods are more subtle and insidious. 

703

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&E/J/10/2: f 6

IMMEDIATE

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

535. Cabinet have had your telegrams and I have shown "U" telegrams to Prime Minister who has had Cripps at Chequers this week-end. He is not himself speaking in debate and has not thought it necessary to have Cabinet discussion on India.

2. From what I have seen so far of Cripps' opening speech I think you will find points of difficulty expressed in more satisfactory way than hitherto.

3. I need not tell you I have done my best in all directions you indicate.

704

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

SECRET

VICEROY'S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, 27 April 1942

My dear Hope,

Very many thanks for your secret letter of the 18th April and for the very lucid account in its opening paragraphs of the war position in Madras. I am most grateful for it. I need not say that I think, in acting as you did, you acted perfectly correctly, and I support you entirely. I am sorry you have not a better report to give of the Europeans. I dare say that you have taken appropriate means to let them know that they did not do too well.
2. I can well believe that Rajagopalachariar and his friends are thoroughly upset. I have been much interested, in these last couple of days, in the courage (and I think probably also the realism) shown by Rajagopalachariar in his proposed resolution\(^2\) about an accommodation with the Muslim League. But it has been no surprise to me to find that Congress as a whole, and the leaders in the Working Committee in particular, are so vehemently opposed to it. I am interested in what you tell me about the possibility of his breaking away from the Central Committee, and I hope that if there are any signs of developments on those lines you will keep me in touch by telegram. I quite agree that it was well worth while seeing him. Reading what you tell me in paragraph 12 of your letter, I cannot help commenting to myself that our cue is evidently not to look too pleased!

3. We await the debate tomorrow. I do sincerely hope that it will be well handled. Once it is over and, as one trusts will be the case, it goes well, and once the All-India Congress Committee have had their meeting, the air will be a little clearer.

With the best of good wishes to you in these anxious times.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

\(^1\) No. 651. \(^2\) See No. 682.

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705

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&E/J/8/510: f 494

NEW DELHI, 29 April 1942, 4.55 pm

Received: 29 April, 6.30 pm

1159–G. Following is summary of Press Statement issued by Sapru at Allahabad on April 28th. Begins. Outstanding fact is that deadlock which Cripps came to solve continues and his visit has left behind sense of disappointment and frustration. It is particularly regrettable that negotiations should have ended so abruptly when gulf on question of defence had nearly been bridged. I knew Mahatma had (?) taken very (?) omission line against Cripps proposals, so line taken by Azad and Nehru on behalf of Congress was more moderate than one was entitled to expect. It is therefore a pity that negotiations should have broken down on question whether Executive Council was to work as responsible Cabinet and whether Viceroy should give some sort of assurance that its decisions would be accepted by him. Since 1940 I have suggested that during
the war Executive Council should be responsible to the Crown, though in
practice it would seek to reflect popular opinion and establish (?) closest) con-
tact with the Legislature. It is difficult to believe that any Viceroy would rule
counter to the united opinion of (?) or 15 men. I regret Cripps should not
have pursued matter further or that word of encouragement should not have
been forthcoming from Viceregal House.

2. I refuse to believe story that political parties concerned were not willing
to assume responsibility, or that there was any danger of any Indian Cabinet
entering directly into peace negotiations with Japan. Suggestions that liberal
distribution of arms for defence might endanger internal safety or British
connection ought not to influence courageous settlement of Indian question.
Unfortunately while Cripps' suggestions about the future contain some very
attractive features despite proposals calculated to disrupt integrity of India, his
proposals about immediate present, which is much more important, were
extremely vague.

3. It is now being (?) urged) that initiative must come from Indian political
parties. Cripps concentrated on Congress and Moslem League almost wholly
to the exclusion of other parties. I do not believe either party will take initiative,
so we shall stand where we have stood for the last two years, except that sense
of frustration will be keener and tension between communities greater than
before. I fear if deadlock continues there may again be conflict between the
Government and one or other of the political parties with disastrous results.
Cannot England at this juncture produce a Lothian or a Montagu? Ends.

706

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow
MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 29 April 1942

The India Debate¹ is happily over and I only hope that you may be spared the
repercussion of further debates and speeches on India from this end. Cripps'
original speech contained several matters which worried me, e.g., his obsession
with the idea that all relations with the Crown would cease in the case of
Princes adhering to the Union; a passage referring to conventions on the
parallel of what had happened in the Provinces, &c. But after some discussion
he took them all out and also added a passage about your Executive. What
I don't think he understands is that his proposals involved a great sacrifice for
the Members of your Executive and that it was not enough merely to tell
them, before others, what he was doing or had failed to do. However, I hope
I put that right in my speeches, as well as emphasising the Government’s con-

fidence in yourself. I hope also that what I said about the future will have
 eased things for the Sikhs without worrying Jinnah, and that my references to
 the open door for the present gave away nothing that you wished preserved.

2. I fully realise the difficulty of the position in which you were placed, in
 any case by the mere fact of Cripps’ visit, and additionally by his methods.
 It certainly was a complete surprise to us here that he seems to have assumed
 that we envisaged the complete Indianisation of the Executive apart from the
 Commander-in-Chief and yourself. As I tried to correct the position in my
 speech, it is participation we invited, which clearly means a part and not the
 whole, and certainly does not mean control. I doubt whether, in his eagerness
 for a settlement of some sort, on top of his natural inclinations, he was really
 a match for Nehru and Azad. I expect he used phrases like “National Govern-
 ment” in the sense that every section in India would be represented, and that
 they took good care at the time not to ask him what he meant in order to
 have it up their sleeve afterwards.

3. As you know, Nehru has an agent here, Krishna Menon, an indefatigable
 worker on the extreme Congress line with a tame clientele among certain
 members of the Labour Party like Cove and Sorensen and even to some extent
 Gordon Macdonald, who was put up as the Party’s spokesman yesterday. He
 has been priming them hard with certain telegrams of Nehru’s, making out
 Cripps to have perverted the true facts. That part of Nehru’s telegrams they
 used freely in yesterday’s debate taking
 good care not to quote other passages ... L.
 showing Nehru’s complete intransigence
 and bitterness. Menon has even seen Cripps since he came back, but I think has
 not got much change out of him.

4. As for the debate itself, Cripps’ statement was the clear matter of fact
 exposition of Counsel, with no attempt at background or colouring, and to
 my mind implying a certain apology for our own past. Otherwise I thought
 it very good and it satisfied all except a few of the ones I have already referred
 to. These were led off by Gordon Macdonald, who incidentally wished to get
 rid of both of us, and made a quite unnecessary fuss about Halifax’s recent
 speech. It really is a little steep that we should take unlimited abuse from Con-
 gress lying down, but should not even be allowed to say that their attitude is
 non-co-operative! For the rest, the debate was uninspiring. Winterton and

2 Personal reference omitted, in which Lord Linlithgow was apparently referring to the concluding
 passage of para. 1 of No. 474.
3 See No. 600, note 1.
Schuster were quite helpful and so, on the whole, was Reed; but none of them made anything that could be called a real contribution to the debate. My own winding-up went down reasonably well, but of course was mainly directed with an eye on the one hand to America and on the other to getting things into proper perspective from your point of view. It is to the latter, of course, that I attach most importance, and can only hope that I have helped you and not let you in for fresh trouble in any direction.

5. Of course, the incorrigible appeasers—mostly people who have denounced appeasement in foreign affairs as the worst of all crimes—are already saying that we must run after Congress at once in supplication. Possibly the results of the All-India Congress Committee in the next few days may sober them for a little. But in the main they are incorrigible for the simple reason that admitting the facts of the situation spoils the kind of speeches they have been accustomed to make and the articles they have been accustomed to write, and it is too much intellectual trouble to change their ways. The same, I suspect, will be true before long of a great many American writers. All the same, I dare say we have gained at any rate a residue of more intelligent thinking on India, and it may be of real value that Cripps should have learnt as much as I think he has learnt. Personally, I believe much the best line would have been, not merely to say that we leave it to them to approach us, but to say definitely that they have missed the bus and that we cannot be bothered with them till the war is over. That would at any rate give enhanced authority to your existing Executive, as well as to the Army and the Civil Service. However, I think I said the next best thing by suggesting that it is in effect only in the case of an agreed approach that there would be anything doing.

6. Meanwhile, I shall look forward with interest to your immediate plans for reconstituting the Executive. You have had before you the possible difficulty of Benthall’s private interests, but I gather you think that is all right. I am sure you will do well to bring in Ambedkar. More particularly I believe it would be a wise thing, if you can find the right man, to carry on with the separation of Defence Member and War Member. If he could be spared from the Punjab, I have no doubt that Sikander would be the right person. If not, I wonder whether Firoz may not do? He has at any rate a good deal of energy and an effective way of talking to people. A bolder experiment might be to bring in a good State Dewan or even a Prince. The Army would, I think, certainly like that and I dare say it would appeal to the general population as well, if we have to go at them in spite of Congress. However, I won’t speculate on this theme as I shall be getting your telegrams before this reaches you. This is to catch tomorrow’s immediate mail, but I believe there is one on the following day, so I will not attempt to deal with any further matters.

All my best wishes to you.
707
The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22

IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, 30 April 1942, 3.35 pm
Received: 30 April, 2.15 pm

No. 1167-S. Most grateful for your kind reference in the debate which will help here and for all your most welcome assistance. Many congratulations on your very lucid statement and your handling of it. I thought Cripps did well and avoided most of the reefs though I wish he had kept off the suggestion that in the Cabinet he envisaged the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief would have been the only two officials. I do not read that as precluding the appointment of Benthall in any way, and shall be asking you to make him firm offer in the immediate future. Perhaps you would give a kind message from me to Cripps in whatever terms you think suitable.

708

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps

L/P&E/J/10/2: f 1

INDIA OFFICE, 30 April 1942

My dear Cripps,
I have had a brief telegram1 from Linlithgow, thanking us both for our speeches on Tuesday, which he thinks will be of great help to him in handling the situation.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

1 No. 707.
709

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE

INDIA OFFICE, 30 April 1942

I have just received your telegram¹ about the Debate and am glad you think it went well. I realise that you would have preferred Cripps not to mention the fact that he had offered all the places except the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, but I think that was pretty clear from the White Paper itself, and in any case I did what I could to protect that position by saying that his particular proposals, aimed at securing the whole-hearted support of Congress and of other parties, had lapsed. I don’t see, therefore, that you are bound by it in the case, say, of Rajagopalachari, Jinnah, &c., coming with a combination which did not include the whole of Congress, but still justified you in going ahead. There is also the point which Simon made in yesterday’s debate in the Lords² (which also went very well) that the presence of British Members on the Council is essential if the Muslims are not to insist on equal representation with the Hindus. I certainly see no reason why you should not go ahead now with your original plans for the expansion of the Council on existing lines, including Benthall. But I do think there is a lot to be said, as I said in my letter yesterday,³ for creating an Indian Defence Member if you can find the right man.

2. Meanwhile, what matters most is to get on with the war. Today’s news from Burma is pretty bad and means, I suppose, that the Burma Road will be closed, and the bulk of our forces, including a good part of the Chinese forces, pushed back towards Assam. I don’t suppose the Japanese will want to do more than isolate China and that therefore the next move against India may come pretty quickly, whatever form it takes. If only you had more aeroplanes. On this point Winston is, I fear, very determined at all costs to honour our obligations in this matter to Russia, whereas I would think it quite justified to divert at any rate a portion of our Russian promises for a time to India. A hundred machines in India would be a much greater proportionate gain to our defence there and help to balance our ground forces, than they would in Russia. Also, I have an uncomfortable feeling that a good deal of our stuff is never properly used by the Russians, who are so suspicious that they won’t let our experts go near any of their people once the machines have been handed over.

3. I am sorry that Louis Johnson seems to have been talking rather condescendingly about India’s war effort. All these Americans, whether newspaper correspondents or otherwise, are apt to be over-hasty in their judgments, thinking that the East is exactly like the West and can move as fast as the
Americans move—or, rather, as they say they are going to move, which is a very different thing. I wonder very much whether any body of Americans could have done as much with the creation and equipment of the Indian Army as General Headquarters, Jenkins, Wood, Armitage, &c., have done under your leadership? Also, there is the very natural American instinct to console themselves for their own failures by being over-critical of us.

4. However, it is possible that there may be something in it and that our whole machine, as spread over India, has become itself somewhat oriental in its notions of time and energy. I wonder what you really think about that? Winston has just sent me a letter which Roosevelt received from an American correspondent—supposed to be a very reliable one—damning everything in Burma to heaps, from Dorman-Smith downwards. I wonder what sort of reports have reached you as to the general running of that show, both on the civil and on the military side? My own impression is that Dorman-Smith has done very well indeed and that the soldiers have put up as good a fight as conditions have allowed.

5. I see you have had to put a stopper on the Congress resolutions on refugees from Burma. I have no doubt Nehru is up to mischief going up to Assam and that their one idea is to make capital out of the affair. I have got questions on it for next week, but shall no doubt before then have telegrams from you about it.

6. My afternoon paper tells me that Rajagopalachari has resigned from the Committee. I wonder whether he will carry with him enough supporters in his own Province to enable him to set up a coalition government in Madras? That would be an excellent thing if it could come about. But I somehow doubt his carrying enough support even for that, let alone for the bigger purpose of a coalition government at the Centre.

7. I am not altogether sure about the reactions to your appointing Benthal. The Cabinet may think it a slamming of the door. It would be less so, of course, if accompanied by the appointment of an Indian Defence Minister and Provincial Advisers.

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1 No. 707.
3 No. 706, para. 6.
Sir H. Twynham (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

(Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

No. R.-94-G.C.P.  CAMP, 30 April 1942

I entirely share the view set forth in Your Excellency’s letter, dated the 23rd of April,¹ that Sir Stafford Cripps’ visit achieved a very considerable measure of success. The really important desideratum was to convince those who are open to reason that Britain is sincere in its professions. That result, I am sure, has been achieved. It is, of course, useless to try to appease the irreconcilable but it is most important at this juncture that influential elements which support the war effort should be convinced of our good intentions. I had direct evidence of this both from Sir Moropant Joshi and Dr. Khare. Since June 1940, I have addressed many public meetings and almost invariably I have had to listen to complaints against the British Government about the failure to promise Good! L. Dominion Status, &c., feeling rather as, I imagine, James VI must have felt when John Knox used to lecture him publicly on the misdeeds of his mother!

Sir Moropant Joshi and Dr. Khare, both of whom were exponents of this straightforward attitude, were certainly greatly impressed by His Majesty’s Government’s offer. I shall now feel much easier in my seat because the issue is now confined, as Sir Stafford Cripps has made clear, to the question whether everything could be handed over to an irresponsible Congress Ministry at this stage. I should find little difficulty in dealing with that aspect of the problem or with the question of Defence, which, notwithstanding all the protestations of the Congress Press, was a secondary matter as the Lord Privy Seal pointed out.

But the upshot of the whole affair only confirms me in the view, expressed in my letter dated the 24th March,² on the reactions to Sir Stafford Cripps’ visit, that the object of the Congress High Command was to secure a position from which they could work for non-belligerency. Dr. Khare was quite frank about it and declared that the majority of the Congress High Command were in favour of negotiating with Japan and that this was indeed the view of “the man in the street”,—his own words. He does not trust Nehru’s declarations and I share his distrust which is incidentally the feeling suggested by a perusal of the last Weekly Report* of the Intelligence Bureau. The best that even Azad can offer us is “non-co-operation with the Japanese”. It is now, I think, accepted that Gandhi threw all his influence into the scales against an agreement. The situation therefore, as I see it, is extremely unsatisfactory and this is the
worst possible time to dwell in a fool’s paradise. The Home and British Indian Press may make what use they can for propaganda purposes of Nehru’s and Maulana Azad’s speeches but, in the event of an enemy landing attended with any success, I feel that we may have to be prepared for instant action against a large number of Congressmen and possibly even against the Congress as an organisation. It is easy to make speeches like those of Nehru and Maulana Azad and they serve the distinctly useful purpose (to them) of disarming opinion in the U.S.A. and the authorities in this country but there is not the slightest indication of any likelihood of resistance to the enemy from Congressmen in this Province. If, therefore, the situation in India becomes more menacing, I feel that many Congressmen will have to be regarded as potential quislings and action taken accordingly, as may be necessary. Circumstances vary from Province to Province and Rajagopalachariar, and a minority like him, can possibly be trusted but I would not trust any of the Congress leaders in this Province if the Japanese secured a foothold in India. I would not even trust them to be neutral but would expect them to intrigue with the enemy. I trust that we may be spared the necessity of facing this problem but I do not think that we can safely ignore it altogether.

I will not comment in this letter on the astonishing development in Madras except to say that the Nagpur Times has most unexpectedly come out in support of Rajaji’s attitude.

* The later report just received seems to establish Nehru’s good faith. L.

1 Not printed. 2 No. 376. 3 See No. 682.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL

THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 30 April 1942

Very many thanks for your letter of 24th April. I was greatly interested in your assessment of the reactions in Bombay to the outcome of Cripps’ negotiations, and am most grateful for them. As you know I have Ambedkar very much in mind, and I hope that it will be possible for me to do something for him—he has behaved very well so far as I am concerned, and as again you know, had our plans for expansion gone through at an earlier stage he would have been one of those to benefit, and he has the quality and the courage. I got the impression from various quarters that Cripps possibly treated these minor

1 No. 684.
minorities as we used to call them with insufficient care and that he left on them too definitely the impression that the only people who really mattered were Congress and the Muslim League. That may or may not be the case, but in this peculiarly sensitive country, and dealing with men who do hold in their hands to some extent the responsibility for very large masses of people, one cannot, I always feel, be too careful to avoid any suggestion of lack of sympathy or failure to accept the sincerity of those with whom one is dealing. If in the outcome Ambedkar joins my Council I should feel that I had in him a reliable and valuable colleague, and I have no doubt that any temporary bitterness which he may feel about the way in which he thinks he has been treated will disappear.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir H. Dow (Sind) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/98

THE VICEROY’S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 30 April 1942

3. I think there is a good deal of general disappointment in the country at the failure of the Cripps Mission. I should doubt if Stafford Cripps would subscribe to Allah Bakhsh’s account of his conversation with him! But however that may be, the concessions and the advance represented by the Declaration were very real and very extensive, and it seems to my mind a tragedy that so good an opportunity should have been wasted. I may be wrong, but I get the definite impression reading the debate in Parliament that India has lost a great deal of sympathy there as a result of the failure of her leaders to rise to the opportunity. I am very glad that Cripps’ characteristically lucid statement on the progress of the negotiations should have exploded the suggestion that their breakdown was due to spanners being thrown in the works either from home or here. But the extent to which that suggestion has got about brings out forcibly the state of bewilderment of the ordinary man, even of the ordinary experienced politician, at the rejection of so generously framed and so substantial an offer.

1 See No. 694.
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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir G. Cunningham
(North-West Frontier Province)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, 30 April 1942

My dear Cunningham,

Many thanks for your Report No. G.H.–135\(^1\) of 23rd April. I am most grateful for the appreciation it gives of reactions to the failure of the Cripps Mission, which was very valuable to me. I am delighted that you should be able to give so good a report of general feeling in the Province in the matter of the war, and relieved that the Congress suggestions that the breakdown was due to us (which was certainly not the case) should have had such little foundation. The debate seems to have gone off very well in both Houses; but it leaves me with the very definite impression that India, or what I may call the national cause, has lost a great deal of ground in Parliament as a result of the failure of political leaders here to seize the opportunity which was given to them. We must now consider what, if anything, can wisely be done by us to keep the situation sweet, and I shall be consulting you today or tomorrow on the issue of non-official Advisers, and shall look forward with much interest to your views as to those of other Governors on that vexed question.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

\(^1\) No. 673.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: ff 490–1

NEW DELHI, 30 April 1942, 6.25 pm

Received: 1 May, 12.30 am

1171–G. Following is summary of press account of proceedings on opening day of All-India Congress Committee session at Allahabad on (? April 29th).\(^1\) Only about 100 members out of about 370 are reported to have attended.

\(^1\) This date was correct.
2. Reuter has already telegraphed points from Maulana Azad's Presidential speech. Following are further points from speech. **Begins**: Cripps in his talks with Azad had definitely said that form of present government would be that of National Government and position of Viceroy vis-à-vis National Government would be that of King in relation to Cabinet. Azad had pointed out that main purpose of mission should be settlement of political issue only and that other issues like communal (? question) and that of States would not be relevant at that stage and were in any case to be settled by Indians themselves. Cripps agreed and said that he himself had taken this line before the War Cabinet. But this picture gradually disappeared and Cripps finally gave it such different shape that it could not possibly appeal to India. Cripps had made it plain that India Office as such would not continue, but later this point also disappeared. Decisions of Working Committee were unanimous; whole-hearted supporters of Gandhi on non-violence were wonderfully (? conciliatory)—Cripps had emphasised that initiative in dealing with Indian situation would not come from British Government, but he (Azad) made it clear no further step would be taken by Congress either—our differences with Britain should not drive us to welcoming Japanese or any other aggressor, either by "active welcome" or by "silent welcome"; I warn you specially against "silent welcome". We will use weapon of non-violence if faced with any aggressor. We would have put up armed defence, (? but that) has been denied us. Weapon of non-violence has been with us for last 22 years and no one can take it away. **Ends.** Asaf Ali, seconding resolution moved by Rajendra Prasad, which endorsed and approved resolution of Working Committee about Cripps proposals, described interview with Cripps and said proposals were not sincere but merely intended to putting of facade before world; Cripps' explanation of breakdown was intended as political propaganda among United Nations. If these nations were taken in by Cripps' propaganda, it would be difficult for Congress to continue their attitude of sympathy with cause of United Nations. Resolution was then passed, one member dissenting.

3. Nehru then moved Working Committee's resolutions, publication of which has been banned and text of which is being sent by Home Department. Bhulabhai Desai seconded resolutions which were unanimously passed.
Appendix I

The 'August Offer'

Cmd. 6219

STATEMENT ISSUED WITH THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL ON 8 AUGUST 1940

India's anxiety at this moment of critical importance in the world struggle against tyranny and aggression to contribute to the full to the common cause and to the triumph of our common ideals is manifest. She has already made a mighty contribution. She is anxious to make a greater contribution still. His Majesty's Government are deeply concerned that that unity of national purpose in India which would enable her to do so should be achieved at as early a moment as possible. They feel that some further statement of their intentions may help to promote that unity. In that hope they have authorised me to make the present statement.

Last October His Majesty's Government again made it clear that Dominion Status was their objective for India. They added that they were ready to authorise the expansion of the Governor-General's Council to include a certain number of representatives of the political parties, and they proposed the establishment of a consultative committee. In order to facilitate harmonious cooperation, it was obvious that some measure of agreement in the Provinces between the major parties was a desirable prerequisite to their joint collaboration at the Centre. Such agreement was, unfortunately, not reached, and in the circumstances no progress was then possible.

During the earlier part of this year I continued my efforts to bring the political parties together. In these last few weeks I again entered into conversations with prominent political personages in British India and the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, the results of which have been reported to His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government have seen also the resolutions passed by the Congress Working Committee, the Moslem League and the Hindu Mahasabha.

It is clear that earlier differences which had prevented the achievement of national unity remain unbridged. Deeply as His Majesty's Government regret this, they do not feel that they should any longer, because of those differences, postpone the expansion of the Governor-General's Council, and the establishment of a body which will more closely associate Indian public opinion with the conduct of the war by the Central Government. They have authorised me accordingly to invite a certain number of representative Indians to join my

1 Cmd. 6121. Statement issued by the Governor-General of India on 17th October, 1939.
2 The resolutions passed by the Working Committee of Congress (on 7 July 1940) and the Muslim League (on 16 June 1940) are at L/P&S/J/7/1815: ff 26, 27.
Executive Council. They have authorised me further to establish a War Advisory Council, which would meet at regular intervals and which would contain representatives of the Indian States and of other interests in the national life of India as a whole.

The conversations which have taken place, and the resolutions of the bodies which I have just mentioned, made it clear, however, that there is still in certain quarters doubt as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government for the constitutional future of India, and that there is doubt, too, as to whether the position of minorities, whether political or religious, is sufficiently safeguarded in relation to any future constitutional change by assurances already given. There are two main points that have emerged. On those two points His Majesty's Government now desire me to make their position clear.

The first is as to the position of minorities in relation to any future constitutional scheme. It has already been made clear that my declaration of last October does not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935, or of the policy and plans on which it is based. His Majesty's Government's concern that full weight should be given to the views of minorities in any revision has also been brought out. That remains the position of His Majesty's Government.

It goes without saying that they could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government.

The second point of general interest is the machinery for building within the British Commonwealth of Nations the new constitutional scheme when the time comes. There has been very strong insistence that the framing of that scheme should be primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves, and should originate from Indian conceptions of the social, economic and political structure of Indian life. His Majesty's Government are in sympathy with that desire and wish to see it given the fullest practical expression, subject to the due fulfilment of the obligations which Great Britain's long connection with India has imposed on her and for which His Majesty's Government cannot divest themselves of responsibility. It is clear that a moment when the Commonwealth is engaged in a struggle for existence is not one in which fundamental constitutional issues can be decisively resolved. But His Majesty's Government authorise me to declare that they will most readily assent to the setting up after the conclusion of the war with the least possible delay of a body representative of the principal elements in India's national life in order to devise the framework of the new Constitution, and they will lend every aid in their power to hasten decisions on all relevant matters to the utmost degree. Meanwhile they will welcome and promote in any way possible every sincere and practical step that may be taken

by representative Indians themselves to reach a basis of friendly agreement, first upon the form which the post-war representative body should take and the methods by which it should arrive at its conclusions, and secondly, upon the principles and outlines of the Constitution itself. They trust, however, that for the period of the war (with the Central Government reconstituted and strengthened in the manner I have described, and with the help of the War Advisory Council) all parties, communities and interests will combine and co-operate in making a notable Indian contribution to the victory of the world cause which is at stake. Moreover, they hope that in this process new bonds of union and understanding will emerge, and thus pave the way towards the attainment by India of that free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth which remains the proclaimed and accepted goal of the Imperial Crown and of the British Parliament.

3 A ‘War Advisory Council’, renamed the ‘National Defence Council’, was eventually established in 1941; see No. 5, note 11.

Appendix II
Resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay,
16 September 1940
L/P&J/7/1816: ff 353-4

The All-India Congress Committee has given its careful attention to the events that have taken place since its last meeting held in Poona on July 27, 1940, and to the resolution passed by the Working Committee at Wardha in August last.1 The Committee approves of and endorses these resolutions.

In order to end the deadlock in India and to promote the national cause, in co-operation with the British people, the Working Committee, even at the sacrifice of Mahatma Gandhi’s co-operation, made a proposal to the British Government in their Delhi resolution of July 7, 1940,2 which was subsequently approved by the A.-I.C.C. at Poona.3 This proposal was rejected by the British Government in a manner which left no doubt that they had no intention to recognize India’s independence, and would, if they could, continue to hold this country indefinitely in bondage for British exploitation. This decision of the British Government shows that they will impose their will upon India, and their recent policy has further shown that they will not even tolerate free expression of public opinion in condemnation of their associating India in the war against Germany, against the will of the vast body of the people of India, and of exploiting her national resources and man-power for this purpose.

1 L/P&J/7/1816: f 353.  2 See Appendix I, note 2.  3 L/P&J/7/1815: f 27.
The All-India Congress Committee cannot submit to a policy which is a denial of India's natural right to freedom, which suppresses the free expression of public opinion, and which would lead to the degradation of her people and their continued enslavement. By following this policy the British Government have created an intolerable situation and are imposing upon the Congress a struggle for the preservation of the honour and the elementary rights of the people.

The Congress is pledged under Gandhiji’s leadership to Non-violence for the vindication of India’s freedom. At this grave crisis in the movement for national freedom, the All-India Congress Committee therefore requests him to guide the Congress in the action that should be taken. The Delhi resolution, confirmed by the A.-I.C.C. at Poona which prevented him from so doing, no longer applies. It has lapsed.

The A.-I.C.C. sympathise with the British people as well as the peoples of all other countries involved in the war. Congressmen cannot withhold their admiration for the bravery and endurance shown by the British nation in the face of danger and peril. They can have no ill-will against them, and the spirit of Satyagraha forbids the Congress from doing anything with a view to embarrass them. But this self-imposed restraint cannot be taken to the extent of self-extinction. The Congress must insist on the fullest freedom to pursue its policy, based on Non-violence. The Congress has, however, no desire at the present moment to extend non-violent resistance, should this become necessary, beyond what is required for the preservation of the liberties of the people.

In view of certain misapprehensions that have arisen in regard to the Congress policy of Non-violence, the A.-I.C.C. desires to state this afresh, and make it clear that this policy continues, notwithstanding anything contained in previous resolutions which may have led to these misapprehensions. This Committee firmly believes in the policy and practice of Non-violence not only in the struggle for Swaraj, but also, in so far as this may be possible of application in a free India. The Committee is convinced, and recent world events have demonstrated, that complete world disarmament is necessary, and the establishment of a new and juster political and economic order, if the world is not to destroy itself and revert to barbarism. A free India will, therefore, throw all her weight in favour of world disarmament and should herself be prepared to give a lead in this to the world. Such lead will inevitably depend on external factors and internal conditions, but the State would do its utmost to give effect to this policy of disarmament. Effective disarmament, and the establishment of world peace by the ending of national wars, depend ultimately on the removal of the causes of wars and national conflicts. These causes must be rooted out by the ending of the domination of one country over another and the exploitation of one people or group by another.

To that end India will peacefully labour, and it is with this objective in view
that the people of India desire to attain the status of a free and independent nation. Such freedom will be the prelude to the close association with other countries within a comity of free nations for the peace and progress of the world.

Appendix III

Resolutions issued by the Congress Working Committee at Bardoli, 30 December 1941

L/P&J/7/1816: ff 174-5

The Political Situation

Fourteen months have elapsed since the Working Committee held their last meeting and during this period the world has fallen ever deeper into the abyss of war and rushed headlong towards self-destruction. The members of the Committee have met again on their release from prison and given earnest thought to all the national and international developments during this fateful period of human history. The burden of guiding the Congress and the nation at this critical stage when old problems assume a new significance and war approaches the frontiers of India bringing new problems in its train, is a heavy one which the Committee can only shoulder worthily with the full co-operation of the people of India. The Committee have endeavoured to keep in view the principles and objectives for which the Congress has stood during these past many years and considered them in the larger context of world conditions and world freedom. The Committee are convinced that full freedom for the people of India is essential even, and more especially, in the present state of world turmoil, not only for India's sake but for the sake of the world. The Committee also hold that real peace and freedom can only be established and endure on the basis of world co-operation between free nations.

The Committee gave full expression to their attitude towards the War in their statement issued on September 14, 1939, wherein they condemned Nazi and Fascist aggression and expressed their willingness to help the cause of freedom and democracy, provided the objectives of the war were clearly stated and acted upon, in so far as was possible, in the present. If freedom and democracy were those objectives, then they must necessarily include the ending of imperialism and the recognition of the independence of India. Subsequent pronouncements made on behalf of the British Government and their reactionary and oppressive policy made it clear that this Government was determined to

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1 This resolution was confirmed by the All-India Congress Committee at their meeting at Wardha on 16 January 1942, with the addition of the words 'from any quarter' after 'subject to aggression' in the second sentence of the penultimate paragraph.

2 L/P&J/7/1815: ff 129-30.
maintain and intensify its imperialist hold and exploitation of the Indian people. British policy was one of deliberate insult to Indian nationalism, of a perpetuation of unrestrained authoritarianism, and the encouragement of disruptive and reactionary elements. Not only has every offer made by the Congress for an honourable compromise been rejected, but public opinion voiced by organisations regarded as moderate has also been flouted.

The Congress was, therefore, compelled, in order to defend the honour and the elementary rights of the Indian people and the integrity of the nationalist movement, to request Gandhiji to guide the Congress in the action that should be taken. Mahatma Gandhi desirous of avoiding embarrassment to his opponent as far as possible, especially during the perils and dangers of war, limited the satyagraha movement which he started to selected individuals who conformed to certain tests he had laid down. That satyagraha has now proceeded for over fourteen months and about twenty-five thousand Congressmen have suffered imprisonment, while many thousands of others who offered satyagraha in the Frontier Province and elsewhere were not arrested. The Committee desire to express their respectful appreciation of Gandhiji’s leadership and of the response of the nation to it, and are of opinion that this has strengthened the people.

Throughout this period the attitude of the British Government has been hostile to Indian freedom and it has functioned in India as a completely authoritarian government, insulting the deeply cherished convictions and feelings of the people. Neither the professions of freedom and democracy, nor the perils and catastrophes that have come in the wake of war, have affected this attitude and policy, and such changes as have taken place have been for the worse.

The recent release of a number of political prisoners has no significance or importance, and the circumstances attending it, and official pronouncements made, make it clear that it is not connected with any change of policy. Large numbers of detenus, who are kept in prison under the Defence of India Act without trial, and whose only offence seems to be that they are ardent patriots impatient of foreign rule and determined to achieve the independence of the country, still remain in prison. Recent arrests of prominent persons and their treatment in prison also indicate that the old policy is being pursued as before.

While there has been no change in Britain’s policy towards India the Working Committee must nevertheless take into full consideration the new world situation that has arisen by the development of the war into a world conflict and its approach to India. The sympathies of the Congress must inevitably lie with the peoples who are the subject of aggression and who are fighting for their freedom. But only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis and be of help in the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the storm of war. The whole background in India is one of hostility and of distrust of the British
Government and not even the most far-reaching promises can alter this background, nor can a subject India offer voluntary or willing help to an arrogant imperialism which is indistinguishable from fascist authoritarianism.

The Committee is, therefore, of opinion that the resolution of the A.-I.C.C. passed in Bombay on September 16, 1940, holds today and defines Congress policy still.

MR GANDHI AND THE BOMBAY RESOLUTION

The Working Committee have received the following letter from Gandhiji and recognise the validity of the point he has raised and therefore relieve him of the responsibility laid upon him by the Bombay resolution referred to by Gandhiji. But the Committee assure him that the policy of non-violence adopted under his guidance for the attainment of Swaraj and which has proved so successful in leading to mass awakening and otherwise will be adhered to by the Congress. The Working Committee further assure him that it would like to extend its scope as far as possible even in free India. The Committee hope that Congressmen will render him full assistance in the prosecution of his mission, including the offering of civil disobedience.

BARDOLI, 30 December 1941

Dear Maulana Saheb,

In the course of discussion in the Working Committee, I discovered that I had committed a grave error in the interpretation of the Bombay resolution. I had interpreted it to mean that the Congress was to refuse participation in the present or all war on the ground principally of non-violence. I found to my astonishment that most members differed from my interpretation and held that the opposition need not be on the ground of non-violence. On re-reading the Bombay resolution I found that the differing members were right and that I had read into it a meaning which its letter could not bear. The discovery of the error makes it impossible for me to lead the Congress in the struggle for resistance to war effort on grounds in which non-violence was not indispensable. I could not, for instance, identify myself with opposition to war effort on the ground of ill-will against Great Britain. The resolution contemplated material association with Britain in the war effort as a price for guaranteed independence of India. If such was my view and I believed in the use of violence for gaining independence and yet refused participation in the effort as the price of that independence, I would consider myself guilty of unpatriotic conduct. It is my certain belief that only non-violence can save India and the world from self-extinction. Such being the case, I must continue my mission whether I am alone or assisted by an organisation or individuals. You will, therefore, please

3 Of 1939  4 Appendix II.
relieve me of the responsibility laid upon me by the Bombay resolution. I must continue civil disobedience for free speech against all war with such Congressmen and others whom I select and who believe in the non-violence I have contemplated and are willing to conform to prescribed conditions.

I will not, at this critical period, select for civil disobedience those whose services are required to steady and help the people in their respective localities.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI.

Appendix IV

Resolution passed by the Muslim League Working Committee at Nagpur,
27 December 1941

L/P&J/71816: f 176

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League have read with satisfaction the statement made by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 15th of December 1941, at Calcutta, reaffirming the policy enunciated in the declaration of the 8th of August 1940, which laid down inter alia the following principle for the future constitution of India:

"There are two main points which have emerged. On those two points His Majesty’s Government now desire me to make their position clear.

"The first is as to the position of minorities, in relation to any future constitutional scheme. It has already been made clear that my declaration of last October does not exclude the examination of any part, either of the Act of 1935, or of the policy and plan on which it is based.

"His Majesty’s Government’s concern, that full weight should be given to the views of the minorities in any revision, has also been brought out.

"That remains the position of His Majesty’s Government. It goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India, to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life.

"Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government."

His Excellency further made it clear in the declaration of the 8th of August 1940, that it was for the representatives of India themselves to reach a basis of friendly agreement, firstly on the form which the post-war representative body should take and secondly upon the principles and outlines of the constitution itself.
This policy of the British Government was re-affirmed by the Secretary of State for India in his speech during the debate in the House of Commons on the 22nd April 1941, in the following words:

“What was the essence of that statement?

“It was that the frame-work of India’s future constitution should be devised by Indians themselves and not by this House. That was a far-reaching and, indeed, revolutionary announcement, the full importance of which has not, I think, even yet been fully appreciated either in this country or in India.

“Even more important in this connection is the stipulation that the constitution itself, and also the body which is to frame it, must be the outcome of agreement between the principal elements in India’s national life. That is an essential pre-requisite to the success of the future constitution.”

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League in their meeting held on the 22nd of September 1940 expressed their satisfaction at the declaration, as the principles enunciated therein covered the consideration of the demand of the Mussalmans for the division of India, which was made long before the declaration, at Lahore on the 23rd of March 1940, and is popularly known as the Pakistan Scheme.

Since then, responsible Ministers of the Crown, Mr. Amery, the Secretary of the State for India, and Mr. Churchill, the Prime Minister, have, from time to time, amplified and confirmed the policy underlying the declaration, thereby assuring 100 million Mussalmans of India, that the British Government was fully alive to the realities of the political situation in India and realised that any decision opposed to the natural aspirations of Mussalmans as a separate entity would hasten a catastrophe and make peaceful administration impossible.

The Working Committee, however, are deeply concerned and alarmed that while the policy of the British Government still remains the same as laid down in the declaration of the 8th of August 1940, there is a growing tendency in a section of the British press and politicians, who under the stress of the war against the Axis powers and the entry of Japan in the arena, to a revision of the policy hitherto followed and to start the policy of appeasement of the Congress by making a fresh declaration, in utter disregard of the previous statements and promises to the Mussalmans of India and in ignorance of the nature and extent of the political, religious and cultural differences existing between the major communities in India, viz., Hindus and Muslims.

The Working Committee, therefore, consider it necessary to warn the British public and Government that any departure from the policy and the solemn declaration of the 8th of August 1940, and the pledges given therein
to the Mussalmans, would constitute a gross breach of faith with Muslim India, and that any revision of policy or any fresh declaration, which adversely affects the demand of Pakistan or proceeds on the basis of a Central Government with India as one single unit and Mussalmans as an All-India minority, shall be strongly resented by the Muslims who will be compelled to resist it with all the forces at their command, which would at this critical juncture, among other things, necessarily result in the serious impediment of the country's war efforts, which have so far been largely carried on with the help and support of the Mussalmans because of the policy and attitude hitherto adopted by the Muslim League in order not to embarrass or impede war efforts as far as possible.

Appendix V

Note prepared in the India Office

L/P&J/10/2: ff 154-67

MOST SECRET

RÉSUMÉ OF TELEGRAMS DEALING WITH CRIPPS MISSION

W.P. (42) 87. S/S's telegrams 3–U and 4–U of 13 February 1942. On 13th February the Prime Minister decided on a new approach to the Indian problem on the following lines. India is in grave danger, all must unite; this is no time for profound changes in the Executive Government, but representatives of communities, parties, Provinces and States should come together in a Council of Defence of about 100 from British India (elected by Provincial Lower Houses on a communal basis) plus a due number of States representatives. The Council should help the war effort in consultation with Government, should nominate a representative of India for the War Cabinet and Pacific Council and a representative or representatives for the Peace Conference, and should frame India's constitution after the war, this constitution to be accepted by the British Government. It should negotiate with the British Government regarding the fulfilment of the British Government's existing and continuing obligations.

W.P. (42) 87. Viceroy's 302–S and 5–U of 13/14 February 1942. 2. The Viceroy objected strongly. The proposal would probably be rejected by the parties. But if accepted the new Council would certainly make itself into a parallel Executive-cum-Legislature, would compete with the existing Executive (than which it would be more popular) and with the Legislature, would import the bitter communal rivalries, inseparable from constitution-making, into the conduct of the war, and might precipitate a communal reaction in the Forces themselves. It was most important that we should keep
entirely separate the conduct of the war and the consideration of a future constitution. We should also avoid the impression of panic at the Japanese approach. We need do no more at the present juncture than strengthen the Executive Council and the existing National Defence Council.

Telegram 451-S.²

3. On 25th February the Viceroy (in response to a request by the Secretary of State) sent alternative constructive suggestions. The furthest he could possibly go would be like this:

4. India is in grave danger and needs unity. Indian fighting forces have won the respect of the world, but the world is puzzled by the Indian problem. England wants Indian Freedom, but India feels frustration at not getting it. But there is a real problem, and delay is not due to British vested interests. In fact His Majesty’s Government now formally declare that they do not insist on safeguards for British interests as such in the post-war constitution. These will be dealt with by diplomatic negotiations and bilateral pacts. But His Majesty’s Government are obliged to ensure that the different races, communities and interests in India may have the prospect of survival and of religious, cultural and political development. This is no time to change the machinery of Government. Leaders must sink their differences and take their full share in the power and responsibility of Government within the framework of the present constitution, both in the Executive Council and Provincial Governments. If they do so, the Viceroy is prepared to discuss with his Council, thus expanded, the question whether the official members be retained, “and it may well be found possible to associate a non-official member much more closely with the problems of the co-ordination of defence”. The India Office will begin to fade out, relations with India becoming progressively diplomatic rather than departmental. His Majesty’s Government stand by their pledges to afford to a body representative of the Indian parties, communities and interests the fullest opportunity to devise the framework of a constitution after the war. The basis of India’s future after the war must be her complete freedom of control of her own destiny, and His Majesty’s Government will recommend to parliament any constitution framed as above.

459-S³ dated 26 February 1942.

5. In a covering telegram the Viceroy said that his proposed alternative declaration might neither win over nor split Congress, might upset Moslems and Europeans, might rattle the Services, and might be represented as “unloading ill-gotten gains in a panic”. But it was the best he could do.

¹ Nos. 111, 112, 121 and 124 were circulated to the War Cabinet under this reference, dated 18 February.
² No. 183.
³ No. 184.

6. The India Committee of the Cabinet decided, in view of the Viceroy's criticisms, to abandon the idea of setting up an advisory body which would also be the constitution-making body. They sketched another alternative Draft Declaration which, with certain amendments, was in fact eventually adopted.

7. This Draft went off on a new line. It consisted in "a clear declaration as to the future, both as regards procedure for arriving at the new constitution and as regards India's future status, coupled with an invitation to Indian leaders to come in and help now but retaining our present responsibility for India's defence" (S/S's telegram 259). The main new features were (a) right of secession from the Empire—originally in the preamble, but excised and reinserted in somewhat less explicit terms in (c) (ii); (b) the intention to set up a constitution-forming body (to be elected by Provincial Legislatures on the basis of new elections and to be joined by representatives of the States proportionate to population) immediately after the war if Indians themselves have not yet reached agreement, with a view to shaping a new Indian Union; (c) "local option" for Provinces to come in or stay out of the Union; (d) the whole field of British obligations to be settled by Treaty with the constitution-framing body.


8. The Viceroy first thought this Declaration a great improvement, but subsequently, after consulting the Commander-in-Chief and certain Governors, feared that it would be a calamity. He therefore pressed for the dropping of "local option" and consequently of the detailed specification of post-war constitutional procedure. The views of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Governor of the Punjab, which led to this attitude, were that local option would be interpreted as acceptance of Pakistan, would therefore cause a communal upset in the Punjab, and would sooner or later take the soldier's mind off fighting our enemies and start him looking over his shoulder. The Viceroy summarised as follows: "The fatal defect in the present draft is the precision given by the local option pledge to the still shadowy prospect of a decisive struggle for power after real authority departs, amongst Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs, in areas where none of them holds a commanding position and above all in the Punjab."

S/S's telegram 303 of 10 March 1942.

9. The War Cabinet, in the light of these objections and difficulties, decided not to publish their Declaration. But they were convinced that the scheme in itself was sound if it could first be explained personally to Indian leaders and
not sprung upon India suddenly. Sir Stafford Cripps was therefore, at his own suggestion, sent to India with the plan embodied in the Draft Declaration (Annexure A)\(^\text{10}\) as his general instructions.

Telegram 788-S.\(^\text{11}\) Telegram 831-S.\(^\text{12}\) Telegram 403.\(^\text{13}\)

10. He arrived on the 22nd March. On the 25th March he reported that after discussion with the Viceroy he considered it essential to publish the Draft Declaration owing to the rumours circulating about its contents. This was done on March 30th. On the night of 28th/29th March Sir S. Cripps reported that “critical issue will arise tomorrow Sunday on the question of defence responsibility. I have made it clear that under no circumstances can we give up any of the responsibility for the defence of India. A very considerable number of persons and interests have on the other hand stressed the need to raise the keenness of Indians to defend their own country”. He accordingly proposed, with the concurrence of the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, an amendment of (e) in the Declaration. This was accepted by the Prime Minister and the final text of the Draft Declaration as published is in Annexure B.\(^\text{14}\)

Telegram 845-S.\(^\text{15}\)

11. On 31st March\(^\text{16}\) Sir S. Cripps reported that the Moslem League would probably accept if Congress did, but that the amendment of (e) about defence responsibility would probably not be sufficient to meet Congress.

Telegram 844-S.\(^\text{17}\)

12. On 31st March also he reported that, in order to ensure that the Moslem majorities in Bengal and the Punjab (who, owing to the weightage given to minorities, have no clear majority in the Legislatures) could make their wishes felt if they wished to opt out of the new Union, he had proposed that if the majority in a Legislature in favour of accession were less than 60% a plebiscite of the male adult population could be demanded.

Telegram 859-S.\(^\text{18}\)

13. On 1st April he reported that the “internal situation was exceedingly bad” and “if we cannot persuade Indian leaders to come in now and help us we shall have to resort to suppression which may... get out of hand”. He accordingly asked for a free hand, subject to the agreement of the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, to try to “arrive at an adjustment” with Congress on the lines of “designating an Indian to some office connected with the Government of India’s defence responsibilities without in any way impinging upon

\(^{8}\) No. 196. \(^{5}\) No. 197. \(^{6}\) No. 209.
\(^{7}\) No. 284. \(^{8}\) Nos. 246 and 248. \(^{9}\) No. 295. \(^{10}\) See Annex to No. 265.
\(^{11}\) No. 391. \(^{12}\) No. 430. \(^{13}\) No. 431. \(^{14}\) See No. 456. \(^{15}\) No. 458.
\(^{16}\) The telegram was in fact despatched on 30 March at 11.55 pm. \(^{17}\) No. 470.
\(^{18}\) No. 484.
the functions and duties of the Commander-in-Chief either in his capacity as 
supreme commander of the armed forces in India or as Member of the Ex-
ecutive Council in charge of Defence.”

Telegram 5937. S/S’s telegram 426.
14. The Prime Minister telegraphed in the night of 1st/2nd April “I cannot 
give you authority to compromise on defence without submitting issue both 
to Cabinet and Ministers above the line”. The Cabinet on April 2nd approved 
discussions with the Congress leaders but was “disinclined to depart from the 
published text of the Declaration” and required to know any new proposals 
before being committed to them. They asked whether Sir S. Cripps was 
satisfied that, subject to adjustment of this point of difference, Congress were 
prepared to accept the whole scheme.

Telegram 875–S.
15. On the same day Sir S. Cripps telegraphed the text of a Congress Resolution 
handed to him by the Congress leaders. It had been framed before the dis-
cussions on Defence had been mooted and was temporarily suspended. It 
amounted to a considered rejection of the whole scheme.

Telegram 872–S. Telegram 6000.
16. On the same day the Viceroy telegraphed his apprehensions about the 
pressure from Congress for a concession on the Defence issue, said “I personally 
suspect that non-accession is the more serious stumbling-block and that Defence 
is chosen as having better propaganda value”, and asked that he and the 
Commander-in-Chief might be allowed to telegraph any views they might have, separately from Sir S. Cripps’ telegrams. The Prime Minister agreed.

Telegram 890–S.
17. On 4th April Sir S. Cripps reported that the critical moment had arrived. 
“The Moslem League are satisfied and prepared to accept scheme as it stands.” 
Congress was split into three factions. Apart from the Gandhi faction (against 
the scheme altogether), one faction considered the defects (Non-Accession and 
failure to provide specifically for representation of Indian States peoples other-
wise than as Rulers’ nominees) as fatal apart from the Defence question; the 
other would swallow the scheme if satisfied on Defence. There were three 
courses: (a) to stand fast, (b) to hand over the Defence Ministry to an Indian, 
subject to a convention in writing that he would not, in any matter affecting 
the prosecution of the war, act contrary to the Commander-in-Chief (under 
His Majesty’s Government), (c) to make an Indian Defence Member and hand 
over to him such functions as the Commander-in-Chief considered safe.

18. Sir S. Cripps preferred (b), “but in view of the immediate dangers and 
the Commander-in-Chief’s view of the confusion that would be caused I cannot
press it as strongly as otherwise I would.” If (b) were not approved he would advocate action under (c) to make the Commander-in-Chief “War Member” and turn the Defence Department into “War Department”, and to set up a Defence Co-ordination Department to take on the duties of the present Defence Co-ordination Section plus such functions of the present Defence Department as the Commander-in-Chief should agree to, but was not very hopeful that this would persuade Congress.

Telegram 912-S.25
19. The Viceroy on the night of 5th/6th April reported that he and the Commander-in-Chief agreed to the above proposal under (c) but could not agree to (b). He added a paragraph dealing with a phrase in Sir S. Cripps’ telegram which read “Under the new arrangement whereby the Executive Council will approximate to a Cabinet”. The Viceroy said “There can however be no question of majority decisions of Council being effective against the requirements of His Majesty’s Government, and it must be for Commander-in-Chief and Governor-General to decide whether in a particular instance the directions of His Majesty’s Government are to be enforced without further argument, or whether circumstances permit and render it desirable to discuss the matter further with His Majesty’s Government before His Majesty’s Government’s decision is enforced”. In a subsequent telegram (917-S)26 Sir S. Cripps said he agreed with this summary of the position.

S/S’s telegram 441.27
20. The War Cabinet replied on 6th April agreeing to alternative (c), detailed arrangements to be agreed with the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. As regards the constitutional position they said “The position is and must remain that the Viceroy in Council acts as a collective body responsible to the Secretary of State and subject to the Viceroy’s special powers and duties under Sections 40 and 41 of the Ninth Schedule of the Act. There should be no misunderstanding between you and Indian political leaders on this point.”

Telegram 919-S.28
21. On 6th April the Viceroy telegraphed the Commander-in-Chief’s proposals “agreed by Lord Privy Seal and myself”, for implementing (c). The Commander-in-Chief agreed to the change of title, gave a list of subjects to be handed over by the Defence Department to the new Indian Member’s department, viz., public relations, demobilisation and post-war reconstruction, petroleum control, Eastern Group Supply Council questions, amenities, canteens,
educational institutions, stationery, arrangements for foreign missions. The Department could also take over many major questions such as denial policy, evacuation, signal co-ordination, economic warfare.

Telegram 930-S.29
22. On 7th April Sir S. Cripps handed letters to Azad (Annexure C)30 and Jinnah which set out the proposals in regard to defence and included the Commander-in-Chief’s list as an appendix. They included the statement “I have also pointed out that all those main aspects of the Defence of India which at present fall under the care of other Members of the Executive Government (e.g. Civil Defence, Supply, Home Affairs, Communications, etc., etc.) will, if the scheme is accepted, be administered by representative Members in the new National Government.” These proposals were not acceptable to Congress.

Telegram 956-S.31 Telegram 957-S. Telegram 958-S.
23. At this stage Colonel Johnson, President Roosevelt’s representative, enters the picture. On the 7th April the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and Sir S. Cripps, at Colonel Johnson’s instance, agreed on a formula (Annexure D),32 amplifying (e) of the Draft Declaration, which Colonel Johnson might take to Congress as his own suggestion in the hope of persuading Nehru to accept it. This formula was in effect the proposed division of functions in paragraph 21, put slightly differently. But in the evening of the 8th the Viceroy was disturbed to find that Sir S. Cripps had devised a further formula (consisting, as the Viceroy understood, of a redraft of a counter-formula by Nehru) and had allowed Johnson to put it to Congress (who were considering it) before getting the Viceroy’s and the Commander-in-Chief’s reactions to it. This formula (the Cripps-Johnson formula) is in Annexure E.33 It reversed the previous arrangement, and provided for the new Defence Member to take over all functions not exercised by the Commander-in-Chief. A list of the functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member was attached. A new clause (d) was added providing for the decision by His Majesty’s Government as to the allocation of any new functions or of any dispute arising as to the allocation of any old functions of Defence.

24. The Viceroy reserved his position in regard to this new formula pending discussion with the Commander-in-Chief, though he saw difficulty in repudiation by His Majesty’s Government of a formula already agreed between His Majesty’s Government’s emissary and Mr. Roosevelt’s personal representative, if it were accepted by the parties.

Telegram 973-S.34
25. Sir Stafford Cripps, however, apparently did not regard the new formula
as anything alarming—indeed, he claimed that it was based on a draft formula produced by the Viceroy himself during the discussions on 7th April but discarded in favour of formula D.

Telegram 456.\textsuperscript{35}
26. The Cabinet on 9th April considered the Viceroy's telegram 956–S, and telegraphed to Sir S. Cripps their concern at his sidetracking the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. They urged a return to the Government's original plan, with such amplifications as were agreed to be put forward, asked for a clear explanation of the developments in or under (e) of the Draft Declaration which he, the Viceroy, and the Commander-in-Chief were propounding, and asked for an assurance that, if agreement on Defence arrangements were reached, the scheme in all other respects would be accepted.

Telegram 457.\textsuperscript{36}
27. They sent a following telegram with certain detailed criticisms.

Telegram 971–S.
28. Meanwhile, Sir S. Cripps (in reply to a telegram\textsuperscript{37} from the Prime Minister sent early on 9th April before the Cabinet meeting) was telegraphing (telegram actually despatched during night of 9th/10th) the text of a further formula (Annexure F)\textsuperscript{38} incidentally meeting certain of the Cabinet's detailed criticisms, which he said was the Cripps-Johnson formula incorporating alterations desired by the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. "I understand that it substantially meets their views." (This amended version still included the new clause (d) about the allocation of functions by His Majesty's Government).

Telegram 973–S.\textsuperscript{39}
29. In the early morning of 10th April Sir S. Cripps replied to the War Cabinet telegrams repeating that, as he understood it, the new formula F was agreed by the Viceroy—except that Congress had insisted on the omission of the words "until the new Constitution comes into operation" in (a). He did not understand the suggestion that he had abandoned the Government's original plan—he was only seeking to define (e) more precisely. He said that the phrase "National Government" had been suggested to him by the Viceroy and meant a Government mainly composed of representative Indians together with the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. He ended "I have throughout told you that I would not agree to anything that was not satisfactory to Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy on the Defence question, but this you seem to doubt. Unless I am trusted I cannot carry on with the task".

\textsuperscript{35} See No. 543, note 1. \textsuperscript{36} See No. 543. \textsuperscript{37} Transmitted in telegram 957–S (No. 558). \textsuperscript{38} No. 577. \textsuperscript{39} No. 557. \textsuperscript{31} No. 557. \textsuperscript{32} Transmitted in telegram 958–S (No. 559). \textsuperscript{33} No. 563. \textsuperscript{34} No. 568. \textsuperscript{35} No. 577. \textsuperscript{36} Transmitted in telegram 971–S (No. 574).
Telegram 978-S.40
30. In the afternoon of 10th April the Viceroy telegraphed that he had the previous night asked Sir S. Cripps for an assurance that the position of the Governor-General had not been compromised during his discussions with Congress. Sir S. Cripps had explained that he had told Congress that there was to be no change in the Constitution; but that "he assumed the Governor-General would proceed to meet the point by means of a convention." The Viceroy asked His Majesty's Government's instructions on this point, since "it is no use trying to shuffle round this difficulty". Either the Governor-General must continue to have the right to differ from his colleagues, or he must promise that in no circumstances will he refuse to act upon their advice.

Telegram 468.41
31. The Cabinet replied on 10th April (repeating to Sir S. Cripps) "There can be no question of any convention limiting in any way your powers under the existing constitution...If Congress Leaders have gathered the impression that such a new convention is now possible this impression should be definitely removed." They asked for the Viceroy's "clear and explicit view as to the composition of the new Executive which you are prepared to approve of". As to the Defence question, they were prepared to accept the latest formula if really accepted by the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, but only subject to the satisfactory alteration, or preferably omission, of clause (d).

Telegram 979-S.42
32. Meanwhile the Viceroy was telegraphing (on the afternoon of 10th April) his comments on Sir Stafford Cripps' 973-S (paragraphs 25 and 29 above). He argued that although he himself had in fact (as Sir S. Cripps had observed) put forward the list of War Department functions, which was annexed to the Cripps-Johnson formula E, with a former draft formula of his own, he had balanced it with a list also of the Defence Department functions. "The whole setting of the formula was clearly altered the moment the definition of the functions of the Defence Department was excluded and the power of decision on matters in dispute transferred, as in (d) of the Cripps-Johnson formula, to His Majesty’s Government."

Telegram 980-S.43
33. In a further telegram of the 10th April the Viceroy explained that he had told Sir S. Cripps that he and the Commander-in-Chief would accept the final formula F, on condition (a) that Congress would accept it, (b) that it was the price of a general settlement under which Congress would leave their other claims in abeyance for the period of the war—but that these conditions were unfulfilled. He also expressed considerable concern at the exclusion at the re-
quest of Congress of the words "until the new Constitution comes into opera-
tion". He read into this a desire by Congress to get rid of the Commander-in-
Chief's control of the army directly the war ended and exercise it themselves, as
the majority party in a National Government, during the period of constitution-
making and plebiscites.

Telegram 984–S.44
34. At this juncture arrived Sir S. Cripps' telegram announcing the rejection
of the offer as a whole by Congress.

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40 No. 578. 41 No. 581. 42 No. 584. 43 No. 585. 44 No. 588.
Glossary

AHIR Caste of graziers and cowherds, sometimes cultivators, widely distributed in northern and central India.

AHOM Branch of the Thai race settled in and giving its name to Assam.

AHRAR Lit.: free, free man. Militant pro-Congress Muslim political and religious organisation founded in 1928.

AKALI Lit.: worshipper of the eternal one. Particularly strict devotee of the Sikh faith. In modern usage, the principal Sikh political party.

AMAN SABA Peace Committee.

AMIR Lit.: commander. Prince, ruler; title of ruler of Afghanistan until 1926.

AZAD Free.

AZADI Freedom.

BAHAJUR Lit.: champion, hero. Formerly a military title following the name usually after Khan; later conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign in conjunction with DIWAN, KHAN, RAI, RAO and SARDAR.

BEGUM A feminine Muslim title, originally of princesses and noblewomen.

BRAHMAN (BRAHMIN) The highest caste of the Hindu world. Originally a priestly caste.

CIRCAR See SARKAR.

CRORE 100 LAKHS OR 10 million.

DAL Organisation, association.

DIWAN (DEWAN) Minister; in Princely States, Chief Minister; also Council of State. The titles DIWAN SAHIB and DIWAN BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign on distinguished south Indians.

DOGRA Inhabitant of the Duggar tract in the Himalayan foothills, now mostly comprised in the Jammu territory of Kashmir.

FAQIR Lit.: with the back broken. Poor, needy; thence Muslim religious mendicant.

GOONDAISM Hooliganism.

GUJAR Grazier caste of the Punjab and north-west India.

GURDWARA Sikh temple.

GURKHA Ruling race of Nepal.

GURMUKHI One of the scripts in which the Punjabi language is written: invented by Guru Nanak (for whom see SIKH) and used particularly by the Sikhs.

GURU Spiritual adviser, religious leader; for Gurus in context of Sikhism, see SIKH.

HARIJAN Lit.: the people of God. Term coined by Gandhi for untouchables. Title of Gandhi’s newspaper.

ITTIHAD I MILLAT Lit.: unity of the community. Volunteer organisation of Muslims connected with the pro-Congress Azad Muslim Conference.
IZZAT Honour, credit, reputation, character.
JAM Chief; part of the title of the ruler of Nawanagar.
JAMIAT UL-UELEMA I HIND Lit.: association of learned men of India. Pro-Congress Muslim organisation.
JAT The great agricultural caste of north-west India: found in Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, western United Provinces and Rajputana and comprising people of the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh faiths.
-JI Lit.: life, soul. As a suffix to a name denotes affectionate and deep respect.
JIRGA Council of elders.
KACHIN Group of hill tribes in Burma and on its northern border.
KAZAK Inhabitant of the area of south central Asia from the Caspian sea to Mongolia.
KHAKSAR Lit.: like the earth, humble. Volunteer organisation of Muslims.
KHALSA Lit.: pure. Applied by Sikhs to denote their community.
KHAN Lit.: ruler, sovereign. Muslim title; commonly an adjunct to Afghan or Pathan names. The titles KHAN SAHIB and KHAN BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
LAKH (LAC) 100,000.
MAHAJAN Merchant, dealer, banker, money-changer, creditor.
MAHAR Depressed caste of the Deccan, employed as scavengers, village watchmen, messengers or weavers.
MAHARAJA Lit.: Great King. Prince; a Hindu title.
MAHASABHA Lit.: Great Assembly. Political party based on militant Hinduism.
MAHATMA Great Soul.
MAULANA Lit.: our Master. Title of respect accorded to Muslim judges, heads of religious orders, and persons of great learning.
MIR (MEER) Abbreviation of AMIR; title of descendants of the Prophet.
MOMIN Muslim weaver.
MOPLAH Member of the fanatical Muslim sect found in Malabar, believed to be descended from Arab immigrants who settled on the west coast of India and married local women in the ninth century A.D.
MULLAH In Muslim countries, a learned man, teacher, doctor of the law; in India, the term is applied to the man who reads the Koran and also to a Muslim schoolteacher.
NARENDRA MANDAL Chamber of Princes.
NAWAB Originally a Governor under the Moghul Empire; thence a title of rank conferred on Muslim nobles.
PANCHAYAT Court of arbitration (properly of five persons) for determination of petty disputes.
PANDIT A Hindu title. In its strict sense applied to those versed in the Scriptures, but used commonly to denote a member of the Brahman community.
PARSEE  Zoroastrian refugees who fled from Persia on its conquest by Muslims in the eighth century A.D.; chiefly settled in western India and distinguished as merchants, shipbuilders and traders.

QUA’ID I A‘ZAM  The Supreme Leader.

RAJ  Kingdom, rule, sovereignty.

RAJA  Lit.: King, Prince; a Hindu title.

SAHIB (SAHEB)  Lit.: master. Respectful form of address.

SAIYID (SAYYID, SYED)  Lit.: lord, chief, master. Title of descendants of the Prophet.

SANAD  Grant, charter.

SARDAR (SIRDAR)  Lit.: chief, leader. Title borne by Sikhs, sometimes also by Hindus and Muslims; the titles SARDAR SAHIB and SARDAR BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.

SARKAR  State, Government. Originally a treasury, revenue district or territorial division; in the latter sense often spelt CIRCAR.

SATYAGRAHA  Lit.: holding on to truth. Total self-giving; integral to Mahatma Gandhi’s whole concept of victory achieved through non-violent resistance.

SATYAGRAHI  Participant in SATYAGRAHA.

SHI‘AH (SHIA)  Lit.: party, sect. The name given by other Muslims to those who believe that Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, was his rightful successor.

SIKH  Lit.: disciple. Follower of Guru Nanak (1469–1538), the first of the line of ten Gurus who formulated the Sikh faith and welded the Sikhs into an independent community. In the face of religious persecution, the Sikhs under the last of the Gurus, Gobind Singh (1666–1708), acquired a formidable military reputation.

SUNNI  From sunnah: ‘way’, ‘practice’. One who follows the practice of the Prophet; the term generally applied to Muslims who acknowledge the first four Caliphs equally as his rightful successors.

SWARAJ  Self-rule, independence.

ZEMINDAR (ZAMINDAR)  One holding land as an actual proprietor but paying a fixed annual sum to the Government.
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INDIA 1942

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British India

Indian States and Territories

Scale

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